

**Security Council**

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**Letter dated 14 January 2026 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council**

I have the honour to transmit the tenth quarterly report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution [2692 \(2023\)](#) as renewed by the Council in paragraph 19 of its resolution [2743 \(2024\)](#) and in its subsequent resolution, [2785 \(2025\)](#). The report includes the requested updated information on the sources and routes of arms trafficking and illicit financial flows and on relevant United Nations activities and recommendations.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present document to the attention of the members of the Security Council and request its publication as a document of the Council.

(Signed) António **Guterres**



I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution [2692 \(2023\)](#) as renewed by the Council in paragraph 19 of its resolution [2743 \(2024\)](#) and in resolution [2785 \(2025\)](#). Specifically, the Council tasked the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) with reporting to it every three months, concurrently with the reporting cycle of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), through the Secretary-General, on sources and routes of illicit arms and financial flows and on relevant United Nations activities and recommendations. UNODC has submitted nine reports to the Council since July 2023.¹

2. In the present report, which covers developments between October and December 2025, UNODC offers a comprehensive assessment of the evolution of criminal networks, illicit markets and security dynamics in Haiti between 2022 and 2025, drawing on sources from across that period, especially UNODC reports submitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution [2692 \(2023\)](#) and reports from the Panel of Experts on Haiti established pursuant to Council resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#). It also examines the implications of this emerging criminal ecosystem for peace, security, human rights and development in Haiti and the wider region.

3. On the basis of its analysis, UNODC finds that criminal networks have shifted from largely opportunistic predatory gang activity to more structured forms of territorial control and integration into transnational illicit markets. Armed gangs have consolidated into federated coalitions that exercise control or influence over significant parts of the national territory, operating as criminal structures engaged in multiple illicit activities, including arms and drug trafficking, fuel smuggling, migrant exploitation, extortion and other unlawful activities. Violence is deployed strategically not only to extract rents, but also to expand influence, contest authority in areas under formal State administration and enforce coercive systems of criminal control. Armed gangs are thereby systematically eroding trust in the operational capacity of State institutions, disrupting the delivery of essential public services and deepening insecurity at the local, national and regional levels (see [S/2025/420](#)).

4. These dynamics are embedded within regional trafficking and financial networks linking Haiti to the wider Caribbean and the Americas. In the report, UNODC highlights the role of arms trafficking, illicit financial flows, weak oversight of private security actors and the instrumentalization of political discourse in sustaining the criminal control system. The report also serves to identify starting points for national, regional and international responses, including the implementation of the arms embargo, the disruption of trafficking and money-laundering networks, the strengthening of State institutions and the protection of populations affected by gang violence and associated human rights abuses (see [S/2024/79](#)).

II. Consolidation of gang and criminal networks

5. The criminal landscape of Haiti has undergone a profound transformation over the past decade, with armed gangs expanding in number, territorial reach and political influence. Gangs that previously operated mainly as fragmented neighbourhood vigilante groups have coalesced into large criminal coalitions that exercise sustained territorial control, exploit transport routes and economic hubs for extortion and carry out coordinated operations against State and rival actors. What was once

¹ See www.unodc.org/unodc/firearms/haiti-report.html for a complete list of reports and submissions by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

predominantly localized and episodic urban violence has evolved into a system of criminal control, in which armed gangs regulate access to physical spaces, services and livelihoods for much of the population in areas under their control or influence (see [S/2024/554](#)).²

6. Haitian gang structures expanded rapidly after the La Saline massacre in 2018, which was described widely in United Nations reporting and by human rights organizations as the worst in decades and emblematic of growing collaboration between political and economic elites and armed gangs.³ That expansion accelerated further after the assassination of the President, Jovenel Moïse, in July 2021, as criminal actors exploited the resulting power vacuum to seize control of an estimated 80–90 per cent of Port-au-Prince, extend into additional communes and drive unprecedented increases in homicides, displacement and kidnappings for ransom. Armed gangs have consolidated their dominance over licit and illicit supply chains while acquiring increasingly sophisticated, military-grade weaponry that outmatches that of the Haitian National Police and enables more coordinated, large-scale operations.⁴

7. From 2020 to 2024, two major federations – G9 Family and Allies and G-Pèp – dominated the criminal landscape. Early in 2024, a coalition called Viv Ansanm began to supersede this dual-bloc configuration, gradually integrating elements from both alliances with the aim of coordinating attacks and consolidating territorial control.⁵ Viv Ansanm rapidly became the predominant platform for collective action, as is demonstrated most clearly by the synchronized assaults carried out since February 2024 on police stations, prisons, revenue collection infrastructure and the international airport.⁶ Although rivalries persist, armed gangs routinely unite against Haitian and international security forces, pooling personnel, firepower and logistics.

² See also www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/toc/Haiti_assessment_UNODC.pdf for a review.



³ See www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2019/305.asp. See also <https://peacekeeping.un.org/fr/node/15004> and www.ohchr.org/fr/documents/country-reports/report-violent-events-13-and-14-november-la-saline-port-au-prince-21-june.


⁴ See www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2019/305.asp, www.unodc.org/unodc/firearms/haiti-report.html and www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/haiti/110-undoing-haitis-deadly-gang-alliance.

⁵ See <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/viv-ansanm>.

⁶ Ibid.

Map 1
Gang territorial expansion, 2018–2024





Territorial expansion of gang networks

8. The consolidation of armed gangs into coordinated coalitions has enabled them to strengthen control over key districts of Port-au-Prince and to expand along peri-urban and rural corridors, where they operate illegal checkpoints, restrict movement and extort payments from those engaged in transport, commercial and humanitarian activities (see [S/2024/79](#)). Their territorial strategy prioritizes road networks, ports, fuel depots and border-adjacent municipalities in order to facilitate trafficking activities and extortion. Illicit income generation varies by location: in commercial hubs, such as Delmas 6, La Saline and Wharf Jérémie, gangs reportedly extort businesses and target public ports, utilities and infrastructure. In the transport corridors that are controlled by Baz Taliban, 400 Mawozo and Gran Ravine, road users are also reportedly subjected to informal extortion. Armed gangs, such as 5 Second, allegedly engage in similar practices along maritime routes.⁷ In poorer communities, these armed gangs depend on other illegal practices, including kidnapping for ransom, extortion of residents and illicit trafficking markets. Their economic adaptability has helped them to sustain their financial stability and build resilient territorial control structures.

9. The consolidation of armed gangs into coordinated coalitions has not eliminated internal competition. Instead, it has generated a fluid and adaptive configuration in which armed gangs retain significant tactical autonomy while aligning whenever and wherever it is expedient to do so, in accordance with broader strategic objectives (see [S/2025/420](#)). This pattern of episodic cooperation and competition is illustrated by

⁷ According to information collected by UNODC, illegal checkpoints established along national highways 1, 2, 4 and 8 have become strategic points for illegal tax collection to finance Viv Ansanm operations. See also previous UNODC reports pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution [2692 \(2023\)](#).

concrete examples. With regard to cooperation, 400 Mawozo and Baz Taliban have conducted joint operations in Saut d'Eau, Mirebalais and Lascahobas, including the dissemination of shared propaganda materials, such as music videos.⁸ Leaders of Bel-Air, Ti Bwa and Delmas 6 have issued joint “peyi lòk” (nationwide shutdown) declarations on social media and reportedly fought side by side against rivals in Canapé Vert, Christ-Roi, Fort National and Solino.⁹ Delmas 6 is alleged to have provided operational support to Kraze Barye, while 5 Segond and Baz Taliban reportedly exchanged personnel and ammunition in the Lafiteau and Moulins d’Haïti areas.¹⁰

10. A number of armed gangs have resisted integration into broader alliances or engaged in violent competition over key strategic assets. Several gangs, such as Nan Boston and Wharf Jérémie, appear to be less aligned than others in Cité Soleil with the Viv Ansanm coalition. Specifically, Gran Ravine and 5 Segond clashed over control of a critical roadblock during the reporting period; Kafou Labatwa and Nèg Chabon have repeatedly fought one another; and Chen Mechan, Kraze Barye and 400 Mawozo continue to vie for dominance over Croix-des-Bouquets. Reporting indicates that the Bel-Air gang, led by Kempes Sanon, refused to comply with demands from 400 Mawozo to transfer hostages under its control. In response, the leader of 400 Mawozo, Wilson Joseph, also known as “Lanmo San Jou”, reportedly sought support through Viv Ansanm, notably through Jimmy Cherizier,¹¹ and mobilized allied groups to pressure Bel-Air. 5 Segond, led by Johnson André, was reportedly tasked with supporting efforts to seize control of the area, resulting in the killing of several Bel-Air fighters. Subsequent reporting indicates that Kempes Sanon was transferred to 400 Mawozo and subjected to an internal coercive process broadcast on social media, illustrating the extra-legal governance mechanisms exercised by gangs.¹² While inherently volatile, this federated model has strengthened the overall resilience of armed gangs. These armed gangs have repeatedly reconstituted themselves following arrests, targeted operations and leadership losses (see S/2024/704).

11. Since the beginning of the reporting period, criminal groups and armed gangs have applied the territorial expansion and income extraction practices used in Port-au-Prince to other areas of Haiti. For example, in Artibonite and Centre Departments, they have targeted key highways, coastal municipalities and strategic land border crossings. They have also established illegal checkpoints and systematically targeted open markets and critical supply chains, thereby deepening their coercive influence and, at times, control over local populations and commercial flows. Gangs affiliated with the Viv Ansanm coalition have extended their influence from coastal areas of Artibonite to border towns in Plateau Central, following east-west transportation

⁸ See www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article310445275.html and <https://riskbulletins.globalinitiative.net/ht-obs-002/01-gangs-expansion-pressure-public-security-strategies.html>.

⁹ Several videos of gang leaders talking together about their attacks, strategies and the enactment of “peyi lòk” have been published on social media.

¹⁰ Information received by a UNODC officer during meetings on the dynamics of criminal groups in Haiti, organized with several United Nations entities.


¹¹ Who is subject to Security Council sanctions and describes himself as the “spokesperson” of Viv Ansanm.

¹² See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), “207 people executed by the Wharf Jérémie gang (Port-au-Prince)”, Haiti flash report, 23 December 2024; see also <https://acleddata.com/report/viv-ansanm-living-together-fighting-united-alliance-reshaping-haitis-gangland>. For information on the proliferation of gangs and of barriers in Port-au-Prince, see <https://ksmfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Article-1-Port-au-Prince-between-gangs.pdf>; this issue was also discussed during a meeting on the dynamics of criminal groups in Haiti, organized with several United Nations entities.

corridors that link the capital to inland markets and the border with the Dominican Republic.¹³

Map 2

Gang territorial control in Port-au-Prince and surrounding cities



12. Some criminal actors have attempted to frame their activities in political terms through public statements and correspondence. On 1 January 2025, Jimmy Cherizier stated publicly that the Viv Ansanm coalition intended to “become a political force” and to “participate in the political future of the country.”¹⁴ Irrespective of the fact that he is subject to United Nations and bilateral United States sanctions, including travel bans and asset freezes, which render sanctioned individuals ineligible to participate in electoral or transitional political processes under existing frameworks, Jimmy Cherizier continues to promote the coalition’s political aspirations on social media, seeking visibility and normalization in the national discourse. While these efforts have not attracted broad popular or institutional backing, they illustrate a deliberate strategy to leverage political debate and transitional uncertainty with a view to strengthening the influence of armed gangs even as coalition members continue to engage in armed attacks, intimidation and other abuses.

¹³ See [www.halofirm.com/news-1/haiti-gang-coalition-dynamics%2C-sanctions-exposure%2C-and-private-sector-risk-\(2020%E2%80%932025\)](https://www.halofirm.com/news-1/haiti-gang-coalition-dynamics%2C-sanctions-exposure%2C-and-private-sector-risk-(2020%E2%80%932025)) and UNODC reports submitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2692 (2023).

¹⁴ See www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/haiti/110-undoing-haitis-deadly-gang-alliance.

Deepening violence associated with gang activities

13. Haiti has experienced a sharp escalation in violence since 2022. BINUH reported at least 5,601 killings in 2024 – over 1,000 more than in 2023 – while an estimated 4,384 people were killed between January and September 2025.¹⁵ Armed gangs are using violence with increasing frequency in order to restrict mobility, engage in extortion in relation to economic activity and challenge State authority, including through attacks on public institutions. As violence spread beyond Port-au-Prince into secondary cities and rural corridors, insecurity deepened nationwide, accelerating displacement, undermining livelihoods and contributing to economic collapse (see [S/2024/79](#) and [S/2025/303](#)).

14. In parallel, gangs have diversified their illicit revenue streams, including kidnapping for ransom, extortion, arms and drug trafficking, fuel smuggling and migrant exploitation, reinforcing their financial resilience. Violence has acquired political and gender-targeted dimensions, including the use of sexual violence as a tool of terror and control, while vulnerable groups are being exploited for labour, recruitment and income extraction. According to the United Nations Children’s Fund, approximately 680,000 children had been displaced and 3.3 million people required humanitarian assistance by October 2025.¹⁶

15. Since 2022, violence has intensified as gangs’ firepower has increased. Gangs’ arsenals include assault rifles, such as .50 BMG rifles, enabling them to seize and hold strategic roads, ports and border crossings and further weakening State control.¹⁷ This firepower reinforces the convergence of coercion, profit and territorial control in gang governance structures (see [S/2025/642](#)).

16. In parallel, some actors traditionally described as gangs have evolved into organized criminal groups, shifting from territorially bounded, predatory violence towards profit-driven criminal activities. While local gangs remain rooted primarily in specific neighbourhoods and rely on extortion and coercion to exert control, trafficking-related groups operate through broader, network-based structures with transnational connections, specialized roles and diversified streams of criminal proceeds. This evolution has further blurred the boundary between local violence and transnational organized crime.

III. Shifting patterns of arms and drug trafficking and illicit financing

17. Since 2022, trafficking to and through Haiti has become increasingly sophisticated and integrated into transnational supply chains linking the Caribbean and international markets (see [S/2025/420](#)). In its assessments, the United Nations has documented a surge in trafficking in increasingly high-calibre and military-style weapons into Haiti since 2022, sourced mainly from the United States and, to a lesser extent, other States (see [S/2024/79](#)).¹⁸ Traffickers rely on flexible, network-based diaspora intermediaries, complicating attribution and sustained dismantling efforts (see [S/2024/554](#)).

18. Most armed gangs and criminal groups rely on an irregular “one-shot” arms trafficking model, in which discrete consignments are distributed rapidly, after which

¹⁵ See https://www.unocha.org/attachments/9fa04d0c-17c9-4fea-b6fd-5f0719234ab4/HTI_HNRP2026_ExecutiveSummary_EN_20251218.pdf.

¹⁶ See <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/10/1166059>.

¹⁷ See <https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2024/04/92211/haiti-gangs-have-more-firepower-police>. See also [S/2025/303](#), p. 3.

¹⁸ See www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/toc/Haiti_assessment_UNODC.pdf.


routes and intermediaries are changed to reduce detection (see [S/2024/320](#)). The interception, in Cap-Haïtien in April 2024, of a 45-foot container from Port Everglades, United States, which concealed at least 26 illegal firearms and hundreds of cartridges destined for gangs in the Artibonite valley, is emblematic of this pattern (see [S/2024/554](#)). By contrast, narcotics and other contraband appear to move through more continuous, regular supply flows, reflecting stable consumer demand and entrenched transnational logistics.¹⁹

19. The evolution of trafficking routes since 2022 demonstrates a clear pattern: once a specific corridor is exposed, whether through major seizures, increased inspection or inter-agency pressure, traffickers rapidly shift to alternative maritime, air or land pathways in order to avoid detection. This was demonstrated by the seizure, in July 2022 by the Port-au-Prince customs authorities, of weapons and ammunition allegedly imported under the cover of Episcopal Church exemptions, and subsequent interdictions in Port-de-Paix, including that of a consignment of approximately 120,000 rounds of ammunition, which prompted a shift towards smaller ports and indirect routes (see [S/2023/674](#)).²⁰

¹⁹ See <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/11/1166460>.

²⁰ The following ammunition was seized in Port-de-Paix: 114,000 rounds of 5.56 x 45 mm; 4,000 rounds of 7.62 x 39 mm; 35 rounds of .38 special ammunition; and 2,000 rounds of 9 x 19 mm.

Map 3
Tracking selected weapons seizures, 2022–2025



20. This reactive adaptation is visible in a sequence of interdictions observed across Port-au-Prince, Port-de-Paix and Cap-Haïtien, as well as at the land border and in the Dominican Republic (see map 3).²¹ As enforcement intensified along direct maritime routes to Haiti, flows increasingly transited through the Dominican Republic. Dominican authorities, in turn, significantly reinforced their counter-trafficking efforts through the deployment of non-intrusive inspection technologies and an expanded customs and border presence. These measures have contributed to a series of high-impact seizures, such as the seizure conducted at Haina Port in January 2025, in which 30 rifles and multiple pistols were concealed inside compressor tanks; the interdiction in February 2025 of a Miami-Haiti transit consignment containing .50-calibre Barrett rifle, dozens of assault rifles, magazines and more than 36,000

²¹ See also www.justice.gov/usao-mdfl/pr/international-gun-trafficking-conspiracy-dismantled.

rounds of ammunition; and the seizure, in March 2025, of some 36,000 cartridges and additional weapons in a container destined for Haiti at Haina Port.²²

21. Following these seizures early in 2025 and the disruption of supply chains linked to the Dominican Republic, trafficking patterns for firearms and ammunition became more opaque. Consignments are increasingly being routed through secondary Haitian ports with a limited or intermittent State presence, including Miragoâne, Saint-Marc and other facilities that already handle significant volumes of containerized cargo but have comparatively weak inspection regimes.²³ There are also indications that traffickers are relying on vessels whose declared destination is not Haiti, allowing consignments to circumvent export controls associated with the arms embargo and to be rerouted through other Caribbean hubs.²⁴ Moreover, there is evidence of offshore transfers from larger vessels anchored outside Haitian territorial waters to small boats that complete the final leg to isolated coastal sites, bypassing port-based screening.²⁵ These adaptations mirror practices observed in other Caribbean trafficking circuits and underscore the capacity of criminal networks to exploit maritime enforcement vulnerabilities.²⁶

22. While private security companies control a significant share of the country's legally registered firearms, the systems governing acquisition, storage and oversight remain inadequate with respect to the number and sophistication of the weapons involved.²⁷ Current licensing procedures lack uniform verification requirements, armoury management rules are inconsistently applied and record-keeping remains largely paper-based, limiting the traceability of weapons when they are lost or diverted. Evidence documented by United Nations entities indicates that firearms legally imported for private use have, on several occasions, resurfaced in the hands of gangs, suggesting diversion through theft, resale or informal lending mechanisms.²⁸

23. Microtrafficking across the border is a persistent challenge. Small consignments of firearms and ammunition are routinely concealed within basic commodities and moved through such border posts as Belladère or Malpasse, or diverted through alternative crossing points when official posts are closed or rendered inoperative by

²² See <https://aduananews.com/en/aduanas-de-republica-dominicana-resalta-logros-en-dos-anos-de-gestion/>, <https://apnews.com/article/dominican-republic-ammunition-guns-seized-haiti-de5d70f178009d26c08e8c81b03f2ae4>, www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2025/10/111891/haiti-under-un-arms-embargo-so-why-are-500000-illegal-weapons, www.elcaribe.com.do/panorama/pais/dga-decomisa-37-armas-de-fuego-en-puerto-haina and <https://diariodigitalrd.com/2025/03/04/aduanas-incauta-36000-municiones-y-armas-en-puerto-de-haina.html>.

²³ UNODC has documented that such ports, together with numerous informal landing sites, constitute critical nodes for the entry of arms, ammunition and narcotics into Haiti. See S/2024/79 and S/2024/320. See also <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/255882/miragoane-les-douaniers-interceptent-des-equipements-tactiques-et-un-drone> and <https://vantbefinfo.com/haiti-securite-portuaire-un-drone-sous-marin-saisi-au-port-de-miragoane>.

²⁴ For example, UNODC and media outlets report that arms and ammunition may first transit through major Dominican ports, such as Haina Port, where more than 112,000 units of firearms and ammunition were seized in the first half of 2022, before being moved across land border crossings into Haiti. See <https://ground.news/article/dominican-republic-seizes-weapons-and-thousands-of-cartridges-destined-for-haiti-via-miami>.

²⁵ See S/2024/320 and www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2023/March/firearms--drug-trafficking-feeding-haitis-cascading-security-crises_-new-unodc-assessment.html.

²⁶ See www.caricomimpacs.org/articles/new-report-calls-for-coordinated-multi-sectoral-action-to-tackle-firearm-related-violence-and-trafficking-in-the-caribbean.

²⁷ See www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/toc/Haiti_assessment_UNODC.pdf. See also OHCHR reports on the human rights situation in Haiti, country reports and thematic updates addressing arms proliferation, private security companies and regulatory gaps (2023–2025).

²⁸ See www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/toc/Haiti_assessment_UNODC.pdf, S/2025/642, A/HRC/58/76 section VI and www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31881.

insecurity.²⁹ Although individual shipments are limited in size, their cumulative effect is to provide armed gangs with a steady supply of ammunition and replacement weapons (see [S/2024/554](#)). These flows are particularly significant for 400 Mawozo and other gangs that are rooted in inland corridors and peri-urban areas without direct maritime access, including coalitions operating along the Croix-des-Bouquets corridor and national highway 3, as well as rival gangs and self-defence brigades that may control access to coastal zones.

24. Haiti has become simultaneously more deeply embedded in regional flows of irregular migration and associated with illicit financial movements.³⁰ These movements are frequently organized by criminal networks operating in coastal areas and at key border crossings that rely on unregistered vessels and clandestine departure points to move migrants (see [S/2025/642](#)). A weak State presence at land and maritime borders, limited patrol and inspection capacity and pervasive corruption have created a permissive environment in which smugglers extract rents through extortion, coercion and unsafe transportation (see [S/2025/85](#)).

25. The financial architecture underpinning these criminal markets extends well beyond the movement of physical commodities. A combination of entrenched corruption, limited financial oversight and the predominance of informal economic activity provides fertile ground for money-laundering and illicit value transfer in Haiti.³¹ Proceeds from extortion, kidnapping, drug trafficking and arms sales are reportedly channelled through bulk-cash smuggling, unregulated remittance operators, trade-based schemes and front companies in such sectors as import-export, logistics and construction, often linked to economic elites with political connections.³² These parallel financial circuits sustain the operational autonomy of criminal networks, enabling the continued procurement of firearms and ammunition, the payment of personnel, territorial expansion and the consolidation of coercive forms of control in gang-controlled areas, while distorting local markets and undermining fiscal and institutional governance (see [S/2025/303](#)).

26. Evolving trafficking patterns underscore the necessity of addressing arms trafficking to and through Haiti as a regional supply chain challenge rather than a narrow Haitian phenomenon. Firearms and ammunition sourced predominantly in the United States and trafficked through Florida, as well as through the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and other hubs in Caribbean countries, are embedded within diversified illicit routes that also facilitate drug trafficking, migrant smuggling and the laundering of illicit proceeds.

IV. Digital technologies, from social media to drones

27. Haitian criminal networks have integrated modern technologies into their operations, including commercial drones, encrypted messaging apps and social media platforms. These tools have expanded gangs' surveillance, coordination and territorial

²⁹ See [S/2024/554](#). Interview with law enforcement officers working at the border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

³⁰ See <https://haiti.iom.int/news/new-iom-study-highlights-reintegration-challenges-faced-deportees-returning-haiti>.

³¹ See [S/2024/79](#) and www.imf.org/en/publications/high-level-summary-technical-assistance-reports/issues/2025/07/01/haiti-governance-diagnostic-report-high-level-summary-technical-assistant-report-568162.

³² See www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2088238/Haiti_assessment_UNODC.pdf, www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R47394/R47394.2.pdf, www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/019/2025/039/article-A001-en.xml and www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/sanctions/haiti.aspx?lang=eng.

control capacities.³³ The 5 Second gang was documented using drones for reconnaissance, attack coordination and prison-break support, with aerial feeds informing real-time decisions.³⁴ Security and aviation authorities, including the United States Federal Aviation Administration, have warned that the presence of unmanned aircraft systems contributed to extended commercial flight restrictions over Port-au-Prince.³⁵ Since 2022, digital spaces have become hubs for recruitment, propaganda and intimidation, with gang leaders livestreaming their efforts to establish and publicize territorial control, issuing threats and using music video performances to promote affiliation.³⁶

28. In addition to propaganda, digital tools are used in connection with extortion and intelligence-gathering. For example, electronic devices belonging to kidnapping victims are mined for contacts and financial information, enabling serial targeting and calibrated ransom demands.³⁷ The normalization of violent imagery online has further weakened the influence of local social and moral leadership, such as community leaders, religious figures and civic associations, contributing to the expansion of gang influence into areas beyond their physical control.³⁸ While these developments represent opportunistic adaptation rather than structured, military-style innovation, they significantly heighten the complexity of the Haitian security environment. They underline the need for modernized monitoring frameworks that combine cyberanalysis, open-source social media intelligence and regional cooperation to address emerging, technology-enabled criminal control.

V. Engagement of private security companies and vigilante or so-called self-defence groups

29. Haiti has witnessed a proliferation of private security companies, alongside the emergence of vigilante or so-called self-defence groups, further reshaping the security landscape. While private security companies operate within a legal framework and are subject, in principle, to State regulation, vigilante and self-defence groups function outside formal structures. In both cases, the scale and fragmentation of these actors exceed the State's capacity to effectively regulate, monitor or respond to their activities.³⁹ The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights estimates that there are approximately 100 private security companies collectively

³³ See www.haitipolicyhouse.org/publications/analyzing-izos-gang-using-satellite-imagery, www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/11/haiti-gangs-social-media-cherizier-izo/, <https://edition.cnn.com/2025/12/01/americas/gangs-launch-large-scale-attack-in-haitis-central-region-as-hundreds-flee-gunfire-and-burning-homes-intl-latam> and <https://news.un.org/en/interview/2025/08/1165662>.

³⁴ See S/2025/303 and <https://forbiddenstories.org/hospital-gangs-haiti>.

³⁵ See www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/us_restrictions/Haiti-Background-Note-Unclassified-For-Public-Release.pdf.

³⁶ United Nations reporting and expert analysis indicate that, since 2022, gang leaders in Haiti have increasingly leveraged digital and social media to broadcast evidence of territorial control, issue threats and disseminate videos that bolster their influence and recruitment efforts. This includes the documented presence of gang leaders on social media and the reported use of video-based intimidation tactics aimed at media outlets and civilians. See S/2025/642 and www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/9/haitis-gangs-are-recruiting-child-soldiers-rights-group-says.

³⁷ Information provided by other United Nations entities during weekly meetings on the dynamics of criminal groups in Haiti.

³⁸ See <https://koff.swisspeace.ch/apropos/3763/haiti-using-social-media-for-peace/> and www.unicef.org/haiti/en/press-releases/haitis-children-under-siege-staggering-rise-child-abuse-and-recruitment-armed-groups.

³⁹ See S/2025/420, www.unodc.org/unodc/en/speeches/2025/020725-unsc-briefing-haiti.html and <https://apnews.com/article/un-haiti-gangs-capital-violence-government-kenya-c14dd55725e2e415b794ab88b4184e65>.

employing between 75,000 and 90,000 personnel in Haiti. The expansion of such companies has created parallel armed structures operating with uneven accountability, notwithstanding their role in protecting key infrastructure (see [A/HRC/58/76](#)).

30. Vigilante or so-called self-defence groups initially emerging as community defence initiatives have, in several areas, adopted the tactics and income models of criminal groups, including the imposition of local extortion and the use of coercion to control movement and territory (see [A/HRC/58/76](#)). Field reporting from Artibonite and Malpasse indicates instances in which the leaders of vigilante or so-called self-defence groups have aligned themselves with established gangs or financed themselves through extortion, illustrating how community-led resistance groups can evolve into armed actors combining elements of local protection, criminal activity and the opportunistic building of alliances. If left unchecked by effective regulation, oversight and security sector governance, an increasing number of these self-defence groups risk evolving into armed gangs driven primarily by economic interests. Together, the expansion of private security companies and the mutation of vigilante groups risk deepening fragmentation within the Haitian security environment, multiplying the number of actors with coercive power and eroding the State's monopoly on the use of force.⁴⁰

VI. National and regional responses

31. The capacity of the Haitian State to respond effectively to the expansion of criminal networks is constrained by structural fragilities, chronic resource gaps, governance deficits and persistent insecurity (see [S/2025/420](#)). Armed gangs control or contest most of the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince and significant portions of Artibonite and other Departments, leaving State institutions with only a limited, discontinuous presence in most of the territory.⁴¹ The Haitian National Police, with an effective active duty workforce estimated at between 9,000 and 10,000 officers for a population of more than 11 million, continues to operate under conditions of chronic overstretch, facing adversaries that are better armed, territorially entrenched and operationally coordinated.⁴² These deficiencies have significantly limited the ability of the Haitian National Police not only to retake, but also to hold and stabilize gang-controlled areas (see [S/2024/79](#)). Large-scale attacks against police stations, courts, prisons and administrative buildings, including the coordinated assaults early in 2024, during which more than 4,600 inmates escaped and at least 22 police facilities were looted or set on fire, have further eroded institutional resilience.⁴³

32. Corruption and collusion compound these challenges, facilitating the movement of firearms, narcotics and other illicit goods through entry points and transit hubs. Illicit arms and drug markets in Haiti are underpinned by corruption and money-laundering, which weaken already fragile oversight systems and enable traffickers to circumvent embargo measures and controls.⁴⁴ Investigations have exposed officials implicated in facilitating arms smuggling between the United States, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, highlighting institutional vulnerabilities on both sides of the

⁴⁰ See [A/HRC/58/76](#) and www.unodc.org/unodc/en/speeches/2025/020725-unsc-briefing-haiti.html.

⁴¹ See www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2025/July/haitian-capital-paralysed-and-isolated-by-gang-violence--security-council-hears.html.

⁴² See www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2024/04/92211/haiti-gangs-have-more-firepower-police.

⁴³ See https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2024_q1_human_rights_quarterly_report_en_19.04.2024.pdf and [S/2024/554](#).

⁴⁴ See www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2025/January/weapons-influx-and-drug-trafficking-compounding-security-situation-in-haiti--unodc-executive-director-tells-security-council.html.

Haiti-Dominican Republic land border.⁴⁵ Efforts to strengthen internal oversight, disciplinary mechanisms and integrity frameworks in key institutions have resulted in incremental progress but remain insufficiently implemented to mitigate systemic risks (see S/2025/303).

33. Regional cooperation to counter arms trafficking, migrant smuggling and cross-border criminal flows have intensified across the northern Caribbean, driven by increased surveillance, joint operations and information-sharing between neighbouring States. While efforts remain uneven, recent advances in The Bahamas, the Dominican Republic and the Turks and Caicos Islands reflect a growing recognition that the security of Haiti and of the surrounding maritime corridors requires shared responsibility and coordinated enforcement.

34. The Dominican Republic has taken a proactive approach to border and firearms control through a combination of physical infrastructure, enhanced screening and institutional reform. Security measures taken since 2022 have included the construction of a 240-mile border wall with integrated sensors and drone surveillance, strengthened customs and immigration controls and expanded maritime and aerial interdiction in coordination with the United States.⁴⁶ These measures have contributed to increased interdictions of illicit arms and contraband, improved detection along border and maritime routes and a reduction in irregular cross-border movements and are reinforced by steps designed to strengthen long-term firearms governance.⁴⁷ Progress includes the drafting of a national firearms road map aligned with Caribbean and Central American frameworks under the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean; the destruction of 3,945 seized weapons; comprehensive armoury inspections to improve stockpile security; and the clearing of a two-year backlog of traced weapons through more than 3,800 new entries into the eTrace system.⁴⁸ The Dominican Republic has also committed itself to acquiring scanners for all four official border crossings with Haiti and maintains operational collaboration with United States agencies and, on a limited basis, Haitian law enforcement.⁴⁹

35. The Turks and Caicos Islands have simultaneously strengthened national security governance and operational capacity, achieving measurable reductions in crime through multi-agency coordination and closer regional cooperation.⁵⁰ National reforms are

⁴⁵ See <https://dominantoday.com/dr/world/2025/03/07/arms-trafficking-fuels-haitis-security-crisis-reports-le-nouvelliste>, www.justsecurity.org/109308/police-network-arms-trafficking-latin-america/ and www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/king-violent-haitian-gang-sentenced-life-prison-hostage-taking-16-american-christian.

⁴⁶ See www.reuters.com/world/americas/dominican-republic-begins-building-border-wall-with-haiti-2022-02-20, <https://dominantoday.com/dr/local/2024/06/20/dominican-air-force-enhances-border-surveillance-with-aircraft>, www.reuters.com/world/americas/dominican-republic-reinforces-border-security-migration-controls-towards-haiti-2025-04-06 and www.caribbeantoday.com/sections/regional/us-military-aircraft-to-arrive-in-dominican-republic-for-deployment-in-the-caribbean.

⁴⁷ See www.unlirec.org/en/dominican-republic-enhances-capacity-to-combat-illicit-trafficking-in-arms-and-ammunition/ and www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=AVI-024/25.

⁴⁸ See <https://deultimominuto.net/en/uncategorized/interior-and-police-and-metaldom-destroy-3945-weapons-to-prevent-them-from-returning-to-the-streets-2>, www.unodc.org/unodc/firearms-protocol/news/2025/strengthening-firearms-control-in-the-dominican-republic.html and www.unlirec.org/en/publicacion/central-america-and-dominican-republic-firearms-roadmap.

⁴⁹ Information provided by Dominican law enforcement and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs in the Dominican Republic.

⁵⁰ See <https://borderforce.gov.tc/files/0TS46FkLzq2ofrwnvjUyZIASf1OllOAwc5osvc3m.pdf>, <https://magneticmediatv.com/2025/08/turks-and-caicos-islands-national-security-council-post-meeting-statement-6> and <https://thewatch-journal.com/2024/04/05/turks-and-caicos-islands-takes-another-step-toward-more-secure-borders>.

focused on developing intelligence-led security structures that are expected to evolve into a joint operations and information-fusion mechanism, supported by expanded training, recruitment and specialist deployments from Barbados and Jamaica. Maritime interdiction has been upgraded with new fast patrol craft, jet-drive vessels and expanded coastal radar surveillance.⁵¹ Targeted operations against organized crime have increased, underpinned by improvements in case management systems, sentencing frameworks and judicial coordination. Through Operation Bahamas Turks and Caicos, the Turks and Caicos Islands are working with The Bahamas and the United States on maritime monitoring, vessel interdiction and intelligence-sharing in connection with arms, drug and migrant smuggling routes linked to Haiti.⁵² Sustained impact depends on parallel progress in harmonizing legislation, data-exchange rules and financial investigations across the wider subregion.⁵³

36. The United Nations system is supporting an integrated, supply-chain-focused approach with some States in the region, including The Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, the United States and the Turks and Caicos Islands, to reinforce export controls, pre-shipment checks, end-user verification and port-loading inspections. It is also establishing collective customs-police-coastguard mechanisms at strategic borders and upgrading scanning, risk analysis and maritime domain awareness capacities through container and passenger-control programmes.⁵⁴ In parallel, United Nations entities provided training in Haiti and the aforementioned States and territories on interdiction, container profiling, coordinated patrols, complex investigations and financial disruption tools, as well as on anti-corruption and oversight measures to be implemented by customs, law enforcement and port authorities. At the same time, the United Nations has prioritized protection and community-level resilience in order to reduce recruitment, in particular of children, by armed gangs. It does so through prevention, release and reintegration programmes, strengthened handover protocols and area-based stabilization efforts led by BINUH and implemented by the United Nations Children's Fund, the International Organization for Migration and partners, while also advancing multinational investigative cooperation and regional legal harmonization through the Security Council sanctions regime and UNODC engagement.⁵⁵

VII. Countering illicit financial flows and enforcing sanctions

37. Between October 2024 and September 2025, the Central Financial Intelligence Unit (Unité centrale de renseignements financiers) of Haiti significantly scaled up its financial-intelligence activities under the new framework to combat money-laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation. It processed close to 1.5 million

⁵¹ See <https://suntci.com/tci-regiment-commissions-new-fast-patrol-boats-boosting-maritime-security-p12983-129.htm>.

⁵² See <https://bs.usembassy.gov/u-s-coast-guard-trains-bahamian-partners-in-water-survival-skills-2>.

⁵³ Information provided to UNODC by the National Security Secretariat of the territorial Government of the Turks and Caicos Islands on 4 December 2025.

⁵⁴ See www.unodc.org/unodc/en/speeches/2025/020725-unsc-briefing-haiti.html.

⁵⁵ In July 2025, for example, the Government of Haiti and the United Nations Children's Fund, with support from the European Union, launched the three-year Prevention and Rehabilitation Programme against Children and Youth Recruitment (PREJEUNES) to prevent recruitment and support the rehabilitation and reintegration of children and adolescents associated with armed gangs, building on a national handover protocol that ensures that such children are treated first and foremost as victims and provided with comprehensive social support. See www.unicef.org/haiti/en/press-releases/haitian-government-and-unicef-launch-prejeunes-programme-address-recruitment and www.unognewsroom.org/story/en/2537/haiti-children-in-armed-groups-unicef-28-february-2025.

transaction reports with a processing rate of almost 100 per cent.⁵⁶ The 10 largest reporting institutions were responsible for more than 93 per cent of all declarations, underscoring the fact that any failure by even a single major reporter could generate a systemic blind spot. Over the same period, the Unit registered some 1,281,000 systematic declarations, dominated by cross-border flows, and 252 suspicious transaction reports, representing an increase of roughly 30 per cent compared with the previous year.⁵⁷

38. On the basis of suspicious activity reports, the Central Financial Intelligence Unit has determined that corruption and diversion of public funds, drug trafficking, extortion and kidnapping for ransom remain the principal suspected predicate offences, with a growing share of cases linked to ransom and extortion payments. The dominant laundering techniques continue to be structured cash deposits (“smurfing”), often organized by “laundering cells” of 5 to 15 individuals, and trade-based money-laundering through mis-invoicing in such sectors as fuel and basic goods. Meanwhile, real estate acquisitions have been identified as a preferred channel for layering and integration. The Unit further notes a discernible diversion of economic activity towards poorly supervised payment channels, including residual risks associated with mobile-money platforms that fall mostly outside the current reporting perimeter, and the use of shell non-profit organizations and “microdonations” to disguise possible terrorist financing or support for violent groups. Risk is concentrated heavily in West Department, which accounts for more than 80 per cent of suspicious transaction reports and is the location of the headquarters of major financial institutions, the main political and commercial centres and the areas most affected by gang activity.⁵⁸

39. A critical structural weakness in the anti-money-laundering/countering the financing of terrorism architecture of Haiti was also exposed during the reporting period, namely, the complete non-compliance of the designated non-financial businesses and professions sector. No suspicious transaction reports were filed by real estate actors, notaries, casinos or other designated non-financial businesses and professions, notwithstanding their central role in the integration phase of illicit funds. To address some of these gaps, the Haiti Anti-Corruption Task Force became operational in December 2024. It brings together the Central Financial Intelligence Unit, the Anti-Corruption Unit (Unité de lutte contre la corruption), the General Inspectorate of Finance (Inspection générale des finances), the National Public Procurement Commission (Commission nationale des marchés publics) and the Financial and Economic Affairs Bureau (Bureau des affaires financières et économiques) of the Haitian National Police. The Haiti Anti-Corruption Task Force serves as the primary platform for joint operations focused on major corruption and money-laundering cases, with the Financial and Economic Affairs Bureau initiating approximately 80 per cent of the information requests submitted to the Central Financial Intelligence Unit.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Commercial banks generated 1,110,516 cash transaction reports (approximately 81.4 per cent of the total) and money transfer houses a further 382,803 (17.8 per cent), while exchange offices and other institutions collectively accounted for less than 1 per cent.

⁵⁷ See the annual report of the Central Financial Intelligence Unit for 2024/2025, available at <https://ucref.gouv.ht/rapport.php>.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ During the period, the Central Financial Intelligence Unit responded to more than 100 formal requests from investigative units and increased its spontaneous dissemination of financial intelligence to national and foreign counterparts. Internationally, the Unit continued to defend the Haitian action plan under the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force “grey list” process, expanded the use of memorandums of understanding with regional financial intelligence units and pursued steps towards membership of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. See <https://ucref.gouv.ht/rapport.php>.

40. Notwithstanding an improved conversion rate from suspicious transaction reports to Central Financial Intelligence Unit dissemination reports, only a small number of cases were transmitted to prosecutors during the period, and no cases have yet resulted in money-laundering convictions or significant asset-recovery outcomes. This highlights the urgent need to strengthen prosecutorial capacity, judicial follow-through and sanctions implementation.⁶⁰

41. The Anti-Corruption Unit has sustained anti-corruption investigations, notwithstanding a highly adverse security environment. On 8 December, the Unit published five additional investigative reports. The Unit reports alleged procedural irregularities, documentation gaps and weaknesses in internal control systems affecting several institutions.⁶¹ In its analyses, the Unit identifies recurring vulnerabilities, such as limited traceability of expenditure, insufficient justification for disbursements, contract splitting or non-competitive procurement processes and incomplete or inconsistent reporting by beneficiaries of public funds.⁶²

42. Through its inquiry into the asset declarations of the former President, Michel Joseph Martelly, the Anti-Corruption Unit identified several possible inconsistencies between his declarations upon taking office in 2011 and upon departure in 2016, as required under Haitian law. In the light of these observations, the Unit has recommended that the competent judicial authorities consider initiating criminal proceedings in relation to alleged false declarations and the use of allegedly false documentation.⁶³

43. A review conducted by the Dominican Republic of suspicious financial transactions involving Haiti and Haitians between 2019 and 2025 is revealing.⁶⁴ Nearly half (47 per cent) of all suspicious transactions between the Dominican Republic and Haiti followed a high-risk remittance pattern, characterized by fragmented transfers across multiple countries, locations and beneficiaries with no clear origin of funds, while a further 15.6 per cent were transactions without proof of source from border areas and 9.6 per cent elsewhere also lacked any documented source.⁶⁵ A smaller but alarming share of cases involved clearly criminal schemes: 2.4 per cent of cases involved attempts to receive remittances using multiple identities and nationalities (possible identity theft or forgery), 1.2 per cent involved what was described as a “parallel agency” allegedly established with the involvement of members of the Haitian police to facilitate migrant trafficking, approximately 1.2 per cent involved the use of corrupt corporate structures and money-laundering linked to different intermediaries and criminal networks, 1.2 per cent was tied to suspected narco trafficking and a further 1.2 per cent was tied to migrant smuggling, underscoring the deep entanglement between financial flows, organized crime and corruption in the border area.⁶⁶

44. In the same assessment, the Dominican Republic tracked more than 10,847 cash transaction reports involving Haitians between early 2021 and 15 October 2025. Cash transaction reports are not always suspicious, but they help authorities to map large cash flows and detect patterns, including structuring, the use of third parties and high-risk transactions. In relation to those cash transaction reports, the authorities issued 1,379 suspicious transaction reports involving Haitians. The total value of the suspicious transaction reports alleged to involve Haitians during that period amounted

⁶⁰ See <https://ucref.gouv.ht/rapport.php>.

⁶¹ These include the National Education Fund (Fonds national de l'éducation), the Ministry of Youth and Sports (regarding the management of funds for the 18 May celebrations), the National Institute for Historic Preservation and the Université publique du Bas-Artibonite.

⁶² See the investigation reports of the Anti-Corruption Unit, published on 8 December 2025.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Government of the Dominican Republic, financial intelligence report, provided to UNODC on request, December 2025 (unpublished).

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

to \$4.1 million (261 million Dominican pesos). Approximately 40 per cent were linked to “multiple suspicious incoming and outgoing transactions to or from Haiti”, 4.8 per cent to fraud committed against a company in Haiti and 2.8 per cent to transactions that matched the Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctions list. The total estimated value of this smaller sample during that period amounted to \$1.8 million (119 million Dominican pesos) and was linked to 1,109 Haitian nationals.⁶⁷

45. The financial intelligence unit of the Dominican Republic also issues technical assessments and spontaneous briefs in response to requests from international partners. The authorities issued 13 separate technical assessments involving 23 Haitian nationals between 2019 and 2025.⁶⁸ Key areas of focus included the smuggling of foreign currency, possible money-laundering and terrorist financing, and drug trafficking. Between 2019 and 2025, the authorities also issued another eight spontaneous reports involving nine Haitians, including assessments linked to drugs and arms trafficking and wildlife smuggling (including the smuggling of eels).⁶⁹

46. As of December 2025, five overlapping sanctions regimes (that of the Security Council, the bilateral regimes of Canada, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States, and that of the European Union) collectively target a broad set of Haitian gang leaders, political figures and business elites who allegedly finance or enable criminal networks. These regimes now cover most of the leadership of the country’s major gangs and coalitions; key political figures (current and former senators, ministers and a former President and other officials linked to drug trafficking, corruption or support for gangs; and business elites and intermediaries accused of laundering proceeds, supplying arms or otherwise financing criminal structures).

VIII. Recommendations

47. The recommendations of UNODC are as follows:

- (a) Strengthen enforcement of the United Nations arms embargo, including through tighter export controls, end-user verification and pre-shipment checks in key source and transit countries;
- (b) Systematically trace seized weapons, using serial number tracking and timely information-sharing with United Nations sanctions bodies and relevant national authorities;⁷⁰
- (c) Identify and prosecute key intermediaries, including brokers, freight forwarders and straw purchasers supplying firearms and ammunition to gangs;

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ The responsibility for tracing seized weapons rests primarily with the States that intercept or seize firearms within or destined for Haiti, in accordance with their national legal frameworks and international cooperation obligations. Tracing can be conducted through established serial number tracing mechanisms, including the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives eTrace system in the United States, or, where seizures occur outside the United States, through bilateral or multilateral cooperation with United States authorities to obtain eTrace support. In the Caribbean, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean provides technical assistance and capacity-building to national authorities to support firearms tracing, information-sharing and reporting to relevant international and United Nations sanctions bodies. The timely transmission of information regarding seized weapons and tracing results to sanctions monitoring mechanisms and affected States is essential to strengthen accountability and disrupt illicit supply chains.

(d) Reinforce border, port and maritime controls through joint inspections, risk-based screening and integrated border management units at strategic entry and transit points;

(e) Target multi-commodity trafficking routes that are used to move firearms, drugs, migrants and bulk cash, supported by expanded non-intrusive inspection technologies and shared watch lists;

(f) Prevent diversion from State and private stockpiles by adopting modern firearms management regulations, mandatory registration, standard armoury procedures and regular independent audits;

(g) Investigate and sanction diversion cases, including instances in which weapons imported for State bodies or private security companies are recovered in the hands of gangs;

(h) Disrupt drug trafficking networks through intelligence-led, regionally coordinated operations, strengthened specialized units and joint maritime and aerial interdictions, including extradition and asset confiscation, where appropriate;

(i) Reinforce anti-money-laundering/countering the financing of terrorism frameworks by converting suspicious transaction reports into investigations and prosecutions, extending supervision to designated non-financial businesses and professions and high-risk sectors, and intensifying financial intelligence unit cooperation with neighbouring States;

(j) Establish a robust asset recovery and management system, including a clear legal framework, an autonomous asset management office and transparent mechanisms to channel confiscated proceeds to public interest uses;

(k) Address the corruption and collusion that enable trafficking flows through integrity the vetting of front-line officials, strengthened anti-corruption institutions and witness protection, and consistent criminal and administrative sanctions against public and private actors found to be involved.
