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The World Bank

Report No: ICR00002074

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IDA-H2370)

ON A

GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 1.4 MILLION
(US$ 2 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF HAITI

FOR A

SECOND ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT

December 30 2011

Poverty Reduction and Economic Management
Haiti Country Management Unit
Latin American and the Caribbean Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective November 15, 2011)

Currency Unit = Haitian Gourde
US$ 1.00 = 40.35 [HTG]

October 1 – September 30

AECI	Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional (Spanish International Cooperation Agency)
BPM	Bureau du Premier Ministre (Prime Minister's Office)
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CEFOPAFOP	Centre d'Education et de Perfectionnement des Agents de la Fonction Publique (Training Center for Public Administration)
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CNMP	Commission Nationale des Marchés Publics (National Public Procurement Commission)
CSC/CA	Cour Supérieure des Comptes et du Contentieux Administratif (Supreme Audit Institution)
CY	Calendar Year
DEE	Direction des Etudes Economiques (Directorate of Economic Studies)
DGB	Direction Générale du Budget (General Budget Directorate)
DGT	Direction Générale du Trésor (General Directorate of the Treasury)
DSNCRP	Document de Stratégie Nationale pour la Croissance et pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté (Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper)
EGRO	Economic Governance Reform Operation
EGTAG	Economic Governance Technical Assistance Grant
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GOH	Government of Haiti
ICF	Interim Cooperation Framework
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
IDA	International Development Association
IADB`	Inter-American Development Bank
IFI	International Financial Institutions
IFR	Interim Financial Report
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IGF	Inspection Générale des Finances(General Finance Inspectorate)
ISR	Implementation Status Report
LICUS	Low Income Countries Under Stress
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation

MEF	Ministry of Economy and Finance
MPCE	Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe (Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation)
OMRH	Office de Management et des Ressources Humaines (Management and Human Resource Office)
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PDO	Project Development Objective
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PEMFAR	Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review
PRUII	Projet de Reconstruction d'Urgence des Infrastructures et des Institutions (Infrastructure and Institutional Emergency Recovery Project)
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
QAG	Quality Assurance Group
SYGADE	Système d'Informatisation des Dépenses (Expenditure Information System)
TOR	Terms of Reference
TTL	Task Team Leader
UCP	Unité de Coopération Projet (UCP)
ULCC	Unité de Lutte contre la Corruption (Anti-Corruption Unit)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

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HAITI
Economic Governance Technical Assistance Grant II

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A. Basic Information

Country:	Haiti	Project Name:	HT Economic Governance TAG II
Project ID:	P095371	L/C/TF Number(s):	IDA-H2370
ICR Date:	12/30/2011	ICR Type:	Core ICR
Lending Instrument:	TAL	Borrower:	THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI
Original Total Commitment:	XDR 1.40M	Disbursed Amount:	XDR 0.42M
Revised Amount:	XDR 1.40M		
Environmental Category: C			
Implementing Agencies: Unit¿ de Coordination du Projet (UCP) at the Ministry of Economy and Finance			
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:			

B. Key Dates

Process	Date	Process	Original Date	Revised / Actual Date(s)
Concept Review:	02/27/2006	Effectiveness:	08/16/2007	08/16/2007
Appraisal:	04/17/2006	Restructuring(s):		10/30/2009
Approval:	06/20/2006	Mid-term Review:	10/01/2010	05/19/2010
		Closing:	06/30/2009	06/30/2011

C. Ratings Summary

C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes:	Unsatisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome:	High
Bank Performance:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Borrower Performance:	Moderately Unsatisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)

Bank	Ratings	Borrower	Ratings
Quality at Entry:	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Government:	Moderately Satisfactory
Quality of Supervision:	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Implementing Agency/Agencies:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Overall Bank Performance:	Moderately Unsatisfactory	**Overall Borrower Performance:**	Moderately Unsatisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation	Indicators	QAG Assessments (if	Rating

Performance		any)	
Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality at Entry (QEA):	None
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality of Supervision (QSA):	None
DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:	Unsatisfactory		

D. Sector and Theme Codes		
	Original	Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Central government administration	100	100

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Administrative and civil service reform	25	25
Law reform	13	13
Other accountability/anti-corruption	25	25
Participation and civic engagement	13	13
Public expenditure, financial management and procurement	24	24

E. Bank Staff		
Positions	At ICR	At Approval
Vice President:	Pamela Cox	Pamela Cox
Country Director:	Alexandre V. Abrantes	Caroline D. Anstey
Sector Manager:	Arturo Herrera Gutierrez	Ronald E. Myers
Project Team Leader:	Alexandre Arrobbio	Linn A. Hammergren
ICR Team Leader:	Alexandre Arrobbio	
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F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document**)**
The objective of the Second Economic Governance Technical Assistance Grant (EGTAG II) was to further assist the Government in strengthening its institutional capacity in the areas of public sector resource management and achieving improved responsiveness to citizen needs and demands. It was designed to advance changes begun with the EGRO, the LICUS Trust Fund grant, and EGTAG I to overcome the weaknesses undermining the planning and implementation of Haiti's current and investment budget; the efficacy of donor assistance, and public trust in public sector institutions. Specifically, EGTAG II's development objectives were to support additional activities required to meet the basic goals of EGTAG I

and to move beyond them. This was expected to: (i) improve operation of the budgetary, control and procurement systems; (ii) build a central human resources unit, and within that to develop and improve procedural rules and organizational capacity to implement them; (iii) advance other elements of the plan to modernize the distribution, upgrade the quality, and improve the incentives of public sector employees; (iv) work with the MEF and one or two sector ministries to create, on an experimental basis, capacity for strategic monitoring of sector policies and service delivery; and (v) improve the effectiveness and sustainability of the Government's anti-corruption, transparency and public participation programs.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

The PDO was revised in October 2009, in order to (i) realign the project with the Bank strategy for governance reform in Haiti, (ii) narrow the project scope and (iii) incorporate findings of recent analytical work. The revised development objective of the Project was to assist the Recipient in strengthening its institutional capacity in the area of: (a) budget formulation and execution; and (b) budget monitoring and control.

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	PEFA indicator 6: comprehensiveness of information included in budget documentation			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	C: recent budget documentation fulfills 3-4 of the 9 information benchmarks		C+: Improvement in information benchmarks fulfilled by budget documentation	Not achieved C: The budget documents meet three out of the nine information benchmarks.
Date achieved	10/01/2007		06/30/2011	11/08/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Source: 2011 assessment of PEFA indicators by the Bank team			
Indicator 2 :	PEFA indicator 19(i): use of competition in award of contracts (% of public contracts awarded on a competitive basis)			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	Not rated		C: Available data shows that less than 50% of contracts above the threshold are awarded on an open competitive basis, but the	Not achieved D:Insufficient data exists to assess the method used to award public contracts

			data may not be accurate.	
Date achieved	10/01/2007		06/30/2011	11/08/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Source: 2011 assessment of PEFA indicators by the Bank team			
Indicator 3 :	PEFA indicator 26(ii): timeliness of submission of audit reports to legislature			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	D+: Audit reports are submitted to Parliament beyond the 12-month period after the end of the fiscal period under review.		C : Audit reports are submitted to the legislature within 12 months of the end of the period covered (for audit of financial statements from their receipt by the auditors).	Not rated
Date achieved	10/01/2007		06/30/2011	06/30/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	This indicator cannot be rated: the 08/09 audit report could not be transmitted to Parliament with the budget, as is the norm, since the FY10-11 budget was adopted by decree due to the earthquake. Source: assessment of PEFA indicators by the Bank team.			
Indicator 4 :	Increased understanding of corruption practices, as measured by studies' dissemination seminars exit surveys.			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	No available survey data		Opinion surveys	Not achieved: No survey undertaken
Date achieved	12/10/2009		06/30/2011	06/30/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Source: Bank's assessment			

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	Reports prepared by DGB on debt levels (debt stock) in order to inform the preparation of the annual budget (between 2009 and 2011)			
Value	No regular reporting on		At least one	Last debt data

(quantitative or Qualitative)	debt levels		report per Haitian fiscal year (between 2009 and 2011)	published on the MEF website dated November 2010. Reports are produced manually by the Debt Directorate.
Date achieved	01/01/2008		06/30/2011	11/08/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Source: Bank team assessment and MEF's website			
Indicator 2 :	Number of Ministries using the human resource's registry			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0.00		9 out of 17 Ministries at least use the human resource registry	The central HR registry exists but is not operational. Ministries are not able to make use of it.
Date achieved	07/08/2008		06/30/2011	06/30/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Source: Bank's assessment			
Indicator 3 :	Public Finance Reform Agenda			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	No Finance Reform Agenda		Reform Agenda in place for Public Finance	Existence of a joint government-IFI matrix of Public Finance reforms. Institutional diagnosis and perspective of reform of the MEF drafted.
Date achieved	12/10/2009		06/30/2011	06/30/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Source: Bank's assessment			
Indicator 4 :	Organic Law on the Organization of the CSC/ CA			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	Current Legal Framework for the CSC/CA is incomplete		New Law sent to Parliament for Approval.	Law exists in draft form but has not been sent to Parliament.
Date achieved	12/10/2009		06/30/2011	06/30/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Source: Bank's assessment			
Indicator 5 :	2 studies on corruption in 2 key sectors			

	published by ULCC			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	No studies on corruption in these sectors		2 studies published	One study completed at the end of June 2011, not yet published
Date achieved	12/10/2009		06/30/2011	06/30/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Source: Bank's assessment			

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO	IP	Actual Disbursements (USD millions)
1	09/29/2006	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
2	12/27/2006	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	0.00
3	06/19/2007	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	0.00
4	12/19/2007	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
5	06/23/2008	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	0.00
6	12/11/2008	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	0.30
7	06/24/2009	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	0.30
8	07/29/2009	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	0.30
9	12/20/2009	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	0.47
10	04/13/2010	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	0.47
11	11/23/2010	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	0.47
12	07/05/2011	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	0.73

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)	Board Approved PDO Change	ISR Ratings at Restructuring		Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USD millions	Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made
		DO	IP		
10/30/2009	Y	MS	MS	0.30	

If PDO and/or Key Outcome Targets were formally revised (approved by the original approving body) enter ratings below:

	Outcome Ratings
Against Original PDO/Targets	Unsatisfactory
Against Formally Revised PDO/Targets	Unsatisfactory
Overall (weighted) rating	Unsatisfactory

I. Disbursement Profile



1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. **At the time of the project appraisal (mid-2006), Haiti was one of the most disadvantaged countries in the world and the poorest country in the Western hemisphere.** It was also one of the most unequal, with a Gini coefficient of 0.65. The country lagged in social indicators, ranking 153 out of 172 in the Human Development Index at the time of the project's appraisal.

2. **After a long period of political instability, constitutional order was restored in 2006.** Haiti's history has been marked by chronic political instability. Since the mid-20th century, the country has endured a 30-year dictatorship characterized by corruption, repression and the pillage of wealth. This was followed by a series of short-lived governments, also plagued by corruption; and the election, overthrow, reinstatement and ultimate resignation in February 2004 of President Jean Bertrand Aristide. A Transitional Government was established in 2004 with a mandate to create the conditions necessary to hold democratic elections and to hand over power to a new government in early 2006. Elections were organized in February 2006. Following the election and the instatement of a new National Assembly, Mr René Preval took office in May 2006.

3. **In the spring of 2004, the Transition Government, in collaboration with the donor community, prepared an Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF), in order to guide future reforms, with a specific focus on economic governance.** The ICF aimed to identify the country's priority development interventions and related funding within a donor coordinated framework. It was also the foundation upon which the medium-term National Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (DSNCRP, 2008-2010) would be prepared. The ICF comprised four pillars: (i) strengthening political governance and promoting national dialogue; (ii) strengthening economic governance and contributing to institutional development; (iii) promoting economic recovery; and (iv) improving access to basic services. At the time of EGTAG2's project appraisal in mid-2006, newly elected President Preval was committed to continuing the ICF focus on economic governance as a key priority.

4. **Since 2004, the Transition Government, with the support of the donor community has made significant advances in economic governance reforms.** In an effort to fight corruption; build links with civil society; and increase the transparency and efficiency of public resources, the government launched an economic governance reform program. The Government created an Anti-corruption Unit and established mechanisms for civil society monitoring. Following the adoption of a new Organic Budget Law in 2004, it strengthened budget preparation processes and increased the transparency of budget information through the dissemination of key budgetary data. The Government enhanced the budgetary oversight of the Supreme Audit Institution and adopted a new Procurement Decree that set up a permanent procurement commission with a revised mandate. It also improved the transparency of procurement processes. Finally, the

Government started a review of human resource policy, as a first step toward modernizing Human Resources Management.

5. **In line with the Government's priorities, the 2004 Bank Transitional Support Strategy (TSS) included a specific focus on institutional strengthening.** The long-term strategy for Bank support in Haiti, as articulated in the TSS was "inclusive growth and poverty reduction through local development, institutional strengthening and support of productive sectors", with an emphasis on restoring the credibility of institutions. EGTAG2 contributed to institutional strengthening by concentrating on economic governance. The assumption was that successful growth, poverty, emergency relief and recovery programs required effective and transparent public resources management. The operation also addressed the need to foment broader participation in governance reforms and support thereof. Civil society monitoring mechanisms; access to information; and communication on reforms and programs enabled this.

6. **EGTAG2 was part of a broader program of institutional strengthening in Haiti.** Since 2004, IDA support for economic management and for a governance reform program has included: (i) a total of US$96.5 million of development policy loans under the three Economic Governance Reform Operations (EGROs, *P089873, P100564, P117944*); and (ii) the LICUS Trust Fund Grant *(TF053366)*, approved in 2004 and amounting to US$6 million, of which US$1.5 million supported economic governance reforms, and two Economic Governance Technical Assistance Grants (EGTAG 1, *P093936* and EGTAG2, *P095371*) amounting to US$4 million, to underpin the reforms of the development policy operations. These grants complemented other donors' support for Haiti in the area of economic governance (including IADB, USAID, CIDA, AECI, EU and IMF)

7. **EGTAG2 was designed to continue the work started with EGTAG1, with greater attention to ICF priorities which were not covered by the former operation**. The Bank technical assistance took the form of two back-to-back US$2.0 million grants - EGTAG 1 (*P093936)* and EGTAG2 *(P095371*) - which were presented to the Board within one year of each other.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

8. **The original objective of EGTAG2 was to assist the Government in strengthening its institutional capacity in the area of public sector resource management and achieving improved responsiveness to its citizens' needs and demands.** It was designed to advance changes begun with the EGROs (*P089873, P100564, P117944*), the LICUS Trust Fund grant *(TF053366)* and EGTAG1 (*P093936)* It was also intended to (i) overcome the weaknesses undermining Haiti's planning and implementation of its current and investment budget and (ii) improve the efficacy of donor assistance, and public trust in public sector institutions. Specifically, EGTAG2's development objectives were to: support additional activities required to meet the basic goals of EGTAG1 and to move beyond them in order to: (i) improve operation of the budgetary, control and procurement systems; (ii) build a central human resources unit,

and within that to develop and improve procedural rules and organizational capacity to implement them; and (iii) advance other elements of the plan to modernize the distribution, upgrade the quality, and improve the incentives for public sector employees; (iv) work with the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) and one or two sector ministries to create, on an experimental basis, capacity for strategic monitoring of sector policies and service delivery; and (v) to improve the effectiveness and sustainability of the Government's anti-corruption, transparency and public participation programs.

9. **The indicators defined to measure progress with the project development objective were defined as follows:**

- Percentage of non-salary current public expenditures going through '*comptes courants*' (discretionary ministerial accounts).
- Inclusion of external financing (disbursements and expenditures) in the national budget.
- Number of ministries developing budgets in program and results format.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority), Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

10. **In 2009, the project was restructured and the PDO was modified**. The revised PDO was to assist the Republic of Haiti in strengthening its institutional capacity in the areas of: (a) budget formulation and execution, and (b) budget monitoring and control.

11. **The outcome indicators to measure progress with the revised development objectives were defined as follows:**

- PEFA indicator 6: comprehensiveness of information included in budget documentation (Baseline: C and Target: C+)
- PEFA indicator 19(i): use of competition in award of contracts (Baseline: Not rated, Target: C)
- PEFA indicator 26(ii): timeliness of submission of audit reports to legislature (Baseline: D+, Target: C)
- Increased understanding of corruption practices, as measured by exit surveys at studies' dissemination seminars. (Baseline: No Current Survey Data, Target: Opinion Surveys).

12. **The revision of the PDO and associated indicators aimed to:**

- ***Realign the project with the priorities of the May 2009 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) and those of the New Government.*** The scope of the project needed to be realigned with the priorities expressed in the National Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (DSNCRP) and in the CAS FY09-12 (Report No 48284 HT). The CAS took note of the recent improvements achieved by the Government since 2006. It also adapted the World Bank's program to the country's 2007 National Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. The CAS sought to respond to a series of important shocks faced in 2008 that led to a loss equivalent to 15 percent of the GDP and further weakened the Government capacity. The CAS was structured into three pillars: (i) promoting growth and local development; (ii) investing in human capital and (iii) reducing vulnerability to disasters, with a cross-cutting emphasis on economic governance reforms. The CAS stressed that Bank interventions would be determined by government priorities and would address areas where Bank projects have already achieved progress, where it has a comparative advantage and where Bank resources can fill gaps or leverage instruments by other donors or the private sector.

- ***Narrow the project's scope building on lessons learned from previous operations and the Bank's comparative advantage.*** Building on lessons learned from former operations, and considering the factors that led to a delay in project implementation, EGTAG2's scope was narrowed down to two strategic areas: (i) budget formulation and execution and (ii) budget monitoring and controls. These were areas where the Bank had a comparative advantage, given its long term engagement with beneficiaries. The limitation of the scope of the project took into account the limited lending envelope and was expected to simplify project supervision.

- ***Incorporate the findings of recent analytical work.*** By revealing specific weaknesses in the management of public resources, the *Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Report* (PEMFAR) analysis, which was completed in 2008, helped the Bank team refine the PDO and determine appropriate outcome indicators.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

13. **The original beneficiaries comprised the main institutions responsible for Public Financial Management, Human Resources and accountability institutions.** These include: (i) the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), including: the General Directorate of the Budget (DGB), the General Directorate of the Treasury (DGT), the Office of Economic Studies (DEE) and the General Directorate of the Ministry (DGM); (ii) the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPCE), (iii) the National Procurement Commission (CNMP); (iv) the Supreme Audit Institution (CSC/CA); (v) the Anti-Corruption Unit (ULCC); (vi) the Human Resources Unit within the Prime Minister's Office (OMRH); (vii) the MEF's Executive Secretary and Oversight Committee for the civil society and (viii) one or two sector ministries to be selected.

14. **Further to the 2009 restructuring, the revised beneficiaries also included Parliamentarians and Inspection Générale des Finances (IGF).** The revised beneficiaries include: (i) the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), including the General Directorate of the Budget (DGB), and the Directorate of Economic Studies (DEE); (ii) The Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPCE); (iii) the National Procurement Commission (Commission Nationale des Marchés Publics, CNMP); (iv) the Supreme Audit Institution (Cour Supérieure des Comptes et du Contentieux Administratif (CSC/CA); (v) the Anti-Corruption Unit (Unité de Lutte Contre la Corruption, (ULCC); (vi) the Human Resources Unit within the Prime's

Minister Office (OMRH); (vii) the Government Training Center (CEFOPAFOP); (viii) the General Inspectorate of Finance (IGF); (xix) Civil Society and Parliamentarians.

1.5 Original Components (*as approved*)

15. **Originally, the project included five components.** These components were: (i) financial resource management; (ii) human resources development; (iii) monitoring of service delivery; (iv) anti-corruption and civil society engagement; and (v) communication, coordination, and project management. Below is a detailed description of each project component, as inferred from the Financing Agreement (No H237-0-HA).

Component 1 - Financial Resource Management (US$700,000)

16. **This component aimed at strengthening financial resource management with the following**:

- The carrying out, through the provision of technical advisory services, equipment and training programs for selected staff of MEF and the Executing Agencies of:(a) follow up activities in respect of the design and implementation of basic budgetary procedures and functions, including in a program-oriented and results linked format; and (b) an evaluation of the initial results of the new budgetary procedures.
- The implementation of, and further adjustment to, the plan to improve CSCCA's performance as an ex-post public auditing body.
- The provision of support for the operation of the CNMP, including through reinforced institution-building, the development of training programs in standardized procurement procedures for sector procurement staff and the subsequent elaboration of related standardized documents.

Component 2 – Human Resource Development (US$500,000)

17. **This component aimed at further advancing the Recipient's capacity to develop its human resource base through the provision of technical advisory services and training and the acquisition of equipment for:**

- The assessment and continued implementation of the Recipient's legal framework on civil service and central administration organization and the development of procedures and incentives for personnel selection and, performance evaluation.
- The building of capacity in information and data management for the Human Resources Unit to enable it to monitor human resource needs policy and programs.
- The development of working relations between the central Human Resources Unit and sector human resources departments; and the provision of assistance by the Human Resources Unit to other agencies in developing plans to meet current and future personnel requirements. This included the use of information and communication technology tools for, *inter alia*, the creation of a single public employees' database and a uniform set of personnel records.
- The building of institutional capacity for human resources management in the Prime Minister's Office (BPM) and in human resources offices of other selected Recipient's

public agencies with a view to assist in the design and spearheading of a longer-term civil service reform.

Component 3 – Development of MEF Capacity for Strategic Monitoring of Sector Policy through Sector Ministries' Tracking of Service Delivery (US$300,000)

18. **This component aimed at developing MEF and MPCE's capacity for strategic monitoring of sector outputs and policy using:**

- Support which was specifically intended for MEF's office of economic studies to assist in creating methodologies to link current and investment budgets to streamline government priorities.
- Identify Selected Agencies to participate in pilot assessments. These assessments will consider current practices in terms of needs and capabilities in monitoring civil service delivery.
- Provide technical advisory services and equipment to develop procedures for tracking service delivery in the Selected Agencies.

Component 4 – Anti-corruption and Civil Society Engagement (US$250,000)

19. **The objective of this component was to strengthen transparency of all public transactions and operations by:**

- The further enhancement of ULCC's capacity for anti-corruption programming, detection and sanctioning, including through the continuance of the preparation of a modernized legal framework in relation thereto.
- The provision of training to improve the performance of the mechanisms for monitoring economic governance by civil society.

Component 5 – Communication, Donor Coordination, and Project Management (US$190,000)

20. **The aim of this component was to ensure optimal efficiency of Project implementation.** This was done by providing continued support to UCP for further implementation of the following:

- Communication mechanisms and strategies needed to disseminate the contents of the Recipient's reform program and to ensure wider ownership thereof among the public.
- Donor coordination activities in the area of economic governance.
- Management, coordination and monitoring activities related to the Project. These activities include organizing meetings for staff members responsible for the project from different Executing Agencies.

1.6 Revised Components

21. **The original five components were reorganized into three components**. Within these three components, resources were reallocated to two new critical beneficiaries: the General Inspectorate of Finance, and the key Parliamentary committees (see table 1 for

an overview of the changes). Below is a detailed description of each revised component, as stated in the amendment to the Financing Agreement ((No H237-0-HA)..

Component 1: Strengthening Budget Formulation and Execution (US$1,320,000)

22. **The objective of this component was to continue strengthening budget formulation and execution by:**

- Executing: (a) capacity building activities related to the design and implementation of the budget reform, including activities to develop strategies at the sector level and a framework to manage externally funded expenditures; and (b) activities related to the debt management system for the debt management unit of MEF.
- Building capacity in Human Resources Management information for the Human Resources Unit. This was intended to enable it to monitor human resource needs via: (a) the implementation of a single public employees' database and a standardized set of personnel records; and (b) the execution of a study on non-permanent employees to better understand the budget implications, thereby providing support to MEF to refine the preparation of the budget law.
- Further developing MEF and MPCE's capacity for strategic monitoring of sector outputs and policy. This would be achieved by: (a) providing support specifically for MEF's office of economic studies to assist in creating methodologies to link current and investment budgets in order to streamline government priorities; (b) identifying Selected Agencies to participate in pilot assessments. These assessments would consider their current practices in terms of needs and capabilities in monitoring civil service delivery; and (c) developing procedures for tracking service delivery in said Selected Agencies.
- Providing support for operation of the CNMP. This support was to help develop training programs in standardized procurement procedures for sector procurement staff in partnership with CEFOPAFOP. The training program would also involve execution of a dissemination and communication strategy, all of which was expected to reinforce institution-building.

Component 2: Strengthening Budget Monitoring and Control (US$480,000)

23. **The objective of this component was to continue to strengthen budget monitoring and control by:**

- Designing and implementing the strategic plan for the improvement of CSCCA's performance as an ex-post public auditing body. This would include continued adjustments to the strategic plan and finalization of the institutional framework.
- Strengthening the General Finance Inspectorate by enhancing the capacity of selected staff to monitor and control public expenditures.
- Further enhancement of ULCC's capacity to detect and sanction anti-corruption programs; preparation of a youth forum on corruption; execution of analysis on governance issues pertaining to the customs, fiscal, judicial and private sector areas.
- Execution of a study on civil society mechanisms and capacity building activities for parliamentarians.

Component 3: Communication and Project Management (US$200,000)

24. **This component aimed to ensure optimal efficiency of Project implementation by providing continued support to UCP to further implement the following**:

- Communication mechanisms and strategies needed to disseminate the contents of the Recipient's reform program and to ensure wider ownership thereof among the public.
- Activities on management, coordination, monitoring and evaluation and fiduciary issues to build capacity of UCP staff, and hiring a deputy accountant for the Project.

Table 1: Original and Revised Costs by Component

Original Project Components as in initial PAD (Report No: 35909-HT)	Original Allocation (USD) as in initial PAD	Revised Project Components	Proposed Reallocation (USD)	Difference in Costs by Component
(I) Financial Resource Management	700,000	**(I)** Improvement of Budget Formulation and Execution	1,320,000	+620,000
(II) Human Resource Development	500,000	Scope reduced and included in Component I		-500,000
(III) Improved capacity of MEF and selected sector agencies to monitor service delivery and sector policy	300,000	This component has been transferred to Component I		-300,000
(IV) Anti-corruption and Civil Society Engagement	250,000	**(II)** Strengthening Budget Monitoring and Control	480,000	+230,000
(V) Communication, Donor Coordination, and Project Management	190,000	**(III)** Communication and Project Management	200,000	+10,000
(VI) To be programmed	60,000			

1.7 Other significant changes

25. **In 2009, the project's closing date was extended from 30 June 2009 to 30 June 2011 in two steps.** The project was granted a four-month bridging extension until 31 October 2009 while the Board approved restructuring was being processed and was then extended until 30 June 2011, as part of the restructuring. The two-year extension was justified by delays in the Grant Agreement's ratification by the Recipient. This was due to difficulties in reaching an agreement regarding conditions for the ratification of IDA grants more broadly. An agreement was reached in 2007 by the Government and National Assembly that exempted such grants from the requirement of the ratification by the Assembly.

26. **Proceeds were re-allocated**. Disbursement categories were consolidated into a single category for: consulting services, works, goods and operating costs in order to facilitate the implementation of the activities.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

27. **The present ICR finds the EGTAG2 quality of entry to be Unsatisfactory**. Despite the overall relevance of its objectives, the design of the project was too complex and overly ambitious given the limited financing available and the implementation challenges in a fragile state.

Strengths of the program at entry

28. **The overall development objectives of the project were appropriate, albeit very broad, as noted by the Quality Assurance Group (QAG) panel's report, conducted in 2008**[1]. The objectives of the project were aligned with the 2004 Bank Transitional Support Strategy (*Report No 30541-HT*), which emphasized the need to strengthen institutions and restore their credibility. They also reflected the Government's own priorities, as articulated in the economic governance pillar of the ICF. Some components of the project included innovative features, such as the introduction of elements of civil society monitoring.

29. **EGTAG2's objectives and activities were aligned with the reform agenda supported by Bank budget support operations (the EGRO series).** While the Bank provided budget support to Haiti through the EGRO series, the strengthening of government capacity in the areas addressed by budget support operations was important to ensure an adequate pace of implementation of the reform program.

30. **The project sought to incorporate lessons learned from previous operations (LICUS and EGTAG1).** Lessons learned included: (i) the need to work incrementally; (ii) the importance of constant communication and coordination among and within governmental agencies and among donors; (iii) the key role played by the counterpart agency and the PCU in effecting this coordinating function; and (iv) the need to assist the authorities in implementing existing legislation before supporting the adoption of new legislation or systems. EGTAG2 therefore incorporated technical assistance to support the implementation of the new budget law, the procurement decree, and the decree defining the CSCCA's operations. It also emphasized the importance of working through donor coordination mechanisms.

31. **As noted by the 2008 QAG panel report, donor collaboration was strong in the preparation of the operation.** It was undertaken in close collaboration with other donor agencies active in the area of economic governance (IADB, USAID, AECI, EU, IMF and the French collaboration agency). An economic governance group led by GoH helped coordinate donor work and ensure that it met Government priorities. The panel noted that the focus on this collaboration ensured that the direction of donor support was consistent with the priorities in the Interim Cooperation Framework. Nonetheless, the panel also

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[1] This 2008 QAG report rated the risks of EGTAG2. It did not rate the quality at entry and the quality of supervision, but included some comments on both aspects. Regarding the PDO, the QAG panel's report noted: "The current statement of development objective, while appropriate, is very broad and not supported by measurable and monitorable indicators to enable monitoring of progress and defining of success."

noted that the coordination of all donors needed to be strengthened particularly with the IADB in order to maintain the momentum of economic governance reforms and that a joint institutional capacity building strategy needed to be prepared.

Weaknesses of the project at entry

32. **The project design was too complex and overly ambitious, with regard to capacity constraints and the limited amount of financing available (US$2,000,000).** The development objectives covered exhaustively all aspects of economic governance (budgetary, control and procurement systems, human resources management, monitoring of service delivery, anti-corruption, transparency and public participation programs). To support these broad objectives, the project comprised more than 30 activities in five different sectors involving UCP and over ten different direct counterparts. These internal implementation arrangements, as well as the high number of activities, limited the Government's ability to implement the project in an efficient way, further stretching weak Government's capacity.

33. **The overlap between the implementation of EGTAG1 and EGTAG2 has introduced further complexity.** To ensure that IDA13 resources allocated to Haiti were fully used, EGTAG2 was presented to the Board only one year after EGTAG1; at this point the implementation of EGTAG1 was still in its early stages. The overlap between the implementation periods, the objectives, activities and indicators of both projects further increased the complexity of the supervision and monitoring of their respective progress. Pooling funding could have eased supervision for the Bank team as well as for the counterparts, especially given the previous comments on capacity. Moreover, the overlap significantly delayed disbursements under EGTAG2, which began only after EGTAG1 closed on September 30, 2009.

34. **The risk related to the capacity of the PCU to handle several projects should have been rated high instead of medium**. The PCU supervised the implementation of EGTAG2, IADB-financed projects, the Bank Infrastructure and, after the earthquake, the Institutional Emergency Recovery Project (PRUII, P120895). Although staff were adequately qualified, managing all these projects simultaneously was challenging, especially in 2010, when the PCU experienced a high turnover. Stronger mitigation measures would have included, for example, systematic training for newly hired staff, who were not familiar with bank procedures, and an appropriate incentive system to retain PCU staff.

35. **Weak government support and sustainability of reforms, identified as two additional risks by the 2008 QAG report, had not been emphasized during project preparation.** The QAG panel report noted that reforms do not appear to have government ownership, although the GoH understands them and supports them. It indicated that: "reforms are driven by international pressures and are strongly encouraged by the resource transfer carrot. Their implementation requires intensive donor coordination to ensure that the GoH clearly understands that all aid is tied to economic governance reforms. (…). Furthermore, it noted that "to be sustainable, the project will

require donor coordination to back up the reforms on a permanent basis. Follow-on projects would also ensure the sustainability of reforms."

36. **Finally, the project lacked an appropriate Monitoring and Evaluation system.** As noted by the 2008 QAG panel report, the PDO objective was too broad and the project lacked an appropriate set of realistic performance indicators and baseline data.

2.2 Implementation

'Force majeure' factors

37. **Between 2008 and 2010, the project experienced a series of external shocks that disrupted project implementation:**

- **Haiti was hit by four back-to–back hurricanes (Fay, Gustav, Hanna and Ike) and by tropical storms in August-September 2008.** These natural disasters caused damages and losses estimated at nearly a billion dollars, or about 15 percent of GDP. They threatened macro-economic stability and diverted resources away from government priorities, and weakened Government capacity.
- **Project implementation was affected by the 2010 earthquake, which significantly decreased the capacity of the Haitian administration.** It caused massive human and material damages to the beneficiaries of the project. In particular, the following buildings collapsed or were severely damaged: the National Public Procurement Commission, the Supreme Audit Institution, the Office of Human Resources Management, and the Government Capacity's Building Institute. Some data were lost, and unfortunately some critical staff members lost their lives. In this context, some activities envisaged under EGTAG2 could not been carried out or were no longer identified as priorities. In the aftermath of the earthquake, most of EGTAG2's procurement processes were interrupted for several months (at least until May 2010), to give priority to the urgent reconstruction needs.
- **The earthquake created substantial political uncertainty**. Presidential and municipal elections, previously scheduled to be held in 2010 stalled. A new Prime Minister was appointed only in October 2011, months after the presidential elections of March 2011 and the new Government only took office at the end of October 2011.
- **Project supervision was disrupted due to several unexpected events in 2010.** Project supervision was particularly affected by a serious accident involving the Bank TTL in May 2010 and the murder of the project Coordinator a few weeks later. The PCU also lost the assistant Accountant during the 2010 earthquake, and had to renew its team members almost entirely in 2010, including: the Coordinator, the Procurement Specialist, the Financial Specialist and the assistant Accountant. These difficult circumstances obliged the PCU to replace and quickly train new critical staff, which led to implementation delays. On the Bank side, the TTL position remained vacant from May to September 2010, after the accident, and there were a total of four TTLs over the lifetime of the project.

Other factors subject to Recipient and/or Bank Control

38. **In addition to these external shocks, some factors were more directly subject to Recipient and/or Bank control:**

- **EGTAG2 became effective on August 16, 2007, 14 months after the Bank Board's approval on June 20, 2006.** The grant became effective following an agreement by the Government and the National Assembly that exempted such grants from the requirement for ratification by the Assembly.
- **The implementation of EGTAG1's activities impacted on the timely implementation of EGTAG2**. EGTAG2's activities were closely tied to advances made under the former operation. Also, there was an overlap between the implementation of EGTAG1 and EGTAG2, which contributed to slowing down implementation. Priority was given to continuing to execute the funds in EGTAG1, which was extended twice and closed in September 30, 2009, instead of December 31, 2007, as originally planned. Until the closing date of EGTAG1 in September 2009, there was almost no disbursement from EGTAG2.
- **The 2009 restructuring did not succeed in streamlining the complex project's design.** Although the components were reduced from five to three and the scope of the project was reduced to focus on budget formulation and execution and control, the project still involved over ten counterpart institutions and comprised more than 40 procurement processes, including several small contracts for individual consultants.
- **The second restructuring's initiative was not completed.** The mid-term review, conducted in May 2010, identified the need to restructure the project to adapt to post-earthquake circumstances and also to simplify the project by reducing the number of activities and counterpart institutions. Discussions on the content of the restructuring were re-initiated by the GoH and the new TTL in October 2010. A request for a second restructuring and an extension of the project was formally submitted by the Ministry of Economy and Finance to the Bank on December 3, 2010. However, in light of the post-earthquake circumstances and the election of a new government, Bank management considered it more relevant to explore new avenues to provide support for economic governance.
- **The high number of procurement processes was time-consuming and impacted on project implementation.** First, it was hard to find and mobilize specialists with adequate skills for each stage of the procurement process. Second, the drafting of terms of reference remained a very iterative process between the Government, the PCU and the Bank to ensure quality standards acceptable to the Bank. Third, compliance with procurement procedures required intensive supervision from the Bank.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

M&E Design

39. **The 2008 QAG panel report noted that the original design of the project lacked an appropriate Monitoring and Evaluation System**. It pointed out that "the current

statement of development objectives, while appropriate, is very broad and not supported by measurable and monitorable indicators to enable monitoring of progress and defining success. The project lacks adequate indicators and an appropriate monitoring and evaluation system. The project would benefit from a more realistic set of performance indicators and baseline data."

40. **The 2009 restructuring sought to incorporate the QAG's recommendations by refining the PDO indicators.** The scope of the PDO put stronger emphasis on budget formulation, execution and control. Outcome indicators sought to encompass the whole range of activities. They were aligned with the PEFA-PFM framework, which are standard indicators for the evaluation of the public finance management system.

41. **However, the 2009 restructuring did not significantly reduce the scope of the PDO and did not adjust the original intermediate outcomes indicators.** The revised PDOs (improving budget formulation, execution and controls) remained broad. It encompassed: the entire budget cycle and all related PFM processes and systems; public procurement, Human Resources Management; and anti-corruption. In addition, the PDO indicators for anti-corruption and public procurement lacked baselines. While the scope of the restructuring required the adjustment of intermediate outcome indicators, this was not done during the restructuring process, nor formally recorded and agreed. Instead, revised intermediate outcomes indicators were adjusted in the Implementation Status Results reports (ISRs), maintaining an inconsistency between the Board approved documents and the ISRs associated with EGTAG2.

M&E Implementation

42. **Progress monitoring remained challenging throughout project implementation.** Although the Bank regularly monitored progress through periodic Bank supervision missions, collecting relevant data was difficult. Firstly, some data was not available after the earthquake (e.g., data on the use of competition in the award of contracts, number of ministries using the human resource registry). In addition, PEFA indicators were not fully owned by the counterpart institutions and the PCU. However a workshop organized during the mid-term review in May 2010 had helped them to improve their understanding of the indicators.

M&E Utilization

43. **Monitoring of project progress improved during the course of the project.** The Bank team channeled its M&E process through ISRs, *aide memoires* and the mid-term review. Before the 2009 restructuring, most of the indicators were similar to EGTAG1 indicators, so progress in some of those reflects support provided through EGTAG1 rather than any specific EGTAG2 achievements. After the 2009 restructuring, EGTAG2 progress could be monitored through specific indicators, which were introduced in the ISRs without being formally validated.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

44. **Because of the nature of the project, safeguard analysis is not applicable.**

45. **Overall, there were not any systemic problems with regard to the quality and reliability of the FM and the procurement administration of the project.** The FM and procurement performance of the project remained either "Moderately Satisfactory" or "Satisfactory" throughout most of the project life.

46. **There were no significant deviations from the Bank's standard procurement procedures throughout the life of the project.** Procurement processes were systematically reviewed by the procurement team and complied with the Bank's guidelines. The contracts granted with a sole source basis (more than 50% of the contracts in value) were considered justified and procedures were respected. However, there was an efficiency challenge due to the high number of contracts with individual consultants which hampered the project implementation. Contracts, including their expiration date and implementation arrangements, were not closely monitored by the PCU.

47. **FM processes were respected, despite delays in the submission of some financial reports.** The audit covering the period from September, 1st 2007 to September 30, 2009, also the interim financial reports (IFRs) for the periods ending in February 2010, March 2011 and May 2011 were not submitted in a timely manner. However, the quality of the reports produced by the PCU was acceptable to the Bank. The audit did not raise any incoherence or abnormality and the auditors certified EGTAG2's financial statements without any reservation.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

48. **In FY11, some EGTAG2 activities were transferred to the Infrastructure and Institutional Emergency Recovery Project approved in March 2008 to respond to the earthquake (PRUII, P120895).** There were strong synergies between EGTAG2, budget support operations, and the Infrastructure and Institutional Emergency Recovery Project (PRUII, P120895). These synergies came about because all these projects focused on institutional strengthening and public finance management. Some priority activities, such as technical assistance to the Directorate of Economic Studies and the Supreme Audit Institution, which could not be completed before EGTAG2's closing date, were transferred to PRUII (P120895).

49. **Under the Interim Strategy CY12, the Bank is exploring new options for providing support to economic governance.** This remains an important priority in Haiti. While there will not be any direct follow-up operation to EGTAG2, strengthening governance has been included as a cross-cutting theme in the Interim Strategy Note CY12. Support to Public Financial Management will be provided through two existing instruments: (i) the Infrastructure and Institutions Emergency Recovery project (PRUII, P120895) and (ii) a GPF Grant: "Enhancing Political Leadership to Improve Governance and Public Sector Performance in Haiti" (TF094822). New activities being prepared in

2012 include a budget support operation (DPO) leveraging policy actions in public finance management and in sectors critical to Haiti reconstruction. Medium-term support is likely to be provided through a Technical Assistance Project, the scope and calendar of which are still to be defined. Finally, sector operations, (e.g., in the areas of Education, Agriculture, Energy) will continue to strengthen institutional capacity.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

50. **Although reconstruction became GoH's main priority after the 2010 earthquake, the EGTAG2 PDO remains relevant.** EGTAG2's objectives supported the key pillars of the Government's poverty reduction strategy (DSNCRP, 2008-10) by building state capacity and improving management of public resources. Even after the earthquake, improving the management of public finances has remained a major priority of the reform agenda in Haiti. Alongside the emergency response to the crisis, the government needs enhanced capacity and effective public finance management to address reconstruction challenges and to manage the significant flow of resources that is being channeled to Haiti subsequent to the earthquake. The Government of Haiti's National Recovery and Development Plan (PARDH) includes the reconstruction of institutions as a priority, with the objective of strengthening the role of the state; re-establishing justice and security; increasing decentralization; and increasing government capacity. Finally, the activities supported by EGTAG2, with their focus on fiduciary transparency and controls, contribute indirectly to one of the pillars of President Martelly's program ("*the four Es*"), which aims at strengthening the "Rule of Law" (*l'Etat de droit*).

51. **EGTAG2 PDO continues to be consistent with current Bank assistance strategy.** In 2009, the original PDO was re-aligned with the country Assistance Strategy FY09-12 (CAS, Report No 48284-HT), which replaced the 2004 Transitional Support Strategy (Report No 30541-HT), and the Interim Strategy Note (Report No 30541-HT) for the period FY07-08. The 2009 CAS, while maintaining a strong focus on economic governance reforms as a cross-cutting pillar, sought to concentrate the Bank's interventions in areas where it had a competitive advantage. The scope of EGTAG2's PDO was adjusted to place stronger emphasis on the budget process and budget control mechanisms. As already noted, Interim Strategy Note CY12, reaffirmed the Bank's support to institutional strengthening reforms. It includes a cross-cutting theme which aims to promote sound policies in the area of investment, as well as to improve economic governance, with the view to strengthening the Government's ability to make and implement decisions that drive reconstruction.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

PDO 1: Strengthening the institutional Capacity of the Republic of Haiti in the area of budget formulation and execution

52. **None of the associated outcome indicators related to PDO1 has been achieved.** It can be inferred from the key associated outcome indicators related to this PDO that the project specifically aimed to: (i) enhance the comprehensiveness of information included in the budget, in order to improve budget formulation, and (ii) improve the open competition in procurement processes.

Table 2: Key Associated Outcome Indicators for PDO#1

Key Outcome Indicator	Baseline	Target (as stated in the restructuring paper)	Status / Comments
PEFA indicator 6: comprehensiveness of information included in budget documentation	**C**: Recent budget documentation fulfills 3-4 out of the 9 information benchmarks	**C+ :** Improvement in information benchmarks fulfilled by budget documentation	**Not Achieved (C)** Budget Documentation fulfills 3 out of the nine information benchmarks Source: 2011 assessment of PEFA indicators by the Bank team[2]
PEFA indicator 19(i): use of competition in award of contracts (% of public contracts awarded on a competitive basis)[3].	Not rated	**C:** Available data shows that less than 50% of contracts above the threshold are awarded on an open competitive basis, but the data may not be accurate.	**Not Achieved (D)** Insufficient data exists to assess the method used to award public contracts Source: 2011 assessment of PEFA indicators by the Bank team

Improving the comprehensiveness of information included in budget documentation

53. **Based on the 2011 assessment of PEFA indicators by the Bank team, the comprehensiveness of the budget information has not improved.** The associated outcome indicator has not met its target. The budget document would meet three out of nine criteria of the PEFA indicator 6: (i) macro-economic assumptions, (ii) the budget deficit, and (iii) the funding of the deficit.

54. **EGTAG2's contribution to improvements in the comprehensiveness of the budget information has remained very limited:**

- EGTAG2, further to EGTAG1, has supported the installation of the debt management software (SYGADE). This includes a database, which has improved the availability, quality and security of debt data. The debt data have been centralized in a single database, which covers loans and partially covers grants. The centralized database and updated software could potentially help the government to produce and publish detailed debt statistical reports, which would offer a comprehensive overview of the external debt situation in Haiti. Thankfully, the database was not destroyed by the earthquake, although activities related to the use of the database and the production of reports have been put on hold. As a result, only one draft debt statistical bulletin was produced with SYGADE, this was produced in October 2009. Reports on the

[2] A PEFA assessment financed by the EU is being prepared. It had not been published at the time of the preparation of this ICR.

[3] The indicator 19 was revised in January 2011 by the PEFA Secretariat. PEFA 19(i) became PEFA 19(ii): "Use of competitive procurement methods". The justification for the rating "D" is still similar in both versions: "reliable data is not available [on contracts awarded by methods other than open competition], in the version of January 2011 and "insufficient data exists to assess the method used to award public contract" in the version of June 2005.

evolution of public debt are still produced manually by the Directorate of Public Debt.

- The operation helped MEF's Directorate of Economic Studies to enhance its capacity and to provide analytical elements to inform budget preparation. In particular, with the help of technical assistance under EGTAG2, the DEE has defined a strategy of economic recovery for Haiti which informed the reconstruction plan presented at the donor conference of March 2010 and also informed the budget. This output, nonetheless, did not directly influence the comprehensiveness of budget information.
- Finally, the project, following on from EGTAG1 supported the development of a central human resources registry that would have allowed the government to better monitor human resources and control payroll data. EGTAG1 saw encouraging progress, for example the installation of the central human resources database in pilot ministries. However, following the earthquake, activity within the Human Resources Unit (the OMRH), which managed this reform was put on hold. To date, the HR registry is not operational.

Improving open competition in procurement processes

55. **There is no evidence of improvement in the use of competition in award of contracts.** Recent procurement data was lost in the 2010 earthquake that destroyed the main government administrative buildings. The government is therefore commissioning a consultancy to gather data from line ministries. Furthermore, available data on procurement only include contracts subject to the CNMP ex-ante approval. At the time of the closing of the project, there was no information available on contracts awarded under the emergency law or on contracts related to security or defense issues. However, in September 2011, the Prime Minister's Office submitted to the CNMP the list of all contracts processed under the emergency law during Haitian FY10-11. Transparency regarding the award of the contracts was an objective supported by the Bank financed emergency DPO (P118239) approved in August 2010.

56. **Despite efforts initiated since 2004, progress to reform public procurement has been limited**. Progress made since 2004 include (i) the creation of the National Public Procurement Commission [Commission Nationale des Marchés Publics, CNMP]; (ii) the adoption of a new Procurement Law by Parliament in June 2009; complemented by (iii) the issuance of four key implementing decrees (arrêtés d'application[4]); and (iv) the introduction of standard bidding documents and a manual of procedures for government staff based on the new code. However, the legal framework still needs to be completed by the publication of the remaining implementing decrees, which were initially foreseen, to ensure the full effectiveness of the 2009 law.

[4] The four implementing decrees that have been published are: (i) the decree establishing relevant thresholds with respect to public procurement; (ii) the decree setting forth the institutional rules and procedures for the CNMP; (iii) the decree setting forth the general rules regarding public procurement rules and public services concessions; and (iv) the decree adopting the manual of procedures for public procurement and mandating its general application.

57. **The contribution of EGTAG2 to Government achievements in procurement reforms is not significant**. Its contribution was limited to supporting the organization of an awareness workshop in 2009 on public procurement practices and to purchase equipment after the earthquake in order to help the institution re-initiate the operations.

PDO 2- Strengthening the institutional Capacity of the Republic of Haiti in the area of budget monitoring and controls

58. **None of the associated key outcome indicators related to PDO2 has been achieved (see table 3).** In order to achieve this PDO, the project was intended specifically to: (i) strengthen external controls; (ii) strengthen internal controls; and (iii) improve the transparency and anti-corruption regulation.

Table 3: Key Associated Outcomes Indicators for PDO2

PDO objectives	Baseline	Target (as stated in the restructuring paper)	Status
PEFA indicator 26(ii): timeliness of submission of audit reports to legislature.	**D+:** Audit reports are submitted to Parliament beyond the 12-month period after the end of the fiscal period under review.	**C** : Audit reports are submitted to the legislature within 12 months of the end of the period covered (for audit of financial statements from their receipt by the auditors)	The 08/09 audit report had not been transmitted to Parliament as of June 2011, 12 months after the end of the period covered and the receipt of financial statements by auditors. This would correspond to a D+ rating in normal circumstances. However, the 08/09 audit report could not be transmitted to Parliament with the budget as is the norm, since the FY10-11 budget was adopted by decree due to the earthquake. Given these exceptional circumstances, the indicator cannot be rated. Source: 2011 assessment of PEFA indicators by the Bank team
Increased understanding of corruption practices, as measured by studies' dissemination seminars exit surveys	**No current Survey Data**	**Opinion Surveys**	**Not achieved** No Survey undertaken *Source*: Bank's assessment

Strengthening External Controls

59. **The timeliness of the submission of public accounts' annual audits has improved, even if the related PEFA outcome indicator cannot be rated.** The backlog of General accounts' audits, which existed in 2006 has been progressively eliminated. The MEF has shortened the preparation time for the General Accounts. Government accounts for 2008-09 were submitted in a timely fashion by the MEF to the Supreme Audit Institution, by the end of May 2010. As of June 2011, the Supreme Audit Institution has submitted to Parliament the audit of the General Accounts for the fiscal years 2005/06, and 2007/08. Conversely, the CSC/CA transmitted the 2008/09 audit report to the Government in September 2011, over twelve months after the receipt of the General Accounts by the CSC/CA and the end of the period under review. It has not transmitted the report to Parliament yet. However, the 08/09 audit report was carried out

under exceptional circumstances, since the 2010 earthquake destroyed the CSC/CA building. Besides, the audit report could not be transmitted to Parliament with the budget, as is the norm, since the FY10-11 budget was adopted by decree due to the earthquake.

60. **Given their level of achievement, activities supported by EGTAG2 could not contribute to enhancing external controls**. EGTAG2 provided technical assistance to help the CSC/CA define a law; to modernize its organization; and to enhance the effectiveness of its internal processes. To date, this law is still in draft form and has not been submitted to Parliament.

Strengthening Internal Controls

61. **Internal controls have been enhanced since the project's appraisal.** Although the project did not include any key outcome indicator associated with this activity, progress can be assessed qualitatively. The Government carried out the critical staffing of its General Finance Inspectorate (Inspection Générale des Finances), which was created in order to start up internal audit operations as one of the prior actions for this sub-component. IGF's action plan was revised in June 2010 to integrate emerging priorities and was expanded to cover the period 2010-2014. Based on this revised work program, IGF has begun audits in the Central, North and South regions.

62. **The project financed equipment which facilitated and improved the effectiveness of IGF's field audits**. It also financed an IGF visit to a peer institution. This mission allowed the IGF to explore potential ways of cooperation and to analyze areas for improvement regarding its organization, audit processes and techniques.

Improving the understanding of corruption practices

63. **In the area of transparency and anti-corruption, there is no evidence of an increased understanding of corruption practices.** A study on corruption practices of private companies doing business with the public sector was completed by the end of the project. The study still has to be published and its impact evaluated. No exit surveys were carried out following study dissemination seminars, prior to the closure of the project.

3.3 Efficiency

64. **As an institution-building project, quantitative computations of rates of return are not applicable.** The PAD nonetheless listed expected qualitative economic gains such as: most effective and efficient allocation of public resources; and aid and investments. As a consequence, it was deemed that these gains increased the impact of social programs and improved public services delivered to the poor. The operation however, did not significantly contribute to these results. Considering the costs related to the project's preparation and the supervision in regard to the modest results achieved, the efficiency in the use of funds is low.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating
Rating: Unsatisfactory

65. **Given the limited achievements of the project and the low efficiency in the use of funds, the overall outcome rating is rated unsatisfactory**. Although progress was made by the Government of Haiti in budget formulation, execution, and control as well as in other areas covered by EGTAG2, the contribution of EGTAG2 to these achievements remained very limited. In particular, no PDO has been achieved and the disbursement rate is low. Hence, the unsatisfactory overall outcome rating.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

66. **Poverty, gender and social development implications were not significant** since the project focused on institution building and improving economic governance through technical assistance.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

67. **The project's institutional development impact has been limited.** The operation did contribute, albeit modestly to enhancing the capacity of the Directorate of Economic Studies, the Directorate of Budget, and the General Inspectorate of Finance through the provision of technical assistance.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

68. **The project contributed to supporting reconstruction efforts after the earthquake.** Jointly with the Infrastructure and Institutions Emergency Recovery Project, EGTAG2 supported the assessment of the counterpart institutions' needs in equipment and furniture to reinitiate their operations. The project also assisted the Government in defining an economic strategy for recovery. This work informed the Government's Action Plan for Haiti Recovery (PARDH), which was presented at the Donor Conference in March 2010.

3.6 Summary of Findings of the Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops
N/A

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome
Rating: High

69. **Development outcomes were not achieved, partly due to the risks mentioned below.** Beyond natural disasters, institutional capacity remains the main risk to reform sustainability in Haiti.

70. **Institutional capacity remains the main risk to development outcomes**. The major constraint to reform implementation continues to be limited institutional capacity in the public sector, to define, oversee and implement reforms. The Haitian Government and development partners are mitigating this challenge through financial and technical assistance.

71. **Development outcomes are highly vulnerable to natural disasters including earthquakes, hurricanes and floods**. Renewed occurrence of large-scale natural disasters derails the Government's reform efforts and diverts resources from the longer term development agenda towards more urgent recovery and reconstruction needs. However, the Bank's ongoing portfolio, especially emergency recovery projects, successfully supports the Government's capacity for preparation and preventive actions to shield the population and the country's infrastructure from disasters. In addition, emergency funding reserves have been introduced into every new project under the CY12 ISN, which is currently being prepared, to rapidly respond to adverse shocks.

72. **The risk of an economic downturn in major international economies could have a serious negative impact on Haiti, through reduced remittances, donor funding and investment.** Support from the Bank and other donors will be a mitigating factor for Haiti in these areas. However, a serious crisis would reduce the overall effectiveness of that assistance and might affect the envelope available to pursue further governance reforms.

73. **Haiti remains vulnerable to political and social instability.** In particular, delays in establishing a new government resulted in greater uncertainty in Haiti political and economic environment. High expectations with regard to reconstruction continue to generate social tensions and remain a challenge for the Government and the international community.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

74. **Project implementation experience shows that the quality at entry was not satisfactory.** The Bank's operation supported relevant development objectives for the Government of Haiti and sought to incorporate lessons learned from previous operations, including EGTAG1. Nonetheless, given the capacity constraints and the challenging environment, a more limited number of objectives, activities, and counterpart institutions would have been preferred. The quasi-simultaneous implementation of EGTAG1 and EGTAG2, with one year between them, hampered project implementation and increased the complexity of the supervision. Finally, the design aspects of project monitoring and evaluation were not properly addressed. In particular, the PDOs were too broad and the project lacked an appropriate set of realistic performance indicators and baseline data.

(b) Quality of Supervision
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

75. **The Bank has ensured sustained supervision efforts in governance activities since 2008.** During most of the implementation period, the project team, based in the Washington headquarters, had weekly meetings or audio conferences with the PCU in addition to regular field supervision missions, to monitor progress made, and to resolve any pending issues. The intensive Bank supervision was critical to ensure compliance with all fiduciary requirements, especially during the post-earthquake period.

76. **The 2009 restructuring did not succeed in adjusting the complex project's design.** Although the 2009 restructuring reduced the number of project components from five to three, it increased the number of activities and beneficiaries, for the same amount of financing. Following this restructuring, the project still included over 40 procurement processes and ten counterpart institutions, resulting in an average of US$200,000 available for each counterpart. The issues related to the monitoring and evaluation framework were not completely fixed. In particular, the restructuring process did not include appropriate intermediate outcome indicators.

77. **From 2010 onward, EGTAG2 supervision and interaction with the Government were maintained despite challenging circumstances.** A series of exceptional external shocks affected project implementation, including the 2010 earthquake, the serious accident of the TTL and the murder of the Project's Coordinator. Despite these extremely difficult circumstances, the Bank ensured the continuity of the supervision and monitored all the fiduciary requirements. After the 2010 earthquake, the Bank team went several times to Haiti and tried to anticipate possible needs and prepare an early response by advancing on preparation of terms of reference and helping identify potential consultants in several PFM sectors. It enhanced its coordination with the donor community. It participated in various meetings to coordinate with donors working in the area (EU, IADB and the Spanish Cooperation).

78. **At the end of 2010, the second restructuring attempt to adjust project design could not be concluded.** The restructuring envisaged at the end of 2010 was intended to simplify the operation by reducing the number of objectives, components, activities, counterpart institutions and implementation processes. A request for a second restructuring and an extension of the project was formally submitted by the Ministry of Economy and Finance to the Bank on December 3, 2010. However, in light of the post-earthquake circumstances and the election of a new government, the Bank management considered it more relevant to explore new options for providing support for economic governance.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

79. **This rating is based on the above-described shortcomings in the design and supervision of the project.** Although the Bank could be credited for the intensive supervision that allowed it to ensure compliance with fiduciary requirements under challenging circumstances, it could not properly address the shortcomings of the initial complex design, and the need to simplify the operation.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

80. **The Government of Haiti remained committed to the development objective of of the project through the project's lifetime.** While urgent reconstruction needs became the center of focus in the immediate aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, the Government re-affirmed its commitment to governance reforms, as expressed in the Action Plan for Haiti Recovery (PARDH) and President Martelly's program (Martelly's program ("*the four Es*").

81. **The Government of Haiti maintained an open dialogue with the Bank**. In particular, the Government was actively involved in the project's mid-term review and in the restructuring initiatives which aimed at ensuring better project implementation and the achievement of objectives.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies' Performance
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

82. **There was a large number of direct implementing entities.** This project was implemented by over ten implementing agencies and one coordination unit (PCU) which was in charge of the fiduciary aspects and reported directly to the MEF.

PCU

83. **The PCU was staffed with human resources with adequate qualifications.** The PCU staff was recruited on the basis of their competencies. They have the appropriate professional qualifications: in project management, finance and procurement, in line with the job requirements.

84. **However, the PCU did not manage to create a dynamic of swift implementation**. In particular, it did not comply with all the requirements of the covenant and agreements of EGTAG2 in a timely fashion. This relates to: the submission of the Interim Financial Reports; update of manual of operations following the first restructuring. The PCU could have monitored procurement processes more closely, especially with regards to contracts' expiry dates. Newly hired staff would have needed

further training specifically related to Bank implementation rules, procurement and financial procedures, as well as monitoring and evaluation.

Implementing Entities

85. **The performance of the executing entities remained uneven.** While the MEF has made some tangible advances, such as the implementation of a debt management system, or the definition of a strategy for economic recovery, other institutions such as the Office of Human Resources Management (OMRH), the Supreme Audit Institution (CSC/CA), the National Public Procurement Commission (CNMP) and the Training Center for Public Administration (CEFOPAFOP) have made no or very little progress.

86. **The limited performance of the implementing entities is mainly due to major external shocks beyond their control.** These include the consequences of the earthquake, and the subsequent damage to several Counterparts' buildings, including the CSC/CA, the CNMP, the OMRH and the CEFOPAFOP. They also suffered the loss of data and archives and the tragic loss of some critical staff. As a consequence, some eligible activities could not be carried out or were no longer considered priorities.

87. **Conversely, there was room for improvement to facilitate the implementation of the project.** For example, counterparts such as CSC/CA or OMRH did not clearly define activities to be financed during the project life.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

88. Although the limited performance of the Borrower is mainly due to major external shocks beyond its control, the overall performance of the Borrower is rated moderately unsatisfactory for the reasons outlined above.

6. Lessons Learned

Project Design

89. **EGTAG2 implementation shows that simple project design, with specific objectives, aimed at feasible activities, is critical in a context of limited institutional capacity.** Counterparts' limited implementation and absorption capacity require focusing Bank activities on a limited number of areas, with few procurement processes, and with a view to achieving realistic targets determined by a sound understanding of country context. In the case of EGTAG2, it would have been more realistic and effective to identify strategic points of entry, rather than addressing the entire scope of public financial management.

90. **In addition to being more focused, EGTAG2 could have further explored stronger coordination with critical ministries for PFM performance.** Budgetary systems can only see meaningful improvements if line ministries are actively involved

and if their capacity has been strengthened. They also need to collaborate with the MEF to achieve shared objectives. In Haiti, the Bank has the unique advantage of being able to work extensively on projects at the sector level with line ministries while working at the same time with the MEF. Greater coordination between the capacity building, conducted through projects at sector level, and the design of Economic governance TA at the MEF level could streamline performance. This opportunity to work with line ministries should nonetheless be balanced with the need to limit the number of counterpart institutions.

91. **In uncertain environments, project design could also include a higher degree of flexibility to respond to external shocks.** Despite the consolidation of the disbursement categories into a single category through the 2009 restructuring, EGTAG2 design did not effectively respond to the Government's changing needs in the post-earthquake context. In this respect, making unallocated emergency reserve funding available could be considered for future operations. Flexibility could also be obtained by combining a broad PDO with specific objectives and project activities.

92. **Linking budget support operations with technical assistance projects generates both incentives and support for progress in the government reform agenda**. Providing technical assistance to the policy areas covered by budget support operations is useful to ensure an adequate pace of reform implementation. In turn, programmatic budget support operations are an incentive for the Government to achieve PDOs supported by technical assistance projects.

93. **During the project design phase, it is critical to discuss thoroughly all potential alternatives.** In the case of EGTAG2, the only alternative discussed in the PAD was a larger, multi-year technical assistance grant. It would have been useful to consider other options in order to identify potential pitfalls and to build a consensus on the most appropriate solution.

94. **Exploring options for implementation is also critical for project performance.** Implementation units with strong capacity are essential to successfully implement projects. It is therefore important to scrutinize potential options in order to identify those implementation arrangements that are most suited to the country context (specific implementation unit, fiduciary agent, etc) and to propose corresponding mitigation measures to enhance counterpart implementation capacity.

95. **It is important to adequately sequence programmatic operations with a view to avoiding conflicting overlaps in implementation periods between projects.** EGTAG2 was presented to the Board only one year after EGTAG1, when disbursements had barely commenced. As previously explained, this led to significant delays in the implementation of EGTAG2, since priority was given to execute the funds in EGTAG1. Using the same indicators made monitoring the project's respective achievements confusing, given the overlap in implementation periods. Furthermore, the context changed when EGTAG2 became effective. It may have been more effective to launch the project later and subsequently update the project design according to the new context and government priorities.

Project Implementation

96. **Clear decision-making processes are essential to the success of project implementation**. In EGTAG2, the PCU ensured day-to-day coordination between the numerous executing agencies, and monitored the advances in each component. However, decision-making processes, with a unique counterpart for decisions on the substance of the project, were not clearly defined until 2010. For example, the content of the first restructuring was negotiated in a consensual manner through the PCU with each implementing entity. This prevented the overall prioritization of the project's activities, which could have ensured better implementation of the project.

97. **Having field-based staff supervise projects is an important factor in the success of a project in fragile states.** In fragile state environments, Bank technical assistance and capacity building activities require intense supervision to ensure smooth implementation and compliance with fiduciary requirements. Field-based staff help monitor day-to-day implementation and provide timely support to implementing agencies and the PCU. They also facilitate dialogue with government counterparts on reform agenda and emerging implementation issues.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

(a**) Borrower/implementing agencies**

98. **The MEF agrees with the overall findings of this ICR (see details Annex 7).**

99. **The MEF concurs with the Bank analysis regarding factors that negatively affected project implementation.**

- The MEF points out a series of external shocks: (i) the serious accident of the TTL in 2010 and the subsequent vacancy of the TTL position, (ii) the departure of the administrative and financial specialist, (iii) the death of the Accountant during the earthquake and (iv) the murder of the project Coordinator.
- It also mentions structural issues such as: (i) the high number of activities of small amount, (ii) the large number of counterpart institutions, (iii) flaws in the monitoring and evaluation system, (iv) the overlap between the implementation periods of EGTAG1 and EGTAG2 and (iv) the amount of financing relative to the multiplicity of activities to be implemented and the necessity to respect specific procedures.
- These factors are consistent with those raised by the Bank to explain the limited achievements of the project. Lessons learned for the design of future operations can be drawn from the analysis of factors that affected project implementation.

100. **The MEF regrets that the second restructuring initiative, which aimed to streamline the project complex design and extend the implementation period, could not be completed.** According to the MEF, this restructuring would have contributed to improve project implementation and achieve project development objectives. The MEF underlines that the GoH supported this restructuring initiative and that the Bank seemed

to be committed to carrying out the restructuring, following a mission of Government representatives to Washington. Important activities could not been implemented due to the Bank's decision not to restructure the project and extend its implementation period.

101. **Bank management considered more relevant to explore new options for providing support for economic governance instead of restructuring and extending EGTAG2.** Bank management decided not to accept the restructuring request, which had been submitted to the Bank by the GoH in December 2011 and was pending Bank management formal approval. In light of post-earthquake circumstances and the election of a new government, Bank management considered more relevant to explore new options for providing support to economic governance, which remains an important priority. The CY12 ISN includes economic governance as a cross-cutting theme and comprises several instruments to continue providing support to this important issue.

(b) Co-financiers
Not applicable

(c) Other partners and stakeholders
Not applicable

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Component 1- Strengthening Budget Formulation and Execution	1.320	0.268	20%
Component 2- Strengthening Budget Monitoring and Control	0.480	0.053	11%
Component 3 - Communication and Project Management	0.200	0.154	77%
Total Baseline Cost	0.00	0.00	
Physical Contingencies	0.00	0.00	0.00
Price Contingencies	0.00	0.00	0.00
Total Project Costs	2.00	0.475	24%
Front-end fee PPF	0.00	0.00	.00
Front-end fee IBRD	0.00	0.00	.00
Total Financing Required	2.00	0.475	24%

(b) Financing

Source of Funds	Type of Co-financing	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Borrower		0.00	0.00	.00
IDA Grant		2.00	0.475	24%

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Outputs Component 1- Strengthening Budget Formulation and Execution

Intermediate outcomes indicators and Accomplishments of Component 1(As inferred from the Restructuring Paper and presented in the ISRs)

Indicator	Baseline	Target	Status
Public Finance Reform Agenda	No Finance Reform Agenda	Reform Agenda in place for Public Finance	**Not achieved**. Existence of a joint government-IFIs matrix of Public Finance reforms. Institutional diagnosis of the MEF, including perspective of reform, drafted. *Source: Bank's assessment*
Reports prepared by DGB on debt levels (debt stock) in order to inform the preparation of the annual budget (between 2009 and 2011)	No regular reporting on debt levels	At least one report per Haitian fiscal year (between 2009 and 2011)	**Partially achieved** Reports produced manually by the Directorate of Budget. Last data published on the MEF website dated November 2010 *Source: http://www.mefhaiti.gouv.ht/dette%20public.htm*
Number of ministries using the human resource's registry	0	9 out 17 at least use the human resources registry	**Not achieved** The central HR registry has not been operational since the earthquake *Source: Bank's assessment*

Public Debt Management. Further to EGTAG1, EGTAG2 supported the implementation of an updated public debt management system, including a centralized database on debt (SYGADE). Both the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Central Bank have access to the database, and the staff of both institutions have received training in the use of the updated software. The newly centralized database could have helped the Government produce detailed quarterly reports that reflect recent debt data for 2009. However, the activity was suspended following the earthquake in 2010. As a consequence, only one annual draft statistical report was prepared in October 2009. Reports on the evolution of public debt are still produced manually by the Directorate of Public Debt. Last debt data published on the MEF website is dated November 2010.

Human Resources Management. The first EGTAG1 project supported the Office for Human Resources and Management (OMRH) through the design and implementation of a central resource database of all salaried employees. The database was piloted in five key ministries early in 2009. However, no progress has been made related to this activity under EGTAG2. Since the earthquake, OMRH activity has been suspended. The database is not yet operational.

Public Finance Management. A detailed analysis on the Haitian public finance system has been produced by an external consultant. It includes several recommendations for future public finance reforms.

Subsequent to the earthquake, the project provided technical assistance to help the Government define a strategy for economic recovery that informed the Government's

Action Plan for Haiti Recovery (PARDH) presented at the Donor Conference in March 2010. This also helped the Government define budget priorities for FY 2011.

Finally, an institutional diagnosis and perspective for reform of the MEF has been drafted.

Public Procurement

Essential equipment and furniture was purchased after the earthquake in order to help the CNMP re-initiate its operations.

Outputs Component 2- Strengthening Budget Monitoring and Control

Intermediate Outcomes Indicators and Accomplishments of Component 2 (As inferred from the Restructuring Paper and presented in the ISRs)

Indicator	Baseline	Target	Status
Organic law on the Organization of the CSC/CA	Current Legal Framework for the CSC/CA is incomplete	New Law sent to Parliament for Approval	**Not Achieved:** law is still in draft form *Source: Bank's assessment*
2 studies on Corruption in two key sectors published by ULCC	No studies on corruption in these sectors	2 studies published	**Partially achieved** One report completed at the end of June 2011, not published *Source: Bank's assessment*

A workshop, jointly funded by EGTAG1 and EGTAG2, was organized at the end of September 2009, in order to present and discuss a conceptual framework for the Supreme Audit Institution and to lay the groundwork for the preparation of a new Law (Loi organique) on the organization of the CSC/CA. The result of the workshop was the collection of different points of view from participants and to bring awareness of the need to prepare a new institutional framework for the CSC/CA, to clarify its role, its attributions and its organizational structure. Although a draft law was drawn up by external consultants, it has not been submitted to Parliament yet.

A study on corruption practices in private companies doing business with the public sector was completed in June 2011. It could not be published before the closing date.

Finally, the Haitian IGF visited the French IGF. This mission allowed the Haitian IGF to explore potential for collaboration and to analyze areas of improvement for its organization, audit processes and techniques. Equipment was also purchased to facilitate and improve the effectiveness of IGF's field audits.

Outputs Component 3- Communication and Project Management

Intermediate Outcomes Indicators and Accomplishments of Component 3

There were no intermediate results indicators related to Component Three.

Consistent with the objective to disseminate the contents of the Government's reform program and to ensure wider ownership thereof among the public, a workshop was organized by the UCP and the CNMP in March 2009. The public was thereby sensitized to procedures related to public procurement.

Several measures were taken to improve project supervision. An assistant Accountant was hired. A mid-term review workshop was organized in May 2010, and a mission, including representatives of the MEF was conducted in November 2010 in order to prepare a second restructuring of the project. The project supported the purchase of some equipment to support the UCP and the beneficiaries' operations.

Jointly with the Infrastructure and Institutions Emergency Recovery Project, EGTAG2 supported the assessment of the counterpart institutions' needs for equipment and furniture to reinitiate their operations.

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis
(including assumptions in the analysis)

Not applicable. As an institution-building project, quantitative computations of rates of return are not applicable.

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
Lending			
Franka Braun	Carbon Finance Specialist	ENVCF	
Thomas Scott Brown	Junior Professional Associate	LCSPS	
Linn A. Hammergren	TTL	ECSP4	
Luc Ladouceur	Consultant	LCSPS	
Patricia E. Macgowan	Consultant	LCSPT	
Maria Del Carmen Minoso	Senior Operations Officer	ECSO1	
Ahmadou Moustapha Ndiaye	Manager, Financial Management	ECSO3	
Milena Sanchez de Boado	Consultant	LCSPS	
Benjamin Santa Maria	Consultant	LCSPS	
Supervision/ICR			
Alexandre Arrobbio	Sr Public Sector Mgmt. Spec., TTL	LCSPS	
Christine de Mariz Rozeira	Economist, TTL	LCSPS	
Ana Bellver Vazquez-Dodero	Sr Public Sector Mgmt. Spec., TTL	LCSPS	
Joseph Irvens Denis	Economist	LCSPE	
Stephanie Anne Kuttner	Consultant	EASPR	
Karla Soledad Lopez Flores	Program Assistant	CSGAE	
Patricia E. Macgowan	Consultant	LCSPT	
Carmen Machicado	Operations Officer	LCSPS	
Maria Del Carmen Minoso	Senior Operations Officer	ECSO1	
Fabienne Mroczka	Financial Management Specialis	LCSFM	
Ahmadou Moustapha Ndiaye	Manager, Financial Management	ECSO3	
Vera Vanessa Paul	Junior Professional Associate	LCC3C	
Benjamin Santa Maria	Consultant	LCSPS	
Atou Seck	Sr Education Econ.	AFTED	
Fily Sissoko	Lead Financial Management Spec	AFTFM	
Roberts Waddle	E T Consultant	LCCHT	
Yao Wottor	Senior Procurement Specialist	LCSPT	
Helene Torresan	E T Consultant	LCSPS	

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)	
	No. of staff weeks	USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)
Lending		
FY06	25	107.67
FY07		3.74
FY08		0.00
Total:	25	111.41
Supervision/ICR		
FY06		0.00
FY07	8	56.71
FY08	10	80.58
FY09	22	94.80
FY10	38.65	188.66
FY11	27.79	122.38
FY12	19.68	47.49
Total:	126.12	590.62

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results
(if any)

Not applicable

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results
(if any)

Not applicable

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

I.- Généralités

Le Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances accuse réception en date du 19 décembre 2011, du Rapport de fin d'exécution du projet EGTAG2 de la Banque Mondiale. Le Ministère prend acte des commentaires de la Banque et de l'insatisfaction exprimée.
Conformément à ces commentaires, le MEF reconnait avec la Banque la conjonction d'événements impondérables qui ont accompagné et perturbé la mise en œuvre des projets EGTAG, dont quatre cyclones majeurs successifs et le séisme dévastateur du 12 janvier 2010. Parallèlement à ces catastrophes naturelles perturbatrices, sont venus également s'ajouter un ensemble d'évènements malheureux qui ont frappé le personnel de l'Unité de Coordination de Projets (UCP) chargée de la gestion des projets EGTAG. Nous rappelons : (i) l'accident majeur survenu en Haïti, du responsable du projet pour Washington et qui a laissé le projet EGTAG sans TTL pendant six (6) mois ; (ii) l'émigration au cours de cette période, du Responsable Administratif et Financier de l'UCP ; (iii) la mort tragique du Comptable de l'Unité à l'occasion du séisme ; (iv) le brutal assassinat du Coordonateur de l'UCP.
Ces pertes successives ont décimé le personnel technique déjà réduit de l'UCP et composé alors de quatre techniciens : le Coordonnateur, le Responsable en passation de marchés, le Responsable Administratif et Financier et le Comptable. L'Unité de Coordination de Projets (UCP), chargée de la gestion des projets EGTAG a du continué a fonctionné pendant un certain temps, sous la supervision du seul Responsable en passation de marchés, accompagné de l'Assistante Administrative de l'Unité, et cela, en l'absence également d'un TTL à Washington.

II. Mise en œuvre du Projet GTAG II

Présentation et objectif du projet
Le Projet d'Assistance Technique à la Gouvernance Economique (EGTAG II) était financé par le Don H 2370 HA de la Banque Mondiale, d'un montant de Deux millions de dollars sur deux ans et dont la date de clôture était fixée au 30 juin 2011. Son objectif était de porter un appui aux efforts du gouvernement haïtien en vue de renforcer la Gouvernance Economique du MEF ainsi que sa capacité institutionnelle dans le domaine de la gestion des ressources dans le secteur public

Composantes et résultats du projet
Le Projet d'Assistance Technique à la Gouvernance Economique (EGTAG II) était formé *de trois(3) composantes qui sont :*

1. *Formation et Exécution du Budget,*
2. *2 : Contrôle du budget,*
3. *3 : Gestion du Projet et Communication,*

Le projet a été approuvé en décembre 2006. Cependant, dans l'attente de la finalisation d'ETGAG I à laquelle EGTAG II devait succéder, ce projet a effectivement démarré seulement à partir de Mars 2009.
L'exécution du projet EGTAG II s'est alors déroulée normalement jusqu'en juin 2010 où, à l'occasion d'un atelier d'évaluation conduite à Port-au-Prince, le responsable du Projet Mme. Christine de Mariz, a eu un terrible accident et devait rester dans le coma durant 3 mois. Un nouveau chef de projet sera désigné par la Banque Mondiale six (6) mois plus tard et le décaissement du projet a alors enregistré une nette stagnation.

Il a fallu donc faire avec les difficultés évoquées et travailler, dans un environnement social et politique pas toujours favorable, au renforcement de l'UCP et à la poursuite des objectifs des différents projets en cours.

Des résolutions ont alors été prises pour améliorer la gestion de l'Unité et les perspectives de décaissement :

- Mise en place d'un nouveau responsable du projet à Washington ;
- Mise en place d'un nouveau Coordonnateur à l'UCP et embauche d'un personnel complémentaire y compris de Consultants à court terme ;
- Proposition de reconversion des activités du projet et demande d'extension de la date de fin du projet ;
- Reprogrammation des activités du projet.

III.- Résultats Obtenus

Nonobstant les difficultés impondérables majeures et conjoncturelles rencontrées**,** le MEF reconnait une insatisfaction mitigée avec EGTAG I pour lequel on a dépensé 99% du budget alloué et EGTAG II où seulement 28% du budget a été dépensé.

En dépit de cette insatisfaction, le MEF reconnait qu'un ensemble d'activités et d'études ont été réalisées qui laisse au MEF des outils disponibles qui constituent des acquis pour le renforcement à court et à moyen terme de la Gouvernance Economique. Aussi, le Gouvernement Haïtien continuera à compter sur l'apport de la Banque Mondiale en vue de poursuivre la bataille engagée pour la consolidation des acquis et le redressement économique du pays.

Au titre de ces activités, nous pouvons citer la liste non exhaustive des réalisations suivantes obtenues dans les différentes Institutions citées :

1) Direction Générale du Budget (DGB) :

- Le renforcement et la consolidation SYSDEP ;
- Le Renforcement des capacités de gestion de la dette par le Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances (MEF) et la Banque de la République d'Haïti (BRH) à travers un contrat signé entre la CNUCED et le MEF.

La mise en œuvre de ce contrat a commencé fin 2008 et s'est poursuivie jusque fin 2009 selon le calendrier établi avant d'être interrompue par les événements de 2010. Les principales activités entreprises s'articulaient t autour de trois objectifs majeurs:

- La modernisation informatique de la Direction de la Dette Publique (DDP)
- Le renforcement des capacités de gestion de la dette
- L'optimisation du cadre institutionnel grâce à la création d'une interface entre le SYSDEP et le SYGADE.

Le tremblement de terre qui a eu lieu en janvier 2010 ainsi que ses conséquences tout au long de l'année 2010 ont rendu impossible la poursuite des activités selon le calendrier établi. Aucune activité n'a pu avoir lieu en 2010 et 2011.

Malgré la destruction du MEF suite au tremblement de terre, la base de données SYGADE a été préservée et les gestionnaires de dette ont accès au système.

2) Inspection Générale des Finances (IGF) :

- Acquisition de fournitures, Impression et publication de brochures ;
- Voyages de formation;

En l’occurrence, formation des Inspecteurs et Cadres de l’Inspection Générale des Finances (IGF) sur les thèmes suivants :

- Méthodologie de la conduite d’une mission d’audit ;
- La maitrise des outils et techniques de conduite de l’audit Interne ;
- La pratique de l’Audit Interne dans le secteur Public ;

3) Commission Nationale des Marchés Publics (CNMP) :

- Loi sur la passation des marchés Publics
- Acquisition d’ Equipments Informatiques

4) Cour Supérieure des Comptes et du Contentieux Administratif (CSCCA) :

- Etudes pour l’élaboration d’une nouvelle loi visant : l’Amélioration du cadre légal institutionnel (Préparation de la loi organique) et dissémination
- Plusieurs Programmes de formation conduits avec l’assistance internationale Française;

5) Centre de Formation et de Perfectionnement des Agents de la Fonction Publique (CEFOPAFOP) :

- La réhabilitation du local du Centre ;
- Les Etudes pour la réalisation d’une Médiathèque ;
- La mise en place d’un laboratoire d’Informatique

6) Unité de Lutte Contre la Corruption (ULCC) :

- Etude approfondie sur les pratiques de la corruption secteur public/secteur privé par Frédéric Gérald Chéry.

7) Office de Management et des Ressources Humaines (OMRH) :

- Poursuite de la mise-en œuvre du Fichier Central des ressources Humaines

8) Direction des Etudes Economiques (DEE) du MEF:

Suie au séisme du 12 janvier 2010 et dans le cadre de la préparation de la conférence des bailleurs du 31 mars 2010 le Ministre de l’Economie et des Finances a commandé dans le cadre du projet EGTAG II, une analyse de la situation économique du pays. Cette mission confiée à un ensemble d’experts locaux et étrangers et à des cadres du Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances et en particulier à ceux de la Direction des Etudes Economiques (DEE) devrait permettre de :

- Conduire une évaluation de la situation macroéconomique récente du pays afin de cerner l’impact de la catastrophe
- Mettre en relief les conséquences de cette nouvelle situation sur le plan sectoriel
- Faire ressortir le profond déséquilibre socio-spatial qui affecte l’économie nationale
- Faire ressortir également l’impact différencié de la catastrophe sur les unités économiques : micro, petites, moyennes et grandes entreprises
- Dégager une vision d’ensemble du futur économique du pays qui doit se traduire par la formulation d’une stratégie de reconstruction économique associée à une esquisse de réformes économiques structurelles.

- L’UCP a également signé un contrat avec Mr Jean Robert Joseph dans le cadre du projet de préparation d’une esquisse de plan de reconstruction et de réorientation de l’économie haïtienne. Cette consultation représente un traitement des données d’enquêtes en appui au Projet de Recapitalisation des Commerçants victimes du Séisme du 12 Janvier 2010.

- Dans ce même ordre d'idées, un contrat a été signé avec Jacques Hendry Rousseau et Emmanuel Charles pour effectuer une enquête portant sur les impacts du séisme et le profil sociodémographique et économique des sinistrés.

- Un contrat a également été établi avec Ibrahim Sar qui portait sur l'assistance en matière de restauration du système de gouvernance économique. Il s'inscrit dans le cadre du volet finances publiques, constitue une analyse du système de gestion des finances publiques, et préconise des recommandations permettant de renforcer significativement le cadre budgétaire et financier, pour répondre aux préoccupations des autorités haïtiennes et des partenaires au développement.

- Un contrat a également été signé avec le consultant Charles Cadet comme Conseiller Technique Spécial pour la seconde phase opérationnelle du projet de Stratégie Economique Intégré pour Haïti

9) Les Organisations de la Société Civile (OSC) :

- Divers rapports de suivi

IV.- Activités non réalisées

Nous déplorons également des activités non réalisées et qui restent d'importance dans la perspective de nouveaux engagements à prendre avec la Banque Mondiale.
Nous rappelons à ce titre, diverses activités programmées avec l'ULCC, dont :

- L'organisation de forum jeunesse sur la problématique de la corruption ;
- La mise en place de mécanismes de comités d'éthique ;
- La conduite de recherches scientifiques sur l'étendue de la corruption :
  a) dans les administrations fiscales et douanières ; b) dans le secteur judiciaire.

Nous voulons citer également la Programmation faite avec le nouveau TTL, monsieur Alexandre Arrobio et qui visait, conformément au tableau joint, à :

- Etendre la période d'exécution du projet d'un an, jusqu'au 30 juin 2012.
- Prioriser et limiter les activités d'EGTAG et réallouer le budget associé.
- Modifier les indicateurs liés aux objectifs de développement et aux résultats intermédiaires.

En particulier, cette reprogrammation et priorisation des activités devraient permettre de réduire de 45 à 33 environ le nombre de processus de marchés publics d'EGTAG II, y compris les 25 contrats déjà signés. Les nouveaux contrats se concentreraient sur trois institutions bénéficiaires, au lieu de douze dans la version initiale du plan de passation de marchés.

Tableau 1 - Proposition de nouvelle répartition du budget d'EGTAG2

Activités	**Budget (USD)**
Appui aux missions et au renforcement de la capacité technique de l'Inspection Générale des Finances	450 000
Appui au renforcement du système comptable, de contrôle et d'audit des opérations de l'EDH	450 000
Appui à l'introduction d'une approche budgétaire programmatique au niveau sectoriel	180 000
Autres activités	920 000

Total	**2 000 000**

Nous déplorons également à ce titre, l'engagement formel pris par la Banque suite à la mission d'une importante délégation du MEF à Washington pour une meilleure visibilité du projet et soutenir le nouveau chef d'équipe engagé dans la nécessaire reformulation du projet et, le rejet brusque par la Banque de cet engagement, contre toute attente et sans aucune justification.

Ce brusque revirement a notamment fait passer à néant toutes ces importantes et nouvelles projections de décaissement faites. Cela a, en particulier, largement perturbé les activités projetées par l'ULCC qui s'en est lourdement plaint auprès de l'UCP et du MEF.

V.- Difficultés d'ordre Structurel

L'insatisfaction exprimée quant à l'exécution du projet EGTAG II découle certes de beaucoup de facteurs impondérables, mais, dans la perspective de nouveaux engagements à prendre avec la Banque, **le MEF tient également à souligner certaines difficultés d'ordre Structurel,** comme par exemple :

- la nature des activités du projet réparties en de multiples Assistance techniques a entrainé également la répétition de multiples activités mais génératrices de faibles décaissements. Ce projet était essentiellement marque par de petits contrats.
- Douze (12) Institutions bénéficiaient en effet des activités projetées au titre des 3 Composantes de ce projet d'un montant total de seulement 2 millions de dollars.
- Le mode de choix des Indicateurs sans consultation avec les Ministères exécutants ;
- Ligne de base établie seulement au moment de l'Evaluation à moyen terme du projet.
- Chevauchement des projets EGTAG : EGTAG II a débuté alors que EGTAG I était dans sa phase terminale.
- Le niveau du budget par rapport aux délais d'exécution, compte tenu de la multiplicité des actions à réaliser et la nécessité de respecter les procédures pour la mise en œuvre de ces activités.

Finalisation du projet

La Banque Mondiale n'ayant pas approuvé la proposition de reconversion adéquate des activités à mettre en œuvre pour atteindre les objectifs fixés et qui devait s'accompagner d'une extension de la date de clôture du projet, l'UCP a dû mettre fin aux activités d'EGTAG II à la date de clôture initialement prévue, soit le 30 juin 2011.

Les dépenses au 30 juin 2011 ont alors atteint 28% du total du budget. Du total des fonds déjà disponibles et qui ont été transférés par la Banque Mondiale pour la réalisation des activités prévues, le montant non dépensé dans le cadre du projet EGTAG II devra être remboursé à la Banque Mondiale.

Annex 8. Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

Not applicable

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

Government of Haiti (Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation). 2007. *Document de Stratégie Nationale pour la Croissance et pour la Reduction de la Pauvreté 2008-2010 (Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper)*. Haiti, November 2007

World Bank. 2006. *Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant to the Republic of Haiti for a Second Economic Governance Technical Assistance Project*, *Report No: 35909-HT*. Washington: DC.

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World Bank. 2008. *Haiti: Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review, A World Bank Country Study No. 44651*. Washington: DC

World Bank. 2009. *Country Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Haiti for the Period FY09-12, Report No 48284-HT*. Washington: DC.

World Bank. 2004. *Transitional Support Strategy for the Republic of Haiti, Report No 30541-HT*. Washington: DC.

World Bank. 2009. *Program Document for a Proposed Grant to the Republic of Haiti for a Third Economic Governance Reform Operation (EGROIII), Report No 49499-HT.* Washington: DC.

World Bank. 2006-2011. Project Supervision Documents including aide-memoires, implementation status reports, requests for no-objection, audit reports, interim financial reports, and deliverables. WBdoc.


HAITI
SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS
DEPARTMENT CAPITALS
NATIONAL CAPITAL
RIVERS
MAIN ROADS
RAILROADS
DEPARTMENT BOUNDARIES
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES
HAITI
ATLANTIC OCEAN
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73°W
72°W
74°W
20°N
19°N
18°N
Île de la Tortue
Palmiste
Port-de-Paix
Windward Passage
Môle St.-Nicolas
NORD - OUEST
Les Trois
Cap-Haïtien
Limbé
Gros-Morne
Baie de Henne
NORD
Fort-Liberté
Trou-du-Nord
Ferrier
Grande Rivière du Nord
NORD - EST
Ennery
Gonaïves
Saint-Raphaël
Saint Michel de l'Attalaye
Central Plateau
Guayamouc
Golfe de la Gonâve
ARTIBONITE
Maïssade
Hinche
Verrettes
Artibonite
CENTRE
Lac de Péligre
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
To Monte Christi
To Santiago
Île de la Gonâve
La Cayenne
Anse-à-Galets
Pointe-à-Raquette
Mirebalais
To San Juan
Grande Cayemite
Jeremie
Roseaux
GRANDE-ANSE
Massif de la Hotte
Anse d'Hainault
NIPPES
Miragoâne
PORT-AU-PRINCE
Croix des Bouquets
Léogâne
OUEST
Étang Saumâtre
Lago Enriquillo
To Barahona
Petit-Goâve
Chaine de la Selle (2680 m)
SUD
Les Anglais
Camp-Perrin
Vieux Bourg d'Aquin
SUD - EST
Jacmel
Belle-Anse
Thiotte
Marigot
Côtes-de-fer
Les Cayes
Port-Salut
Île à Vache
Caribbean Sea
To Oviedo
0 10 20 30 40 Kilometers
0 10 20 30 Miles
JANUARY 2006
IBRD 33417R