

HAITIAN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

**Transforming Crisis-Driven
Mobility into Development
Potential**

2026



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Acronyms

ACNUR	<i>Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados</i> (Spanish acronym for United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR])	EFA	Education for All
ACS	American Community Survey	ENI	National Immigrant Survey, Chile (<i>Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes</i>)
AIC	American Immigration Council	EU	European Union
ASFC	Lawyers without Borders, Canada (<i>Avocats sans frontières Canada</i>)	GARR	Support Group for the Repatriated and Refugees (<i>Groupe d'Appui aux Repatriés et Réfugiés</i>)
BINUH	<i>Bureau intégré des Nations Unies en Haïti</i> (United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti)	GCM	Global Compact for Migration
BRH	Bank of the Republic of Haiti (<i>Banque de la République d'Haïti</i>)	GDP	Gross Domestic Product
CBP	Customs and Border Patrol	GNI	Gross National Income
CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management	GoH	Government of Haiti
CELADE	Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (<i>Centro Latinoamericano de Demografía</i>)	HFRP	Haitian Family Reunification Parole
CGD	Center for Global Development	HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Country
CGRS	Center for Gender and Refugee Studies	IBGE	Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (<i>Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística</i>)
COMAR	Mexican Commission for Refugee Assistance (<i>Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados</i>)	IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
CHNV	Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans	IDP	Internally Displaced Person
CMS	Center for Migration Studies	IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
CPS	Current Population Survey	IHD	Integral Human Development
DEM	Department of Foreigners and Migration (<i>Departamento de Extranjería y Migraciones</i>)	IHSI	Haitian Institute of Statistics and Informatics (<i>Institut Haïtien de Statistiques et d'Informatique</i>)
DHS	Department of Homeland Security	ILO	International Labour Organization
DIOC	Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries	IMF	International Monetary Fund
DOJ	Department of Justice	IMILA	International Migration Research in Latin America (<i>Investigación de la Migración Internacional en Latinoamérica</i>)
DPC	Directorate of Civil Protection (<i>Direction de Protection civile</i>)	INEGI	National Institute of Statistics and Geography, Mexico (<i>Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Geografía</i>)
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix	INSEE	National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (<i>Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques</i>)

INURED	Interuniversity Institute for Research and Development (<i>Institut Interuniversitaire de Recherche et de Développement</i>)	PAHO	Pan American Health Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration (<i>Organisation Internationales Pour Les Migrations</i>)	PNRE	National Platform for the Regularization of Foreigners, Dominican Republic (<i>Plan Nacional de Regularización de Extranjeros</i>)
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification	POHDH	<i>Plateforme des Organisations Haïtiennes des Droits Humains</i> (Platform for Haitian Human Rights Organizations)
IPUMS	Integrated Public Use Microdata Series	RNDDH	Human Rights Defense Network (<i>Réseau de Défense National des Droits Humains</i>)
IRCC	Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada	SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
ISCED	International Standard Classification of Education	SEDLAC	Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean
ISCO	International Standard Classification of Occupations	SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
LAC	Latin American and the Caribbean	TPS	Temporary Protected Status
MHAVE	Ministry of Haitians Living Abroad (<i>Ministère des Haïtiens Vivant à l'Étranger</i>)	TSR	Temporary Suspension of Removals
MAST	Ministry of Labor and Employment (<i>Ministère des Affaires Sociales et du Travail</i>)	UN	United Nations
NFAP	National Foundation for American Policy	UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
OAS	Organization of American States	UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
OBMICA	<i>Observatorio Migrantes del Caribe</i> (Observatory of Caribbean Migrants)	UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
OCHA	U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
OFPRA	<i>Office Français De Protection Des Réfugiés Et Apatrides</i> (French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons)	USAID	United States Agency for International Development
ONE	National Statistics Office (<i>Oficina Nacional de Estadística</i>)	USCIS	United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
ONM	Office of National Migration (<i>Office Nationale de la Migration</i>)	USCRI	United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants
		WBGBMM	World Bank Group Business Management Model
		WFP	World Food Programme
		WHO	World Health Organization

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
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Haiti's Mobility Crisis, Brain Drain, and Diaspora Potential

Over the past decade, Haiti's international migration landscape has grown in scale, diversified in terms of geographic destinations, and increased in complexity. Successive and overlapping crises, including political instability, economic decline, recurrent natural disasters, and escalating insecurity have driven one of the most rapid and sustained increases in emigration recorded in the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region. The scale and diversity of these movements have outpaced the institutional frameworks designed to monitor and govern them, creating significant gaps and limiting the country's capacity to harness migration as a resource for development.

This report offers a comprehensive diagnostic of Haitian international migration examining current trends in emigration flows and their human capital consequences, the drivers and modalities of migration across key destination countries, the structural role of remittances in the Haitian economy, and the dynamics of return migration and internal displacement. It gives particular attention to the development consequences of large scale skilled emigration, the largely unrealized potential of a growing and professionally diverse diaspora, and the humanitarian implications of forced returns and insecurity driven displacement. Drawing on these findings the report proposes a sequenced, evidence grounded policy reform agenda oriented toward reducing vulnerabilities, strengthening migration governance, and progressively transforming Haiti's mobility crisis into a driver of sustainable development.

Key Findings



1. Diversification of Migration Patterns

- Haitian migration is not a new phenomenon, but the last 15 years (2010–2025) have seen significant changes in volume, demographic composition, routes, and destinations. The Haitian diaspora has grown from approximately 1.15 million people in 2010 to more than 2 million people in 2024, a 74 percent increase that reflects the acceleration of outflows in response to compounding shocks. Haitians living abroad now represent approximately 16 percent of the national population, one of the highest emigration rates relative to population size in the LAC region.
- Historically concentrated in the United States, Canada, France, and the Dominican Republic, Haitian migration has diversified significantly in both geography and modality. Haitians now migrate via irregular land routes across Latin America; participate in temporary labor programs in North America; and settle in diverse destinations such as Brazil, Canada, Chile, the Dominican Republic, France, Mexico, and the United States. While migration provides opportunities for survival and upward mobility, many of these new migration corridors have developed faster than the bilateral legal and institutional frameworks needed to monitor and govern them, leaving many migrants in irregular status and exposed to xenophobia, human rights and labor abuses, legal uncertainties, and deportations.



2. Escalating Brain Drain

- One of the most pressing challenges posed by Haitian emigration is escalating brain drain. An estimated 80 to 84 percent of tertiary-educated Haitians now reside abroad, one of the highest skilled emigration rates recorded globally. Haiti is losing skilled professionals in key sectors, including health, education, engineering, and public administration. With only 6.38 health professionals per 10,000 inhabitants, the impact on national development is profound. The emigration of talent undermines the government's ability to provide essential services and manage crises, weakens public administration, and increases reliance on foreign aid and technical assistance.

- These losses of resources are compounded by underemployment and occupational segregation in destination countries ('brain waste'). Educational and labor profile data indicate pronounced skills underutilization among Haitian migrants. Even among tertiary-educated Haitians, a large share is employed in low skill and low wage sectors such as construction, transportation, agriculture, and domestic services, particularly in Latin America. This systematic mismatch between qualifications and employment opportunities exacerbates Haiti's development losses, as the country exports substantial human capital without fully realizing its potential returns in the form of higher skilled employment, enhanced remittance capacity, professional knowledge transfer, or sustained engagement with institutions in Haiti.



3. Remittances: scale, stability and structural limitations

- Remittances constitute Haiti's single largest source of external finance, growing from under one billion US dollars in the early 2000s to nearly four billion US dollars in 2021, and representing approximately 18.9 percent of gross domestic product in 2023, a share that exceeds official development assistance, export revenues, and foreign direct investment combined. Between 35 and 45 percent of Haitian households have at least one member abroad, and roughly one third receive remittance income, underscoring the centrality of these flows to household welfare and basic consumption.
- Despite this scale, the productive impact of remittances remains limited. The vast majority of flows are directed toward consumption rather than investment or capital formation. Transaction costs remain high at between 5 and 11 percent depending on the migration corridor, and between 70 and 84 percent of inflows originate from the United States, creating a structural dependency that poses macroeconomic risks, including from recent proposals to tax outbound remittances. Realizing the broader development potential of these flows will require lower transaction costs, improved financial inclusion, and enabling frameworks for productive investment, carefully sequenced with macroeconomic stabilization efforts.




4. Humanitarian and Institutional Implications of Mass Repatriations and Internal Displacement

- Mass repatriations from countries such as the United States and the Dominican Republic have intensified, posing humanitarian and


institutional challenges. The Dominican Republic, which hosts the second largest Haitian diaspora globally, recorded more than 216,000 deportations in 2023 and approximately 119,000 further repatriations between January and April 2025. These returns often occur with little regard for due process, resulting in the forced removal of individuals, some of whom have spent years abroad. Lacking documentation, housing, and job prospects, returnees face stigmatization and often reenter dangerous migration cycles. Haiti's capacity to respond remains weak, necessitating contingency planning, reintegration centers, and stronger bilateral protection systems.

- Internal displacement adds a further layer of complexity. By mid-2025, more than 1.3 million Haitians had been displaced by gang violence, a 24 percent increase in the first six months of 2025 alone. Children account for more than half of the internally displaced population, and 1 in every 8 Haitian children has been uprooted by violence. Natural disasters continue to generate additional displacement, with the 2021 earthquake and 2023 floods displacing tens of thousands more. The convergence of internal displacement and international migration creates overlapping vulnerability profiles that require integrated policy responses across humanitarian, development, and migration governance frameworks.



5. The Diaspora as a Strategic Development Asset

- Against this backdrop of deep-rooted impediments, loss of human capital to migration (brain drain), and acute vulnerabilities, the report urges policy makers to view the skilled diaspora as a latent strategic asset of significant and largely unrealized potential. The Haitian diaspora, though geographically dispersed, remains culturally and emotionally connected to its homeland, and in many cases actively seeking meaningful channels to contribute to national recovery and long-term development. Beyond remittances, the diaspora represents a reservoir of skills, networks, investment capacity, and institutional knowledge that, under enabling conditions, could contribute substantially to Haiti's reconstruction, service delivery, and economic transformation. Through policy instruments such as diaspora skill mapping, professional exchanges, remote training platforms, and investment incentives, these professionals can contribute to rebuilding local institutions, stimulating private sector development, mentoring youth, and modernizing service delivery.



6. Institutional and Governance Constraints

- Haiti's capacity to govern migration, protect migrants, and harness diaspora resources is constrained by institutional factors that predate the current crisis but have been worsened by it. The 2015 to 2030 National Migration Policy has never been formally evaluated. The Office of National Migration (Office Nationale de la Migration, ONM) and the Ministry for Haitians Living Abroad (Ministère des Haïtiens Vivant à l'Étranger, MHAVE) remain chronically under resourced relative to the scale of the challenges they face. Consular services are stretched and unevenly distributed across the diaspora's geographic spread. Reliable, disaggregated migration data is lacking for many destination countries, limiting the evidence base for both policy and advocacy.

The analysis presented in this report points to the need for a policy agenda that is both ambitious in its vision and grounded in institutional realism. While the structural challenges facing Haiti's migration governance are substantial, the evidence also points to concrete and actionable opportunities, particularly in the areas of institutional capacity building, diaspora engagement, labor migration regulation, and migrant rights protection, that can be progressively unlocked through coordinated, nationally owned, and sequenced policy action.

The report's main recommendations are organized around time horizons and thematic priorities spanning migration governance, data and evidence systems, labor migration, protection of migrants' rights, reintegration, and diaspora engagement. Grounded in the empirical findings of this report, they are presented as phased, technically feasible entry points rather than a comprehensive reform agenda, in recognition that sustained progress will require continued institutional strengthening, genuine national ownership, coordinated engagement of international partners, and, for the more ambitious measures, improved macroeconomic and security conditions as enabling prerequisites.

Recommendations

Short-Term Interventions (0-2 years)

Strengthen the National Migration Policy Framework

- **Actions.** Conduct a process review of the 2015–2030 policy, update it to address new migration patterns, realities, and align with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Global Compact for Migration (GCM).
- **International partners.** Provide technical expertise and funding for policy evaluation, facilitate policy dialogue, and support alignment with international standards.
- **Impact.** A well-designed review will (i) update the policy's evidence base highlighting implementation gaps and emergent challenges, including destination diversification and the escalation of internal displacement, (ii) allow to re-engage diaspora and civil society stakeholders through a government-owned process, and (iii) provide a legitimate framework to support migration governance reforms and institutional capacity building. Strengthened migration governance will ensure safe, orderly migration and reinforce effective institutions, contributing to SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities) and SDG 16 (Peace, Justice, Strong Institutions) and to alignment with the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.

Build Institutional Capacity for Migration Governance

- **Actions.** Expand funding and training for the ONM and MHAVE; establish a National Migration Platform that facilitates exchanges and coordination between government, research, community-based, and civil institutions; and professionalize adapted consular services for migrating Haitians.
- **International partners.** Provide technical training, equipment, and financial resources to Haitian institutions and facilitate South-South and triangular cooperation.

- **Impact.** Stronger institutions will better track migration flows, coordinate return and reintegration responses, monitor policy implementation and ensure accountability advancing SDG 16 and SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals). They will also be better equipped to protect Haitians on the move abroad and engage diaspora communities across destination countries in a structured and sustained manner moving beyond a consultative approach to partnerships that can support development interventions.

Protect the Rights of Haitians Abroad

- **Actions.** Establish data collection mechanisms to monitor and document protection failures experienced by Haitian migrants abroad, including through diaspora networks and returnee surveys. Strengthen diplomatic engagement, ratify migrant worker conventions, and expand mobile consular services.
- **International partners.** Advocate for Haitian migrant rights in bilateral and regional forums, provide legal aid support, and strengthen consular protection programs.
- **Impact.** Data monitoring systems, increased diplomatic engagement on protection standards and expanded consular capacity will enhance the ability of relevant actors to respond to protection failures. Protecting migrant's rights reduces their vulnerabilities and promotes inclusion, aligning with SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities) and GCM Objective 15 (provide access to basic services); SDGs 10.2 (empower social and political inclusion) and 16.3 (rule of law).

Develop Programs that Support Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Foster Long-Term Resilience and Self-Sufficiency

- **Actions.** Launch cash transfer programs, vocational training and small-business grants targeting IDPs and host communities; support local agricultural cooperatives and micro-enterprises to rebuild local economies; ensure displaced children's access to schooling through mobile classrooms, school-fee subsidies, and psychosocial support; rehabilitate or build water, sanitation,

and energy infrastructure in displacement-affected areas; and promote conflict-resolution initiatives in areas of tension between IDPs and host populations.

- **International partners.** Develop an integrated approach with community-based organizations and local authorities to address IDPs' challenges.
- **Impact.** In the short-term targeted interventions will increase household incomes, restore livelihoods, and access to education and training opportunities and support social and economic reintegration. In the medium term these interventions will strengthen community resilience, reduce dependency on humanitarian aid, and enhance social cohesion between displaced and host populations, ultimately reducing the economic pressures that drive irregular emigration.

Medium-Term Interventions (2-5 years)

Expand Reliable Data and Research Systems

- **Actions.** Establish and financially support a Migration Research Consortium that can help create and maintain interoperable databases and conduct regular migration surveys as well as generate actionable policy briefs at national and local levels. Such a consortium could comprise the following institutions: ONM, International Organization for Migration (IOM), Haitian Institute of Statistics and Informatics (*Institut Haïtien de Statistiques et d'Informatique*, IHSI), Interuniversity Institute for Research and Development (*Institut Interuniversitaire de Recherche et de Développement*, INURED), and the State University of Haiti (*Université d'Etat d'Haïti*, UEH).
- **International partners.** Fund data systems, provide access to global migration datasets, and strengthen Haiti's participation in international scientific networks.
- **Impact.** Evidence-based migration management will improve governance and policy coherence, supporting SDG 17.18 (develop data for sustainable development) and GCM Objective 1 (collect and utilize accurate data).

Regulate and Protect Labor Migration

- **Actions.** Negotiate bilateral labor agreements, explore Global Skill Partnerships options, and regulate recruitment agencies. Promote recognition and certification of Haitian qualifications abroad.
- **International partners.** Assist Haiti in negotiating agreements, ensure ethical recruitment standards, and co-finance migrant orientation programs.
- **Impact.** Functional credential recognition frameworks will support migrants in accessing skill-commensurate occupations, improving their welfare and productive inclusion. Higher incomes will translate into larger and more stable remittances, greater savings available for investment, and an enhanced ability to contribute to Haiti's development whether through remote professional services or eventual return. Ethical and safe labor migration will reduce exploitation and strengthen income security, contributing to SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth) and SDG 10.7 (Facilitate Orderly, Safe, and Responsible Migration through Well-Managed Policies).

Develop Comprehensive Reintegration Programs

- **Actions.** Establish reintegration centers, provide vocational training, and embed reintegration into local development plans prioritizing high-return communities and border zones where returnee populations are most concentrated.
- **International partners.** Fund reintegration centers, provide technical support for training programs, and co-develop community-based initiatives.
- **Impact.** Reintegration measures and programs will reduce re-migration pressures, foster livelihoods, and strengthen social cohesion, contributing to SDG 1 (No Poverty), SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth), and SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities).

Longer-Term Interventions (5 years and over)

Harness the Diaspora for Development Beyond Remittances

- **Actions.** Launch diaspora skills mapping and establish a Diaspora Advisory Council to formalize diaspora engagement in national development and policy dialogue. Create mentorship platforms to facilitate knowledge transfer between diaspora professionals and local institutions. Once macroeconomic conditions and institutional prerequisites are in place, explore and pilot diaspora investment opportunities and instruments, subject to feasibility assessments and appropriate design safeguards.
- **International partners.** Facilitate diaspora investment instruments, reduce remittance transfer costs, and support knowledge-transfer platforms.
- **Impact.** Sustained and structured diaspora engagement carries concrete economic and development relevance. Under improved macroeconomic and governance conditions, it will promote brain circulation, enhance education and innovation and stimulate investment, strengthening both the volume and productive quality of their contributions to the country's development. These efforts advance SDG 4 (Quality Education), 4.3 (equal access to tertiary education), SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure), 9.5 (enhance research and innovation), and SDGs 17.3 (mobilize financial resources).

Conclusion: Transforming Crisis-Driven Mobility into Development Potential

Migration has become a structural feature of Haiti's development landscape, and it will remain so for the foreseeable future. The central policy question is no longer whether Haitians will continue to migrate, but whether the governance frameworks, bilateral partnerships, and institutional capacities exist to ensure that mobility translates into protection, opportunity, and development rather than deepening vulnerability and human capital loss. The evidence presented in this report suggests that this outcome is achievable, but it will require a deliberate shift from reactive crisis management toward a coherent, rights-based, and development-oriented migration strategy that places the protection of migrants, the creation of decent employment opportunities, and the structured engagement of the diaspora at its core.

Realizing this potential will depend on sustained institutional investment, coordinated international support, and genuine national ownership of the reform agenda. The phased and sequenced approach proposed in this report, anchored by technically feasible near term entry points including labor migration regulation, credential recognition, and reintegration programming that directly supports returnee employment and local job creation, is designed to build progressively toward more ambitious structural reforms, reflects the operational realities of Haiti's current context while remaining oriented toward transformative longer term outcomes. With the right policy choices and the political commitment to implement them, Haiti is positioned to begin converting a development challenge into a driver of resilience, inclusion, and national renewal.

Introduction and Theoretical-Methodological Framework

Haitian international migration represents a multidimensional and historically entrenched phenomenon that has reshaped both the nation state and the diasporic landscapes of the Americas, Africa, Europe, and beyond. Haiti is among the most emigration-dependent countries in the western hemisphere, with nearly one in five Haitians now living abroad. This study explores the complex trajectories, evolving patterns, and structural implications of skilled (and unskilled) Haitian emigration, with particular focus on the period following the 2010 earthquake, a critical juncture that accelerated both the scale and scope of Haitian migration.

The context for this study is defined by a convergence of crises: recurrent natural disasters, political upheaval, chronic poverty, and escalating insecurity. These conditions have produced an ongoing cycle of internal displacement and transnational mobility. In recent years, intensifying gang violence, state collapse, and economic stagnation have further exacerbated the drivers of migration. Simultaneously, Haitians on the move have faced shifting immigration regimes, increasingly restrictive border controls, and discrimination in many host countries. It is in part due to these formidable obstacles that Haitian migration has diversified geographically, moving beyond traditional destinations such as the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Canada to include Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and other countries in the Global South.

Aims of this Study

This report provides a comprehensive diagnostic of Haitian international migration, with the following specific aims:

- Document the demographic, gender, and educational composition of emigrating Haitians across primary and emerging destination countries.
- Evaluate the national and international policy frameworks governing Haitian migration, including visa regimes, return and reintegration programs, and diaspora engagement.
- Identify critical challenges, such as deskilling and occupational downgrading of Haitians living abroad.
- Map the Haitian diaspora in main destination countries using available census and household survey data.
- Assess the remittance landscape and its socioeconomic impacts on Haitian households and national development.
- Analyze internal displacement trends within Haiti and their socioeconomic implications, particularly concerning economic downturns and political instability.
- Offer evidence-based policy recommendations.

Overall Theoretical Framework

The study adopts an interdisciplinary migration systems approach, informed by political economy, climate and human-driven environmental processes, transnationalism, and mobility justice frameworks (Anderson et al. 2024; Anderson et al. 2021; Richmond 2000; Tagliacozzo et al. 2023; Voulvoulis et al. 2022). This approach moves beyond the analysis of migration as a discrete phenomenon, by looking at the mutual influences, feedback mechanisms, and transboundary effects between the migration system and other environmental and societal processes (Anderson et al. 2021; Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002). At the core of this approach is the premise that the historical experience of Haitian society, within uneven operating regional and global forces, has carried with it unsettled social and political issues that underlie Haiti's fragility through the present day (INURED 2020; INURED 2024; Marcelin 2011). It examines how macro-level structures (for example, state and societal fragility, environmental shocks, sociopolitical and structural oppressions) interact with micro-level aspirations, familial networks, cultural disenchantments, and institutional barriers to shape patterns of movement and set conditions (or not) for return, whether voluntary or forced. The report suggests that Haitian migration should be considered in the context of the country's structural, sociopolitical, and environmental challenges, as well as international factors such as border control policies, the integration of Haitian labor in foreign economies, and foreign involvement in Haiti's political landscape. This broad perspective highlights the need to examine both internal issues and external influences to understand Haitian migration comprehensively (INURED 2024). The report includes specific examples to demonstrate how these domestic conditions and international dynamics interact to shape migration patterns and outcomes.

Methodology

In this study, INURED employs a mixed-methods research design that integrates quantitative data analysis, qualitative case studies, comparative policy analysis, and document-based reviews of gray and peer-reviewed literature. The methodology is structured to ensure historical depth, regional specificity, and analytical rigor, while acknowledging the substantial limitations posed by disparate and fragmented data systems as well as the inaccessibility or absence of official data systems.

Quantitative Data Collection

Quantitative data were compiled from international databases maintained by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), the World Bank, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC), and national statistics institutes (for example, the US Census Bureau, Statistics Canada, National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies [*Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques*, INSEE France], and the Haitian Institute of Statistics and Informatics [*Haiti's Institut Haïtien de Statistiques et d'Informatique*, IHSI]). The following data sources were also consulted and integrated: the World Bank's Microdata Library, the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC) dataset of harmonized household and labor force survey microdata, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) International and IPUMS Current Population Survey (CPS), and Eurostat. In addition, data sources from various INURED studies were also consulted. A list of datasets consulted is provided in Appendix 1.

These sources were used to assess migration¹ stock and flow estimates, identify key destinations (for general and skilled Haitian migration), and characterize education attainment and sectoral labor participation.

¹ In this study, 'migrant' or 'immigrant' is used as a noun to describe the condition of a person who migrates, in alignment with core literature and policy frameworks on migration. However, due to the current political discourse and the potential for the term 'migrant' to dehumanize and distance individuals, INURED avoids referring to people or specific nationalities as 'migrants' or 'immigrants' whenever possible. For example, the study describes the conditions of 'migrating Haitians', 'Haitians on the move', or 'Haitians who migrate' instead of 'Haitian migrants' or 'Haitian immigrants.'

Scoping Review and Qualitative Analysis

Scoping Review

To complement quantitative gaps, the study draws extensively on qualitative material, including the following:

- Ethnographic and case studies, including doctoral dissertations on migrating Haitians' experiences across countries.
- Policy reports, evaluations, and program reviews produced by governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and multilateral institutions (for example, IOM, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and Pan American Health Organization [PAHO]).
- Media reporting and investigative journalism, particularly in contexts where official data are lacking on issues such as the deaths of migrating individuals in transit or conditions in detention facilities.

Content analysis was used to identify recurring policy narratives, institutional practices, and outcomes for migrating people. Case studies from the United States, Dominican Republic, Chile, Brazil, and Panama provide in-depth comparative insights into migration pathways, emerging migratory routes, integration challenges, labor market incorporation, and return migration, whether voluntary or forced.

Comparative Policy Mapping

The study includes an inventory of key visa, residency, and humanitarian programs benefiting Haitians between 2010 and 2025:

- General and targeted immigration programs (for example, temporary protected status [TPS], parole, and family reunification)

- Regularization efforts (for example, Brazil's humanitarian visa scheme, Chile's 2018 immigration decree)

Policies and programs were analyzed for the following:

- Outcomes and policy reversals (for example, the US H-2B visa eligibility termination for Haitians in 2018)

A comparative matrix was developed (see Appendix II) to trace cross-national similarities and differences in the treatment of migrating people, their labor rights, and access to services.

Limitations

This diagnostic report is constrained by several significant limitations:

- **Lack of reliable data on 'occupational downgrading'.** Despite strong anecdotal and qualitative evidence that migrating Haitians—especially those with tertiary degrees—are frequently underemployed or deskilled abroad, few datasets capture these employment outcomes systematically.
- **Incomplete or outdated migration and remittance figures.** Data from Haiti's institutions are often out of sync with host country statistics or are aggregated at national rather than bilateral levels.
- **Scarcity of return migration metrics.** Voluntary and forced return migration remains under-documented, particularly concerning the reintegration outcomes of deportees and failed asylum seekers.
- **Political sensitivity and underreporting.** Populations of people on the move living irregularly or under humanitarian parole often go uncounted or are excluded from formal datasets, skewing the representativeness of available statistics and likely underestimating the true prevalence of those migration flows.

Despite these limitations, triangulation across diverse sources and regions helps mitigate data gaps and builds a composite picture of Haitian migration since 2010. This report does not claim definitive quantification in every domain but strives to provide a rigorous and policy-relevant synthesis that reflects both macro-level trends and experiences of people who migrate.






PART I

Haitian Migration: An Overview

International Emigration: Flows and Characteristics



Haitian emigration has shaped the country's recent history, largely due to political repression, economic hardship, and disasters. Early migration focused on rural-to-urban shifts and labor recruitment abroad. Three main waves followed: elites fleeing the Duvalier regime (1960s–70s), the poor escaping in the 1980s, and continued departures in the 1990s–2000s, amid socio-political instability. The 2010 earthquake accelerated skilled emigration, raising the diaspora to over 2 million by 2024 and causing notable brain drain, especially in health and education.

Key Findings

The diaspora grew from 1.15 million in 2010 to over 2 million in 2024–2025, making up about 16 percent of Haiti's population, fueled by disaster, insecurity, and new migration routes.

- Men account for 54–55 percent of emigrants, often migrating for work. Women more often migrate later for family reunification.
- Over 80 percent of college-educated Haitians live abroad, causing severe shortages in health, education, engineering, and public administration.

Emigration Impacts

- **Health:** Loss of physicians, nurses, and other health workers.
- **Education:** Fewer teachers and faculty.
- **Technical fields:** Slowed infrastructure and technological progress.
- **Private sector and banking:** Loss of entrepreneurs and service professionals.
- **Public administration:** Weakened governance.
- **Migration policy has shifted** since 1990, focusing on legal migration, diaspora engagement, and protection. Implementation remains weak.
- **Diaspora inclusion remains problematic**, despite efforts to increase engagement through dual citizenship, voting rights, and MHAVE. Initiatives such as Diaspora Day and institutional reforms have strengthened their role.
- **Remittances** make up 20–25 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and support development, though operational challenges persist.
- **Ongoing issues** include ineffectual bureaucracy, unreliable and absence of data, and sociopolitical instability, all hindering effective policy and sustainable development.

Haitian Migration Dynamics: Historical Patterns and Contemporary Transformations

Haitian migratory movements have long been shaped by intersecting forces of economic hardship, political repression, and environmental vulnerability (Dorvillier 2024). Large-scale emigration began in the early 20th century, as internal migration directed rural populations toward Port-au-Prince and regional urban centers, while the demand for labor on sugarcane plantations resulted in external flows to nearby countries such as Cuba and the Dominican Republic, as early as 1913 (Audebert 2011; Casey 2012; Martinez 1999).

Historically, Haitian migration has been oriented toward the Global North, particularly the United States, Canada, and France (Audebert 2017; OECD and INURED 2017). This pattern has roots in the Haitian Revolution (1791–1804), during which period, plantation owners fled to France or its territories, including Martinique, Guadeloupe, Quebec (Canada), and the Louisiana Territory. Between 1791 and 1804, a smaller yet significant number of Haitians migrated to the United States (César 2007; Stepick 1998) creating its first refugee crisis when over 25,000 arrived on its shores (Foreman 2016). The US occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934 deepened bilateral ties and set the stage for future migratory flows. However, during the François Duvalier regime (1957–1971), the emigration of Haiti’s elite intensified significantly. Duvalier’s authoritarian rule, marked by political violence and repression of educated dissenters, spurred the flight of professionals, intellectuals, and middle-class families. An estimated 50,000 Haitians emigrated to northeastern United States and approximately 3,600 to Quebec during this period (Audebert 2011; IOM 2015).

Between the 1960s and 1970s, Haiti became a crucial source of skilled French-speaking professionals for newly independent African nations. Haitian doctors, teachers, and administrators filled essential roles in countries such as the Congo (then Zaire), Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, and Benin (Anglade 1982; Jackson 2014; Laguerre 1984; Pépin 2021). In the Congo alone, Haitians became the second-largest foreign contingent working under the UN and UNESCO, significantly contributing to early state-building efforts in education

and health (Robertshaw 2024). This South-South migration facilitated a powerful transfer of knowledge, but simultaneously depleted Haiti's own institutional capacity.

Meanwhile, North America became a key destination for Haiti's educated exiles. In the United States, the so-called 'Boeing people'—middle- and upper-class Haitians who fled Duvalier by air—established themselves as professionals in cities such as New York and Miami (Laguerre 1984, 2006; Stepick 1998). In Quebec, Haitians were welcomed just as the province underwent its Quiet Revolution and urgently needed French-speaking educators. Haitian teachers and academics became instrumental in Quebec's educational expansion, contributing significantly to its public school and university systems (Anglade 1982; Jadotte 1977). A more politically active segment of Haitian intellectuals found refuge in Mexico and parts of Latin America, where leftist exiles engaged with local universities and political movements (Casimir 2020).

This wave of elite migration coincided with changes in US immigration law. The 1965 Hart-Celler Immigration Act, which ended racially biased quotas in favor of a skills-based system, facilitated the entry of Haitian professionals such as physicians, engineers, cabinetmakers, and seamstresses (Fouron 2020). The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 introduced certain legal and social protections for Blacks in the United States (Laguerre 1999; Wah 2013). These legal reforms made the United States an increasingly attractive destination for Haitians.

By the 1970s, emigration patterns expanded to include working-class and poor Haitians from urban and rural areas. These segments of the Haitian population sought to escape worsening poverty, urban overcrowding, and political repression under the dictatorship of Francois Duvalier's son, Jean-Claude Duvalier (1971–1986). Lacking access to legal visas, many attempted perilous sea crossings to Florida aboard overcrowded and unsafe vessels (Fouron 2020). Political instability following the fall of Duvalier in 1986, coupled with failed democratic transitions during Jean-Bertrand Aristide's three presidencies (1991, 1994–1996, and 2001–2004), further fueled out-migration. As access to North America became increasingly limited, lower-income and poor Haitians turned to new or previously dormant regional destinations across Latin America and the Caribbean (Audebert 2011).

This historical trajectory has produced three distinct waves of Haitian emigration: the first wave (1960s to 1970s) consisted of elite and middle-class Haitians fleeing repression under François Duvalier; the second wave (1980s) included the urban and rural poor escaping economic stagnation and political repression during Jean-Claude Duvalier's rule; and the third wave (1990s to early 2000s) encompassed broader societal segments responding to the intertwined effects of political, economic, and environmental crises during and after the Aristide era (OECD and INURED 2017).

The year 2010 marked a watershed moment in Haitian migration. First, the devastating earthquake of January 2010 claimed over 200,000 lives and displaced more than 1.5 million people. Later that year, a cholera outbreak inadvertently introduced by UN Peacekeepers infected an estimated 800,000 individuals and resulted in more than 10,000 deaths over the following decade. Over the next decade and a half, these disaster events would initially spur out-migration of many of Haiti's skilled professionals (INURED 2010; OECD and INURED 2017) only to be followed by its educated youth (INURED 2024).

In response to the 2010 earthquake, the United States granted TPS to Haitians who arrived before January 12, 2010. TPS beneficiaries are protected from deportation and provided with temporary work authorization, helping Haitians abroad support their families through remittances. Brazil adopted more favorable policies during the 2010s, whereas Chile, unaccustomed to hosting a large Black population had no particular policy in place, resulting in a new phase of South-South migration from Haiti to South America.

Haiti's topography, unregulated land use, deforestation, and weak infrastructure compounded the effects of the 2010 disasters and heightened the country's vulnerability to climate change (Jørstad and Webersik 2016; INURED 2017). Subsequent natural disasters, including Hurricane Matthew in 2016 and another major earthquake affecting the southern region of Haiti in 2021, further deepened Haiti's systemic crisis. These cascading crises, which affected nearly one-third of the population, created complex emergencies that prompted widespread internal displacement and accelerated emigration (Marcelin et al. 2016). However, as humanitarian fatigue set in and more restrictive migration policies were adopted in the Global North, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, young

Haitians seeking education and improved economic prospects increasingly migrated to Latin America and the Caribbean countries (INURED 2024). This reorientation toward regional destinations reflects a dynamic transformation in Haitian migration patterns over the past quarter of a century, shaped by shifting geopolitical alignments, evolving immigration regimes, and the compounding effects of environmental and institutional fragility.

Haitian Emigration (2010–Present): Scale, Characteristics, and Trends

a) Emigrant Population Size and Growth (2010–2025)

The net migration figures for Haiti have consistently been negative, indicating a larger number of individuals leaving the country than entering (World Bank 2024). According to the United Nations Population Division (2024), by 2010, there was a substantial outflow of people, with approximately 1.15 million Haitian-born individuals residing abroad, accounting for roughly 11.5 percent of Haiti's population. The January 2010 earthquake marked a significant turning point, displacing millions and leading to increased emigration. The UN estimated that nearly 2 million Haitians were internally displaced following the earthquake, officially rendering 1.5 million people homeless while causing widespread insecurity. Over the subsequent decade, the Haitian diaspora expanded rapidly: by 2015, the number of Haitians living abroad had risen to 1.47 million (14 percent of the population). In 2020, the stock of Haitians who migrated reached approximately 1.77 million, representing about 15.7 percent of Haiti's total population. With new migration flows to Central and South America consolidated and a recently implemented US Parole program adopted by the Biden administration (though subsequently challenged by the Trump administration), compounded by generalized human insecurity in the country, the outflow of Haitians currently exceeds 2 million. This denotes a roughly 60 percent increase in the Haitian-born diaspora since 2010. Current estimates suggest that this trend has persisted, underscoring Haiti's position as one of the western hemisphere's major emigration countries.

Table 1. Haiti international in- and out-migration, by sex, 1960–2024

International Emigrants				International Immigrants			Net International Migration Balance		
Year	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
1960	108,384	32,770	141,154	7,174	7,325	14,499	(101,210)	(25,445)	(126,655)
1970	140,390	69,636	210,026	5,615	5,468	11,083	(134,775)	(64,168)	(198,943)
1980	181,334	120,994	302,328	7,460	6,587	14,047	(173,874)	(114,407)	(288,281)
1990	289,835	223,497	513,332	10,568	8,448	19,016	(279,267)	(215,049)	(494,316)
2000	460,345	513,898	974,243	8,903	7,074	15,977	(451,442)	(506,824)	(958,266)
2010	588,945	562,345	1,151,290	8,979	7,108	16,087	(579,966)	(555,237)	(1,135,203)
2020	950,860	809,395	1,760,255	10,497	8,385	18,882	(940,363)	(801,010)	(1,741,373)
2024 ^a	1,084,638	933,054	2,017,692	19,581	10,887	8,694	(1,065,057)	(922,167)	(2,008,998)

Source: Global Bilateral Migration Matrix 1960–2020 and World Bank Migration Database.

a. Data for 2024 compiled with data from UNDESA, Population Division (2024). International Migrant Stock, 2024. Table 1: International migrant stock at mid-year by sex and by region, country or area of destination and origin, 1990–2024.

b) Gender Composition of Haitians who Emigrate

The emigrant population of Haiti is predominantly male. Over the past decade, men have consistently outnumbered female Haitians who migrate (INURED 2024; UNDP 2019). In 2010, about 52 percent of Haitians abroad were male, increasing to 54 percent in 2015 following the post-2010 earthquake migration surge, and rising to 55 percent between 2019 and 2020. This trend is likely due to sociocultural norms related to gender and mobility in Haiti, combined with the demand for migrant labor in male-dominated sectors in destination countries. INURED's recent study (2024) indicates that Haitian household interviewees, regardless of sex, culturally believe men are more likely to secure employment abroad than women. Additionally, prevailing sociocultural norms discourage women from migrating independently, and those with

children are expected to fulfill caregiving responsibilities. This makes women less likely to be pioneers in migration and more likely to migrate under family reunification schemes (INURED 2024).

Overall, the gender composition has remained relatively stable since 2010, maintaining a persistent male majority among migrating Haitians. This trend suggests that Haiti's emigration has significantly affected the domestic male working-age population while simultaneously fostering expansive transnational family networks, with women frequently remaining in Haiti and some migrating later through family reunification schemes.

d) Education and Skills Profile of Emigrants

Haiti's emigration patterns suggest a combination of brain drain and large-scale low-skilled labor migration, the latter often obscuring the former reality in studies of international migration from Haiti. Haiti experiences one of the world's most significant brain drains, with an estimated 80–84 percent of Haitians with tertiary education living abroad, which is the highest rate of skilled emigration globally (Brücker et al. 2013; Docquier and Marfouk 2007; Mishra 2006). Many of Haiti's professionals, including doctors, nurses, engineers, and academics, have relocated to countries such as the United States, Canada, and France over recent decades (Aurelus and Saintil 2020; Belt et al. 2024; Blain et al. 2017; Clerveau 2024; Millien 2025). Consequently, Haiti's pool of educated workers has been significantly reduced by emigration, presenting challenges for domestic capacity and national development (OECD and ILO 2018; OECD and INURED 2017).

Conversely, most Haitians who emigrate to countries in the Global South have relatively low formal education levels. In the Dominican Republic, for example, the majority hail from impoverished backgrounds, and many have not completed secondary or higher education. One study (OECD and ILO 2018) notes that many Haitians in the Dominican Republic engage in low-skilled jobs abroad, including agriculture (for example, sugarcane plantations), construction, manufacturing, domestic work, and employment in the service sectors. In Brazil and Chile, where many migrated post 2010, Haitians found lower-wage positions in construction, hospitality, and informal commerce (INURED 2024).

Overall Emigration of Skilled Professionals

- **Extreme loss of skilled workforce.** Haiti faces one of the world's highest rates of skilled emigration, with a substantial portion of professionals with some tertiary education living abroad (INURED 2010; Wah 2013). Notably, over 80 percent of Haiti's college graduates have emigrated, a trend exacerbated by the 2010 earthquake and ongoing crises (Brücker et al. 2013; Docquier 2014; World Bank 2023).

The Health Sector

- **Severe shortages.** Haiti has approximately 0.2 physicians per 1,000 individuals, one of the lowest ratios globally, far below the ratio of 2.5 per 1,000 for basic care by the World Health Organization (PAHO 2025). Nurses are also critically scarce, with approximately 1.8 nurses per 10,000 population in the public sector, the lowest ratio in the Americas (Aurelus and Saintil 2020; Belt et al. 2024; Blain et al. 2017; Clerveau 2024; Millien 2025).
- **Ongoing exodus.** A 2023 survey revealed that 74 percent of Haitian health workers and medical students planned to emigrate. Hospital directors report dozens of nurses resigning monthly to seek opportunities abroad (Belt et al. 2024). An online survey of 43 Haitian professionals in the United States and Canada revealed that 76 percent left Haiti between 2015 and 2023, mainly due to security concerns and a deteriorating health care system. Most respondents indicated a low likelihood of returning without substantial reforms. Additionally, 10 out of 11 local officials cited poor career prospects and limited skills development as key reasons for the exodus of doctors and nurses (Millien 2025).

Education Sector (Teachers and Professors)

- **Faculty flight.** Public universities face significant challenges due to professor emigration. Some departments have closed, and officials warn of worsening shortages as educators depart (Arnold and Rahimi 2024).

- **Teacher emigration.** Economic hardships and prolonged school closures have left approximately 100,000 teachers unpaid, prompting many to emigrate or change careers. This exodus threatens the continuity and quality of education in the country (UNESCO 2024).

Technology and Engineering Professionals

- **Loss of technical expertise.** Engineers, IT specialists, and other professionals have increasingly emigrated since 2010 due to instability and gang violence. This brain drain undermines infrastructure projects and technological growth (Belt et al. 2024).

Economics and Public Administration

- Haiti's financial experts, managers, and administrators often leave for better opportunities abroad. Over 80-84% percent of Haiti's most qualified workforce has emigrated, eroding public institutions and governance capacity (World Bank 2023).

Irregular Flows: Old and New Migration Routes

Patterns, Shifts, and Contextual Influences (2010–2025)

Over the latter 15-year period (2010 to 2025), key events and policy changes have influenced Haitian migration patterns. As mentioned above, the January 2010 earthquake was a catalyst for migration, introducing new destinations and creating new routes to/through countries with previously limited encounters with Haitian nationals, if any at all. The magnitude of the 2010 disaster, which claimed over 200,000 lives and displaced over one million people, led to a mass exodus of Haitians to several countries across the Americas. While the exodus began immediately, Haiti's slow recovery, which remains

ongoing, has contributed to steady migration flows that continue through today. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, some neighboring countries (for example, the United States, Canada, and Brazil) temporarily relaxed immigration rules, and Haiti's already significant diaspora swelled further. The quake also instigated Haiti's current displacement-driven migration: many who left in 2010 did not initially intend permanent emigration, but as Haiti struggled to recover, short-term stays became long-term or permanent. For example, Haitian students and professionals living abroad in 2010 overwhelmingly stayed rather than return to a devastated homeland.

Shift from South-North to South-South Migration. In the early 2010s, migration routes diversified. With the United States and Canada routes limited by restrictive migration policies, Haitians increasingly looked to regional destinations. This led to novel large-scale migration to South America (Brazil, Chile, and so on), representing a significant shift from the traditional northward pattern (INURED 2024; Marcelin and Cela 2024). This South-South movement was facilitated by policies such as Brazil's humanitarian visas and Ecuador's visa waiver, as well as Haiti's integration into Latin American geopolitics (for example, Brazil and Chile's role in the United Nations' stabilization force in Haiti). By the late 2010s, however, conditions in South America changed (economic crises and stricter immigration laws), prompting a migratory shift: Haitians circulated within Latin America or attempted to migrate further north. The mid-2010s thus saw Haiti-born nationals become increasingly mobile across multiple countries, an emerging phenomenon that defies the traditional origin-to-destination migration model (Ceja and Ramírez 2022; INURED 2020, 2024; Joseph 2015, 2020; Marcelin and Cela 2024).

Haiti's Migration Policy Framework (1990–2025)

Institutional Arrangements: Laws, Agreements, and Outflow Management

Since the 1980s, Haiti has engaged in bilateral cooperation to manage migration flows without integrating a clear policy on migration into its national strategy. Significant agreements include the 1981 United States–Haiti accord facilitating US interdiction and return of Haitians, referred to at the time as ‘boat people’ (Wasem 2005), the 1995 repatriation pact with the Bahamas (Gavigan 1997), and agreements with the Dominican Republic to regulate seasonal labor migration and reduce irregular crossings. Domestically, Haiti has enhanced migration controls by establishing a specialized border police referred to as POLIFRONT in the mid-2010s, enacting a 2014 anti-trafficking law, and collaborating with international entities such as the IOM for training and equipment (IOM 2014a). These initiatives aim to mitigate unsafe, irregular migration while promoting protection of people who migrate, as demonstrated by Haiti’s ratification of key international conventions.

Since the fall of the Duvalier regime, the government of Haiti (GoH) has struggled to effectively harness the diaspora’s resources beyond remittances. Despite remittances accounting for 19 percent of GDP in 2012, long-term strategies for national development have been lacking (OECD and INURED 2017). Institutions such as MHAVE were created to engage the diaspora but have faced challenges such as underfunding, limited influence, and frequent leadership changes, hindering consistent policy implementation (OECD and INURED 2017).

The 2007 Haiti: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper recognized the significant role of the diaspora in development (IMF 2008). It proposed various initiatives such as promoting tourism targeted at the diaspora, taxing remittances to fund local projects, and encouraging diaspora investment. However, these proposals were

only briefly outlined. The 2010 earthquake further highlighted the importance of engaging the diaspora (GoH 2010b). President Martelly advocated for greater involvement of the diaspora in reconstruction efforts but establishing effective channels was challenging due to widespread disasters and a weakened state apparatus (GoH 2010a; GoH 2010b). The Haitian diaspora and international organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS), through its 2010 Haitian Diaspora Forum, called for concrete roles in rebuilding efforts, including participation in governance structures and capacity-building initiatives (OAS 2010).

In the aftermath of the earthquake, the government's *Action Plan for Recovery and Development* emphasized the importance of leveraging contributions from the diaspora through remittance mobilization, skills transfer, and investment (GoH 2010a). However, despite this focus, members of the diaspora lacked significant decision-making authority within the reconstruction commission. The recovery efforts highlighted the critical need for diaspora engagement. Nevertheless, external pressures from countries affected by irregular Haitian emigration prompted the government to expand its migration strategy beyond just the diaspora.

To develop an extensive migration policy strategy, the GoH established the Migration Task Force, which includes multiple government agencies and international organizations, most notably the IOM and civil society groups. This task force aims to develop comprehensive migration policies. However, progress has been hindered by the paucity of reliable migration data and ongoing sociopolitical crises that disrupt the functioning of relevant agencies thereby impeding effective policy formulation.

Migration Policy Development

After decades without a comprehensive migration policy, Haiti—with IOM's support—formulated its first National Migration Policy in 2015. IOM played a pivotal role by providing technical assistance, facilitating consultations, and aligning the policy with international best practices. Key aspects of this process included the following:

- **Technical assistance and funding.** IOM deployed national and international migration experts to advise the Haitian government in drafting the policy. A dedicated government

Migration Task Force was created to steer the effort, with IOM serving as a technical adviser (IOM 2014b, 2015).

- **Policy guidance and thematic priorities.** With IOM's guidance, the 2015 National Migration Policy was structured around key priority areas to address Haiti's migration challenges. The final policy document (validated by the government in September 2015) outlined recommendations in four main sectors: (a) migration, environment, and development; (b) labor migration and social protection; (c) irregular migration; and (d) border management (GoH 2015). Notably, Haiti became the first country in its region to integrate environmental and climate change considerations into its migration policy (GoH 2015). This innovative emphasis recognized the role of natural disasters and environmental degradation in Haitian migration. The policy also addressed diaspora engagement, brain drain, remittance utilization, and protections for migrating workers and vulnerable groups, aligning with global best practices. IOM and ILO's technical inputs ensured the policy was forward looking and rights based (IHD. n.d.).
- **Policy and strategy alignment.** During this period, the Office of National Migration (*Office Nationale de la Migration*, ONM) aligned its policies and programs with the country's overall migration strategy, becoming a member of the Migration Task Force responsible for national policy. After 2015, IOM assisted ONM in drafting its internal strategic plan, which reflects the priorities of the National Migration Policy. This included establishing ONM units focused on key areas such as diaspora engagement, returnee reintegration, and data collection. IOM experts worked with ONM to review its protocols and incorporate new legal standards, such as the 2014 anti-trafficking law, while ensuring protections for vulnerable people on the move were integrated (IOM 2014a). Today, ONM and IOM jointly lead the response for returning Haitians from the United States, the Dominican Republic, and other countries (IOM 2025b).

In sum, from 1990 to 2025, Haiti's emigration strategy has emphasized collaboration with other countries to manage migrant flows and the implementation of domestic laws to reduce irregular departures. The GoH adopted the National Migration Policy 2015–2030, recognizing migration as essential for national development.

This policy aims to facilitate legal emigration while harnessing the potential contributions of its diaspora. However, to date, no formal assessment of the policy's implementation has been undertaken.

Implications for Diaspora Engagement: Institutions, Rights, and Initiatives

As Haiti set out to establish democratic institutions in the post-Duvalier era, the government significantly increased engagement of its diaspora. In the early 1990s, Haiti's democratically elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, expressed his intention to formalize the engagement of Haitians abroad. In 1995, Aristide established a cabinet-level ministry for Haitians living overseas (MHAVE), although political turmoil delayed its full establishment. MHAVE was officially institutionalized in 2000, reflecting the significant impact the diaspora has had on Haiti's economy and social fabric. Through MHAVE and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Haiti implemented frameworks to serve and mobilize its diaspora communities, which are predominantly located in North America (United States and Canada), the Caribbean (Dominican Republic, Bahamas, and French overseas territories), and increasingly in Chile, Brazil, and other regions.

The political and civic inclusion of the Haitian diaspora has undergone significant changes over the past century. Since the nation's independence, Haitian law prohibited dual citizenship, causing Haitians who naturalized elsewhere to lose their Haitian nationality and the right to vote or own property in Haiti. This situation changed following the 2010 earthquake, spurred by efforts to involve expatriates in the national recovery process. In 2011, the Haitian Parliament approved substantial constitutional amendments to enfranchise the diaspora (Americas Quarterly 2011). Legislators officially recognized multiple citizenship for up to 4 million Haitians residing abroad, facilitating their dual nationality. For the first time, Haitians living overseas were granted the right to vote in elections, marking the culmination of 25 years of advocacy by the Haitian diaspora.

The amended 1987 Constitution also relaxed political office requirements. As a result, the residency requirement for running for office in Haiti was reduced from five years to three years, and dual nationals were permitted to hold positions such as mayor or local

councillor. However, certain offices remained inaccessible unless the individual renounced other citizenships; dual citizens were still barred from becoming President or Prime Minister of Haiti. Despite these restrictions, the 2011 reforms were considered a significant advancement toward integrating the Haitian diaspora into national affairs, thus initiating a new era of political engagement for Haitians living abroad.

Institutionally, MHAVE has implemented programs focused on the diaspora, serving as a liaison for Haitian communities abroad by addressing issues such as property disputes and investment inquiries. Haiti now celebrates National Haitian Diaspora Day on April 20, an observance officially established by the government in 2011. The idea to commemorate the diaspora emerged during the March 2010 diaspora forum sponsored by the OAS to honor the diaspora's contributions, particularly in the wake of the earthquake. On that day, Haitian authorities and embassies recognize the accomplishments of the diaspora in fields such as business, science, and culture, reaffirming the integral role of the diaspora.

Public officials often acknowledge that Haitian families and communities rely heavily on remittances received by members of the diaspora. In recent years, remittances sent by Haitians living overseas have become a cornerstone of Haiti's economy, estimated to account for between 20 percent and 25 percent of GDP (Cela et al. 2022; INURED 2020; World Bank 2024). Beyond remittances, the government has sought to channel diaspora resources into development projects. For example, MHAVE and the central bank have encouraged diaspora investment in Haiti's infrastructure and small businesses through initiatives such as investment fairs and the promotion of 'Diaspora Bonds'. This [idea was suggested](#) and supported by some experts at the [World Bank](#) after the 2010 earthquake and endorsed by the [Governor of Banque de la République d'Haïti](#) (the Bank of the Republic of Haiti), but could not be operationalized due to World Bank/IMF and Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) rules.

Additionally, Haiti has partnered with IOM to implement short-term, diaspora skills transfer programs (IOM 2025a). These initiatives, which have yet to be implemented, invite Haitian doctors, engineers, and academics in the diaspora to temporarily return to Haiti to train locals or fill critical gaps, leveraging what is often

referred to as brain circulation to mitigate the effects of brain drain.

Diaspora outreach and inclusion in governance have expanded. Haiti's embassies and consulates now routinely host town hall meetings with expatriate Haitians. The government under President Michel Martelly (2011–2016) emphasized policies such as dual nationality and diaspora voting rights. During his term, diaspora figures were appointed to prominent positions, such as a Haitian American serving as Minister of MHAVE, indicating increased diaspora involvement. The Haitian diaspora also had greater input in policy reform. In recent constitutional reform initiatives (2017–2021), MHAVE established mechanisms for diaspora input, including online consultations and commissions with diaspora representatives, recognizing the importance of accounting for citizens abroad. Haiti now allows overseas voting through its embassies during national elections, though logistical challenges remain.


Successive governments have implemented measures to engage diaspora capital and philanthropy. MHAVE collaborates with diaspora associations on development projects, such as building schools or clinics funded by Haitian American and Haitian Canadian community organizations. The diaspora's involvement in disaster response has been formally recognized: after the 2010 earthquake and subsequent hurricanes, diaspora networks were instrumental in fundraising and delivering aid. Haiti's policy framework now encourages diaspora partnerships in humanitarian efforts. Haitian authorities have explored policies to direct some remittance flows from consumption to productive investment (Joachim 2024). For instance, campaigns have offered diaspora members special investment incentives in agriculture and tourism and involved them in local governance through sister-city programs and diaspora representation on local project committees.

In summary, between 1990 and 2025, Haiti transitioned from indifference regarding its diaspora to active engagement and integration. Notable achievements include establishing the diaspora ministry (MHAVE), legally recognizing dual citizenship and voting rights, and symbolic initiatives such as Diaspora Day. Despite ongoing bureaucratic red tape associated with implementing many of these changes, the overall trend is toward incorporating the diaspora into Haiti's socioeconomic development and political landscape.



PART II

Drivers of Haitian Migration and Intentions



Since 2010, Haitian migration has been shaped by repeated natural disasters, persistent poverty, deteriorating public institutions, violence, and climate change, leading many to emigrate for safety and stability.

Key Findings

- Preferred destinations such as the United States and Canada offer more settled integration through various humanitarian and legal channels, though shifting policies create uncertainty.
- Migration to the Dominican Republic and Caribbean is often temporary or circular, with many Haitians facing insecure status and social exclusion.
- South American countries such as Brazil and Chile initially welcomed Haitian migrants with visas and job opportunities, but economic downturns and stricter immigration rules have prompted onward movement.
- In Europe, especially France, long-standing diaspora networks aid new arrivals, but regularizing residency is difficult, and return migration is rare.
- Overall, Haitian migration reflects a search for security and opportunity, with most migrating Haitians relying on diaspora networks, community resources, and remittances to support families back home. Ongoing crises in Haiti will likely sustain migration pressures, highlighting the need for humane international policies and expanded legal options.

Drivers of Migration in Haiti

Since 2010, multiple intersecting factors have compelled Haitians to leave their country. Disaster events, political instability, failures in the rule of law, and institutional and governance crises have led to systemic violence. These factors, combined with the paralysis of the state (INURED 2024; Marcelin 2025; Marcelin and Cela 2024), have undermined public services and the economy, contributing to an environment of extreme human insecurity.

Historically, and as detailed above, major events in Haiti correspond with waves of emigration. Contemporary migration patterns were instigated by the January 2010 earthquake, a disaster compounded by subsequent crises such as the October 2010 cholera outbreak and Hurricane Matthew in 2016 (Marcelin et al. 2017). As Haiti struggled to recover from each of these disasters, the sociopolitical situation in the country began to deteriorate. In July 2021, President Moïse was assassinated following delayed elections and a year-long constitutional crisis (INURED 2024). Within one month of the assassination, the southern region suffered an earthquake of 7.2 magnitude. The deteriorating political situation gave way to surging gang violence, creating a sense that the Haitian state was nearing collapse. In late 2021 and 2022, demand for passports in Haiti skyrocketed as people sought any means of exit. UNHCR notes that indiscriminate violence and humanitarian collapse in 2023 have rendered many more Haitians eligible for refugee protection. The confluence of disasters, a political vacuum (no elected government as of 2023), and gang rule have solidified the view among Haitians that migration is the only remaining option.

Since 2023, gang violence has escalated with impunity, as the national police and UN forces appear powerless against the armed groups. Gangs have increasingly laid claim to more territory, effectively controlling vast swaths of urban and semi-rural sections of Haiti, including metropolitan Port-au-Prince, Artibonite, and Centre (IOM 2025c). This violence has led to widespread human rights abuses and internal displacement (RNDDH 2025). In urban areas, ordinary Haitians face kidnappings, sexual violence, and lawlessness, making daily life perilous. The collapse of the justice

and police systems has resulted in impunity for criminals and little protection for citizens (Marcelin 2025; UNHCR 2025). Such pervasive insecurity at home strongly pushes people to seek safety abroad.

Recurrent natural disasters have been another driver of migration, both in rural and urban areas. The January 2010 earthquake was cataclysmic—killing over 300,000 people, displacing more than 1.5 million, and destroying infrastructure and livelihoods around the nation’s capital (Desroches et al. 2011). The quake’s devastation eliminated jobs and worsened poverty, triggering a large exodus. In the decade since, Haitians have endured repeated shocks: a severe cholera outbreak (ASFC² and INURED 2024), Hurricane Matthew in 2016 (INURED 2017), another major earthquake in August 2021, and frequent tropical storms. Each disaster has destroyed homes and farms, destabilizing livelihoods. The Integrated Food Security Classification (IPC) Report, March–June 2025, suggests that the recent intensification of armed gang violence in the affected regions severely “disrupt[s] livelihoods and limit the movement of people and essential goods in rural and urban Haiti,” and that there is an increase of more than 300,000 people in IPC Phase 3 (acute food insecurity), surpassing previous projections. Climate change effects—droughts, flooding, and soil erosion—also disproportionately affect Haiti’s largely agrarian communities. The result is chronic food insecurity for a large share of the population, while providing more incentive for migration.

The Allure of Destination Countries

A corresponding set of factors has lured Haitians toward specific destinations during this period. Foremost is the prospect of economic opportunity and labor demand abroad (Audebert 2016; Fouron 2020; INURED 2024). Emerging economies in the Latin America and Caribbean region need workers in sectors such as agriculture, construction, and service industries that low-skilled Haitians can fill. For example, the Dominican Republic’s

² ASFC = Lawyers without Borders, Canada) (Avocats sans frontières Canada).

growing economy has long drawn Haitian laborers, initially toward agricultural sectors but later toward construction, given wage differentials between the two countries (INURED 2024; OECD 2024). Similarly, Brazil's economic boom in the early 2010s—as it prepared for the World Cup and Olympics—created jobs that locals rebuffed but Haitians were prepared to fill (INURED 2020, 2024). When Brazil's economy later stagnated around 2015–2016, many Haitians in South America migrated to Chile, which at the time was one of the region's most stable, prosperous countries (Dona-Reveco 2024; INURED 2020, 2024). With no visa requirements for Haitians entering Chile (until 2018), Haitians in Brazil simply crossed the border into neighboring Chile, while those in the homeland secured invitation letters (from family, friends, and intermediaries) and the requisite US\$2,000 required for entry as a tourist (INURED 2024).

Another critical driver of migration has been family reunification and diaspora networks. Haitians have established sizable communities in North America and, over the past decade, in South America that function as anchors for new migration. Established immigrant populations often assist relatives and friends in making their migration aspirations a reality (INURED 2024). These social networks lower the costs and risks of migration by providing newcomers with initial housing, job leads, and emotional support (INURED 2024; Marcelin and Cela 2024). For example, as Haitians settled in Chile in the 2010s, they solidified community networks and encouraged others from Haiti (or those who had first gone to Brazil) to join them, accelerating chain migration. Similarly, long-standing Haitian diasporas in the United States and Canada have sponsored family members through formal immigration channels. Family ties thus strongly draw Haitians toward locales where they already have community connections.

Humanitarian and legal migration programs abroad have also played a role. After the 2010 earthquake, the United States granted TPS to Haitian nationals, allowing tens of thousands to legally remain and work in the United States rather than be deported to a disaster zone. This policy, renewed multiple times, effectively pulled many Haitians to the United States who might otherwise have remained in Haiti or migrated elsewhere. Brazil implemented a special humanitarian visa program for Haitians in 2010–2012, streamlining their entry as a form of disaster relief (INURED 2024).

However, as disaster sympathies waned, economic crisis emerged, and/or Haitian presence—whether transient or permanent—increased, several destination countries tightened entry rules and/or rendered regularization nearly impossible. Chile’s introduction of a visa requirement for Haitians in 2018 abruptly curtailed direct migration and converted permanent residents into transit migrants (INURED 2024). Migrating populations pay close attention to such policy shifts, influencing the decision-making processes and trajectories of those who aspire to migrate to Chile. In recent years, asylum opportunities, or perceptions thereof, have also influenced the decision to migrate as well as the choice of destination. Some Haitians have sought refugee protections due to political instability and ongoing violence in Haiti in countries such as the United States, Canada, Mexico, France, and its overseas territories.

Migration Destinations and Intentions

In the subsection below, we examine the destinations, migratory patterns, shifts over time, and migrants’ intentions regarding length of stay, return, and integration in each context.

United States and Canada

Intentions and integration. In North America, Haitians on the move generally have long-term or permanent settlement intentions. The United States and Canada are seen as final destinations, offering the chance to build a new life. The likelihood of returning to Haiti permanently is very low, particularly under current conditions. In the United States, for instance, tens of thousands of Haitians have held in a quasi-temporary status (TPS) for over a decade now, but few have chosen to return to Haiti; instead, they patiently await the emergence of opportunities or paths to regularize their status. As a result, Haitian diaspora communities in North America have deepened and grown more permanent. Haitian labor force participation in the United States actually surpasses the national average after a few years, and poverty rates for Haitians decline to roughly the US average after 15 years of residency (Bier 2021; Dain

and Batalov 2023.). Homeownership and naturalization rates are also high in the community. These indicators show that, given time and legal work authorization, Haitians integrate into the economy and become self-sufficient.

An important integration strategy has been the formation of robust diaspora networks and community institutions. In cities like Miami, New York, and Montreal, Haitians have clustered in neighborhoods (for example, ‘Little Haiti’ in Miami and ‘Flatbush’ in Brooklyn, New York) where Creole-language churches, businesses, radio programs, and social clubs provide support. These networks help newcomers secure housing and employment while providing social safety nets (for example, informal lending circles and childcare). Haitians also rely on NGOs and advocacy groups that assist with obtaining legal status and community services. Through such organizations, newly arrived Haitians navigate integration challenges while also lobbying for policies (TPS extensions or family reunification programs) to regularize their status.

In summary, Haitians migrating to the United States and Canada generally plan to remain permanently, building new lives abroad. They invest in integrating—learning the language, securing jobs, and educating their children—rather than preparing to return to Haiti. The diaspora remains engaged through remittances (over US\$3 billion annually from the United States and Canada) and advocacy for Haiti, even as they themselves become rooted in their host countries.

Dominican Republic and the Caribbean Region

Intentions and integration. Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic and Caribbean is characterized by a high degree of circulation and short-term intent, although many end up staying longer than planned (Lundahl 2009; Morales and Rodríguez 2022). Historically, in the Dominican Republic, seasonal migration for harvest or tourist seasons led laborers to return to Haiti in the off-season. Even in the 2010s, a significant number of Haitians treated work in the Dominican Republic as a temporary livelihood strategy—earning money in Santo Domingo or Punta Cana for a

year or two, then returning home to support their family or invest in a small business. These returns highlight the fluid nature of this migration corridor.

However, not all Haitians in the Dominican Republic are short term. A portion has effectively settled in the Dominican Republic, especially those who have children or spouses there. On the other hand, a growing number of Haitian investors and members of the Haitian political and economic elite take quasi-permanent residency in the Dominican Republic while conducting their main businesses in Haiti. Integration for Haitians in the Dominican Republic is fraught with difficulty. The sociopolitical climate is often hostile; anti-Haitian sentiment is fueled by historic tensions and competition for low-skill jobs. Haitians face discrimination and even periodic violence; for example, mob attacks on Haitian communities have occurred during nationalist backlash. Despite significantly contributing to sectors of the Dominican economy, Haitians largely occupy an undocumented underclass, with limited rights or protections (OECD and INURED 2017; Wooding and Moseley-Williams 2004). Until recently, many Haitian children born in the Dominican Republic could not attend school or access public services due to lack of legal status (the 2013 judicial ruling exacerbated this). Even those registered under the regularization plan often only receive temporary work permits. As for Haitian elites living in the Dominican Republic, while they may have more resources to navigate Dominican society, they are not immune to the racialized and nationalistic biases that shape the broader treatment of Haitians in the Dominican Republic (Wucker 2000).

In essence, many Haitians in the Dominican Republic keep one foot in Haiti, given the impermanence of their status. Studies indicate that changes in Dominican policies directly affect their intentions: when crackdowns loom, Haitians plan their exit—either back to Haiti or trying to reach another country such as Chile, Brazil, or the United States (INURED 2024; Marcelin and Cela 2024).

In other Caribbean states (mainly the Bahamas), Haitians similarly face precarious integration. They often lack legal status and are subject to deportation. Communities form in shantytowns (for example, ‘the Mudd’ in Abaco, Bahamas—a now-bulldozed Haitian

shanty). Yet, over time Haitians have become an integral part of the labor force in these countries. Their intentions are typically to stay and work as long as possible to send remittances, but if given the chance, many would relocate to the United States or Canada for greater security. Return to Haiti is usually considered only if forced (through deportation) or if conditions improve in the homeland. For now, the Caribbean-based migrating Haitians remain in a tenuous position: essential to local economies yet socially excluded. Their strategies involve maintaining low profiles, forging ties with local churches, and saving money to either send home or fund their next move.

South America (Brazil, Chile, and Other Countries in Latin America)

Intentions and integration. The experience in South America shows fluid migration intentions, with many Haitians treating countries such as Brazil, Chile, and Mexico as stepping stones in a longer journey. Initially, some intended to settle permanently in those countries—especially when prospects seemed bright (for example, a Haitian might have viewed Chile as a new home around 2015–2017, when jobs were plentiful and the policies were favorable). However, as conditions evolved, a significant portion adjusted their plans. Researchers note that “circulatory movement is at the core of Haitian migration in Latin America, often blurring the lines between transit and destination” (Marcelin and Cela 2024). In practice, many Haitians became transit migrants, even if that was not their original plan. For example, a Haitian who migrated to Brazil in 2011 might have moved to Chile in 2015 and then set out for the United States in 2020, a multi-stage migration trajectory shaped by shifting economic, juridical, and policy landscapes (Ceja and Ramírez 2022; Domenech and Dias 2020; Joseph 2015, 2020; Marcelin and Cela 2024).

For those Haitians who have remained in Brazil or Chile, integration has proven challenging. Language barriers are a primary hurdle, particularly in the former, as few Haitians speak Portuguese while some may be proficient in Spanish if they lived in the Dominican Republic, and lack of language proficiency limits job opportunities, and access to services (Crawley et al. 2024a). Haitians often have

to accept menial jobs regardless of their education (INURED 2024). Haitians in Chile have faced difficulties finding stable housing and were hard hit by COVID-19-related layoffs (often being the first to lose their jobs). Similarly in Brazil, Haitians often work in precarious conditions (construction, meatpacking plants, and so on), though Brazil's history of racial diversity has made societal reception somewhat less hostile than in Chile. Both countries have seen the emergence of Haitian community organizations (for example, Haitian-led churches and cultural associations) to help newcomers navigate life. These community networks, along with support from NGOs and religious organizations in destination countries, have served as the main integration strategy for Haitians in Latin America (Crawley et al. 2024b).

Critically, many Haitians in South America never intended to return to Haiti, nor did they necessarily intend to stay permanently in their first country of asylum (INURED 2024). Their overarching intention can be described as seeking stability and opportunity wherever they can be found. For many, obtaining citizenship in Brazil or Chile is not only a major achievement but it represents a gateway to other countries in the Global North. However, as citizenship is a long-term strategy, other intermediate strategies are employed: if Chile becomes unwelcoming, move on; if the US border opens, try to enter; if not, remain in Mexico, temporarily or permanently; if all else fails, consider Canada or return to a safer part of Brazil. This high degree of adaptability and pragmatism define Haitian migration decisions. One consequence is that very few Haitians in South America have voluntarily repatriated to Haiti: they either remain where they are or move to a second or third country. The only returns to Haiti from this cohort have been involuntary (deportations) or due to extreme personal circumstances. In recent years, some Haitians who could not make it to the United States have settled in Mexico, creating new diaspora enclaves in cities such as Tijuana and Mexicali.

In summary, Haitians in South America illustrate dynamic, multi-destination migration. Their intentions have often shifted from settling to onward migration as external conditions changed. Integration in host countries such as Brazil and Chile has been partial at best. Haitians remain economically marginalized and face

many social barriers (for example, race, language, culture, and so on). This has reinforced their inclination to keep moving in search of a place to support themselves and their family members (who may be with them at the destination, in the homeland, or in another country). Those who do establish roots in South America tend to be the ones who have no other options or who have achieved some measure of stability (for example, secured permanent residency in Brazil, started a binational family in Chile, and so on). For many others, South America was one chapter in a longer journey, with the North American dream (or, occasionally, Europe) as the final chapter they hope to write.

Europe (France)

Intentions and integration. Haitians who do reach Europe generally intend to settle long term, but their ability to do so depends on their legal status. In France, Haitians benefit from linguistic familiarity (most educated Haitians speak French) and an existing diaspora network in Paris and other cities. Integration into French society has had successes. Haitian immigrants in France have made contributions in academia, medicine, and culture. However, new arrivals from Haiti often struggle economically at first, working in low-skilled jobs such as cleaning or caregiving (similar to other immigrant groups). Integration strategies involve tapping into Haitian diaspora associations in France, which provide social support and help newcomers navigate the processes of regularizing their status, obtaining permanent residency, or securing citizenship. France's Haitian community is relatively organized, with cultural associations and events that maintain Haitian heritage while facilitating integration (for example, Haitian churches in Paris or Marseille). Discrimination in Europe is not typically targeted specifically at Haitians, as they fall under broader immigrant or Black minority categories, but Haitians may face racial or xenophobic biases as any African or Caribbean in Europe might.

Importantly, Haitians in Europe have little intention of returning to Haiti, given the even greater geographical distance between the homeland and host country and the fact that many left for political reasons or education. Once in Europe, those who secure legal status tend to remain. One challenge is that many Haitians in

Europe are asylum seekers or *sans-papiers* (without papers) whose visas have lapsed. Those whose asylum claims are rejected (and most are in countries such as France or the United Kingdom) face potential deportation. UNHCR's 2024 guidance urged European states not to forcibly return Haitians in light of the grave situation in Haiti. In practice, European governments have not conducted large-scale deportations to Haiti in recent years, so even rejected asylum seekers often remain as undocumented migrants. Their intention is to find a way to remain in the country legally, through appeals, marriage, work permits, and so on, rather than to return home. Europe is seen as a safe haven with robust social systems, so the calculus of Haitians is to remain, if at all possible.

Integration versus return. Over this period, a consistent pattern is the low rate of return migration. Unlike some migrant groups who return as conditions improve, Haitians generally have not, as conditions continue to deteriorate. International agencies have repeatedly called for halting deportations to Haiti on humanitarian grounds. Haiti's brain drain has worsened (professionals emigrating and not returning), with migration to France featuring a proportionally larger number of Haitian students and professionals who are more likely to find pathways to permanent residency and citizenship than their lesser educated counterparts. Given the protracted nature of Haiti's crisis, one can surmise that Haitians who have migrated will work toward solidifying their roots in France rather than returning to the homeland.

Conclusion

Between 2010 and 2025, international migration has been a lifeline for many young, able-bodied, and increasingly educated Haitians. Factors driving migration, including economic deprivation, political instability, rampant violence, and natural disasters, have made daily life untenable for large segments of the population. Employment opportunities, safety and security, family networks, and humanitarian efforts have attracted Haitians to well-established and new destinations that offered hope for a better life. The result has been an evolving Haitian diaspora spread across the western hemisphere (and beyond), with major communities in the United States, Dominican Republic, Canada, Chile, Brazil, and elsewhere.

Migration intentions have tended toward long-term emigration rather than temporary sojourns. In most destination regions, Haitians plan to stay as long as possible, if not permanently, because the situation in Haiti is dire and continues to deteriorate. Rates of return migration have been minimal, with the focus on integrating at destination, helping family and friends through remittances, and supporting the migratory aspirations of those in the homeland or in transit. In the Dominican Republic, some Haitians do engage in circular migration, but even there it is often out of necessity (job loss or involuntary removals) rather than preference, and many would settle longer if allowed. Across the diaspora, integration strategies include forming tight-knit communities, leveraging diaspora organizations, accessing community-based services and supports, learning host languages, and gradually improving socioeconomic status, as seen in North America, where Haitians achieve high employment and their children thrive educationally. In countries where integration is more challenging, Haitians have shown resilience by moving again or creating parallel support systems in churches and through community-based organizations and NGOs.


Between 2010 and 2025, Haitian migration has also been marked by significant shifts: the early 2010s saw new South-South routes emerge, the late 2010s saw secondary movements to North America, and the 2020s have seen both an emergency outflow under collapsing conditions as well as an increase in asylum cases in places such as French Guiana. Every host-country policy—whether humanitarian or restrictive—has had ripple effects on Haitian movements. As of 2025, Haiti's governance and security crisis remains critical, suggesting that migration pressures will continue. With nearly 1.3 million people internally displaced by violence within Haiti in 2025, the line between internal displacement and external migration is thin. Many of the internally displaced are likely to seek opportunities to leave the country, where possible. The international community (for example, IOM, UNHCR, and OAS) has called for shared responsibility in managing Haitian migration humanely, urging countries to protect Haitian asylum seekers, expand legal pathways, and avoid forcible returns to a country in chaos.

In summary, the decade-and-a-half since 2010 has solidified the Haitian diaspora as a crucial coping mechanism for the nation. The drivers of migration remain compounding crises and poverty. Haitians on the move are quite pragmatic in their quest for stability: they seek to support themselves and their families; integrate where feasible; continue migrating in search of better opportunities, when presented and if necessary; and hold on to hope for Haiti's renewal from afar. The patterns observed between 2010 and 2025 highlight both the resilience of migrating Haitians and the urgent need for improved conditions in Haiti, so that migration becomes a choice rather than a necessity.




PART III

International Migration of Skilled Workers



Key Destinations for Haitian Migrants



Haitian international migration has expanded dramatically since 2010, with the migrant population growing by 74 percent to reach over 2 million in 2024—about 16 percent of Haiti’s population. The **United States** remains the primary destination, though its share declined from 52 percent to 40 percent, reflecting diversification of migration routes. The **Dominican Republic** continues to host over one-quarter of all Haitian migrants, but the most striking trend is the rise of **Chile**, **Mexico**, and **Brazil** as key destinations, driven by labor demand and more restrictive immigration policies adopted by the United States. Mexico, once largely a transit point, is now the sixth most common destination country, signaling a structural shift in regional migration flows.

Migration patterns are also **gendered and stratified**. Men dominate flows to Latin America (Chile, Brazil, and Mexico), reflecting their concentration in labor-intensive sectors, whereas women remain more likely to migrate to North America and Europe. Skilled migration represents a critical dimension: nearly three-quarters of tertiary-educated Haitians reside abroad, with the United States and Canada hosting over 80 percent of this highly skilled population. This contributes to Haiti’s severe ‘brain drain,’ straining its health, education, and technical sectors.

Educational and labor profiles show significant **underemployment and occupational segregation**. Even among tertiary-educated Haitians, many are concentrated in low-skilled sectors such as construction, transportation, agriculture, and domestic services, particularly in Latin America. In the United States and Canada, tertiary education correlates with higher employment rates and lower unemployment, especially for women, suggesting that education can mitigate economic vulnerability when credentials are recognized. However, structural inequalities and immigration restrictions continue to constrain upward mobility.

Key Findings

- **Explosive growth.** Haitian migrant population grew 74 percent between 2010 and 2024, now exceeding 2 million globally.
- **Diversified destinations.** The United States' share of the Haitian migrant population declined while migration to Latin America surged, especially to Chile, Mexico, and Brazil.
- **Gendered flows.** Men dominate labor migration in the Latin America and the Caribbean region; women remain concentrated in the United States, Canada, and France.
- **Severe brain drain.** Approximately 72 percent of Haiti's tertiary-educated population lives abroad, mostly in the United States and Canada.
- **Labor market segmentation.** Skilled Haitians often face underemployment or concentration in low-wage sectors.
- **Policy implications.** Expanding credential recognition, legal migration channels, and diaspora engagement programs are critical to transforming migration from a survival strategy into a driver of development.

According to mid-year migration stock data from UNDESA, the Haitian migrant population increased dramatically between 2010 and 2024: from 1.15 million to 2 million, representing a percentage increase of 74 percent over the 14-year period (Table 2 and Figure 1). Among the top ten key destinations, seven dominate overall, accounting for 94.6 percent of migrating Haitians. In descending order, these destinations include the United States, the Dominican Republic, Chile, France, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil. The United States remains the main destination for Haitian migrants, with an absolute growth from 133,737 between 2010 and 2020 to 65,333 between 2020 and 2024, although its relative share of the global Haitian migrant population decreased from 51.8 percent to 39.6 percent from 2010 to 2024. Similarly, the Dominican Republic remains the second most common destination for migrating Haitians, increasing in absolute numbers by 221,753 between 2010 and 2024. This also represented a marginal percentage decline (from 27.1 percent in 2010 to 26.5 percent in 2024) of the global Haitian population. France and Canada, meanwhile, maintain a steady, moderate growth, representing between 5 percent and 6 percent of all migrating Haitians, with Canada dropping slightly more than France, from 7.1 percent in 2010.

New destinations have emerged over the last decade, including strong representation from Latin America, particularly Chile, Brazil, and Mexico.

Before 2010, these countries were not among the top 10 key destinations for migrating Haitians. However, by 2020, Chile became the third most common destination, with just over 10 percent of Haitian migrant residents. This trend persists through 2024, although with a drop to 8.5 percent, possibly due to economic conditions and restrictive immigration policies adopted in 2018 (INURED 2024). Similarly, Brazil was ranked as the sixth most common destination for Haitian migrants in 2020 at just 2.0 percent, increasing to 4.4 percent in 2024. Although Brazil's ranking dropped to the seventh position, in absolute terms, it increased considerably: 52,823 more than in 2020, representing a percentage increase of 148.5 percent in the four years between 2020 and 2024.

In 2024, Mexico emerged for the first time as a key destination for Haitians, occupying the sixth position (with 91,622 Haitians), thus relegating Brazil to seventh place. Once primarily serving as a transit country for Haitians intending to cross the United States-Mexico border, Mexico's current ranking as one of the top 10 destinations is reflective of shifting US immigration policy blocking border crossings from Mexico (Horwood and Frouws 2024; McCorkle et al. 2024; UNHCR-ACNUR³ 2024). Mexico has thus shifted from a transit to a destination country for many Haitians unable to traverse the border into the United States.


³ ACNUR = *Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados* (Spanish acronym for UNHCR).

Table 2. Top 10 destinations for migrating Haitians, 2010, 2020, and 2024

Ranking	2010			2020			2024		
	Destination	Population	%	Destination	Population	%	Destination	Population	%
	World	1,157,011	100.0	World	1,764,699	100.0	World	2,017,692	100.0
1	United States	599,162	51.8	United States	732,899	41.5	United States	798,232	39.6
2	Dominican Republic	313,363	27.1	Dominican Republic	496,112	28.1	Dominican Republic	535,116	26.5
3	Canada	82,200	7.1	Chile	181,271	10.3	Chile	172,050	8.5
4	France	75,919	6.6	France	105,761	6.0	France	116,971	5.8
5	Bahamas	25,465	2.2	Canada	99,407	5.6	Canada	107,237	5.3
6	French Guiana	15,743	1.4	Brazil	35,560	2.0	Mexico	91,622	4.5
7	Guadeloupe	14,731	1.3	Bahamas	29,629	1.7	Brazil	88,383	4.4
8	Turks and Caicos ^a	9,756	0.8	French Guiana	22,084	1.3	Bahamas	31,353	1.6
9	Dominica	3,071	0.3	Turks and Caicos ^a	15,787	0.9	French Guiana	24,246	1.2
10	Saint Maarten ^b	2,635	0.2	Guadeloupe	13,973	0.8	Turks and Caicos ^a	17,446	0.9
	Other destinations	14,966	1.3	Other destinations	32,216	1.8	Other destinations	35,036	1.7

Source. Compiled with data from UNDESA, Population Division (2024). International Migrant Stock 2024. Table 1: International migrant stock at mid-year by sex and by region, country or area of destination and origin, 1990–2024.

Note: a. Islands; b. Dutch part.

Figure 1. Map of top 10 destinations for migrating Haitians, 2010, 2020, and 2024

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This map was produced by the Cartography Unit of the World Bank Group. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, on the part of the World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

Source: Global Bilateral Migration Matrix 1960–2020 and World Bank Migration Database. Data for 2024 compiled with data from UNDESA, Population Division (2024). International Migrant Stock, 2024. Table 1: International migrant stock at mid-year by sex and by region, country or area of destination and origin, 1990–2024.

When examining these key destinations by sex, some differences are noted for men and women (see Table 3 and Table 4). Among male migrants, Latin American countries, specifically Chile, Mexico, and Brazil, all overtook Canada and France, occupying the 3rd to 5th positions in 2024. For female migrants, France and Canada remained the stronger destinations, with those same three countries (Chile, Mexico, and Brazil) now holding the 5th to 7th positions surpassing nations in the Caribbean such as the Bahamas, French Guiana, and Guadeloupe.

Table 3. Top 10 destinations for migrating Haitian men, 2010, 2020, and 2024

Ranking	2010			2020			2024		
	Destination	Population	%	Destination	Population	%	Destination	Population	%
	World	578,350	100.0	World	967,516	100.0	World	1,084,638	100.0
1	United States	270,561	46.8	United States	350,280	36.2	United States	365,542	33.7
2	Dominican Republic	194,191	33.6	Dominican Republic	323,796	33.5	Dominican Republic	349,254	32.2
3	Canada	35,937	6.2	Chile	116,441	12.0	Chile	113,262	10.4
4	France	33,506	5.8	France	44,718	4.6	Mexico	54,992	5.1
5	Bahamas	14,517	2.5	Canada	44,319	4.6	Brazil	52,477	4.8
6	Guadeloupe	6,920	1.2	Brazil	29,705	3.1	France	47,835	4.4
7	French Guiana	6,660	1.2	Bahamas	16,762	1.7	Canada	47,647	4.4
8	Turks and Caicos ^a	4,878	0.8	French Guiana	9,395	1.0	Bahamas	17,735	1.6
9	Dominica	1,536	0.3	Mexico	8,571	0.9	French Guiana	10,315	1.0
10	Saint Maarten ^b	1,518	0.3	Turks and Caicos ^a	7,896	0.8	Turks and Caicos ^a	8,724	0.8
	Other	8,126	1.4	Other	15,633	1.6	Other	16,855	1.6

Source: Compiled with data from UNDESA, Population Division (2024). International Migrant Stock 2024. Table 1: International migrant stock at mid-year by sex and by region, country or area of destination and origin, 1990–2024.

Note: a. Islands; b. Dutch part.

Table 4. Top 10 destinations for migrating Haitian women, 2010, 2020, and 2024

Ranking	2010			2020			2024		
	Destination	Population	%	Destination	Population	%	Destination	Population	%
	World	578,661	100.0	World	797,183	100.0	World	933,054	100.0
1	United States	328,601	56.8	United States	382,619	48.0	United States	432,690	46.4
2	Dominican Republic	119,172	20.6	Dominican Republic	172,316	21.6	Dominican Republic	185,862	19.9
3	Canada	46,263	8.0	Chile	64,830	8.1	France	69,136	7.4
4	France	42,413	7.3	France	61,043	7.7	Canada	59,590	6.4
5	Bahamas	10,948	1.9	Canada	55,088	6.9	Chile	58,788	6.3
6	French Guiana	9,083	1.6	Bahamas	12,867	1.6	Mexico	36,630	3.9
7	Guadeloupe	7,811	1.3	French Guiana	12,689	1.6	Brazil	35,906	3.8
8	Turks and Caicos ^a	4,878	0.8	Turks and Caicos ^a	7,891	1.0	French Guiana	13,931	1.5
9	Dominica	1,535	0.3	Guadeloupe	7,834	1.0	Bahamas	13,618	1.5
10	Saint Maarten ^b	1,117	0.2	Brazil	5,855	0.7	Turks and Caicos ^a	8,722	0.9
	Other	6,840	1.2	Other	14,151	1.8	Other	18,181	1.9

Source: Compiled with data from UNDESA, Population Division (2024). International Migrant Stock 2024. Table 1: International migrant stock at mid-year by sex and by region, country or area of destination and origin, 1990–2024.

Note: a. Islands; b. (Dutch part).

Skilled Migrant Destinations

Skilled migration is usually conceptualized as migration of individuals residing in a country other than their country of birth who have achieved a certain level of education. In practice, this level of education ranges from having at least 10 years of schooling, to having some university-level education, to having completed a tertiary education. The World Bank defines tertiary education as formal post-secondary education, encompassing universities, colleges, and vocational or technical schools, which may or may not result in a formal qualification. In line with these commonly used definitions, this study defines skilled migration as individuals who have at least one year of tertiary education and live outside their country of birth. In this report, Haitians who meet these criteria are referred to as ‘tertiary-educated Haitians’.

Given that the education levels of migrating Haitians may not be reported, this study also explores data on employment as a complementary measure to proxy-skilled migration where possible. Identifying the types of occupations and sectors in which Haitian migrants work across key destination countries will also improve our understanding of how and where skilled Haitian migration is represented and integrated in local labor markets. In some contexts, educational qualifications obtained in Haiti may not be recognized or accredited in destination countries, leading to potential underemployment or deskilling.

Data from UNDESA reporting key destinations do not contain information on educational attainment. As such, this study uses data from the Global Bilateral Migration Matrix and the World Bank Migration Database for 2020 to examine skilled migration. Among tertiary-educated Haitians, the top five destinations are broadly similar to the general migrating population (see [Table 5](#)) with the United States dominating (accounting for 69.9 percent of tertiary-educated men and 74.9 percent of women). One notable difference is the Dominican Republic. While it has been an important destination for migrating Haitians, among those who are tertiary educated, it was a key destination for males, ranking fifth. Among women, the United Kingdom took that position in 2020.

Table 5. Top five destinations for tertiary-educated Haitians by sex, 2020

	Men	%		Women	%		Total	%
Total	200,536	100.0	Total	209,477	100.0	Total	410,013	100.0
United States	140,232	69.9	United States	156,900	74.9	United States	297,132	72.5
Canada	22,267	11.1	Canada	23,415	11.2	Canada	45,682	11.1
Chile	16,588	8.3	France	6,715	3.2	Chile	21,777	5.3
France	5,810	2.9	Chile	5,189	2.5	France	12,525	3.1
Dominican Republic	4,402	2.2	United Kingdom	4,572	2.2	United Kingdom	8,728	2.1

Source: Global Bilateral Migration Matrix 1960–2020 and World Bank Migration Database; Population age 15+.

In addition to the six countries indicated in Table 5 and given the growing importance of emerging Latin American countries as described previously, this study also examines Mexico and Brazil on skilled migration. Together, eight countries will be explored. In the following sections, each of these eight destination countries is discussed, first, in terms of the flow and key demographics of the Haitian migrant population (apart from the United Kingdom, which did not feature as an important destination for the general Haitian migrant population). This is followed by an analysis and discussion of tertiary-educated Haitian migration and their occupation-related details in the country of destination, where available. Details on the approach are provided in the Methodology section and summarized by country to highlight the specific data sources and time frame used.

Comparative Analysis of Skilled Migration in Key Destination Countries

The Haitian diaspora is distributed across eight major destination countries that differ markedly in the profile of migrants they attract and the labor market outcomes those migrants achieve. A central finding is the disconnect between education and labor market integration. Approximately 72 percent of Haiti's tertiary-educated population now lives abroad — one of the highest brain drain rates in the world — yet only in North America do migrants consistently convert their qualifications into commensurate employment. Across Latin America and, to a lesser extent, France, skilled Haitian migrants remain trapped in low-skilled, poorly paid, or informal work, representing an enormous waste of human capital both for Haiti and for receiving countries.

Educational Attainment

The educational profile of Haitian migrants varies enormously across destination countries, reflecting a combination of self-selection, immigration policy design, and the nature of bilateral migration corridors.

The **United Kingdom** stands at one extreme: 58.2 percent of Haitians aged 15 and above residing there in 2020 held a tertiary qualification, making it the most educated Haitian diaspora globally. Though the UK does not rank among the top ten destinations by total migrant volume, it ranks fifth globally for skilled Haitian migrants — a profile consistent with selective, points-based immigration criteria that systematically favor high-skilled applicants.

Mexico presents a similarly striking educational profile, with 49.4 percent of its Haitian population holding tertiary qualifications as of 2020, and 74.8 percent of those tertiary-educated migrants being women. This reflects the recency and composition of flows to Mexico: the migrants who arrived or remained in Mexico post-2019

were predominantly young, urban, and relatively educated — many of them diverted from the U.S. border rather than traditional labor migration channels.

The **United States** (43.9 percent tertiary-educated in 2023) and **Canada** (37.3 percent in 2021) follow, anchoring a North American tier of destinations that collectively absorb over 80 percent of Haiti's global tertiary-educated emigrant population. Within Canada, gender balance in educational levels is relatively even, though women with tertiary education slightly outperform men in employment outcomes.

Brazil (24.5 percent tertiary-educated in 2020) and **France** (11.7–13.4 percent depending on source and year) occupy the middle ground. In France, the majority of the Haitian population — particularly women, 89.4 percent of whom are non-tertiary-educated — arrived through historical and family reunification channels rather than skilled migration pathways. The share of tertiary-educated Haitians in France is nonetheless rising among younger cohorts aged 20–24.

The **Dominican Republic** is unambiguous: 96.7–98.6 percent of Haitians there have no tertiary education. This migration corridor functions essentially as a low-skill labor flow, driven by geographic proximity, wage differentials, and demand for manual labor in agriculture and construction. It represents an entirely different phenomenon from the skilled diasporas concentrated in North America and Europe.

Chile's data requires particular care. The 2017 national census recorded 83.2 percent of Haitians over 15 as holding some tertiary education — a figure that diverges sharply from harmonized international estimates (~10 percent) and likely reflects definitional differences in how Chile records incomplete or partial post-secondary enrollment. Regardless of the measure used, the key finding for Chile is not the education level itself but what happens to it in the labor market.

Employment and labor market outcomes

Employment outcomes diverge sharply across the eight countries and are closely — though imperfectly — linked to educational profiles. The data reveal three distinct tiers (see Table 6).

Table 6. Key employment and labor market outcomes

Destination	Ref. Year	Employment Rate (Tertiary)	Unemployment Rate (Tertiary)	Inactivity Rate (Tertiary)	Employment Rate (Non-Tertiary)	Unemployment Rate (Non-Tertiary)
United States	2023	94.5%	5.5%	19.5%	92.3%	7.7%
Dominican Republic	2010	87.2%	12.8%	52.4%	87.7%	12.3%
Chile	2017	81.5%	18.5%	20.7%	83.6%	16.4%
France	2011	72.5%	27.5%	54.8%	55.1%	44.9%
Canada	2021	95.4%	4.6%	18.1%	92.3%	7.7%
Mexico	2020	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Brazil	2018–2024	n/a	n/a	18.7% (no occupation)	n/a	n/a
United Kingdom	2020	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

Notes: latest available year. See Appendix II for data sources.

North America: Strongest Integration. The United States and Canada achieve the highest employment rates and lowest unemployment rates among the eight destinations, and uniquely show that tertiary education translates into a measurable employment premium. In the United States (2023), tertiary-educated Haitians have an employment rate of 94.5 percent and an unemployment rate of 5.5 percent — considerably better than the 92.3 percent employment rate and 7.7 percent unemployment rate recorded for non-tertiary-educated counterparts. Inactivity rates also fall substantially with education: 19.5 percent for tertiary-educated migrants versus 37.2 percent for those without higher

education. Gender dynamics within the tertiary group are favorable: women have a slightly lower unemployment rate (5.0 percent) than men (6.0 percent), and a higher employment rate (95.0 vs. 94.0 percent).

Canada (2021) records the best aggregate outcomes of any country: a 95.4 percent employment rate and just 4.6 percent unemployment among tertiary-educated Haitians. Tertiary-educated women in Canada achieve a 96.0 percent employment rate — marginally above men (94.7 percent) — and an unemployment rate of just 4.0 percent. The inactivity rate for skilled migrants (18.1 percent) is among the lowest in the comparison group.

France and the Dominican Republic: High Unemployment

and Inactivity. France (2011 data) presents the starkest underperformance relative to its developed-economy status. Tertiary-educated Haitians record an employment rate of only 72.5 percent and an unemployment rate of 27.5 percent — more than five times the rate observed in Canada. Non-tertiary-educated Haitians fare even worse, with an employment rate of 55.1 percent and unemployment reaching 44.9 percent. The inactivity rate among tertiary-educated Haitians is 54.8 percent, and among tertiary-educated women specifically it reaches 60.8 percent — pointing to structural barriers that go well beyond credential recognition.

The Dominican Republic (2010) exhibits high nominal employment rates (87.2 percent for tertiary-educated migrants), but this figure masks a near-total informality of employment — estimated at 93 to 96 percent of all Haitian workers. Unemployment among tertiary-educated migrants stands at 12.8 percent, and female inactivity is extreme: 69.9 percent of tertiary-educated Haitian women in the Dominican Republic are economically inactive, reflecting both limited formal opportunities and entrenched gender norms in the informal economy.

Latin America: Employment Without Integration. Chile (2017) presents a paradox: employment rates for both tertiary- (81.5 percent) and non-tertiary-educated (83.6 percent) Haitians are relatively high, yet unemployment among the tertiary-educated

reaches 18.5 percent — and among tertiary-educated women specifically, 33.9 percent. These figures reflect a labor market that absorbs Haitian workers in volume but not in quality. The premium from education is negligible or even inverted: tertiary-educated migrants face higher unemployment than their non-tertiary counterparts, a pattern consistent with employers' unwillingness to recognize Haitian qualifications.

Brazil's labor market data are organized differently — Brazil's registration-based system tracks occupational status rather than standard employment and unemployment rates — but the picture is clear. Only 6.4 percent of Haitian migrants in Brazil hold skilled employment. The majority (33.3 percent) are classified as working in unskilled occupations, and 18.7 percent report having no occupation at all. Average monthly wages are US\$362, rising to US\$448 for tertiary-educated migrants — but skilled women earn roughly US\$75 less per month than skilled men, a persistent gender wage gap at all education levels.

Mexico lacks disaggregated labor market data for the most recent period, reflecting both the recency of large-scale Haitian arrivals and the difficulty of capturing irregular migrants in official statistics. Mexico has functioned as both a transit and destination country, and the emerging labor market profile of Haitians there — predominantly young, relatively educated, female-majority among the skilled — differs from all other destinations in the comparison group.

Sectors of Activity and Occupational Distribution

Sectoral distribution reveals not only where migrants work but whether their qualifications are being used — or wasted.

Professional and Skilled Occupation Access: United States and Canada. In the United States, tertiary-educated Haitians are predominantly found in professional and related occupations (42.7 percent of all skilled workers: 36.5 percent of men, 48.3 percent of women). Service, sales, and administrative roles account for a further 33.9 percent. A notable exception persists among skilled men: 22.7 percent of tertiary-educated Haitian males in the U.S.

still work in transportation and production — indicating that even in the best-performing destination, occupational integration is incomplete for a significant minority. Among non-tertiary-educated Haitians in the U.S., men are concentrated in transportation and production (37.7 percent) while women cluster in service, sales, and administrative occupations (50.0 percent).

Canada shows the most pronounced sectoral concentration of any destination: health care and social assistance dominates across both education levels. Among tertiary-educated Haitians, 42.0 percent work in this sector — rising to 60.8 percent among tertiary-educated women. Tertiary-educated men are more diversified, with 29.5 percent in utilities, construction, and manufacturing. Among non-tertiary migrants, health care and social assistance (36.1 percent) and manufacturing (13.6 percent) lead.

Underutilization and Brain Waste: Chile. Chile is the clearest case of structural brain waste in the comparison group. Despite holding relatively high levels of reported education, 70.5 percent of skilled Haitians in Chile work in sectors that do not require tertiary qualifications: construction (21.4 percent), agriculture (18.9 percent), and commerce and vehicle repair (16.7 percent). This pattern reflects both the absence of credential recognition mechanisms and the sectoral demand profile that drew Haitian migrants to Chile in the first place — primarily unskilled labor in construction and agribusiness.

Informality and Manual Labor: Dominican Republic. In the Dominican Republic, sectoral concentration is extreme among both education groups. Non-tertiary migrants work predominantly in agriculture, fishing, and forestry (35.8 percent) and construction (20.5 percent), with occupational distribution dominated by elementary occupations (36.2 percent) and craft trades (23.2 percent). Tertiary-educated migrants show more diversification — wholesale and retail trade (18.9 percent), education (15.4 percent) — but 9.3 percent still work in construction, and the overwhelming majority remain in the informal economy.

Mixed Profiles: France and Brazil. In France, tertiary education does provide some occupational access: 20.6 percent of skilled Haitians work in professional roles and 15.4 percent in technical occupations. However, 13.7 percent of tertiary-educated migrants remain in craft trades, and 9.9 percent in elementary occupations — a higher downward displacement than in North America. Among non-tertiary migrants, the largest occupational groups are services and market sales (30.0 percent) and elementary occupations (20.3 percent).

In Brazil, among the small share of migrants in skilled employment (6.4 percent), teachers represent the most common professional role (19.4 percent of skilled workers), followed by technical and liberal professionals (15.1 percent). The vast majority, however, are concentrated in unskilled construction (21.6 percent of unskilled workers) and sales (18.5 percent). Female skilled migrants in Brazil are heavily concentrated in health-related professional fields (95.5 percent of Haitians in health professions are women), reflecting a gendered division in what few professional pathways exist.

Mexico lacks sectoral data at sufficient disaggregation for this comparison period.

Synthesis

Three patterns emerge clearly from this comparative analysis.

The first is a North America premium: the United States and Canada are the only countries where education reliably translates into appropriate employment, high formal-sector participation, and relatively low unemployment. This reflects both demand for skilled foreign labor and functional credential recognition systems.

The second is a Latin America penalty: Chile, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic all exhibit severe skill underutilization, occupational mismatches, and/or labor market informality that effectively nullify the education premium migrants bring. In Chile, skilled Haitians face higher unemployment than unskilled ones — a striking inversion that signals active discrimination or credential rejection rather than simple market sorting.

The third is a France anomaly: France's labor market outcomes for Haitian migrants are the weakest of the three developed-economy destinations (alongside the US and UK), with unemployment rates for skilled migrants more than five times higher than in Canada. This cannot be explained by migrants' education level alone and points to structural labor market barriers — possibly including discrimination and poor credential portability — that are specific to the French context.

For Mexico and the UK, data limitations preclude strong conclusions, but both represent important cases to track: Mexico as an emerging large-scale destination absorbing an unusually educated migrant cohort, and the UK as a niche high-skill destination that warrants closer integration into the global analysis of Haitian brain drain.



PART IV

Remittances from the Haitian Diaspora (2000–2025): Trends, Impacts, and Regional Comparison



Haiti's diaspora has become a financial lifeline for the country over the past 25 years. This section examines the trends in remittance flows from key diaspora communities (notably in the United States, Canada, France, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico) between 2000

and 2025. The economic, social, demographic, and political impacts of these remittances on Haiti are analyzed, highlighting hypotheses from the available data and empirically based reports. Finally, Haiti's remittance dynamics with those of other Latin American and Caribbean countries are compared.

Key Findings

- **Exponential growth in remittances.** Haiti's remittance inflows surged from under US\$1 billion in the early 2000s to nearly US\$4 billion, constituting 20–25 percent of GDP, especially after the 2010 earthquake and during the COVID-19 pandemic.
- **Dominance of remittances.** By the late 2010s, remittances surpassed foreign aid and foreign direct investment (FDI), becoming Haiti's largest external financial inflow, four times greater than export revenues by 2023.
- **Stability in crisis.** During economic shocks, remittances remained stable or grew, serving as a vital safety net for households amid disaster and instability.
- **Diversification of sources.** While the United States is the main source of remittances (70–84 percent), Chile and Brazil have emerged as important remittance corridors since 2010.
- **High costs.** Sending remittances to Haiti incurs 5–10 percent in fees, with additional government charges and a new US tax introduced in 2025, potentially reducing inflows.

- **Poverty reduction.** Remittances help decrease poverty and support basic needs for one-third of Haitian households, improving child well-being.
- **Dependency concerns.** While alleviating poverty, remittances are primarily used for consumption rather than investment, likely fostering economic dependency.
- **Social and political effects.** Remittances affect family dynamics and can increase crime risk for recipient families, while also shrinking the state's service responsibilities.
- **Haiti in the regional context.** Haiti is one of the most remittance-dependent economies globally, with a more diversified source than many Caribbean and Central American countries.
- **Policy recommendation.** Remittances provide essential support but are not a sustainable development solution, highlighting the need for policies that encourage productive investment from the diaspora.

Trends in Remittance Flows (2000–2025)

Haiti's remittance inflows have increased exponentially since 2000 (BRH 2024; Orozco and Springer 2024; World Bank 2023). Figure 2 highlights key milestones in this growth. Annual remittances have surged from under US\$1 billion in the early 2000s to nearly US\$4 billion in recent years, with exceptionally rapid growth after Haiti's 2010 earthquake and during the late 2010s. By 2020–2021, Haiti's remittance receipts were at record highs (approximately US\$3.8 to US\$4 billion per year)—a roughly eightfold increase from 2000. This increase defied expectations during periods of shock. For example, in 2020, despite the COVID-19 pandemic, remittances rose rather than fell, helping Haitian households survive the crisis (BRH 2024; Cela et al. 2022; INURED 2020). Between 2023 and

2025, remittances have remained historically high, albeit with slight declines from peak periods. For instance, official estimates show that flows in 2023 held at around US\$3.8 billion (just under 20 percent of GDP). In per capita terms, remittances inflows represented US\$349.2 in 2024, or about 16.3 percent of GDP per capita.⁴

Remittances eclipsed all other external financial inflows to Haiti over this period. Over the first two decades of the 2000s, remittances have consistently outpaced FDI, eventually surpassing foreign aid (except for a brief aid spike immediately following the 2010 earthquake). By 2018, for example, Haiti's US\$3.1 billion in remittances was more than three times the country's foreign aid receipts and nearly 30 times greater than FDI. During this same period, remittances also dwarfed Haiti's export earnings; by 2005, they were already "well over 100 percent of the value of the nation's exports," and by 2023, they were four times larger than Haiti's export revenues and 100 times larger than FDI inflows (World Bank 2023). Similarly, in this period, remittances received represented a large proportion of Haiti's GDP, from a low of 8.5 percent (2000) to nearly one-quarter in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic. This underscores how dependent the Haitian economy has become on funds sent from abroad.


Significant events have punctuated the remittance trend. As discussed in previous sections, the January 2010 earthquake triggered a wave of outmigration and Haitians living abroad contributing to a jump in remittances in the ensuing years. Remittances in 2010 reached about US\$1.5 billion, or approximately half of overseas direct assistance (US\$3.1 billion), and continued to increase as more Haitians migrated. Almost a decade later, remittance transfer totals would exceed both foreign aid and FDI. Surprisingly, this trend would persist during the COVID-19 pandemic despite initial forecasts of a 20 percent drop in transfers that was contradicted when Haitians living abroad increased their support, leading to a nearly 10 percent rise in 2020. US stimulus measures and an economic rebound, among other factors, helped push Haiti's remittance transfer totals to an all-time high of roughly US\$4 billion by 2021. This increase might, however, have also reflected a shift from informal channels to formal ones

⁴ Authors' calculations based on World Bank (2026) World Development Indicators. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Retrieved from <https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators>

rather than a change in actual flows due to mobility restrictions imposed during the pandemic. (BRH 2024; Cela et al. 2022; Dinarte et al., 2022; INURED 2020, 2024; Orozco and Springer 2024; World Bank 2023).

Between 2021 and 2025, Haitian society has experienced a systematic collapse of its political authority and the state's rule of law institutions, leading to generalized insecurity and state failure (Cela et al. 2022; INURED 2020, 2024; Orozco and Springer 2024). These inflows provided a critical cushion as Haiti faced concurrent systemic crises (cascading disasters, pandemic, political instability, generalized violence, and so on), allowing families to weather income losses. In the past few years, Haiti's remittances have plateaued or dipped slightly. Haiti's central bank data show a modest 1–5 percent decline from the peak, with diaspora transfers totaling about US\$3.8 billion in 2022–2023. Even so, at roughly 20–25 percent of GDP, Haiti remains one of the highest remittance-dependent nations in the world.

Figure 2. Haiti's remittance inflows as a percentage of GDP over time




Source: Data compiled by the World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS>.

Remittance Outflows

Despite the high levels of remittances received in Haiti, many Haitian households also send money to their household members abroad. Between 2000 and 2023, remittances sent from Haiti abroad varied from a low of US\$11 million (2000) out of an inflow of US\$578 million to a high of US\$678 million (2021) out of an inflow of US\$3,994 million. While these only represented a small proportion of the remittance inflow, they nevertheless indicate the reciprocal nature of resource sharing and mutual reliance. While the dominant narrative emphasizes remittances to Haiti from Haitians abroad, these figures highlight the importance of remittances from Haitians in Haiti to relatives abroad. These remittances, though smaller in volume, demonstrate how Haitians enact family solidarity, fulfill moral economies of obligation, and respond flexibly to changing global constraints—even amid economic hardship at home. In addition, many middle- and upper-class Haitians send their children to study abroad. Due to the intensity of violence, depleted infrastructure, human insecurity, and volatile sociopolitical situations, many entrepreneurs, high-level government officials, and leaders of local NGOs maintain their families outside of Haiti. The common objectives of these remittances are summarized as follows:

Objectives	Tertiary Education
Subsistence and Emergency support	Rent, food, medical costs, or detainment fees abroad
Transit assistance	Bus fare, coyote payments, and temporary lodging
Educational expenses	Tuition or materials for students abroad
Religious or ritual obligations	Support for funerals, baptisms, or spiritual needs
Migration documentation	Passport, visa applications, or legal fees
Health care support	For undocumented family members who cannot access care

Figure 3. Remittances received and sent (US\$, millions, at current prices)

Source: Data compiled World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS>.

Haitians have historically emigrated mainly to the Dominican Republic, North America (United States and Canada), and Europe (France), but since 2010, new diasporas have also formed in Latin America. Correspondingly, the United States remains the largest source of remittances to Haiti. At the same time, countries such as Brazil, Chile, and others in Latin America have emerged as critical new migration corridors over the past 15 years.

- **United States.** The United States is the dominant source of Haiti's remittance inflows. Haitian Americans form the largest diaspora community (well over 1 million people), and their transfers account for an estimated 70–84 percent of all remittances to Haiti in recent years. For instance, even during the pandemic, the US share remained high. In April 2020,

remittances from the United States alone totaled US\$238 million, about 83 percent of that month's total remittances to Haiti (Cela et al. 2022; INURED 2020).

- **Canada and France.** Haiti's diaspora in Canada (primarily Quebec) and in France also sends sizable remittances, though much smaller than US flows. Together, transfers from Canada and France typically make up 10–13 percent of Haiti's remittances. In late 2020, for example, the combined remittance contribution of Canada plus France (along with Brazil) was roughly equal to Chile's alone (Cela et al. 2022; INURED 2020)—implying each of those countries individually contributed only a few percent. These flows are steady and vital to many Haitian families as there are well-established diaspora communities in Montreal and Paris, but the scale of US remittances greatly overshadows their contributions.
- **Dominican Republic.** The neighboring Dominican Republic hosts many Haitians, often seasonal workers and recent immigrants, and has become an increasingly significant remittance source. Remittances from the Dominican Republic to Haiti have almost tripled since 2010, reflecting the post-earthquake migration surge and better documentation of flows. Despite this growth, the Dominican Republic's share remains relatively modest compared to the United States, partly because Haitians in the Dominican Republic generally have lower incomes. However, it must be noted that due to their shared border, the costs of remitting, and the often clandestine nature of migration between these two countries, some funds move through informal channels and are difficult to track. Still, by the late 2010s, the Dominican Republic was among the top six source countries for Haiti's remittances. These South-South remittances are a new dynamic: before 2010, virtually no recorded remittances came to Haiti from the Dominican Republic or other Latin American countries. The increase since then illustrates the expanding regional migration corridors.
- **Brazil.** Brazil became a significant destination for Haitians after 2010, when it offered humanitarian visas following the earthquake. By the mid-2010s, tens of thousands of Haitians resided in Brazil, and they established a remittance channel to

Haiti. However, remittances from Brazil have remained smaller, though steadier, than other newer corridors. From 2017 to 2020, Haitian central bank data show Brazilian-sourced remittances were consistently lower than those from Chile (about 40 percent of Chile’s volume, on average). Brazil’s contribution was typically only a few percent of Haiti’s monthly remittance totals, though it remained relatively stable from month to month. During the first wave of COVID-19 in 2020, remittances from Brazil dipped less sharply than those from Chile, suggesting that Haitians living in Brazil were somewhat more insulated from the pandemic’s economic impacts. Many Haitians in Brazil have since moved on (some traveling northward to Mexico/United States), which may have capped the long-term growth of this corridor (INURED 2020, 2024).


- **Chile.** Chile has emerged in the last decade as one of Haiti’s most important new remittance sources. Virtually no Haitians lived in Chile before 2010, but Haitian migration to Chile exploded after the earthquake, creating a sizable diaspora community. By 2019, remittances from Chile to Haiti reached US\$115 million, roughly 1 percent of Haiti’s GDP. By mid-2020, there were 237,000 people of Haitian origin living in Chile (Yates 2021). Chile at that time rivaled—and even surpassed—Haiti’s traditional destination countries in Europe: for example, in August 2020, Chile accounted for 8 percent of Haiti’s remittances (about US\$22 million), which was almost equal to the combined contributions of Canada, France, and Brazil. This is remarkable growth from essentially zero a decade prior. That said, the Chile–Haiti remittance corridor has shown volatility. Transfers from Chile peaked in the late 2010s and then saw a general downward trend, with 20 out of 23 months in one analysis showing year-on-year decreases. Economic struggles in Chile and shifts in immigration policy led some Haitians to leave or send less money. During the COVID lockdown in 2020, remittances from Chile to Haiti dropped sharply (far more than Brazil-originated flows), highlighting the economic vulnerability of Haitians living in Chile during the height of the pandemic. Remittance flows began to recover by late 2020. Despite these fluctuations, Chile remains a critical new source of remittances for Haiti, illustrating how intraregional migration has diversified the country’s remittance base (INURED 2020, 2024).

In summary, Haiti's remittance inflows are still dominated by the traditional migration hubs (United States, Canada, and France), which account for the bulk of the US\$3 billion to US\$4 billion sent annually. However, the intraregional flows from Latin American countries (Dominican Republic, Chile, Brazil, and so on) have added a new dimension to Haiti's remittance landscape since 2010. This mirrors a broader trend in Latin America of growing South-South migration and remittances (INURED 2024). Haiti is a leading example of this trend; few other Caribbean countries receive such a significant portion of remittances from within the Latin America and Caribbean region. Within the Latin America and Caribbean region, remitting practices among Venezuelans, the largest migrating population within the region, is a parallel case in Latin America, with Venezuelans sending money to Venezuelan families, but in the Caribbean context, Haiti's situation is unique (Orozco and Springer 2023). The diversification of remittance source countries may offer some economic resilience to Haitian families (as seen in 2020 where pandemic-related policies had differential impacts on diasporas), but it also means Haiti's fortunes are directly tied to economic conditions in many host countries (Cela et al. 2022; INURED 2020).

Cost of Remittances for Haitians Living Abroad

The cost of sending remittances to Haiti is notably higher than the average for the LAC region, posing a significant financial burden to Haitians sending money abroad. On average, Haitians in the diaspora incur fees ranging from 5 percent to over 10 percent of the remitted amount. Sending money to Haiti from the United States stands at 5.54 percent, below the global average but higher than many neighboring countries. The additional US\$1.50 fee imposed by the Haitian government further increases the financial burden on senders. This disparity is evident when compared to remittance costs for other nations in the Americas (see Figure 4 below).

Figure 4 displays a comparative chart showing remittance costs to Haiti from various countries in the continent, alongside the Latin America and Caribbean regional average, the global average, and the UN Sustainable Development Goal target of 3 percent:


Figure 4. Remittance costs to Haiti compared with regional and global averages

Source: Data compiled World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS>.

Corridors (dark green bars) show the actual fees charged to send remittances to Haiti. Benchmark averages (light green bars) include the global and regional averages from the World Bank. The SDG target (orange bar) reflects the UN Sustainable Development Goal 10.C which aims to reduce fees to 3 percent or lower.⁵

As of May 23, 2025, the US House of Representatives passed the US Remittance Bill. The excise tax on remittance transfers imposed is 3.5 percent, affecting non-US citizens, which includes visa and green card holders. This segment of immigrants in the United States includes the most economically vulnerable populations and, as reported in the graphs below, people from countries that face the most challenging socioeconomic and political conditions in their home countries.

⁵ All migration corridors to Haiti exceed the SDG target of 3 percent. Dominican Republic → Haiti is the most expensive at 11 percent, nearly four times the SDG target. Even the lowest cost corridor (United States → Haiti at 5.54 percent) is still above both the global (6.2 percent) and regional averages (5.8 percent). The SDG target (3.0 percent) is clearly marked in green to emphasize the gap.

Figure 5. Estimated reduction in annual remittances by destination as % of gross national income (GNI)

Source: Estimated Reduction in Annual Remittances by Destination as % of GNI (Source: CGD, World Bank, US Census Bureau).

Using data from the Center for Global Development (CGD), which includes sources from the World Bank and the US Census Bureau, the study estimated the reduction in annual remittances as a percentage of GNI for selected countries, based on the potential impact of a 3.5 percent US remittance tax. This graph underscores how remittance-dependent economies, especially smaller, low- and middle-income countries, are vulnerable to shifts in US remittance policy or financial costs. Even small disruptions or added fees can translate into significant national-level losses, affecting household welfare, consumption, and poverty reduction strategies. Haiti would see an estimated reduction of 0.52 percent of GNI, reflecting its heavy dependence on remittances as a social and economic lifeline.

Socioeconomic and Demographic Impacts in Haiti

Remittances have far-reaching impacts on Haitian society. At the household level, they are a critical lifeline sustaining consumption, education, and health. They influence labor patterns, migration, and even demographic trends at the national level. Below, the key impacts identified by the document analysis are examined:

- **Poverty alleviation and household welfare.** Remittances are outsized in reducing poverty in Haiti. Around 35 percent to 45 percent of Haitian households have at least one member abroad, and roughly one-third of all households receive remittance income (INURED 2024). According to an Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) study, these remittances are an ‘escape route from poverty’ for many families (IDB 2024). Households that receive diaspora funds have about 22 percent lower vulnerability to poverty than those that do not. The study suggests that Haitian households receiving remittances also experience lower rates of chronic poverty. Essentially, money from relatives overseas helps pay for food, housing, and other basic needs that local incomes could not cover. INURED studies have shown that there have been tangible improvements in child well-being: children in remittance-recipient households in Haiti have *better health and nutrition and higher school attendance* than children in similar households without remittances (INURED 2020). One study found positive impacts on educational outcomes for low-income Haitian families that received remittances (Cela et al. 2022; INURED 2020). Remittances, thus, are likely to make a direct contribution to improving human development indicators by enabling families to cover school fees, health care, and nutrition (contributing to improved diets).
- **Consumption, investment, and dependency.** A large share of remittances to Haiti is used for consumption expenditure—food, rent, transportation, school costs, and daily needs. This has a crucial short-term welfare effect (preventing hunger and homelessness for many), but scholars debate its long-term developmental effect. Some economists have argued that remittances can foster dependency and do not necessarily spur

productive investment (Cela et al. 2022). These inflows might encourage recipients to consume more ‘non-essential’ goods instead of investing in businesses or assets. They might reduce labor supply if families rely on external support (a form of the so-called ‘remittance curse’); a similar phenomenon has occurred in the Dominican Republic. In Haiti’s case, researchers note that despite billions of diaspora dollars, there has been little broad-based economic growth or job creation (Inter-American Dialogue 2022). The funds often keep households afloat but are rarely channeled into large-scale enterprise development, due to Haiti’s complex business environment and the challenges associated with conducting business there even in times of relative stability (World Bank, n.d.).

On the other hand, more optimistic research points out that spending on basic consumption is valuable for poor households, raising living standards. It can indirectly improve productivity (a healthier, better-fed, better-educated population). Even small investments happen at the micro level: for instance, some families use remittances to save or to purchase livestock, farming equipment, or improve their homes, which can have multiplier effects. One common use of remittances in Haiti is home construction or improvement (often termed ‘remittance houses’). While this is an investment, it is in housing rather than business. The net effect on Haiti’s development is complex: remittances undoubtedly alleviate immediate poverty but have not yet propelled sustained economic growth. They may also contribute to inequality, as households with relatives abroad gain a source of income not available to others (though in Haiti, so many households have some diaspora connection that remittances are widespread) (Cela et al. 2022; INURED 2020; Orozco and Springer 2024).

- **Social impacts and demographic changes.** Remittances have also shaped social and demographic patterns. The prospect of supporting family back home has encouraged further emigration—migration in Haiti is often a family survival strategy, whereby one or more members go abroad to earn and send money. Over time, this has contributed to Haiti’s brain drain (primarily as skilled or educated workers emigrate) even as it boosts the circumstances of those remaining in Haiti. Demographically, the areas and communities within Haiti where

migrating Haitians predominantly originate often see changes: many working-age adults leave, potentially skewing the age structure of those communities (more children and elderly, fewer in between). The reliance on diaspora support has become embedded in household dynamics: INURED’s migration study found that nearly half of all households in Haiti depend on remittances to meet their basic needs (Cela et al. 2022; INURED 2024). This affects family structures, for example, many children grow up with parents abroad, supported by remittances but lacking parental presence, which can have serious additional social impacts. These can range from caregiver substitution, where children are cared for by grandparents or extended kin when parents migrate, sometimes leading to overburdened caregivers or inconsistent supervision and even abuse (CDC and INURED 2014; Jones et al. 2014), to emotional and psychological trauma (Al-Azzeh and Diab 2025), among others.

- On the positive side, families receiving remittances have fewer children and invest more in each child’s education, a pattern observed in some remittance-heavy countries (though data specific to Haiti’s fertility rate linked to remittances are limited). Another social aspect is the culture of migration: as so many Haitians have relatives overseas, aspirations among youth often tilt toward emigration as a path to prosperity. Migration is thus embedded with social expectations within families and communities. Remittances thus indirectly encourage a cycle of migration, as young people see international opportunities as the surest way to help their families (Cela et al. 2022; INURED 2020, 2024), although there is a need to better understand those Haitians who failed after having migrated.
- **Resilience to shocks.** A critical impact of remittances in Haiti is on disaster resilience and crisis recovery. Haiti is highly vulnerable to natural disasters (hurricanes and earthquakes), political crises, and economic instability. Remittances serve as a form of insurance and recovery fund during these times. Studies have documented that remittance inflows to Haiti spike after disasters, as diaspora members rush to assist family and friends. For example, following destructive disasters such as Hurricane Jeanne (2004), remittances to Haiti rose markedly—the World Bank found that Haiti had the most pronounced

remittance increase among all disaster-hit countries studied, attributing it to the diaspora's rapid response (World Bank 2010). Similar patterns occurred after the 2010 earthquake, when Haitian expatriates organized fundraisers and sent additional money home. Collective remittances also emerged: Haitian churches, hometown associations, and diaspora organizations pooled money to send back for community recovery projects. These inflows have been vital in helping families rebuild homes and livelihoods when formal aid was delayed, insufficient, or nonexistent. Remittances also help households cope with everyday crises; for instance, during Haiti's recurring political turmoil or periods of inflation, diaspora funds help relatives back home address their basic needs (INURED 2020). In recent years, as Haiti has faced a surge in gang violence and kidnapping, remittances have sadly been drawn into that sphere as well, and families often end up using diaspora-sent money to pay ransoms or relocate to safer areas. This underscores that while remittances increase household resilience, they can also become entangled with Haiti's instability: the rise of kidnappings for ransom in Haiti has targeted those families assumed to have access to diaspora funds, the unintended dark side of heavy remittance inflows (Bojarski 2021).

In summary, social and economic impacts of remittances in Haiti are a double-edged sword. They undeniably reduce poverty, improve living conditions, and act as a safety net for millions of Haitians. Remittances have enabled higher school enrollment, better health outcomes, and survival through crises in a country where the government often fails to provide adequate services. At the same time, concerns persist about dependency and structural change: Haiti's economy has not diversified or grown commensurately with the remittance boom, and many families relying on money are vulnerable to economic downturns in host countries. Haiti's heavy remittance dependence is a symptom of an anemic domestic economy (Cela et al. 2022; Jaupart 2023; Orozco and Springer 2024). Thus, while remittances are a lifeline, they are not a panacea for Haiti's broader development challenges.

Political Impacts of Remittances and Diaspora Engagement

Remittances and the diaspora have also influenced Haiti's political landscape, albeit in complex ways. One impact is that remittances act as a private social safety net, possibly reducing pressure on the government to provide welfare or jobs. Plagued by weak institutions, the Haitian State has leaned informally on the diaspora's contributions to sustain the population. Some analysts argue that this external support enables Haitian governments to avoid difficult reforms; essentially, the diaspora cushions public discontent that might otherwise force political change. For example, when basic services or employment are lacking, families still survive on remittances, and the urgency for government intervention is dampened. This dynamic can entrench the status quo or enable poor governance, a phenomenon noted in other countries with high emigration. In Haiti's case, decades of emigration and inflows have coincided with weak state capacity; causation is debated, but the correlation is clear that the economy is "sustained largely by migrant remittances and foreign assistance" in the absence of effective public institutions (Orozco and Springer 2024).

On the other hand, the Haitian diaspora has become an essential political actor in its own right. Many members of the diaspora are highly engaged in Haiti's future, advocating for policy changes and even participating in politics. Diaspora organizations in the United States lobby for international aid to Haiti and for immigration relief (such as TPS in the United States) that enables Haitians abroad to remain and keep sending money. In Brazil, human rights organizations partner with Haitian community-based organizations in Rio and São Paulo to lobby for cooperation between Haiti and Brazil to address the Haitian sociopolitical crises and systemic violence (Crawley et al. 2024). Research indeed shows the diaspora can boost growth and social development if effectively engaged.


There are also more direct political effects of remittances at the community level. Remittance inflows can elevate the social status of recipient families, which might translate into local influence or

alliances with political actors. In some towns, those with diaspora support become community leaders or financiers of local projects, indirectly shaping local governance. Conversely, the influx of money can attract predatory behavior by corrupt officials or gangs. As mentioned, the crime surge in Haiti, especially kidnappings, has a link to remittances: gangs target individuals or neighborhoods known to receive money from the United States or Canada, assuming they can pay ransom. Unfortunately, this has politicized remittances, since insecurity undermines the very benefits that the diaspora provides. The US Treasury and Haitian banks have also had to strengthen anti-money laundering oversight, as the massive flow of remittance funds can be co-opted by criminal networks or fuel gang violence and drug trafficking in Haiti.

In summary, Haiti's diaspora is an increasingly pivotal political force, though one primarily operating from the outside. Remittances have given the diaspora economic leverage that they are slowly translating into political influence, whether through lobbying for favorable policies abroad, advocating for electoral participation, or funding local initiatives in Haiti. The Haitian population's dependence on diaspora dollars has also subtly shifted the citizen-state relationship, arguably making the government less accountable to its people's economic needs. Going forward, many observers see better diaspora engagement as key to Haiti's progress—harnessing not just the diaspora's money, but its human capital and ideas. Initiatives such as diaspora bonds, voting from abroad, or incentive programs to channel remittances into development projects have all been discussed as ways to convert this vast informal flow into a more strategic tool for national development (World Bank 2010). The challenge is to do so while maintaining the vital support that remittances provide to households on a daily basis.

Haiti in Regional Context: Comparison with Selected Latin America and Caribbean Countries

Haiti is often cited as one of the world's most remittance-dependent economies, which holds true compared to its regional neighbors. Figure 6 compares Haiti's remittance metrics with those of select countries in the Caribbean and Central America (which host many high-emigration societies). By percentage of GDP, Haiti consistently ranks near the top.

Figure 6. Remittances as a share of GDP - Haiti versus selected LAC countries (circa 2022)

Source: World Bank data (2022–2023); national central banks.

The graph illustrates that countries like Honduras and El Salvador lead globally in remittance dependency, with Haiti following closely behind. Most other Caribbean nations have much lower dependence (for example, the Dominican Republic’s remittances are about 10 percent of GDP, and islands with tourism-driven economies tend to have single-digit remittance ratios). Still, their much larger GDP means remittances account for only a small percentage of the economy. Haiti, by contrast, has a small GDP, so even moderate dollar inflows translate into a huge proportional impact (Jaupart 2023).

Haiti’s reliance on remittances has grown over time, outpacing many of its peers. In 2012, remittances were about 12 percent of Haiti’s GDP; presently that share is roughly double, whereas countries such as El Salvador or Jamaica have increased more gradually or started from a higher base. Haiti’s current remittance/GDP ratio positions it in the top tier globally (in league with countries like Nepal or Tonga outside the hemisphere).

Another comparative aspect is how remittances are used and their effects. Generally, across the Caribbean and Central America, remittances are credited with reducing poverty and boosting household spending on education and health. Haiti is no exception to those regional trends. However, Haiti's situation is often seen as more extreme. For example, remittances to Haiti are four times the value of exports, whereas for the Dominican Republic remittances (though large in absolute terms, over US\$9 billion in 2022) are roughly equal to exports (around 10 percent of GDP each)—the Dominican Republic has a more diversified economy with tourism and export manufacturing. Jamaica's remittances (about US\$3.6 billion in 2021) also rival its leading industry (tourism) in foreign earnings, but Jamaica has more internal production than Haiti. Honduras and El Salvador mirror Haiti in that remittances form the backbone of their economies, supporting consumption while domestic investment lags. These countries struggle with the downside of dependency: young people emigrate *en masse*, and growth is slow, but without remittances, poverty would be dramatically worse.

One notable difference is the geographic diversification of Haiti's remittance sources compared to some other countries. El Salvador and Honduras, for example, receive the vast majority of remittances from one country (the United States). Haiti also relies principally on the United States, but as discussed, it now also taps significant flows from France, Canada, and increasingly other western hemisphere countries. This multi-source pattern is somewhat unusual in the region (reflecting Haiti's unique diaspora spread). It could offer a slight hedge—economic trouble in the United States might be partly offset by Chile or Canada. In reality, the US economy still drives outcomes for most diaspora remitters. In any case, Haiti's South-South remittance channels (for example, from Chile or the Dominican Republic) have been highlighted in research as a distinctive feature. This aligns with the broader trend that intraregional migration in Latin America is creating 'new remittance corridors' beyond the traditional US-centric flows.

In summary, Haiti's remittance dynamics both reflect and exceed regional patterns. Like several other Latin American and Caribbean nations, Haiti depends on its diaspora to sustain household incomes and foreign exchange earnings. However, Haiti's dependence is at the high end of the spectrum, and the stakes are correspondingly high—remittances have effectively become Haiti's

economic lifeblood, in a way matched by only a few other countries in the hemisphere. This comparison underscores the crucial role of migration in Haiti's development (or lack thereof). While other countries use remittances to supplement domestic production, Haiti relies on them as a substitute for a significant portion of domestic economic activity. This reality frames many policy discussions. The Haitian government and international agencies recognize that any shocks to remittance flows (due to US immigration policy changes, global recessions, and so on) would have dire repercussions in Haiti. Conversely, leveraging these flows for development (for example, through diaspora investment initiatives) represents an opportunity if the right reforms and financial instruments can be implemented.

Conclusion and Policy Implications


Over the first quarter of the twenty-first century, remittances from the Haitian diaspora have grown from a minor stream into a torrent of support that underpins Haiti's economy and the welfare of its people. This deep-dive analysis illustrates that from 2000 to 2025, remittances to Haiti have followed a steep upward trajectory, mirroring the expanding Haitian diaspora across the globe, and now account for around one-fifth (or more) of the country's GDP. The United States remains the bedrock of Haiti's remittance inflows. Still, newer corridors in Latin America (Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, and others) have added an interesting dimension to Haiti's remittance landscape. These flows have provided immense benefits at the micro level: reducing poverty, improving education and health outcomes, and helping families survive crises. At the same time, the analysis confirms key hypotheses in the literature: heavy reliance on remittances is a double-edged sword. It can create dependency, mask the symptoms of economic underdevelopment, and even expose families to new risks (such as criminal extortion). Haiti's experience epitomizes this paradox: remittances are both a lifeline and a warning sign of structural weaknesses.

Comparatively, Haiti stands near the top of the Latin America and Caribbean remittance league, in company with a few Central American countries, and far above most other Caribbean nations in proportional dependence. This underscores Haiti's unique challenges and its diaspora. The Haitian case thus offers valuable lessons for policy. One is the importance of engaging the diaspora

productively: Haiti's diaspora has resources and goodwill that, if channeled into investment (beyond basic household transfers), could help break the cycle of dependency. Another lesson is the need for domestic reform: Haiti will continue to lose citizens and rely on their remittances, a tenuous development model without better economic opportunities at home. For Haitians themselves, the diaspora remains a source of hope and support amid turmoil—the Creole saying '*Lajan transfe se kòb lavi*' ('Money transfers are a lifeline') captures how critical remittances are viewed by those who receive them.


Ultimately, Haiti's story from 2000 to 2025 is one of a nation sustained by its scattered sons and daughters abroad. Remittances have not solved Haiti's fundamental problems but have undeniably softened the blows of poverty, disaster, and political dysfunction. Any future strategy for Haiti, whether by its government or international partners, must account for this reality. Harnessing the power of remittances for sustainable development, while reducing the risks of over-reliance, will be a delicate balancing act. Haiti's diaspora and remittances will thus remain at the forefront of the country's economic and social narrative for the foreseeable future.

Yet the diaspora that has become Haiti's primary economic lifeline is not a stable or permanent phenomenon. That lifeline depends entirely on Haitians remaining abroad and able to work. The delicate balancing act described above — harnessing remittances while reducing structural over-reliance — is made infinitely more precarious by a parallel reality: the very men and women whose transfers sustain Haitian households are being forcibly returned at higher rates. Part V turns to this phenomenon. It documents how waves of deportations and forced repatriations, primarily from the Dominican Republic but also from the United States and the Bahamas, are not merely a humanitarian challenge for the individuals concerned. They represent a sudden subtraction from the remittance economy — a severing of the financial threads that Part IV has shown to be the closest thing Haiti has to a social protection system. Understanding return migration is therefore inseparable from understanding what is at stake when the diaspora economy is interrupted by force.



PART V

Voluntary and Forced Return Migration



This section examines voluntary and forced return migration to Haiti, highlighting frequent deportations and returns primarily from the Dominican Republic, United States, Bahamas, and other countries in the region.

Key Findings

- **High volume of returnees.** Haiti experiences regular returns, primarily from the Dominican Republic, the United States, and the Bahamas, driven by restrictive migration policies and regional crises.
- **Dominican Republic as principal source of Haitian deportations.** The Dominican Republic is the largest source of deportations, with over 216,000 in 2023, leading to issues such as statelessness for Dominicans of Haitian origin.
- **Insufficient reintegration capacity.** Haiti's migration office, ONM, provides basic aid at entry points but lacks the resources for sustainable reintegration.
- **International and NGO support.** Organizations such as IOM and UNHCR offer crucial assistance; however, only a fraction of returnees receive help due to funding limitations.
- **Vulnerable populations at elevated risk.** Forced returnees, especially women and children, face heightened risks of poverty and violence, with cases of deported pregnant women raising humanitarian concerns.
- **Policy and structural challenges.** Haiti's fragile institutions and limited support hinder reintegration, with strict migration policies and economic instability perpetuating cycles of vulnerability.
- **Need for sustainable solutions.** While there have been improvements in immediate aid, long-term reintegration remains a challenge due to ongoing instability and reliance on international support, highlighting the need for better collaboration and policies.

Return and Reintegration

Haiti has seen regular waves of returnees, which include both deportees and voluntarily returning migrating people, primarily from the United States, the Dominican Republic, and the Bahamas. In response, the Haitian government, often with international support, has established basic frameworks to accommodate these returnees. However, achieving sustainable reintegration remains a significant challenge.

Reception and reintegration services have significantly supported vulnerable people on the move, providing a safety net across the border. Owing to years of support, ONM was able to establish procedures to promote the safe and orderly return of Haitians to the homeland. Despite some improvements, ongoing economic and security challenges mean both IOM and ONM continue to appeal for assistance and increased funding.

Since the 1990s and intensifying during the last 10 years, many Haitians have faced large-scale forced returns from host countries, driven by a combination of tightened migration controls, sociopolitical pressures, and regional migration crises.

- Large-scale deportations of Haitian nationals have been driven by restrictive migration policies, sociopolitical pressures, and crises in host nations, including the Dominican Republic, the United States, Chile, the Bahamas, and Mexico.
- The Dominican Republic has been the principal source of forced returns, with over 216,000 deportations recorded in 2023 alone, according to IOM and the Support Group for the Repatriated and Refugees (*Groupe d'Appui aux Repatriés et Réfugiés*, GARR), a leading civil society organization in Haiti. The Dominican government reports that between January and April 2025, **119,000 Haitians with irregular status had been repatriated to Haiti**. Deportation measures have disproportionately targeted individuals of Haitian descent, including those rendered stateless by nationality rulings.
- During both the first Trump and Biden administrations, the United States increased deportations of Haitians, using Title 42

public health orders to expel approximately 20,300 individuals between January 2021 and February 2022 (Loftus 2025). The second Trump administration terminated TPS protections for Haitians and dismantled humanitarian parole programs, adopting a policy centered on repatriation and expanded deportation enforcement that has left hundreds of thousands of Haitians facing the prospect of removal from the United States despite continuing instability in Haiti.

- Chile implemented stricter immigration laws and economic policies that resulted in the forced or voluntary return of Haitian nationals, compelling many to migrate further north to other destinations (INURED 2024).
- The [Bahamas](#) has consistently deported Haitians, including those displaced by natural disasters such as Hurricane Dorian in 2019. Other countries in Latin America, including Brazil, Panama, and Mexico, have periodically engaged in deportations or redirected Haitian migrants within the region (INURED 2020).
- Mexico has increasingly detained and deported Haitians (PBS News 2021), particularly under the influence of US immigration policies. Vulnerable populations, including women and children, face elevated risks during transit (CGRS 2024).

Mass deportations result in a significant number of returnees to Haiti each year, leading to substantial humanitarian concerns. Returnees often face shortages of food, shelter, and protection, making them susceptible to gang violence and poverty. Reports from human rights organizations highlight issues such as the deportation of pregnant women and children without due process being followed. Haiti's fragile institutions and decreasing international support exacerbate the challenges of addressing this crisis. Various structural and policy factors, including racial discrimination, economic pressures, and stringent migration policies, contribute to the forced return of Haitians. The combined effects lead to ongoing displacement, with many returnees arriving in Haiti without adequate support systems and experiencing multidimensional insecurity.


Geographic Distribution of Haitian Returnees (2022–2025)

This section is based on limited data reported by the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM). It summarizes the key findings on the geographic distribution of Haitian returnees (both deported and voluntary) from the Dominican Republic, United States, and the Bahamas between 2022 and 2025. Data sources are from IOM DTM Returnee Reports 2022–2024 and ONM Port-au-Prince arrival data.

Key Findings

- Ouest department, which includes Port-au-Prince, accounts for the largest share of returnees (38 percent), serving as a major hub for arrivals.
- Centre and Sud-Est follow, with 20 percent and 15 percent respectively, reflecting the proximity of major border crossings with the Dominican Republic.
- Nord-Ouest (7 percent) and Nord (6 percent) receive a substantial portion of returnees from the United States and Bahamas due to historic boat migration patterns.
- Artibonite accounts for 6 percent, while Nord-Est, Sud, Grand'Anse, and Nippes collectively represent under 10 percent of total returnees.
- Returnees are highly concentrated in three departments (Ouest, Centre, and Sud-Est), which together absorb nearly 70 percent of all returnees.

The concentration of returnees in specific departments highlights the urgent need for targeted reintegration programs, job creation initiatives, and security interventions in Ouest, Centre, and Sud-Est, which are also the most affected by violence and humanitarian crises.

Figure 7. Geographic distribution of Haitian returnees (2022–2025)

Source: IOM, 2025. <https://crisisresponse.iom.int/response/haiti-crisis-response-plan-2025>

Profile of Forced Return Migrants

The IOM, ONM, and GARR conduct data collection activities on forced return flows at arrival points to effectively guide assistance (humanitarian and sustainable reintegration). Key findings from data collection carried out throughout 2025 are summarized below (IOM 2026c).

Scale and Demographics

A total of 270,214 individuals were forcibly returned to Haiti in 2025 — a 36 percent increase compared to 2024, averaging around 740 persons per day. About 98 percent came from the Dominican Republic. The majority were adult men (66 percent), followed by

adult women (25 percent), boys (5 percent), and girls (4 percent). A notable 57 percent of returnees had previously been returned more than once.

Migration Experience

The primary driver for leaving Haiti was economic — cited by 85 percent of respondents. The average cost of the journey was \$274 USD, though this varied significantly by destination (\$236 USD for the Dominican Republic versus \$4,165 USD for the Bahamas). Among those apprehended, 35 percent were detained in the street, 26 percent at home, and 26 percent at work. The vast majority (71 percent) spent fewer than three days in detention before being returned.

Socio-Economic Profile

Among the nearly 29,000 survey respondents, 60 percent had attended secondary school and only 4 percent had reached university level. Over a third of returnees (35 percent) had no identity documents. While abroad, they were primarily employed in construction (31 percent), commerce (21 percent), and agriculture (19 percent).

Post-Return Needs and Intentions

Upon arrival, the most pressing needs reported were transportation to their area of origin (88 percent), food (73 percent), and temporary accommodation (25 percent). Looking ahead, 12 percent reported intending to leave Haiti again within six months, with 72 percent of that group citing economic motivations as their primary reason.

Policies and Programs in Place for Returnees

Responses and Institutional Setup in Haiti

Institutional setup. The primary state body responsible for supporting the return of people who migrated is the ONM—also known in English as the National Office of Migration or Bureau of Migration. The ONM, operating under the MAST, is tasked with receiving repatriated citizens at ports of entry and providing initial assistance. However, according to the OAS, its capacity is limited. The ONM has occasionally relied on external grants (for example, EU funding) to provide emergency support for returnees. In practice, the ONM collaborates with IOM and local NGOs to assist returnees. For instance, at the airports in Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haïtien, ONM officials interview returnees and record their information, while IOM and its partners provide humanitarian aid. A typical post-arrival package includes food, water, a small cash stipend or local transportation allowance, and hygiene kits. In recent years, psychosocial support has also been offered, in recognition of the trauma that many returnees have endured as a result of the deportation process (IOM 2025b).

Reintegration support and its limits. Assistance to Haitian returnees is primarily short term. With UN support, Haitian authorities can facilitate returnees' transfer to a bus station or temporary shelter, but longer-term reintegration programs are scarce. A 2022 report by the Human Rights Watch found that UN agencies and the ONM provided some immediate assistance (cash, food, and hygiene products) but did not monitor returnee reintegration, thereafter, leaving individuals to navigate challenges independently in a country grappling with insecurity. Consequently, many deportees struggle to find housing, employment, or family support. Some have no social network in Haiti after years (or a lifetime) abroad. Those deported from the United States for criminal offenses face additional stigma (UM School of Law et al. 2015). There is a supposed registration process with the Haitian police, but resources for follow-up are minimal. One positive development is Haiti's collaboration with international partners on specific reintegration projects—for instance, IOM and GARR run a 'holistic

reintegration' program at the Haiti-Dominican Republic border, offering returnees legal advice, basic medical care, and referrals to services such as education or microenterprise support. However, such programs reach only a fraction of returnees due to increasing need and insufficient funds (Charles 2025).

Summary of Institutional Setup and Returns

- **Institutional setup.** Haiti's ONM, supported by international organizations such as IOM, is responsible for assisting deportees by providing basic aid at points of entry (Lemonnier 2025). However, its capacity remains limited, and reintegration programs are limited to non-existent.
- **Reintegration challenges.** Assistance provided to returnees is primarily short term, with limited mechanisms for tracking or supporting individuals after their initial arrival. Institutions involved in reintegration efforts include the Office National d'identification (National Identification Office, [ONI]), Haitian NGOs such as GARR, Human Rights Defense Network (*Réseau de Défense des Droits Humains*, RNDDH), and Platform of Haitian Human Rights Organizations (POHDH), among others. While NGOs and international partners implement targeted initiatives, returnees must contend with unemployment and socioeconomic insecurity, while faced with the stigma brought on by the circumstances of their forced return.
- **Returnees from the United States.** The United States has repatriated substantial numbers of Haitians, particularly under Title 42 policies. These returnees frequently face elevated risks such as gang violence and extortion upon reentering Haiti. The nation's limited capacity to reintegrate these individuals has been noted by international agencies, which have raised serious concerns regarding the safety and dignity of such returns.
- **Returnees from the Dominican Republic.** The Dominican Republic has consistently deported Haitian nationals, with reports indicating that over 216,000 individuals were expelled in 2023 alone. Between October 2024 and April 2025, over 180,000 people of Haitian descent were deported to Haiti (Humanyun et al. 2025). In April 2025, a new policy mandating that the country's 33 National Health Service hospitals request proof of residency of all patients resulted in the detention

and subsequent deportation of 135 women (who were either pregnant or had recently given birth) and children (Humanyun et al. 2025). The actions sent shockwaves through the human rights community and heightened fears that this new measure would negatively affect the health-seeking behaviors of the undocumented population in the Dominican Republic (Humanyun et al. 2025). Of note is that some returnees are of Haitian descent but have lived most of their lives in the Dominican Republic (Lemonnier 2025). A considerable number of returnees confront severe insecurity and lack of essential support, leading some to clandestinely migrate back to the Dominican Republic (Lemonnier 2025).

- **Returns from the Bahamas and other Caribbean states.** Caribbean nations, including the Bahamas and Turks and Caicos Islands, frequently deport Haitians. The ONM and IOM provide initial assistance to returnees, which includes basic humanitarian aid. However, long-term reintegration efforts remain insufficient. Haiti has occasionally negotiated the delay of deportations following crises.
- **International cooperation.** International organizations such as IOM, UNHCR, and others play a pivotal role in facilitating reintegration for deportees. These bodies provide financial support, monitor returnee conditions, and offer reintegration services. Nonetheless, several evaluations by international agencies highlight Haiti's limited capacity to ensure sustainable reintegration, exacerbated by the nation's prevailing economic and security challenges (IOM 2024).

Conclusion

From 1990 to 2025, Haiti has improved its coordination and immediate assistance for returning citizens. However, long-term reintegration remains a significant issue. Key institutions such as MHAVE, the Ministry of the Interior's Immigration Service, and ONM operate under strain. International organizations provide vital support in humanitarian aid and migrant rights advocacy. As of 2025, Haiti continues to struggle with reintegrating returnees amid increasing national instability. As countries such as the United States and the Dominican Republic introduce and enforce increasingly restrictive migration policies targeting Haitians, the Haitian government's limited capacity to serve returnees is further weakened, making collaboration with international partners crucial for sustainable migration solutions.

Yet institutional strain and insufficient reintegration capacity do not tell the full story of what forced returnees encounter upon arrival. A significant share of those being returned — 18 percent according to IOM Flow Monitoring data — had already been internally displaced within Haiti due to insecurity before they left the country in the first place. For these individuals, return does not necessarily mean going home; it means returning to a community that may itself be under gang control, partially depopulated, or cut off from basic services. The crisis of forced return migration and the crisis of internal displacement are not parallel phenomena. They are two expressions of the same underlying collapse of security and governance — and understanding one requires understanding the other.



PART VI

Internal Migration and Displacement in Haiti (2020–2025)

Between 2020 and 2025, Haiti faced escalating internal displacement due to both natural disasters and intensifying gang violence.

Disaster-induced displacement peaked following major events such as Tropical Storms Isaias and Laura (2020), the 2021 earthquake, and severe floods in 2023, affecting hundreds of thousands. However, by mid-2025, conflict-driven displacement far surpassed disaster-related figures, with over 1.3 million Haitians, many of them children, uprooted primarily by gang violence, which spread from Port-au-Prince into provincial regions like Artibonite, Centre, and Nord.

Key Findings

- **Displacement.** Between 2021 and mid-2025, over 1.3 million Haitians, mostly children, were displaced by political (President Moïse’s assassination in 2021) and/or gang violence.
- **Expanding violence.** Gang activity has spread from Port-au-Prince to other regions of Haiti such as Artibonite, Centre, and Nord, causing significant population displacement.
- **Government response.** Disaster management remains limited; there is still no comprehensive strategy to address conflict-induced displacement, and government aid is minimal.
- **International aid.** Organizations such as IOM and UN agencies provide relief but face funding shortages and restricted access due to increasing insecurity.
- **Humanitarian conditions for IDPs.** Displaced people endure overcrowding, poor services, and increased violence, leading to food insecurity and loss of livelihoods.
- **Long-term needs.** Emergency aid provides short-term relief; however, sustainable progress requires addressing insecurity, poor governance, and disaster risks.
- **Call for action.** Progress hinges on coordinated efforts in relief, security, reform, and development through a multisectoral strategy.

When Haiti's forced returnees step across the Haiti-Dominican Republic border at Belladère or Ouanaminthe, they re-enter a country that is itself in motion. Between 2021 and mid-2025, over 1.3 million Haitians were displaced from their homes by a combination of political violence, gang territorial expansion, and recurrent natural disasters — a figure that dwarfs the number of those formally returning from abroad. The drivers that push Haitians to emigrate — insecurity, the collapse of rule of law, the absence of economic opportunity — are the same forces reshaping settlement patterns within Haiti's own borders. Internal displacement is not a humanitarian footnote to this report's analysis of international migration; it is both part of its causes and its consequences.

The relationship between internal and international migration in Haiti runs in both directions. As documented earlier in the report, gang violence and political instability following the 2021 assassination of President Moïse rank among the most powerful push factors driving emigration. Those same forces are documented here as the primary driver of internal displacement, which by 2025 had overtaken disaster-related movement as the dominant form of forced mobility within the country. And as Part V makes clear, Haiti currently has no sustainable reintegration framework to absorb those who are returned from abroad — many of whom re-enter communities that are themselves hosting, or constituted by, internally displaced persons. The result is a compounding of vulnerabilities that neither international humanitarian assistance nor the Haitian state has yet addressed in an integrated way.

Haiti has experienced a cascade of crises since 2010, ranging from a catastrophic earthquake to a cholera outbreak affecting more than 1 million households in Haiti (ASFC 2019), to systemic political crises and gang violence leading to mass internal displacement and outmigration. The years following the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic have resulted in the accelerated disintegration of the core institutional fabric of Haitian society, as well as the generalized failure of governance and rule of law. This section analyzes internal migration and displacement trends from 2020 to 2025, examining both disaster-induced and conflict-driven displacement. It focuses on the most affected regions—Port-au-Prince, Artibonite, Centre, and Sud—and the policy responses and humanitarian efforts undertaken by national authorities, such as the Directorate of Civil Protection (DPC) and international agencies, including IOM and UN partners.

Disaster-Induced Displacement (2020–2025): An Overview

Between 2020 and 2025, Haiti experienced significant levels of disaster-induced displacement, primarily driven by its acute vulnerability to natural hazards, including earthquakes, tropical storms, and floods. Tropical Storms Isaias and Laura in August 2020 brought heavy rains and winds, flooding homes, especially in the Sud-Est and Ouest departments, where around [13,000 new displacements](#) were recorded by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. The most consequential disaster event during this period was the 2021 earthquake in the Sud department, which affected over 800,000 people, took the lives of more than 2,200 people, and displaced over 38,777 individuals (IDMC 2021). This figure excludes those displaced who found shelter with relatives. By mid-August 2022, IOM reported that 17,000 people were still displaced.

Early June 2023 brought severe nationwide floods, intense rains on June 2, 3 triggered flooding and mudslides across 5 of Haiti's 10 administrative departments. Haiti Civil Protection reported over 13,300 people were displaced by these floods. Especially hard-hit was the Ouest department (including parts of Port-au-Prince's outskirts and low-lying areas), where around 9,000 people had to take shelter at temporary sites (OCHA 2023). Just days later, on June 6, a 5.5 magnitude earthquake struck the Sud-Est department, damaging hundreds of homes, adding to displacement figures. These concurrent shocks highlight Haiti's vulnerability to disaster.

Overall, disaster-induced displacement peaked in 2021 but gradually declined as earthquake victims readjusted to the realities of life. Nonetheless, Haiti's climate and geology ensure that such displacement remains a recurring risk. This period highlighted the critical importance of preparedness and rapid response measures, including early warning systems for storms and robust post-disaster shelter programs, to minimize the duration of displacement for Haitians following disasters.

Conflict-Driven Displacement in Haiti (2020–2025): An Overview

Between 2020 and 2025, Haiti experienced an unprecedented internal displacement crisis due to escalating gang violence, culminating in over 1.3 million individuals being displaced by mid-2025. The assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in 2021 exacerbated pre-existing gang conflicts, leading to widespread displacement, primarily centered in Port-au-Prince. By 2023, displacement figures surged significantly, reaching their peak as gang violence extended beyond the capital into regions such as Centre and Nord.

Conflict-induced displacement in Haiti surged from approximately 17,105 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 2020 to approximately 1.3 million by June 2025, a 24 percent increase in a six-month period ([IOM 2025c](#)). Gang violence has spread from the nation's capital to the provinces. A June 2025 attack in the municipality of La Chapelle in the department of Artibonite internally displaced almost 9,000 residents (from more than 2,200 households), the majority of whom have remained in Artibonite ([IOM 2025a](#)). Another outbreak of gang violence in the city of Mirebalais in the Centre department led to a 118 percent increase in IDPs in the department (from 67,000 to more than 147,000) and a 79 percent increase in IDPs (from 64,000 to over 115,000) in the Nord department ([IOM 2025c](#)) marking the fastest regional increase during this period. In 2025, for the first time since the outbreak of gang violence, IDPs from Haiti's provinces outpaced those from the capital at 55 percent and 45 percent, respectively ([IOM 2025c](#)). At its current pace, the rapid spread of violence is set to increase the conflict-driven IDP population one-hundredfold in a five-year period, making Haiti host to one of the world's largest internal displacement crises of the year. Tragically, children comprise over half of those displaced; in 2025, one in every eight Haitian children had been uprooted by violence ([UNICEF 2025](#)).


Figure 8 below summarizes the progression of Haiti's internal displacement from 2020 to 2025, broken down by cause (disaster versus conflict) and highlighting key affected regions (Port-au-Prince

in Ouest, Artibonite, Centre, and Sud departments). Figures are approximate, based on available reports.

Figure 8, illustrating internal displacement trends in Haiti from 2020 to mid-2025, disaggregated by cause (conflict versus disaster) clearly shows the following:

- A sharp escalation in conflict-related displacement, especially from 2022 onward.
- Disaster-related displacement peaked in 2021 (due to the 7.2 earthquake) but has since remained relatively low.
- 2025 marks the highest number of conflict-induced IDPs ever recorded, with over 1.28 million people displaced as of June.

Figure 8. Displacement trends in Haiti, 2020 to mid-2025



Sources: IOM DTM reports, IDMC analyses, internal-displacement.org, UN OCHA/UNICEF reports, Haitian Civil Protection data, and relief organizations' estimates.

Socioeconomic Profile of the Internally Displaced

Data from the DGPC and IOM shows that as of December 2025, Haiti had 1,450,254 IDPs across 333,729 households, representing 12 percent of the country's total population (IOM 2026b). Women and girls made up the majority at 54 percent, while children accounted for 52 percent of all IDPs. The age composition differed significantly depending on living arrangements: those in formal sites were mostly adults (66 percent), while those living outside sites are predominantly children (56 percent).

The vast majority — 85 percent — lived with host families or in rented accommodation outside formal sites, while 15 percent resided in spontaneous sites. Geographically, 80 percent were hosted in the provinces, with only 20 percent remaining in the Metropolitan Area of Port-au-Prince (MAPAP). That said, 44 percent of all IDPs were concentrated in just 10 municipalities, with Port-au-Prince (11 percent), Delmas (5 percent), and Jacmel (5 percent) being the top three receiving areas.

In Port-au-Prince, displacement translates into collapse of livelihoods. Many IDPs struggle to generate income after displacement. Gangs' control over key transit routes, ports, and commercial corridors paralyzes trade and commerce, making movement for work extremely dangerous. IDPs are also subject to gang extortion and loss of productive assets, eliminating the capital base needed for self-employment or small enterprise.

Displacement leads to significant disruptions in human capital accumulation and preservation. Lack of schooling particularly affects displaced children in sites, where 29 percent do not attend, compared to 20 percent among displaced children living outside of sites. The majority of displaced households suffer from hunger, but displaced people in sites are the most severely affected. They are more likely to face food shortages, go to bed without eating, and spend entire days without eating. Households displaced in sites also face critical sanitary overcrowding and hygiene issues (IOM 2026a).

The IDP crisis in Port-au-Prince is generating a compounding labor market shock: immediate and near-total income loss for displaced populations, wage depression and crowding in the already precarious informal sector, erosion of employer capacity in formal sectors, and a generational skills deficit driven by mass educational disruption. Without a meaningful improvement in security, these effects will be very difficult to reverse, as they are becoming embedded in the human capital and economic structure of the capital city.

National Authorities and the Management of Internal Displacement in Haiti (2020–2025)

The Haitian government's capacity to manage internal displacement has been significantly strained by overlapping natural and human-made disasters and conflict-related crises. The DPC, under the Ministry of the Interior, has led disaster response efforts, particularly during the 2020–2021 emergencies. Following the 2021 earthquake, the DPC coordinated with international partners to activate emergency operations, establish shelters, and register displaced families. Local authorities, including municipal leaders, contributed by identifying resettlement sites and facilitating communication with humanitarian agencies. A notable success was the implementation of cash assistance programs, which enabled rapid resettlement and led to a sharp reduction in camp populations within a year.

In contrast, the government's response to conflict-induced displacement has been limited and reactive. Haiti lacks a formal legal or policy framework to protect individuals displaced by violence. Efforts have primarily focused on restoring security, primarily with the aim of financing under-resourced police operations, particularly through appeals for international assistance. These efforts culminated in the 2023 UN Security Council's approval

of a multinational support mission, led by Kenya, to assist the Haitian National Police. A state of emergency was also declared in early 2024 in gang-affected areas, though its implementation has been inconsistent.

Humanitarian support for conflict-displaced populations has largely depended on international organizations. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (referred to heretofore as MAST, its French acronym), in collaboration with agencies such as the World Food Programme (WFP), has supported vulnerable households through social protection programs. However, direct government assistance to conflict IDPs remains minimal due to resource constraints and institutional fragility. Some local authorities and community leaders have initiated localized responses, such as transit centers and informal security patrols, but these efforts are largely fragmented and insufficient to meet the scale of need.

Humanitarian Challenges

Although initially Port-au-Prince served as the epicenter of the displacement crisis, other regions such as Artibonite and Centre emerged as significant flashpoints, and the provinces have been overtaken by gang violence. Gang violence overwhelmed rural communities, resulting in mass migration and straining local resources. By June 2025, approximately 1.3 million IDPs have been recorded by IOM, with the provinces hosting 150 of 246 sites ([IOM 2025c](#)). IDPs face cramped living conditions as camps and host communities struggle to keep pace with the dire needs of a swelling displaced population. Access to clean water, sanitation, and health care services is severely limited, with emergency relief such as water trucking and mobile clinics unable to meet the demand ([IOM 2025c](#)). Women and children are at higher risk of gender-based violence and exploitation as gangs infiltrate camps (UNHCR 2024). Finally, lost livelihoods and inflation have exacerbated hunger in a country that was already facing food insecurity before the conflict, thereby increasing Haiti's reliance on humanitarian aid (UN News 2025).

Policy and Humanitarian Responses

Efforts to mitigate conflict-induced displacement in Haiti between 2020 and 2025 included emergency aid delivery, cash assistance, and psychosocial support. However, persistent insecurity significantly hindered relief operations, and sustainable solutions remained largely inaccessible for most IDPs. The ongoing instability threatens to prolong displacement, underscoring the urgent need for enhanced security measures and comprehensive governance reforms to address the underlying causes of the crisis. The displacement crisis, initially driven by localized gang violence, has evolved into a nationwide humanitarian emergency. Addressing this complex situation requires not only immediate humanitarian interventions but long-term strategies focused on restoring stability and rebuilding affected communities.

Constrained by limited resources and [escalating violence](#), the Haitian government continues to rely heavily on international organizations. Agencies such as IOM provide emergency shelter, health care, and IDP tracking systems, while UN partners have prioritized child protection, food distribution, and advocacy for durable solutions. Nevertheless, funding shortfalls and [gang-imposed blockades](#) severely impede these efforts, leaving many IDPs in protracted displacement.

The Haitian displacement crisis highlights the intersection of [systemic governance failures](#), [escalating violence](#), and the limitations of humanitarian aid in meeting growing needs. While emergency relief has mitigated suffering, sustainable solutions demand a multifaceted approach that includes restoring security, fostering economic opportunities, and strengthening institutional governance to address the root drivers of displacement.

International Humanitarian Response to Internal Displacement in Haiti

International actors have played a central role in addressing Haiti's internal displacement crisis, particularly as national capacity has been overwhelmed by compounding natural and conflict-related emergencies.

IOM has led operational and coordination efforts. Through its DTM, IOM has provided critical data on displacement trends, informing humanitarian planning. As the lead agency for the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster, IOM has distributed emergency shelter kits, non-food items, and clean water, while also establishing sanitation facilities and communal shelters. Mobile teams have delivered basic health care and mental health services, and IOM has supported both emergency relocation and advocacy for durable solutions, despite ongoing insecurity.

UN agencies have complemented these efforts. OCHA and BINUH have coordinated appeals and raised international awareness, while UNICEF has focused on child protection, psychosocial support, and emergency education. WFP has addressed food insecurity through distributions and cash-for-food programs, reaching hundreds of thousands of displaced individuals. UNHCR has provided technical support on protection and shelter, and WHO/PAHO and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) have contributed to health and reproductive services in displacement sites.

International and local NGOs have filled critical gaps, often operating in high-risk areas. Organizations such as *Médecins Sans Frontières*, Catholic Relief Services, and the Haitian Red Cross have provided medical care, shelter, and family reunification services. Community-based groups and religious institutions have also offered safe havens and coordinated grassroots aid, though access constraints—particularly in gang-controlled zones—remain a major challenge.

Coordination and policy mechanisms have been established through the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) and the UN cluster

system. While these frameworks prioritize displaced populations, chronic underfunding—especially in protection sectors—has limited their effectiveness. Discussions on durable solutions, including economic reintegration and neighborhood rehabilitation, are ongoing but hindered by persistent insecurity.

In summary, international humanitarian efforts have delivered essential relief—shelter, food, water, and protection—to Haiti’s displaced populations. However, the scale and protracted nature of the crisis have outpaced available resources. As IOM emphasized in its 2025 appeal, humanitarian aid is vital but insufficient on its own. Sustainable solutions require addressing the root causes of displacement: insecurity, weak governance, and disaster vulnerability. Without these structural changes, the cycle of displacement in Haiti is likely to persist.

Conclusion

From 2020 to 2025, Haiti’s internal displacement crisis evolved from being primarily disaster induced to overwhelmingly driven by gang violence and insecurity. Regional dynamics reflect the multifaceted nature of the crisis. Port-au-Prince has seen mass displacement due to urban violence, while Artibonite, Centre, and Nord illustrate the spread of instability into Haiti’s provinces. In Sud, the long-term effects of the 2021 earthquake continue to hinder recovery, highlighting the compounded vulnerabilities faced by affected populations.

The Haitian government, constrained by limited resources and deteriorating security, has struggled to mount an effective response. Agencies such as the DPC have made progress, particularly in post-disaster cash assistance. However, the broader response has relied heavily on international actors, including IOM, UN agencies, and NGOs. These organizations have delivered essential services, such as food, shelter, water, and protection, despite persistent funding gaps and restricted access, but these have largely been short-term solutions to longstanding structural issues.

Restoring the rule of law in gang-controlled areas is essential for enabling safe returns home and rebuilding communities. This requires sustained national and international engagement in security reform, justice, and community reintegration. Simultaneously, investments in disaster risk reduction, such as resilient infrastructure and flood mitigation, are vital to preventing future displacement.

Ultimately, Haiti's experience over this five-year period illustrates the devastating impact of compounded and systemic crises. Displaced families may lose their home to an earthquake or hurricane, only to be uprooted again by gang violence, a tragic but common reality in Haiti today. As the IOM Director General noted, while Haitians have shown remarkable resilience, "resilience cannot be their only refuge." A comprehensive strategy is urgently needed, one that integrates humanitarian relief, security stabilization, political reform, and long-term development. Only through a multipronged approach can Haiti begin to reverse the tide of displacement and offer its citizens a path toward lasting stability.



Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Conclusion

Haiti's international migration has evolved into one of the most defining features of its socioeconomic and political reality. Migration has served as both an adaptive strategy for survival in the face of political crises, economic stagnation, and recurrent natural disasters, and as a structural challenge, undermining the country's long-term development by draining its skilled workforce.

Between 2010 and 2025, Haiti's migration patterns diversified geographically, extending from traditional destinations in North America and France to Latin America and the Caribbean. This diversification has created new opportunities for mobility but also exposed Haitian migrants to precarious working conditions, xenophobia, and mass deportations. The brain drain crisis—with over 80 percent of Haiti's tertiary-educated citizens residing abroad—has severely weakened health care, education, engineering, and governance capacity. At the same time, the Haitian diaspora remains a powerful but underutilized development partner. Its contributions through remittances, skills, and advocacy represent untapped resources for national renewal.

Haiti thus faces a paradox of mobility: migration both erodes institutional capacity and sustains national survival. One dimension of this mobility paradox warrants particular emphasis. Geographic diversification of emigration flows has not uniformly translated into improved welfare or productive labor market integration for Haitian migrants. Across newer South-South migration corridors, a pattern of occupational downgrading is observed compounding the development cost of emigration. This calls for policy responses that go beyond facilitating safe and orderly mobility, toward actively ensuring that migration translates into decent, skills-commensurate work.

The key challenge is transforming migration governance from a reactive, fragmented approach into a rights-based, development-driven strategy that channels mobility toward resilience and institutional strengthening. This requires coordinated action from the GoH and sustained support from international partners.

In 2015, the GoH adopted the National Migration Policy (2015–2030), a landmark framework recognizing migration as essential

to national development and emphasizing the diaspora's role as a strategic partner. The policy seeks to:

- Facilitate legal and orderly emigration through regulated pathways.
- Harness diaspora contributions to investment, skills transfer, and institution-building.
- Protect migrants' rights while reducing vulnerabilities linked to irregular migration and deportations.

Despite these ambitions, the policy has not been formally evaluated or updated since its adoption. Weak institutional capacity and inter-ministerial coordination, limited resources, and shifting migration pressures have hampered implementation. Without sustained international engagement and domestic reform, Haiti risks losing the opportunity to transform migration into a genuine driver of development.

Recommendations

The policy options outlined below are presented as entry points for dialogue and collaborative action. They are addressed to the Government of Haiti, its international partners, and civil society actors, including diaspora organizations, as potential contributors to a shared agenda. Given Haiti's complex political context and the diversity of stakeholders involved, the sequencing and prioritization of these options will ultimately require national ownership and multi-stakeholder consultation. The recommendations are structured to distinguish between options that are primarily within Haiti's sovereign policy domain, those that require bilateral or multilateral engagement, and those where international partners can provide enabling support.

Given the country's institutional constraints and macroeconomic environment, the recommendations are also presented using a feasibility lens recognizing that not all can be implemented simultaneously, and attempting to do so would risk spreading limited institutional and donor resources across an unmanageable agenda.

The report therefore proposes a phased approach organized around three time horizons:

- Short-term (0–2 years): Actions that are technically bounded, require no new institutional infrastructure, and can be anchored by existing actors with international support.
- Medium-term (2–5 years): Actions that require a foundation of improved governance conditions and partial institutional recovery.
- Long-term (5+ years): Actions that require significant policy changes and sustained financing and presuppose meaningful macroeconomic stabilization and institutional credibility.

Taken together, this classification is intended to support sequencing and decision-making rather than prescriptive mandates or implementation boundaries.

Short-term interventions (0-2 years)

Strengthen the National Migration Policy Framework

Actions. Conduct a review of the 2015–2030 policy to assess implementation, and update it to address new migration pattern realities, and align with SDGs and the GCM.

International partners. Provide technical expertise and funding for policy evaluation, facilitate policy dialogue, and support alignment with international standards.

Impact. A well-designed review will (i) update the policy's evidence base highlighting implementation gaps and emergent challenges, including destination diversification and the escalation of internal

displacement, (ii) allow to re-engage diaspora and civil society stakeholders through a government-owned process, and (iii) provide a legitimate framework to support migration governance reforms and institutional capacity building. Strengthened migration governance will ensure safe, orderly migration and reinforce effective institutions, contributing to SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities) and SDG 16 (Peace, Justice, Strong Institutions).

Build Institutional Capacity for Migration Governance

Actions. Expand funding and training for ONM and MHAVE; establish a National Migration Platform that facilitates exchanges and coordination between government, research, community-based, and civil institutions; and professionalize adapted consular services for Haitians on the move.

International partners. Provide technical training and capacity building, as well as equipment and financial resources to Haitian institutions and facilitate South-South and triangular cooperation.

Impact. Stronger institutions will better track migration flows, coordinate return and reintegration responses, monitor policy implementation and ensure accountability advancing SDG 16 and SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals). They will also be better equipped to protect Haitians on the move abroad and engage diaspora communities across destination countries in a structured and sustained manner moving beyond a consultative approach to partnerships that can support development interventions.

Protect the Rights of Haitians Abroad

Actions. Establish data collection mechanisms to monitor and document protection failures experienced by Haitian migrants abroad, including through diaspora networks and returnee surveys. Strengthen diplomatic engagement, ratify migrant worker conventions, and expand mobile consular services.

International partners. Advocate for Haitian migrant rights in bilateral and regional forums, provide legal aid support, and strengthen consular protection programs.

Impact. Data monitoring systems, increased diplomatic engagement on protection standards and expanded consular capacity will enhance the ability of relevant actors to respond to protection failures. Protecting migrant's rights protection reduces their vulnerabilities and promotes inclusion, aligning with SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities), 10.2 (Empower Social and Political Inclusion), GCM Objective 15 (Provide Access to Basic Services); and SDGs 16.3 (Rule of Law).

Develop Programs that Support IDPs and Foster Long-Term Resilience and Self-Sufficiency.

Actions. Launch cash transfer programs, vocational training and small business grants targeting IDPs and host communities; support local agricultural cooperatives and micro-enterprises to rebuild local economies; and ensure displaced children's access to schooling through mobile classrooms, school-fee subsidies, and psychosocial support. Rehabilitate or build water, sanitation, and energy infrastructure in displacement-affected areas. Promote peacebuilding and conflict-resolution initiatives in areas of tension between IDPs and host populations.

International partners. Develop an integrated approach with community-based organizations and local authorities to address IDPs' challenges.

Impact: In the short-term targeted interventions will increase household incomes, restore livelihoods, and access to education and training opportunities and support social and economic reintegration. In the medium term these interventions will strengthen community resilience, reduce dependency on humanitarian aid, and enhance social cohesion between displaced and host populations, ultimately reducing the economic pressures that drive irregular emigration.

Medium-term interventions (2-5 years)

Expand Reliable Data and Research Systems

Actions. Establish and financially support a Migration Research Consortium that can help create and maintain interoperable databases and conduct regular migration surveys as well as

generate actionable policy briefs at national and local levels. Such a consortium could comprise the following institutions: ONM, IOM, IHSI, INURED, and UEH (Université d'État d'Haïti).

International partners. Fund data systems, provide access to global migration datasets, and strengthen Haiti's participation in international scientific/ethnographic networks.

Impact. Evidence-based migration management will improve governance and policy coherence, supporting SDG 17 (Data for Sustainable Development) and GCM Objective 1 (Collect and Utilize Accurate Data).

Regulate and Protect Labor Migration

Actions. Negotiate bilateral labor agreements, explore Global Skill Partnerships options, and regulate recruitment agencies. Promote recognition and certification of Haitian qualifications abroad.

International partners. Assist Haiti in negotiating agreements, ensure ethical recruitment standards, and co-finance migrant orientation programs.

Impact. Functional credential recognition frameworks will support migrants in accessing skill-commensurate occupations, improving their welfare and productive inclusion. Higher incomes will translate into larger and more stable remittances, greater savings available for investment, and an enhanced ability to contribute to Haiti's development whether through remote professional services or eventual return. Ethical and safe labor migration reduce exploitation and strengthen income security, contributing to SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth) and SDG 10.7 (Orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration).

Develop Comprehensive Reintegration Programs

Actions. Establish reintegration centers, provide vocational training, and embed reintegration into local development plans prioritizing high-return communities and border zones where returnee populations are most concentrated.

International partners. Fund reintegration centers, provide technical support for training programs, and co-develop community-based initiatives.

Impact. Reintegration measures and programs will reduce re-migration pressures, foster livelihoods, and strengthen social cohesion, contributing to SDG 1 (No Poverty), SDG 1.3 (Social Protection Systems), SDG 8.5 (Productive Employment), and SDG 10.2 (Social Inclusion).

Longer-term interventions (5 years and over)

Harness the Diaspora for Development Beyond Remittances

Actions. Launch diaspora skills mapping and establish a Diaspora Advisory Council to formalize diaspora engagement in national development and policy dialogue. Create mentorship platforms to facilitate knowledge transfer between diaspora professionals and local institutions. Once macroeconomic conditions and institutional prerequisites are in place, explore and pilot diaspora investment opportunities and instruments, subject to feasibility assessments and appropriate design safeguards.

International partners. Facilitate diaspora investment instruments, work to reduce remittance transfer costs, and support knowledge transfer platforms.

Impact. Sustained and structured diaspora engagement carries concrete economic and development relevance. Under improved macroeconomic and governance conditions, it will promote brain circulation, enhance education and innovation and stimulate investment, strengthening both the volume and productive quality of their contributions to the country's development. These efforts will advance SDG 4 (Quality Education), 4.3 (Equal Access to Tertiary Education), SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure), 9.5 (Enhance Research and Innovation), and SDGs 17.3 (Mobilize Financial Resources).

Final Reflection

Migration will remain central to the Haitian condition for decades to come. The question is whether it will continue as a symptom of fragility—draining human capital and deepening inequality—or become a lever of resilience—channeling diaspora expertise, remittances, and mobility into sustainable development.

By investing in a coherent migration governance framework, building institutional and data capacity, protecting migrants, supporting returnees, and fully engaging the diaspora, Haiti and its international partners can transform migration from a crisis into a platform for national renewal.

Achieving this potential will require an honest assessment of Haiti's current starting point, characterized by governance institutions under severe strain, a migration policy framework that has not been systematically evaluated, and a diaspora whose confidence in public institutions has been eroded by decades of governance challenges. The phased and sequenced approach reflected in this report, beginning with technically grounded and government-owned actions such as the midterm policy review, offers a credible path toward the broader transformation that Haiti's mobility crisis both demands and, with the right policy choices, makes possible.

Areas for Further Research and Analysis to Support Policy Implementation in Haiti

This report has traced Haitian international migration across its full arc — from its historical roots and the demographics of diaspora settlement, to the drivers that have turned mobility into a survival strategy, to the remittance economy that now sustains Haitian households in the absence of a functioning state, to the forced return flows that are dismantling it, to the internal displacement crisis. At each stage, the analysis has run up against the same fundamental obstacle: the evidence base is thin, fragmented, and often lagging far behind the reality it purports to capture. The areas for further research outlined below are not a standard academic appendage to this diagnostic. They are the preconditions for any policy intervention that aspires to be evidence-based — and, given the pace at which Haiti's mobility crisis is evolving, they are also urgent.

To ensure the effective implementation of Haiti's migration policies and maximize the developmental benefits of mobility, it is essential to ground policy decisions in robust evidence and ongoing analysis. The following areas for further research and analysis are proposed to address critical data gaps, strengthen institutional capacity, and enhance the alignment of migration governance with national priorities and global commitments. By prioritizing these research domains, policymakers and stakeholders can better understand evolving migration dynamics, improve program outcomes, and develop comprehensive strategies that support both migrants and Haiti's broader development goals.

1. Policy Implementation and Institutional Effectiveness

→ **Assessment of the 2015–2030 National Migration Policy.**

No systematic evaluation has yet been conducted despite the significant changes in Haiti's migration landscape. Research is needed on how effectively ONM and MHAVE have operationalized policy priorities, particularly returnee integration and diaspora engagement.

- **Institutional bottlenecks.** Analysis of bureaucratic inefficiencies, staff capacity, and coordination gaps between ONM, MHAVE, and other state bodies would clarify where reforms are most urgent.

2. Data, Evidence, and Migration Monitoring

- **Occupational downgrading and deskilling.** More empirical evidence is required to track how Haitian professionals fare in host country labor markets, and how “brain waste” affects both individuals and Haiti’s development capacity.
- **Return migration outcomes.** Systematic data on reintegration trajectories of deportees, voluntary returnees, and failed asylum seekers are non-existent. Understanding their livelihood strategies, the extent and impact of their stigmatization, and remigration cycles would improve reintegration programs.
- **Displacement–migration links.** Longitudinal studies on how disaster- and violence-induced internal displacement interact with emigration decisions will be critical in guiding humanitarian and development planning.

3. Establishment of a Migration Research Consortium

- Support the creation of a **Migration Research Consortium** to optimize and synergize expertise and resources. Such a consortium could involve the following institutions: ONM, IOM, IHSI, INURED, and UEH. The consortium would facilitate joint data collection, comparative research, and policy-relevant analysis.
- **Impact.** Better evidence-based policy, strengthened governance, and alignment with GCM and SDGs.
- **Rationale.** Establishing a Migration Research Consortium is critical for Haiti’s migration governance because it creates a structured platform for coordination among state institutions, international organizations, and research bodies. By pooling expertise, sharing data, and harmonizing methodologies, the

consortium would overcome current gaps in reliable migration statistics, reduce duplication of efforts, and provide policy makers with timely, evidence-based insights. This collaborative framework would also strengthen Haiti's voice in regional and international migration dialogues, ensuring national priorities are aligned with global commitments while maximizing the developmental potential of migration.

4. Diaspora Engagement Beyond Remittances

- **Diaspora skills mapping.** A systematic inventory of Haitian professionals abroad, disaggregated by sector, will enable targeted skills transfer and mentorship initiatives.
- **Evaluating diaspora bonds.** Feasibility studies on financial instruments such as diaspora bonds or pooled investment funds, including risk assessments and institutional prerequisites needed.
- **Remote professional engagement.** Implementing pilot projects on telemedicine, virtual teaching, and remote mentoring that can be evaluated for scalability.

5. Social Protection, Rights, and Integration Abroad

- **Migrant rights protection.** Comparative studies of experiences of discrimination (for example, labor, housing, and so on) and human rights violations faced by Haitian nationals abroad, as well as legal aid access and consular and advocacy services received by victims would guide policy advocacy.
- **Gendered migration analysis.** More research is needed on women's migration experiences, family reunification patterns, and caregiving dynamics across transnational households.
- **Youth and second-generation outcomes.** Longitudinal studies on Haitian youth abroad (education, employment, political participation) could help design dual-engagement policies.

6. Remittances and Development Linkages

- **Costs and remittance channels.** Further analysis of how to reduce transfer costs and increase digital/mobile remittance adoption is essential.
- **Household-level impacts.** More granular data are needed on how remittances shape education, health, and entrepreneurship in Haitian households and the impact of remittance transfers on migrant integration abroad.
- **Local investment mechanisms.** Study of how remittances have and can be pooled into community and development projects (cooperatives, local infrastructure, and SMEs) could inform national frameworks.

7. Migration-Climate Change Nexus

- **Environmental drivers of migration.** Research should examine how drought, hurricanes, and land degradation interact with socioeconomic factors to accelerate mobility and international migration.
- **Planned relocation strategies.** Pilot studies on community resilience and adaptation (for example, in flood-prone or deforested regions) would help align migration with environmental protection, disaster risk reduction, and climate policy.

8. Governance and International Partnerships

- **Policy coherence across ministries.** Mapping overlaps and gaps between migration, education, labor, and health policies could strengthen whole-of-government approaches.
- **Evaluation of international cooperation.** Analysis of IOM, UNHCR, OAS, multilateral and bilateral partners' support to Haitian migration governance, and its effectiveness can inform aid practices and lead to more targeted aid efforts.

Appendix I

Data sources, methodology, challenges and processing

Data sources

Country	Source	Repository	Data format	Years	Data processing
All	OECD Migration Database	https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/oecd-databases-on-migration.html	Excel	2010 and 2020	Excel
All	United Nations: International Migrant Stock 2024: Destination and origin. Table 1: International migrant stock at mid-year by sex and by region, country or area of destination and origin, 1990–2024	https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/undesd_2024_ims_stock_by_sex_destination_and_origin.xlsx		1990–2024	Excel
All	World Bank. Global Bilateral Migration Matrix 1960-2020	https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/00700f3fc0f4eb17bdc08a372a4a2a13-0050062023/original/Global-Migration-Matrix-1960-2020.zip	Excel	1960–2020	Excel
All	World Bank: Global Bilateral Migration Matrix 2000–2010-2020 (by education level)	https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/7d8f46cee82def92199ca5549bddb1f7-0050062023/original/WBGBMM-2000-2010-2020.zip	Excel	2000, 2010, and 2020	Excel
USA	Census Bureau American Community Survey	https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs.html	CVS	2023	SPSS
Canada	Statistics Canada	https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2021/dp-pd/index-eng.cfm	CVS	2021	SPSS
Dominican Republic	IPUMS internacional	https://international.ipums.org/international/	SAV	2010	SPSS
Dominican Republic	Oficina Nacional de Estadística, ONE. ENI	https://dominicanrepublic.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/ENI-2017%20FinalWeb.pdf	PDF	2012 and 2027	Tables in Excel
Brazil	IBGE	https://portaldeimigracao.mj.gov.br/pt/dados/microdados/1733-obmigra/dados/microdados/401205-sismigra	CVS	2010–2017; annually from 2018 to 2024 (only used 2024)	Excel
Brazil	UNHCR-ACNUR. Haitians' access to the formal labor market in Brazil	https://www.acnur.org/br/sites/br/files/2025-02/202312-haitians-access-formal-labour-market-brazil.pdf	PDF	2024	Extracted in Excel
Brazil	IBGE.	https://agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/media/com_mediaibge/arquivos/5372562f3733b0300ecc87116b276e54.pdf	PDF	2010 and 2022	Extracted in Excel
Chile	INE. Censo de Población y Vivienda	https://www.inec.cl/estadisticas/sociales/censos-de-poblacion-y-vivienda/centro-de-poblacion-y-vivienda	Formato .CSV	2017	SPSS
México	INEGI	https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/ccpv/2020/	Formato .SAV	2020	SPSS
France	Population Census 2021	https://www.insee.fr/en/metadonnees/source/operation/s2150/acces-micro-donnees		2021	Not available
	IMILA de la CEPAL, Naciones Unidas.	https://celade.cepal.org/bdcelade/imila/	Tables in Excel		To inform methodology
	IMILA - Investigación de la Migración Internacional en Latinoamérica - Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe.				

Challenges with Quantitative Databases

Over the course of this study, major challenges were encountered in the search for quantitative data on Haitian international migration, some anticipated, others unexpected. These challenges include the following:

- Inconsistent national reporting mechanisms, particularly from Haiti's institutional apparatus, weakened by political instability and under-resourced civil registration systems.
- Lack of harmonized definitions across datasets, especially concerning irregular migration, return migration, and circular migration.
- Limited data disaggregation for key indicators (for example, by country of birth/origin, legal status, level of education, skill level, or occupation category).
 - Obtaining data that distinctly identify Haitians presents several challenges. Although most census sources collect metrics on individuals' country of birth or origin, these variables are frequently aggregated with those from neighboring countries, resulting in regional-level groupings rather than specific national distinctions. While principal destination countries were selected due to their significant intake of Haitian migrants, it is important to note that Haitians may not constitute a major segment of the destination's overall migrant population, leading to further aggregation for reasons such as anonymity or the need for larger sample sizes in analyses. Accurate identification of the target population is vital to this research, but limitations in available data have necessitated reliance on older datasets or information with restricted scope.
 - Although census enumeration is intended to encompass all residents, irrespective of their legal or immigration status, the availability of data that permit disaggregation by status is extremely limited.
 - At times, datasets that should have the relevant information are unavailable, even several years after data collection. For example, the 2023 Brazil census contains a migration module that should include information on Haitians. However, while it

was recently released, only data tables where all ‘foreigners’ are grouped together are available. For a number of countries, access to microdata is not yet publicly available (for example, Brazil, France, Chile, and the Dominican Republic). As an alternative, the IPUMS International and Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (*Centro Latinoamericano de Demografía*, CELADE) datasets were used, and although they may be outdated, they do provide the representative microdata for certain countries. Supplementary reports were also used, such as the Second National Survey of Immigrants in the Dominican Republic (ENI⁶ 2017 - General Report), which contains relevant information on Haitian migration in the country.

→ Conceptual Challenges: Defining ‘Skilled Migration’

One of the central methodological challenges encountered in this study was the conceptual ambiguity surrounding what constitutes a skilled migrating Haitian. In the Haitian context, where tertiary education is limited in terms of quantity (available seats) and quality, no accreditation scheme is in place, and governance remains weak, international categorizations often fail to capture the lived realities of ‘skilled’ migration such as the following:

- Formal credentials may not align with labor market competitiveness abroad due to disparities in training, language proficiency, or credential recognition.
- Migrating individuals with functional professional experience in Haiti (for example, teachers, nurses, and engineers) are often deskilled in host countries, working in low-wage, informal, or unregulated sectors. However, the ability to analyze this is limited due to the few datasets incorporating both the field of study of Haitians and their current occupation in the destination country. If available, this analysis would elucidate the prevalence of deskilling. As it stands, few datasets include both the individual’s field of study alongside their occupation to understand the relationship between education and labor market integration at the destination.

⁶ ENI = *Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes* (National Immigrant Survey, Chile).

- The global metrics for defining high-skill migration (for example, International Standard Classification of Occupations [ISCO] or United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization [UNESCO] ISCED⁷ levels) do not map cleanly onto the Haitian education system, nor to some of the country-level systems, given the diverse range of contexts (North America, South America, and Europe). For this study's analysis, where data are available, the individual education categories are mapped against this study's definition of 'skilled migrants'⁸ (or skilled people who migrate), who are those who have completed at least one year of tertiary studies.

Thus, this report adopts a contextualized definition that considers both formal qualifications and the perceived skill utility at destination and draws from alternative indicators such as job category and professional experience.

Quantitative Data Processing and Analysis

The study began with a scoping of existing data sources, focusing on the key destinations to which Haitians have migrated. Top destinations were identified for both the general population of Haitian migrants, as well as those with some tertiary education (skilled migrants). Further exploration of key destinations, including the United States, Canada, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and France, was conducted using data drawn from national census microdata or surveys. The data extraction process was conducted in Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). In each case, the results were presented using weights. The categories were used as reported. With respect to occupational categories, they are presented in order of importance. For countries without microdata, data were extracted and processed in Excel (Brazil and the United Kingdom, for example).

Harmonized datasets such as the World Bank Migration Database and the Global Bilateral Migration Matrix, OECD-related data were prioritized to provide an overview of migrant⁹ flows, presenting

⁷ ISCED = International Standard Classification of Education.

⁸ Throughout this report, the expressions 'skilled migrant', 'skilled people who migrate', or 'skilled people on the move' are used interchangeably.

the number of Haitians who migrate by sex in the destination country and the proportion it represents from the overall migrating population globally over two or three time points, depending on availability: 2010, 2020, and 2024. This process was repeated for those with tertiary education, which was examined among those ages 15 or older, using only 2010 and 2020 data, as the data that include tertiary education were not available for 2024. To determine the population structure of Haitians who migrate to any given country, national population datasets, such as the American Community Survey (ACS) from the United States Census Bureau, were used. The proportion of Haitians who could be considered 'skilled migrants', using national datasets, is presented in addition to those from harmonized data sources. In some datasets, there is also more detailed information on the main field of study among those who have some tertiary education.

Information on employment was examined among those aged 15 or older, to understand migrating Haitians' access to and integration in the destination country's formal labor market. Information on employment activity, employment sector, and type of employment, was analyzed where available. This provides an overview of how tertiary-educated Haitians are represented in migration flows, with particular focus on alignment and mismatches in education and labor force participation at their destination, where such data are available.

Descriptive analysis was conducted separately for each dataset. In each case, the results were presented using weights. Only simple frequencies and cross-tables were obtained without any special treatment for the variables, except for recategorizations based on this study's definition or in identifying the Haitian population, such as in Canada, which is described in the country analysis. The categories were used as reported. No statistical tests were conducted, but the sample cases were observed to identify statistical representativeness.

Where different datasets provided similar information, these were analyzed and presented separately to enable comparison due to different methodologies or years of data availability. National

9 In this study, INURED uses 'migrant' or 'immigrant' as a noun to describe the condition of a person who migrates, in alignment with core literature and policy frameworks on migration. However, due to the current political discourse and the potential for the term 'migrant' to dehumanize and distance individuals, INURED avoids referring to people or specific nationalities as 'migrants' or 'immigrants' whenever possible. For example, the study describes the conditions of 'migrating Haitians', 'Haitians on the move', or 'Haitians who migrate' instead of 'Haitian migrants' or 'Haitian immigrants.'

datasets were explored to identify the national categorizations of education, by levels, which were then recategorized to define tertiary education that aligns with the definition used in this study. The variables for each microdata collection were broken down from the available countries; no special groupings were used. All analyses were conducted in Excel and SPSS.

In general, the following analyses were conducted: first, an examination of the general Haitian migration population was conducted using data from the Global Bilateral Migration Matrix (for 2010 and 2020) and UNDESA (for 2024) harmonized datasets. These analyses enable the presentation of global Haitian migration figures and the relative numbers and proportions residing in a particular destination country, at different time points, separately by sex, where available. Second, data that can provide Haitian population distribution by age groups and sex were examined, typically using national datasets such as the census. Data regarding levels of educational attainment, specifically tertiary-educated individuals, were drawn from the World Bank Migration Database, with data available until 2020. In all cases, official and alternative sources, where relevant, were reviewed. These include the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), CELADE, and International Migration Research in Latin America (*Investigación de la Migración Internacional en Latinoamérica*, IMILA), the OECD, the World Bank, and the United Nations (UN). Where statistical weights were provided, these were incorporated in the analysis.

Data were compared with the wider Haitian global migration population, again to assess the proportion of tertiary-educated Haitians residing in the destination country in question. Further breakdown of tertiary-educated Haitians in terms of age and sex, as well as field of study and employment activity at destination, drew on national datasets. In most destinations, different datasets were used as key variables relevant to this study as the data were not always available or accessible within one dataset. As such, the year of available data for the different components may also vary within one destination. In each of the key destinations, a short description of the methods and procedures followed and the data sources used are included.

Data Visualization

This study uses ArcGIS to generate a cartography of Haitians on the move in key destination countries, where geographic locations were provided in the datasets, drawing on the findings from the analysis described in the previous section that identified migrating Haitians with at least one year or more of tertiary education. Due to common limitations in international databases—such as sampling constraints that prevent mapping of specific geographic units (including IPUMS International, World Bank, DIOC, IMILA, and International Labour Organization [ILO])—these sources were used as supplementary data. Mapping was conducted using ArcMap/ArcGIS version 10.2.2.

Appendix II

Detailed country profiles



United States

Data Sources and Analysis

Analysis of the United States was conducted using several datasets. First, the Global Migration Matrix and World Bank Database (for 2010 and 2020) and UNDESA (for 2024) harmonized data were used to identify the global Haitian migrant population, as well as the total number of Haitian migrants in the country. Similarly, tertiary education data were reported in the same way by country and as a proportion of the global tertiary-educated Haitian migrant population. These tertiary education data were obtained from the World Bank Migration Database by gender, as well as to show its ranking as a key destination country.

Data from ACS 2023 were used to provide the age and gender breakdown of the Haitian population in the United States. The ACS is a household survey conducted monthly since 2000 by the United States Census Bureau. The ACS design allows for the collection of annual, triennial, or five-year microdata and covers all current non-institutional residents (in private dwellings) and residents of institutions and military barracks (collective dwellings). It collects detailed information on the housing, demographic, social, economic, and labor characteristics of the population on a permanent basis for 12 months. Due to its large sample size, the ACS approximates statistical representativeness for small populations and analysis at the territorial level. For Haitian populations, it is possible to map their resident location by state, for most states. Using this dataset, analyses on education

and economic profiles were conducted by recategorizing the educational attainment in line with this study's definition of tertiary education with respect to the geographic distribution across the country.

Haitian Population in the United States

The United States remains the primary destination for migrating Haitians (see Table 7), despite a decline in the proportion of inflows since 2010. While the global population of migrating Haitians has increased dramatically from 1.15 million in 2010 to 1.76 million in 2020, and reached 2 million in 2024, the share of Haitians residing in the United States has decreased, from approximately 52 percent of the global population in 2010 to 41 percent in 2020, and further to 40 percent in 2024. Despite this trend, the United States still hosts the highest share of Haitian migrants. Across all three time points, more Haitian females were in the country compared with males, and the growth rates for females were thus also higher.


Table 7. Haitians in the United States relative to the global Haitian migrant population, by sex, 2010, 2020, and 2024

	Men	%	Women	%	Total
<i>Total Haitian population who migrate, global</i>					
2010	588,945	51.2	562,345	48.8	1,151,290
2020	950,860	54.0	809,395	46.0	1,760,255
2024	1,084,638	53.8	933,054	46.2	2,017,692
<i>Total Haitian population in the United States</i>					
2010	284,538	47.7	312,207	52.3	596,745
2020	336,820	47.1	377,755	52.9	714,575
2024	365,542	45.8	432,690	54.2	798,232
<i>Proportion of the global Haitian migrants in the United States</i>					
2010	—	48.3	—	55.5	51.8%
2020	—	35.4	—	46.7	40.6%
2024	—	33.7	—	46.4	39.6%
<i>Annual growth rate</i>					
2010 and 2020	—	1.7	—	1.9	1.8
2010 and 2024	—	1.8	—	2.4	2.1
Rank as key destination country	1	—	1	—	1

Source: Data for 2010 and 2020 from Global Bilateral Migration Matrix 1960–2020. Data for 2024 compiled with data from UNDESA, Population Division (2024). International Migrant Stock 2024. Table 1: International migrant stock at mid-year by sex and by region, country or area of destination and origin, 1990–2024.

ACS data from 2023 indicate that 820,551 people of Haitian descent were residing in the United States, substantially higher than the figures provided from the harmonized databases. The age distribution of the Haitian population is relatively broad, concentrating in the most economically active age groups (see Figure 9). Across all age groups, females outnumbered males in most categories, consistent with the previous findings. This is particularly prominent in the older age groups: 40.7 percent of men and 42.3 percent of women are over the age of 50.


Figure 9. Age and sex structure of Haitians in the United States, 2023



Source: Estimates based on the US Census Bureau, ACS 2023.

ACS data from 2013 and geographic statistics from 2019–2023 were also used to map the geographic distribution of Haitians residing within the United States (see Figure 10). The data reveal high concentration of Haitians in only a few key states. The state of Florida is host to almost half of the Haitian population (48.9 percent), followed by New York (17.5 percent), Massachusetts (8.3 percent), and New Jersey (6.7 percent). A smaller proportion resides in Georgia, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Maryland, North Carolina, California, and Texas. Elsewhere, particularly in the central northwest, the Haitian population is marginal.

Figure 10. Haitians in the United States by geographic distribution, 2019–2023



Source: Prepared with data from the US Census Bureau, ACS 2019–2023.

Education Profile of Haitians in the United States

Among Haitians residing in the United States, in 2010, nearly three-quarters (73.4 percent) were non-tertiary educated, while only 26.6 percent had some tertiary education, according to data from the World Bank Migration Database. By 2020, the number of Haitians in the United States with tertiary education had nearly doubled, increasing from 154,602 in 2010 to 297,132 in 2020, an increase of 92.2 percent.

When examining those with a tertiary education, females outnumbered males at both time points, with the proportional gap increasing slightly over time: 51.2 percent versus 48.8 percent for females versus males in 2010 and 52.8 percent versus 47.2 percent in 2020 (see Table 8).

Table 8. Educational attainment among Haitians^a in the United States, relative to global tertiary-educated Haitians who migrate, by sex, 2010 and 2020

	Men	%	Women	%	Total
Total tertiary-educated Haitians who migrate, global					
2010	104,528	48.4	111,455	51.6	215,983
2020	200,536	48.9	209,477	51.1	410,013
Education attainment among Haitians in the United States					
2010 Total	268,901	46.3	312,207	53.7	581,108
Non-tertiary	193,497	45.4	233,009	54.6	426,506
Tertiary	75,404	48.8	79,198	51.2	154,602
2020 Total	314,000	46.7	358,661	53.3	672,661
Non-tertiary	173,768	46.3	201,761	53.7	375,529
Tertiary	140,232	47.2	156,900	52.8	297,132
Proportion of the global tertiary-educated Haitian migrants in the United States					
2010	—	72.1	—	71.1	71.6%
2020	—	69.9	—	74.9	72.5%
Annual growth rate for tertiary- educated Haitians: 2010 and 2020	6.4	—	7.1	—	6.8
Position as a destination country for tertiary-educated Haitians	1	—	1	—	1

Source: World Bank Group Business Management Model (WBGBMM) 2000–2020 and World Bank Migration Database.
Note: a Population 15 years and older.

To determine a tertiary education variable close to this study's definition, the education-level categories from the ACS were reclassified (see Table 9).

Table 9. Classification of education levels from the American Community Survey

Non-tertiary Education	Tertiary Education
bb. N/A (less than 3 years old)	19. 1 or more years of college credit, no degree
01. No schooling completed	20. Associate's degree
02. Nursery school, preschool	21. Bachelor's degree
03. Kindergarten	22. Master's degree
04–16. Grades 1–12, with and without diploma	23. Professional degree beyond a bachelor's degree
17. GED or alternative credential	24. Doctorate degree
18. Some college, but less than 1 year	

Source: Based on the US Census Bureau, ACS.

Using the revised categorization system, the ACS data show that the majority of Haitians in the United States had no tertiary education (56.1 percent) compared to those who had tertiary education (43.9 percent). The proportion with tertiary education is quite similar to the World Bank data of 2020 (44.17 percent). The gender breakdown shows a marginal difference, with slightly more females with non-tertiary education compared to males (56.9 percent versus 55.2 percent), see Table 10.


Table 10. Educational attainment among Haitians in the United States by sex

	Men	%	Women	%	Total	%
Total	368,704	100.0	406,715	100.0	775,419	100.0
Non-tertiary educated	203,522	55.2	231,143	56.9	434,954	56.1
Tertiary educated	165,182	44.8	175,283	43.1	340,465	43.9

Source: Estimates based on the US Census Bureau, ACS, 2023.

Educational attainment by age groups shows that those with non-tertiary education tend to be concentrated in the younger (20–24) and oldest (65+) age groups, at 10.9 percent and 15.61 percent, respectively (see Figure 11). In contrast, the working-age groups, especially between 30 and 49 years, are far more likely to be tertiary-educated: 47.2 percent compared to 34.5 percent with non-tertiary education. Likewise, among the younger group (20 to 24 years), the largest percentage has no tertiary education (10.9 percent versus 6.73 percent with some or more tertiary education), which may be related to ongoing educational processes or more recent migratory trajectories that may have disrupted their education. Overall, the data reflect a clear trend toward higher qualifications among post-earthquake migrating Haitians.

Figure 11. Educational attainment of Haitians in the United States by age group, 2023



Source: Estimates based on the US Census Bureau, ACS, 2023.

Among tertiary-educated Haitians, the most common fields of study were administration, business, and finance (21.3 percent) and medicine and health science (19.5 percent), followed by engineering at 11.5 percent (see Table 11). Unsurprisingly, there were some gender differences. Most females studied medicine and health sciences, 30.2 percent, while for males this only represented 7.9 percent. Administration, business, and finance represented the top fields of study for males at 23.6 percent but were also common among females at 19.1 percent. This was followed by engineering for males, 20.7 percent, and social and economic sciences for females, 10.8 percent.

Table 11. Field of study among tertiary-educated Haitians in the United States by sex, 2023

	Men	%	Women	%	Total	%
Physics, mathematics, and earth sciences	5,688	8.6	3,805	5.3	9,493	6.8
Biology and chemistry	3,471	5.2	3,004	4.2	6,475	4.7
Medicine and health sciences	5,274	7.9	21,750	30.2	27,024	19.5
Biotechnology and agricultural sciences	1,190	1.8	264	0.4	1,454	1.0
Engineering	13,746	20.7	2,249	3.1	15,995	11.5
Arts	719	1.1	307	0.4	1,026	0.7
Humanities	6,295	9.5	5,367	7.4	11,662	8.4
Behavioral sciences	3,547	5.3	6,273	8.7	9,820	7.1
Social and economic sciences	7,148	10.8	7,794	10.8	14,942	10.8
Education	3,314	5.0	7,428	10.3	10,742	7.8
Administration, business, and finance	15,709	23.6	13,767	19.1	29,476	21.3
Services	383	0.6	96	0.1	479	0.3

Source: Estimates based on the US Census Bureau, ACS, 2023.

Considering the geographic distribution of Haitians by education level, two maps are depicted below (see Figure 12). The top section highlights the states where the majority (more than 50 percent) of Haitians have less than a tertiary education. The bottom half are states where the majority of Haitians (more than 50 percent) have a tertiary education.


In Florida, the state with the largest Haitian population, 63.2 percent of Haitians ages 15 and over have less than a tertiary education. Other states with a high proportion of Haitians with non-tertiary attainment include Alabama (61.8 percent), Utah (71.6 percent), Nevada (66.6 percent), Arkansas (73.2 percent),

Mississippi (68.3 percent), and North Dakota (92.9 percent). The pattern shows that states with smaller Haitian populations and non-eastern seaboard states tend to host Haitians with lower educational attainment.


Further, although Florida, in absolute terms, has the largest number of tertiary-educated Haitians, only 37.7 percent fall into this category. This trend could be related to older waves of migration or the arrival of people with less human capital. By contrast, New York and Massachusetts stand out as the states with the second and third highest numbers of tertiary-educated Haitians—accounting for 20.4 percent and 9.6 percent of people in that group, respectively.

Figure 12. States with majority non-tertiary and tertiary-educated Haitians, 2019–2023

States with majority non-tertiary educated Haitians



States with majority tertiary-educated Haitians



Source: Prepared with data from the US Census Bureau, ACS 2019–2023.

Employment Profiles of Haitians in the United States

The labor market participation of the Haitian population ages 15 or older residing in the United States were examined using ACS 2023 data (see Table 12). A greater proportion of tertiary-educated Haitians were employed compared to those with no tertiary education, at 76 percent (or 238,461) and 58 percent (228,484), respectively. Furthermore, economic inactivity was also higher among those with no tertiary education compared to those who are tertiary educated (37.2 percent versus 19.5 percent, respectively). Gender differences were also noted, with non-tertiary educated female Haitians representing the highest proportion of inactivity (42.2 percent) and the lowest level of employment (53.3 percent) compared to males whose inactivity and employment rates were 31.5 percent and 63.3 percent, respectively. This trend is also evident for males, with employment increasing from 63.3 percent (without tertiary education) to 76.3 percent (with tertiary education), while inactivity decreased from 31.5 percent to 18.8 percent, respectively. Employment and unemployment rates mirror this pattern: while the employment rate among Haitians with non-tertiary education was 92.3 percent, among the tertiary educated, it reached 94.5 percent. Furthermore, the unemployment rate fell from 7.7 percent to 5.5 percent when comparing Haitians with no tertiary education to those with tertiary education.

Overall, the data suggest that tertiary-educated Haitians have improved employment opportunities in the United States, enjoying a higher employment rate and lower unemployment. Further, tertiary-educated women had a higher employment rate compared to males, suggesting that education is a key tool for equity in the United States for Haitian females. Among those without tertiary education, both sexes had similar employment rates.

Table 12. Labor market participation among Haitians in the United States by educational attainment and sex, 2023

	Sex		Total
	Men	Women	
Non-tertiary education			
Total	185,064	209,027	394,091
Employed (%)	63.3	53.3	58.0
Unemployed (%)	5.2	4.5	4.8
Inactive (%)	31.5	42.2	37.2
Employment rate ^a (%)	92.4	92.2	92.3
Unemployment rate ^b (%)	7.6	7.8	7.7
Tertiary education			
Total	148,364	165,248	313,612
Employed (%)	76.3	75.8	76.0
Unemployed (%)	4.9	4.0	4.4
Inactive (%)	18.8	20.2	19.5
Employment rate ^a (%)	94.0	95.0	94.5
Unemployment rate ^b (%)	6.0	5.0	5.5

Source: Estimates based on the US Census Bureau, ACS 2023. Among population age ≥15.

Note: ^a Employed / economically active population (EAP) × 100; ^b Unemployed / EAP × 100.

The type of employment secured by Haitians in the United States is presented in Table 13. Among those without tertiary education, females are largely concentrated in the service, sales, and administrative occupations (50.0 percent) followed by cleaning and food preparation occupations (24.7 percent). Men without tertiary education are primarily found in transportation and production (37.7 percent), followed by cleaning and food preparation (20.8 percent); service, sales, and administrative occupations (19.9 percent); and construction, maintenance, and repair occupations (12.3 percent). However, Haitians with a tertiary education were better represented in professional and related occupations, at 36.5 percent of males and 48.3 percent of females. However, inequalities persist: tertiary-educated males continue to be fairly prevalent in the transportation (22.7 percent) and construction (7.4 percent) occupations, while females are concentrated in the services and administrative occupations (40.8 percent).

Table 13. Employment type among Haitians in the United States by educational attainment and sex, 2023

	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
	Non-tertiary education (%)			Tertiary education (%)		
	133,486	134,536	268,022	127,951	142,170	270,121
Professional and related occupations	8.4	11.8	10.1	36.5	48.3	42.7
Service, sales, and administrative occupations	19.9	50.0	35.0	26.3	40.8	33.9
Building cleaning and food preparation	20.8	24.7	22.8	7.0	6.0	6.5
Farming, fishing, and forestry occupations	0.9	0.6	0.7	0.1	0.0	0.0
Construction, maintenance, and repair occupations	12.3	0.5	6.4	7.4	0.2	3.6
Transportation and production	37.7	12.4	25.0	22.7	4.7	13.2

Source: Estimates based on the US Census Bureau, ACS, 2023.



Canada

Data Sources and Analysis

Analysis for Canada followed the same pattern in the initial stages, using the Global Migration Matrix and World Bank Database (for 2010 and 2020) and UNDESA (for 2024) to examine the relative proportion of Haitians in Canada to the global Haitian migrant population. Tertiary education data used the same process and sources to describe the proportion of the global tertiary-educated Haitian migrant population. These tertiary education data were obtained from the World Bank Migration Database for 2010 and 2020. The subsequent sections offer more detailed profiling across education and employment and were conducted using the Canadian Population Census 2021 data.

Within the census data, the main limitation for the Haitian population is statistical representativeness. Although the census asks individuals to report their country of birth, and Haiti is reported, in the dataset, this is grouped together at the regional level under Caribbean and Bermuda. This is likely due to Haitians not being a sufficiently large immigrant group in Canada. A variable identifying cultural/ethnic background also included Haitians as a category; however, a large proportion who identify as being of Haitian ethnicity were born in North America. As there was no single variable that clearly identified Haitians, this study used both, by restricting it to those who identify as being of Haitian ethnicity and who were born in the Caribbean/Bermuda. This approach was adopted after it was confirmed that a significant proportion self-identifying as Haitian by ethnicity or culture were actually born in North America. By applying these restrictions, the analysis achieved the closest available proxy for Haitians living in Canada.

Haitian Population in Canada

Canada ranks as the fifth most significant destination for Haitian migration overall (seventh for females), following the United States, the Dominican Republic, Chile, and France. Canada accounted for 5.3 percent of all Haitians residing outside Haiti in 2024. Between 2010 and 2020, the number of Haitians in Canada increased by 2.3 percent, rising from 83,328 to 104,566. This increase was driven more by male migration (an increased rate of 2.9 percent) compared to female migration (1.8 percent increase). By 2024, there were slight decreases for males and increases for females, with a notable reduction in growth over the four-year period (see Table 14).

Table 14. Haitians in Canada relative to the global Haitian migrant population, by sex, 2010, 2020, and 2024


	Men	%	Women	%	Total
Total Haitian population who migrate, global					
2010	588,945	51.2	562,345	48.8	1,151,290
2020	950,860	54.0	809,395	46.0	1,760,255
2024	1,084,638	53.8	933,054	46.2	2,017,692
Total Haitian population in Canada					
2010	36,206	43.4	47,122	56.6	83,328
2020	48,203	46.1	56,363	53.9	104,566
2024	47,647	44.4	59,590	55.6	107,237
Proportion of the global Haitian migrants in Canada					
2010	—	6.1	—	8.4	7.2%
2020	—	5.1	—	7.0	5.9%
2024	—	4.4	—	6.4	5.3%
Annual growth rate					
2010 and 2020	—	2.9	—	1.8	2.3
2010 and 2024	—	−0.1	—	0.4	0.2
Rank as key destination country	7	—	4	—	5

Source: Data for 2010 and 2020 obtained from Global Bilateral Migration Matrix 1960–2020.

Data for 2024 compiled with data from UNDESA, Population Division (2024). International Migrant Stock 2024. Table 1: International migrant stock at mid-year by sex and by region, country or area of destination, and origin 1990–2024.

Based on the 2021 census data, the overall Haitian population in Canada is made up of adults, of which approximately half were in the 30–54 age group. The age distribution is fairly balanced between males and females until the age of 40, at which point females surpass males at every age group. Notably, 11 percent are ages 70 or older, indicative of long-term settlement in the country (see Figure 13).

Figure 13. Age and sex structure of Haitians in Canada, 2021



Source: Estimates based on the Canada Census of Population 2021.

Education Profiles of Haitians in Canada

Although Canada ranks fifth overall as a destination for migrating Haitians, among skilled migrants its ranking moves up to second place. According to World Bank data, in 2010, among tertiary-educated Haitians in Canada, 44.3 percent were males and 55.7 percent were females. By 2020, this gender gap narrowed, with males rising to 48.7 percent while females declined to 51.3 percent. Despite ranking second for skilled Haitian migrants, the proportion of global tertiary-educated Haitian migrants living in Canada decreased between the two time points, falling from 17 percent in 2010 to 11.1 percent in 2020, with the drop most evident among females (18.3 percent in 2010 to 11.2 percent in 2020) (Table 15).

Table 15. Educational attainment among Haitians^a in Canada, relative to global tertiary-educated Haitians who migrate, by sex, 2010 and 2020

	Men	%	Women	%	Total
<i>Total tertiary-educated Haitians who migrate, global</i>					
2010	104,528	48.4	111,455	51.6	215,983
2020	200,536	48.9	209,477	51.1	410,013
<i>Education attainment among Haitians in Canada</i>					
2010 Total	36,206	43.4	47,122	56.6	83,328
Non-tertiary	19,971	42.8	26,739	57.3	46,700
Tertiary	16,235	44.3	20,393	55.7	36,628
2020 Total	48,203	46.1	56,363	53.9	104,566
Non-tertiary	25,936	44.0	32,948	56.0	58,884
Tertiary	22,267	48.7	23,415	51.3	45,682
<i>Proportion of the global tertiary-educated Haitians in Canada</i>					
2010	—	15.5	—	18.3	17.0%
2020	—	11.1	—	11.2	11.1%
Annual growth rate for tertiary- educated Haitians: 2010 and 2020	—	3.2	—	1.4	2.2
Position as a destination country for tertiary-educated Haitians	2	—	2	—	2

Source: WBGBMM 2000–2020 and World Bank Migration Database.

Note: ^a Population 15 years and older.

Using the most recent Canadian census data (2021), the tertiary education levels were reconstructed to align with this study's definition. The Canadian census captures 13 education categories, some of which are unique to the province of Quebec (see Table 16).

Table 16. Classification of education levels, Canadian census, 2021

Non-tertiary Education	Tertiary Education
1. No certificate, diploma, or degree	6. Program of 1 to 2 years (College, CEGEP ¹⁰ and other non-university certificates or diplomas)
2. High (secondary) school diploma or equivalency certificate	7. Program of more than 2 years (College, CEGEP and other non-university certificates or diplomas)
3. Non-apprenticeship trades certificate or diploma	8. University certificate or diploma below bachelor level
4. Apprenticeship certificate	9. Bachelor's degree
5. Program of 3 months to less than 1 year (College, CEGEP and other non-university certificates or diplomas)	10. University certificate or diploma above bachelor level
	11. Degree in medicine, dentistry, veterinary medicine, or optometry
	12. Master's degree
	13. Earned doctorate

Source: Based on the Canada Census of Population 2021.

According to Canadian census data, the majority of migrating Haitians do not have any tertiary education (62.7 percent) with relatively equal distribution between males and females, 63.5 percent versus 62.1 percent, respectively (see Table 17). This contrasts with the World Bank data, which show a greater overall proportion of tertiary-educated Haitians who have migrated, as well as a wider gap by sex (see Table 15).

Table 17. Educational attainment among Haitians in Canada by sex, 2021

	Men	%	Women	%	Total	%
Total	30,751	100.0	38,345	100.0	69,096	100.0
Non-tertiary educated	19,525	63.5	23,822	62.1	43,347	62.7
Tertiary educated	11,226	36.5	14,523	37.9	25,749	37.3


Source: WBGBMM 2000–2020 and World Bank Migration Database.

Note: ° Population 15 years and older.

10 Collège d'enseignement général et professionnel (CEGEP) is a post-secondary school in Quebec, Canada, bridging high school and university.

The geographic distribution of Haitians in Canada is displayed in Figure 14, with the majority concentrated in four provinces: Quebec, Ontario, British Columbia, and Alberta. A larger proportion of tertiary-educated Haitians resided in British Colombia (66.7 percent), while the largest proportion of non-tertiary-educated Haitians reside in Alberta and Quebec, 71.4 percent and 63.7 percent, respectively.


Figure 14. Geographic distribution of tertiary and non-tertiary-educated Haitians in Canada, 2021



Source: Estimates based on the Canada Census of Population 2021.

When examining educational attainment by age groups, the highest concentration of tertiary-educated Haitians in Canada is in the 40 to 54 age group (47.63 percent). By contrast, a smaller proportion of younger (under 35) and older (over 55) Haitians in Canada are tertiary educated (see Figure 15).

Figure 15. Tertiary and non-tertiary-educated Haitians in Canada by age group, 2021



Source: Estimates based on the Canada Census of Population 2021.

Tertiary-educated Haitians in Canada reportedly studied a wide range of disciplines. The most common fields included business, management, and public administration (26.5 percent), followed closely by health and related fields (25.7 percent). The third most common fields were social and behavioral sciences and law, at

12.5 percent. Among males, business, management, and public administration dominated, at 27.5 percent, while for females, nearly 40 percent studied health and related fields, fields reported by just 7.1 percent of males. Men were also well represented in architecture, engineering, and related trades, at 19.3 percent while only 1.0 percent of females were in these fields.

Table 18. Field of study among tertiary-educated Haitians in Canada by sex, 2021

	Men	Women	Total
Total^a	10,928	14,337	25,265
	%		
Education	6.4	8.8	7.8
Visual and performing arts and communication Technology	1.4	1.3	1.3
Humanities	8.1	5.4	6.6
Social and behavioral sciences and law	14.2	11.1	12.5
Business, management, and public administration	27.5	25.8	26.5
Physical and life sciences and technologies	2.4	2.8	2.6
Mathematics, computer, and information sciences	9.2	2.3	5.3
Architecture, engineering, and related trades	19.3	1.0	8.9
Agriculture, natural resources, and conservation	1.0	0.3	0.6
Health and related fields	7.1	39.8	25.7
Personal, protective, and transportation services	3.4	1.3	2.2

Source: Estimates based on the Canada Census of Population, 2021.
Note: a. Excludes those not specified.

Employment Profiles of Haitians in Canada

Analysis of labor market participation by educational attainment shows that although the majority of the Haitian population in Canada does not have any tertiary education (62.7 percent), the employment rate is nevertheless relatively high at 92.3 percent (see Table 19). The employment rate for those without tertiary education is lower for females (90.6 percent) compared to males (94.1 percent). However, the pattern is reversed for those with tertiary education, where the employment rate for females is marginally higher than for males, at 96 percent versus 94.7 percent, respectively. Most notably, more non-tertiary-educated females are inactive compared to their male counterparts, at 39.0 percent and

29.4 percent, respectively. Having tertiary education improves labor market participation substantially, with only 17.9 percent of females and 18.5 percent of males being inactive. Women with some tertiary education also outperform men, suggesting that education is a key tool for gender equity in Canada.

Table 19. Labor market participation among Haitians in Canada by educational attainment and sex, 2021

	Men	Women	Total
Non-tertiary education	19,525	23,822	43,347
	%		
Employed	66.4	55.2	60.3
Unemployed	4.2	5.8	5.0
Inactive	29.4	39.0	34.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
Employment Rate ^a	94.1	90.6	92.3
Unemployment Rate ^b	5.9	9.4	7.7
Tertiary education	11,226	14,523	25,749
	%		
Employed	77.2	78.8	78.1
Unemployed	4.3	3.3	3.7
Inactive	18.5	17.9	18.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
Employment Rate ^a	94.7	96.0	95.4
Unemployment Rate ^b	5.3	4.0	4.6
Non-tertiary education	19,525	23,822	43,347

Source: Estimates based on the Canada Census of Population 2021.

Note: Among population ages 15 or older.

a. Employed / EAP × 100; b. Unemployed / EAP × 100.

Among Haitians in the labor market, those without a tertiary education mainly worked in health care and social assistance (36.1 percent) and manufacturing sectors (13.6 percent). Although both sectors were the top two by sex, distribution varied widely, with health care and social assistance dominated by females (57.8 percent versus 14.1 percent for males), while the reverse is true for the manufacturing sector (18.9 percent for males versus 8.3

percent for females). Among those with a tertiary education, health care and social assistance still dominated for females (60.8 percent versus 17 percent for males). However, other sectors were more prominent among tertiary-educated Haitians, particularly males with 29.5 percent working in utilities, construction, manufacturing, and related trades, followed by 10.3 percent in cultural, recreational, and public services.

Table 20. Employment sector among Haitians in Canada by educational attainment and sex, 2021

	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Sector	Non-tertiary education (%)			Tertiary education (%)		
	13,113	13,335	26,448	8,928	11,818	20,746
Manufacturing	18.9	8.3	13.6	—	—	—
Wholesale trade	7.1	1.1	4.1	—	—	—
Retail trade	11.9	7.5	9.7	—	—	—
Transportation and warehousing	15.5	0.6	8.0	—	—	—
Administrative and support, waste management and remediation services	12.1	6.4	9.2	11.2	4.1	7.1
Health care and social assistance	14.1	57.8	36.1	17.0	60.8	42.0
Accommodation and food services	3.7	5.8	4.8	—	—	—
Professional, scientific, and technical services	—	—	—	7.5	4.4	5.7
Educational services	—	—	—	5.8	9.7	8.0
Finance and insurance, management of companies and enterprises	—	—	—	5.4	5.0	5.2
Utilities, construction, manufacturing, trade, transportation and warehousing	—	—	—	29.5	5.6	15.9
Cultural, recreational and public services	—	—	—	23.6	10.3	16.1

Source: Estimates based on the Canada Census of Population 2021.

Note: a. Excludes those not specified.



Chile

Data Sources and Analysis

The overall patterns of Haitian migrants in Chile are provided by the Global Migration Matrix and World Bank Database (for 2010 and 2020) and UNDESA (for 2024) to examine the relative proportion of Haitians in Chile to the global population of migrating Haitians. The Chilean Population and Housing Census of 2024 was also used to characterize and compare the Haitian population in the country, but microdata were unavailable. Tertiary education data, describing the proportion of the global tertiary-educated Haitian migrant population, are based on the World Bank Migration Database, supplemented by the Chilean Population and Housing Census of 2017. The latter was also used to assess the wider Haitian profile, including education and employment profiles in Chile.

Haitian Population in Chile

In recent years, Chile has become increasingly important for Haitians migrating within the Latin America and Caribbean region. In 2010, Chile did not feature among the key destinations for Haitians, and according to data from the World Bank, it only registered 437 Haitian migrants (see [Table 21](#)). Since then, the growth has been exponential, increasing to more than 228,049 in 2020. It dropped to 172,050 by 2024, although data for the latter year is from a different source (UNDESA). Across all time points, there were more Haitian males compared to females, 54 percent versus 46 percent in 2020 and 53.8 percent versus 46.2 percent in 2024. Chile became the third most common destination for Haitian males and the fifth most common destination for females.

Table 21. Haitians in Chile relative to the global Haitian migrant population, by sex, 2010, 2020, and 2024

	Men	%	Women	%	Total
<i>Total Haitian population who migrate, global</i>					
2010	588,945	51.2	562,345	48.8	1,151,290
2020	950,860	54.0	809,395	46.0	1,760,255
2024	1,084,638	53.8	933,054	46.2	2,017,692
<i>Total Haitian population in Chile</i>					
2010	295	67.5	142	32.5	437
2020	145,411	63.8	82,638	36.2	228,049
2024	113,262	65.8	58,788	34.2	172,050
<i>Proportion of the global Haitian migrants in Chile</i>					
2010	—	0.1	—	0.0	0.0%
2020	—	15.3	—	10.2	13.0%
2024	—	10.4	—	6.3	8.5%
<i>Annual growth rate</i>					
2010 and 2020	—	85.9	—	89.0	87
2010 and 2024	—	−1.8	—	−2.4	−2
Rank as key destination country	3		5	—	3

Source: Data for 2010 and 2020 compiled from Global Bilateral Migration Matrix 1960–2020.

Data for 2024 compiled with data from UNDESA, Population Division (2024). International Migrant Stock 2024. Table 1: International migrant stock at midyear by sex and by region, country or area of destination, and origin 1990–2024.

Additionally, using the 2024 Chilean census, Haitians represented 5 percent of the total immigrant population in the country, placing them as the fifth largest immigrant group behind Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia. There is strong male overrepresentation: 59.6 percent versus 40.4 percent females, reflecting a male-to-female ratio of 147.8 to 100, the highest of all listed nationalities (see Table 22). The Haitian migration pattern in Chile is masculine and labor-based, which contrasts with those in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, where women outnumber men.

Table 22. International immigrants to Chile by country/region of birth and sex, 2024

Country/Continent of Birth	International Immigrants	%	Men	%	Women	%	M:F Ratio
Total born outside Chile	1,608,650	100.0	776,388	100.0	832,262	100.0	93.3
Argentina	70,266	4.4	34,614	4.5	35,652	4.3	97.1
Bolivia	168,083	10.4	74,977	9.7	93,106	11.2	80.5
Colombia	197,813	12.3	91,384	11.8	106,429	12.8	85.9
Haiti	80,781	5.0	48,177	6.2	32,604	3.9	147.8
Perú	233,432	14.5	108,547	14.0	124,885	15.0	86.9
Venezuela	669,408	41.6	326,127	42.0	343,281	41.2	95.0
Other South American countries	78,860	4.9	36,533	4.7	42,327	5.1	86.3
Other Central America/Caribbean countries	40,559	2.5	18,421	2.4	22,138	2.7	83.2
North America	11,329	0.7	5,961	0.8	5,368	0.6	111.0
Europe	33,563	2.1	17,714	2.3	15,849	1.9	111.8
Asia	20,047	1.2	11,449	1.5	8,598	1.0	133.2
Africa	1,580	0.1	950	0.1	630	0.1	150.8
Oceania	1,477	0.1	806	0.1	671	0.1	120.1
Not reported	1,452	0.1	728	0.1	724	0.1	100.6

Source: Population and Housing Census Chile 2024 - National Statistics Institute.

The analysis of Haitians in Chile by region of residence reveals differences by geography and gender. The Santiago metropolitan region accounts for 72.1 percent (58,253 individuals) of the total Haitian population in Chile. Other key regions include Valparaíso (8.3 percent), Coquimbo (2.6 percent), Maule (5.4 percent), and Libertador General Bernardo O'Higgins (5.0 percent), with each representing a small proportion (see Table 23). This pattern indicates a strong concentration of migration in the metropolitan region, a situation that may be due, in part, to recent arrivals in the country, as just over two-thirds (67.7 percent) of Haitians residing in Chile in 2024 arrived after 2017.

The dominance of Haitian males in Chile extends across geographies within the country. For example, several regions far exceed the sex ratio of 147.8 men per 100 women, such as Aysén (453.8), Antofagasta (250.0), Magallanes (241.2), Los Lagos (226.4), and Los Ríos (204.9). Even in regions with larger Haitian populations, such as O'Higgins and Maule, the sex ratio remains quite high at 188.7 and 183.6, respectively. The extreme differences in the sex ratio may indicate differences in migration patterns, with males likely migrating alone in search of labor opportunities.

Findings from a study of South-South migration from Haiti to Latin America (INURED 2024) corroborate that migration to Chile has been male dominated, precisely due to limited opportunities afforded to Haitians in the local labor market, which has relegated them to low-skilled, manual jobs deemed unsuitable for Haitian women.

Table 23. Haitians in Chile, by region of residence and sex, 2024


Geographic Region	Haitian Migrants	Men	Women	M:F Ratio
Haitians	80,781	48,177	32,604	147.8
Arica y Parinacota	22	12	10	120.0
Tarapacá	239	151	88	171.6
Antofagasta	56	40	16	250.0
Atacama	142	94	48	195.8
Coquimbo	2,093	1,336	757	176.5
Valparaíso	6,670	4,239	2,431	174.4
Metropolitana de Santiago	58,253	33,540	24,713	135.7
Libertador General Bernardo O'Higgins	4,074	2,663	1,411	188.7
Maule	4,347	2,814	1,533	183.6
Ñuble	627	404	223	181.2
Biobío	1,195	790	405	195.1
La Araucanía	989	655	334	196.1
Los Ríos	436	293	143	204.9
Los Lagos	1,508	1,046	462	226.4
Aysén del General Carlos Ibáñez del Campo	72	59	13	453.8
Magallanes y de la Antártica Chilena	58	41	17	241.2

Source: Population and Housing Census Chile 2024 - National Statistics Institute.

Note: The information used was processed under the data protection and privacy principles of Law 21,719.

According to the 2017 Chilean census data, Haitian migrants were mainly in the 20 to 44 age group. These age ranges account for 87.6 percent of the total Haitian population in the country and are largely dominated by the 25–29 age group for both males and females. However, the figure for males is double that of females, at 20.0 percent and 10.4 percent, respectively (see Figure 16).

Figure 16. Age and sex structure of Haitians in Chile, 2017



Source: Estimates based on Population and Housing Census Chile 2017.

Education Profiles of Haitians in Chile

Haitian migration to Chile largely comprised individuals without tertiary education. In 2010, of the 437 Haitians who migrated to Chile none had a tertiary education. By 2020, Chile would emerge as a key destination for Haitians migrating in the Latin America and Caribbean region, hosting just under 225,000 Haitians. However, only 9.68 percent had a tertiary education. There was a large gender disparity in educational attainment among Haitians in Chile as Haitian males were more than three times as likely, at 76.2 percent, to have a tertiary education than females, at 23.8 percent (see Table 24). Note that growth rates could not be calculated due to insufficient data in 2010.

Table 24. Educational attainment among Haitians^a in Chile, relative to global tertiary-educated Haitians who migrate, by sex, 2010 and 2020

	Men	%	Women	%	Total
Total tertiary-educated Haitians who migrate, global					
2010	104,528	48.4	111,455	52	215,983
2020	200,536	48.9	209,477	51	410,013
Education attainment among Haitians in Chile					
2010 Total	295	0.0	142	0.0	437
Non-tertiary	295	67.5	142	32.5	437
Tertiary	0	0.0	0	0.0	0
2020 Total	143,821	63.9	81	0.0	224,899
Non-tertiary	127,233	62.6	75,889	37.4	203,122
Tertiary	16,588	76.2	5,189	23.8	21,777
Proportion of the global tertiary-educated Haitian migrants in Chile					
2010 ^b	—	0.0	—	0.0	0.0%
2020	—	8.3	—	2.5	5.3%
Position as a destination country for tertiary-educated Haitians	3	—	4	—	3

Source: WBGBMM 2000–2020, World Bank Migration Database.

Note: a. Population 15 years and older. b. No growth rates as insufficient data from 2010.

The remaining education analysis was conducted using Chilean census data. First, the 14 education classifications were recategorized to align more closely with this study's definitions (Table 25).

Table 25. Classification of education levels from Chile's Population Census, 2017

Non-tertiary Education	Tertiary Education
1. Sala cuna o jardín infantil (Nursery or Preschool)	7. Científico-humanista (Scientific-Humanistic)
2. Prekinder (Pre-kindergarten)	8. Técnica profesional (Professional Technical)
3. Kinder (Kindergarten)	9. Humanidadesa (Humanities*)
4. Especial o diferencial (Special Education)	10. Técnica comercial, industrial/normalista (Commercial/Industrial Technical / Teacher Training*)
5. Educación básica (Basic Education)	11. Técnica superior (1–3 years) [Higher Technical (1–3 years)]
6. Primaria o preparatoria (Primary or Preparatory*)	12. Profesional (4+ years) [Professional (4+ years)]
	13. Magister (Master's)
	14. Doctorado (Doctorate)

Source: Population and Housing Census Chile, 2017.

Note: *Sistema antiguo.

Using this classification, the vast majority, 83.2 percent or 161,382 of Haitians over the age of 15 in Chile have some tertiary education. Overall, more males than females have tertiary education, at 84.9 percent versus 80.0 percent, respectively (see Table 26).


Table 26. Educational attainment among Haitians in Chile by sex, 2017

	Men	%	Women	%	Total	%
Total	127,691	100.0%	66,200	100.0%	193,891	100.0%
Non-tertiary education	19,255	15.1%	13,254	20.0%	32,509	16.8%
Tertiary education	108,436	84.9%	52,946	80.0%	161,382	83.2%

Source: Estimates based on Population and Housing Census Chile, 2017.

Breaking down education by age groups, those ages 20 to 34 comprise the largest portion of tertiary-educated Haitians in Chile at 77.1 percent (see Figure 17). This proportion declines after the age of 35. Among those without tertiary education, those in the 40 to 44 age group dominate. It should be noted that although the Education for All (EFA) initiative increased access to primary schooling globally and, by extension, increased demand for higher education, in Haiti, EFA was not officially launched until 2007. Thus, while EFA may have expanded access to tertiary education for Haiti's youth, those gains are potentially more recent than might be expected.

Figure 17. Tertiary and non-tertiary-educated Haitians in Chile by age group, 2017



Source: Estimates based on Population and Housing Census Chile 2017.

Employment Profiles of Haitians in Chile

Labor market participation rates were broadly similar among Haitians in Chile with different educational attainment (see Table 27). The difference between the percentage of the employed population and the employment rate is minimal among the two groups. The highest unemployment rate, at 18.5 percent, is seen among individuals with some tertiary education. However, when examining by sex, a different picture emerges. Among those without tertiary education, the rates are fairly similar between the sexes. However, among those with tertiary education, the employment rate is far lower for females at 66.1 percent versus 87.8 percent for males. More educated females were also inactive compared to males.

Table 27. Labor market participation of Haitians in Chile by educational attainment and sex, 2017

	Men	%	Women	%	Total	%
Non-tertiary education						
Employed	12,661	66.5	8,784	67.0	21,445	66.7
Unemployed	2,578	13.5	1,622	12.4	4,200	13.1
Inactive	3,787	19.9	2,707	20.6	6,494	20.2
Total	19,026	100.0	13,113	100.0	32,139	100.0
Employment Rate	—	83.1	—	84.4	—	83.6
Unemployment Rate	—	16.9	—	15.6	—	16.4
Tertiary education						
Employed	78,835	73.5	24,217	46.4	103,052	64.6
Unemployed	10,938	10.2	12,420	23.8	23,358	14.6
Inactive	17,535	16.3	15,541	29.8	33,076	20.7
Total	107,308	100.0	52,178	100.0	159,486	100.0
Employment rate	—	87.8	—	66.1	—	81.5
Unemployment rate	—	12.2	—	33.9	—	18.5

Source: Estimates based on Population and Housing Census Chile, 2017.

Despite being tertiary-educated, most Haitians in Chile work in low-skilled sectors: agriculture (18.9 percent), construction (21.4 percent), commerce and vehicle repair (16.7 percent), and manufacturing (13.5 percent) (see Table 28). These areas employ 70.5 percent of skilled Haitians. Apart from the agriculture sector, which is highly dominated by Haitians without tertiary education (40.8 percent versus 18.9 percent of tertiary-educated Haitians), most other sectors are similar between the two groups, with some slightly more represented by tertiary-educated Haitians.

When examining the employment sectors by sex, both are highly concentrated in low-skilled sectors. Women are mainly in administrative and support services (20.8 percent) and agriculture-related sectors (12.0 percent). Women with non-tertiary level education further dominate in these low-wage sectors, 15.0 percent of non-tertiary-educated females versus 12.2 percent of females with tertiary education. Even among skilled females in Chile, the main employment sectors are administration and accommodation/food services (21 percent each). Similarly, among non-tertiary-educated males, 24 percent work in construction and 21 percent in both agriculture and commerce-related occupations. Men with some tertiary education also work in the same sectors at similar rates, 27.5 percent in construction, 21 percent in agriculture, and 18 percent in commerce/vehicle repairs.

Table 28. Employment sector participation of Haitians^a in Chile by educational attainment and sex, 2017

	Men	Women	Total		Men	Women	Total
Non-tertiary education	13,113	13,335	26,448	Non-tertiary education	13,113	13,335	26,448
	%				%		
Agriculture, livestock, forestry, and fishing	20.8	67.7	40.8	Construction	27.5	1.1	21.4
Construction	24.1	0.9	14.2	Agriculture, livestock, forestry, and fishing	21.0	12.0	18.9
Commerce, motor vehicle, and motorcycle repair	20.9	5.0	14.1	Commerce, motor vehicle, and motorcycle repair	18.1	12.2	16.7
Manufacturing industries	14.1	2.6	9.2	Manufacturing industries	15.0	8.3	13.5
Administrative and support service activities	6.0	6.5	6.2	Administrative and support service activities	5.1	20.8	8.8
Accommodation and food service activities	3.8	6.3	4.9	Accommodation and food service activities	4.3	21.3	8.2
Transportation and warehousing	5.9	2.8	4.6	Transportation and warehousing	4.6	3.5	4.4
Household activities ^b	0.4	5.4	2.6	Household activities ^b	0.4	10.0	2.6
Other service activities	1.1	0.7	0.9	Others	4.0	10.8	5.6
Human health care and social assistance activities	0.5	1.2	0.8				
Other	2.3	0.8	1.7				

Source: Estimates based on Population and Housing Census Chile, 2017.

Note: a. Population ages 15 years or more. b. As employers: Undifferentiated household activities as producers of goods and services.

In summary, despite relatively high educational attainment, particularly among males, the tertiary-educated Haitian population in Chile in 2017 was largely integrated into precarious and low-skilled sectors, with strong gender segmentation. This suggests an underutilization of their training and labor force integration, marked by structural inequalities. There appears to be some disconnect between educational attainment and labor market integration, as education does not seem to have influenced labor market integration positively. The employment rate among tertiary-educated Haitian females is actually lower than that of their non-tertiary-educated counterparts. While data on Haitians' actual occupations in Chile are unavailable, the heavy emphasis on low-wage and low-skilled sectors suggests that they are unlikely to be able to advance in the workplace. Further, the fact that those with less education have higher employment rates suggests that tertiary-educated Haitians face distinct integration challenges in Chile.



Dominican Republic

Data Sources and Analysis

Data from the Global Migration Matrix and World Bank Database (for 2010 and 2020) and UNDESA (for 2024) were used to examine the relative proportion of Haitians in the Dominican Republic to the global Haitian migrant population. The Dominican Republic 2022 Population and Housing Census data are available in microdata format on the official website of the National Statistics Office (*Oficina Nacional de Estadística*, ONE). However, the migration variables are not yet available. As a result, other sources were consulted to supplement the analysis. Datasets such as the International Public Information System (IPUMS International) and CELADE, which offer microdata, were consulted. However, in both cases, the microdata available for the Dominican Republic are outdated, limiting the possibility of drawing meaningful conclusions.

The study team also consulted the ENI (2012 and 2017). In particular, the Second National Survey of Immigrants in the Dominican Republic (ENI 2017 - General Report) contains relevant information on Haitian migration in the country. While the databases are available for the specific analysis of skilled migration, the sample size is only 235 cases, which considerably limits the depth and scope of conducting the analysis. Therefore, ultimately, the microdata from the 2010 Census, available in IPUMS, were used to provide some information to enable a partial analysis of Haitian migration in the Dominican Republic. Due to the porous nature of the shared Haiti-Dominican border (OECD and INURED 2017), the total migration numbers presented herein are considered quite conservative.

Haitian Population in the Dominican Republic

The number of Haitians in the Dominican Republic grew at an annual rate of 4.7 percent between 2010 and 2020, rising from 313,363 to 496,112, and increasing again to 535,116 by 2024 (see Table 29). There was a slight widening of the gender gap between 2010 and 2020, with males accounting for 62 percent and females 38 percent of the overall Haitian migrant population in 2010. In 2020, this increased slightly for males to 65.3 percent, while for females it decreased to 34.7 percent. By 2024, despite increases in the absolute numbers of Haitian migrants, the gender distribution remained the same. Although the Dominican Republic ranks second among key destinations for migrating Haitians, the growth experienced was much higher than that of Haitian migration to the United States, which ranks first among all destination countries.

Table 29. Haitians in the Dominican Republic, relative to the global Haitian migrant population, by sex, 2010, 2020, and 2024

	Men	%	Women	%	Total
Total Haitian migrant population, global					
2010	588,945	51.2	562,345	48.8	1,151,290
2020	950,860	54.0	809,395	46.0	1,760,255
2024	1,084,638	53.8	933,054	46.2	2,017,692
Total Haitian population in the Dominican Republic					
2010	194,191	62.0	119,172	38.0	313,363
2020	323,796	65.3	172,316	34.7	496,112
2024	349,254	65.3	185,862	34.7	535,116
Proportion of the global Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic					
2010	—	33.0	—	21.2	27.2%
2020	—	34.1	—	21.3	28.2%
2024	—	32.2	—	19.9	26.5%
Annual growth rate					
2010 and 2020	5.2	—	3.8	—	4.7
2010 and 2024	4.3	—	3.2	—	3.9
Rank as key destination country	2	—	2	—	2

Source: Data for 2010 and 2020, Global Bilateral Migration Matrix 1960–2020. Data for 2024 compiled with data from UNDESA, Population Division (2024). International Migrant Stock 2024. Table 1: International migrant stock at mid-year by sex and by region, country or area of destination and origin, 1990–2024.

According to the 2012 National Immigrant Survey in the Dominican Republic, Haitians made up 87 percent of all immigrant populations in the country, with two out of five Haitians reporting that they had migrated following the 2010 earthquake (OECD and ILO 2018). Haitian men were more likely than women to migrate to the Dominican Republic (Merone 2019; OECD and ILO 2018), the former representing just under two-thirds of the Haitian population in 2024.


Table 30. Immigrant population in the Dominican Republic, 2012 and 2017

	2012 Survey		2017 Survey		Relative Difference	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Foreign population:	768,784	100.0	847,979	100.0	79,195	9.7
Immigrants	524,633	68.2	570,933	59.6	46,300	9.4
Born in Haiti	458,233	59.6	497,825	58.7	39,592	9.2
Born in other countries	66,400	8.6	73,108	0.9	6,708	9.6
Descendants:	244,151	31.8	277,046	32.6	32,845	11.8
Parents born in Haiti	209,912	27.3	253,255	29.8	43,343	10.7
Parents born in other countries	34,239	4.5	23,791	2.8	−10,448	−35.9
Dominican Republic population:	9,716,240	100.0	10,189,895	100.0	473,655	4.7
Native population	8,947,456	92.1	9,341,916	91.6	394,460	4.3
Foreign population	768,784	7.9	847,979	8.4	—	—
Immigrants	524,633	5.4	570,933	5.6	—	—
Descendent population	244,151	2.5	277,046	2.8	—	—
Parents born in Haiti	209,912	2.1	253,255	2.4	—	—
Parents born in other countries	34,239	0.0	23,791	0.4	—	—

Source: Data for 2010 and 2020, Global Bilateral Migration Matrix 1960–2020. Data for 2024 compiled with data from UNDESA, Population Division (2024). International Migrant Stock 2024. Table 1: International migrant stock at mid-year by sex and by region, country or area of destination and origin, 1990–2024.

The age and sex profile of Haitians in the Dominican Republic is predominantly young, with over half (54.5 percent) from the 20 to 34 age group, the majority of whom are males. Older age groups are only minimally represented (see Figure 18).

Figure 18. Age and sex structure of Haitians in the Dominican Republic, 2010



Source: Estimates based on Ruggles et al. 2025.

Education Profiles of Haitians in the Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic ranks second as a key destination for migrating Haitians, following the United States. However, among those with tertiary education, the pattern changes, falling from second to seventh place. Among those who have tertiary education, the majority are males, 64 percent in 2010 and 67.2 percent in 2020, although the overall proportions are small since Haitians who have migrated to the Dominican Republic represented only 1.6 percent of the global share of the tertiary-educated Haitian migrant population in 2020, down from 1.9 percent in 2010 (see Table 31). The proportion of tertiary-educated females

in the Dominican Republic reduced over this period, falling from 36 percent in 2010 to 32.8 percent in 2020. Gender differences are also reflected in the ranking of the Dominican Republic as a key destination for tertiary-educated Haitians, ranking fifth among males compared to seventh for females with a post-secondary education (see Table 31).

Between 2010 and 2020, the Haitian migrant population in the Dominican Republic had consistently low educational attainment. In both years, 2010 and 2020, nearly the entire Haitian population in the Dominican Republic did not have a tertiary education. In 2010, 98.6 percent had no tertiary education, and in 2020, the proportion remained nearly the same with no gender difference across the two periods. The proportion with tertiary education, as well as the gender distribution, remained unchanged over the 10-year period, with the overall figure being 1.4 percent (1.4 percent for males and 1.3 percent for females).

Table 31. Educational attainment among Haitians in the Dominican Republic, relative to global tertiary-educated Haitians who migrate, by sex, 2010 and 2020

	Men	%	Women	%	Total
<i>Total tertiary-educated Haitians who migrate, global</i>					
2010	104,528	48.4	111,455	51.6	215,983
2020	200,536	48.9	209,477	51.1	410,013
<i>Education attainment among Haitians in the Dominican Republic</i>					
2010 Total	187,777	61.8	116,062	38.2	303,839
Non-tertiary	185,137	61.8	114,575	38.2	299,712
Tertiary	2,640	64.0	1,487	36.0	4,127
2020 Total	313,101	65.1	167,819	34.9	480,920
Non-tertiary	308,699	65.1	165,669	34.9	474,368
Tertiary	4,402	67.2	2,150	32.8	6,552
<i>Proportion of the global tertiary-educated Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic</i>					
2010	—	2.5	—	1.3	1.9%
2020	—	2.2	—	1.0	1.6%
Annual growth rate for tertiary- educated Haitians: 2010 and 2020	5.2		3.8		4.7
Position as a destination country for tertiary-educated Haitians	5		7		7

Source: WBGBMM 2000-2020, World Bank Migration Database.

Using IPUMS data, the tertiary-educated Haitian population was recategorized and analyzed. The education categories used on the IPUMS survey, and the reclassification used to align with this study's definition is presented in Table 32. Subsequent analysis of tertiary education levels from the IPUMS data follows the categorization shown in Table 32.

Table 32. Classification of education levels from IPUMS, 2010

Non-tertiary Education	Tertiary Education
None/Preschool 1–2, completed	University 1–8
Primary 1–8	Specialty 1–2
Intermediate 1–2	Master's 1–3
Secondary 1–4, Reformed Secondary	
University <1 year	

Source: Estimates based on Ruggles et al. 2025.

Regarding the educational attainment of the 281,300 people for whom information is available, only 3.3 percent have tertiary education (9,410 people). Of this group, 61 percent are male and 39 percent are female. The remaining 96.7 percent have no tertiary education and follow a similar gender distribution (Table 33).

Table 33. Educational attainment among Haitians in the Dominican Republic by sex, IPUMS 2010


	Men	%	Women	%	Total	%
Total	178,920	100.0	102,380	100.0	281,300	100.0
Non-tertiary education	173,180	96.8	98,710	96.4	271,890	96.7
Tertiary education	5,740	3.2	3,670	3.6	9,410	3.3

Source: Estimates based on Ruggles et al. 2025.

Data from IPUMS show that in 2017, the Haitian population residing in the Dominican Republic consisted of a strong concentration of people with no tertiary education, especially in the young and working-age age groups, consistent with other data sources. The 25 to 29 age group accounted for the largest percentage of individuals with some or more tertiary education (39 percent), followed by the 20 to 24 age group (24.4 percent), and 30 to 34 age group (19.3 percent), see Figure 19. However, even within these groups,

the absolute number of people with tertiary education is small compared to the vast majority with lower educational attainment. For example, among those ages 25 to 29, only 3,670 Haitians had a tertiary education, compared to 61,090 with no tertiary education. In general, tertiary-educated Haitian males outnumber females. These data confirm that the Haitian population in the Dominican Republic has a predominantly low educational profile, with a nascent group of tertiary-educated Haitians. This may suggest different patterns of migration, labor market integration, or residence in the country between the sexes.¹¹

Figure 19. Educational attainment among Haitians in the Dominican Republic by age groups, IPUMS, 2010



Source: Estimates based on Ruggles et al. 2025.

¹¹ Data on field of study for tertiary-educated Haitians residing in the Dominican Republic were not available.

Employment Profiles of Haitians in the Dominican Republic

In the Dominican Republic, educational attainment appears to affect the labor market participation of Haitians. Although the employment rate among the working population is high for those with and without tertiary education, the unemployment rate is notably higher among females with tertiary education (17.8 percent) compared to those without (14.5 percent). Among males with tertiary education, 52.1 percent were employed, while 41.3 percent were inactive. By contrast, only 24.7 percent of women with tertiary education were employed, compared to 69.9 percent who remained inactive. This high level of female inactivity is also observed among those with no tertiary education (62.9 percent) (Table 34). It is worth noting that the distribution between those with and without tertiary education is heavily skewed, with the former only representing a very small minority of migrating Haitians.

Table 34. Labor market participation of Haitians^a in the Dominican Republic by educational attainment and sex, 2010

	Men	Women	Total
Non-tertiary education	171,630	97,270	268,900
	%		
Employed	75.7	31.7	59.8
Unemployed	10.0	5.4	8.3
Inactive	14.2	62.9	31.9
Employment Rate ^a	88.3	85.5	87.7
Unemployment Rate ^b	11.7	14.5	12.3
Tertiary education	5,660	3,560	9,220
	%		
Employed	52.1	24.7	41.5
Unemployed	6.5	5.3	6.1
Inactive	41.3	69.9	52.4
Employment Rate ^a	88.9	82.2	87.2
Unemployment Rate ^b	11.1	17.8	12.8

Source: Estimates based on Ruggles et al. 2025.

Note: a. Among population ages 15 or older. b. Employed / EAP × 100. c. Unemployed / EAP × 100.

Due to limited access to microdata regarding Haitian migration in the Dominican Republic, this study uses data from 2010. In the absence of quantitative information, additional recent sources are referenced to further describe the migration and integration of Haitians in the Dominican Republic.

According to a study conducted by the OECD and ILO, foreigners in the Dominican Republic have significantly lower school enrollment totals and overall levels of educational attainment compared to the native population (OECD and ILO 2018). However, at the tertiary level, this margin significantly reduces (OECD and ILO 2018). The share of immigrants versus native populations with little or no primary schooling is 30 percent and 5 percent, respectively. The share of those who have completed secondary school is 17 percent and 36 percent for the immigrant and native populations, respectively. Yet, 16 percent of immigrants, compared with 21 percent of the native population, have some higher education (OECD and ILO 2018). When the country of origin is considered, Haitians exhibit the largest share of those with little or no primary school education, at 80 percent (OECD and ILO 2018). Even when comparing the educational attainment levels of Haitians living in the Dominican Republic with that of Dominicans of Haitian descent, the latter outperform the former in terms of access to and completion of primary school studies (Merone 2019). That said, these educational advantages do not persist beyond primary school for Dominicans of Haitian descent. It should also be noted that more recently arrived Haitians in the Dominican Republic have higher rates of secondary and tertiary level educational attainment compared with Haitians who migrated to the Dominican Republic in or before 2000, a fact attributable to improved educational access in Haiti (for example, the EFA initiative) and the increasing number of migrating Haitian youth enrolled in Dominican schools and universities over the past two decades (Merone 2019).

Between January 2010 and December 2015, 4,736 tertiary-level student visas and 14,724 tertiary-level student visa renewals were issued to Haitians by the Dominican government (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 2016). This accounted for 92 percent of the 21,224 visas issued to Haitians during that period (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 2016). By 2015, over 44,000 Haitian youth were enrolled in public or private schools in the Dominican Republic, representing over 66 percent of the foreign student

population, and 12,000 students were enrolled at various Dominican universities (Dominican Today 2015). It should be noted that primary and secondary school students do not require official documentation to attend Dominican schools (Dominican Today 2015). These factors have led to the threefold overrepresentation of young, working-age (ages 15 to 24) Haitians who are either undereducated or (relatively) highly educated (with some form of tertiary education) in the Dominican Republic compared to youth in Haiti (OECD and ILO 2018).

Labor force participation rates in the Dominican Republic have been higher for immigrants than natives (OECD and ILO 2018). This may be attributed to incomes remaining stagnant since 2000, irrespective of education levels, and remittances further disincentivizing entering (or remaining in) the labor force (OECD and ILO 2018). There are positive returns on education for immigrants in the labor force who have completed secondary school, as they have the potential to earn twice as much as those with less than a primary school education (OECD and ILO 2018). Despite the minimum wage in the Dominican Republic ranking among the lowest in Latin America, it surpasses Haiti's minimum wage. Between 2000 and 2014, Haitians in the Dominican Republic earned less than the native population at all levels of education, whereas other immigrants with a primary school education earned less than the native population with comparable education levels but surpassed the native population's earnings at the secondary and tertiary levels (OECD and ILO 2018). While the earnings gap almost closes between Haitians and natives with a secondary school education, the gap nearly doubles at the tertiary level, where the native population registers stronger earnings (OECD and ILO 2018).


In the Dominican Republic, manufacturing jobs declined from 17 percent in 2000 to 10 percent in 2015 (OECD and ILO 2018). As jobs in manufacturing began to dry up, opportunities in the service sector grew from 67 percent to 76 percent. The native population occupied more positions in manufacturing than immigrants, at 11 percent and 4 percent, respectively. Immigrants have been and continue to be overrepresented in agriculture (37 percent versus 13 percent) and construction (16 percent versus 6 percent) compared with the native population and have increasingly taken up posts in the services sector. The same holds true for Haitians (OECD and ILO 2018).

While these factors suggest that Haitians in the Dominican Republic are mainly low-skilled laborers, there are other considerations that require further scrutiny. As educational access increases within the region, the share of unqualified labor has decreased, while that of overqualified labor has increased, and competitive employment opportunities have shrunk. Immigrant populations are more inclined to engage in own-account work (61 percent) than their native counterparts (43 percent), with Haitians representing 55 percent of all immigrant employers in the labor force.

Immigrant populations participate in the informal economy at a rate of 73 percent compared to 53 percent for the native population. The informal sector offers more competitive remuneration compared to the formal sector, though the latter offers social benefits. The informal sector also includes jobs that require advanced skills, as well as enterprises with fewer than five employees. Such a reality speaks to a mismatch between education level and labor opportunities that may have resulted in Haitians being underemployed or accepting jobs in the informal sector, while many natives forgo these opportunities altogether.

Once again, these data suggest that Haiti is losing its skilled population, but those skills are not absorbed by the Dominican labor market. The sectors in which Haitians in the Dominican Republic are employed appear to be related to their level of education. Among those without a tertiary education, the majority are concentrated in traditionally low-skilled activities, such as agriculture, fishing, and forestry (35.8 percent); construction (20.5 percent); and wholesale and retail trade (18.4 percent). By contrast, Haitians with some tertiary education work across a more diverse range of sectors, including education (15.4 percent), wholesale and retail trade (18.9 percent), business services and real estate (8.3 percent), and health and social work (7.3 percent). Yet, the presence of skilled workers in typically non-professional industries persists in areas such as construction (9.3 percent), hotels and restaurants (7.7 percent), and manufacturing (7.3 percent) (Figure 20).

Figure 20. Employment sectors among Haitians^a in the Dominican Republic, by educational attainment and sex, 2010



Source: Estimates based on Ruggles et al. 2025.
Note: a Population 15 years or more.

As described above, the types of occupations follow a similar pattern to the employment sectors, with variations observed across educational levels and sex (see Table 35). Among those with non-tertiary education, low-skilled occupations predominate, such as elementary occupations (36.2 percent), crafts (23.2 percent), and skilled agriculture or fishing (19.6 percent), followed by service and commercial work (17.1 percent). By contrast, more Haitians with tertiary education work in higher-skilled occupations, as professionals (24.9 percent) and technicians and associate professionals (11.4 percent). Although a significant portion of this population is represented in the service and sales occupations (23.4 percent), there is greater occupational diversification and mobility in higher-skilled occupations. However, there is still a certain level of underutilization of education, such as those in elementary occupations (7.8 percent) and craft work (13.7 percent).

Among those with tertiary education, there appears to be little gender difference in work sectors, apart from the low-skilled service, shop, and market sectors, where more females with tertiary education are represented (27.7 percent), compared to males (22.1 percent). In contrast, among those with non-tertiary education, gender differences are evident. Specifically, although elementary occupations are the highest for both sexes, females dominate at 43.4 percent versus 34.5 percent among males. Women without tertiary education also dominate the service, shop, and market sectors, at the same proportion as other elementary occupations (43.4 percent), compared with only 11.0 percent of males. On the other hand, males without tertiary education were well represented in the craft and related trades sector at 27.8 percent, whereas females only represented 3.3 percent.

Table 35. Employment types among Haitians in the Dominican Republic by educational attainment and sex, 2010

	Men	Women	Total		Men	Women	Total
	140,250	32,630	172,880		3,080	940	4,020
Sector	Non-tertiary education (%)			Sector	Tertiary education (%)		
Elementary occupations	34.5	43.4	36.2	Legislators, senior officials, and managers	2.6	3.2	2.7
Crafts and related trades workers	27.8	3.3	23.2	Professionals	25.3	23.4	24.9
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers	22.6	7.1	19.6	Technicians and associate professionals	11.4	11.7	11.4
Service workers and shop and market sales	11.0	43.4	17.1	Clerks	6.8	14.9	8.7
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	2.9	1.0	2.6	Service workers and shop and market sales	22.1	27.7	23.4

Source: Estimates based on Ruggles et al. 2025.

The majority of Haitians in the Dominican Republic, regardless of their educational level, work as wage earners, although the proportion is slightly higher among those with more education (71.5 percent versus 67.1 percent). Their participation in self-employment is also substantial, especially among those without tertiary education (29.3 percent), while for those with tertiary education, this figure drops to 24.3 percent. The percentages of people working without pay or in other occupations are low in both groups (Table 36). This distribution suggests that, although wage earners predominate, fewer Haitian migrants with tertiary education are self-employed, possibly reflecting their integration into more formal labor structures.

Table 36. Employment status among Haitians in the Dominican Republic by educational attainment and sex, 2010

	Men	Women	Total		Men	Women	Total
	126,220	29,490	155,710		2,870	750	3,620
Sector	Non-tertiary education (%)			Sector	Tertiary education (%)		
Self-employed	25.5	45.8	29.3	Self-employed	25.1	21.3	24.3
Wage/salary worker	71.0	50.4	67.1	Wage/salary worker	71.1	73.3	71.5
Unpaid worker	0.5	1.9	0.8	Unpaid worker	1.4	1.3	1.4
Other	3.0	1.9	2.8	Other	2.4	4.0	2.8

Source: Estimates based on Ruggles et al. 2025.

Lower rates of regularization and documentation among Haitian migrants correlate strongly with their exclusion from formal labor arrangements. ENI-2017 and OBMICA analyses show that documented migrants have more access to written contracts and benefits. Drawing on ENI-2012, ENI-2017, and related OBMICA and UNDP analyses, the study summarizes estimates of the share of Haitians who worked in the informal sector between 2010 and 2025. Informality is measured using proxies such as contract modality (verbal versus written), social security coverage (health, pension, and work-risk insurance), and sectoral employment patterns. In 2012, 88 percent of Haitian migrants reported having verbal contracts with employers and 41 percent were engaged in occasional work, both hallmark indicators of informality. By 2017, formality indicators remained extremely low: only 7 percent of laborers had health insurance, 3.6 percent had pension coverage, and less than 6 percent had work-risk insurance (UNDP 2022; Wooding and Riveros 2017). This suggests that by 2017, between 93 percent and 96 percent of Haitian migrants worked outside the formal labor system in high-informality sectors such as construction and agriculture, where Haitian men predominate, as well as commerce, domestic service, and hotels/restaurants, where Haitian women are overrepresented. This distribution indicates that both Haitian men and women are subject to a precarious labor market in the Dominican Republic (ENI 2018). COVID-19 further reinforced informality, as migrant workers, especially those without legal status, were largely excluded from wage protections and state assistance programs.



Brazil

Data Sources and Analysis

Brazil has become a significant destination for Haitian migrants, alongside other key Latin American countries. However, the relative recency of this trend means challenges exist with data availability for this population. This section utilizes various sources to provide an overview of Haitians residing in Brazil. The analysis begins with the harmonized Global Migration Matrix and the World Bank Database to capture figures for 2010 and 2020, supplemented by UNDESA data for 2024. Although the Brazil Population Census was conducted in 2022 and includes migration data, microdata are not yet publicly available, and its release date is uncertain. Preliminary tables on fertility and migration, released in late June 2025, group all non-nationals together without disaggregation by country of origin. Beyond presenting the absolute figures of Haitians in Brazil, alongside key countries, the census data do not offer further disaggregation that can support this analysis.

In the absence of recent census microdata, the next set available is from 2010, when Brazil was not a key destination for migrating Haitians; therefore, analyzing that period provides limited insight into recent trends. As an alternative, this study uses administrative data from Brazil's Ministry of Justice and Public Security, which contains migrant registration information. Regarding this type of information, the ILO states that migrant registry data are administrative acts that allow for estimating trends but not determining the number of residents (ILO 2017, citing DEM 2016). This data source is currently the most viable option until updated census data are made available. Registration data are updated monthly and summarized annually, though they are

not comprehensive. Specifically, they do not include details on migrants' educational attainment, which is a key variable for this study. Nevertheless, they record professions according to self-reported occupations, which serve as a proxy for educational attainment and skilled migration, roughly equivalent to tertiary-educated Haitians for the purposes of this analysis. This approach assumes that working in a professional role typically requires a certain level of education.

It is important to note that registration is not mandatory for migrants, nor is it required shortly after arrival or in their state of residence. Additionally, Brazil may serve as a transit country for those migrating onward, which introduces further limitations to these data. Further, it is not possible to ascertain who chooses to register or not, and whether there may be systematic differences by gender, age group, location, education, and occupation, all of which are key for this analysis. Thus, this data source should not be considered representative or comprehensive, and there may be unobserved differences between registered and unregistered Haitians in Brazil.

Haitian Population in Brazil

While it is known that the Haitian population residing in Brazil before the 2010 earthquake was negligible, discrepancies abound regarding the exact numbers. However, by 2020, Brazil had risen to become the seventh most common destination for migrating Haitians, and the fifth when considering Haitian male migrants only. Despite Brazil's growing importance as a destination for Haitian migration, there is relatively little information, preventing a comprehensive characterization of the Haitian population residing in the country. A comparison of data from the Global Bilateral Migration Matrix, the World Bank Migration Database, UNDESA, and the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (*Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística*, IBGE) census reveals significant variation in the recorded number of Haitians residing in Brazil. According to the World Bank data, in 2010 only 55 Haitians were recorded as living in Brazil. Yet Brazil's census data reported 112 Haitians living in Brazil between 2005 and 2010, which increased to 23,507 between 2017 and 2022. UNDESA data indicate that there were over 88,000 Haitians residing in the country in 2024 (see Table 37).

Table 37. Haitians in Brazil relative to the global Haitian migrant population, by sex, 2010, 2020, and 2024

	Men	%	Women	%	Total
Total Haitian migrant population, global					
2010	588,945	51.2	562,345	48.8	1,151,290
2020	950,860	54.0	809,395	46.0	1,760,255
2024	1,084,638	53.8	933,054	46.2	2,017,692
Total Haitian population in Brazil					
2010	18	32.7	37	67.3	55
2020	11,274	34.4	21,523	65.6	32,797
2024	52,477	59.4	35,906	40.6	88,383
Proportion of the global Haitian migrants in Brazil					
2010	—	0.0	—	0.0	0.0%
2020	—	1.2	—	2.7	1.9%
2024	—	4.8	—	3.8	4.4%
Annual growth rate					
2010 and 2020	—	90.4	—	89.0	89.5
2010 and 2024	—	76.8	—	63.4	69.4
Rank as key destination country	5	—	7	—	7

Source: Data for 2010 and 2020 compiled with data from the Global Bilateral Migration Matrix 1960–2020. Data for 2024 compiled with data from UNDESA, Population Division (2024). International Migrant Stock 2024. Table 1: International migrant stock at mid-year by sex and by region, country or area of destination, and origin 1990–2024

Data from the 2022 Brazil census reinforce this trend, showing a significant increase in the number of foreign-born residents and naturalized Brazilians from Haiti, rising from 54 in 2010 to 57,453 in 2020 (see [Table 39](#)). The registration data from Brazil's Ministry of Justice and Public Security also indicate a cumulative total of 94,433 Haitians residing in Brazil between 2018 and 2024. These data, together with those in [Tables 38 and 39](#), underscore Brazil's established status as a key destination for migrating Haitians over the past decade (2015–2025).

Table 38. Country or region of origin among residents of Brazil, 2005 – 2010 and 2017 - 2022

Country or region	2005–2010	2017–2022	Country or region	2005–2010	2017–2022
Total	268,291	457,003	Africa	7,066	11,198
Latin America and the Caribbean	72,720	329,239	Angola	1,811	4,378
Venezuela	1,892	199,067	Asia	50,806	24,093
Bolivia	15,651	23,875	Japan	41,045	9,262
Haiti	112	23,507	China	3,571	4,341
Togo	24,610	18,637	Europe	79,628	55,743
Argentina	8,084	15,800	Portugal	21,673	13,566
Colombia	3,255	15,700	Spain	11,799	7,157
Uruguay	4,326	6,961	United Kingdom	12,905	6,521
Peru	4,224	6,421	Italy	10,655	5,938
Cuba	738	5,373	France	6,646	5,785
Chile	2,674	3,890	Germany	5,950	4,510
Mexico	2,399	2,971	Ireland	975	3,283
North America	54,394	32,145	Oceania	1,968	4,549
United States	52,050	27,993	Australia	1,285	3,870
Canada	2,344	4,152			

Source: Prepared with data obtained from
https://agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/media/com_mediaibge/arquivos/5372562f3733b0300ecc87116b276e54.pdf.

Table 39. Foreigners and naturalized Brazilians, by country of birth, 2010 and 2022


Country or region of the world	2010	2022	Annual growth rate	Country or region of the world	2010	2022	Annual growth rate
Total	592,569	1,009,341	4.5	Africa	18,361	33,393	5.1
Latin America and the Caribbean	183,448	646,015	11.1	Angola	6,444	11,566	5.0
Venezuela	2,869	271,514	46.1	Asia	99,968	100,373	0.0
Bolivia	38,816	80,288	6.2	Japan	49,059	38,962	-1.9
Paraguay	39,251	58,286	3.3	China	19,397	23,779	1.7
Haiti	54	57,453	78.7	Lebanon	12,336	11,219	-0.8
Argentina	29,067	42,647	3.2	Republic of Korea	8,577	8,354	-0.2
Colombia	6,851	33,653	14.2	Europe	263,393	203,284	-2.1
Uruguay	24,048	30,272	1.9	Portugal	137,972	104,345	-2.3
Peru	15,020	26,024	4.7	Italy	37,165	30,200	-1.7
Chile	15,432	17,221	0.9	Spain	30,736	23,114	-2.3
Cuba	2,077	13,308	16.7	Germany	16,241	10,309	-3.7
North America	25,100	24,811	-0.1	France	9,559	8,967	-0.5
United States	23,513	23,289	-0.1	United Kingdom	4,947	5,659	1.1
				Oceania	882	1,281	

Source: Prepared with data obtained from
https://agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/media/com_mediaibge/arquivos/5372562f3733b0300ecc87116b276e54.pdf.

According to the *Registros Migrantes del Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Pública de Brasil*, in 2024, a significant proportion of Haitians registered in Brazil held temporary immigration status (84.7 percent), while 14.6 percent obtained permanent residency and 0.7 percent possessed provisional residence while awaiting decisions on their asylum claims.

The registration data for Haitians in Brazil demonstrate a persistent upward trend in Haitian migration since 2010, with a sharp increase from 2017 onward and reaching a peak in 2019, when 27,899 individuals were registered, the highest annual volume recorded. The year 2018 also recorded a substantial influx, with 19,045 registrations. Although registrations decreased to 15,709 in 2020, this figure remained comparatively elevated. From 2021, however, the number of registrations declined more markedly, ranging from 6,410 in 2021 to 5,675 in 2024. The fall in registration figures from 2021 may be linked to the COVID-19 pandemic and various associated lockdown restrictions. In summary, the majority of Haitian migration to Brazil occurred between 2017 and 2020, representing a pivotal period in recent mobility trends. It is important to note that registration in Brazil is not mandatory; individuals may choose to register well after their actual arrival. These data do not necessarily correspond to individuals' time of arrival and should only be considered as indicative.

Figure 21. Cumulative totals of Haitians registered in Brazil by year, 2010–2024



Source: Ministry of Justice and Public Security of Brazil, 2024.
 Note: 2025 not labeled as the full year has not been recorded.

Education Profiles of Haitians in Brazil

According to the World Bank Migration Database, in 2020, 6,577 Haitians with tertiary education lived in Brazil, accounting for 1.6 percent of all tertiary-educated Haitian migrants globally (see Table 40). In earlier years, labor demand in Brazil was concentrated in sectors such as construction (INURED 2024), where tertiary education was not typically required. Brazil ranks sixth among countries hosting qualified Haitian migrants. Other data sources in Brazil did not provide education breakdowns by country of birth, limiting the possibility of conducting further analyses for this study.

Table 40. Educational attainment among Haitians^a in Brazil, relative to global tertiary-educated Haitians who migrate, by sex, 2010 and 2020

	Men	%	Women	%	Total
Total tertiary-educated Haitians who migrate, global					
2010	104,528	48.4	111,455	51.6	215,983
2020	200,536	48.9	209,477	51.1	410,013
Education attainment among Haitians in Brazil					
2010 Total	15	33.3	30	66.7	45
Non-tertiary	11	32.4	23	67.6	34
Tertiary	4	36.4	7	63.6	11
2020 Total	9,395	35.0	17,451	65.0	26,846
Non-tertiary	6,890	34.0	13,379	66.0	20,269
Tertiary	2,505	38.1	4,072	61.9	6,577
Proportion of the global tertiary-educated Haitian migrants in Brazil					
2010 ^b	—	—	—	—	—
2020	—	1.2	—	1.9	1.6
Position as a destination country for tertiary-educated Haitians	7	—	6	—	6

Source: WBGBMM 2000–2020, World Bank Migration Database.

Note: a Population 15 years and older. b. No growth rates are reported, as data from 2010 are insufficient.

Between 2010 and 2020, Brazil experienced a notable increase in the number of migrating Haitians, especially those with tertiary education. In 2010, less than one-quarter (11 individuals) of Haitians residing in Brazil had a tertiary education. By 2020, this rose to 6,577 tertiary-educated Haitians, reflecting a significant rise in Haitian presence in the country, though the proportion remained relatively constant at 24.5 percent.

Brazil consolidated its position as an emerging destination for skilled Haitian migration over the past decade, likely due to the opening of specific migration channels and regularization programs implemented after the 2010 earthquake. In terms of gender, females represented a majority of the Haitian population in Brazil, especially among those with tertiary education. In 2020, 61.9 percent of Haitians with some tertiary education were females. This trend was already observed in 2010, albeit with very low overall numbers; yet the pattern remains consistent 10 years later.

Considering the ILO's findings and data from Haitian registries in Brazil, the majority of the registered Haitian population is male (55 percent). Haitians are concentrated in the 25 to 40 age group (50.5 percent of the total), followed by the 15 to 25 age group (26.4 percent) and, to a lesser extent, those under 15 (12.3 percent). Regarding marital status, 81.2 percent declared themselves single, while only 15 percent were married. The overall picture of Haitians in Brazil is one of predominantly single individuals of working age, with a low representation of older people above the age of 65 (0.3 percent).

Employment Profiles of Haitians in Brazil

The Brazilian registration data do not include educational information. However, occupational status and type are recorded. The cumulative registration data from 2018 to 2024 show that nearly one-fifth (18.7 percent) of the Haitian population in Brazil had no occupation, or were students (15.2 percent), while the largest group among those employed were in unskilled occupations (33.3 percent). Those recorded as unemployed, combined with students, represented approximately 39 percent of the population (Table 40).

Occupations classified as skilled include professionals in health, engineering, law, education, communications, public services, and business management (see Appendix III). Although each occupation is only minimally represented (generally less than 1 percent), they nevertheless indicate Haitian representation in professional roles in the formal labor market, particularly in key areas such as the health, education, and technical services sectors. Overall, skilled employment remains rare among Haitians in Brazil, at only 6.4 percent.

Unskilled occupations were more prevalent among Haitians in Brazil, the main ones including construction workers, salespeople and commercial employees, domestic and cleaning workers, cooks and domestic staff, and agricultural laborers (Table 42). Nearly one-quarter, 22.8 percent, fell under 'other unclassified occupation'. In general terms, Haitians are concentrated in unskilled occupations (32.7 percent) with over one-third (34.7 percent) of males belonging to this group, particularly in construction and industrial trades such as mechanics, welders, or plumbers. Among females, the proportion in unskilled occupations is lower (30.2 percent), but they are concentrated in service occupations such as salespeople (32.4 percent), domestic workers (12.0 percent), cooks or waitresses (12.1 percent), and seamstresses (8.6 percent).

At only 6 percent, Haitians are less commonly found in professional occupations in Brazil. Among the more skilled occupations such as teaching, nursing, or engineering, the proportions are quite low with Haitians in business management representing 4.3 percent, medicine 1.5 percent, and architecture or engineering 3.4 percent. The teaching profession and related fields are most prevalent skilled professions undertaken by both sexes, at 19.2 percent for males and 19.6 percent for females. Among tertiary-educated Haitians, 8 percent work in health-related fields such as nursing, midwifery, and massage therapy. Consistent with the findings across all countries featured in this report, tertiary-educated women are overrepresented in health-related fields. Among the tertiary-educated Haitian population in Brazil, women represent 95.5 percent of Haitians in these health-related fields.


Table 41. Employment status and types among Haitians in Brazil by skill level and sex, 2018–2024 (cumulated data)

	Men	%	Women	%	Total	Total
Total	51,942		42,461		94,433	
No occupation	9,083	17.5	8,561	20.2	17,651	18.7
Student	7,203	13.9	7,122	16.8	14,329	15.2
Retired, pensioner, or similar	11	0.0	25	0.1	36	0.0
Intern or similar	23	0.0	19	0.0	42	0.0
Minor (not a student)	1,995	3.8	1,961	4.6	3,959	4.2
Other non-classified	12,165	23.4	9,314	21.9	21,485	22.8
Skilled occupations	3,417	6.6	2,654	6.3	6,074	6.4
Teacher or similar	657	19.2	519	19.6	1,176	19.4
Liberal professional, technician, or similar	582	17.0	336	12.7	919	15.1
Active civil servant with no specific occupation	364	10.7	273	10.3	637	10.5
Nurse, midwife, massage therapist, and so on	21	0.6	462	17.4	484	8.0
Economist, accountant, auditor, and so on	193	5.6	165	6.2	358	5.9
Programmer or data analyst	203	5.9	80	3.0	283	4.7
Business director or owner	64	1.9	198	7.5	262	4.3
Chemical industry worker, and so on	157	4.6	70	2.6	227	3.7
Architect, engineer, or surveyor	167	4.9	38	1.4	205	3.4
Agricultural director or owner	186	5.4	18	0.7	204	3.4
Artist, actor, musician	114	3.3	23	0.9	137	2.3
Writer, journalist, translator	89	2.6	27	1.0	116	1.9
Executive civil servant	47	1.4	59	2.2	106	1.7
Biologist, veterinarian, agronomist	64	1.9	41	1.5	105	1.7
Doctor or medical personnel	49	1.4	42	1.6	91	1.5
Other occupations	460	13.5	303	11.4	764	12.6
Unskilled Occupations	18,044	34.7	12,805	30.2	30,856	32.7
Bricklayer, construction worker	6,425	35.6	228	1.8	6,654	21.6
Salesperson, merchant	1,546	8.6	4,153	32.4	5,700	18.5
Agricultural worker or gardener	1,432	7.9	526	4.1	1,959	6.3
Baker, butcher, brewer, and so on	1,295	7.2	634	5.0	1,929	6.3
Cook, waiter, housekeeper	328	1.8	1,546	12.1	1,874	6.1
Domestic worker	76	0.4	1,534	12.0	1,610	5.2
Seamstress, dressmaker, upholsterer, and so on	371	2.1	1,097	8.6	1,468	4.8
Mechanic, welder, plumber, and so on	1,299	7.2	45	0.4	1,344	4.4
Hairdresser, beautician	140	0.8	762	6.0	902	2.9
Cleaner, janitor	285	1.6	590	4.6	877	2.8
Sales representative	226	1.3	632	4.9	858	2.8
Unclassified industrial worker	499	2.8	199	1.6	698	2.3
Transport driver or inspector	689	3.8	3	0.0	692	2.2
Electrician, electronics technician	667	3.7	6	0.0	673	2.2
Painter or wallpaperer	586	3.2	11	0.1	597	1.9
Other occupations	2,180	12.1	839	6.6	3,021	9.8

Source: Ministry of Justice and Public Security of Brazil 2018–2024.

To further supplement these data, UNHCR’s publication on Haitians’ access to the formal labor market in Brazil (UNHCR 2024) was explored. It revealed that in 2011, only 519 Haitians were registered in Brazil’s formal labor market. That figure increased to 34,224 by 2015, growing by more than 6,400 percent in just four years. This growth was likely associated with the increase in migratory flows from Haiti to Latin America, especially after the 2010 earthquake; Brazil’s need for manual labor in preparation for the World Cup and Olympic Games; and its adoption of favorable immigration policies toward Haitians who could meet those labor demands (INURED 2020 and 2024). In 2016, there was a decline in the number of registered Haitians to 26,127. However, by 2018, it increased again, reaching 46,820, rising further in 2019 to 57,394. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the figure continued to rise, peaking at 70,867 in 2020. This growth may be due to the regularization of migrants, specific labor demands (such as in essential sectors), or government efforts to formalize employment. In 2021, there was a significant drop in Haitian integration into the labor market to 53,841, corroborating findings from a study of Haitian migration to Brazil that revealed Haitians to be among the last hired and first fired (INURED 2024). Between 2022 and 2024, the number of Haitians in the Brazilian labor market stabilized at around 45,000 people (see Figure 22).


Figure 22. Haitians in the formal Brazilian labor market, by year, 2011–2024



Source: UNHCR-ACNUR 2024.

Unsurprisingly, the age distribution of the Haitian population in the Brazilian labor market shows a clear concentration in the working-age groups. The most common age group is 30 to 39, representing 43.5 percent, followed by the 40 to 49 age group at 22.8 percent. Additionally, the two younger age groups, 18 to 24 and 25 to 29, accounting for 9.4 percent and 17.1 percent, respectively, combine to highlight the significance of the age group and predominance of young adults within the working-age demographic. Meanwhile, Haitians 50 years and over account for 6.4 percent of those in the formal labor market. This distribution suggests that Haitian migration is dominated by people of working age, possibly motivated by employment opportunities.

Figure 23. Age ranges among Haitians in the formal labor market in Brazil, 2024



Source: UNHCR-ACNUR, 2024.

UNHCR (2024) data on the Haitian population in the formal labor market in Brazil reveal a strong correlation between educational attainment and average monthly wage, in addition to a persistent gender wage gap at all levels. Overall, as education levels increase, so does average income. Those with tertiary education (3.2 percent, 1,447 people) earn the highest salary, averaging US\$448.20 per month. Tertiary-educated women, however, earn US\$75 less than their male counterparts, at US\$393.40 and US\$468.40, respectively.

In contrast, people with some level of schooling but no post-secondary education (90.3 percent, 40,856 people) earn an average of US\$436.80, with a notable difference between men (US\$466.50) and women (US\$392.30).

Among those who completed secondary education (22,342 people), salaries remain relatively low (US\$384.40 on average), reflecting the segmentation of labor into lower-paying occupations even for those with no tertiary education. Overall, the average monthly income of the Haitian population in Brazil is US\$362.10, yet consistently higher for men (US\$374.20) than for women (US\$336.10), highlighting a persistent gender gap in the formal labor market. Unlike in the United States and Canada, where tertiary-educated Haitian women outearn their male counterparts, Haitian women in Brazil earn less than men at all educational levels.

Table 42. Educational attainment and average salary of Haitians in Brazil, by sex, 2024

Profile	Total	Percentage	Men (US\$)	Women (US\$)	Total (US\$)	Gap (Women)
No education	2,947	6.5	466.5	392.3	436.8	-74.2
Low schooling	40,856	90.3	416.9	355.2	397.1	-61.7
Incomplete primary education	7,452	16.5	431.2	370.7	410.6	-60.5
Complete primary education	6,492	14.3	417.1	357.2	397.9	-59.9
Incomplete high school	4,570	10.1	418.7	347.6	395.5	-71.1
Complete high school	22,342	49.4	400.5	345.1	384.4	-55.4
Higher education, Incomplete and complete	1,447	3.2	468.4	393.4	448.2	-75.0
Incomplete higher education	658	1.5	443.2	368.4	423.8	-74.8
Complete higher education	789	1.7	493.5	418.4	472.6	-75.1
Total	87,553	100.0	374.2	336.1	362.1	-38.1

Source: UNHCR-ACNUR 2024.



Mexico

Data Sources and Analysis

Mexico, alongside other key Latin American destination countries, has become increasingly important for migrating Haitians. Initially its role was more of a transit country, but it has since transformed into a key destination country in its own right. This change can be attributed to wider shifts in the political landscape affecting Haitian migrants' access to other key destinations, particularly the United States, and to a lesser extent Canada. Given the relatively recent emergence of this trend and the still modest size of the Haitian population, official Mexican sources offer limited statistical representation of Haitians. It remains challenging to provide an accurate sociodemographic and employment profile of the Haitian community in Mexico. Nonetheless, initial exploratory research utilizes available data to enhance our understanding of this population and their integration into Mexico.

In Mexico, the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (*Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Geografía*, INEGI) is the agency responsible for the census and surveys. The most recent microdata from the 2020 Population and Housing Census are available for analysis. However, in the specific case of Haitian migration, the sample size is quite small, preventing statistical representativeness that would allow for more robust analysis. The Mexican census data recorded 182 Haitians residing in Mexico who were ages 15 or older. Of these, 147 were non-tertiary educated, while only 35 were tertiary educated (INEGI). Given this limitation, the analytical strategy adopted focuses on describing the population and key characteristics relevant to this study.

This section integrates multiple data sources to provide an overview of Haitian migrants residing in Mexico. For consistency, the study relies on harmonized datasets such as the Global Migration Matrix, the World Bank Migration Database, and UNDESA to contextualize the number of Haitian migrants in Mexico relative to global figures. This is followed by a description of educational attainment, using data from the 2020 Mexican Population and Housing Census, which is presented. However, data concerning tertiary fields of study and detailed labor market participation or occupation are currently unavailable.

Haitian Population in Mexico

According to data from the World Bank, the Haitian population in Mexico showed notable growth from 2010 to 2020 and 2024 (see Table 43). In 2010, there were only 941 Haitians residing in Mexico, of which 62.3 percent were males and 37.7 percent were females. By 2020, this figure had increased fivefold to 5,787, which also narrowed the gender gap to 52 percent males and 48 percent females. This trend evidently continues in 2024, according to UNDESA data, where the male-to-female ratio is 6:4. The annual growth rate of the Haitian population in Mexico was significant, with an average rate of 19.9 percent between 2010 and 2020 (22.8 percent for females and 17.8 percent for males). Despite this increase, Mexico represented only 0.3 percent of total migrating Haitians worldwide in 2020 and ranked sixth as a destination country for Haitians.

Table 43. Haitians in Mexico relative to the global Haitian migrant population, by sex, 2010, 2020, and 2024

	Men	%	Women	%	Total
Total Haitian migrant population, global					
2010	588,945	51.2	562,345	48.8	1,151,290
2020	950,860	54.0	809,395	46.0	1,760,255
2024	1,084,638	53.8	933,054	46.2	2,017,692
Total Haitian population in Mexico					
2010	586	62.3	355	37.7	941
2020	3,010	52.0	2,777	48.0	5,787
2024	54,992	60.0	36,630	40.0	91,622
Proportion of the global Haitian migrants in Mexico					
2010	—	0.1	—	0.1	0.1%
2020	—	0.3	—	0.3	0.3%
2024	—	5.1	—	3.9	4.5%
Annual growth rate					
2010 and 2020	17.8	—	22.8	—	19.9
2010 and 2024	38.3	—	39.3	—	38.7
Rank as key destination country	4	—	6	—	6

Source: Data for 2010 and 2020, Global Bilateral Migration Matrix 1960–2020. Data for 2024 compiled with data from UNDESA, Population Division (2024). International Migrant Stock 2024. Table 1: International migrant stock at mid-year by sex and by region, country or area of destination and origin, 1990–2024.

Education Profiles of Haitians in Mexico

When examining the educational attainment of Haitians in Mexico, data from the World Bank showed significant growth over the last decade. The 387 Haitians with tertiary education in Mexico in 2010 represent 0.2 percent of Haiti’s global skilled diaspora. By 2020, that number had increased sevenfold, reaching 2,861 Haitians with tertiary education, equivalent to 0.7 percent of the global total of tertiary-educated Haitians living outside Haiti (see [Table 44](#)).

Educational attainment was nearly equal between non-tertiary and tertiary-educated Haitians across the two time points. In 2010, the distribution was 50.4 percent versus 49.6 percent, which remained unchanged in 2020 at 50.6 percent versus 49.4 percent for non-tertiary versus tertiary-educated Haitians, respectively. In absolute

terms, the number of Haitians in Mexico with tertiary education increased from 387 in 2010 to 2,861 in 2020, representing notable growth in both absolute terms of the flow of Haitian migrants into Mexico and number of tertiary-educated Haitians. However, there were clear and important gender differences: among those with non-tertiary education, 76.6 percent were female compared to 33.0 percent of males in 2010, while among the tertiary educated, only 23.4 percent were female while 67.0 percent were male. By 2020, women made up 74.8 percent of those with tertiary education, reflecting a significant shift in the proportion of educated Haitian females migrating to Mexico when compared to Haitian males. In contrast, among those without tertiary education (2,926), men dominated at 74 percent.

Table 44. Educational attainment among Haitians^a in Mexico, relative to the global tertiary-educated Haitians who migrate, by sex, 2010 and 2020


	Men	%	Women	%	Total
Total tertiary-educated Haitians who migrate, global					
2010	104,528	48.4	111,455	51.6	215,983
2020	200,536	48.9	209,477	51.1	410,013
Education attainment among Haitians in Mexico					
2010 Total	469	60.1	312	39.9	781
Non-tertiary	155	39.3	239	60.7	394
Tertiary	314	81.1	73	18.9	387
2020 Total	3,010	52.0	2,777	48.0	5,787
Non-tertiary	2,227	76.1	699	23.9	2,926
Tertiary	783	27.4	2,078	72.6	2,861
Proportion of the global tertiary-educated Haitian migrants in Mexico					
2010 ^b	—	0.3	—	0.1	0.2%
2020	—	0.4	—	1.0	0.7%
Annual growth rate for tertiary education Haitians: 2010 and 2020	9.6	—	39.8	—	22.1
Position as a destination country for tertiary-educated Haitians	10	—	8	—	8

Source: WBGBMM 2000–2020 and World Bank Migration Database.


Note: a. Population 15 years and older; b. No growth rates as insufficient data from 2010.

When examining educational attainment data by age groups, the 20–29 age group had the highest proportion with tertiary education, accounting for nearly 50 percent. From the 30–34 age group onward, those with no tertiary education dominate (28.2 percent versus 18.5 percent, respectively). Older age groups begin to show a trend dominated by those with non-tertiary education, peaking for those in the 40–44 age group, where 21.2 percent have non-tertiary education versus only 4.6 percent who have a tertiary education (Figure 24).

Figure 24. Tertiary and non-tertiary-educated Haitians in Mexico, by age groups, 2020



Source: Estimates from INEGI, *Muestra del Censo de Población y Vivienda 2020*.



France

Data Sources and Analysis

France has historically been one of the main destinations for Haitian migration. Although its relative importance has slightly decreased over the past decade, it still holds a prominent position as a key migration destination. The analysis for France begins similarly to all other countries: first describing Haitians in France relative to the global Haitian migrant population using the Global Bilateral Migration Matrix harmonized data. Data on educational attainment are initially drawn from the World Bank Migration Database for comparability with other countries. The lack of microdata availability contributed to the study's use of older census data. Although it is possible to conduct an analysis of tabulated data online with more updated census data, the information available is static and lacks specific details about the migrant population from Haiti. Due to the unavailability of census microdata, the IPUMS International was consulted, where the most recent census available corresponds to 2011. Although these are not the most up-to-date data, they nevertheless enable the compilation of a basic statistical profile of Haitian migration, particularly regarding educational attainment and economic activity.

Haitian Population in France

The absolute numbers of Haitians in France increased slightly between 2010 and 2020, from 104,987 to 112,398. This represents an average annual growth rate of 1.0 percent, with fairly equal distribution between the sexes. In 2010, France accounted for 8.9 percent of all Haitians who migrated globally; by 2020, this proportion dropped to 6.4 percent. While the annual growth of the Haitian population in France between 2010 and 2020 has been moderate, the country remains a key destination, ranking fourth worldwide in 2020 for Haitians who migrate (Table 45).

Data from UNDESA show the same downward trend, where, in 2024, only 5.8 percent of global Haitian migrants were in France. There is a gender difference among Haitians residing in France with a larger proportion of females versus males (59.1 percent compared to 40.9 percent, respectively). The different data sources all confirm a general decline in France's role as a key destination for migrating Haitians. Despite small growth, the downward trend alongside the changing migratory landscape for Haitians begins to shift toward other countries, particularly in Latin America. However, the gender profile shows a female majority among Haitians in France, which has remained stable over time. In 2010, females represented 56.8 percent of Haitians in France, which was largely unchanged in 2020, at 57.3 percent, increasing slightly by 2024 to 59.1 percent, according to UNDESA data. This suggests that despite the generally declining trend observed by different data sources, for migrating Haitian females, there continues to be slow and steady growth.


Table 45. Haitians in France relative to the global Haitian migrant population, by sex, 2010, 2020, and 2024

	Men	%	Women	%	Total
<i>Total Haitian population who migrate, global</i>					
2010	588,945	51.2	562,345	48.8	1,151,290
2020	950,860	54.0	809,395	46.0	1,760,255
2024	1,084,638	53.8	933,054	46.2	2,017,692
<i>Total Haitian population in France</i>					
2010	44,052	43.2	57,935	56.8	101,987
2020	47,978	42.7	64,420	57.3	112,398
2024	47,835	40.9	69,136	59.1	116,971
<i>Proportion of the global Haitian migrants in France</i>					
2010	—	7.5	—	10.3	8.9%
2020	—	5.0	—	8.0	6.4%
2024	—	4.4	—	7.4	5.8%
<i>Annual growth rate</i>					
2010 and 2020	—	0.9	—	0.9	1
2010 and 2024	—	0.6	—	0.6	1
Rank as key destination country	6	—	3	—	4

Source: Data for 2010 and 2020, Global Bilateral Migration Matrix 1960–2020. Data for 2024 compiled with data from UNDESA, Population Division (2024). International Migrant Stock 2024. Table 1: International migrant stock at mid-year by sex and by region, country or area of destination and origin, 1990–2024.

An analysis of France's 2011 Population Census reveals that the Haitian community comprised 62,717 individuals, with a predominantly female composition: 54.2 percent were female and 45.8 percent male, resulting in a male-to-female ratio of approximately 84 to 100. The age distribution indicates substantial representation of young people, with 31.0 percent under age 15 and an additional 28.9 percent between 15 and 34 years. Consequently, roughly 59.9 percent of the population was within early and productive age ranges. Individuals ages 35 to 64 represented 36.3 percent of the total, while those over 65 constituted only 3.8 percent. Across nearly all age categories, females outnumber males, with the disparity most evident in the 30–39 age group. Male representation decreases notably from age 75 onward, as illustrated in Figure 25.

Figure 25. Age and sex structure of Haitians in France, 2011



Source: Estimates based on Ruggles et al. 2025.

Education Profiles of Haitians in France

When examining Haitians in France with tertiary education, the overall number has increased, although their proportion relative to the global tertiary-educated Haitian migrant population has decreased slightly. In 2010, 8,406 Haitians with tertiary education resided in France (4,033 males and 4,373 females). By 2020, this number had risen to 12,525, representing a 49 percent increase over a decade. The gender profile shows a similar pattern to the general Haitian profile in France, with a slight female majority among those with tertiary education, which remains consistent from 2010 to 2020. In 2010, 3.9 percent of Haitians with tertiary education worldwide resided in France, falling to 3.1 percent in 2020. Despite this, the presence of Haitians with tertiary education in France remains significant, and France ranked fourth globally in 2020 for skilled Haitian migration (Table 46).

Table 46. Educational attainment among Haitians^a in France, relative to the global tertiary-educated Haitians who migrate, by sex, 2010 and 2020

	Men	%	Women	%	Total
Total tertiary-educated Haitians who migrate, global					
2010	104,528	48.4	111,455	51.6	215,983
2020	200,536	48.9	209,477	51.1	410,013
Education attainment among Haitians in France					
2010 Total	35,242	43.2	46,348	56.8	81,590
Non-tertiary	31,209	42.6	41,975	57.4	73,184
Tertiary	4,033	48.0	4,373	52.0	8,406
2020 Total	39,982	42.7	53,683	57.3	93,665
Non-tertiary	34,172	42.1	46,968	57.9	81,140
Tertiary	5,810	46.4	6,715	53.6	12,525
Proportion of the global tertiary education Haitian migrants in France					
2010	—	3.9	—	3.9	3.9%
2020	—	2.9	—	3.2	3.1%
Annual growth rate for tertiary education Haitians: 2010 and 2020	3.7	—	4.4	—	4.1
Position as a destination country for tertiary-educated Haitians	4	—	3	—	4

Source: WBGBMM 2000–2020, World Bank Migration Database.
Note: a. Population 15 years and older.

Between 2010 and 2020, the Haitian population residing in France experienced an increase both in absolute terms and in the proportion of those with tertiary education. The majority (almost 9 out of 10) of Haitian migrants in France were concentrated in non-tertiary education levels. However, a progressive improvement in educational attainment can be observed, as the proportion of people with tertiary education increased from 10.3 percent in 2010 (8,406) to 13.4 percent (12,525) in 2020 (Table 47).

Women make up a slightly larger proportion of the Haitian population in France, both among those with tertiary education and among Haitians in France as a whole. However, males represent a higher relative proportion of those with tertiary education compared to women. In 2020, 6,715 women (12.5 percent) had a tertiary education, compared to 5,810 men (14.5 percent). This confirms the trend observed in 2010: women constituted the majority of the Haitian population in France, but there was a higher relative proportion of tertiary-educated men. The increase in the educational attainment of the Haitian population in France may be reflective of migratory selection processes, integration into the French education system, and the greater mobility of qualified professionals with French language proficiency. Even so, a significant concentration of Haitians at the lower education levels persists: 89.7 percent had no tertiary education in 2010, compared to 86.6 percent in 2020. Data from the Population Census of 2011 were used to reclassify education categories. There are 10 education categories in the census, which were reclassified based on this study's definition of tertiary education (Table 46). Using this classification, further analysis at the population level was conducted.

Table 47. Classification of education levels, France Population Census, 2011

Non-tertiary Education	Tertiary Education
CEP	University 1–8
Primary or middle school, without primary certificate	Specialty 1–2
BEPC	
Some secondary, without middle school certificate	
CAP	
BEP	
General Baccalaureate (BAC)	
Technical Baccalaureate (BEA, BEC, BEI)	

Source: Estimates based on Ruggles et al. 2025.

Data from IPUMS 2011 indicate that Haitians ages 15 and older residing in France totaled 38,005 individuals, of whom 88.3 percent had a non-tertiary education level and only 11.7 percent had a tertiary education. In absolute terms, 33,570 people had not reached tertiary education (14,643 men and 18,927 women), while 4,435 had some level of tertiary education (2,184 men and 2,251 women). Although females dominate the overall figures, the proportion of individuals with tertiary education is slightly higher among men (13.0 percent) than women (10.6 percent), suggesting a gender gap in access to higher education within this community (Table 48).


Table 48. Educational attainment of Haitians in France, by sex, 2011

	Men	%	Women	%	Total	%
Total	16,827	100.0	21,178	100.0	38,005	100.0
Non-tertiary education	14,643	87.0	18,927	89.4	33,570	88.3
Tertiary education	2,184	13.0	2,251	10.6	4,435	11.7

Source: Estimates based on Ruggles et al. 2025.

In 2011, the distribution of the Haitian population in France by education level and age group showed that the highest age groups with tertiary education were concentrated among those ages 20–24 (37.5 percent), followed by ages 25–29 (17.4 percent) and ages 30–34 (14.7 percent). In contrast, those with non-tertiary education tend to be among the older age groups, peaking for those ages 50 or older, at 22.9 percent. Those ages 30–39 are fairly equal in the proportions with and without tertiary education. These patterns may reflect both the educational conditions in Haiti and patterns of labor migration requiring lower academic qualifications for the older age groups and increasing educational opportunities among the younger age groups (Figure 26).

Figure 26. Tertiary and non-tertiary-educated Haitians in France by age groups, 2011



Source: Estimates based on Ruggles et al. 2025.

Employment Profiles of Haitians in France

Regarding labor market participation, among those with non-tertiary education, 36.5 percent are employed, 29.7 percent are unemployed, and 33.8 percent are inactive. Men without tertiary education have an employment rate of 63.6 percent, substantially higher than that of females (47.9 percent). The unemployment rate among non-tertiary-educated Haitians is higher among women (52.1 percent) compared to men (36.4 percent). Among tertiary-educated Haitians in France, the employment rate is 76.4 percent for men and 67.5 percent for women, with an overall unemployment rate of 27.5 percent. However, it is notable that the inactivity rate is high (54.8 percent) among the tertiary educated, especially among women (60.8 percent) (Table 49).

Table 49. Labor market participation among Haitians^a in France by educational attainment and sex, 2011

	Men	Women	Total
Non-tertiary education			
Employed	44.3	30.4	36.5
Unemployed	25.3	33.1	29.7
Inactive	30.4	36.5	33.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
Employment Rate ^b	63.6	47.9	55.1
Unemployment Rate ^c	36.4	52.1	44.9
Tertiary education			
Employed	39.2	26.5	32.7
Unemployed	12.1	12.7	12.4
Inactive	48.7	60.8	54.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
Employment Rate ^b	76.4	67.5	72.5
Unemployment Rate ^c	23.6	32.5	27.5

Source: Estimates based on Ruggles et al. 2025.

Note: a. Among population ages 15 or older. b. Employed / EAP × 100; c. Unemployed / EAP × 100.

The types of occupations held by Haitians in France show marked differences by level of education and sex. Among those with non-tertiary education, manual and low-skilled occupations predominate: 20.3 percent are in elementary occupations and 20.0 percent in craft trades, with a strong male concentration (64.4 percent and 88.2 percent, respectively). Women are concentrated in services and sales (50.1 percent) and administrative work (19.2 percent). Participation in managerial (1.3 percent) or professional (2.6 percent) positions is very low, reflecting the limited opportunities for career advancement for this population.

In contrast, among those with tertiary education, there is an increase in professional (20.6 percent), technical (15.4 percent), and managerial (2.8 percent) occupations. However, there is a sizable proportion of skilled Haitians still working in manual jobs: 13.7 percent in crafts and 9.9 percent in elementary occupations, suggesting likely underutilization of their skills. Women with tertiary education are concentrated in the same key services, sales (42.5 percent), and administrative occupations (13.6 percent) as

those without tertiary education. However, there is evidence of better labor market integration among tertiary-educated Haitians. A substantial proportion of tertiary-educated females were also employed in roles classified as technicians and associate professionals (16.5 percent) as well as professional occupations (15.6 percent), which is a marked increase, more than double, when compared to those without tertiary education, at 5.4 percent and 2.6 percent, respectively. A similar trend can be observed among tertiary-educated males, with 24 percent working in professional occupations and 14.7 percent in technical and associated professional roles, compared to 2.6 percent and 4.7 percent of those without tertiary education, respectively.

Overall, the pattern suggests that tertiary education expands access to higher-skilled occupations, but barriers to entry and gender segmentation persist, especially for tertiary-educated females who appear to have limited access to more skilled positions (Table 50).

Table 50. Employment types among Haitians in France by educational attainment and sex, 2011

Sector	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
	6,479	5,753	12,232	853	595	1,448
	Non-tertiary education (%)			Tertiary education (%)		
Legislators, senior officials, and managers	1.5	1.1	1.3	3.5	1.7	2.8
Professionals	2.6	2.6	2.6	24.0	15.6	20.6
Technicians and associate professionals	4.7	5.4	5.0	14.7	16.5	15.4
Clerks	4.1	19.2	11.2	7.6	13.6	10.1
Service workers and shop and market sales	12.2	50.1	30.0	8.7	42.5	22.6
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers	7.4	0.9	4.3	0.5	0.0	0.3
Crafts and related trades workers	33.3	5.0	20.0	21.2	3.0	13.7
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	9.6	0.4	5.3	7.7	0.3	4.7
Elementary occupations	24.7	15.4	20.3	12.1	6.7	9.9

Source: Estimates based on Ruggles et al. 2025.

Most Haitian migrants in France, regardless of their level of education, work as wage earners, with a marginal increase among the more qualified individuals (89.8 percent versus 90.8 percent). There were no differences in self-employment rates by education level (10 percent versus 9.2 percent for non-tertiary versus

tertiary educated). This distribution suggests that, although wage employment is most prevalent, self-employment is low regardless of educational attainment, possibly reflecting their integration into more formal labor structures (Table 51). There is, however, a strong gender disparity with respect to self-employment, with far more males represented than females, regardless of educational attainment, 13.4 percent versus 6.0 percent for non-tertiary-educated males and females, respectively, and 12.6 percent versus 4.2 percent for tertiary-educated males and females, respectively. Gender differences can also be observed among wage workers, with females dominating at both the tertiary and non-tertiary levels: 95.8 percent versus 87.4 percent for males, and 93.7 percent versus 86.4 percent for males, respectively.

Table 51. Employment status among Haitians in France, by educational attainment and sex, 2011

	Men	Women	Total
Non-tertiary education			
Self-employed	13.4	6.0	10.0
Wage/salary worker	86.4	93.7	89.8
Unpaid worker	0.2	0.3	0.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
Tertiary education			
Self-employed	12.6	4.2	9.2
Wage/salary worker	87.4	95.8	90.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Estimates based Ruggles et al. 2025.

In summary, France remains a significant destination for both skilled and unskilled Haitians, with a female majority in its overall composition and a slight upward trend in educational attainment, especially among men. Although France continues to be an important destination for Haitians, other countries, particularly those in the Americas, have gained greater importance as key destinations in recent years for both skilled and unskilled populations.



United Kingdom

Data Sources and Analysis

The United Kingdom does not feature among the top 10 key destinations for migrating Haitians. However, it has always been represented among skilled Haitian migration. Since 2000, as a key destination among tertiary-educated Haitians it ranked between fourth (2010) and fifth (2000, 2020). Consequently, it is included in this study's analysis to provide an overview of Haitian migration to the United Kingdom.

Data from the United Kingdom were limited, similar to other countries where Haitians constitute a relatively small immigrant population. Although the United Kingdom census data are available through its statistics office, on examination, it was found that Haiti is not listed as an option for the place-of-birth variable. IPUMS International was consulted, but the available data date back to 2001. Therefore, a contemporary analysis of Haitian migration, particularly by education level, is not possible. As a result, analysis of Haitians in the United Kingdom relied on data drawn from the UN, OECD, and the World Bank.

Data from the Global Bilateral Migration Matrix and UNDESA were examined to describe and compare the Haitian population in the United Kingdom relative to the global Haitian migrant population for three time points: 2010, 2020, and 2024. Although 2024 data were consulted, there was insufficient information to include in this analysis. The World Bank Migration Database was then used to describe the education profile of Haitians in the United Kingdom for 2010 and 2020.

Education Profiles of Haitians in the United Kingdom

Between 2010 and 2020, the Haitian population in the United Kingdom grew from 10,016 to 16,222, representing a 62 percent increase over the last decade (data not presented). In both 2010 and 2020, the proportion of Haitians residing in the United Kingdom represented just under 1 percent of the global Haitian migrant population. Thus, it is not a key destination country for Haitians in general. However, the pattern differs when considering skilled migration.

Between 2010 and 2020, the number of tertiary-educated Haitians in the United Kingdom increased from 5,386 to 8,728, representing an increase of 62 percent. This growth was similar to that of the general Haitian population, suggesting that the proportion of tertiary-educated Haitians residing in the United Kingdom has remained stable. In 2010, 2.5 percent of all tertiary-educated Haitians resided in the United Kingdom, decreasing slightly to 2.1 percent in 2020.

This pattern follows the trend with the broader balanced nature of Haitian migration to the United Kingdom, both in volume and gender composition, even within the tertiary-educated group. Finally, in the global ranking of skilled Haitian migration destinations, the United Kingdom maintained a stable position, ranking fifth for both men and women in 2020, reinforcing its role as a relevant, though not priority, destination for the skilled Haitian diaspora.

In the United Kingdom, the majority of Haitians over the age of 15 have some tertiary education. At the aggregate level, in 2010, 67.2 percent of Haitians in the United Kingdom had tertiary education, which decreased to 58.2 percent in 2020. The gender distribution among tertiary-educated Haitians was nearly equal in the United Kingdom: 49.6 percent males and 50.5 percent females in 2010. By 2020, the proportion of females increased to 52.4 percent while males decreased to 47.6 percent, creating a slight gender gap. During the same period, there was a small increase among those with non-tertiary education: for males, from 50.6 percent in 2010 to 51.9 percent in 2020; and for females, 49.5 percent in 2010 and 53.7 percent in 2020.

Table 52. Educational attainment among Haitians^a in the United Kingdom, relative to global tertiary-educated Haitians who migrate, by sex, 2010 and 2020

	Men	%	Women	%	Total
Total tertiary-educated Haitians who migrate, global					
2010	104,528	48.4	111,455	51.6	215,983
2020	200,536	48.9	209,477	51.1	410,013
Education attainment among Haitians in the United Kingdom					
2010 Total	3,997	49.9	4,016	50.1	8,013
Non-tertiary	1,328	50.6	1,299	49.4	2,627
Tertiary	2,669	49.6	2,717	50.4	5,386
2020 Total	7,411	49.4	7,594	50.6	15,005
Non-tertiary	3,255	51.9	3,022	48.1	6,277
Tertiary	4,156	47.6	4,572	52.4	8,728
Proportion of the global tertiary-educated Haitian migrants in the United Kingdom					
2010	—	2.6	—	2.4	2.5%
2020	—	2.1	—	2.2	2.1%
Annual growth rate for tertiary-educated Haitians: 2010–2020	4.5		5.3		4.9
Position as a destination country for tertiary-educated Haitians	6		5		5

Source: WBGBMM 2000–2020 and World Bank Migration Database.

Note: a. Population 15 years and older.

Appendix III

Main Visa and Regularization Programs

Since Haiti's devastating 2010 earthquake, Haitians have sought refuge and economic opportunities across the Americas and beyond. In response, countries have implemented various visa, residency, and protection programs, from humanitarian parole and TPS to regularization plans and asylum pathways, that explicitly target or disproportionately affect Haitian nationals. This section of the report examines the key programs in nine countries: the United States, Canada, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Chile, Panama, Mexico, Colombia, and France, between 2010 and 2025. It covers temporary and permanent visa options, asylum/refugee channels, labor migration schemes, humanitarian programs, and family reunification mechanisms.

United States

Asylum and Refugee Policies

Haitians seeking asylum in the United States must meet the same eligibility criteria as all others. However, certain populations have benefited from targeted policies, such as the Cubans under the 'wet-foot/dry-foot' policy, which was terminated in January 2017. The United States has a long and complicated history with Haitian asylum seekers. Despite acknowledgment of the brutality of the two Duvalier regimes (1954 to 1971 and 1971 to 1986), the vast majority of Haitians seeking refuge in the United States have been classified as 'economic immigrants', thus making them ineligible for asylum (USCRI 2021). Some suggest that such a classification is discriminatory, as it ignores decades of sociopolitical crises and human rights violations in Haiti (USCRI 2021). The historically low asylum approval rates have been attributed to this misclassification of thousands of Haitians, dating back to the 1980s and 1990s, when Haitian 'boat people' were intercepted at sea and returned to Haiti or detained at the US military base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba (USCRI 2021).

Between 1981 and 1991, of the 25,000 Haitians intercepted at sea, only 28 asylum cases were processed (USCRI 2021). Further, Haitian asylum seekers were subject to increased scrutiny, as they were tested for HIV and quarantined in Guantanamo Bay, where they were not provided with proper medical treatment (USCRI 2021). Asylum approval rates have remained low through the present day, despite Haitians arriving at US borders citing political persecution, gang violence, and/or human rights abuses. For example, in 2021 under the Trump administration, asylum became harder to access as thousands of Haitians at the United States-Mexico border in Del Rio, Texas, were summarily expelled under a public health rule (Title 42) without asylum processing. In 2023, under the Biden administration, of the more than 5,200 asylum cases filed in the United States, only 4 percent (217) were approved (DOJ 2023).

Labor Migration Pathways

Haiti's inclusion in the US H-2 guest worker program was a notable post-earthquake development. In 2012, recognizing Haiti's need for economic opportunities, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) added Haiti to the list of countries eligible to send seasonal workers on H-2A (agricultural) and H-2B (non-agricultural) visas. This allowed US employers to recruit Haitian workers legally for temporary jobs. A few hundred Haitian workers benefited, primarily in the agriculture and hospitality sectors. However, challenges arose: many Haitian applicants lacked travel history or strong ties to the United States, leading to high visa refusal rates, and some who obtained visas either overstayed or filed asylum claims. Citing these issues, the DHS removed Haiti from the H-2 eligibility list in January 2018 (along with Belize and Samoa). The US government noted that Haitian H-2 visa holders had an 'extremely high' overstay rate and that upholding this designation for Haitians was no longer in the interest of the United States. Since then, recruiting Haitian nationals through H-2 programs has become challenging without a DHS exception. The elimination of this labor pathway to Haitians has cut off a small but symbolically important avenue for legal migration. Apart from H-2, some Haitians migrate to the United States under other employment-based visas (for example, as nurses or French teachers, typically through standard processes not specific to Haiti).

Temporary Protective Status

The US Secretary of Homeland Security may grant TPS to certain nationals by designating a country, or region within a country, unsafe for return due to extreme political upheaval or natural disasters (USCIS 2025b). TPS beneficiaries must be in the United States at the time of designation, cannot be deported from the United States and may obtain employment and travel authorization. In 2021, the national employment rate among TPS holders was 94.6 percent. TPS holder-headed households also contributed US\$1.3 billion in federal taxes and over US\$966.5 million in state and local tax contributions (AIC 2023).

According to the National Immigration Forum (2025), in September 2024 approximately 863,880 individuals from 16 countries were beneficiaries of TPS in the United States. At that time, Haitians accounted for just under one-fourth of TPS beneficiaries, or 200,005 individuals, with an additional 274,000 Haitians deemed eligible but not applying for this status (AIC 2023). More than half of all TPS beneficiaries resided in three states: Florida (295,720), Texas (93,680), and New York (67,840). While this information is not provided by nationality, it mirrors broader settlement patterns of the Haitian population in the United States, who mostly reside in Florida followed by New York (OECD and INURED 2017). Notably, a 2017 statistical and demographic profile of TPS holders indicated that almost two-thirds, or 32,500, of all Haitian TPS holders lived in Florida at the time of reporting (Warren and Kerwin 2017).

Haiti was first designated for TPS in January 2010 as a result of the earthquake. This designation was extended several times, with a notice of termination for July 22, 2019, at which time several juridical challenges against TPS remained in place pending court rulings (DHS, n.d.). The re-designation of TPS for Haitians has since been extended several times, with the former Secretary of Homeland Security, Kristi Noem, reducing the period of extension to August 3, 2025 (USCIS 2025c). On November 26, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) terminated Temporary Protected Status for Haitians in the US, effective February 3, 2026. As of the release date of this report, the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) re-designation for Haitians is still subject to ongoing litigation within United States courts.

While TPS data by nationality remains sparse, in 2017 approximately 81 percent of Haitian households with TPS holders lived above the poverty line, with 78 percent of TPS holders age 25 or older (Warren and Kerwin 2017). With an estimated 50,000 TPS holders from Haiti living in the United States, among those ages 18 or older, 37 percent had started or completed university studies, a level on par with the the foreign-born population that surpassed their Salvadoran (13 percent) and Honduran (12 percent) TPS counterparts (Warren and Kerwin 2017). Yet, the labor force participation rates among Haitian TPS beneficiaries (ages 16 and older) lagged behind Salvadoran and Honduran TPS holders at 81 percent, 88 percent, and 85 percent, respectively. Of 38,600 Haitian TPS holders in the labor force, two-thirds worked in unspecified fields categorized as ‘all other industries’. Just over 17 percent (6,700) were employed at restaurants or in food services, and 6 percent (2,400) worked in grocery stores. There were 1,999 Haitian TPS holders employed in ‘elementary and secondary schools’ in unspecified capacities, but it should be noted that no such labor category was listed among their Salvadoran and Honduran counterparts (Warren and Kerwin 2017).

When factoring in educational attainment and language proficiency, the lower labor force participation rates of Haitian TPS holders compared to their Salvadoran and Honduran counterparts are even more confounding. Over 70 percent of Haitians had completed secondary school, compared with less than 40 percent of Salvadorans and Hondurans and 96 percent of Haitians reported speaking English well, very well, or only speaking English, compared to 85 percent of Salvadorans and Hondurans (Warren and Kerwin 2017). Though data on TPS holders by nationality are limited, they reflect the incongruence we have seen elsewhere between educational attainment levels of Haitians and their employment status in the host country.

Family Reunification Parole

To facilitate safe and legal migration and keep families together, the United States established the Haitian Family Reunification Parole (HFRP) program in 2014. Under this program, US citizens or lawful permanent residents can request parole for relatives through approved immigration petitions (Dain and Batalova 2013). This allows families to reunite earlier by bypassing visa backlogs

and granting immediate residency and work authorization until permanent status becomes available. In August 2023, the DHS expanded the program to an online platform and removed pre-2016 petition restrictions, making it a crucial pathway for Haitian family reunification.

Humanitarian Parole for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans Program

In October 2022, the Biden administration established a humanitarian parole program in response to increasing irregular migration of Venezuelans to the United States. By January 2023, the program was expanded to address a new wave of irregular migration to the United States among Cubans, Haitians, and Nicaraguans (Christi et al. 2024). The Humanitarian Parole for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans (CHNV) required individuals to apply for parole from their home country. Those who had crossed into the United States illegally were ineligible to apply. Applicants had to identify a United States-based sponsor, purchase their own ticket to the United States, and were granted temporary entry for up to two years during which time they could apply for humanitarian relief and immigration benefits and would be authorized to work (Global Refuge 2024).

The program proved successful in its aim to reduce irregular migration, specifically across the United States–Mexico border (Christi et al. 2024). According to CBP (2025), “Since DHS has implemented these safe, orderly and lawful processes, encounters of CHNV nationals in between ports of entry are down 91%.” By the end of 2024, over half a million individuals (531,690) had arrived in the United States under the CHNV program (CBP 2025). Overall, Haitians account for approximately 40 percent of those benefiting from the program (NFAP 2024). Of the 213,150 Haitians vetted and authorized for travel under the program, 211,040 arrived and were granted parole (NFAP 2024). By March 2025, the Trump administration issued a federal register titled, Termination of Parole Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans, which was challenged in court, resulting in a US District Court issuing a preliminary injunction staying parts of the notice (USCIS 2025a). However, on May 19, 2025, the US Supreme Court issued a stay on the order.

As the CHNV program is fairly recent and currently in limbo, data on this population are limited. However, FWD.us, a bipartisan team of political campaigners, in collaboration with several immigrant-serving nonprofits, conducted an online survey of CHNV beneficiaries in 2023. Of the 196 respondents, 15 were Cuban, 60 Haitian, 79 Nicaraguan, and 42 Venezuelan. Though the total number of participants was insufficient to conduct an analysis by country, the overall findings suggest that the majority of respondents had advanced educational attainment. Almost half (48 percent) of all participants were employed while nearly one-third (32 percent) were looking for work. The occupational categories of employed CHNV beneficiaries mirrored those of TPS holders: building and grounds maintenance (16 percent), retail sales (14 percent), food preparation and services (14 percent), transportation (13 percent), and construction (11 percent). However, these results are not generalizable and they may be more of a reflection of who chose to participate in the survey.

CBP One Mobile Application

In fall 2020, the Biden administration launched the CBP One mobile application, which was designed to make Customs and Border Protection information and certain functions accessible to travelers before arrival in the United States (AIC 2025). In a now undated, archived page of the DHS website, the agency described the CBP One mobile application as a ‘humane tool’ that facilitated over 170,000 appointments in a six-month period (January 18, 2023, to the end of June 2023), listing the “top nationalities who [had] scheduled appointments [as] Haitian, Mexican, and Venezuelan” (DHS, n.d.). No specific national data have been found for the CBP One application. By May 2023, the CBP One application had become the sole medium through which an individual could apply for asylum in the United States and failure to do so rendered them ineligible for asylum, with few exceptions (DHS, n.d.). Beneficiaries of the CHNV program were also required to submit documentation necessary for travel authorization through the CBP One app. In March 2025, the Trump administration replaced CBP One with CBP Home. Before this change, the administration terminated the use of the application by asylum seekers, suspended its use for the CHNV parole program, and cancelled 30,000 pending asylum appointments (AIC 2025).

In summary, though US migration policy has largely disadvantaged Haitians, since 2010, occasional efforts have been made to assist those escaping the complex crises Haiti faces. These efforts have included: humanitarian protection (TPS), family reunification (HFRP), limited labor migration (H-2, now defunct for Haitians), and asylum, augmented by novel parole pathways during acute periods of migration. These policies have provided some relief to hundreds of thousands of Haitians; however, in a matter of weeks many will be facing the threat of deportation as these programs expire.

Canada

Canada responded to Haiti's 2010 earthquake with generous and targeted, if time-limited, immigration policies. First, Canada introduced a Temporary Suspension of Removals (TSR) for Haitians. It also created the Haiti Special Measures program to expedite family reunification and prevent inadvertent hardship to Haitians in Canada. Starting January 16, 2010, family sponsorship applications for Haitians affected by the disaster were processed on priority. Canadian citizens and permanent residents could quickly sponsor spouses, children, parents, and other family members from Haiti. They were instructed to label new applications 'Haiti' and notify authorities if their in-process application was for someone affected by the 2010 earthquake. In the six months after the disaster, over 2,300 Haitian family members were approved for reunification in Canada, a processing rate five times higher than the norm.

At the same time, Canada made it easier for Haitian nationals in Canada with temporary status (for example, visitors, tourists, students, and foreign workers) to apply for extensions with application fee waivers, on an expedited basis. Over 3,700 Haitians benefited from status extensions or new work permits with waived fees in 2010. These emergency measures reunited hundreds of Haitian families and provided temporary relief to Haitians in Canada on humanitarian grounds. However, these were short-term responses. By late 2010, the Special Measures Program and accelerated processing began to wind down as the immediate crisis passed. The underlying TSR (moratorium on removals) remained in place, and many Haitians continued living in Canada but without permanent resident status.

Lifting of the Removal Moratorium and Special PR Pathway (2014–2016)

In December 2014, the Canadian government lifted the TSR for Haiti (and Zimbabwe), signaling that it believed conditions had improved enough to resume deportations, affecting an estimated 3,200 Haitians who had been living in Canada without a clear immigration status, some for many years, under the TSR's protection. The impending deportations created fear in the Haitian community. After some advocacy by community groups, Canada announced Special Immigration Measures allowing these individuals to remain in the country permanently. This initiative converted the vast majority of long-term, undocumented Haitians in Canada into permanent residents. By 2017, Haitians who were formerly in limbo were on the road to citizenship.

Recent Developments (2021–2025)

Canada's Haitian community faced a new challenge in the latter part of the 2010s when the United States announced in 2017 it would end TPS for Haitians, raising the prospect of deportations. This prompted several thousand Haitian TPS holders in the United States to migrate to Canada, entering irregularly (mostly into Quebec) to claim asylum. Canadian authorities received over 7,000 Haitian asylum claims that year. Most of those claims, however, were eventually denied because claimants had not arrived directly from Haiti but had lived safely in the United States before coming to Canada. Canada did not create a special program for this new influx of Haitians, reviewing their asylum cases under normal channels.

Between 2023 and 2025, Haiti's security situation had deteriorated to unprecedented levels. In response, Canada, once again, introduced special measures—this time focused on *temporary status extensions* for Haitians. In May 2024, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) announced measures to support Haitian nationals in Canada who *could not return safely* due to the crisis through fee-exempt extensions on work permits, study permits, and visitor status. It also allowed for documentation flexibility, recognizing that renewing a Haitian passport might be impossible, thereby *waiving the passport requirement* for Haitian applicants applying for a visa or for permanent residency within

Canada. Additionally, starting November 20, 2025, Canada will continue granting fee exemptions for Haitian nationals in the country. This allows them to extend their temporary status or to apply for work and study permits at no cost. The policy addresses Haiti's security crisis and supports safety, legal employment, and access to education.

In conclusion, during periods of crisis, Canada has developed targeted policies to regularize the status of Haitians in Canada. Some policies have provided long-term, permanent solutions to regularizing the status of Haitians (for example, offering paths to citizenship and permanent residency) in Canada and others have offered temporary protection (for example, halting removals and work permit authorizations). Most Haitians who came to Canada around 2010 are now fully integrated as permanent residents or citizens. Today, Canada continues to monitor Haiti's situation and adjust its policies—as seen by the measures adopted in 2024, ensuring that no one is forced back to a collapsing state and that families can reunite or remain together in Canada when humanitarian circumstances demand it.

Dominican Republic

Nationality and Regularization Crisis: 2004 Regularization Plan for Irregular Migrants

Migration from Haiti to the Dominican Republic dates back to the early twentieth century with the establishment of the Dominican sugar industry, which required manual labor that Haiti could furnish (INURED 2020, 2024; OECD and INURED 2017). Migration from rural Haiti to the Dominican Republic persists to this day, peaking and dipping based on increasing or decreasing demand for labor in the host country, when Haiti is facing crises, and political tensions between the island sharing nations. This long history of permanent and circulatory migration has given rise to a large population of Dominican nationals of Haitian descent, making Haitians the largest foreign population living in the Dominican Republic.¹² Furthermore, in recent years, rising levels of irregular migration into

¹² There are limited public data specifically on the treatment of Haitian elites in the Dominican Republic, but anecdotal evidence and historical patterns suggest that

- Social acceptance is conditional and often tied to assimilation into Dominican norms;
- Legal and bureaucratic barriers (for example, documentation, residency) still apply, especially if the individual is not a dual national; and
- Racial profiling and xenophobia can affect even affluent Haitians, particularly in times of political tension or anti-immigrant sentiment.

the Dominican Republic have contributed to more forceful political rhetoric, fostering xenophobia while exacerbating negative political attitudes toward Haitian migration to the country. For instance, research demonstrates that local concentrations of Haitians in certain locales are associated with changes in electoral outcomes (Jaupart 2018).

The most critical moment and defining event in Haitian migration to the neighboring Dominican Republic after the 2010 earthquake was the 2013 Constitutional Court ruling (Sentence 168-13), which abruptly reinterpreted the citizenship clause of the Dominican Constitution. Though adopted in 2004, the National Regularization Plan for Irregular Migrants would not come into effect until 2013 under Presidential Decree 327-13. Haitians were the primary beneficiaries of this regularization effort, with more than 244,000 participants, representing 97 percent of all beneficiaries (OECD and ILO 2018). The purpose of the plan was to prevent deportations while processes were established for Haitians who migrate to the Dominican Republic to secure more permanent status in-country (OECD and ILO 2018).

Historically, the Dominican Republic followed *jus soli*, or birthright citizenship, with an exception for children of diplomats or those ‘in transit’. The court expanded the interpretation of ‘in transit’ to include all persons without legal residency, effectively applying it to generations of Haitian-born workers and their Dominican-born children. The ruling retroactively stripped citizenship from individuals born between 1929 and 2010 to foreign parents with irregular status. In practice, this meant tens of thousands of Dominicans of Haitian descent, who had lived their entire lives as Dominicans, found themselves stateless, as many had no ties to Haiti nor were they eligible for Haitian citizenship (Marcelin et al. 2017). This unprecedented denationalization drew international criticism including condemnation from the 2014 Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

To mitigate the fallout, the Dominican government passed Law 169-14 in May 2014. This law created a two-tier solution:

- **Group A:** People of foreign descent already in the civil registry (roughly 55,000–60,000 individuals, mostly Dominican-born children of Haitians who had been officially registered at birth) would have their Dominican nationality affirmed. Essentially,

their papers (cedulas and so on) were restored or reissued, acknowledging them as citizens.

- **Group B:** People fitting the profile but never registered in the Dominican civil registry could apply for a special ‘registration as foreigners’—in other words, they could be granted a legal residency status as foreign nationals, with a possible route to naturalization as Dominican after two years in the country. Group B was far larger, with estimates ranging from 40,000 to over 100,000 individuals. They had to self-report, prove birth in the Dominican Republic, and enroll in an alien registry.

While Law 169-14 helped many in Group A regain citizenship, Group B’s process was onerous and saw low turnout. According to the Center for Migration Studies (CMS), only about 8,755 people in Group B registered during the allotted window, far fewer than expected. Of those, eventually only a couple of thousand were able to naturalize as Dominicans after the required waiting period—leaving a significant number stateless. In 2026, statelessness remains a serious issue for Dominicans of Haitian descent born before 2010 who were never officially documented.

Parallel to addressing nationality, the Dominican Republic also tackled the migrant population’s legal status through the National Plan for the Regularization of Foreigners (PNRE). This was an 18-month administrative program, implemented between mid-2014 and mid-2015, that allowed *all* undocumented immigrants in the Dominican Republic to apply for temporary legal residency. In practice, the vast majority of applicants were Haitian (or of Haitian descent). The government opened registration centers across the country and, with international support (IOM and so on), conducted outreach to communities with migrating populations. By the deadline in June 2015, about 288,466 people had registered for the PNRE, *98 percent of them being Haitian citizens*. Depending on documents submitted (work records, housing, ID from home country, and so on), applicants could be granted either a temporary residence permit, a one-year renewable visa, or a non-resident work permit. In the initial round, tens of thousands received one- or two-year permits to remain legally in the Dominican Republic. However, many others received nothing due to a lack of documentation. Crucially, the PNRE did not offer a clear path to permanent

residency or citizenship—beneficiaries had to renew their permits and could later be required to meet stricter criteria.

The UN reported that, initially, first-generation Dominican-born individuals of Haitian descent rendered stateless were estimated at up to 210,000 people, a figure that was later adjusted to approximately 133,770. This estimate did not account for subsequent generations of individuals of foreign descent, as reliable population data for these groups are unavailable. Consequently, it did not encompass all Haitians without nationality (UNCHR-Refworld 2018).

Enforcement and Evolving Visa Policies (2015–2025)

After 2015, the Dominican Republic established a steady pattern of migration enforcement initiatives focusing almost exclusively on Haitians. Deportation operations became routine, sometimes involving sweeps through Haitian neighborhoods and job sites. Racial profiling was frequently reported: immigration agents used skin color or Haitian Creole language as a basis for detention. There were documented incidents of people with legal status or even Dominican citizens being expelled in error, underscoring the intensity of the situation and the absence of due process. Statistics indicate that from 2022 to 2023, over 120,000 Haitians were expelled from Dominican territory, a scale far above previous years. Notably, reports emerged of the Dominican authorities deporting pregnant Haitian women and separating families, which violated previous informal humanitarian understandings. The Dominican government has also targeted Dominicans of Haitian descent who lack documents, effectively expelling people ‘back’ to a country (Haiti) they may have never known. In 2024, more than 276,000 Haitians were deported. According to reports from the Dominican government, between January and April 2025, over 119,000 Haitians were deported.

As of 2025, the vast majority of Haitian nationals in the Dominican Republic either have temporary status or are undocumented. Dominicans of Haitian ancestry born before 2010 remain a marginalized, partly stateless group fighting for documentation. The Dominican state has not instituted any new permanent residency or citizenship pathways for Haitians beyond the above measures; rather, it is doubling down on enforcement and short-term fixes. The government has undertaken measures to make it difficult for

Haitians to migrate to the Dominican Republic, legally or otherwise. The Dominican Republic has enforced stringent visa requirements for Haitians, making legal entry difficult. Border security has also been heightened, with a border fence erected in 2022–2023 covering a portion of the two countries' shared border.

In conclusion, the Dominican Republic's approach to Haitian migration between 2010 and 2025 has largely been restrictive. Regularization efforts have been undertaken, with limited results, in response to criticisms of the country's denationalization of Dominicans of Haitian origin, which has rendered hundreds of thousands of Haitians stateless. Haitians in the Dominican Republic thus face a precarious existence, and their fate is closely tied to political currents and historical sentiments of anti-Haitianism (Marcelin et al. 2017). The case highlights how internal nationality laws and migration control can have profound humanitarian consequences for a neighboring nation's people—in this case, Haiti's.

Brazil

Humanitarian Visas and Permanent Residency for Haitians

Brazil played a significant role in welcoming Haitians, particularly after the 2010 earthquake. Many initially migrated through employer sponsorships as Brazil sought manual labor to assist in building infrastructure for the 2014 World Cup and subsequent Rio Olympic Games in 2016 (INURED 2020). As rumors of an abundance of jobs in Brazil circulated across Haiti, others followed suit without sponsorship (and undocumented) flying into a neighboring South American country and then traveling by land. Over a four-year period (2010 to 2014), the number of Haitians traversing overland from Peru to Brazil rose from 200 to 50,000 (Fernandes and de Castro 2014). By 2015, approximately 100,000 Haitians were officially known to be living in Brazil (OBMigra 2015). While Brazil initially welcomed the low-skilled labor, it was not prepared to receive these foreign nationals (INURED 2024).

Between 2010 and 2012, Haitians could file for asylum through Brazil's existing refugee statute of 1997 (Lei 9.474/97), which protected those facing violence (Kenny 2013). However, most

of the Haitian nationals arriving on Brazilian soil were fleeing a natural disaster (exacerbated by poor governance and limited infrastructure) that had brought Haiti's weak economy to a virtual standstill (INURED 2020, 2024). In 2012, a humanitarian visa category was created, allowing Haitians to legally enter Brazil and obtain permanent residency. With over 10,000 visas issued by 2015 (INURED 2024), Haitians became a major immigrant group, contributing significantly to industries like construction, services, and agriculture. Brazil's approach marked a pioneering effort in addressing disaster-induced displacement, making it one of the most accommodating destinations for Haitians in the post-earthquake period.

New Migration Law and Temporary Humanitarian Visas

Brazil's former Aliens Law (1980) was replaced by a new Migration Law (Lei 13.445) in 2017, which took a more rights-based approach to immigration. Under the new law, Brazil adjusted how it handled humanitarian cases. In April 2018, Inter Ministerial Ordinance No. 10 was issued, creating a two-year 'temporary visa for humanitarian reasons', tailored toward the needs of Haitian nationals resettling in Brazil. This was essentially the next phase of Brazil's Haiti policy: instead of granting Haitians an immediate permanent visa, they would receive two-year temporary residency, which was renewable, and could be converted to permanent residency thereafter. Importantly, the ordinance specified that this visa would be available exclusively through the Brazilian Embassy in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, encouraging an orderly, direct application process, rather than irregular journeys that could place their lives in danger. To transition to permanent residency after two years, Haitians would need to meet certain conditions: not be absent from Brazil for more than 90 days per year, enter and exit only through official checkpoints, have no criminal record (in Haiti or Brazil), and demonstrate means of subsistence. These conditions aimed to ensure good conduct and proper integration in Brazil.

With this new system, from 2018 onward, Haitians continued to migrate to Brazil but under a more regulated process. Brazil effectively mainstreamed humanitarian visas into its regular migration system, recognizing them under the category of *visas granted for humanitarian reasons in national interest*. The change

from granting immediate visas to temporary ones was to align with how Brazil treats other groups on the move (for example, Syrians and Venezuelans).

Beyond the special humanitarian visas, Haitians in Brazil also made use of other migration categories:

→ **VITEM V (Work visas).** Some Haitian professionals and skilled workers were sponsored by Brazilian companies (particularly Haitians employed by NGOs or Haitian physicians employed in medical cooperation programs). The VITEM V is Brazil's standard temporary work visa for foreign nationals entering the country to take up formal, paid employment in skilled or professional roles. It requires a direct employment relationship with a Brazilian entity and prior authorization from the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MTE). Valid for up to two years and renewable, it can lead to permanent residence after approximately four years. For skilled Haitians, this visa offers a legal pathway into Brazil's formal labor market outside humanitarian or family reunification mechanisms, but it is primarily accessible to those with tertiary education or specialized skills.

Applicants must hold recognized qualifications or relevant work experience, have a confirmed job offer from a Brazilian employer, and meet labor market tests proving no suitable Brazilian candidate is available. Employers must submit applications to the MTE, provide a formal employment contract, and register workers in Brazil's social security system.

Evidence from NGO reports and interviews indicates that Haitian professionals on VITEM V visas predominantly work in health care and medical cooperation, NGO project management, engineering/construction management, and education/training. These roles are often associated with public-private partnerships or municipal-level hiring in remote areas of Brazil, particularly in the northern and northeastern regions such as Amazonas, Pará, and Maranhão, where there is a chronic shortage of Brazilian-trained personnel. Large Brazilian NGOs and international NGOs operating in Brazil employ Haitian professionals for project management, community outreach, and field coordination, especially in programs serving migrant and

refugee communities. Private technical schools and language institutes have also hired Haitian educators, particularly French- and Creole-speaking instructors. These sectors frequently align with skill shortages or Brazil's international cooperation commitments.

Visa fees are approximately US\$100 for applicants. Additional costs include translation and legalization of documents, employer legal and administrative fees, and potential relocation expenses. Employers often reserve sponsorship for hard-to-fill roles due to these costs and bureaucratic requirements.

Advantages include full labor protection, social benefits, and a path to permanent residence. Limitations include high entry barriers (credential recognition, Portuguese proficiency, and employer willingness to sponsor) and concentration on a narrow set of skilled professions.

- **Student visas.** Brazil has offered scholarships to Haitian students such as the Exchange Program for Undergraduate Students from developing countries (PEC-G).
- **Family reunification.** Brazil's laws allow a permanent resident to sponsor a spouse, minor children, and certain other dependents for residency. As Haitians settled and obtained residency, they could sponsor immediate family to join them in the country.

Brazil's model is often cited positively. It demonstrated good practice in providing humanitarian visas as an adaptation to climate-/disaster-induced displacement. By 2025, many Haitians have become long-term residents or even Brazilian citizens (after meeting the four-year residency requirement for naturalization, reduced to two years if married to a Brazilian or having Brazilian children).

In summary, between 2010 and 2025, Brazil implemented one of the most accommodating frameworks for Haitians:

- Creating an unprecedented *permanent* humanitarian visa for them (2012–2017)
- Transitioning to a formal temporary humanitarian visa under a new law (2018 onward)

- Integrating Haitians through work and residence, rather than leaving them in refugee camps or undocumented

No other country in the region has given as many Haitians immediate residency upon arrival. This comparative openness made Brazil an alluring destination for Haitians in the post-2010 earthquake period. However, by 2015 Brazil's economy shrunk by 3.8 percent (BBC 2016) and the recession deepened in 2016 (Cascione 2017) as unemployment soared. The economic downturn would result in significant job losses, particularly for newly arrived Haitians, and rising xenophobia, compelling many to migrate to neighboring Chile (INURED 2024). Still, tens of thousands of Haitians have made Brazil their adoptive home, contributing to its society and economy as legal immigrants.

Chile

The Boom of Haitian Migration, Regime Change, and Policy Shifts

As Brazil's economy shrank, neighboring Chile saw a rise in Haitian arrivals at its borders. Several factors made Chile attractive: political stability, a sound regional economy, and crucially, not requiring visas for Haitian visitors at that time. Between 2014 and 2017, tens of thousands of Haitians fled across the border from Brazil to Chile or purchased one-way airline tickets from Haiti, entering as 'tourists'. Once in Chile, they would find work (often in agriculture, construction, or services) and overstay their visas.

Chile's government initially tolerated this de facto labor migration due to demand for workers, but by 2017, the Haitian population swelled dramatically as they became the largest immigrant group arriving annually (before the Venezuelan migrant crisis). This sudden visibility led to public debate in Chile about how to manage the influx of migrating Black populations, a phenomenon unprecedented in the country's history (INURED 2024). There were concerns about Haitians living in crowded conditions, facing exploitation, and encountering distinct cultural challenges in integrating into Chilean society, unlike their other Latin counterparts. In 2018, the conservative administration of President Sebastián Piñera was elected to office and decided to implement immigration reforms with particular focus on the growing Black

foreign population. In April 2018, Chile ended visa-free entry for Haitians. Newly adopted visa requirements entailed furnishing a valid passport, proof of lodging or an invitation letter, evidence of economic solvency, a return ticket, and a clean criminal record (INURED 2024). This instantly reduced the number of new Haitian arrivals while leaving Haitians already in Chile in a somewhat precarious situation.

In late 2018, the Piñera government launched its highly criticized ‘Ordenado’ voluntary return plan, specifically aimed at Haitian nationals. The plan was deemed by human rights activists as a form of deportation. The government offered free charter flights to Haiti, a modest cash grant, and forgiveness of overstay fines, on the condition that returnees sign a pledge not to return to Chile for nine years. About 1,000 Haitians accepted the offer in November 2018, but the program was halted by 2020 amid criticism over the government’s failure to effectively integrate Haitians in Chile and allegations of racial discrimination against the nation’s only foreign Black population (INURED 2024).

Regularization and Return Programs

For the tens of thousands of Haitians who came before 2018 and were undocumented, Chile undertook a regularization campaign open to all nationalities in 2018. Many Haitians applied for temporary visas through this program to legalize their status. Those who met the requirements (no criminal record and proof of being in Chile before a specific cutoff date) were granted one-year temporary residency, renewable and eventually able to file for permanent resident status. During its initial implementation, the program was rife with allegations of discrimination against Haitians (Cela et al. forthcoming). As of 2021, Chile’s government reported that over 200,000 residence permits had been issued to Haitian nationals between 2018 and 2021.

Humanitarian Family Reunification Visa

Recognizing the needs of Haitians for reunification with immediate family members in Haiti, the Piñera government concurrently established a “Visado con Fines Humanitarios” for family reunification of Haitians. From July 2, 2018, this visa could be requested only at the Chilean consulate in Haiti by eligible family members. The criteria: the petitioner in Chile had to be a Haitian

national with permanent residency in Chile and could sponsor their spouse or civil union partner, children under 18, and adult children up to 24 if studying, as well as (in practice), other dependents like disabled adult children. The applicants must have no criminal record.

It would not be until a few years later that this reunification program gained momentum. By 2021–2022, a number of Haitians in Chile had regularized their status—some through Chile’s 2018 regularization for undocumented people on the move of all nationalities—although there have been numerous reports of Haitian nationals encountering bureaucratic red tape preventing them from benefiting from the regularization program. In 2022, Chile’s National Migration Service reaffirmed its commitment to family reunification for all documented immigrants (not just Haitians) as part of a more humanitarian migration policy.

Current Status

As of 2025, Chile’s Haitian community is well established, though smaller than it was at its peak, due to a combination of homeland returns and, most notably, onward migration to North America (INURED 2024). Those who remained in Chile and navigated the system have gradually improved their situation. A good portion now have permanent residency or citizenship in Chile. Their children, including those born in Chile (who obtain Chilean citizenship *jus soli*), are integrating into Chilean society.

As the Haitian presence peaked in Chile, policies had to be formulated with this distinct population in mind. Chile’s migration policies toward Haitian nationals reflect the political shifts in the country’s leadership over the past decade (2015 to 2025). The introduction of visa requirements and voluntary return schemes restricted the flow of newly arrived Haitians and reduced their presence in the country, while migrant regularization efforts and family reunification schemes have allowed Chile to uphold a compassionate stance toward this relatively new immigrant population that has adopted Chile as its new home.

 Mexico

Haitian Migration to/through Mexico

Historically, Mexico has not received many Haitians, with the exception of university students, but this changed after 2010, and especially around 2016. In 2016, when the United States briefly resumed deportations of Haitians (ending a policy of parole entry that had been in place since the earthquake), thousands of Haitians who were journeying north were stranded at the US-Mexico border. Cities such as Tijuana and Mexicali suddenly became hosts to camps of Haitians. Rather than return to Haiti or remain undocumented, a large number decided to remain in Mexico. This marked the beginning of a significant Haitian presence in Mexico.

One immediate avenue for status regularization was Mexico's asylum system. In 2016–2017, hundreds (later thousands) of Haitians filed asylum claims with the Mexican Commission for Refugee Assistance (*Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados*, COMAR). Initially, many claims were based on economic hardship and the lingering quake's aftermath—which did not meet the narrow legal definition of refugees. Mexico's asylum law requires persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, social group or political opinion, or generalized violence. Haitian asylum cases were often denied on the grounds that they did not meet the country's legal criteria for asylum. However, Mexico often granted 'complementary protection' (a form of humanitarian protection) to Haitians who would face serious danger if deported. Similar to refugee status, complementary protection is a renewable status with many of the same rights (for example, legal residency and work authorization).

From just a few hundred Haitian asylum applicants in 2014–2015, the number of applications ballooned over time. By 2021, Haiti ranked second among the countries of origin of asylum seekers in Mexico, with Honduras ranking first. In that year, 26,000 Haitian asylum applications were submitted between January and September, a sevenfold increase from about 5,900 in 2020. COMAR has explored ways to filter out cases unlikely to be approved so as not to clog the system for 'genuine refugees'.

Humanitarian Visas and Alternatives to Asylum

To address this, Mexican authorities considered using Humanitarian Visitor Visas (*Tarjeta de Visitante por Razones Humanitarias*) as an alternate pathway for Haitians seeking to regularize their status in Mexico. A humanitarian visa in Mexico is typically a one-year document granting work authorization given to:

- Asylum seekers (while their case is processed, they automatically get a humanitarian visa after 30 days);
- Victims of crimes in Mexico; and
- People with medical emergencies or others deemed in need by the INM, Mexico's immigration authority

In early 2019, facing large 'caravans' of migrants, Mexico briefly issued thousands of humanitarian visas *en masse*, until pressure from the Trump administration caused them to stop in June 2019. In fall 2021, Mexico tried to confine the Haitian (and other) asylum seekers to the southern state of Chiapas (by law, asylum applicants must remain in the state where they apply). This led to protests and desperate attempts to resume the caravans northward. Then, in November 2021, INM began bussing Haitians out of Tapachula to other cities and, at the same time, issued humanitarian visas or migration documents that allowed them to travel within the country. Reports from Refugees International suggest that, by December 2021, approximately 30,000 Haitians benefited from these transfers out of Tapachula.

These humanitarian visas are renewable annually, and many Haitians have used them as a sort of *de facto* long-term status. Some Haitians subsequently found other routes to regularize their status in Mexico: for instance, Mexico created a program to grant one-year residence cards to certain nationals in late 2021 and 2022. Haitians with children born in Mexico, or those who had pending asylum cases for over a year, were among the beneficiaries.

Summary of Mexico's Approach to Addressing Irregular Migration Among Haitians

- **Asylum.** An option available but not ideal for Haitians who are often denied refugee status despite Haiti being a top country of asylum seekers
- **Complementary protection.** Often granted to Haitians who do not meet refugee criteria but for whom return is unsafe
- **Humanitarian visas.** Used strategically to manage flows and humanitarian needs, especially in 2019 and 2021. One-year permits offering work authorization, which many Haitians renew and effectively use to reside in Mexico long-term
- **Regularization programs.** Mexico occasionally offers programs that regularize the immigration status (for example, 2022 for certain long-term asylum applicants or during COVID-19), which some Haitians have benefited from. For example, in late 2022, hundreds of Haitians in the state of Nuevo León were given resident cards under a temporary program
- **Family reunification.** Mexican law allows residents to sponsor their immediate family. A Haitian with permanent residency or citizenship in Mexico can sponsor a spouse or minor children
- **Labor migration.** Mexico does not recruit labor from Haiti; however, Haitians can obtain work permits if they have an offer and regular status. Some skilled Haitians have come as students or professionals, but those are individual cases (for example, Haitian engineers or medical personnel)

Mexico's migration policies have only recently been adapted to the needs of a relatively new migration population, Haitians. Mexico has adapted existing tools (for example, regularization programs and humanitarian visas) to respond to the needs of this emerging migrant population. However, Mexico's migration policies must be negotiated with respect to the policies of its powerful neighbor, the United States. As the United States closed its borders to and reshaped its policies toward foreigners from the Latin America and Caribbean region, Mexico's status as a transit country shifted to a destination for many people on the move, including Haitians. By

the end of 2024, an estimated 100,000 people of Haitian origin were living in Mexico, according to one Mexican diplomat. With such a substantial presence in Mexico, it is likely that Mexico's policies will necessarily evolve as Haiti's sociopolitical situation worsens and US immigration policies change.

Colombia

A Transit Country Under Strain

Colombia does not have dedicated programs for Haitians migrating to/through its territory, primarily because relatively few Haitians choose Colombia as a final destination. Instead, Colombia's role has been largely as a transit corridor for Haitians traveling from South America through Central America en route to North America.

Visa Policies toward Haitian Nationals

Colombia requires visas for Haitian visitors. There is no visa waiver for Haiti, meaning a Haitian would need to apply for a short-term tourist or transit visa to fly into Colombia. However, the bulk of Haitian transit migration does not involve flying to Colombia, as most arrive overland from Ecuador. Until recently, Ecuador did not require visas for Haitians, so it was a common entry point. From Ecuador, Haitians would slip into Colombia—often with the help of smugglers, without passing through official immigration checkpoints. Therefore, Colombian visa policy did not have much bearing on these flows, as they were largely irregular entrants.

For those Haitians seeking to settle in Colombia, there are limited pathways to citizenship or permanent residency:

- **Refugee claims in Colombia.** These have been extremely few. A Haitian could theoretically claim asylum in Colombia if they feared persecution in Haiti, but most view Colombia as economically unattractive, as it has lower wages than destinations such as Chile or the United States, and Haitians have no community ties there. The Colombian Refugee system has mostly handled cases from Venezuela, Cuba, Syria, and a few other countries. There are no significant records of Haitians

receiving asylum in Colombia, even though many were escaping political persecution or violence.

- **Work or study visas.** Uncommon for Haitians, though there may be a handful of Haitian professionals working for international NGOs who have work visas.
- **Temporary protective status.** Colombia is one of the principal hosts of Venezuelans in the region, as it shares a border with Venezuela. Though a significant share of Venezuelans transit en route to the United States, Colombia established a TPS program for Venezuelans with the support of the United States, as a deterrent to onward migration north. No similar program exists for Haitians, who are also only a transient presence in the country but comparatively lower. Integrating Haitians also poses social challenges (for example, language and cultural differences).

2022–2025 Developments

After a peak in Haitian migration in 2021, Haitian presence in Colombia began to dip. Still, Haitians continue to traverse Colombia. There were reports in 2022 of renewed large groups, and in 2023, the Darien Gap crossings hit record highs again, though increasingly by Venezuelans and Ecuadorians whose numbers outpaced those of Haitians.

In summary, for Haitians, Colombia does not represent a destination with dedicated integration programs. Instead, beyond management of Haitian entry at official border points, Haitians migrating through the country are a largely transient population for whom the following efforts were made by the Colombian government:

- An agreement with Panama to manage daily migrant quotas
- Police actions against smugglers (for example, the Gulf Clan gangs who profit from Darien Gap crossings)
- Humanitarian declarations in sea crossing towns such as Necoclí to unlock resources when the number of transit migrants swell

For Haitians on the move, Colombia is a crucial gateway to the intended destination. While Colombia lacks specific residency programs for Haitians, its enforcement of safe and orderly migration on its territory significantly affects them by facilitating or impeding their onward migration northward. As has been noted elsewhere, the Colombian government has provided minimal oversight and protection to Haitians while displaying a level of indifference toward them, resulting in their falling victim to crimes such as bribery, theft, overcharging, and various forms of violence (INURED 2024).

Panama

Crisol de Razas: A Broad Regularization (2010–2014)

Panama has long been a crossroads of migration, and in the 2010s, it implemented a unique program known as ‘*Crisol de Razas*’ (Melting Pot) to regularize undocumented foreigners. This program consisted of a series of fairs or registration drives where people on the move could apply for temporary legal status by paying fees and showing minimal documents. Haitians were among the diverse nationalities that took advantage of this opportunity, though the largest groups were from neighboring Latin countries and Asia. The program is said to have benefited 50,000 migrants in its first years of implementation.

For Haitians in Panama at that time, *Crisol de Razas* provided provisional residence permits (often valid for 2 years), which could be renewed or eventually converted to longer-term residency. The eligibility was simply being in Panama without status for over one year and having no criminal record. Many Haitian participants were those who had come either as students or were working informally in construction and service jobs. By granting them legal permits, Panama was able to bring them into the formal labor market. *Crisol de Razas* was controversial domestically—some Panamanians felt it encouraged illegal migration or was too lenient. However, the program did raise significant funds in fees and was promoted by the government as a national security measure.

Extension in 2014–2016. The Varela administration implemented another phase of *Crisol de Razas*. In 2015, about 39,000 people whose regularized status was in jeopardy of expiration, or who

missed prior opportunities to regularize their status, were given a six-year temporary migratory permit. This extension was meant to bridge the gap until a new migration policy could be formulated. Many beneficiaries of this phase of the program were those who legalized in 2010–2012 but now needed to renew their status. The six-year permits issued in 2015 would have likely expired by 2021.

Aftermath: Gaps and New Humanitarian Permits

In July 2023, under President Cortizo, Panama created a *‘Permiso Temporal de Protección’* (Temporary Protection Permit). This offered a two-year legal status (non-renewable) to foreigners who had been in Panama at least since 2022 and remained without documentation. It essentially gave them a two-year grace period. It is likely that many former *Crisol de Razas* beneficiaries applied. By March 2025, with a new administration (President José R. Mulino) in office, Panama went a step further by establishing the *Permiso de Protección de Seguridad Humanitaria* (The Humanitarian Security Protection Permit). This permit is extensive as it is valid for two years and can be extended for six more years or eight years in total. Crucially, it comes with work authorization and is aimed at those who have been in Panama for more than one year and are still undocumented.

For Haitians specifically, these new permits are significant. Panama’s Haitian community is not very large —estimates range in the low thousands—but many Haitians transit through Panama. One notable flexibility in the 2025 humanitarian permit is that it waives some documentation requirements because of the difficulties certain nationalities face in obtaining papers from their homeland, which likely applies to Haitians whose passport renewals can be challenging given the collapse of the Haitian government.

Transit Migration and Darien Gap

Apart from the resident Haitian community, Panama has been contending with being a transit country for Haitians heading north. In 2016, when the United States abruptly stopped parole for Haitians and began deportations, many Haitians were stranded in Central America. Panama at that time negotiated with Haiti and IOM to repatriate approximately 130 Haitians by air in an emergency measure and also allowed some to remain in Panama temporarily until they found other solutions. However, generally,

Panama has refrained from offering asylum or long-term stays to transiting Haitians, viewing its territory as a corridor and not a destination for this population.

Outcomes for Haitians in Panama

Haitians who remain in Panama long-term often do so because they have secured a more permanent status (through work or family ties). Panama does not have a specific permanent residency program for Haitians, but it has general categories:

- The **Friendly Nations visa** benefits certain nationalities but does not include Haiti.
- **Work permits.** Panama has strict quotas on hiring foreigners (10 percent of skilled workforce and 15 percent of unskilled workforce per company). Haitians would need a company to sponsor them and prove that their skills cannot be found locally, which is challenging except in niche areas.
- **Marrying** a Panamanian grants eligibility for permanent residency.
- **Refugee status.** Theoretically possible but rarely granted to Haitians unless they can demonstrate that they have been victims of persecution.

The humanitarian regularization schemes have been Haitians' main avenue to legal status in Panama. With the new 2025 permit, Haitians who arrived in Panama during the last decade's migration waves have one more opportunity to legalize their status and obtain work authorization.

In conclusion, Panama's policies affecting migration of Haitians from 2010–2025 can be summarized as follows:

- Broad amnesty programs (Crisol de Razas) offered to all people on the move offering temporary regularized status
- Transitional humanitarian permits in 2023 and 2025 to extend protections to remaining undocumented populations still present in the country

- Transit migration where limited humanitarian assistance is provided but permanent stay is discouraged for Haitians

For Haitians looking to build a life abroad, Panama is usually not the final stop, but it has served as a safety valve and waystation—sometimes turning into a permanent residence for a small minority of Haitians who have made a life in Panama.

France

Limited Special Measures Adopted for Haitian Nationals Post 2010 Earthquake

France, home to a sizable Haitian diaspora—particularly in Paris and in overseas departments such as Guadeloupe, reacted to the 2010 Haiti earthquake with public sympathy but relatively modest policy changes compared to the United States or Canada. On January 13, 2010 (the day after the quake), the French government announced a temporary suspension of expulsions of Haitian nationals for three months. This meant that any Haitians without legal status in France—commonly referred to as *sans-papiers* (without papers)—could not be deported to Haiti during that period.

France did not establish any regularization programs for Haitians. Appeals from NGOs to grant all Haitians in France residency permits on humanitarian grounds were denied by the Sarkozy government. Instead, France handled requests on a case-by-case basis. Some Haitians with irregular status were able to get temporary stay permits (*autorisation provisoire de séjour*) if they had compelling reasons. However, there were no official programs.

France made a significant gesture in the realm of family reunification and orphan adoption. France accelerated the adoptions of approximately 300 Haitian orphans whose adoptions by French families were already in process (similar to the United States' 'orphan parole'). Additionally, France simplified visa issuance for family members of French or European Union (EU) citizens affected by the earthquake. For example, Haitian spouses of French citizens were fast-tracked for visas in early 2010.

Haitian Asylum Seekers in France

Haitians have had the right to seek asylum in France, but historically their success rates have been low as France views Haiti as a country with generalized poverty and instability, not systematic persecution by the state. From 2010 through the mid-2010s, Haitian asylum claims in France hovered in the low thousands annually. Many claims cited gang violence or political persecution, particularly during times of political turmoil in Haiti. *Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides* (OFPRA) has rejected most applications, although some applicants received subsidiary protection due to Haiti's humanitarian situation.

However, by 2022–2024, Haitian asylum applications surged sharply, particularly in France's overseas departments in the Americas. French Guiana, which borders Brazil and Suriname, became a popular destination for Haitians. The journey is easier as no visa is required for Haitians to enter Suriname, who then cross over land into French Guiana. Once on French soil, Haitians can claim asylum. French Guiana has seen a dramatic increase in Haitian arrivals due to Haiti's 2018–2023 compounded sociopolitical crises. Since 2018, Haitian nationals have ranked among the top ten nationalities filing asylum claims. According to the Ministry of the Interior, in 2018, just under 3,000 new claims were filed, but by 2019, claims had nearly doubled to 5,000. By 2023, the asylum system was overwhelmed by Haitian cases in French Guiana, forcing the government to open new reception centers. By 2024, Haitians became the seventh-largest group of asylum applicants in France, recording almost 5,800 new claims (a 104 percent increase from the previous year), reflecting how dire the situation in Haiti had become.

Despite the surge, asylum case approval rates remain relatively low. In 2022, for instance, OFPRA's protection rate for Haitian applicants was between 8 and 10 percent, though many appeals are pending, and some applicants receive humanitarian status. France has not activated any temporary protections for Haitians (such as the one used for Ukrainians)—that is, an EU-level mechanism unlikely to be used for Haiti, absent a sudden mass exodus.

Regular Immigration Avenues

Below are the immigration schemes available to Haitians wishing to migrate to France through legal channels:

- **Family reunification.** Haitians with immediate family in France (spouses, minor children, and so on) can apply for family visas.
- **Student visas.** After 2010, France offered special scholarships to Haitian students under programs like ‘Project Phoenix’ to help support Haiti’s human capital development. Hundreds of Haitian students studied in French universities on these scholarships. Some later stayed in France for work or research.
- **Labor migration.** A small number of Haitian professionals migrate to France for employment (particularly in fields such as health care, Haitian nurses and doctors sometimes migrate to France or its overseas territories). France’s labor migration is skills based and nationality neutral, so no particular program exists for Haiti, but French language proficiency may give Haitians an advantage.
- **Visa policies.** Haitians need a visa to enter Schengen France. Visa issuance rates vary—many Haitians struggle to obtain visitor visas due to the risk of overstaying. However, a proportion do obtain short-term Schengen visas (often those with economic standing or sponsored by relatives in the diaspora). In general, there has been no waiver of visa requirements even in times of crisis.

Overseas Departments as a Backdoor

It is worth noting France’s unique situation with overseas departments (*départements d’outre-mer* or DOM) in the Caribbean and South America. Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guiana are fully part of France (the EU’s outermost regions). They have become entry points for regional migration. For Haitians, Martinique and Guadeloupe are relatively close; in fact, French territories issue a limited number of *collectivité* visas for visits. Some Haitians migrate legally or irregularly and then develop strategies to reach the French mainland. French Guiana, as mentioned, borders

non-EU countries, many of which have porous borders. In 2019, the French government tightened its visa-free travel agreement with Suriname because many Haitians were using Suriname as a transit route to French Guiana. As a result, Suriname has since introduced visa requirements for Haitians in an effort to stem transit migration to French Guiana.

France's approach to managing Haitian migration (2010–2025) has largely remained constant, with few humanitarian gestures during periods of extreme crisis. Except for a three-month deportation reprieve and a scholarship program for university students following the 2010 earthquake, no special accommodations have been afforded Haitians during the many sociopolitical, health (for example, cholera), or environmental crises they have faced since that time. Haitians are subject to the same asylum, naturalization, and family reunification mechanisms available to all foreigners who wish to live in France or any of its overseas territories. Yet, because of historic cultural and language ties, Haitians continue to make their way to France in notable numbers. France's restrictive policies have left many Haitians with undocumented status, reliant on discretionary relief or community support. The sharp increase in Haitian asylum claims in France over the latter years is a testament to the desperation driving migration—and it poses a challenge for French authorities to reconcile immigration control with humanitarian protection.

Appendix IV

Comparative Migration Policy Analysis Matrix

Category	UnitedStates	Canada	Dominican Republic	Brazil	Chile
Policy Frameworks	TPS, Biden Parole Program, Asylum system	Refugee resettlement, Francophone Mobility Program	Strict visa enforcement and deportation policies	Humanitarian visas (past), immigration reform	Visa normalization programs (post-2010 earthquake)
High-Skill Entry Pathways	Limited for Haitians	Express entry and provincial programs	Not available	Restricted post-2018	Limited recognition of Haitian credentials
Labor Market Access	Limited for TPS holders	Broad labor access for refugees	Restricted to certain sectors	Conditional, informal economy dominant	Informal labor market absorption
Protection of Rights	Varies by status; TPS holders protected	Strong labor and human rights framework	Often absent or discriminatory	Moderate, depends on documentation	Moderate; recent human rights concerns
Irregular Migration Response	Border patrol and deportation; Return to Mexico Policy	Interception and resettlement	Detention and deportation	Previous openness; now stricter controls	Deportation and border monitoring
Diaspora Engagement	US Agency for International Development (USAID), remittances, policy dialogue	Diaspora consultations, dual citizenship	Minimal engagement	Weak formal engagement	Emerging but limited efforts
Gender-Specific Programs	Few targeted efforts	Strong gender-based protection frameworks	Absent	Gender-based violence concerns	Sporadic NGO-led responses

Appendix V

Classification of qualified occupations from the Brazil data. The grades are included in the following table based on their original descriptions. The data were sorted from highest to lowest, and the top ten occupations are presented.

Registros administrativos de Brasil

1: Ocupaciones calificadas	
2: Ocupaciones no calificadas	
Clasificación	PROFISSAO
—	
Otra clasificación	Sem Ocupacao
Otra clasificación	Estudante
Otra clasificación	Aposentado, Pensionista, Ou Assemelhado
1	Profissional Liberal, Tecnico, Ou Assemelhado, Nao Classificado Sob Outra Demominacao
1	Enfermeiro, Parteira, Massagista, Nutricionista, Ou Tecnico Paramedico
1	Economista, Atuário, Contador, Tecnico Em Contabilidade, Auditor, Estatístico, Administrador, Ou Assemelhado
1	Programador, Analista, Ou Outro Tecnico, No Processamento Eletronico De Dados
1	Diretor , Gerente Ou Proprietario, De Casa Comercial, Atacadista Ou Varejista, Exportadora Ou Importadora, Ou Assemelhado
1	Trabalhador Da Industria Quimica, Da Industria De Produtos Farmaceuticos, E Veterinarios, Da Industria De Perfumaria, Saboes E Velas, Da Industria De Produtos, De Materias Plasticas, Da Industria De Papel E Palelao, Ou Assemelhado
1	Arquiteto, Engenheiro, Agrimensor, Ou Assemelhado
1	Diretor , Gerente Ou Proprietario, De Estabelecimento Agricola Ou Pecuário, (Agricultor , Fazendeiro , Pecuaria), Ou Assemelhado
1	Artista, Ator, Musico, Ou Assemelhado
1	Escritor, Jornalista, Tradutor, Ou Assemelhado
1	Administrador Ou Funcionario Executivo, Da Administracao Publica, Direta Ou Indireta, (Inclusive Ocupante De Cargo Eletivo)
1	Biologo, Veterinario, Zootecnista, Agronomo, Ou Assemelhado
1	Dependente De Titular De Viper.
1	Medico, Cirurgiao, Dentista, Ou Assemelhado
1	Fotografo, Cinegrafista, Ou Assemelhado
1	Farmaceutico, Ou Assemelhado
1	Diretor , Gerente Ou Proprietario, De Hospital, De Empresas De Hotelaria, Fornecimento De Refeicoes, Turismo, Ou Assemelhado
1	Diretor , Gerente Ou Proprietario, De Industria De Empresa, De Construcão, De Eletricidade, De Gas, De Agua, De Esgotos, De Empresas De Exploracao, De Minas Ou Pedreiras, Ou Assemelhado

1	Sacerdote, Ou Membro Asselhado De Ordens, Ou Seitas Religiosas
1	Corretor Ou Agente De Seguros, Corretor Ou Agente De Imobiliario, Corretor, Agente De Venda De Servicos, Leiloeiro, Avaliador, Ou Assemelhado
1	Quimico, Fisico, Geologo, Ou Outro Especialista, Em Ciencias Fisicas
1	Jurista, Advogado, Magistrado, Promotor, Ou Assemelhado
1	Aeronauta, Piloto, Navegador, Comissario, Aeromoca, Mecamico, Ou Outro Trabalhador, Da Navegacao Aerea
1	Bibliotecario, Tecnico Arquivista, Ou Assemelhado
1	Diretor, Gerente Ou Proprietario, De Empresa De Transporte, Armazenagem, Comunicacoes, Producao Cinematografica, Ou Assemelhado
1	Policias, Delegado, Agente, Investigador, Escrivao, Perito, Papiloscopista, Ou Assemelhado
1	Publicitario, Profissional De Relacoes Publicas, Desenhista, Ou Assemelhado
1	Funcionario Diplomatico Estrangeiro, Adido Estrangeiro, Militar Estrangeiro, Ou Assemelhado
1	Psicologo, Analista, Sociologo, Assistente Social, Ou Assemelhado
1	Oficial, Piloto, Maquinista, Marinheiro, Ou Outro Trabalhador, Na Navegacao Maritima Ou Fluvial
1	Diretor, Gerente Ou Proprietario, Nao Classificado Sob Outra Demominacao
1	Capitalista, (Proprietario De Titulos Mobiliarios), Ou Assemelhado
1	Diretor , Gerente Ou Proprietario, De Estabelecimento Financeiro, De Seguros Ou Imobiliario, Incorporador, Ou Assemelhado
1	Embaixador, Diplomata, Ou Assemelhado
1	Militar Na Ativa
1	Ocupante De Cargo Legislativo, (Senador , Deputado Ou Vereador)
1	Tabeliao, Oficial De Cartorio, Oficial De Justica, Ou Assemelhado
1	Professor, Ou Assemelhado
1	Funcionario Publico Civil Ativo, Nao Classificado Sob Outra Ocupacao
2	Pedreiro, Servente, Ladrilheiro, Gesseiro, Vidraceiro, Ou Assemelhado, A Outro Trabalhador Da Construcão Civil, Nao Classificado Sob Outra Demominacao
2	Vendedor Ou Empregado De Casa Comercial, Comerciarior, Vendedor Ambulante, Vendedor A Domicilio, Jornaleiro, Ou Assemelhado
2	Menor (Crianca, Nao Estudante)
2	Trabalhador Agricola, Jardineiro, Ou Assemelhado, Agricultor, Lavrador
2	Padeiro, Cervejeiro, Acougueiro, Trabalhador Em Laticinios, Ou Outro Trabalhador, Na Producao De Alimentos Ou Bebidas
2	Cozinheiro, Mordomo, Governanta, Camareiro, Garcao, Ou Assemelhado
2	Prendas Domesticas (Lides Do Lar)
2	Decorador, Costureiro, Alfaiate, Modista, Peleteiro, Tapeceiro, Ou Assemelhado
2	Mecanico, Operador, Ajustador, Chapeador, Lanterneiro De Veiculos, Bombeiro Hidraulico, Encanador, Soldador, Galvanizador, Ou Outro Trabalhador Em Metais, Nao Classificado Sob Outra Denominacao
2	Barbeiro, Cabeleireiro, Esteticista, Especialista De Instituto De Beleza, Ou Assemelhado
2	Porteiro, Zelador, Ascensorista, Faxineiro, Empregado De Limpeza, Empregado Domestico, Ou Assemelhado
2	Vendedor Viajante, Propagandista, Representante Comercial, Comissionista, Ou Assemelhado
2	Industriario Ou Sevente, Nao Classificado Sob Outra Demominacao
2	Motorista, Condutor, Ou Outro Trabalhador, De Transporte Rodoviario
2	Eletricista, Mecanico Eletricista, Mecanico De Eletronica, Reparador De Aparelhos, De Radio E Televisao, De Instalacoes Telefonicas, E Telegraficas, Ou Assemelhado

Appendices

2	Pintor, Empapelador, Ou Assemelhado, Da Construção Civil De Conservação
2	Trabalhador Em Serviços De Esportes, Ou Diversões, Não Classificado Sob Outra Denominação
2	Carpinteiro, Marceneiro, Tanoeiro, Ou Assemelhado
2	Operador De Máquina Estacionária, De Guindaste, De Máquina De Terraplanagem, De Empilhadeira, Ou Outro Operador Assemelhado, Lubrificador Ou Graxeiro Dessas Máquinas
2	Trabalhador Da Fabricação, De Instrumentos Musicais, Artesão Ou Trabalhador, Dos Diversos Processos De Produção, Não Classificado Sob Outra Denominação
2	Trabalhador De Transporte, Ou Comunicações, Não Classificado Sob Outra Denominação
2	Lavadeiro, Limpador A Seco, Passador, Ou Assemelhado
2	Garimpeiros, Trabalhador De Minas Ou Pedreira, Beneficiador De Minerais, Perfurador De Pocos, Trabalhador Na Extração, De Gas Ou Petróleo, Ou Assemelhado
2	Proprietário Motorista, De Veículo De Transporte De Passageiros
2	Mecânico De Precisão, Relojoeiro, Joalheiro, Ourives, Ou Assemelhado
2	Proprietário Motorista, De Veículo De Transporte De Carga
2	Trabalhador Na Indústria Do Fumo
2	Pescador, Lenhador, Ou Assemelhado
2	Estivador, Carregador, Ou Assemelhado
2	Oleiro, Operador De Forno, Moldador De Vidro, De Argila, Ou Assemelhado
2	Tipógrafo, Compositor, Impressor, Linotipista, Operador De Máquina De Impressão, Gravador, Encardador, Ou Assemelhado
2	Empacotador, Etiquetador, Ou Assemelhado
2	Sapateiro, Correeiro, Cosedor De Couros, Ou Assemelhado
2	Atleta, Esportista, Ou Assemelhado
2	Fiandeiro, Tecelão, Tecelão De Malharia, Tintureiro, Ou Assemelhado
2	Caixa, Tesoureiro, Ou Assemelhado
2	Cobrador, Fiscal, Inspetor, Ou Assemelhado, Não Classificado Sob Outra Denominação
2	Maquinista, Foguista, Chefe De Trem, Chefe De Estação, Ou Outro Trabalhador, De Transporte Ferroviário Ou Metroviário
2	Carteiro, Mensageiro, Ou Assemelhado
2	Locutor, Radialista, Telepista, Radiotelegrafista, Telegrafista, Telefonista, Ou Assemelhado
2	Embalsamador, Ou Empregado De Empresa Funerária
2	Vulcanizador Ou Trabalhador, De Fabricação De Pneumática, Trabalhador Da Fabricação, De Instrumentos Musicais, Ou Outro Artesão, Ou Trabalhador, Dos Diversos Processos De Produção, Não Classificado Sob Outra Denominação
2	Fundidor, Laminador, Ferreiro, Trefilador, Ou Assemelhado Da Produção, E Tratamento De Metais
2	Empregado De Escritório, Secretário, Bancário Securitário, Econômico, Taquígrafo, Recepcionista, Mecanógrafo (Datilógrafo), Ou Assemelhado
2	Dependente De Titular De Vitem.
2	Patrulheiro, Vigia, Guarda, Bombeiro, Ou Assemelhado
1	Bolsista, Estagiário, Ou Assemelhado
2	Manequim, Modelo, Ou Assemelhado
	Outra Ocupação Não Classificada

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