



## Security Council

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### Letter dated 14 July 2026 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the eleventh report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution [2692 \(2023\)](#) as renewed by the Council in paragraph 19 of its resolution [2743 \(2024\)](#) and in its resolution [2785 \(2025\)](#), and subsequently revised in paragraph 6 of resolution [2814 \(2026\)](#).

The report includes: updated information on developments in transnational organized crime, including arms trafficking and financial crimes; joint action with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean under the Caribbean Firearms Roadmap and the National Action Plan of Haiti established in accordance with the Roadmap; and relevant activities of United Nations entities.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present document to the attention of the members of the Security Council and have it published as a document of the Council.

*(Signed)* António **Guterres**

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\* Reissued for technical reasons on 28 July 2026.



## I. Introduction

1. This report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2692 (2023), as renewed by paragraph 19 of resolution 2743 (2024) and in resolution 2785 (2025) and revised by paragraph 6 of resolution 2814 (2026). The Council requested the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to report to it every six months, through the Secretary-General, on transnational organized crime, including illicit arms trafficking and financial crimes, and joint efforts with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean in the context of the Roadmap for Implementing the Caribbean Priority Actions on the Illicit Proliferation of Firearms and Ammunition across the Caribbean in a Sustainable Manner by 2030, Haiti's national action plan under the Roadmap and relevant United Nations activities. Since July 2023, UNODC has submitted 10 reports on Haiti to the Council.

2. This report covers the period from January to July 2026, during which armed gang activity intensified and became more territorially dispersed within the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and across several areas of Haiti. Violence remained persistently high, although comparatively stable, during the early months of the reporting period. From April onwards, the security situation deteriorated significantly, with armed gangs expanding their operations in April with mounting pressure on key population centres, transportation corridors and State institutions in Port-au-Prince, Artibonite and southern parts of the country. Haiti's multidimensional crisis is increasingly situated within a broader regional crisis, with cross-border security, humanitarian and criminal justice implications.

3. In Port-au-Prince, in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac, clashes in April and May involving armed gangs operating in Terre Noire, Sarthe and surrounding localities generated new displacement and intensified violent competition for control of key transportation routes and economic corridors. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported at least 2,310 deaths, 1,106 injuries and 99 kidnappings between January and early June. During the same period, 699 people, notably women and young girls, had fallen victim to sexual violence and hundreds of children continued to be trafficked by gangs.<sup>1</sup>

4. A defining feature of the reporting period was the increasing role of armed gangs as both perpetrators of violence and gatekeepers of access to territory, services and supply routes. UNODC has repeatedly reported to the Security Council that these actors have reorganized into more structured criminal networks with defined leadership, territorial ambitions and diversified revenue streams.<sup>2</sup> They are prioritizing efforts to control ports, highways and border towns to dominate supply chains and extract revenue from the population.<sup>3</sup> Armed gangs thus increasingly function as coercive regulators of movement, markets and essential services.

5. This report examines six related developments: (a) the evolving role and activities of armed gangs, vigilante or so-called self-defence groups and private security contractors and the use of remote technologies; (b) arms trafficking, drug trafficking, maritime insecurity and port vulnerability; (c) the diversification of criminal markets under conditions of scarcity in relation to fuel, food and transport; (d) corruption, illicit finance, institutional responses and sanctions-related

<sup>1</sup> See [www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2026/06/specialised-judicial-units-haiti](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2026/06/specialised-judicial-units-haiti).

<sup>2</sup> See [www.unodc.org/unodc/en/speeches/2026/210126-un-security-council-briefing-on-haiti.html](https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/speeches/2026/210126-un-security-council-briefing-on-haiti.html), [www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2026/January/explainer-organized-crime-and-gang-violence-in-haiti.html](https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2026/January/explainer-organized-crime-and-gang-violence-in-haiti.html) and [www.unodc.org/unodc/en/speeches/2025/220125-un-security-council-briefing-haiti.html](https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/speeches/2025/220125-un-security-council-briefing-haiti.html).

<sup>3</sup> See [www.unodc.org/unodc/en/speeches/2026/210126-un-security-council-briefing-on-haiti.html](https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/speeches/2026/210126-un-security-council-briefing-on-haiti.html).

developments; (e) migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons; and (f) the spillover effects of Haiti's crisis on neighbouring States and the wider Caribbean.<sup>4</sup>

## II. Evolving role and activities of armed gangs

6. The security situation during the reporting period was marked by the territorial expansion and operational consolidation of armed gangs in Artibonite and areas adjacent to Port-au-Prince. These dynamics also began to affect strategic corridors leading towards the south-east, suggesting a wider contest over access routes beyond the capital.<sup>5</sup>

7. Gang activity in Port-au-Prince intensified from April onwards, possibly in connection with the drawdown of the Multinational Security Support Mission following the transition deadline of 15 April 2026 and gang efforts to exploit the operational handover to the Gang Suppression Force. Gangs engaged in renewed territorial confrontations, opening new fronts in areas such as Sarthe and other strategic locations as rival factions sought to expand or consolidate their areas of control. Kidnapping incidents reportedly increased during the reporting period, including in areas previously viewed as comparatively insulated from gang activity.<sup>6</sup> The broader deterioration of the security environment was further illustrated on 25 April, when a Belgian military aircraft transporting personnel in support of the Gang Suppression Force was shot at, underscoring the risks facing international deployments and the vulnerability of aviation operations in and around Port-au-Prince.<sup>7</sup>

8. Violence escalated across the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area in May in the northern approaches to the capital, where a new configuration of armed gangs emerged. In the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac and Cité Soleil areas, an alliance reportedly assembling elements of the Baz Taliban, Chen Mechan and 400 Mawozo gangs launched coordinated operations against rival gangs controlling parts of Sarthe, Terre Noire and neighbouring areas.<sup>8</sup> Sources described the coalition as referring to itself as the “Barons de la Plaine”.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 2814 (2026), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) prepared this report in coordination with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, in the context of the Caribbean Firearms Roadmap, Haiti's national action plan under the Roadmap and other relevant United Nations activities. The Regional Centre provided substantive contributions to UNODC on 31 March 2026, which have been incorporated throughout the report.

<sup>5</sup> See [www.reuters.com/world/americas/least-16-dead-10-injured-haiti-town-police-says-2026-03-30](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/least-16-dead-10-injured-haiti-town-police-says-2026-03-30), <https://apnews.com/article/9ceb486d3c24b292eed3a7e6fa093b62>, [www.reuters.com/world/americas/haiti-gangs-keep-up-attacks-breadbasket-region-after-massacre-2026-04-01](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/haiti-gangs-keep-up-attacks-breadbasket-region-after-massacre-2026-04-01) and <https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/03/1167188>.

<sup>6</sup> See <https://levoiciinfonews.com/2026/04/11/port-au-prince-insecurite-nouvelle-vague-de-kidnappings-a-petion-ville>, <https://canada-haiti.ca/content/seven-municipal-employees-kidnapped-petion-ville>, <https://haiti.unfpa.org/en/publications/situation-report-crisis-haiti-january-march-2026> and <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Brokers-and-patrons-Unstitching-gangs-from-Haitis-political-fabric-GI-TOC-March-2026.pdf>.

<sup>7</sup> This escalation may be linked to the drawdown of the Multinational Security Support Mission, whose personnel began departing after the 15 April 2026 transition deadline, and to gang efforts to exploit the operational handover to the Gang Suppression Force (see [www.the-star.co.ke/news/2026-04-21-fourth-batch-of-kenya-police-officers-returns-from-haiti-mission](https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2026-04-21-fourth-batch-of-kenya-police-officers-returns-from-haiti-mission) and [www.brusselstimes.com/2097322/belgian-aircraft-shot-at-during-un-operation](https://www.brusselstimes.com/2097322/belgian-aircraft-shot-at-during-un-operation)).

<sup>8</sup> See <https://haitiantimes.com/2026/04/21/port-au-prince-international-airport-gunfire-clashes-armed-groups>.

<sup>9</sup> Interview with key informant K#2, 29 May 2026.

9. Armed gangs controlling Sarthe and Terre Noire reportedly received support from vigilante or so-called “self-defence” groups. In several areas, residents reportedly relied on such groups for protection in the absence of a State security presence.<sup>10</sup> Some residents viewed these actors as a lesser threat than rival gangs. However, their growing role in providing security, exercising social control and generating revenue through extortion, racketeering and protection arrangements blurs the distinction between gangs, vigilante or so-called self-defence groups and local governance structures, contributing to insecurity, impunity and the erosion of public authority. Interviews conducted by United Nations entities documented incidents of so-called “popular justice”, including lynchings of individuals suspected of gang affiliation.<sup>11</sup>

10. The security situation in Cité Soleil, Croix-des-Bouquets and Plaine du Cul-de-Sac also deteriorated during the reporting period. At least 390 people were reportedly killed in these communities between March and May during clashes, while the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti documented at least 305 people killed, 277 injured and more than 10,100 displaced in the same period.<sup>12</sup> The violence was accompanied by reports of summary executions, sexual violence, arson and looting.<sup>13</sup>

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
<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Interview with key informant K#2, 22 May 2026.

<sup>12</sup> According to the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, these deaths and injuries were concentrated in Cité Soleil and Croix-des-Bouquets (see <https://press.un.org/en/2026/db260520.doc.htm> and <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-93-displacement-following-armed-clashes-cite-soleil-10-12-may>). The figures refer to violence in the affected communes and should not be read as national totals. Insights provided by the Department of Safety and Security on the general security situation in Haiti, May 2026. See also <https://press.un.org/en/2026/db260520.doc.htm>, [www.bssnews.net/news/387175](http://www.bssnews.net/news/387175), [www.alterpresse.org/Haiti-Violences-des-gangs-Pres-de-400-morts-et-plus-de-80-batiments-incendies-a-Cite-Soleil-et-Croix-des-Bouquets-selond](http://www.alterpresse.org/Haiti-Violences-des-gangs-Pres-de-400-morts-et-plus-de-80-batiments-incendies-a-Cite-Soleil-et-Croix-des-Bouquets-selond) and <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-93-displacement-following-armed-clashes-cite-soleil-10-12-may>.

<sup>13</sup> It also resulted in the suspension and evacuation of critical medical services, including a Médecins sans frontières facility that treated more than 40 gunshot victims in under 12 hours (see <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-violence-gangs-port-au-prince-431b915e4143adddfacb105473ee604d>). See also [www.france24.com/en/americas/20260514-haiti-gang-clashes-port-au-prince-suburbs-78-dead-un](http://www.france24.com/en/americas/20260514-haiti-gang-clashes-port-au-prince-suburbs-78-dead-un).

Figure I  
Selected gang clashes in Port-au-Prince, January to July 2026



*Abbreviations:* OSM, open-source media; UNODC, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

11. Insecurity also increased in other parts of the capital. From May onwards, the Haitian National Police, supported by an anti-gang task force, intensified operations in Village-de-Dieu, a long-standing stronghold of the 5 Segonn gang.<sup>14</sup> Operations reportedly involved the coordinated use of armed drones and armoured vehicles to target gang positions and facilitate the advance of security forces into areas that had remained largely inaccessible to the State for several years.<sup>15</sup> The campaign highlighted the growing role of remotely operated capabilities in Haiti's security response.

12. According to Human Rights Watch, at least 1,243 people were killed and 738 injured in 141 drone-strike operations between 1 March 2025 and 21 January 2026 in Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas.<sup>16</sup> OHCHR reported that a private military company, reportedly hired by the Government of Haiti, had participated in security operations involving drone strikes and helicopter gunfire since March 2025.<sup>17</sup> The continued use of such capabilities underscores the reliance on stand-off forces in

<sup>14</sup> See <https://haitiinfospro.com/village-de-dieu-une-offensive-denvergure-de-la-pnh-et-de-la-task-force-relevance-la-strategie-de-reconquete-des-zones-armees> and <https://lefacteurhaiti.com/operation-policier-a-village-de-dieu-la-residence-du-chef-de-gang-manno-prise-pour-cible>.

<sup>15</sup> See [www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/gangs-expand-reach-haiti-amid-persistent-deadly-violence-un-human-rights](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/gangs-expand-reach-haiti-amid-persistent-deadly-violence-un-human-rights).


<sup>16</sup> See <https://thedialogue.org/analysis/whats-behind-the-use-of-drones-in-haitis-conflict> and <https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/03/10/haiti-drone-strikes-put-residents-at-risk>.

<sup>17</sup> See [www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/gangs-expand-reach-haiti-amid-persistent-deadly-violence-un-human-rights](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/gangs-expand-reach-haiti-amid-persistent-deadly-violence-un-human-rights).

environments in which conventional policing remains constrained by the territorial control exercised by armed gangs.<sup>18</sup>

13. Armed gangs projected violence into other geographical areas of Haiti. In March 2026, OHCHR reported that armed gangs had “expanded their reach beyond Port-au-Prince into the Centre and Artibonite Departments”, where they “continued to kill, rape and terrorize the population” while “strengthening their influence over strategic transport corridors”.<sup>19</sup> This trend was illustrated by attacks carried out in late March 2026 in Jean-Denis.<sup>20</sup> Coordinated attacks caused large-scale casualties and displacement, with fatality estimates varying across available reporting because of insecurity, limited access and rapidly evolving conditions.<sup>21</sup> The International Organization for Migration documented 5,291 displaced persons from 1,359 households following the attacks that began on 28 March 2026.<sup>22</sup>

Figure II  
Expansion of armed gangs outside Port-au-Prince, 2025–2026



14. Armed gangs applied pressure along strategic road and maritime corridors connecting Port-au-Prince to the southern departments. One of the clearest

<sup>18</sup> UNODC already reported in July 2025 that Haitian security actors were employing surveillance and explosive drones in operations against armed gangs. See [www.unodc.org/unodc/en/speeches/2026/210126-un-security-council-briefing-on-haiti.html](https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/speeches/2026/210126-un-security-council-briefing-on-haiti.html) and <https://thedialogue.org/analysis/whats-behind-the-use-of-drones-in-haitis-conflict>.

<sup>19</sup> See [www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/gangs-expand-reach-haiti-amid-persistent-deadly-violence-un-human-rights](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/gangs-expand-reach-haiti-amid-persistent-deadly-violence-un-human-rights).

<sup>20</sup> See <https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/03/1167188> and [www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/gangs-expand-reach-haiti-amid-persistent-deadly-violence-un-human-rights](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/gangs-expand-reach-haiti-amid-persistent-deadly-violence-un-human-rights).

<sup>21</sup> See [www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/03/31/haiti-gang-attacks-kill-at-least-70-people-over-the-weekend-says-un\\_6751996\\_4.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/03/31/haiti-gang-attacks-kill-at-least-70-people-over-the-weekend-says-un_6751996_4.html) and <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/265789/artibonite-carnage-in-jean-denis>.

<sup>22</sup> See <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-88-displacement-following-armed-attacks-petite-riviere>.

manifestations of this trend occurred in Seguin, where armed men reportedly killed seven people and set fire to a police station in mid-April. Local authorities described the attack as part of the expansion of armed gangs to areas of the south-east.<sup>23</sup> Local authorities also identified the Kajak area, located along the Kenscoff–Marigot axis, as an emerging flashpoint.<sup>24</sup> These incidents highlight the risk of the expansion of gang influence into localities historically outside the principal areas of their control and exposes the vulnerability of communities located along key access routes.

15. The international security architecture also shifted in response to several of these trends. Security Council resolution [2814 \(2026\)](#) renewed the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti until 31 January 2027 and reiterated its concern regarding the critical security situation in Haiti, the continued illicit flow of arms and ammunition into the country and the need to assist and support the Haitian authorities. Attention has focused on the operationalization of international security support arrangements, particularly the Gang Suppression Force, to reinforce Haiti's capacity to respond to the territorial expansion of armed gangs and related criminal violence.<sup>25</sup>

16. The Security Council, in its resolution [2793 \(2025\)](#), authorized the Gang Suppression Force for an initial 12-month mandate, with a ceiling of 5,550 personnel. The Force expanded its operational presence during the reporting period as it advanced through its deployment and operationalization phase. The Force Commander arrived in Haiti in May 2026 together with 39 staff officers and nine personnel assigned to the Force's headquarters support company. On the same date, 20 Jamaican personnel deployed as part of a mobile training team supporting induction and predeployment activities, which concluded on 31 May, while an additional 7 Jamaican personnel, including the Deputy Force Commander were also deployed. As at 17 June, the Force's military component comprised 747 personnel, including 397 Chadian infantry personnel, 150 Guatemalan military police officers and 125 Salvadoran personnel, as well as Jamaican and Mongolian personnel assigned to training and headquarters functions. Additional contingents and support arrangements continued to be developed during the reporting period.<sup>26</sup>

17. As the Gang Suppression Force moves towards greater operational capacity, its priorities include coordination with Haitian authorities and compliance with applicable human rights standards, while longer-term security gains will also depend on the ability of Haitian institutions, supported by international partners, to disrupt the financial and logistical networks sustaining armed gangs.<sup>27</sup>

### III. Arms trafficking dynamics

18. Arms trafficking continued to enable high levels of organized violence in Haiti during the reporting period. The clearest documented external illicit supply line remains the United States of America-Haiti firearms corridor, operating through maritime cargo channels and adaptive transnational trafficking networks. Multiple seizures during the reporting period reinforced this assessment.

<sup>23</sup> See <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-gangs-seguin-attack-killings-90e638b676d181dc63359c8c92bacf4a>.

<sup>24</sup> See [www.alterpresse.org/Haiti-Cri-d-alarme-apres-l-attaque-meurtriere-de-gangs-armes-a-Seguin](http://www.alterpresse.org/Haiti-Cri-d-alarme-apres-l-attaque-meurtriere-de-gangs-armes-a-Seguin).

<sup>25</sup> See [www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/01/haiti-briefing-and-consultations-16.php](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/01/haiti-briefing-and-consultations-16.php) and [www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/09/haiti-vote-on-a-draft-resolution-authorising-a-gang-suppression-force-and-a-un-support-office.php](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/09/haiti-vote-on-a-draft-resolution-authorising-a-gang-suppression-force-and-a-un-support-office.php).

<sup>26</sup> Information provided to UNODC by Gang Suppression Force officials, 28 June 2026.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

19. On 13 January 2026, UNODC reported two interdictions at a northern Haitian terminal involving shipments originating from the United States. The first resulted in the seizure of three firearms, magazines and 1,800 rounds of 9 mm ammunition. A follow-up interdiction uncovered nine pistols, nine magazines and 5,500 rounds of 7.62 × 39 mm ammunition.<sup>28</sup> On 21 May, customs authorities at the port of Saint-Marc reportedly seized firearms and ammunition concealed in another shipment originating from the United States.<sup>29</sup> These cases underscore the use of commercial maritime cargo and the importance of inspection at secondary ports.<sup>30</sup>

20. United States judicial proceedings further illustrate that the United States-Haiti firearms corridor involves both direct and indirect routes through neighbouring jurisdictions. On 6 January 2026, the United States Department of Justice announced charges against Haitian nationals accused of smuggling firearms from the United States to Haiti. On 28 May, the United States Attorney's Office for the Middle District of Florida announced that a resident of Florida had pleaded guilty to conspiracy to smuggle goods, unlawful shipment of firearms and smuggling from the United States. This case related to the interdiction in 2025 in the Dominican Republic of a Miami-origin shipment destined for Haiti that contained rifles, handguns and more than 36,000 rounds of ammunition.<sup>31</sup>

21. Additional seizures highlight the diversification of illicit trafficking flows into Haiti. On 25 May 2026, authorities at the Malpasse border crossing reportedly intercepted more than 1,000 tactical uniforms, while customs officials in Gonaïves reportedly seized approximately 100 machetes using handheld scanning equipment.<sup>32</sup> Although distinct from firearms, such materials remain relevant in the Haitian context given the use of military-style equipment, uniforms and bladed weapons by armed gangs to intimidate the population, impersonate security forces and complicate law-enforcement responses during episodes of collective violence.

22. Police-reported operational results further illustrated the scale of weapons circulation. On 25 March 2026, a Haitian National Police spokesperson stated that 32 operations conducted since January had resulted in the seizure of 46 rifles, 19 pistols, 10,659 rounds of ammunition, six drones, communication equipment, Molotov cocktails and two armoured vehicles. The counter-narcotics bureau of the Haitian National Police (Bureau de lutte contre le trafic de stupéfiants) separately reported the seizure of 17 firearms, 11,580 rounds of ammunition and the arrest of 29 individuals between January and June 2026.<sup>33</sup> While these figures may overlap with other operational reporting, they point to sustained levels of firearms trafficking.

23. Other operations suggested the tactical sophistication of armed gangs.<sup>34</sup> In Bel-Air, authorities reportedly recovered four ballistic vests, four rifle magazines, Haitian National Police uniforms, two rifles, three shotguns and a container of

<sup>28</sup> See [www.unodc.org/ropan/en/Noticias/2026\\_13enero\\_haiti\\_pccp\\_seizure.html](https://www.unodc.org/ropan/en/Noticias/2026_13enero_haiti_pccp_seizure.html). Details were also reported to UNODC by control units in the field.

<sup>29</sup> See [www.alterpresse.org/Haiti-Saisie-d-armes-et-de-munitions-au-port-de-Saint-Marc-le-suspect-en-fuite](https://www.alterpresse.org/Haiti-Saisie-d-armes-et-de-munitions-au-port-de-Saint-Marc-le-suspect-en-fuite).

<sup>30</sup> See <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/266322/quartier-morin-saisie-darmes-et-arrestation-dun-individu-pour-traffic-illicite-de-stupefiants>.

<sup>31</sup> See [www.justice.gov/usao-mdfl/pr/haitian-nationals-charged-unlawfully-smuggling-firearms-united-states](https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdfl/pr/haitian-nationals-charged-unlawfully-smuggling-firearms-united-states).

<sup>32</sup> Information provided to UNODC by the General Administration of Customs, 25 May 2026.

<sup>33</sup> Statistics provided by the Bureau de lutte contre le trafic de stupéfiants, a specialized unit of the Central Directorate of the Judicial Police, on seizures conducted between 1 January and 3 June 2026.

<sup>34</sup> See <https://haitiantimes.com/2026/01/14/pnh-continue-operations-seize-33-firearms-12000-rounds>.

5.56-calibre ammunition, along with a vest marked “La Presse”.<sup>35</sup> In a separate operation near the national palace in Champs-de-Mars, officers reportedly confiscated two M16 rifles, a modified Kalashnikov-pattern rifle, more than 4,900 rounds of 5.56 and 7.62 ammunition, an additional ballistic vest marked “Police” and a drone.<sup>36</sup> These findings suggest that armed gangs continued to access military-grade weapons and equipment, misuse official identifiers to deceive authorities.

24. Operations conducted by the Central Directorate of the Judicial Police under the “Goudougoudou” initiative reportedly resulted in the seizure of firearms, ammunition, narcotics, cash and vehicles. Authorities also arrested a foreign individual wanted in alleged connection with a long-running arms trafficking case.<sup>37</sup> These cases illustrate the extent to which firearms trafficking in Haiti remains intertwined with other forms of organized criminal activity, including drug trafficking and illicit financial flows.

25. At the same time, concerns persisted regarding the diversion and mismanagement of seized weapons and ammunition. Available reporting pointed to structural gaps in chain-of-custody procedures and the need to strengthen coordination between the National Police and judicial authorities, establish standardized evidence registration protocols and reinforce weapons and ammunition management systems. The Prosecutor of the Nord-Ouest Department highlighted this issue in a letter to the Director General of the Haitian National Police, raising allegations regarding the disappearance of evidentiary materials, particularly firearms and ammunition.<sup>38</sup> Such losses undermine investigations and impede court proceedings where evidentiary support is insufficient.<sup>39</sup>

## IV. Drug trafficking trends

26. Drug trafficking continued to constitute a source of revenue for criminal networks operating in and transiting through Haiti. Narcotics trafficking routes throughout the country reportedly remained active and adaptive, reflecting broader shifts in regional trafficking patterns across the Caribbean. Law enforcement operations during the reporting period pointed to sustained trafficking activity.<sup>40</sup>

27. Joint operations conducted by the Bureau de lutte contre le trafic de stupéfiants and the Haitian Coast Guard in Les Cayes and surrounding areas resulted in multiple cocaine seizures in April and May. These reportedly included seizures of

<sup>35</sup> See [www.ichaiti.com/en/news-46596-ichaiti-delmas-2-seizure-of-weapons-and-ammunition.html](http://www.ichaiti.com/en/news-46596-ichaiti-delmas-2-seizure-of-weapons-and-ammunition.html).

<sup>36</sup> See <https://conven.org/holy-see/news/pnh-reports-dozens-of-weapons-seized-as-anti-gang-operations-expand> and [www.radiomaximumfm.com/2026/01/13/bilan-des-operations-de-la-pnh-des-bandits-tues-plus-de-12-000-munitions-et-33-armes-a-feu-saisies](http://www.radiomaximumfm.com/2026/01/13/bilan-des-operations-de-la-pnh-des-bandits-tues-plus-de-12-000-munitions-et-33-armes-a-feu-saisies).

<sup>37</sup> See [www.haitilibre.com/en/news-47149-pnh-operation-summary-43-terrorists-killed-weapons-and-ammunition-seized.html](http://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-47149-pnh-operation-summary-43-terrorists-killed-weapons-and-ammunition-seized.html), [www.caribbeannationalweekly.com/posts/haitian-police-report-43-gang-members-killed-since-start-of-year](http://www.caribbeannationalweekly.com/posts/haitian-police-report-43-gang-members-killed-since-start-of-year), [www.alterpresse.org/Haiti-Criminalite-Plus-de-40-presumes-bandits-tues-depuis-janvier-2026-selon-la-Pnh](http://www.alterpresse.org/Haiti-Criminalite-Plus-de-40-presumes-bandits-tues-depuis-janvier-2026-selon-la-Pnh), [www.caribbeannationalweekly.com/news/haitian-police-report-43-gang-members-killed-since-start-of-year](http://www.caribbeannationalweekly.com/news/haitian-police-report-43-gang-members-killed-since-start-of-year), [www.thestkittsnevisobserver.com/haiti-police-say-they-have-killed-more-hn-40-gang-members-since-start-of-the-year](http://www.thestkittsnevisobserver.com/haiti-police-say-they-have-killed-more-hn-40-gang-members-since-start-of-the-year), <https://lequotidien509.com/en/zimbabwean-suspect-arrested-haiti-arms-kidnapping> and <https://lequotidien509.com/en/zimbabwean-suspect-arrested-haiti-arms-kidnapping>.

<sup>38</sup> See <https://haitiantimes.com/2026/03/30/port-de-paix-prosecutor-accuses-police-of-evidence-tampering>.

<sup>39</sup> Regional meeting on countering firearms trafficking flows to Haiti, held in Panama on 25 and 26 November 2025.

<sup>40</sup> The evidence combines seizures, operational reporting and interlocutor assessments; route shifts should therefore be treated as assessed trends rather than conclusive findings where corroborating interdiction data remain limited.

approximately 4 kg of cocaine on 6 April, 3.4 kg on 10 April, 3.3 kg on 19 April and a further 3 kg on 2 May. Several of these cases were reportedly linked to maritime supply routes servicing the south-western region of Haiti. Available operational reporting also suggested possible trafficking connections involving Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and northern Colombia, highlighting the continued integration of Haiti into wider Caribbean drug-trafficking networks. Smaller armed criminal groups may also continue to exchange narcotics for firearms and ammunition.<sup>41</sup>

28. According to law enforcement interlocutors, counter-narcotics efforts in the southern Caribbean and traditional maritime corridors prompted traffickers to adapt routes and transport methods. Interlocutors described reduced reliance on high-speed “go-fast” vessels and increased use of containerized cargo, fishing vessels and recreational craft. Shipments originating in South and Central America are reportedly increasingly consolidated in Jamaica before moving through secondary maritime routes involving northern Haiti, The Bahamas the Turks and Caicos Islands and the Dominican Republic.<sup>42</sup>

29. Recent interdictions were consistent with these assessments. On 3 May 2026, a vessel carrying approximately 3,200 pounds of marijuana was intercepted approximately 8 miles off Môle-Saint-Nicolas by a United States Coast Guard detachment operating with the authorization of the Haitian authorities.<sup>43</sup> The operation highlights the continued use of waters surrounding Haiti by maritime trafficking networks. While these assessments remain based largely on operational reporting and interviews conducted by UNODC, they suggest a growing role for Haiti as a logistical node within evolving regional trafficking patterns.


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<sup>41</sup> Information provided to UNODC during meetings with representatives of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, Homeland Security Investigations and the United States Coast Guard, 20 April 2026, and during discussions with military intelligence officials of the Royal Bahamas Defence Force, 21 April 2026.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> The contraband and one detained suspect were subsequently transferred to Haitian authorities (see [www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/4477528/coast-guard-us-navy-interdicts-suspected-drug-vessel-off-haiti](https://www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/4477528/coast-guard-us-navy-interdicts-suspected-drug-vessel-off-haiti)).

Figure III  
Expanding drug trafficking corridors in the northern Caribbean



Abbreviation: UNODC, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

### Armed robbery, maritime insecurity and port vulnerability

30. Armed robbery and maritime criminal activity posed a serious threat to security and commercial navigation in Haitian waters, reflecting broader patterns of organized violence, weak maritime surveillance and criminal control over strategic access points. The same gaps in maritime control that facilitate illicit flows also expose commercial vessels and port operations to criminal predation. For example, on 2 May 2026, the Haitian Coast Guard responded to a maritime security incident involving a Panama-flagged cargo vessel in the Bay of Léogâne.<sup>44</sup>

31. According to an incident report provided to UNODC, the vessel had been attacked by armed individuals travelling in small boats, prompting an emergency response. Coast Guard patrol units located and secured the vessel, which was subsequently escorted to Port-au-Prince harbour. Upon arrival, authorities boarded the vessel, verified documentation and collected testimony. According to the captain, the incident occurred late on 1 May while the vessel was positioned offshore. Four unidentified assailants approached the vessel, boarded the ship, threatened the crew with firearms, confiscated personal belongings and took control of parts of the vessel. The assailants reportedly attempted to abduct the captain but instead seized two foreign crew members. The victims were taken away by boat, and subsequent communication indicated that at least one remained alive.<sup>45</sup>

32. Port security vulnerabilities acquired wider commercial and strategic significance during the reporting period. Following earlier notification to Haiti regarding serious deficiencies in the implementation of the International Code for the

<sup>44</sup> Haitian Coast Guard submission regarding the incident on-board the *Semiha-Ahmet-M*, 2 May 2026.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

Security of Ships and of Port Facilities, the United States Coast Guard announced in June 2026 that it would impose conditions of entry on vessels arriving in the United States from Haiti. The *Federal Register* notice reflected United States Coast Guard concerns regarding deficiencies in the implementation of the International Code and the effectiveness of anti-terrorism measures at Haitian ports.<sup>46</sup> As a result of the notice, vessels from the United States arriving in Haiti will require enhanced security measures and vessels transiting from Haiti to the United States will not be authorized to land.

33. Given Haiti's dependence on maritime imports, additional port security restrictions can strain logistics, disrupt commercial and humanitarian supply chains and expand rent-seeking opportunities for criminal networks controlling strategic corridors and port facilities. This can create a negative feedback loop in which insecurity can weaken port compliance, port restrictions can raise transaction costs and higher costs can increase the value of controlling supply routes.

## V. Scarcity and criminal opportunity

34. Haiti's criminal economy continued to diversify during the reporting period. UNODC has described an organized crime ecosystem encompassing arms and drug trafficking, corruption, money-laundering schemes, migrant smuggling, trafficking in persons and related financial crimes (S/2026/32, paras. 3 and 25).<sup>47</sup>

35. Scarcity provides an enabling environment for diversification by increasing the value of access and distribution. Haiti's dependence on imported fuel and food made fuel distribution networks, storage facilities and transport corridors strategically important.<sup>48</sup> Disruptions affecting the Varreux terminal or its surroundings allowed armed gangs to apply leverage over the State, humanitarian actors and the wider economy.<sup>49</sup> As fuel prices increased and supply uncertainty persisted, checkpoints, road blocks, port access points and transport corridors generated greater rents for those able to control them.<sup>50</sup> In April 2026, the Haitian authorities announced austerity measures in response to oil supply disruptions and higher fuel prices,

<sup>46</sup> United States Coast Guard, "Imposition of conditions of entry for vessels arriving to the United States from the Republic of Haiti", *Federal Register*, document No. 2026-11328, 5 June 2026.

<sup>47</sup> See also [www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2026/January/explainer\\_-organized-crime-and-gang-violence-in-haiti.html](https://www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2026/January/explainer_-organized-crime-and-gang-violence-in-haiti.html).

<sup>48</sup> Haiti imported roughly \$3.9 billion in goods in 2023 (the latest year for which data are available), with refined petroleum accounting for about \$525 million, or 14.6% of the total, as the country has no domestic refining capacity. Remittances reached 15.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2024. See [www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/haiti-market-overview](https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/haiti-market-overview).

<sup>49</sup> Disruption of the fuel terminal gives criminal groups infrastructural power to convert territorial control into bargaining power over the State. For example, a blockade of the free movement of fuel from Varreux in October 2022 by the G9 coalition contributed to economic paralysis. G9 demanded the resignation of the Prime Minister, Ariel Henry, as a condition for lifting the blockade but later relented to allow fuel distribution to resume. Road access to Varreux was also blocked in November 2025 to prevent tanker trucks from refuelling and delivering to service stations. See Security Council resolution 2653 (2022) and [www.haitilibre.org/en/news-46253-haiti-flash-varreux-oil-terminal-blocked-no-shortage-but.html](https://www.haitilibre.org/en/news-46253-haiti-flash-varreux-oil-terminal-blocked-no-shortage-but.html).

<sup>50</sup> Mercy Corps reported in the past that gang control of routes in and out of Port-au-Prince and Artibonite disrupted food supply chains, increasing transport costs, limiting market access, raising staple prices and worsening shortages (see, for example, [www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/2024-12/impact-of-gang-violence-on-food-systems-in-haiti.pdf](https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/2024-12/impact-of-gang-violence-on-food-systems-in-haiti.pdf)). The Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2653 (2022) noted in 2024 how container trucks paid 15,000–30,000 gourdes per container and that a single gang could earn at least \$22,000 a day from port access extortion alone (see S/2024/704, paras. 151, 154 and 156 and annex 40).

highlighting growing pressure on State mobility and logistics at a time when armed gangs continued to benefit from scarcity and control over movement.<sup>51</sup>

36. Scarcity also shaped patterns of recruitment and coercion. The United Nations Children's Fund indicated that children and adolescents comprise a substantial share of gang membership in Haiti.<sup>52</sup> Poverty, school disruption, hunger and displacement increase adolescents' vulnerability to recruitment as lookouts, couriers and fighters. Scarcity therefore affects not only commodity markets, but also criminal labour markets.

## VI. Corruption and financial crime

37. During the reporting period, Haitian authorities and international partners advanced efforts to strengthen anti-corruption and the criminal justice chain at both the institutional and legislative levels. Security Council resolution 2814 (2026) took note of the decree of April 2025 establishing two distinct specialized judicial poles to address complex financial crimes, including corruption and mass crimes, including sexual violence. The Council also looked forward to their full operationalization with the support of UNODC and other United Nations entities.<sup>53</sup> However, these reforms will require time to generate judicial outcomes.

38. On 11 March 2026, Haiti presented its first national risk assessment on money-laundering and terrorist financing, coordinated by the National Anti-Money-Laundering Committee, with the Central Financial Intelligence Unit acting as its executive secretariat and with technical support from the World Bank.<sup>54</sup> The assessment covered the period 2019–2024. It found that Haiti faced an elevated overall risk, with arms trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, corruption and contraband assessed at the “very high” threat level.

39. The assessment found that, within the assessed period, the decree of 30 April 2023 established cash thresholds for designated activities and prohibits cash settlements above 400,000 gourdes (approximately \$3,000).<sup>55</sup> However, authorities still need to strengthen implementation and enforcement. The assessment found that oversight of the real estate and gambling sectors remained weak, with no anti-money-laundering and countering the financing of terrorism supervision and, in the case of real estate, no designated regulatory authority.<sup>56</sup> The decree created the Office for the Management of Seized and Confiscated Assets, but the office had not yet begun operating because Haiti has not adopted the organic law defining its organization and functions. Between 2019 and 2024, the Central Financial Intelligence Unit received 1,254 suspicious transaction reports and transmitted 19 cases to the judiciary, with no recorded convictions.<sup>57</sup>

40. In April 2025, the Central Bank reissued its currency transaction reporting framework. The framework requires all categories of financial institutions to report cash movements and transfers to the Central Financial Intelligence Unit above defined

<sup>51</sup> See <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-austerity-measures-oil-iran-war-61ff6b8e3463ca749e62b5ce5848ff>.

<sup>52</sup> See [www.unicef.org/press-releases/child-recruitment-haiti-surges-threefold-just-one-year-unicef](https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/child-recruitment-haiti-surges-threefold-just-one-year-unicef) and <https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/02/1166954>.

<sup>53</sup> See <https://press.un.org/en/2026/sc16285.doc.htm>.

<sup>54</sup> National assessment of the risks of money-laundering and the financing of terrorism for 2019–2024, March 2026.

<sup>55</sup> Decree of 30 April 2023 on the suppression of money-laundering and the financing of terrorism, *Le Moniteur*, special issue No. 12, 4 May 2023.

<sup>56</sup> National assessment of the risks of money-laundering and the financing of terrorism for 2019–2024.

<sup>57</sup> Central Financial Intelligence Unit annual report for 2024–2025.

thresholds, including a bank threshold of 1,320,000 gourdes, close to the international \$10,000 benchmark. Supervision, enforcement and the conversion of financial intelligence into judicial outcomes remain marked deficiencies.<sup>58</sup>

41. Judicial reform also faces constraints. On 17 December 2025, the decree on the organization and functioning of the High Court of Justice was published. The Panel of Experts on Haiti established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2653 (2022) noted concerns regarding certain aspects of the decree, while civil society actors called for its repeal (see S/2026/241, annex 12).<sup>59</sup> The decree establishes a multi-stage procedure for cases involving senior public officials, requiring validation by institutional boards, deliberation by the Council of Ministers, transmission to the Chamber of Deputies, review by a 20-member parliamentary commission, and a vote with a two thirds majority before indictment.<sup>60</sup> Haiti has not yet established the chambers of Parliament, the High Court of Justice or the institutional boards of the Central Financial Intelligence Unit and the Anti-Corruption Unit. In light of these absences, the mechanism established under the decree cannot operate, creating a risk of jurisdictional void.

42. At the same time, Haiti formally inaugurated on 27 May the two specialized judicial poles: one for complex financial crimes, including corruption and money-laundering, and another for mass crimes, including arms trafficking, organ trafficking and sexual violence. Their effective operationalization and functioning will require sustained resources, security, case-management capacity, witness protection, digital evidence management and coordination with financial intelligence and anti-corruption bodies.

43. Allegations of corruption within public institutions continued to emerge. In May 2025, the Anti-Corruption Unit reported a scheme involving the production of passports using unpaid tax stamps through a fictitious user account.<sup>61</sup> In March 2026, the Central Directorate of the Judicial Police arrested the sitting Director General and nine officials of Haiti's Directorate of Immigration and Emigration on suspicion of corruption linked to the alleged sale of Haitian passports to foreign nationals using mismatched tax identification numbers. Judicial authorities reportedly released the officials under travel restrictions while proceedings are pending.<sup>62</sup> The alleged issuance of genuine travel documents based on fraudulent identity information creates national and regional risks, including potential exploitation by transnational criminal networks and individuals seeking to circumvent immigration controls or sanctions regimes.

44. Regional reporting further underscores the links between illicit finance, firearms and trafficking networks. For example, Jamaica reported a vessel interception involving a Haitian national carrying \$11,150 in cash, although authorities did not establish evidence of trafficking. Jamaica also reported the conviction of a Jamaican national suspected of trafficking items from Haiti on charges including illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, possession of cocaine and possession of criminal property, with \$64,000 recovered and proceeds-of-crime proceedings

<sup>58</sup> Bank of the Republic of Haiti, circular No. 95-5 to financial institutions, 16 April 2025.

<sup>59</sup> See also the decree of 1 December 2025 on the organization and functioning of the High Court of Justice, *Le Moniteur*, special edition No. 68, 17 December 2025. The decree was challenged by the Organisation des citoyens pour une nouvelle Haïti, Nègès Mawon, Nou Pap Dòmi, the Plateforme des organisations haïtiennes de droits humains, the Réseau national de défense des droits humains and the Ensemble contre la corruption.

<sup>60</sup> Decree of 1 December 2025 on the organization and functioning of the High Court of Justice.

<sup>61</sup> Anti-Corruption Unit reports, May 2025.

<sup>62</sup> See <https://haitiantimes.com/2026/03/25/haiti-immigration-director-arrested-passport-scandal> and [www.rhinews.com/actualites/haiti-le-directeur-general-de-limmigration-arrete-dans-une-enquete-sur-un-traffic-de-passeports](http://www.rhinews.com/actualites/haiti-le-directeur-general-de-limmigration-arrete-dans-une-enquete-sur-un-traffic-de-passeports).

pending. Jamaica also confirmed that traffickers continued shipping marijuana to Haiti through unofficial ports and exchanging drugs at sea or on arrival for weapons, ammunition or cash, which gangs then distribute or use to finance the trade.<sup>63</sup>

45. External pressure on Haiti's political-criminal nexus intensified. On 28 January 2026, the United States announced visa restrictions on three additional Haitian officials, including two members of the Transitional Presidential Council and one Cabinet minister, on the grounds that their actions had enabled gangs to destabilize Haiti.<sup>64</sup> The United States continued to use Haiti-related sanctions under the global Magnitsky sanctions programme and illicit drug trafficking and counter-terrorism authorities, with designations covering 17 individuals and two entities linked to serious human rights abuses, corruption, drug trafficking, laundering of illicit proceeds and support for Haiti-based gangs.<sup>65</sup> The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland maintained Haiti-related designations on 11 individuals and two entities.<sup>66</sup> The European Union continued to implement the relevant United Nations sanctions regime<sup>67</sup> and its autonomous Haiti sanctions framework.<sup>68</sup>

## VII. Smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons

46. Smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons are significant components of Haiti's broader criminal ecosystem. UNODC has identified migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons among the organized crime markets that have expanded in the context of weak border management, poorly monitored ports and airstrips and institutional fragility.<sup>69</sup>

47. Ongoing investigations indicate that migrant smuggling networks operating across the northern Caribbean rely on adaptive maritime strategies designed to reduce

<sup>63</sup> Information provided by the Ministry of National Security and Peace of Jamaica on "Response to the UNODC request for information in the context of the Security Council resolution S/RES/2692 (2023) paragraph 9", 14 January 2026.

<sup>64</sup> See [www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/01/visa-restrictions-for-haitian-officials-empowering-terrorist-gangs-in-haiti](https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/01/visa-restrictions-for-haitian-officials-empowering-terrorist-gangs-in-haiti).

<sup>65</sup> Ten individuals are listed under the global Magnitsky sanctions programme for serious human rights abuse and corruption. Five individuals are listed under the illicit drug trafficking authority. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act and executive order 13224, the United States designated two entities, a gang coalition and a gang, as foreign terrorist organizations and specially designated global terrorists on 2 May 2025. A total of 18 are "blocking" designations and 1 is "non-blocking". These measures freeze assets, bar dealings and, where applicable, criminalize the knowing provision of material support under United States law.

<sup>66</sup> See <https://admin.lawthek.eu/detail/01d7ee32-dec0-4ff4-91fb-5aea835aff8e/en> and [www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2022/1281/contents](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2022/1281/contents) and response of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the UNODC request for information, 17 April 2026.

<sup>67</sup> Security Council resolution 2653 (2022) imposes a travel ban, asset freeze and targeted arms embargo in connection with the situation concerning Haiti, and also establishes a sanctions committee and Panel of Experts.

<sup>68</sup> See <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/1429/oj/eng> and [www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/12/15/haiti-council-lists-three-individuals-and-one-entity-over-gang-violence-and-related-human-rights-abuses](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/12/15/haiti-council-lists-three-individuals-and-one-entity-over-gang-violence-and-related-human-rights-abuses).

<sup>69</sup> See [www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2026/January/explainer\\_-\\_organized-crime-and-gang-violence-in-haiti.html](https://www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2026/January/explainer_-_organized-crime-and-gang-violence-in-haiti.html).


detection and distribute operational risk.<sup>70</sup> Departures are often timed to coincide with favourable sea conditions, reduced visibility and limited maritime surveillance. Rather than relying on direct transportation from origin to destination, smugglers use fragmented, multi-stage journeys involving multiple vessels, transit points and facilitators. This complicates efforts to build prosecutable cases against higher-level criminal entities.

48. Authorities identified at least four principal maritime smuggling routes departing from northern Haiti, notably from Môle-Saint-Nicolas, Île de la Tortue, Port-de-Paix, Le Borgne, Cap-Haïtien and Fort-Liberté. These routes connect Haiti with Cuba, The Bahamas, the Turks and Caicos Islands and ultimately the United States. Smuggling networks reportedly rely on isolated islands, remote coastal areas, temporary accommodation and offshore rendezvous points to stage migrants, transfer passengers between vessels and facilitate onward movement.

49. Locations such as the Elbow cays, Ragged Island and isolated coastal areas reportedly serve as temporary transit points where migrants may await onward transportation, sometimes in precarious conditions and with limited access to basic services. These practices reduce losses following interdiction, separate organizers from transporters and complicate efforts by authorities to identify suspects, collect evidence and dismantle entire smuggling networks.

Figure IV

**Reported smuggling routes from Haiti across the Turks and Caicos Islands and The Bahamas to the United States, 2025–2026**



Abbreviation: UNODC, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

<sup>70</sup> Information contained in paragraphs 47–51 is based on interviews conducted by UNODC with the Royal Bahamas Defence Force Intelligence Unit, Nassau, on 21 April 2026 and with the National Security Secretariat of the Turks and Caicos Islands on 21 May 2026. The information reflects assessments shared by the respective authorities regarding trafficking routes, criminal networks and related security developments in the northern Caribbean. It is further informed by ongoing UNODC cooperation with Haitian law enforcement authorities in the field of migrant smuggling, including regular operational and strategic exchanges on trafficking patterns, criminal networks and regional migration dynamics.

50. Authorities in The Bahamas reported that smuggling fees vary considerably depending on the route, destination and intermediary network involved, ranging from approximately \$1,500 to \$5,000. Arrangements coordinated through facilitators based in The Bahamas, the Turks and Caicos Islands or the United States reportedly command higher fees because of additional transport, accommodation and logistical services. It has been reported that migrants are permitted to travel without upfront payment and are required to reimburse transportation costs after arrival. Such arrangements increase vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, debt bondage and other abuses, constituting a potential convergence between migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons.

51. Document fraud remained a key enabling mechanism within these smuggling networks. Available information pointed primarily to the use of fraudulent visas, fraudulently obtained travel documents and irregular charter travel arrangements rather than counterfeit Haitian passports. Criminal facilitators continued to exploit weaknesses in documentation and migration systems to move migrants across borders. In addition to maritime corridors linking Haiti with The Bahamas, the Turks and Caicos Islands and the United States, available information also pointed to southbound facilitation routes operating through Latin America and relying on fraudulent documentation, intermediary networks and the exploitation of humanitarian, family reunification or regular migration pathways.

52. According to media sources, the most notable documented case during the reporting period was reported from Brazil. In March 2026, Brazilian authorities and local partners assisted Haitians stranded at Viracopos airport in Campinas with migration regularization, refugee registration and social support. Reporting indicated that a charter flight originating from Haiti had landed with 118 passengers reportedly presenting irregular or false humanitarian visa documentation, prompting a federal police investigation into suspected migrant smuggling. Official Brazilian and local reporting confirmed the stranded group and the regularization response, while allegations relating to false visas remained based on contemporaneous reporting rather than completed judicial findings.<sup>71</sup>

## VIII. Regional exposure to Haiti-linked criminal markets

53. Haiti's crisis continued to generate pressures for neighbouring countries and the wider Caribbean through forced displacement and returns, criminal route diffusion, interdiction demands, illicit financial flows, maritime trade disruption and indirect effects on tourism and investment. These pressures were felt not only by public authorities, but also by private operators exposed to higher shipping, insurance, compliance and security costs. Although the scale of these effects varied across countries and sectors, they increasingly formed part of the regional operating environment.<sup>72</sup>

54. Displacement and forced returns remained the most immediate concern. The International Organization for Migration reported that, as of May 2026, 1,466,862

<sup>71</sup> See <https://g1.globo.com/sp/campinas-regiao/noticia/2026/03/14/justica-federal-da-48-horas-para-pf-analisar-pedidos-de-refugio-de-haitianos-retidos-em-viracopos.ghtml>, <https://g1.globo.com/sp/campinas-regiao/noticia/2026/04/12/por-dentro-da-rota-dos-haitianos-ao-brasil-viracopos-recebe-ate-600-imigrantes-por-semana.ghtml>, <https://jornal.unicamp.br/noticias/2026/05/14/haitianos-entre-fronteiras-recomecos-e-aco-es-solidarias>, <https://brazil.iom.int/en/news/iom-supports-humanitarian-reception-haitian-migrants-recently-arrived-brazil> and <https://jornal.unicamp.br/en/noticias/2026/05/14/haitianos-entre-fronteiras-recomecos-e-aco-es-solidarias>.

<sup>72</sup> See [www.unodc.org/unodc/en/speeches/2026/210126-un-security-council-briefing-on-haiti.html](https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/speeches/2026/210126-un-security-council-briefing-on-haiti.html).

people were displaced inside Haiti.<sup>73</sup> Violent attacks in March displaced approximately 20,000 people across Artibonite, Centre and Ouest, while humanitarian partners documented 5,291 displaced persons following attacks in Petite-Rivière de l'Artibonite.<sup>74</sup> Humanitarian reporting recorded more than 23,000 forced returns to Haiti from neighbouring countries in January 2026, exceeding the 2025 monthly average.<sup>75</sup> The Dominican Republic's migration authorities stated that 67,940 undocumented Haitians had been deported in January and February 2026.<sup>76</sup> These movements increased pressure on Haiti's limited absorption capacity and placed additional humanitarian and administrative demands on neighbouring countries.<sup>77</sup>

55. Other regional effects were less visible but increasingly relevant. Maritime spaces linking Haiti with The Bahamas, Jamaica and the Turks and Caicos Islands remained exposed to migrant smuggling, drug trafficking and firearms trafficking, increasing demands on interdiction, border management and intelligence cooperation.<sup>78</sup> Illicit proceeds from criminal activities also created regional laundering risks through bulk cash smuggling, informal remittance channels, trade-based schemes and front companies. For smaller island economies, such exposure may be primarily reputational and compliance-related, particularly where correspondent banks perceive heightened anti-money-laundering/countering the financing of terrorism, corruption or sanctions risks.<sup>79</sup>

56. Haiti's insecurity also affected tourism and investment sentiment. Royal Caribbean suspended calls to Labadee in 2025 and extended the suspension through 2026, while Celebrity Cruises also removed Labadee from 2025 and 2026 itineraries amid safety concerns.<sup>80</sup> Although these decisions directly affected Haiti, they also illustrate a wider reputational sensitivity in a region where travellers, cruise operators, insurers and investors may respond to perceived security risks across the Caribbean. Neighbouring countries therefore have incentives to communicate clearly about destination-specific security conditions and to distinguish their operating environments from Haiti-linked instability.<sup>81</sup>

<sup>73</sup> See <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-information-sheet-displacement-situation-round-13-may-2026>.

<sup>74</sup> See [https://haiti.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd11091/files/documents/2026-04/2026-03\\_sitrep\\_en.pdf](https://haiti.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd11091/files/documents/2026-04/2026-03_sitrep_en.pdf).

<sup>75</sup> See <https://crisisresponse.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd11481/files/appeal/documents/Haiti-Situation-Report-Jan-2026.pdf>.

<sup>76</sup> See <https://migracion.gob.do/en/dgm-deported-67940-undocumented-immigrants-in-january-and-february-2026-through-the-border-with-haiti> and <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-rapport-de-situation-no-1-attaques-armees-et-deplacements-de-population-jean-denis-artibonite-au-31-mars-2026>.

<sup>77</sup> See [www.unocha.org/haiti](http://www.unocha.org/haiti).

<sup>78</sup> See [www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2025/11/113463/record-cocaine-seizure-haitian-waters-underlines-countrys-pivotal](http://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2025/11/113463/record-cocaine-seizure-haitian-waters-underlines-countrys-pivotal), [www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2026/January/explainer\\_organized-crime-and-gang-violence-in-haiti.html](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2026/January/explainer_organized-crime-and-gang-violence-in-haiti.html) and [www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/4509058/coast-guard-cbp-amc-partner-agencies-interdict-240-aliens-near-turks-and-caicos](http://www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/4509058/coast-guard-cbp-amc-partner-agencies-interdict-240-aliens-near-turks-and-caicos).

<sup>79</sup> See [www.unodc.org/unodc/en/speeches/2026/210126-un-security-council-briefing-on-haiti.html](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/speeches/2026/210126-un-security-council-briefing-on-haiti.html), [www.state.gov/reports/2025-investment-climate-statements/haiti](http://www.state.gov/reports/2025-investment-climate-statements/haiti), <https://www.imf.org/en/publications/high-level-summary-technical-assistance-reports/issues/2026/05/13/haiti-public-investment-management-assessment-pima-and-climate-pima-follow-up-576058>, [www.eiu.com/n/effects-of-de-risking-limit-caribbeans-access-to-finance](http://www.eiu.com/n/effects-of-de-risking-limit-caribbeans-access-to-finance) and [www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/detail/Haiti.html](http://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/detail/Haiti.html).

<sup>80</sup> See [www.cruisemapper.com/news/15372-celebrity-cruises-omit-calls-labadee](http://www.cruisemapper.com/news/15372-celebrity-cruises-omit-calls-labadee), [www.the-sun.com/travel/15787195/royal-caribbean-cuts-caribbean-cruises-2026-skips-haiti](http://www.the-sun.com/travel/15787195/royal-caribbean-cuts-caribbean-cruises-2026-skips-haiti) and [www.royalcaribbeanblog.com/2026/01/13/royal-caribbean-cancels-labadee-haiti-stops](http://www.royalcaribbeanblog.com/2026/01/13/royal-caribbean-cancels-labadee-haiti-stops).

<sup>81</sup> See [www.traveldailynews.com/meetings-events/caribbean-tourism-stakeholders-underscore-importance-of-collaboration-and-communication-during-times-of-crisis](http://www.traveldailynews.com/meetings-events/caribbean-tourism-stakeholders-underscore-importance-of-collaboration-and-communication-during-times-of-crisis).

57. Major carriers have priced insecurity into Haiti-bound routes. Maersk introduced an emergency risk surcharge for Haiti-bound cargo effective 1 July 2024, ranging from \$50 for 20-foot dry containers to \$1,000 for 40-foot reefer and 45-foot high-dry containers,<sup>82</sup> while CMA CGM also introduced an extra risk coverage surcharge for Haiti-bound cargo.<sup>83</sup> These surcharges interacted with wider structural fragilities in Caribbean logistics. To illustrate its potential effects, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development reported in 2024 that shipping connectivity in the Caribbean had fallen by 9% over the previous decade and that port handling charges were two to three times higher than at comparable ports elsewhere.<sup>84</sup> In 2026, the International Monetary Fund similarly found that maritime connectivity for Caribbean small island developing States remained substantially lower than for regional hubs and had declined further over the previous decade, while port handling charges and freight costs remained two to three times the global average; Haiti's insecurity therefore adds a security premium to an already costly and vulnerable maritime system.<sup>85</sup>

58. The recommendations of UNODC are as follows.

59. The Haitian authorities, with international support and cooperation, should prioritize the disruption of armed gangs' control over extortion systems and strategic corridors, airports, ports and fuel distribution points. Security operations should be linked to financial investigations, customs enforcement and action against the networks that enable armed gangs to extract rents from transport, trade, fuel distribution and humanitarian flows.

60. The Haitian authorities, with international support, should strengthen firearms control and accountability by conducting a national weapons and ammunition management assessment and an audit of weapons and ammunition held by the Haitian National Police, the Haitian Armed Forces, customs authorities and judicial institutions. Private security contractors should be required to declare stockpiles, import records and deployment locations. The findings should support the establishment of centralized weapons storage, standardized chain-of-custody procedures and destruction, tracing mechanisms and inter-agency protocols to prevent diversion and support prosecutions.

61. The Haitian authorities, with international support and cooperation from neighbouring States, should strengthen implementation of the arms embargo and develop intelligence-led investigative capacities to disrupt arms trafficking networks, financial flows and corruption networks linked to firearms supply. This should include systematic tracing of seized weapons to support prosecutions, the establishment or reinforcement of an inter-agency firearms task force bringing together the Haitian National Police, customs and judicial authorities, border police and the Haitian Armed Forces, and the integration of risk indicators, inspection protocols and detection measures for firearms, ammunition, parts, components and conversion items. Priority should be given to maritime cargo, secondary ports, postal and courier shipments, cross-border consignments and private port facilities.

62. The Haitian authorities, with international and regional support, should adopt an intelligence-led approach to disrupt organized crime and related criminal markets, including extortion, kidnapping for ransom, fuel and food diversion, illicit taxation

<sup>82</sup> See [www.maersk.com/news/articles/2024/06/03/implementation-of-emergency-risk-surcharges-world-to-haiti](https://www.maersk.com/news/articles/2024/06/03/implementation-of-emergency-risk-surcharges-world-to-haiti).

<sup>83</sup> See [www.cma-cgm.com/news/4742/haiti-extra-risk-coverage-surcharge-at-destination](https://www.cma-cgm.com/news/4742/haiti-extra-risk-coverage-surcharge-at-destination).

<sup>84</sup> See <https://unctad.org/news/latin-america-caribbean-shipping-struggles-amid-geopolitical-and-climate-crises>.

<sup>85</sup> See [www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2026/05/14/mind-the-gaps-caribbean-trade-patterns-and-the-connectivity-constraint-576030](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2026/05/14/mind-the-gaps-caribbean-trade-patterns-and-the-connectivity-constraint-576030).

of transport corridors, drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, trafficking in persons, document fraud and money-laundering. This should combine financial investigations, targeted customs and port controls, anti-corruption measures, asset tracing and action against facilitators who provide logistics, weapons, transport, documentation, financial services or political protection to armed gangs. Priority should be given to criminal markets that finance armed gangs, undermine humanitarian access and increase regional spillover risks. The international community should develop and support the implementation of an integrated regional response mechanism to support Haiti's and the region's collaborative capacities in preventing, understanding and disrupting illicit trafficking and organized crime.

63. International partners supporting the Gang Suppression Force and Haitian law enforcement should ensure that equipment, training and operational support are adapted to Haiti's urban, rural and maritime operating environments. Support should strengthen mobility, force protection, interoperability, civilian protection standards, logistics and sustainability, while ensuring coordination with Haitian authorities and compliance with international human rights norms. Parallel support should be provided to investigative, judicial and correctional institutions to manage the expected increase in arrests and prosecutions. Over the longer term, security assistance should be complemented by investments in governance, public services and economic recovery in areas reclaimed from gang control to consolidate gains and reduce the risk of renewed criminal influence. Furthermore, regional partners should consider contributing to the strengthening of Haiti's law enforcement and security capacity, including training to increase numbers across the criminal justice system, including police and judicial officers, to sustain and improve national security and a momentum for the rule of law.

64. The Haitian authorities, with international support, should translate recent institutional and legislative gains into judicial outcomes. This requires making the specialized judicial poles fully operational, strengthening anti-money-laundering supervision across high-risk sectors and closing the gap between financial intelligence, investigation, prosecution, conviction and asset recovery. Priority should be given to operationalizing the asset management office and developing an effective non-conviction-based confiscation regime.

65. The Haitian authorities should ensure that the legal framework governing the prosecution of senior public officials is operable, including by reviewing the provisions of the decree of December 2025 on the High Court of Justice.

66. The Haitian authorities and international partners should establish clear legal, operational and accountability standards governing the use of force and remote technologies, including drones, in security operations. Such standards should include authorization procedures, civilian protection safeguards, incident review mechanisms, casualty tracking and reporting arrangements consistent with international human rights norms.

67. Haiti and affected neighbouring States should strengthen coordinated responses to forced displacement, returns, migrant smuggling, trafficking in persons and document fraud. Priority should be given to protection-sensitive return arrangements, screening and referral mechanisms, intelligence-sharing at land, sea and air entry points and investigations targeting facilitators of fraudulent travel documentation, charter flight abuse and maritime smuggling. Given the regional spillover effects of Haiti's crisis, neighbouring States should receive targeted support for border management, maritime interdiction, migrant reception and registration, and disruption of transnational trafficking networks.

68. With the support of international partners, Haiti should strengthen port security and compliance with international maritime security standards by enhancing access controls, cargo and container screening, perimeter security, surveillance systems and inter-agency coordination at ports. These measures should prioritize detection and disruption of illicit trafficking through maritime routes and address vulnerabilities that expose commercial shipping, humanitarian supply chains and port facilities to criminal exploitation.

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