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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

P144614

ON A

GRANT

**IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 29.1 MILLION
(US\$45 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE**

REPUBLIC OF HAITI

FOR A

**CULTURAL HERITAGE PRESERVATION AND TOURISM SECTOR SUPPORT
PROJECT**

March 19, 2023

Latin America And Caribbean Region

Urban, Resilience And Land Global Practice

Latin America And Caribbean Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective March 19, 2023)

Currency Unit = Haitian Gourde
HTG 1.00 = US\$ 0.0064
US\$1.00 = HTG 157

FISCAL YEAR

October 1 – September 30

Regional Vice President: Carlos Felipe Jaramillo

Country Director: Lilia Burunciuc

Regional Director: Anna Wellenstein

Practice Manager: David N. Sislen

Task Team Leader(s): Alexandra Ortiz

ICR Main Contributor: Doekle Wielinga

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AGP/PMA	Autorité de Gestion du Parc National / Park Management Authority
CERC	Contingency Emergency Recovery Component
CIAT	Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement du Territoire/Interministerial Committee for Territorial Planning
CPF	Country Partnership Framework
CHUD	Cap-Haïtien Urban Development Project
E&S	Environmental and Social
ERR	Economic Rate of Return
FCV	Fragility, Conflict, and Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoH	Gouvernement de Haïti / Government of Haiti
GRM	Grievance Redress Mechanism
HEIS	Hands-on Expanded Implementation Support
IDA	International Development Association
ICOMOS	International Council on Monuments and Sites
ICR	Implementation Completion and Results Report
IFR	Interim Financial Reports
ISPAN	Institut de Sauvegarde du Patrimoine National - National Cultural Heritage Institute
ISR	Interim Status Report
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MEF	Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances / Ministry of Economy and Finance
MC	Ministère de la Culture / Ministry of Culture
MDUR	Municipal Development and Urban Resilience Project
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MS	Moderately Satisfactory
MT	Ministère du Tourisme / Ministry of Tourism
MU	Moderately Unsatisfactory
NPV	Net Present Value
OGDNH / DMO	Organisation de Gestion de la Destination du Nord d'Haïti - Destination Management Organization
OP	
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
P-AGP	Provisional Autorité de Gestion Provisoire du Parc National / Provisional Park Management Authority
PaP	Port au Prince
PAP	Personnes Affectées par le Projet / Project Affected People
PAST	Projet de Préservation du Patrimoine et d'Appui au Secteur Touristique
PDO	Project Development Objective
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PLR	Performance and Learning Review
PMP	Park Management Plan
PNH-CSSR	Parc National Historique Citadelle-Sans Souci-Ramiers - National History Park

RCCL	Royal Caribbean Cruise Line
SC	Steering Committee
SRP	Summary Resettlement Plans
TA	Technical Assistance
TOC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UTE	Unité Technique d'Exécution - Technical Implementation Unit
WHC	World Heritage Committee

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**DATA SHEET****BASIC INFORMATION****Product Information**

Project ID	Project Name
P144614	Cultural Heritage Preservation and Tourism Sector Support Project
Country	Financing Instrument
Haiti	Investment Project Financing
Original EA Category	Revised EA Category
Partial Assessment (B)	Partial Assessment (B)

Organizations

Borrower	Implementing Agency
Republic of Haiti	UNITE TECHNIQUE D'EXECUTION

Project Development Objective (PDO)

Original PDO

The objectives of the Project are to: (a) increase the attractiveness of the cultural heritage sites in North of Haiti for tourists; (b) improve the living environment for the residents living in North of Haiti; and (c) support the Recipient's capacity to respond promptly and effectively to an Eligible Emergency, as needed.



FINANCING

	Original Amount (US\$)	Revised Amount (US\$)	Actual Disbursed (US\$)
World Bank Financing			
IDA-H9440	45,000,000	26,150,000	17,843,118
Total	45,000,000	26,150,000	17,843,118
Non-World Bank Financing			
Borrower/Recipient	0	0	0
Total	0	0	0
Total Project Cost	45,000,000	26,150,000	17,843,118

KEY DATES

Approval	Effectiveness	MTR Review	Original Closing	Actual Closing
19-May-2014	06-Oct-2014	29-Jan-2018	31-Aug-2020	29-Jul-2022

RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING

Date(s)	Amount Disbursed (US\$M)	Key Revisions
30-Jun-2017	5.85	Change in Results Framework Change in Implementation Schedule
29-Jun-2018	5.85	Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Reallocation between Disbursement Categories Change in Procurement
06-Jun-2020	12.54	Cancellation of Financing Reallocation between Disbursement Categories
27-Aug-2020	12.54	Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Change in Loan Closing Date(s) Cancellation of Financing Reallocation between Disbursement Categories Change in Implementation Schedule
09-Oct-2021	15.84	Reallocation between Disbursement Categories
04-Mar-2022	15.84	Cancellation of Financing Reallocation between Disbursement Categories



KEY RATINGS

Outcome	Bank Performance	M&E Quality
Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Modest

RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO Rating	IP Rating	Actual Disbursements (US\$M)
01	27-Aug-2014	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	.90
02	25-Mar-2015	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	2.32
03	07-Sep-2015	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	2.32
04	30-Jun-2016	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	3.85
05	06-Jan-2017	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	3.85
06	30-Jun-2017	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	5.85
07	30-Dec-2017	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	5.85
08	27-Jun-2018	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	5.85
09	19-Nov-2018	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	8.85
10	14-Jun-2019	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	11.85
11	08-Jan-2020	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	12.54
12	21-Jun-2020	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	12.54
13	23-Dec-2020	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	12.54
14	30-Jun-2021	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	14.79
15	20-Dec-2021	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	15.84
16	29-Jul-2022	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	17.84



SECTORS AND THEMES

Sectors

Major Sector/Sector	(%)
Public Administration	17
Other Public Administration	17
Social Protection	66
Social Protection	66
Water, Sanitation and Waste Management	6
Other Water Supply, Sanitation and Waste Management	6
Industry, Trade and Services	11
Public Administration - Industry, Trade and Services	5
Trade	6

Themes

Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3)	(%)
Private Sector Development	100
Jobs	100
Finance	2
Finance for Development	2
Disaster Risk Finance	2
Public Sector Management	4
Public Administration	4
Administrative and Civil Service Reform	1
Municipal Institution Building	3



Urban and Rural Development	96
Urban Development	19
Urban Infrastructure and Service Delivery	19
Cultural Heritage	71
Disaster Risk Management	6
Disaster Response and Recovery	2
Disaster Risk Reduction	2
Disaster Preparedness	2

ADM STAFF

Role	At Approval	At ICR
Regional Vice President:	Hasan A. Tuluy	Carlos Felipe Jaramillo
Country Director:	Mary A. Barton-Dock	Lilia Burunciuc
Director:	Ede Jorge Ijjasz-Vasquez	Anna Wellenstein
Practice Manager:	Anna Wellenstein	David N. Sislen
Task Team Leader(s):	Sylvie Debomy	Alexandra Ortiz
ICR Contributing Author:		Doekle Geert Wielinga



I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL

Context

Country Context

1. Known as the “Pearl of the Antilles,” Haiti was the most sought-after tourist destination in the Caribbean, alongside Cuba, in the middle of the 20th Century. In 2014, with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of US\$771 (2012), and the unenviable label of “poorest country in the Americas”, the nation was recovering from the devastating earthquake of January 2010 and striving to develop new sources of growth for its economy.
2. At appraisal, the country was still recovering from the massive impact of the 2010 earthquake that resulted in damages and losses of US\$7.9 billion (120 percent of GDP), with reconstruction needs being estimated at US\$11.3 billion. Nevertheless, four years after the earthquake, Haiti’s economy had improved. Growth was estimated to have reached four percent in FY13, up from 2.8 percent observed in FY12. This was due to a pick-up in agricultural production, construction, and the industrial sector, as well as an improvement in security indicators. Despite substantial residual challenges, Government efforts aimed to improve climate investment and encourage entrepreneurship, as well as public-private partnerships for infrastructure. Due to its strong labor supply and its proximity to the United States, allowing shipping and travel, Haiti had the potential to attract new investments in agribusiness, apparel, and tourism, as well as establish a platform for longer-term development.
3. Although developing tourism in Haiti was perceived as a challenge, the country captured the imagination of many, and interest in traveling there was growing. Haiti had advantages, which positioned it favorably to redevelop its tourism industry: the extraordinary natural beauty of its coastline; its proximity to large French, English, and Spanish language tourism markets; its rich cultural heritage and vibrant, artistic culture; and several physically impressive sites of historical significance for Haitian, Caribbean, and world heritage. The symbolic value of such sites as the location of the first landing of Christopher Columbus in the Americas and the first successful national liberation of slaves and establishment of an independent government by emancipated people of color are of universal appeal.
4. The historic monuments in the vicinity of Cap Haïtien, the second largest city in the country, represent Haiti’s history and cultural heritage and the pride of its people. The Project, approved in 2014 was considered a priority as it was designed to rehabilitate the Citadelle Henri-Ramiers, considered the largest fortress in the Americas, the Sans Souci Palace ruins, and the Royal Chapelle, located within the National Historical Park, (PNH-CSSR - Parc National Historique Citadelle-Sans Souci-Ramiers), all of which were declared World Heritage by United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1982¹. Furthermore, Cap Haïtien and its surroundings had considerable potential for tourism and economic development. This includes the Port of

¹ See Annex 6 for photos of the three main historic monuments



Labadie, which is a private resort leased to Royal Caribbean Group for the exclusive use of passengers of its three cruise lines: Royal Caribbean International, Celebrity Cruises, and Azamara Club Cruises, until 2050.

Sectoral and Institutional Context

5. A period of political stability and a sense of optimism to develop Haiti took place during the post-earthquake time. This was captured in “Haiti Tomorrow,” formulated by the Inter-ministerial Committee on Territorial Planning (CIAT), which had as its objective to transform the 2010 earthquake into an opportunity through forms of regional solidarity along three axes: the Northern region, the Capital region, and the Southern region.
6. The North had strong potential for regional development through tourism. It benefits from world-class cultural and natural heritage assets, providing solid building blocks for tourism development. For example, the annual Patron Saint festivals, under normal circumstances, typically attract one million domestic and international visitors between June and September each year.
7. Demand for tourism in the North region was growing. Around 56 percent of tourists in Haiti came from the Haitian Diaspora and the US would generate the largest share of visitors to Haiti, followed by Canada and the Dominican Republic. The US Travel Warning for Haiti were revised on August 13, 2013, as well as the Travel Advisory for Canadians, where the North as a regional destination was not identified as an area of high risk. The figures collected by the Ministère du Tourisme / Ministry of Tourism (MT) for 2013 showed an average of 2,800 visitors per month to the PNH-CSSR, one of the North’s main tourism attractions, with a conservative projection of 30,000 visitors for 2013. Receipts from international tourists in the North were US\$312 million in 2009, which accounted for about 34 percent of the value of Haiti’s total service exports and 8 percent of GDP that year.
8. The 2014’s Administration was the first government to actively support tourism as a driver of growth. The MT pursued regionally based tourism development of three regions including the North coast, based on the 2013-2014 Tourism Strategy. Actions by the Haitian public and private sector reflected the priority given to the development of the North as a tourist destination. The MT worked with the private sector to improve existing hospitality and convention facilities, as well as to construct new hospitality training centers. The FY14 budget of the MT was increased by 26 percent, and various investments were made in and around the National History Park (PNH-CSSR - Parc National Historique Citadelle-Sans Souci-Ramiers), including the recruitment of staff to work on touristic sites. In addition, the North region received several large international investments, laying the foundations for the effective development of tourism.
9. Conservation and management of cultural heritage were seen as of paramount importance for the sustainable development of tourism. The 2010 earthquake further highlighted the vulnerability of physical heritage assets and the need to prevent irreversible destruction through preventive structural reinforcement. The World Heritage Committee (WHC) highlighted the extreme vulnerability of the PNH-CSSR and the Citadel to seismic risk, with a need to intervene with both short-term emergency response and long-term protective actions to improve the seismic resilience of vulnerable assets. In such a context, the management of the PNH-CSSR was key for the sustainable development of tourism in the North. As a first step toward the establishment of a Park Management Authority (AGP - Autorité de Gestion du Parc National), the Government created an inter-ministerial committee to coordinate the activities of the main government agencies involved in the preservation of cultural heritage sites.




10. To develop the North, the Bank partnered with multiple entities allowing for a coordinated investment program to rebalance the economy. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) focused industrial development of the industrial park Caracol, developing a textile growth pole, water and sanitation, and solid waste management in Cap Haïtien. The US aimed to invest in the development of the port, while the Bank focused on transport, urban development, cultural heritage preservation, and tourism development. The transport projects, among others, connected Cap Haïtien to the center of the country and to Milot, where the entrance to the PNH-CSSR is located. The municipal and urban resilience project focused on reducing urban flooding and access to municipal infrastructure. The Cultural Heritage Preservation and Tourism Sector Support Project (Projet de Préservation du Patrimoine et d'Appui au Secteur Touristique - PAST) would complement this by enhancing the main attraction of the North: the national park and its monuments and promoting tourism development by strengthening tourism-related services and infrastructure.

Theory of Change

11. A Theory of Change (TOC) was not required at appraisal. This Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) extrapolated the TOC from the Results Framework of the Project Appraisal Document (PAD), to show the causal relationship between activities, outputs, outcomes, and the impact (Figure 1).
12. Critical assumptions were derived from the risks identified at appraisal and include:
- 1) No major political crisis hinders the implementation of the Project;
 - 2) The Government of Haiti (GoH) maintains the Steering Committee (SC), ensuring the proper coordination and execution throughout project implementation;
 - 3) Community consultation and information processes are properly and largely implemented; and
 - 4) Appropriate capacities of implementation partners to ensure high-quality rehabilitation works of cultural heritage sites.



Figure 1: Theory of Change for the PAST Project



Project Development Objectives

13. The original Project Development Objective (PDO), as stated in the Financing Agreement, approved on April 22, 2014, and the PAD was to: (a) increase the attractiveness of the cultural heritage sites in North of Haiti for tourists; (b) improve the living environment for the residents living in North of Haiti; and (c) support the recipient's capacity to respond promptly and effectively to an eligible emergency, as needed.

14. No revisions to the PDO were made throughout the Project.



Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators

15. These objectives were envisaged to be achieved through (a) physical investments to improve resilience, restore, conserve, and beautify heritage assets and to upgrade local infrastructure; (b) support capacity for the management of the PNH-CSSR and cultural assets, as well as to promote sound tourism development; and (c) a provision to access funds to respond promptly and effectively to an eligible emergency.
16. Achievement of the PDO was originally measured through the following outcome indicators:
 - a) Rehabilitated buildings resistant to an 8.5 magnitude seismic event;
 - b) An effective park management system is contributing to the sustainable development of the PNH-CSSR;
 - c) Population in project areas satisfied with the quality of infrastructure financed by the Project;
 - d) Increase the number of entries at the PNH-CSSR (of which from the Royal Caribbean Cruise Line (RCCL); and
 - e) Increase the number of entities providing tourism and cultural services.

Components

17. The Project included five components with a range of activities aimed to achieve the PDO:
 - **Component A – Physical cultural heritage sites and touristic circuits in the PNH-CSSR and Cap-Haïtien historic city center** (US\$28 million, US\$ 16.95 million at closing). The main activities consisted of (a) physical investments in the PNH-CSSR, (b) support to the management of the PNH-CSSR; physical Investments in Cap-Haïtien Historic City Center, and (c) capacity building for the Institut de Sauvegarde du Patrimoine National - National Cultural Heritage Institute (ISPAN).
 - **Component B - Local investments in Dondon, Milot, and Cap-Haïtien** (US\$7 million, US\$5 million at closing). This component financed (a) investments, (b) urban studies, and (c) Technical Assistance (TA) to municipalities.
 - **Component C – Inclusive tourism sector development support** (US\$4 million). This component provided (a) support to the MT and the Destination Management Organization (OGDNH - Organisation de Gestion de la Destination du Nord d’Haïti), and (b) a community event and tourism development grant.
 - **Component D - Contingent Emergency Response** (US\$1 million). This component was included to support an eligible emergency response as needed.
 - **Component E - Project implementation, monitoring, and evaluation** (US\$5 million). This component supported (a) Project Implementation, and (b) Monitoring and Evaluation.



B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION

Revised PDO Indicators and Outcome Targets

18. The PDO was not revised throughout the project implementation. The outcome target values for all four PDO indicators were adjusted during the June 2018 Mid-Term Review and August 2020 restructurings. The intermediate results and indicators were also revised during these restructurings to set more realistic targets.
19. Table 1 provides details on how the indicators and targets were adjusted throughout the life of the Project, Annex 1 provides the Project Results Framework and Outputs, including original and revised targets.

Table 1: Revised PDO and Intermediate Outcome Indicators and Targets

Original		Revised	Revised Target		Rationale
PDO Indicators	Target	Indicator	2018	2020	
Rehabilitated CH building resistant to a 8.5 magnitude seismic event	80%	2018: % to number; 2020: Number of restored buildings with increased resistance to seismic events	4	1	Setting a realistic target. Previous delays made it impossible to reach the original target
Tickets sold annually to the PNH-CSSR	16,750		16,850		
of which sold to RCCL visitors	4,400	Dropped in 2018			Logistics and safety of cruise ship customers to visit PNH-CSSR was unachievable
Entities providing cultural and tourism services in the project areas	370		350	288	Setting realistic goals and reduced scope under Component C
Direct Project Beneficiaries (of which women)	35,000 (40%)		35,000 (35%)		Setting realistic goals
Intermediate Indicators					
New: An Interim Authority (Autorité de Gestion Provisoire (AGP) with staffing acceptable to IDA is established in the PNH-CSSR					To accelerate implementation. Due to considerable delays in the creation of a Permanent Management Authority it was decided to create an interim authority.
New: The Interim Authority Established in the Park adopts a work program for the Haitian FY 2017-2018 and implements such action plan starting in October 2018.		Dropped in August 2020			The activity is encompassed within another indicator: An interim authority (Autorité de Gestion Provisoire) with staffing acceptable to IDA is established in the PNH-CSSR
Heritage Sites restored enhanced and open to public	29,800 sq.m	Dropped in 2020	14,900 sq.m		Setting realistic goals at that stage of the project. Dropped due to complexity of data collection and the reduced scope of activities under Component A.
Streetscapes upgraded in project target areas	300 meters		150 meters		Setting realistic goals at that stage of the project.
Touristic routes developed and promoted through project investments/activities	5		2		Setting realistic goals at that stage of the project.
Activities supported by the Community Event & Tourism Development Grants (of which are women)	100 (40%)		60 (25%)	40 (25%)	Setting realistic goals at that stage of the project. Reduced scope under Component C
Infrastructure properly operated and maintained following project financing (US\$ million)	5	2020: Infrastructure properly operated and maintained following project financing (number)		3	Setting realistic goals at that stage of the project. Reduced scope under Component B



Revised PDO Indicators

20. The PDO-level Indicator “Rehabilitated CH building resistant to a 8 magnitude event” was reformulated to: “Number of restored buildings with increased resistance against seismic events”, to make the indicator more specific and measurable.
21. The PDO Indicator “Tickets sold to the PNH-CSSR” included a sub-indicator “of which sold to RCCL visitors”. This was dropped after the 2018 restructuring, as the cruise ship company’s requirements for logistics and safety of their customers were unachievable and therefore, they were not able to visit the PNH-CSSR.

Revised Components

22. No revisions to the original components occurred during the life of the Project, other than changes in the component costs:
 - 1) Component A was reduced from US\$28 million to US\$16.95 million, through three restructurings: (a) June 2020 - US\$3.3 million equivalent for COVID-19 response; (b) August 2020 - US\$7.75 million due to dropped activities (rehabilitation of monuments in the PNH-CSSR and second phase of façades in streets of Cap Haitian); and (c) March 2022 – US\$1.5 due to a dropped activity (rehabilitation of Ancienne Capitainerie).
 - 2) Component B was reduced from US\$7 to US\$5 million as part of the June 2020 restructuring (COVID-19) and in August 2020 several activities were dropped (health center in Matador, artisanal production center in Milot, and works and supervision on the Picolet waterfront and the coastal forts).
 - 3) The March 2022 restructuring canceled US\$4.3 million, corresponding to savings in different activities. Since all disbursement categories by then were merged into one, it was not possible to attribute this to specific components, except for US\$1.5 million to Component A, referenced above.

Restructurings

23. The Project underwent six Level 2 restructurings: this included changes in the results framework (3), cancellation of funds (3), and extension of the closing date (1):

Restructurings 1 and 2 – 2017, 2018

24. These two restructurings were planned as a sequence to address the significant delays that the Project faced in the rehabilitation of cultural heritage sites and establishing proper management of the PNH-CSSR. June 2017 introduced concrete objectives to achieve the interim management of the park through a Provisional Park Management Authority (P-AGP) and consequently added two new intermediary indicators to the Project’s results framework. These intermediary indicators were: (a) establish a P-AGP in charge of implementing, and (b) prepare and adopt an appropriate work program of conservation and consultation activities in the PNH-CSSR, where most of the Project’s investments were to take place. This included a work plan to establish a permanent AGP by 2018 and included changes to the implementation arrangements and results framework to accelerate the implementation of the Project. Following the Mid-Term Review in January of 2018, the second of the two restructurings envisaged by the Bank and the Government of Haiti to ensure the acceleration of the implementation of the PAST Project took place, given the lack of tangible results. The restructuring included



dropping activities under Component A, whilst reinforcing some activities that supported the Project (safeguards and communications). This required a reallocation of funds, and in addition, some indicators were modified to set realistic goals at that stage of the Project and align procurement with the Bank's new framework.

Restructuring 3 – 2020

25. The June 2020 restructuring consisted of a cancellation of US\$5.3 million to mobilize resources to support the GoH in its response to the COVID-19 crisis under a different Bank operation. To facilitate this process, the restructuring included the creation of a new disbursement category and the reallocation of all uncommitted funds to that category.

Restructuring 4 – 2020

26. This second restructuring in 2020 followed a reduction of activities under Component A, given the delays encountered in the preparation of technical documents and the impossibility of foreign firms to start work on the Project site due to COVID-19 restrictions. This restructuring included the cancellation of US\$7.75 million to simplify the Project activities and provide a 23-month extension to the closing date, from August 31, 2020, to July 31, 2022.

Restructuring 5 – 2021

27. This restructuring, effectuated in October of 2021, was necessary to create a new disbursement category to finance the Project's originally unforeseen resettlement, linked to the upgrading of façades in two main streets of Cap Haïtien's city center, due to central government level difficulties in making funds available.

Restructuring 6 – 2022

28. This restructuring, taking place four months before closing of the Project, saw the cancellation of a further US\$5.8 million. This included US\$1.5 million, by dropping the rehabilitation Ancienne Capitainerie under Component A. The Ancienne Capitainerie rehabilitation works were scheduled to be completed in early 2022, contingent upon a successful call for bids. However, due to the latter being unsuccessful, it became impossible to complete the works. The remaining US\$4.3 million corresponds to savings made on different activities, as these would not be utilized by the Project closing date.

29. In summary, the PAST was extended by 23 months, and its grant amount was reduced from US\$45 million to US\$26.15 million, a reduction of 42 percent.

Rationale for Changes and Their Implication on the Original TOC

30. Since its effectiveness on October 6, 2014, the Project encountered a number of implementation challenges which included endogenous factors such as limited technical and fiduciary capacity within many of the participating agencies, complex institutional arrangements, and too many activities to conduct. Exogenous factors most notably include the deterioration of the political and socio-economic situation of the country and the COVID-19 pandemic.

31. The rationale for changes to the Project was to simplify it, set more realistic goals and targets, align it with the capacity of the implementing agencies, accelerate implementation by focusing on better-functioning components, strengthen project management, continue to monitor project progress, allow financing of potential



resettlement, and to contribute to COVID-19 recovery response. The rationale for the Project closing date extension was to allow for time to complete infrastructure works and ongoing Community Fund projects. This resulted in a reduction of the scope of the Project, specifically of outputs related to the restoration of cultural heritage sites and monuments under Component A.

32. The implication to the TOC is considerable in that one of the development outcomes, “increased attractiveness of the cultural heritage sites in North of Haiti for tourists,” and therefore also the Project’s overall impact, was much harder to achieve. The second development outcome: “Improved living conditions for the residents in the North of Haiti” was also affected, although less drastically, by a reduction of several outputs, such as dropping three solid waste management studies, canceling the restoration of the Cultural Center in Milot, and reducing the number of tourist routes and circuits. This meant, although to a lesser extent than the first development outcome, that the impact of the Project was reduced.

II. OUTCOME

A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs

Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating

Rating: Substantial

33. Haiti’s current Bank engagement is based on the Country Partnership Framework (CPF) FY2016–21 (98132-HT), which has been enhanced with a Performance and Learning Review (PLR). The PDO remains consistent with this CPF as it contributes to three of its focus areas: enhancing inclusive growth by promoting development in the north of Haiti; strengthening resilience by earthquake-proofing cultural heritage and buildings; and improving governance in the management of the PNH-CSSR and by strengthening agencies managing tourism and cultural heritage.
34. At closing, the PDO remained relevant to Haiti’s development challenges and aligned with the priorities of the Government of Haiti and the Bank the Development Objectives: ‘to improve the living environment for the residents living in North of Haiti’, and ‘support the recipient’s capacity to respond promptly and effectively to an eligible emergency, as needed’.
35. These two PDOs also remained relevant to the adjustments made to the CPF, following the PLR, in particular to (a) the introduction, where relevant, of a territorial approach to investments to foster economic opportunities outside of Port au Prince (PaP), and more equitable and balanced growth, in collaboration with the private sector; and (b) further strengthening of the program’s robust approach to resilience. In July 2022, the GoH requested a follow-up project to the PAST, illustrating the relevance it saw in continuing project activities.
36. The Development Objective to: ‘increase the attractiveness of the cultural heritage sites in the North of Haiti for tourists’, has become less relevant due to the escalation of political and social issues in the country during the implementation period of the Project, exacerbated by the COVID019 pandemic, which has significantly reduced



international tourism and increased the need for more basic needs being addressed, such as food and health security. However, the potential to use these assets as a driver of development remains relevant.

37. In a high-risk environment like Haiti, there is a tendency to simplify project design. In this case, this project was ambitious in objective and design, taking informed risk to support medium- to long term development goals and create regional development opportunities and contribute to Haiti's cultural identity, and therefore remained relevant to the portfolio.
38. Given that two the PDO remains relevant, its rating is Substantial.

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs

Rating: Modest

Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome

39. The achievement of the PDO is assessed against the outcome targets confirmed in the August 2020 restructuring and is unpacked along the lines of the three distinct outcomes:
- 1) Increase the attractiveness of the cultural heritage sites in the North of Haiti for tourists
 - 2) Improve the living environment for the residents living in the North of Haiti
 - 3) Support the recipient's capacity to respond promptly and effectively to an eligible emergency, as needed.
40. It was decided not to apply the split rating method. There were changes to one outcome indicator and its' outcome targets, which were revised downwards. However, when comparing the results of the approach followed here and the split rating method, the overall Outcome rating would be the same.
41. Despite the impact of the country's social and political instability, the Project was able to complete: (a) the urgent conservation works in the Citadelle Henri, (b) the UNESCO studies for the management of the PNH-CSSR, which was submitted to the World Heritage Center; (c) the works to upgrade the façades of Rue 16 and 20; (d) the ISPAN documentation center; and (e) 47 community subprojects contributing to either cultural heritage or tourism in the Cap Haitian area, were implemented and financed. Other project accomplishments include the provision of public spaces and the completion of the preliminary phases of technical studies for the rehabilitation, seismic reinforcement, and museology of the monuments.
- 42. The Project was only partially able to Increase the attractiveness of the cultural heritage sites in North of Haiti for tourists:**
- 4) Apart from emergency repairs to the parts of Citadelle Henri, the Project did not restore any of the three monuments or four historic buildings to increase resistance to seismic events as envisaged. However, diagnostic studies for the rehabilitation of the monuments were developed. From its effectiveness in October 2014 to mid-2016, no measurable progress was made. The Mid-Term Review (MTR) of January 2018 identified the complexity of the Project and the lack of capacity in ISPAN as problems. As a result of the March 2018 restructuring, the rehabilitation of the old prison, Maison Anténor Firmin and the Alliance Française were



dropped. Given cumulative delays in the execution of the Project, at restructuring in August 2021, it was agreed that the only historic building that would be upgraded would be the Ancienne Capitainerie. This activity was dropped from the Project in March 2022 after delays in the procurement of a construction firm made it impossible to complete before the Project closing. The detailed studies for the rehabilitation of the monuments, Palais Sans Soucie and Citadelle Henri-Ramiers were completed, while the final studies were dropped. In one case this was because of the hired international firm not being able to travel to Haiti, first because of COVID-19 restrictions and later because of the deteriorated security situation in Haiti. Annex 9 provides a comprehensive list of studies and reports that were produced by the Project.

- 5) Lacking an AGP, the Project supported the P-AGP, which was installed in 2018 and was fully operational. However, the permanent AGP was never created, putting the sustainability of an effective Park Management System, contributing to the sustainable development of the PNH-CSSR, into question. The Minister of Culture (MC) appointed a liaison agent charged with the task of developing the AGP, who left when there was a change of Government in 2020. It took time to find a new liaison, leaving no time to legally create the permanent AGP leaving this task incomplete.
- 6) Originally planned for 2018, the PNH-CSSR Management Plan (PMP) was completed by ISPAN in May 2022, with support from International Council of Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) experts. By the time of writing this ICR, it was confirmed by the GoH and UNESCO that the PMP was received and approved by WHC. This allows the monuments to remain World Heritage sites and presents the GoH with the task to implement the PMP. Despite this, the PMP is not being implemented given the lack of a functioning AGP.
- 7) Tickets sold annually to the PNH-CSSR. The P-AGP estimated in June of 2022 that 10,500 tickets were sold, while the target was to reach 16,850. Both COVID-19 and the deteriorating security situation have negatively affected the tourist arrivals to the PNH-CSSR. During the height of the pandemic, international flights to Cap Haïtien were suspended as well as RCCL calls to Labadie. The cruise line resumed its visits to Labadie in early 2022 but suspended these again in October 2022. However, the assumption that cruise line tourists would be able to visit the PNH-CSSR and the monuments never became a reality, given logistical and security constraints. In addition, only a few international airlines, mainly budget carriers, have resumed flights into Cap Haïtien, which previously would have included major airlines, such as Delta, American Airlines, and United Airlines.
43. In addition to the outputs and outcomes mentioned, ISPAN's documentation center was constructed, inaugurated by the Project, and is fully functional. This center has also received support from the Florida International University, in the form of computer equipment and software, and TA, which enhances the center's ability to document and retain the work conducted under the Project related to the cultural heritage sites, in terms of studies and reports generated.
44. As detailed above, increasing the attractiveness of the cultural heritage sites as measured through these five indicators has only been partially achieved. The management capacity of the park was temporarily improved allowing for studies and plans to be prepared. However, this was not continued or formalized after the project closure. Despite this, there was inadequate implementation indicated by the lack of a substantial increase in ticket sales to the PNH-CSSR.



45. Despite partial and full achievements during project implementation under this outcome, the Project was not able to fully reach its development objective of increasing the attractiveness of the cultural heritage sites in North of Haiti for tourists.

46. The living environment for the residents living in the North of Haiti improved as result of the Project:

- 1) The Project is estimated to have directly benefitted 63,500 people, which is 181 percent over the target of 35,000. The estimate is based on the total urban population of Milot and Dondon, plus the population living on Rues 16 and 20 in Cap Haïtien, who would benefit from the upgraded public squares and the improved streetscapes. Thirty-five percent of the direct beneficiaries are estimated to be women, meeting the target. It was further estimated that 7,367 people benefitted from the Community Event & Tourism Development Grants.
- 2) In the target areas of Milot, Dondon, and Cap Haïtien, streetscapes totaling 2.7 kilometers were upgraded, which is more than the 150 meters envisaged by the Project. In total, 70 meters were upgraded in Milot; 1,200 meters on Rue 16; and 1,400 meters of Rue 20 in Cap Haïtien².
- 3) It was estimated that 256 businesses (out of a target of 288) were providing cultural and tourism services, of which up to 47 benefitted from Community Event & Tourism Development Grants and improved upgraded urban infrastructure and facades. These include hotels and guesthouses, restaurants and enterprises providing other touristic and cultural services. Twenty-five percent of the beneficiaries were women and 25 percent were youth. Of these grants, 24 promoted handicrafts, cultural activities, or entertainment, such as music, theatre, and painting; 7 grants supported food processing, like manioc and chocolate, and Haitian cuisine; another 13 grants financed the upgrade and maintenance of tourist sites and destinations, while 3 grants supported transport and tour guides. Annex 8 provides a complete list of the 47 sub-projects financed by the Project. Due to COVID-19 and the reduced tourist arrivals, some of these businesses may have closed either temporarily or permanently. It was not possible to obtain updated information on the status of these businesses.
- 4) One touristic route was developed out of the two that were planned: The route from Sans-Souci to Choiseul was completed, and a tourist circuit that includes Rues 16 and 20 was proposed.
- 5) A 2022 survey by UTE3 found that 75 percent of the 1,728 respondents living in Milot, Dondon and Cap Haïtien were satisfied with the infrastructure that the Project has provided, in line with the target. Respondents identified contributions, such as the promotion of tourism in the North, projects that financed cultural activities, the rehabilitation of public squares in Milot and Dondon, and the strengthening of OGDNH, which according to one of the key informants created opportunities and jobs in the project areas. In addition, according to respondents, the Communal Consultation Tables, structures that already existed before the Project, have enabled better integration and representation of the population, particularly youth and women.

47. The Project rehabilitated Place de Milot, Place de Dondon, along with the improvement of Streets 16 and 21, and implemented the Community Fund, with a total of 47 subprojects being finalized. It was not able however to

² See Annex 7 for photos of the urban upgrading carried out by the Project

³ Etude de ligne de base et de la situation actuelle du projet PAST, MEF, UTE, 2022



advance on the solid waste activities. The Project mostly reached its development objective to improve the living environment for the residents in the North of Haiti.

48. **The project provided the Recipient the capacity to respond promptly and effectively to an Eligible Emergency, as needed.** This consisted of a CERC of US\$1 million to support an eligible emergency response as needed and as a mechanism for rapid response in the event of an eligible emergency, subject to the request of the GoH.
49. There was no indicator developed for this PDO. It was therefore not possible to monitor its progress. Such components, which include triggers and conditions for the use of funds, were included in most investment projects in Haiti in keeping with the recommendations of the 2011 World Development Report on Conflict, Security, and Development and with the operational experience acquired in Haiti since the 2010 earthquake.
50. In 2017, following Hurricanes Irma and Maria, the consideration to trigger this Component took place, however, due to the minor impact of these hurricanes on the project area, it was decided not to activate the CERC. Similarly, during the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2021 earthquake, these funds were also not triggered, instead, funds for COVID-19 response were freed through the June 2020 restructuring.
51. Although there was a provision to reallocate these funds if not disbursed 24 months before the closing date, this was not initiated. The Project team decided to keep this contingency in case there would be a need to use it. There was also no need to finance activities under the other Project components. Overall, the availability of this contingent financing mechanism to be triggered in case of rapid response to an eligible emergency, supported the government's capacity to respond promptly and effectively to the emergency.

Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating

52. The Project partially achieved its Development Objectives, particularly in contributing to a better living environment for the population in the project area. However, not increasing the attractiveness of the cultural heritage sites for tourists carries more weight than the achievements made under the second part of the PDO. PDO 3 was not triggered, therefore has not been considered in the overall rating. The PDO achievement is therefore rated Modest.

C. EFFICIENCY

Assessment of Efficiency and Rating

Economic Analysis

53. The Project's ex-ante economic analysis was based on Component A only, with a cost of US\$28 million. The estimation was an Economic Rate of Return (ERR) of 39 percent, and a Net Present Value (NPV) of US\$18 million, considering conservative estimates of tourist inflows, their associated expenditures, a time horizon of 10 years (five years beyond the Project's end), and a discount rate of 10 percent. External factors, such as the pandemic and the deteriorated security situation harmed tourist inflows, the principal factor used in the economic analysis. Component A's budget was also reduced through several restructurings, from US\$28 million to US\$16.95 million,



with an estimated disbursement of 37 percent. Applying the same model, with the data available at the end of the Project, presents an ERR of plus one percent and the NPV is negative US\$14.6 million.

54. The economic model used to evaluate the Project during appraisal has significant limitations. It is a financial cost-benefit analysis that relied on tourist arrivals and expenditure data. Overall tourist figures for 2015 were especially high, and therefore did not represent the underlying tendency, skewing the output of the model, which uses 2015 as a base year to calculate the NPV and ERR. Tourist exit surveys would have been conducted by the Project to estimate the average spending of tourists, as well as other qualitative data, but this data was not available for this analysis. Furthermore, the larger dataset of overall tourists coming to Haiti⁴ showed that annual tourist figures do not follow a clear trend and that visitor numbers are erratic, limiting the assumptions that could be made for analysis.
55. The consideration to expand the ex-ante model to include economic and social considerations was made, but the lack of reliable data made this impossible. Also considered was to create a different ex-post model, by using the Cap-Haïtien Urban Development Project (CHUD) 2022 baseline data on housing prices⁵. House price data would have provided a more relevant analysis if a comparable dataset had been available at the beginning to determine the impact of the PAST's urban upgrading.
56. Without relying too heavily on the results of the ex-post economic analysis, given the data limitations, it is clear the Project did not provide the benefits it envisaged. The rating is therefore Negligible.

Administrative and Operational Efficiency

57. The PAST project implementation was affected by both internal and external factors. On the one hand, the very sophisticated field of intervention of the Project, namely the rehabilitation of historical monuments classified as World Heritage by UNESCO, the complexities resulting from the institutional arrangements, and the low capacity at technical and operational levels of all the participating agencies, have made it difficult to advance the rehabilitation of cultural heritage and historic buildings to the actual works phase. On the other hand, the significant socio-political upheavals from the second semester of 2018 up to the closing of the PAST, the restrictions and insecurity to project implementation that the COVID-19 pandemic brought, the assassination of the President in 2021, the subsequent social chaos that ensued, the shortage of fuel and the critical depreciation of the Gourde, have all negatively impacted the implementation of the Project.
58. In addition, other key project implementation obstacles included: (a) lack of implementation readiness; (b) high turnover of staff and decision-makers; (c) poor procurement capacity; (d) complex institutional arrangements, and (e) lack of agility in timely decision-making.

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING

Rating: Unsatisfactory

⁴ Statistiques Arrivees de Tourists, MINISTÈRE DU TOURISME, UNITE D'ETUDES ET DE PROGRAMMATION (U.E.P.), January 2022

⁵ Rapport Final, Ligne de Base sure les Interventions dans Les Ravines, CHUD, September 2020



59. The Project remained relevant for Haiti's development, in particular for the territorial development approach, private sector development and resilience. The project also was relevant to the portfolio, given the need to take informed risks to support medium to long-term development goals.
60. The Project Outcome was Modest. It did improve the living conditions of the population in the North, it contributed to the increased capacity in tourism management, private sector development, and community development, creating important economic and social development benefits. However, the main outcome of the Project, "to increase the attractiveness of the cultural heritage sites for tourists" was not achieved. The Project was not able to rehabilitate and increase the resilience of the monuments and historic buildings. It could also not complete the detailed studies for the rehabilitation, seismic reinforcement, restoration, conservation, valorization, and interpretation of the Citadelle Henri-Ramiers, the Sans Souci Palace ruins, and the Royal Chapelle. It did complete the PMP for the PNH-CSSR but was not able to help create a permanent authority to manage the PNH-CSSR with adequate budget and staffing to implement its PMP. The Project gains were supported by the smaller Project components, but this does not outweigh the bigger Project component, which did not perform.

E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS

Gender

61. The Project significantly supported women, especially through the Community Fund. Twenty-five percent of the 47 projects were granted to women for various activity development, such as sewing workshops, crafts, agri-food, and chocolate making. For example, the Association des Femmes Paysannes de Milot developed the craft and clothing center of Milot; the Fédération des Femmes Organisées du Nord developed a community training center for the promotion of local cuisine; and the Association pour l'Égalité des Femmes contributed to the development of Agri-tourism by strengthening the center with an equipped space, as well as training staff for the production and sale of coffee and cocoa products.
62. In addition, out of the 63,540 direct project beneficiaries who had improved living environments in Milot, Dondon, and Rues 16 and 20 in Cap Haitian, 35 percent were women.

Institutional Strengthening

63. ISPAN was fully equipped, a documentation center was built, and a capacity building plan was developed, but not implemented. ISPAN continues to function while the unit that was financed by the Project, in support of the project implementation, was closed. OGDNH recruited staff, now under the CHUD Project, and received training in accountancy and tourism management. The P-AGP was established and staffed, however, the permanent AGP remains to be officially established and funded by the Government. Since the closing of the Project, the P-AGP is suspended and is awaiting the Government's decision to be financed to resume its functions.
64. The ISPAN Center of Documentation, which was rehabilitated and equipped by the Project, established a partnership with Florida International University to (a) set up a digitization unit; (b) classify and digitize all the documents; (c) train; and (d) producing documentation services. This work is valuable for the management of the



country's cultural heritage in general, allowing for the proper documentation of the thousands of documents, studies, photos, maps, and plans that have been produced concerning the monuments of the northern region.

Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity

65. The Community Fund provided opportunities for small and medium enterprises to develop and stay afloat during the COVID-19 pandemic when tourism numbers dropped significantly. The Community Fund supported 47 projects, with a total of 7,367 beneficiaries. It also provided financing for training, upgrading, and new machinery and equipment allowing beneficiaries to re-tool and recover faster once markets reopened.
66. The Community Fund supported youth, a group who are particularly vulnerable to the poverty trap. Twenty-five percent of the Community Fund benefitted young entrepreneurs through activities focusing on tourism, such as the Association Union des Jeunes pour le Progrès Bas-Limbé, which helped to develop Caramel Beach by setting up reception structures, and the Association des Jeunes pour le Développement du Tourisme de Milot, which provided capacity building to horse drivers, involved in horse transport from Sans-Souci to Citadelle, and improving the conditions of horse transport in the PNH-CSSR.

Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts

67. Government officials, Bank staff, and UNESCO staff confirmed that the Project contributed to a heightened awareness of the importance of cultural heritage in Haiti. Examples are the submission by the GoH of the Park Management Plan to the WHC, which would ensure these monuments remain on the World Heritage list, and the request for a follow-up Project to the PAST by the GoH in July 2022, pointing out the importance to safeguarding its cultural heritage.

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION

68. Optimism in the Bank and the wider donor community to have a one-time possibility to change Haiti's future led to the inception, design, and scope of the PAST. The Project was part of a larger coordinated approach to developing Haiti, and in this case, the North. While this Project focused on cultural heritage preservation, urban upgrading, and tourism-related community-driven development, other investments by IDB and the US, as well as the Bank's transport projects and Municipal Development and Urban Resilience Project (MDUR), would contribute to industrial development, tourism development, urban development, and transport. This Project would also contribute to an improved image of Haiti that would have exponential effects, reaching far beyond the tourist industry and spurring trust in local and foreign direct investment. The perspective was such that it was anticipated that other locations in the North could be included in the second phase of the Project.
69. The Project identified Unité Technique de Exécution (UTE) as the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) based in Port au Prince (PaP) instead of ISPAN. The rationale was that UTE did not possess technical knowledge but had some experience in implementing other donor-financed projects, as well as several project preparation advances for



Bank-financed projects. The technical inputs on cultural heritage would then be provided by ISPAN, with technical support from UNESCO, through a convention that the Government and UNESCO would sign. ISPAN was not satisfied with this decision, given that previous cultural heritage projects in the North were managed by ISPAN.

70. The UNESCO country representation, in support of ISPAN, did not agree with the choice of UTE to manage the cultural heritage component. This led to strained communication and the need for project coordination with UNESCO Headquarters. Eventually, UNESCO entered into an implementation agreement with the GoH to support the implementation of the physical and institutional activities related to cultural heritage preservation, as well as the capacity-building activities of ISPAN. UNESCO also was to provide highly specialized TA to address specific technical implementation issues of the heritage buildings, and to the AGP to prepare and implement the PMP. It also facilitated communication with the WHC to acquire the necessary review and approval of the PMP.
71. Although UTE was required to open a satellite office in Cap Haïtien, it only did so after 2018. This caused delays in decision-making, communication, coordination, and supervision.
72. The Project was ambitious while Haiti, a fragile state with limited capacities, was rebuilding after the 2010 earthquake, including its depleted Government capacity. The project thereby took an informed risk in contributing to Haiti's long-term development.

B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION

Government/PIU

Coordination and engagement

73. Project coordination was complex. At the project implementation level, there were eight main partners including: the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) as the main client, and the UTE as PIU, ISPAN of the Ministry of Culture, responsible for validating the activities of Component A, supported by UNESCO through an agreement with the Government, the Ministry of Tourism, and the municipalities of Dondon, Cap Haïtien, Milot, related to Components B and C.
74. The PIU, UTE, was often overwhelmed and faced difficulty when managing the complex set of results and coordinating the large range of partners and stakeholders. UTE had experience in project implementation, but not with Bank-financed projects, and was therefore unfamiliar with the financial management, procurement, and social and environmental standards and their application. This led to implementation delays, particularly around procurement.
75. Given the specialized topic of cultural heritage, ISPAN entered into an agreement with the PIUN to provide technical oversight for Component A. ISPAN is responsible for the management of all Cultural Heritage Assets in Haiti including the PNH-CSSR and the historic center of Cap-Haïtien. From the onset ISPAN was disappointed to not have been selected as PIU for Component A, leading to poor coordination, delays in developing ToRs, review of technical documents, etc. This led to significant implementation delays for Component A.
76. In-country UNESCO was of the same opinion that given its technical expertise and presence in the North, ISPAN would be better placed to implement Component A. Previously the UNDP and UNESCO provided technical and financial support for cultural heritage preservation targeting the same monuments and supported ISPAN for that



purpose. The Project therefore communicated with UNESCO in Rome to hire the necessary expertise to support ISPAN in the review of the technical studies that were being prepared for the monuments.

77. UNESCO entered into an implementation agreement with the GoH to support the implementation of the PAST, specifically for Component A. This encountered many delays affecting the first years of project implementation. In 2018 the Bank concluded that the UNESCO support was inadequate, leading to a reformulation of the convention to reduce its scope according to achievements and to simplify the list of remaining deliverables. The establishment of the new convention was also delayed, resulting in delaying UNESCO's ability to advise and train ISPAN and start developing the PMP.
78. The role of UNESCO was to provide TA to address specific technical implementation issues on the heritage buildings, and to the P-AGP to prepare and implement the PMP, build the capacity of ISPAN, and facilitate communication with the WHC.
79. The conservation and rehabilitation of the cultural heritage sites and the PMP formulation were dependent on the specialized expertise and accompaniment of UNESCO. However, the mobilization of UNESCO was slow and resulted in not all the agreed deliverables in the GoH-UNESCO convention being completed. In addition, UNESCO was not able to provide the timely advice and seniority required for the Project. As of 2019, improvements were seen, but despite this, the development of the PNH-CSSR management plan, and the development of designs for the rehabilitation of the monuments, experienced significant delays.
80. Due to capacity constraints in ISPAN, the Project financed a team of consultants assigned to ISPAN for the preparation and monitoring of heritage works in the PNH-CSSR and Cap-Haïtien, and the preparation of reports and other deliverables required by UNESCO before beginning any work on the monuments. ISPAN would coordinate relations with UNESCO related to the Project. The team worked from the ISPAN office in the North, with the UTE satellite office. The team reported contractually to UTE and technically to the Director of ISPAN. ISPAN however was slow in reviewing and signing off on the Terms of Reference (ToR), studies, and technical reports, due to having only a few highly skilled experts resulting in the need to consult UNESCO frequently. This was compounded by the fact that each document had to be cleared by the Minister of Tourism, before being submitted to the Ministry of Finance. This would then be processed by the UTE and implemented by consultants and firms, technically supervised by ISPAN, instead of being delegated to the Director of ISPAN or the PIU Director.
81. Given the delays within the Government to establish the AGP and accelerate the Project implementation related to PNH-CSSR activities, the Project helped finance the P-AGP. The P-AGP consisted of one Director and four technical staff, covering cultural heritage preservation, tourism development, environmental conservation, and sustainable population development.
82. The Community Event & Tourism Development component was implemented by OGDNH, with fiduciary support from the UTE. Initially, the MT lacked engagement, this improved after the 2020 restructuring once more funds were allocated to Component C and the functioning of OGDNH, despite the Bank's concerns about sustainability of this support.
83. A key obstacle to the Project implementation was also the high turnover of decision-makers involved in giving direction and making decisions needed. Each new Minister, be it in Finance, Tourism, or Culture needed to get



properly informed and up to speed with the details of the Project before being able to provide direction and make decisions related to project restructuring, staffing, and project management.

84. For proper coordination and execution of the Project, the GoH was to maintain the SC throughout Project implementation, headed by the MT and including MEF and the MC, the Ministry of Interior and Collectivities (MICT), and the Ministry of Environment (MdE), CIAT, ISPAN, the OGDNH, the municipalities, and UNESCO; UTE served as Secretariat for the SC. The SC was to meet regularly. However, the SC did not function or meet regularly, except for in 2018, after which it ceased to meet due to the impact of COVID-19. As a result, the SC did not meet its intended function to provide strategic direction to the Project or enhance coordination and project oversight.
85. The combination of political crises and social unrest, which led to the deterioration of security, as well as the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, hindered implementation in various ways. It reduced the ability of the UTE to properly supervise project progress, as well as hire and host international consultants and firms in the project area. It also hindered UNESCO in its implementation of fielding staff for extended periods, as well as in recruiting and maintaining project staff.
86. The assumption was that given the symbolic importance of the monuments in the North all involved Government Agencies and local actors would align to preserve and beautify these national treasures. In practice this alignment did not materialize, leading to frequent miscommunication, and a lack of coordination and engagement. There was also a certain degree of lack of trust between the PaP-based Ministries and the agencies and local actors based in the North, negatively affecting communication and coordination. The lack of inter-agency coordination and cooperation was most evident and relevant between UTE and ISPAN, leading to frequent delays in document preparation, procurement, and project implementation.

Human resources and organizational capacity constraints

87. The UTE office in Cap Haïtien (Cap PIU) lacked human resources and was not properly equipped to coordinate project implementation or properly communicate with its implementing partners, resulting in a centralized approach to project management. From 2018 onwards efforts were made to strengthen the Cap PIU. In addition to a coordinator, two social specialists, one environmental specialist, one engineer, and 2/3 staff from ISPAN were incorporated. This facilitated better coordination between UTE and ISPAN, improving project implementation to a certain extent. The financial management and procurement functions remained in PaP. For the last three years of project implementation, the UTE had one environmental specialist and one social specialist assigned full-time to the Cap-PIU. Travel difficulties (e.g., vehicle availability) made supervision visits difficult.

Legislation and regulations

88. The UTE was not able to timely hire a suitable lawyer to prepare the permanent AGP formalization decree. After the P-AGP was installed and operating, a liaison agent was appointed by the Minister of Culture and charged with the task of developing the AGP. This position was then left vacant for a long period of time because the liaison officer moved to a new position in 2020, and a replacement was required. By this point, there was not sufficient time left for UTE to hire a lawyer to support the preparation of the AGP creation decree. As a result, the AGP was not established.



Fiduciary

89. During the first four years of implementation, procurement proved to cause a significant bottleneck. The UTE did not have significant capacity available and remained overwhelmed by the number of packages that needed to be processed. There was also a high degree of centralization in the authorization of payments. For example, for payments of a firm or consultant working on cultural heritage, the ToR, followed by the deliverables had to be checked by ISPAN in the first instance, then signed off by the Minister of Tourism, before it was turned over to UTE. The UTE would then only process the payments after authorization from the Minister of Finance. Despite this, the procurement performance rating was Moderately Satisfactory (MS) at closing, thanks to the efforts in the last three years to provide capacity support to clear the backlog in payments. At closing, the Project counted 16 ongoing activities for a total amount of US\$2.3 million still to be completed. By January 2023 all these activities were completed.
90. The underlying procurement issues arose because of a lack of client capacity, ownership, and close monitoring of procurement and contracts. In addition, STEP was not updated regularly to help in tracking procurement activities. The Hands-on Expanded Implementation Support (HEIS) involvement was quite late, only taking place from October 2021 onwards, while the Project closed in July 2022.

Environmental and Social

91. The lack of permanent environmental and social safeguard specialists in Cap Haïtien from 2014 - 2019, as well as the lack of adequate equipment, made compliance supervision difficult. The rating was downgraded at the end of the Project because the environmental specialist at the PIU in Cap Haïtien resigned and was not replaced. UTE sent its Head of Safeguards Unit to fix the problems, which came too late to upgrade the rating back to Satisfactory. Overall, the Environmental and Social Evaluation Report shows that all sites have been rehabilitated, and compensation payments to Project Affected Persons (PAP) were made. For the works that could not be completed due to the procurement delays, the occupants and owners of the buildings concerned were all informed of the reason for such a decision.

World Bank

Adequacy of supervision

92. The Bank team conducted 17 supervision missions, of which seven were conducted virtually because of COVID-19 travel restrictions. In some instances, the missions were accompanied by senior management. All four TTLS, and most of the support team were based outside Haiti.
93. The reporting through Aides-Memoire and Implementation Status and Results (ISR) Reports was adequate, with sufficient details to document the Project. However, there was a lack of consistency in the works' description and no clear overview with details of planned and implemented/incomplete works. The deficiency of the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) system may have caused these inconsistencies.
94. Issues were identified often, such as implementation delays and lack of coordination between implementing partners, but remediations came late. In addition, the first major reorientation of the Project took place in 2018 and 2020. The Project could have benefitted from close supervision in the initial years to ensure the timely completion of the studies needed to initiate the works related to the preservation of the monuments.



Factors outside the control of government and/or implementing entities

95. Between 2012 and July 2022, Haiti was hit by 16 floods, eight hurricanes, two droughts, two earthquakes, two cholera outbreaks, and the COVID-19 pandemic. The country experienced prolonged periods of political gridlock and social unrest throughout the project life, interspersed with spikes in violence that lasted throughout the lifetime of the Project, and violence and unrest which culminated to new heights with the assassination of President Jovenel Moise in July of 2021. This has led to an erosion of democracy, fuel scarcity, the deterioration of the country's security climate, and prevalent protests. All this has without a doubt affected the project outcomes, as well as slowed down the implementation and monitoring of the Project's progress.
96. Although COVID-19 did not seem to have a significant effect in terms of implementation disruptions in Haiti itself, it did prevent project site visits for the Bank and international consultants and companies. In addition, the number of direct flights from the USA and Canada to Cap Haïtien and related to that the number of visitors to the project area dropped, causing various tourism businesses to close either temporarily or permanently.

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

M&E Design

97. The Project's Results Framework was clear. Its indicators were well formulated and appropriate to monitor progress toward the PDOs, as well as the achievement of intermediate results.
98. The Results Framework was also complex and ambitious, with six PDO indicators and six intermediate outcome indicators, several of which have sub-categories. The initial targets were ambitious regarding the original timeline and the country context. Two of the initial six outcome targets had to be reduced in scope. In addition, four of the original intermediate outcome targets were reduced and one was dropped, while one new indicator (establishment of the P-AGP) was added. No outcome indicators or intermediate indicators were included to measure PDO 3. Most targets were adjusted during various restructurings to better reflect the Project's current framework. Despite these changes, only half of the PDO indicators and intermediate outcome indicators were achieved.
99. Various M&E tools were envisaged to assess the impact of the Project on direct beneficiaries, including the establishment and operation of an M&E database, a baseline survey and semi-annual supervision mission, technical audits, and a MTR.

M&E Implementation

100. The UTE was responsible for establishing the M&E system for different activities of the Project and ensuring that required M&E data were regularly generated and tracked. However, in practice, this did not happen



due to delays in hiring expertise, for example the baseline study was only provided in January 2022. The 2018 restructuring included reallocation of funds to strengthen monitoring and evaluation.

101. Up to 2018 estimates collected from multiple sources and verified during supervision missions were used to monitor Project outcomes and compliance. This was then converted to virtual supervision from early 2020 onwards, lessening the Bank's supervision and monitoring ability. The baseline study was conducted in 2021, in combination with an impact study.

M&E Utilization

102. Performance and results data were used to inform Management and make the necessary decisions to adjust the Project, though more reliable data only became available during the later stages of the Project.

Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E

103. Despite the design of the Results Matrix being clear but complex, the M&E system was established late, resulting in the Project using estimates from multiple sources instead of the project-specific M&E system. The M&E system was not used to inform the restructurings or the MTR. The M&E rating is therefore Modest.



B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE

104. The six safeguard policies triggered in the Project are as follows:
- 4.01 - Environmental Assessment
 - 4.04 - Natural Habitats
 - 4.09 - Pest Management
 - 4.36 - Forests
 - 4.11 - Physical Cultural Resources
 - 4.12 - Involuntary Resettlement
105. The environmental and social screening was carried out for each sub-project, whether for Component A, Component B, or Component C of all sub-projects. All the safeguard instruments have been prepared, including the Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP), , and the Summary Resettlement Plans (SRP)s. For Component A, due to the sub-projects being in the same location as the project office in Cap-Haïtien, the monitoring of worksites was better, in comparison to the sub-projects of Component B and C, which were in communities further away from Cap-Haïtien.
106. The environmental and social aspects related to the generation of solid waste by the Project were not fully considered at the project preparation phase. Due to the lack of appropriate infrastructure in the country for the treatment, disposal, and management of solid waste of different natures, implementation of some project activities was hindered. In addition, the budget for the implementation of safeguard measures was limited, which made it even more difficult to finance remediation actions. In this case, the approach adopted was to abandon some of the Project's activities, given its closing date and the social, political, technical, and sanitary context.
107. The Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM) was carried out on an ongoing basis by the PIU's environmental and social specialists based in the Cap Haitian office. As COVID-19 restrictions continued, public consultations were held virtually, including through telephone contacts, WhatsApp, and the internet to comply with the social-distancing measures. PAP complaints could be presented in Creole, and as of July 2022, the PIU received 18 complaints. Several cases of temporary resettlement (physical and economic) were recorded under the Project at Rue 16 in Cap-Haïtien, for which public consultation did take place. There were gaps in the individual consultations with the PAPs. In addition, there was a lack of participation of local elected officials and local authorities in the city of Cap-Haïtien in the process of resettling PAPs.
108. At closing the Environmental and Social (E&S) performance rating was Moderately Unsatisfactory due to the non-completion of all planned works by the project closure date. This resulted in the need for a Post-Closure Action Plan, which set out the measures and actions committed to by the Borrower to complete all sub-projects in line with applicable operational procedures and relevant mitigation measures, as set out in individual risk management instruments. By the end September 2022, all triggered safeguard policies and mitigation measures were successfully implemented, and all relevant mitigation measures carried out.



Financial Management

109. Compliance with the Project's Financial Management (FM) arrangements was maintained throughout project implementation, ending with a Satisfactory FM rating and a Substantial FM risk. The disbursement ratio for the Project reached 81.5 percent, due to several cancellations taking place as a result of several exogenous factors affecting implementation. Some of these factors related to the political instability and lack of security conditions altering the possibility of staff being deployed in the field to execute activities as intended. Interim Financial Reports (IFRs) and financial audits were submitted as requested by the financing agreement and were accepted by the Bank. Some IFRs were delayed but this did not affect the capacity to provide timely and reliable provision of information required to manage and monitor the execution of the Project's activities. Internal control weaknesses, detected by the auditors were progressively addressed. The assignment of a Financial Management Specialist since the inception and exclusively dedicated to the Project, allowed the Bank to have a key focal point in this area to address shortcomings arisen during implementation in a timely manner. In terms of contract management with UNESCO, improvements could have been made to monitor activities and the execution of deliverables, as well as requesting periodical financial information in a timely manner.

Procurement

110. The procurement support to the Project was problematic during the first five years of project implementation, and it only improved from January 2019 onwards. From January to mid-2018, there was no procurement staff assigned to the Project. Subsequently, a Brazil-based staff member was assigned to the Project who had a large portfolio and therefore could not spend sufficient time on the Project. The language barrier also caused additional problems. In 2020 HEIS support was offered to strengthen the procurement practices, however this support only became effective in October of 2021, by then the Project was in its final months before closing.

C. BANK PERFORMANCE

Quality at Entry

111. The Project was strategically relevant to Haiti and the Bank's partnership framework and took an informed risk in a fragile environment to attempt to achieve a transformative change and contribute to Haiti's medium- and long-term development. The Project was carefully planned, analyzed, and developed to mitigate the stakeholder, capacity, governance, and project risks (design, environmental and social, monitoring and sustainability). However, the Project did not address the capacity risks during preparation to ensure project implementation readiness and underestimated the very narrow professional base that can implement this type of cultural heritage conservation project, while overestimating the capacity of partners such as UNESCO. The complexity in design required a multidisciplinary approach with an equally complex institutional setup, dependent on strong coordination, collaboration, and communication among eight different entities. During implementation, the shortcomings of these design elements became evident and required considerable adjustments.
112. The results framework was robust but, given the large scope of the Project, included five components, and seventeen separate outputs, each including a multitude of activities. The Project included works,



differentiated between cultural heritage preservation, restoration of historic buildings, urban development, local economic development, private sector development, strengthening institutions, and institutional reforms, and the initial targets were ambitious. The works included the rehabilitation and strengthening of prime cultural heritage sites located in the PNH-CSSR, that are of paramount importance to Haiti and of World Heritage value, and the establishment of a Permanent Park Authority that would implement a PMP; all to be developed by the Project, within a six-year timeframe.

113. The assumption of the Project was that a large part of the visitors to the PNH-CSSR and its monuments would be cruise ship tourists, coming from Labadie. RCCL has the exclusive rights to this resort. However, the resort is fenced off from the surrounding area, and passengers are actually not allowed to leave the property. Even if the tourists could have left the property, the logistical challenges to transport them to and from Labadie in less than 6 hours, as well as the related security concerns, would have made it almost impossible for tourists to visit the PNH-CSSR and its monuments. The influx was therefore dependent on tourists coming from the Dominican Republic and the diaspora. As mentioned above, this was restricted due to COVID-19 and the social upheaval in the country over the last three years of implementation.
114. The Project envisaged a programmatic approach, whereby a set of activities under Phase I would inform and define Phase II of the Project. This would facilitate implementation, in line with the evolving client capacity. The Project would focus first on activities with the prospect of quick impact while laying the groundwork for interventions that need longer preparation. The first phase of implementation would last 30 months. A MTR would define the expansion of activities and the introduction of new activities for the second phase. Such an approach requires flexibility and strong project management and monitoring capacities. Actual implementation of the Project did not apply this phased approach.
115. The institutional setup was complex and centralized: the PIU, UTE, was based in PaP in the Ministry of Finance and implemented the Project on behalf of MC and MT. The UTE was responsible for procurement, financial management, safeguards, and overall technical, monitoring and evaluation tasks. The MC (through ISPAN) and the MT entered into Institutional Arrangements with MEF for this purpose. For urban upgrading projects, the UTE entered into Local Investment Agreements with the respective Beneficiaries, and for the Community Event and Tourism Grants the UTE coordinated with OGDNH and entered into Community Event and Tourism Grants Agreements with the Beneficiaries.
116. The UTE was selected given its track record in implementing other donor-financed projects, as well as several project preparation advances for Bank-financed projects. This was the first time the UTE implemented a Bank project and did not have technical expertise in cultural heritage and management of national parks. The UTE agreed with OGDNH to manage the Community Event and Tourism Grants agreements. The UTE further coordinated with the 'collectivités territoriales' and communities on urban upgrading. A UTE satellite office was established in Cap Haïtien but had few staff and lacked resources and facilities.

Quality of Supervision

117. The initial four years saw a frequent turnover in staff leading the Project (4 TTLs in four years), which affected the quality of the supervision. The first TTL completed the project preparation and was succeeded by a



TTL who within the first 18 months of implementation and was succeeded in 2016 by a TTL who was part of the Country Management Unit instead of a Global Practice. This TTL was succeeded in 2018 by an experienced staff from the Global Practice who remained until the closing of the Project. The Project also saw a turnover in support staff, notably in procurement. The quality of supervision improved from 2017 onwards when an action plan was put in place to create a more decentralized implementation modality. At certain points in the project life, most notably June 2018 and August 2020, adjustments were made that improved the Project's performance, this resulted in an upgrade of the implementation progress to MS in mid-2019 up to mid-2020, and the PDO rating was upgraded to MS during 2021.

118. The Bank had major deficiencies in providing adequate procurement supervision. There were prolonged periods without procurement staff assigned to the Project. In addition, language barriers posed communication problems. HEIS was promised in 2020 but only materialized in October 2021, 8 months before the Project closed.
119. The Project underwent six restructurings, indicating that the Bank team did take action to recalibrate the Project. The first two restructuring of 2017 and 2018 were planned as a sequence to course correct the Project mid-term. The MTR, conducted in January 2018, identified several problems, ranging from the lack of technical and financial management capacities in ISPAN, little involvement of the MT, non-compliance of UNESCO support, a general lack of communication, insufficient attention to safeguards, and difficulties of the PIU in project management, particularly procurement, and coordination. The solutions included a reallocation of funds to strengthen project management and monitoring, dropping activities, and adjustments to the results framework. These corrections had positive effects on the Project implementation: the 2018 MTR and restructuring saw the uptake in disbursement and the upgrading of the Implementation Progress rating from MU to MS in 2019.
120. The June 2020 and the October 2021 restructurings were to respectively free up funds for COVID-19 and involuntary resettlement respectively, and therefore are not considered as attempts to improve the project performance.
121. During the 2020 restructuring, the number of cultural heritage works was further reduced and the coordination with UNESCO was improved, which resulted in an upgrade of the PDO rating from MU to MS by end 2020. The restructuring is significant as it shows a shift of emphasis away from cultural heritage reservation towards urban upgrading and tourism sector support. This was fueled by the realization that the Project would not achieve its main objective and the desire to support small and medium enterprises during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, many of these positive developments were short-lived, partly because of structural problems in the areas of procurement, coordination, communication, and the social and political fragility.
122. Despite the four restructurings to address the PDO and in the implementation progress, the Project retained problem status for five of eight years. First, the measures came too late, with the first restructuring only taking place in 2017, whereas the initial years of the Project are critical to establish the Project and its implementation modalities. Secondly, the root problem to the slow progress and the perpetual delays, came as a result of the choice of the PIU and the ensuing lack of collaboration, cooperation, and communication, in particular in the initial years with ISPAN and UNESCO, as well as the lack of strategic direction which was never fully addressed.
123. Questions can be asked whether the Bank team did enough. Should the team have taken more radical actions, for example, either canceling Component A and focusing on Components B and C, or vice-versa? Should



larger fund cancellations have been made to ensure the funds could have flowed back to the IDA19 envelope, or even cancel the Project when it became clear that achieving its objectives was becoming elusive? All these options were considered and discussed internally and with the Government. However, there was strong pushback from the client to reduce the cultural heritage activities, given the importance of the monuments to Haiti and because the selection of the investments was made through a participatory process. Closure of the Project would have posed an enormous political risk, with ripple effects on the Bank portfolio in Haiti. In addition, the insecurity on how COVID-19 would affect operations and for how long, favored a wait and see approach.

124. The quality of supervision is also dependent on management support and guidance. For this Project, the task team could have benefitted from stronger fiduciary support, specifically in the areas of procurement and safeguards, as well as from consistent management advice on adjusting the Project, which pre-COVID leaned towards cultural heritage preservation, and afterward on canceling this activity to focus on Community Driven Development.
125. The overall assessment is that the quality of supervision was poor in the first three years of implementation and only saw improvements from 2018 onwards. By this time, the task team did what was possible under the circumstances and within these constraints to make the Project work, although these measures came late.

Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance

126. The rating is based on a problematic Quality at Entry and weighing the first four years with few results, against the last four years with moderate results and efforts to improve project implementation. This leads to a MU rating for the Bank's Performance.

D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

127. The preliminary studies for the rehabilitation of the Cultural Heritage sites are completed. To date, there is no commitment to these studies being used. If they are not used to restore the monuments and increase the buildings' resistance to seismic events, the monuments continue to be at risk of deterioration and collapse caused by earthquakes.
128. OGDNH, active under the Project in managing the Community Funds, is now incorporated into the CHUD Project. The risk remains that after this Project is completed, the OGDNH might cease to exist, risking the tourism development outcome of the Project.
129. If the AGP is not established, and the P-AGP not being operational, the PNH-CSSR is not properly managed and will be at risk of environmental degradation, together with its' cultural heritage sites and the natural resources.
130. If the current political crisis, and deteriorated security situation perpetuate, there is a risk that the Project's gains in developing the local tourist industry and small enterprises may not be sustained. It has already



caused a sharp drop in international tourist arrivals to the area: there are limited flights into Cap Haïtien and RCCL has suspended its visits to Labadie. This could be partially mitigated by an increase in domestic visits to the area, who traditionally visit the North to celebrate national holidays and other cultural events.

V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

131. Taking informed risks to support medium to long term development goals in a Fragility, Conflict and Violence (FCV) environment like Haiti presents a particular set of challenges, whereby success is not always guaranteed. This project was ambitious in nature and attempted to contribute, with a unique opportunity, to redeveloping the North, create opportunities outside of the capital and to contribute to Haiti's national heritage. Not being able to fully achieve its development outcome, being confronted with various project management, coordination, and supervision challenges should be considered an important learning experience to inform future operations.
132. The complexity of the design of the Project should be balanced with the choice and capacity of the implementing partners, and collaboration is key. The PAST project design is comparable to projects that the Bank finances, which combine a cultural heritage preservation component with other components such as tourism development, urban upgrading, or solid waste management. This project however was the first of its kind for Haiti and required a wide range of entities to be involved in the implementation of the various Components. For the cultural heritage preservation component UTE, ISPAN, and UNESCO were required to seamlessly work together, which did not materialize until late in the Project, given the combination of reluctance to collaborate by ISPAN and UNESCO, and the lack required technical expertise and fiduciary experience in UTE. This remained one of the main obstacles to the successful outcome of the Project. The Project should have carefully assessed the existing institutional and technical capacity of the client agencies – both at the national and local level and prioritized collaboration, coordination, and communication.
133. Decentralized projects should carefully consider the appropriate implementation modalities for contexts like Haiti and need to establish delivery mechanisms and full ownership during project preparation. Political economy issues are critical in these contexts and need specific focus to being acknowledged and addressed, as well as there being a plan in place before project effectiveness. The project implementation failed partly because the PIU was based in PaP, while the Project focus was on Cap Haïtien, Milot, Dondon, and the PNH-CSSR in the North. For a Project to be successful, it requires the main PIU to be a strong presence in the project area and to be fully equipped to manage the Project, before or shortly after it becomes effective. In addition, decision-making should be delegated to the PIU, and its project staff should be empowered to manage the entire Project on behalf of the Government, including all operational transactions. This would have avoided the extensive delays because of the high degree of centralization and bureaucracy. The Project also made the mistake to assume that the AGP, and for that matter the P-AGP, would be swiftly established and funded to properly manage the PNH-CSSR, and that the PMP would be swiftly established to sustainably manage the national park and the cultural heritage sites.
134. A project that finances investments outside the hubs of its existing capacity must take time to assess the “how” and “who” part of planned investments and not necessarily be overly influenced by demand. In this Project, there was an overwhelming demand rationale for the planned investments because of many “captive” cruise tourists in Labadie. This influenced the team to take on investments led by a demand perspective in terms of



creating attractions outside the cruise enclave, but perhaps skimmed over the aspects of building ownership for these investments at a national level to generate the necessary momentum to get the investments in place at a local level.

135. In an FCV context like Haiti it is indispensable to build flexibility into project design, by including a CERC, to mitigate periods of implementation stagnation because of conflict, pandemics, and natural disasters.
136. Implementation readiness in a low-capacity environment like Haiti needs to be addressed during project preparation. This includes a thorough analysis of available resources, institutional support, consultation, detailed planning, and risk management. Stakeholders across all entities and organizations involved need to be thoroughly trained and informed on Bank Procedures. Bank support could include the TA, including HEIS, mobilized to support PIUs in all aspects of the project implementation (including procurement, FM, safeguards, and technical evaluation of the designs and studies). This would minimize the institutional and capacity risks, while also enhancing the PIU and implementing agencies' experience and expertise from HEIS, which would need to be appropriate to the needs and provided in French. The project experienced major delays because of a procurement capacity bottleneck in the UTE, which were insufficiently mitigated. The project enjoyed institutional support at the national level, however leadership turnover at times resulted in a lack of strategic direction. By addressing implementation readiness, the Project could potentially have reduced implementation delays and had a more positive outcome.
137. When engaging partner agencies, projects need to anticipate and build into the project design the time that is required to mobilize, engage, and deliver the required outputs. The Project expected collaboration with UNESCO to fill the need for highly qualified and specialized expertise needed for a cultural rehabilitation project of enormous scale and importance. This eventually materialized but given the time it took for the GoH and UNESCO to establish a convention, the Bank staff had to step in to check and improve seismic and architectural studies. The late mobilization of UNESCO also caused considerable delays in the preparation of the PMP, one of the major outputs of the Project.
138. Projects could also apply other modalities to ensure that they benefit from UNESCO expert guidance and expertise, including the possibility to hire individual experts to provide specific advice or technical guidance, or to find ways to benefit and engage with UNESCO based on a Memorandum of Understanding that was signed between the Bank and UNESCO several years ago.
139. Complex investment projects, with sensitive components such as cultural heritage preservation, need close supervision and require adjustments through timely decision-making. The PAST proved problematic for five out of eight years of its implementation and underwent six restructurings, of which four were to correct the course of the Project. A crucial factor herein was the high staff turnover, with four TTLS in the first four years of implementation, the insufficient support in procurement, and the lack of systematic M&E of project activities and results. This points to the need in having a strong Bank team with adequate management support and guidance from day one of the effectiveness, and a team that remains in place for the important first years of project implementation, ideally based in-country. Related to this is the importance to have a robust M&E system to support early detection in support of decisive action to address the unsatisfactory status of a Project.
140. Cultural Heritage projects require the involvement of specialized technical expertise in areas such as architecture and archeology to ensure their success. Bank experience shows that when adequate expertise was



made available, projects achieved successful results. Though the Bank team counted on one seasoned architect, most technical input came from quite junior experts, both from the Bank, UNESCO, and the client side. The Bank could have assigned more cultural heritage expertise from the accumulated pool of senior experts, especially when the Project encountered implementation challenges.

141. Trust Funds should be considered as an important tool to support analytics and TA, while investment projects would only focus on implementation. Trust Funds can provide the necessary resources to conduct the highly technical studies required for the preservation, rehabilitation, and seismic upgrading of cultural heritage sites. The Project was not able to start actual works on the monuments, since most of the time was dedicated to procuring and conducting the required architectural, topographic, and geotechnical studies.



ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS

A. RESULTS INDICATORS

A.1 PDO Indicators

Objective/Outcome: To increase the attractiveness of the cultural heritage sites in North of Haiti for tourists

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
An effective Park Management system is contributing to sustainable development of the park	Text	No 01-Sep-2014	Yes 01-Sep-2014		No 27-Jul-2022

Comments (achievements against targets):

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of restored buildings with increased resistance to seismic events	Number	0.00 01-Sep-2014	7.00 01-Sep-2020	1.00 01-Jul-2020	0.00 27-Jul-2022

Comments (achievements against targets):



The original target was 85%. This was changed to 4 (number) in the June 2018 restructuring, and reduced to 1 in the July 202 restructuring

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of entities providing cultural and tourism services in the project areas	Number	200.00 03-Aug-2020	350.00 01-Sep-2014	288.00 03-Aug-2020	256.00 27-Jul-2022

Comments (achievements against targets):

The 2014 baseline of 310 was reduced in August 2020 to 200 and the target was reduced from 350 to 288.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Tickets sold annually to the PNH-CSSR	Number	12,500.00 01-Sep-2014	16,750.00 01-Sep-2014	16,850.00 03-Aug-2020	10,500.00 27-Jul-2022

Comments (achievements against targets):

Objective/Outcome: To improve the living environment for the residents living in North of Haiti

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
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Direct project beneficiaries	Number	0.00	35,000.00		63,450.00
		01-Sep-2014	01-Sep-2014		27-Jul-2022
Female beneficiaries	Percentage	0.00	40.00	35.00	35.00
Comments (achievements against targets):					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Population in project areas satisfied with the quality of infrastructure financed by the project	Percentage	0.00 01-Sep-2014	75.00 01-Sep-2014		76.00 27-Jul-2022
Comments (achievements against targets):					

A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators

Component: Physical Cultural Heritages sites and Touristic Circuits in the PNH-CSSR and Cap-Haitien Historic Center

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
An interim authority	Yes/No	No	Yes		Yes



(Autorité de Gestion Provisoire) with staffing acceptable to IDA is established in the PNH-CSSR		30-Jun-2017	01-Sep-2014		27-Jul-2022
Comments (achievements against targets):					
Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
PNH Management Plan (i) finalized and (ii) under implementation	Yes/No	No 01-Sep-2014	Yes 01-Sep-2014		Yes 27-Jul-2022
Comments (achievements against targets): The plan was finalized. It is not under implementation.					
Component: Local Investments in Milot, Dondon and Cap-Haitien					
Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Streetscapes upgraded in project target areas	Meter(m)	0.00 01-Sep-2014	300.00 01-Sep-2014	150.00 03-Aug-2020	2,670.00 27-Jul-2022
Comments (achievements against targets):					



Component: Inclusive Tourism Sector Development Support

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Activities supported by the Community Event & Tourism Development Grants	Number	0.00 01-Sep-2014	100.00 01-Sep-2014	40.00 03-Aug-2020	47.00 27-Jul-2022
Of which are women	Percentage	0.00	40.00	25.00	25.00
Of which are youth	Percentage	0.00	25.00		25.00
Comments (achievements against targets):					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Touristic routes developed and promoted through project investments/activities	Number	0.00 01-Sep-2014	5.00 01-Sep-2014	2.00 03-Aug-2020	2.00 29-Jul-2022



Comments (achievements against targets):

One route was developed and the second completed and proposed

Component: Project Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Infrastructure properly operated and maintained following project financing	Number	0.00	5.00	3.00	3.00
		01-Sep-2014	01-Sep-2014	03-Aug-2020	10-Jun-2021

Comments (achievements against targets):

This was initially measured in US\$ million, in the August 2020 restructuring this was changed to a number and reduced to 3



B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT

Objective/Outcome 1: To increase the attractiveness of the cultural heritage sites in North of Haiti for tourists	
Outcome Indicators	1) An effective Park Management system is contributing to sustainable development of the park (Text, Custom) 2) Number of restored buildings with increased resistance to seismic events (Number, Custom) 3) Number of entities providing cultural and tourism services in the project areas (Number, Custom) 4) Tickets sold annually to the PNH-CSSR (Number, Custom)
Intermediate Results Indicators	1) An interim authority (Autorité de Gestion Provisoire) with staffing acceptable to IDA is established in the PNH-CSSR (Yes/No, Custom) 2) PNH Management Plan (a) finalized and (b) under implementation (Yes/No, Custom) 3) Activities supported by the Community Event & Tourism Development Grants (Number, Custom)
Key Outputs by Component (Linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1)	1. Component A: 1) Diagnostic studies for the rehabilitation of the monuments finalized (Topographical surveys, geotechnical and conservation studies) 2) Urgent conservation works done at the Henri-Ramiers Citadelle 3) Rehabilitation of the road between Citadelle and Ramiers 4) Construction of the route Sans-Souci to Choiseul 5) Creation of the provisional National Historic Park (PNH-CSSR) Management Authority (AGP) and roadmap to begin its formalization as a permanent entity



	6) PNH Management Plan completed and provided to the World Heritage Center 7) Capacities of the National Cultural Heritage Institute (ISPAN) reinforced <i>Component C:</i> 1) Creation and strengthening of the OGDNH (DMO) which is fully staffed with annual plans 2) Implementation of the Community Fund, with a total of 47 subprojects being finalized
Objective/Outcome 2: To improve the living environment for the residents living in North of Haiti	
Outcome Indicators	1) Direct project beneficiaries (Number, Custom), Female beneficiaries (Percentage, Custom Supplement) 2) Population in project areas satisfied with the quality of infrastructure financed by the Project (Percentage, Custom)
Intermediate Results Indicators	1) Streetscapes upgraded in project target areas (Meter(m), Custom) 2) Touristic routes developed and promoted through project investments/activities (Number, Custom)
Key Outputs by Component (Linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 2)	<i>Component A:</i> 1) Rehabilitation of façades in Streets 16 and 20 in the historic city center of Cap Haïtien, 2) studies of restoration and consolidation of the Ancienne Capitainerie of Cap Haïtien's port. <i>Component B:</i> 1) Rehabilitation of the public squares in the Municipalities of Milot and Dondon and their facades,



- | | |
|--|--|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none">2) Completed the participatory process to discuss the priorities in each of the municipalities (Milot, Dondon and Cap Haïtien),3) Completed studies for the construction of various local amenities.(iv) ISPAN's documentation center equipped <p><i>Component C:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">1) Detailed proposal of integrated touristic circuits done |
|--|--|

**ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION****A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS**

Name	Role
Preparation	
Sylvie Debomy	Task Team Leader(s)
Prosper Nindorera	Procurement Specialist(s)
Nyaneba E. Nkrumah	Social Specialist
Peter F. B. A. Lafere	Social Specialist
Supervision/ICR	
Alexandra Ortiz	Task Team Leader(s)
Khadija Faridi, Luciano Gutierrez Wuerzius	Procurement Specialist(s)
Lucas Carrer	Financial Management Specialist
Rahmoune Essalhi	Procurement Team
Bruce MacPhail	Social Specialist
Beth Wanjeri Mwangi	Team Member
Kevin McCall	Environmental Specialist
Joan Dessaint Fomi	Team Member
Alex Pio	Team Member
Barnet Joseph	Team Member
Marie Eleonor Jean Baptiste	Team Member
Maria Cristina Rosa Lucia Villani	Team Member
Ancito Etienne	Team Member
Philome Surfin	Team Member
Jean Marie Dominique Lebon	Procurement Team
Vladimir Mathieu	Procurement Team

**B. STAFF TIME AND COST**

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost	
	No. of staff weeks	US\$ (including travel and consultant costs)
Preparation		
FY13	10.971	84,285.23
FY14	39.044	237,430.86
FY15	26.665	133,260.22
FY16	0	0.00
Total	76.68	454,976.31
Supervision/ICR		
FY15	5.663	52,643.82
FY16	14.825	138,666.02
FY17	3.214	111,031.36
FY18	16.577	262,590.55
FY19	12.950	210,767.67
FY20	24.374	246,974.29
FY21	28.577	228,832.73
FY22	24.663	249,644.10
FY23	10.191	84,722.45
Total	141.03	1,585,872.99


ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT

Components	Amount at Approval (US\$M)	Actual at Project Closing (US\$M)	Percentage of Approval (US\$M)
Physical Cultural Heritages sites and Touristic Circuits in the PNH-CSSR and Cap- Haïtien Historic Center	28	16.95	61
Local Investments in Milot, Dondon and Cap- Haïtien	7	5.00	71
Inclusive Tourism Sector Development Support	4	4.00	100
Contingency Emergency Response	1	1.00	100
Project Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation	5	5.00	1000
Total	45.00	31.95 (26.15)	71 (58)

During the March 2022 restructuring, US\$5.8 million was canceled. Since by then, only one disbursement category was established, this US\$5.8 cannot be broken down to each Component. Therefore, the Actual Amounts shown for each Component are January 2022 figures. In between brackets, the Total Actual Amount at Project Closing is shown, US\$26.15 million, as well as the Percentage of Approval (58%).



ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

Economic Analysis Rating: Negligible

The project has not provided good economic rate of return. Inputting the number of visitors to the site from Table 2 into the model that was used *ex-ante* in the PAD presents the following cost-benefit analysis based on analysis of Component A only for 2015-2019 and using a discount rate of 10 percent, as per the *ex-ante* analysis. The economic rate of return is +1 percent (+39 percent *ex-ante* projection) and the NPV is negative US\$14.6 million (positive US\$18 million *ex-ante* projection).

Table2: Tickets Sold for the PNH-CSSR

Year	Tickets Sold
2015	50,850
2016	38,114
2017	45,067
2018	32,908
2019	32,117

Source: Haitian Ministry of Tourism

Data quality and access limits the depth of the economic analysis for this project *ex-post*. The PAD stated that tourist exit surveys would be conducted to estimate the average spend of tourists, as well as other qualitative data, but this data has not been available for this analysis. The data in Table 2 has come from the Ministry of Tourism but data for the entire year was provided only for 2014⁶ and 2017, with the other years just having between 3-7 months of data provided. Data were then averaged and multiplied by twelve for the annual figure. Depending on what months the data was collected for, this may skew the result for the years as it does not allow for the cyclical nature of tourism. If data was provided for the peak tourist months, then the figures will be skewed upwards and not be representative. This may explain the erratic trend in figures across the sample, albeit with a net reduction in tickets sold.

Some assumptions were made to mitigate the poor access and data quality. The Ministry of Tourism was also able to provide additional figures for the overall number of tourists to Haiti, without disaggregated figures for visitors to the site⁷. This data is for 2013-2021 and partially for 2022. Estimates for the years without data for the number of visitors to the site were calculated by determining the percentage of overall tourists that went to the site for years where the data overlapped, calculating an average, and then applying this average to the years with missing data. Furthermore, the larger dataset of overall

⁶ Which cannot factor into the analysis because it is from before the baseline year in the model, which is 2015

⁷ Statistiques Arrivees de Tourists, MINISTÈRE DU TOURISME, UNITE D'ETUDES ET DE PROGRAMMATION (U.E.P.), 2022



tourists to Haiti showed that annual tourist figures do not follow a trend and that visitor numbers are erratic. Overall tourist figures for 2015 were an outlier and especially high, skewing the output of the model, which uses 2015 as a base year to calculate the NPV and ERR. To abate this and add greater realism to the outcome, the average number of tourists between 2013-2015 was calculated and used as the baseline figure.

The *ex-ante* model suffered from similar issues and its design has drawbacks for the *ex-post* analysis.

The model has been created to calculate spend because of the Project and this does not capture the true economic impact of the Project, just the financial impact. However, the design of the model was complicated by both changes to the Project during the conception stage and pressures to have an adaptable model to evolving circumstances as well as a lack of data to undertake any sophisticated analysis. Data made available from a World Bank CHUD Project baseline survey in May 2022 for house price data would have provided a more relevant analysis if a comparable dataset had been available at the beginning to determine what impact the Project has had. However, this assertion is only valid *ex-post* according to what project implemented, and not the Project that had been planned when the model was being planned.

Domestic and international crises have contributed to poor tourism rates and were outside of the control of the Project. Large changes, both in the design and implementation phases, have contributed to low impact but there are also elements outside of the control of the Project that has contributed to the poor performance and the analysis should be viewed through the lens of a continued deterioration in the socio-political situation since 2018 acting as a deterrent to potential tourists. Lockdown measures and travel restrictions in response to COVID-19 have affected tourism rates worldwide and Haiti will have been affected too.



ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS

Unofficial translation

The Government of Haiti (GoH) thanks the World Bank for the work accomplished through the Cultural Heritage Preservation and Tourism Sector support project (PAST). As stated in the letter sent on July 8, 2022, to the World Bank representative in Haiti, the government of Haiti would have very much liked to benefit from new financing to continue the priority actions undertaken in the PAST. This new funding would make it possible to perpetuate the achievements of the PAST and to complete the priority activities with the reinforcement, conservation, rehabilitation, enhancement, and interpretation of the Citadelle Henri, the Palace and the Chapel of Sans-Souci. Despite a very fragile socio-security situation, tourism remains a development lever for the country, particularly for the northern region, and interventions should be carried out with a view to medium and long-term planning and future exploitation.

The overall impact of the Project

Despite constraints related to the complexity of the Project and its focus on heritage, the high number of activities and the inadequacy of the institutional arrangements for their implementation, and the socio-political and security situation of recent years, the PAST has achieved considerable gains that will serve as a basis for further interventions. Of note are:

- for the PNH-CSSR the establishment of a Temporary Park Management Authority (AGP) which has allowed to bring together all the institutions involved in the management of the Park
- the finalization of the management plan of the PNH-CSSR and its transmission to the World Heritage Centre, thus responding to the requirements made to the State Party for the conservation of this site in the list of World Heritage sites
- the conduct of very complex studies on the monuments of the Park, including geotechnical, geological and seismic studies that have allowed a very thorough knowledge of these monuments
- conservation studies on the Henri Citadel
- the local interventions through the Community Fund which have generated a significant enthusiasm of the communities around the need to preserve the cultural and touristic heritages and wealth and the opportunities to improve the living environment that they represent
- the gradual strengthening of institutions and actors of the tourism industry in the region, the Northern Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Tourism and the Organization for the Management of the Northern Destination of Haiti (OGDNH).



Specific remarks

On administrative and operational efficiency

It is true that there are a significant number of elements internal to the management unit that have led to delays in the implementation of the Project. Nevertheless, it seems excessive to speak of "weaknesses in the implementation unit". Within the same institution, there are projects and programs with different realities from a performance perspective. In this sense, some of the difficulties experienced by the Project are often related to the structure, functioning and performance of the team (in the broadest sense) assigned to implementation. Whether it is from a procurement, safeguard, or financial management perspective, results can vary from project to project. As the report rightly notes, the decision to entrust this project to UTE was motivated by the generally good results that the institution has had and continues to have.

On the coordination and participation

The Ministry of Economy and Finance does not approve procurement as mentioned in paragraph 69. In terms of institutional arrangements, for all components, the partners prepare and/or validate the technical inputs (specifications, terms of reference, etc.) and submit them to the UTE. The UTE and the World Bank then agree on the procurement arrangements.

Concerning the steering committee headed by the Ministry of Tourism and including the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of the Interior and Territorial Collectivities (MICT), the Ministry of the Environment (MoE), the Comité interministériel d'aménagement du territoire (CIAT), ISPAN, DMO, the municipalities and UNESCO, it should be noted in paragraph 73 that a steering committee meeting was held in October 2021 and another in February 2022 (immediately after the inauguration of the ISPAN Documentation Center).

On the fiduciary aspects

Contrary to the statement in paragraph 81 that the UTE processed payments only after receiving authorization from its Minister of Finance, this is not the way the UTE does things. Once the contracts are signed by the Minister, the UTE has the flexibility to manage the contract according to the terms agreed upon, including the management of payments. Some payments have indeed taken time due to delays in approving transfer orders at the Ministry of Finance, or internal processing delays, or irregularities in invoices, etc.

On the environmental and social aspects

The lack of a permanent presence of a safeguard specialist in Cap-Haïtien noted in paragraph 83 should be tempered by the fact that the Project has had at least one environmental specialist and one social specialist assigned full time to the Cap-Haïtien office for the past 3 years. But indeed, travel difficulties (e.g., vehicle availability) made supervision visits difficult.



ANNEX 6. PHOTOS OF THE THREE MAIN CULTURAL HERITAGE SITES



Photo 1 : Palais San Souci



Photo 2 : Citadelle Henry




Photo 3 : Chapelle de Sans Souci



ANNEX 7. PHOTOS OF THE URBAN UPGRADING CARRIED OUT BY THE PROJECT



Photo 1 : Ilot de maisons de la rue 16



Photo 2 : Bâtiment à la rue 16



Photo 3 : Travaux au niveau de la toiture



Photo 4 : Clôture réhabilitée à la rue 20



Photo 5: Requalification des fronts bâtis rues 16 et 20



Photo 6: Requalification des fronts bâtis rues 16 et 20



Photo 7 : Requalification des fronts bâtis rues 16 et 20



Photo 8 : Mairie de Dondon



Photo 9 : Façade de l'école presbytérale Dondon



Photo 10: Ravalement de façades autour de la place



Photo 11 : Ravalement de façades autour de la place de Dondon



Photo 12 : Place de Dondon



Photo 13 : Vue de la place de Dondon



Photo 14 : Escalier de la Chute de Cotard



Photo 15 : Escalier de la Chute de Cotard



Photo 16 : Vue du hangar à Camp Louise



Photo 17 : Charpente réhabilitée à Camp Louise



Photo 18 : Hangar sur la plage Caramel



Photo 19 : Cabine installée pour les toilettes sur la plage Caramel



ANNEX 8. LIST OF COMMUNITY FUND PROJECTS

I - Cultural activities and crafts

1. Strengthening of the sewing workshop of the Legphibao association
2. Strengthening of the Toto Bissainthe Cultural Center
3. Capacity building and valorization of artistic works of disabled people in the North of Haiti
4. Support for the promotion of the heritage of the North of Haiti
5. Support for the strengthening of the Artistic and Tourist Workshop of Pignon
6. Transformation of the artisans' alley in Milot into an artisanal market
7. Project to strengthen the handicraft workshop for the promotion of Culture and Tourism
8. Project to support the promotion of handicraft entrepreneurship by strengthening the capacity of JMLAYITI-CORDONNERIE
9. Project to support the revitalization of the craft sector in North Acul
10. Improvement of the reception of tourists at the Poterie de Lory
11. Project to support and strengthen "Style pam- atelier de couture"
12. Strengthening the production and marketing capacities of Citadelle Shop
13. Strengthening the traditional leisure and craft training center
14. Strengthening of the workshop and preparation of an exhibition on the architecture of Cape Town
15. Strengthening the production and marketing capacities of Dolce Art Workshop
16. Strengthening the workshop's capacity to sell tourism products on the national market
17. For a cultural and artistic revival in Caracol
18. Artisanal and Clothing Center of Milot
19. Valorization of historical painting, sculpture and embroidery works
20. 100 traditional songs
21. Capacity building project for youth groups animating the tourist circuit Sans Souci/ Citadelle
22. Support for the development of the talents of 30 orphaned children
23. Support for artistic creativity through the transformation of recycled objects
24. Project for the Creation of Memories inspired by the History and Culture of Cap Haitien

II - Tourist sites and destinations

1. Jacques Lajoie Natural Park development and animation project
2. Improvement of the Santa Maria beach in Caracol, to improve its potential as a tourist attraction
3. Development of a rest area and sanitary block at Bassin Mambo
4. Support for the strengthening of tourist sites through the redevelopment of a hangar on the beach Saint-Michel of Camp Louise
5. Development of Caramel beach
6. Fencing the remains of the Dumesnil mill
7. Renovation of an ancestral house into a guest house at Patrick's Guild
8. Project of tourist development of the birthplace of Jean Jacques Dessalines
9. Project to strengthen the organizational capacities of Grand Lakou and Quart-Milot
10. Development of the Saint-Jacques Gate
11. Development of the Lovana site in Quartier Morin
12. Development of the tourist site called Chute de Cotard
13. Project for the development of Fort Saint-Joseph and other tourist sites in the bay of Fort-Liberté



III - Restoration

1. Contribution to the development of agritourism by strengthening the processing workshop of the Association for Women's Equality
2. Support for the establishment of a modern cassava processing workshop
3. Revalorization of the traditional Haitian cuisine
4. Community training center for the promotion of local cuisine
5. Support for chocolate production in the Sans Souci Park area "King's Chocolate"
6. Project to strengthen Gaia enterprise for the production of locally flavored starch candy
7. Support for capacity building of the Queen's Bar services

IV - Excursions and transportation

1. Support for the revalorization of tourist, historical and cultural sites in the North through excursions and guided tours
2. Support to the revalorization of the tourist, historical and cultural sites of the North through excursions and repair of the bodywork of the minibusses of guided tourist transport
3. Reinforcement of the capacities of the actors involved in the horse transport from Sans-Souci to Citadelle



ANNEX 9. LIST OF STUDIES AND REPORTS

1. Terms of Reference (ToR) and Specifications (SP)

Description	Author	Date	Format	Use
TOR - Development of a Training Program of Guides in the North of Haiti	Yuri Horowitz	2015	Electronic	Private
TOR – Members of the staff of the Northern Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Tourism	Yuri Horowitz	2015	Electronic	Private
SP - Development of the access road to the Citadel: Milot - Choiseul section	UTE	2015	Electronic	Public
SP - Rehabilitation of the public squares of Milot and Dondon	UTE	2016	Electronic	Public
Framework document of the provisional management structure of the National Historical Park Citadel Sans-Souci Ramiers	ISPAN/UTE	2017	Electronic	Public
TOR - Alternative access road upgrade studies, including identification of an alternative route	UTE	2018	Electronic	Public
TOR - Rehabilitation and development studies of the old harbor master's office in Cap-Haïtien	UTE	2019	Electronic	Public
TOR - Studies and works of requalification of the built fronts in the streets of the Historical Center of Cap-Haïtien	UTE	2019	Electronic	Public
TOR - Conservation, reinforcement, rehabilitation, enhancement and interpretation studies of the Sans-Souci site	UTE	2020	Electronic	Public
TOR - Conservation, reinforcement, rehabilitation, enhancement and interpretation studies of the Henry Citadel and the Ramiers site	UTE	2020	Electronic	Public
TOR - Studies and works for the restoration of the facades of the public square of Dondon	UTE	2021	Electronic	Public



2. Technical Studies

Description	Author	Date	Format	Use
Development studies of the access road to the Citadel: Milot - Choiseul section	GENINOV	2015	Electronic /Hard copy	Private
Reconnaissance, geotechnical, geophysical and pathological studies for the construction of the Cultural Center of Milot and the Health Center of Matador	Laboratoire National des Bâtiments et Travaux Publics (LNBTP)	2016	Electronic /Hard copy	Public
Architectural and technical studies for the rehabilitation of the public squares of Milot and Dondon	Benjamin Jadotte	2016	Electronic /Hard copy	Private
Topographical surveys of the streets of the tourist circuit in downtown Cap-Haïtien	Geo-Scan 3D	2017	Electronic	Private
Topographic surveys of the Citadel, Palais Sans-Souci, Ramiers and surrounding areas	Geo-Scan 3D	2017	Electronic	Private
Topographic surveys of four coastal forts and the access road to Fort Picolet	Geo-Scan 3D	2017	Electronic	Private
Geotechnical studies of the old captaincy and the old prison of Cap-Haïtien	Laboratoire National des Bâtiments et Travaux Publics (LNBTP)	2017	Electronic /Hard copy	Public
Alternative access road upgrade studies, including identification of an alternative route	GENINOV	2018	Electronic /Hard copy	Private
Geotechnical, geological and seismic studies of the PNH-CSSR monuments	Bureau de Recherche Géologique et Minière (BRGM)	2018	Electronic	Public
Design for the requalification works of the built fronts in the street 16 of the Historical Center of Cap-Haïtien	L'Atelier S.A.	2019	Electronic /Hard copy	Private
Preliminary studies for the conservation, reinforcement, rehabilitation, enhancement and interpretation of the Sans-Souci site	Groupeement EGIS/HYADES Agence V. Phalente/VIA Architectes/CCET/ Tropisme/COMPAQ/Pierre Bortolussi/INRAP/Exposition	2021	Electronic	Private
Rehabilitation and development studies of the old harbor master's office in Cap-Haïtien	Groupeement AEdifica Inc./AEdifica Sud	2021	Electronic /Hard copy	Private
Design for the requalification works of the built fronts in Street 20 of the Historical Center of Cap-Haïtien	Firme Conseils d'Architecture de Construction et de Supervision (FICCAS)	2021	Electronic /Hard copy	Private



Description	Author	Date	Format	Use
Architectural and technical studies for the construction of the Milot Socio-Cultural Center, the Milot Craft Production and Training Center and the Dondon Health Center	COMPAQ	2021	Electronic	Private
Design for the restoration of the facades of the public square of Dondon	EXTRACO S.A.	2022	Electronic	Public
Reconnaissance campaign, geotechnical, geophysical, and pathological studies of the Sans-Souci and Milot Cultural Center sites	Laboratoire National des Bâtiments et Travaux Publics (LNBTP)	2022	Electronic /Hard copy	Public

3. Studies and Reports

Description	Author	Date	Support	Use
Report on the Citadelle	Constantino MEUCCI	2013	Electronic	Public
Development of an environmental and social management framework for the project	Maximilien ONGANANA	2013	Electronic	Public
Management Framework for Physical and Cultural Heritage		2013	Electronic	Public
Identification & development of tours and tourism products for the Ministry of Tourism	Céline CHAUVEL	2015	Electronic	Public
Needs Assessment for upgrading the national information system on tourism statistics	Henry RABEMANANTSOA	2015	Electronic	Public
Report – Development of tourism products	Yuri HOROWITZ	2015	Electronic	Public
Human Resources Manual of the Northern Regional Directorate	Yuri HOROWITZ	2015	Electronic	Public
Social evaluation studies of the project	Structure d'Appui à la Gestion d'Entreprise (STRATEGE)	2017	Electronic	Public
Development of a functional framework and concept of grievance mechanisms	Centre d'études et de Coopération internationale (CECI)	2017	Electronic /Hard copy	Public



Description	Author	Date	Support	Use
Urban and architectural diagnosis within the framework of the requalification operation of certain built fronts of the already evaluated perimeter of the historical center of Cap-Haïtien	JB MILLET ARCHITECTES	2016	Electronic /Hard copy	Public
Business plan of the Citadelle Sans-Souci Ramiers National Historic Park	Eslin JEAN-BAPTISTE	2016	Electronic	Public
Report of analysis and strategic proposals for the reduction of the seismic and cyclonic vulnerability of the buildings and vestiges of the Citadelle - Sans-Souci - Ramiers site	Patricia BALLANDIER	2017	Electronic	Public
Supplemental Studies for the PAST Social Assessment	Jocelyn DORSAINT	2020	Electronic	Public



ANNEX 10. MAP OF THE PROJECT

