



Security Council

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Letter dated 13 October 2025 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit the ninth quarterly report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution [2692 \(2023\)](#) as renewed by paragraph 19 of Council resolution [2743 \(2024\)](#) and the subsequent resolution [2785 \(2025\)](#). The report includes the requested updated information on the sources and routes of arms trafficking and illicit financial flows, and on relevant United Nations activities and recommendations.

I should be grateful if you would have the present document brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) António **Guterres**



Report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2692 (2023)

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2692 (2023) as renewed by paragraph 19 of Council resolution 2743 (2024) and the subsequent resolution 2785 (2025). Specifically, the Council tasked the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) with reporting to it every three months, concurrently with the reporting cycle of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), through the Secretary-General, on sources and routes of illicit arms and financial flows and on relevant United Nations activities and recommendations. UNODC has submitted eight reports to the Council since July 2023.¹ The present report covers the major developments since the previous report on 27 June 2025, a period of continuing escalation of gang violence and instability in Haiti.

2. Between July and September 2025, Haiti experienced a continued escalation of violence, with criminal groups tightening control over up to 90 per cent of Port-au-Prince and expanding along key corridors from Saint-Marc to the Belladère border. The growing presence of private security contractors supporting national police forces has added operational capacity territories that had long remained outside the police's operational reach. At the same time, their deployment has raised concerns over transparency, respect for human rights and the privatization of security functions of the Government. Regionally, a record cocaine seizure of 1,045 kg near Île de la Tortue on 13 July and another interdiction of 426 kg of cannabis in Petite-Anse on 27 July underscored the island's pivotal role in trafficking routes linking South America, the Caribbean and the United States of America. Parallel surges in irregular migration, drug flows and arms trafficking were documented across Bahamas (The), the Dominican Republic and Jamaica, as well as the Turks and Caicos Islands, signalling widening regional spillover risks. International enforcement showed incremental gains, reflecting growing but still limited coordination to disrupt illicit financial flows and criminal networks.

II. Deteriorating security context

3. Gang violence in Haiti continued to increase from July to September 2025. At least 3,137 violent deaths and 336 kidnappings for ransom during the first half of 2025 were registered.² The United Nations reported that, between April and June 2025, at least 1,500 people were killed, and roughly 1.3 million remained internally displaced.³ On 3 August, armed assailants kidnapped nine individuals from an

¹ See <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/firearms/haiti-report.html> for a complete list of UNODC reports and submissions.

² According to United Nations reporting, at least 1,617 people were killed between January and March 2025 and 1,520 between April and June 2025, for a total of more than 3,100 violent deaths in the first half of the year (BINUH, "At least 1,617 people killed in the first quarter of 2025 in Haiti", 1 May 2025; BINUH, "Haiti: At least 1,520 people killed by violence during the second quarter of 2025", 1 August 2025). The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) also reported that at least 2,680 people had been killed by 30 May 2025 (OHCHR, "Haiti: UN Human Rights Chief alarmed by widening violence as gangs expand reach", 13 June 2025).

³ United Nations, "Haiti: more than 1,500 killed between April and June", 1 August 2025, available at <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/08/1165554>; and Dánica Coto, "Blackwater

orphanage in Kenscoff.⁴ Despite significant increases in spending on public security, media reports indicate that violent gangs have gained “near-total control” of Port-au-Prince, with up to 90 per cent of the capital under gang dominance.⁵ Humanitarian conditions have likewise worsened sharply as women and girls faced heightened risks due to widespread displacement and collapsing health services. The United Nations has reported massive unmet needs and funding shortfalls.⁶

4. On 9 August, the Government of Haiti declared a three-month “state of emergency” in the West, Artibonite and Centre Departments to tackle an upsurge in gang violence and a deepening food crisis.⁷ The declaration mobilizes State forces to restore security and revive agriculture, particularly important in Artibonite, the country’s main rice production region.⁸ As part of the state of emergency, the Government announced a shake-up in police leadership. Specifically, it appointed a new interim Director General of National Police, a former head of security at the National Palace.⁹ The Haitian public security forces are working closely with the Multinational Security Support Mission, authorized by the Security Council in October 2023 and renewed in September 2024, to try to reassert control and curb the expanding gang influence.¹⁰

III. Escalating gang violence and uneven police response

5. Gang violence in the capital has undergone a disturbing evolution. Whereas in previous years criminal groups relied primarily on sporadic firefights and kidnappings for ransom, they now employ systematic guerrilla-style ambushes against police and deliberately destructive attacks designed to instil widespread fear.¹¹ The arson of the historic Grand Hôtel Oloffson in July 2025 illustrated this shift in aims: targeting a cultural landmark symbolically to demonstrate that nothing is beyond their reach.¹² Likewise, the 12 September massacre in Labodrie, during which 42 civilians were killed without any clear strategic purpose, reflected the escalation

founder to deploy nearly 200 personnel to Haiti as gang violence soars”, Associated Press, 14 August 2025, available at <https://apnews.com/article/8b354f3e085b927b30b6877b5b98e7a5>.

⁴ See <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cr4e23w2dlko> and <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/ireland-calls-hostages-release-after-gunmen-storm-haiti-orphanage-2025-08-05/>.

⁵ In April 2025, the Transitional Presidential Council of Haiti allocated approximately 36 billion gourdes (around \$275 million) to security and stabilizing efforts, a so-called “war budget”. These funds are divided among bolstering police and military capabilities (40 per cent), reinforcing border protections (20 per cent) and supporting social programmes, including education, healthcare and humanitarian aid (16 per cent). See <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-gangs-violence-war-budget-mirebalais-saut-deau-daa19487d58e9ada1846ad674bca0e54> and <https://www.npr.org/2025/07/03/nx-s1-5455540/haiti-gangs-capital-port-au-prince-violence>.

⁶ See <https://haiti.unfpa.org/en/publications/haiti-situation-report-junejuly-2025>.

⁷ Associated Press, “Haiti declares a 3-month state of emergency as gangs ravage country’s central region”, 9 August 2025, available at <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-state-of-emergency-gangs-west-artibonite-5afeb9b859928436eaf4c362fbb91489>.

⁸ Between October 2024 and June 2025, the violence in the Artibonite and Central regions resulted in over 1,000 deaths, more than 200 injuries and 620 kidnappings. In addition, more than 239,000 people were displaced from these areas. Ibid.

⁹ Ibid. and Reuters, “Haiti replaces police chief with former head of palace security”, 9 August 2025, available at <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/haiti-replaces-police-chief-with-former-head-palace-security-2025-08-09/>.

¹⁰ See <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/07/1165391>.

¹¹ See <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/07/1165246> and <https://journal24h.com/les-bandits-utilisent-une-nouvelle-strategie-de-guerilla-pour-bloquer-les-forces-de-lordre/>.

¹² See <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/07/world/americas/haiti-oloffson-hotel-fire-port-au-prince.html> and <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-grand-hotel-oloffson-burned-down-gangs-bb08a45c646bf5bada9759721de1b342>.

in the scale and randomness of their violence.¹³ These tactics, routinely employed, larger in scope, and directed at emblematic or purely civilian targets, have magnified the climate of terror, prompting airlines and cruise lines to extend bans or suspend services to Haiti.¹⁴

6. Gang dominance has rapidly expanded to neighbouring areas around Port-au-Prince.¹⁵ In Kenscoff, which overlooks the capital, Haitian security forces deployed explosive drones and launched a helicopter-supported counteroffensive which inflicted heavy casualties on gang recruits.¹⁶ In a separate incident, a drone reportedly handed over in good faith by residents to the Haitian National Police exploded, killing two special weapons and tactics team officers and injuring others.¹⁷

7. In late August 2025, the gang coalition Viv Ansanm seized the Téléco site, an essential telecommunications centre in Kenscoff, disrupting Internet services and threatening aviation safety by cutting cables and dismantling equipment.¹⁸ On 24 and 25 August, the Haitian National Police and the Multinational Security Support Mission launched an operation to retake control over the facility. According to media sources, the operation led to the removal of gang members from the site and the seizure of rifles, grenades and over 1,500 rounds of ammunition.¹⁹ Public authorities hailed the recovery as a rare show of strength, stressing the site's critical role in telecommunications and aviation control and vowing further action against armed groups.²⁰

¹³ See <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/un-condemns-reported-massacre-haiti-that-left-more-than-40-dead-2025-09-13/>.

¹⁴ See <https://www.al.com/news/2025/09/mayor-cruise-line-cancels-all-stops-at-popular-vacation-spot.html> and <https://apnews.com/article/faa-ban-haiti-capital-commercial-flights-march-356bee7f9653220194b6fc65978f7de5>.

¹⁵ See <https://news.un.org/en/interview/2025/08/1165662>.

¹⁶ See <https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/haiti-least-1520-people-killed-violence-during-second-quarter-2025> and <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/two-haitian-police-killed-when-drone-accidentally-explodes-2025-08-20/>.


¹⁷ See <https://lequotidien509.com/kenscoff-un-drone-explode-2-policiers-tues-swat/>.

¹⁸ See <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/08/26/haiti-police-mss-take-control-teleco-site-aviation-threats/>.

¹⁹ See <https://www.reutersconnect.com/item/haitian-police-and-international-forces-recapture-communications-site-from-armed-gangs-in-kenscoff/dGFnOnJldXRlcnMuY29tLDIwMjU6bmV3c21sX1JDMjNGR0FWNDZaWw>, confirmed by the Haitian National Police.

²⁰ See <https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/police-in-haiti-regain-control-of-key-telecom-hub-seized-by-gangs/ar-AA1LhifL?ocid=BingNewsSerp>.

Map 1
Expansion of gangs in Haiti (July–September 2025)



8. Meanwhile, the Viv Ansanm coalition has expanded and consolidated its control along a strategic corridor spanning Saint-Marc to the Belladère border crossing, encompassing key towns such as Pont Sondé, Liancourt, Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite, Dessalines, Desdunes, Verrettes, Mirebalais, Lascahobas, Croix-Fer and Belladère (see map 1). Communities in these areas face systematic extortion, severe movement restrictions and the imposition of parallel governance structures by gang networks. This expansion continues despite the United States designation of Viv

Ansanm and Gran Grif as “foreign terrorist organizations” and “specially designated global terrorists” in May 2025.²¹

9. The consolidation of these groups reflects their strategic adaptation to the shifting security environment in Haiti. Armed groups appear to be entrenching themselves in peripheral regions, fortifying strategic transit corridors and maintaining dominance over critical maritime and overland trafficking routes that sustain their financing and operational resilience. Despite expanded anti-gang operations across Haiti, including the recent allocation of over 177 million gourdes (\$1.3 million) to interventions, there is limited evidence of measurable reductions in gang influence.²² There are serious concerns about the uneven effectiveness and coordination of current State strategies. Analysts note that ongoing political uncertainty is emboldening criminal networks, enabling them to pursue increasingly aggressive territorial expansion.²³

10. On 25 August 2025, Jimmy Chérizier (alias “Barbecue”) of the Viv Ansanm gang coalition announced the withdrawal from the neighbourhoods of Delmas, Solino, Christ-Roi and Nazon, which were under gang control for over a year.²⁴ This marks a shift by the Viv Ansanm coalition away from an expansionist strategy in Port-au-Prince.²⁵ On 12 August 2025, the United States issued a \$5 million reward for information leading to the arrest of Jimmy Chérizier,²⁶ the leader of Viv Ansanm, which is designated as a foreign terrorist organization. Other designated individuals, such as Johnson “Izo” André (5 Segond), Wilson “Lanmo Sanjou” Joseph (400 Mawozo) and Vitel’Homme Innocent (Kraze Barye), remain at large.²⁷

11. Notwithstanding the advanced deployment of Multinational Security Support Mission units to several priority sites, security conditions along key inland and coastal corridors have continued to deteriorate, underscoring the persistent fragmentation of State authority. In particular, media sources report that the corridor linking Saint-Marc to Belladère has become a critical transit and control zone for criminal networks affiliated with Viv Ansanm. Armed checkpoints, ambushes and systematic extortion are now reported on a daily basis along this route.²⁸ The consolidation of control on that corridor appears to be tactical, anchored in the strategic seizure of river crossings, fuel supply hubs and primary food distribution routes, thereby ensuring both mobility and economic leverage for armed groups.

²¹ See <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/05/terrorist-designations-of-viv-ansanm-and-gran-grif>.

²² See <https://infosnation.com/haiti-securite-177-millions-de-gourdes-alloues-pour-des-operations-anti-gangs-sans-impact-visible/>.

²³ See <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/the-weaponization-of-displacement-by-gangs-in-haiti>, <https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/spreading-gang-violence-poses-major-risk-haiti-and-caribbean-sub-region-un-human-rights-report-warns> and <https://www.npr.org/2025/08/15/nx-s1-5503316/blackwater-erik-prince-haiti-gang-violence>.

²⁴ See <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-45649-haiti-flash-barbecue-authorizes-the-return-of-the-population-to-4-neighborhoods-of-the-capital-video.html>.

²⁵ It is possibly connected to increased pressure by the United States and others, including a major bounty offered for help in Jimmy Chérizier’s apprehension. See, for example, <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/16/us/haiti-gang-barbeque-bounty.html>.

²⁶ See <https://www.state.gov/jimmy-cherizier>.

²⁷ See <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/johnson-andre>, <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/wilson-joseph> and <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/vitelhomme-innocent>. See also <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/09/04/what-barbecues-defiant-im-here-says-about-us-intentions-toward-haiti-editorial/>.

²⁸ See <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article310294480.html> and <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article310445275.html>.

12. The limited operational reach of national and international forces is compounding the deepening instability in Haiti. High-visibility operations, bolstered by aerial surveillance and airlift support in areas such as Kenscoff and Croix-des-Bouquets, have yet to achieve sustained results, with gangs rapidly regrouping and reasserting control once security units withdraw. In Port-au-Prince, the brief reoccupation of several neighbourhoods by the Haitian National Police was followed by coordinated retaliatory attacks on State infrastructure, including police stations, schools and humanitarian facilities.²⁹

13. Violence in the Artibonite region intensified significantly during the reporting period. On 16 July 2025 in Marchand-Dessalines, gangs set fire to the local police station, forcing nearly 15,000 people to flee Dessalines and nearby Verrettes as rival factions fought for territorial control.³⁰ On 17 July in Liancourt, clashes erupted when the Gran Grif de Savien gang launched a violent assault that killed multiple police officers and spread panic throughout the town.³¹ On 19 July in L'Estère, fierce fighting between gangs and local self-defence groups left multiple fatalities, destroyed homes and vehicles and severely restricted humanitarian access.³²

14. Of particular concern is the systematic maritime predation surrounding Île de la Gonâve, where reports of armed robbery, extortion and targeted killings at sea are on the rise. According to the Haitian Coast Guard Commission, gangs affiliated with Viv Ansanm are disrupting trade routes, imposing tolls of up to 100,000 gourdes (\$765) on boats.³³ These dynamics have significantly strained supply lines, contributing to rising food insecurity, deepening humanitarian challenges and disrupting the local economy. The absence of a coherent State maritime response has allowed such attacks to expand unchecked, consolidating criminal dominance over vital maritime trade and transport routes.³⁴

Deepening role of private security

15. According to media reports, a United States private security firm has expanded its footprint in Haiti since July 2025.³⁵ Active with drone operations since March 2025, the private security company has reportedly mobilized nearly 200 personnel. Forces include snipers and intelligence experts from El Salvador, the United States and Europe, along with helicopters, to support local security actors in retaking gang-held areas.³⁶

²⁹ Roberson Alphonse, “Drone explosif et hélicoptère utilisés contre les gangs à Kenscoff”, *Le Nouvelliste*, 24 July 2025, available at <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/258387/drone-et-helicoptere-utilises-contre-les-gangs-a-kenscoff>.

³⁰ Haitian Times, “One killed as gangs torch police station in Haiti’s Artibonite town, Marchand-Dessalines”, 18 July 2025, available at <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/07/18/gangs-torched-marchand-dessalines-police-station/>.

³¹ See <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/am%C3%A9riques/20250723-ha%C3%Afti-des-policiers-tu%C3%A9s-dans-une-embuscade-par-les-gangs-arm%C3%A9s-dans-l-artibonite>.

³² See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-attaque-groupe-armee-contre-la-population-avsls19072025> for detailed descriptions.

³³ Roobens Isma, “L’île de la Gonâve en train d’être asphyxiée par les bandits-pirates de Viv ansanm”, *Le Nouvelliste*, 2 July 2025, available at <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/257730/gonave-asphyxie-par-viv-ansanm>.

³⁴ See, for example, Le Filet Info, “Attaque armée contre un bateau à Port-au-Prince: morts et blessés enregistrés”, 9 July 2025, <https://lefiletinfo.com/attaque-armee-contre-un-bateau-a-port-au-prince-morts-et-blesses-enregistres/>.

³⁵ See <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/trump-ally-erik-prince-plans-keep-personnel-haiti-10-years-fight-gangs-collect-2025-08-14/>.

³⁶ See <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-erik-prince-contractors-gang-violence-police-8b354f3e085b927b30b6877b5b98e7a5>.

16. The company is allegedly operating under a 10-year agreement with the transitional Government of Haiti.³⁷ According to media reports, the contract is focused on recovering territory from gangs, securing roads and related infrastructure and restoring order. It reportedly includes provisions for the design and implementation of a modernized tax collection system, particularly at the key border with the Dominican Republic.³⁸ There are, however, few publicly available details about the financial terms or oversight of the deal. Several civil society groups have raised concerns, citing potential human rights violations, breaches of export-control and anti-abuse laws, and growing risks of ceding key State functions to a foreign firm.³⁹

17. In a letter dated 18 August 2025 addressed to the other members of the Transitional Presidential Council, a member and former coordinator of the Council explained that his team had not been made aware of the signature of a contract for border control and tax collection. Even so, he has confirmed that the State is negotiating with another company.⁴⁰ In his letter, seen by UNODC, he underscored the need for a transparent public tendering process and the requirement to adhere to the existing frameworks to regulate such State contracts.⁴¹

Record-breaking drug seizures in Haiti

18. On 13 July 2025, the Haitian National Police, supported by specialized units including the Brigade for the Fight against Narcotics Trafficking and the Departmental Law Enforcement Unit, conducted a maritime interdiction operation near Île de la Tortue. The operation reportedly resulted in the seizure of approximately 1,045 kg of cocaine, the largest such confiscation in Haiti in over three decades.⁴² During the pursuit and engagement, three suspected traffickers of Jamaican nationality were reportedly killed, while a fourth individual, a Bahamian national, sustained injuries and was subsequently detained. Initial investigations reportedly indicate that the narcotics originated in South America and were intended for distribution across the Caribbean and into the United States.⁴³

³⁷ See <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-urges-un-security-council-boost-haiti-support-gangs-recruit-more-children-2025-08-28/> and <https://www.business-humanrights.org/pt/%C3%BAltimas-not%C3%ADcias/haiti-vectus-global-reportedly-planning-10-year-deployment-raising-human-rights-concerns/>.

³⁸ See <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/trump-ally-erik-prince-plans-keep-personnel-haiti-10-years-fight-gangs-collect-2025-08-14/>.

³⁹ See <https://www.telesurenglish.net/erik-princes-vectus-global-deploys-armed-drones-and-mercenaries-in-haiti-amid-secrecy-and-controversy/> and *ibid*.

⁴⁰ Fritz Alphonse Jean, “Contrat pour le recrutement d’une firme privée aux fins d’augmenter la perception des recettes à la frontière entre Haïti et la République Dominicaine”, personal communication, 18 August 2025.


⁴¹ See <https://canada-haiti.ca/content/fritz-alphonse-jean-denies-any-connection-erik-princes-vectus-global-contract>.

⁴² See <https://apnews.com/article/c1066c470f273a2171ef04f8c2bea555>.

⁴³ See <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/am%C3%A9riques/20250715-ha%C3%AFti-saisie-record-de-plus-d-une-tonne-de-coca%C3%AFne-plusieurs-trafiqants-tu%C3%A9s>, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/boat-shootout-cocaine-suspects-killed-haiti/> and <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article310645715.html>.

Map 2

Recent drug seizures (July–September 2025)



*Non-Self-Governing Territory

Source: UNODC

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

19. Île de la Tortue has long been a strategic point for transnational criminal operations. It was historically exploited by pirates and, in recent decades, by organized criminal networks involved in drug trafficking, human smuggling and other illicit activities. Its geographical position, which provides direct maritime access to Bahamas (The) and Jamaica, as well as the Turks and Caicos Islands, makes it suitable as a staging and storage platform for illicit shipments.⁴⁴

20. The island's role in trafficking was observed in previous interdictions, including the seizure of cannabis shipments in the Turks and Caicos Islands in 2024.⁴⁵ Specifically, on 17 August 2024, law enforcement authorities in the Turks and Caicos reportedly interdicted over \$2.7 million worth of marijuana traced back to Île de la Tortue.⁴⁶ Moreover, as part of the so-called “*Marauder*” case documented in a previous report (see [S/2024/752](#)), Île de la Tortue has been used as a logistics hub, including for the storage of drugs and stolen maritime vessels (some of which were later deployed in regional drug trafficking and migrant smuggling operations).⁴⁷ Smugglers are reportedly using Île de la Tortue as a departure point for overcrowded

⁴⁴ Local sources allege that Bahamian and Jamaican nationals acquired property on the island, raising concerns about the establishment of safe havens or logistical bases.

⁴⁵ [S/2024/752](#), annex, paras. 26–32.


⁴⁶ Royal Turks and Caicos Islands Police Force, “Million dollar drug bust”, available at <https://www.tcipolice.tc/million-dollar-drug-bust/>.

⁴⁷ [S/2024/752](#), paras. 27–32.

boats carrying not only Haitian migrants but also those from other countries towards The Bahamas, the Turks and Caicos Islands and the State of Florida in the United States, exposing passengers to shipwrecks and trafficking risks (see map 3).⁴⁸

Map 3

Reported smuggling routes from Île de la Tortue, Haiti, to the Caribbean and the United States



⁴⁸ Interview with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Bahamas, 16 June 2025. See also Reuters, “Record number of people displaced by violence in Haiti”, 11 June 2025, available at <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/record-number-people-displaced-by-violence-haiti-un-agency-says-2025-06-11/>.

21. Information obtained by UNODC from the 13 July 2025 operation resulting in the cocaine seizure indicates that the trafficking activities connected to Île de la Tortue involve a multinational network. The deceased individuals were Bahamian and Jamaican nationals, underscoring the presence of regional actors collaborating with Haitian counterparts. These groups reportedly leverage maritime expertise, familial links and cultural connections to operate drug trafficking and migrant smuggling routes extending from South America through the Caribbean basin and to the east coast of the United States, particularly Florida.⁴⁹ Such cooperation complicates enforcement efforts and underscores the need for strengthened regional coordination and intelligence-sharing mechanisms.

22. The seizure of 13 July 2025 further underscores the critical security implications of Île de la Tortue's entrenchment as a nexus of organized crime. They highlight the cross-border nature of the criminal threat, with direct impacts on maritime security, regional stability and the rule of law. Sustained and coordinated efforts between Haitian authorities, regional partners and international stakeholders remain imperative to disrupt the operational resilience of these networks and to strengthen maritime surveillance, interdiction capacity and judicial cooperation.

23. On 27 July 2025, Haitian authorities also made a major cannabis seizure of 425.9 kg and arrested three suspects during a coordinated police raid in Petite-Anse, near Cap-Haïtien.⁵⁰ The operation, led by the Brigade for the Fight against Narcotics Trafficking and supported by multiple law enforcement units, reflects mounting concerns over the country's growing role as a transit hub in regional narcotics networks spanning Bahamas (The), Jamaica and the wider Caribbean. The bust came just days after two Haitian nationals were arrested in Jamaica with over 3,000 lb of cannabis (worth an estimated \$9.3 million).⁵¹

24. There is also recent evidence received by UNODC of drugs transiting Haiti in Europe. Specifically, on 22 August 2025, Belgian authorities seized 1,156 kg of cocaine in the port of Antwerp in a container originating from Haiti.⁵² According to preliminary reports, the consignment departed Cap-Haïtien on 14 July, transited through Kingston and subsequently arrived in Belgium on 22 August, where it was intercepted. The case is currently under investigation by the competent authorities. Meanwhile, the United States intensified operations in the Caribbean in August and September 2025, including the deployment of substantial maritime and air assets.⁵³

IV. Regional spillover effects

25. Between June and August 2025, authorities in The Bahamas reported a marked rise in irregular migration and criminal incidents involving Haitian nationals, underscoring the regional impact of the instability in Haiti.⁵⁴ Immigration and law enforcement agencies executed a series of enforcement operations in cooperation with international partners, which resulted in multiple seizures and arrests linked to

⁴⁹ Interviews with representatives of security and intelligence in the Turks and Caicos Islands, Jamaica and The Bahamas during the reporting period.

⁵⁰ See <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/08/01/major-drug-bust-in-cap-haitien-exposes-growing-caribbean-trafficking-network/> and <https://www.plenglish.com/news/2025/07/30/haiti-goes-on-with-fight-against-drugs/>.

⁵¹ See <https://www.jamaicaobserver.com/2025/07/22/three-charged-9-million-ganja-seizure/>.

⁵² See <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/07/15/haiti-record-cocaine-seizure-tortuga-island/>.

⁵³ See <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-deploying-10-fighter-jets-puerto-rico-drug-cartel-fight-sources-say-2025-09-05> and <https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-builds-up-forces-caribbean-officials-experts-ask-why-2025-08-29/>.

⁵⁴ Interview with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Bahamas on 16 June 2025 and follow-up consultations.

maritime and aerial trafficking routes between Haiti and the southern region of The Bahamas. These targeted operations across New Providence resulted in the arrest and conviction of dozens of Haitian nationals for illegal entry and overstaying. High-profile enforcement actions included Operation Morning Glow on 23 July, which resulted in the detention of 17 individuals, and additional arrests and convictions on 15 and 3 July, with offenders processed through Magistrate's Courts and turned over for deportation.⁵⁵ These operations were conducted against the backdrop of heightened maritime surveillance by the Royal Bahamas Defence Force and the Department of Immigration.⁵⁶

26. Parallel to intensified migration enforcement, Bahamian law enforcement has noted the continued use of Bahamian territory as a trans-shipment hub for narcotics and firearms.⁵⁷ Officials emphasized that most illicit firearms were trafficked from the United States and that cocaine, rather than marijuana, remained the primary drug involved. Direct links to Haitian-based gangs remain limited and are under continued assessment by authorities in the region. In mid-July, law enforcement agencies in New Providence executed a major interdiction, seizing more than 25 illegal firearms, 5,200 rounds of ammunition and 22 kg of marijuana, underscoring the reach and sophistication of regional trafficking pipelines that frequently overlap with migrant smuggling routes.⁵⁸ These concerns were further exacerbated by the 13 July 2025 incident off Île de la Tortue.

27. In response to increased reports of criminal activity linked to Haitian criminal networks, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Bahamas issued a formal advisory urging citizens to avoid non-essential travel to Haiti.⁵⁹ Authorities specifically warned of heightened risks associated with transnational smuggling networks and violence.⁶⁰ Collectively, these developments illustrate the escalating cross-border dimensions of organized crime, reinforcing the urgent need for enhanced bilateral and regional cooperation to mitigate the complex security and humanitarian challenges posed by the spillover of the crisis in Haiti into The Bahamas and the wider Caribbean.

28. There are also signs of regional spillover from the escalating security crisis in Haiti into the Turks and Caicos Islands.⁶¹ On 27 July 2025, a deadly mass shooting at the Island Hookah Lounge in Providenciales involving four suspected gang members left 4 people dead and 10 injured in what authorities described as the territory's first such incident.⁶² While officials noted parallels with trafficking routes and violent retaliation patterns associated with Haitian criminal groups, they cautioned that investigations remained ongoing and no conclusive attribution had been made.⁶³ The Police Commissioner condemned the attack as "deeply disturbing", while the Premier

⁵⁵ See <https://www.bahamaspress.com/17-haitian-nationals-apprehended-in-enforcement-operation/>.

⁵⁶ See <https://www.tribune242.com/news/2025/jul/08/rbdf-braces-for-surge-of-haitian-migrants-as-instability-increasing/>.

⁵⁷ Interview with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Bahamas on 16 June 2025 and follow-up consultations.

⁵⁸ See <https://www.tribune242.com/news/2025/jul/01/police-and-customs-dept-seize-200k-in-guns-and-marijuana/>.

⁵⁹ Interview with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Bahamas on 16 June 2025 and follow-up consultations.

⁶⁰ See <https://mofa.gov.bs/updated-travel-advisory-for-haiti/>.

⁶¹ The following paragraphs were drafted in consultation with the Turks and Caicos authorities.

⁶² See <https://apnews.com/article/turks-caicos-mass-shooting-018be7b697a4af2f32b18c7191a28aaf> and <https://lefacteurhaiti.com/iles-turques-et-caiques-des-gangs-haitiens-accuses-de-tuer-3-personnes-et-de-blesser-10-autres-lors-dune-fusillade-dans-un-bar/>.

⁶³ Ibid. and Daisy Handfield, "Premier, Police Commissioner link mass shooting to Haitian gang violence", *Turks and Caicos Islands Sun*, 29 July 2025, available at <https://suntci.com/premier-police-commissioner-link-mass-shooting-to-haitian-gang-violence-p12986-129.htm>.

urged the Haitian community to cooperate with law enforcement to help to curb gun smuggling and gang infiltration.

29. In the aftermath, authorities declared a “national security critical event” and launched a series of measures, including multi-agency enforcement operations in high-risk neighbourhoods, a 48-hour curfew in Blue Hills and subsequent nightly curfews in Kew Town and Dock Yard. Security forces reportedly recovered firearms and ammunition in targeted searches and neutralized a key suspect linked to the mass shooting. They also enlisted support from the National Crime Agency of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to bolster investigative and tactical capacity.⁶⁴ By early August 2025, the Turks and Caicos authorities had launched Operation Dragon, a sweeping multi-agency crackdown in the Blue Hills area. Authorities highlighted that informal settlements, including La Tortue, Mary Jane Lane and Snake Hill, had long been identified as strongholds for organized crime and illicit trafficking, with gangs recruiting from and operating within these communities.⁶⁵ More than 220 illegally constructed structures were demolished in the operation, led by the Royal Turks and Caicos Islands Police Force with the full backing of the National Security Council.⁶⁶ A 72-hour curfew was imposed on 8 August to stabilize the area and enable security forces to reassert control. Officials have described the operation as a decisive step to dismantle entrenched criminal enclaves, restore public order and prevent further entrenchment of Haitian gang-linked networks on the islands.⁶⁷

30. Meanwhile, Jamaican authorities reported the largest firearms seizure in the country’s history in June 2025, uncovering weapons believed to be part of a transnational trafficking network supplying gangs across the Caribbean, including those in Haiti.⁶⁸ Police and customs claimed to have intercepted 233 illegal rifles and handguns and over 40,000 rounds of ammunition, enough to “arm a small army”.⁶⁹ The Acting Senior Superintendent of Police of Jamaica claimed that these incidents had a “direct correlation” to the guns-for-drugs trade.⁷⁰ Intelligence reports suggest that the weapons originated from multiple foreign jurisdictions, raising alarms about the sophistication and coordination of regional arms pipelines fuelling escalating violence.⁷¹

31. Cross-border dynamics became even more evident in July 2025 during a major drug bust in Toms River, Saint Andrew, where law enforcement seized over 1,419 kg of marijuana valued at \$9.3 million. Two Haitian nationals along with three Jamaican suspects were arrested and charged with drug trafficking, conspiracy to export and

⁶⁴ See <https://www.newslinetci.com/post/mass-shooting-victims-visited-by-tci-leaders-as-police-launch-manhunt-for-gunmen>.

⁶⁵ Interview with the Permanent Secretary of the National Security Secretariat, Turks and Caicos Islands Government, 2 September 2025.

⁶⁶ See <https://www.newslinetci.com/post/over-220-illegal-structures-demolished-in-la-tortue-blue-hills>.

⁶⁷ Interview with the Permanent Secretary of the National Security Secretariat.

⁶⁸ All information was shared and confirmed by the Jamaican authorities. See <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/09/questions-grow-over-unprecedented-firearms-seizure-in-jamaica>.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ See <https://jcf.gov.jm/major-drug-bust-three-charged-in-guns-for-drugs-crackdown/>.

⁷¹ The Jamaican authorities report a significant increase in weapons and ammunition seizures between 2024 and 2025. For example, a total of 7,961 ammunition rounds were seized between January and August 2024 compared with 42,287 over the same equivalent period in 2025. See Jamaica, Constabulary Force, Firearms and Narcotics Division, “Information on drugs and guns trade between Jamaica and Haiti”, unpublished communication with UNODC, 11 September 2025.

illegal entry.⁷² The arrests followed a seizure of marijuana, when three Haitians were arrested, as well as an 18 July operation led by the Firearms and Narcotics Investigation Division, which intercepted vehicles near the border between Sainte-Marie and Saint-André carrying over 350 packages of marijuana.⁷³ These incidents hint at the deepening operational links between Jamaican criminal organizations and Haitian nationals and networks.

32. United States authorities have also continued arresting and prosecuting individuals associated with arms trafficking to Haiti. In July 2025, a United States national was sentenced to 30 months in federal prison for trafficking firearms concealed in cargo shipments bound for Haitian ports and organized criminal groups.⁷⁴ Also in July, federal agents arrested a Haitian national in Miami who reportedly acquired firearms through friends and family and then shipped aluminium-wrapped weapons and ammunition in containers to Cap-Haïtien.⁷⁵ These cases underscore how United States territory continues to serve as a procurement hub for illicit arms feeding conflict in Haiti.

33. In July 2025, nine United States Democrat senators sent a letter to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security demanding transparency over arms exports to Haiti from 2021. In the letter, the senators called for a public inventory of export licences, detailing weapon types, recipients and safeguards against diversion to gangs.

34. On 30 September, the Security Council, by its resolution [2793 \(2025\)](#), authorized the transition of the Multinational Security Support Mission to a Gang Suppression Force and requested the creation of a United Nations Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH) to provide logistical and operational support to the Force. The Prime Minister of Haiti expressed his full support to the Council's decision by stating that the new mission, designed with a stronger mandate and logistical backing, was essential to confront gangs.⁷⁶

V. Countering illicit financial flows and enforcing sanctions

35. In its letter dated 9 June 2025 to the President of the Security Council, the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) underlined the intermittent attacks by gangs against the country's main port located in Port-au-Prince area.⁷⁷ The National Port Authority has noted how criminal groups have disrupted activities, leading to loss of revenue for the Government and disrupting the supply of much-needed commodities, not least food, to Haitians.⁷⁸ Trucks leaving and arriving at the National Port Authority port have been subjected to extortion, carried

⁷² The Jamaican authorities claim that preliminary investigations revealed that the drugs were being transported from Saint Elizabeth to Portland, whereafter they would be sent to Haiti. Ibid.

⁷³ The Jamaican authorities claim that the three Haitian individuals had been living in Jamaica for between eight months and two years. They were charged and deported, and no linkages to criminal organizations were identified. Ibid.

⁷⁴ See <https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/smuggler-firearms-key-west-haiti-sentenced-dc-30-months-prison>.

⁷⁵ Released on a \$300,000 bond, the suspect awaits trial under strict travel restrictions. See <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article310716385.html>.

⁷⁶ See <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/09/10/haiti-supports-us-proposed-new-force/>.

⁷⁷ [S/2025/356](#), sect. V.C and references mentioned in the document.

⁷⁸ According to sources identified by the Panel of Experts, when the port is operational, the General Customs Administration collects at least 500 million gourdes (equivalent to \$3,800,358.47) per day from the goods imported through the Caribbean Port Services terminal located at the port.

out by the Wharf Jérémie and La Saline gangs, which control adjacent areas and impose payments of cash amounts.⁷⁹

36. Financial flows emanating from, or transiting through, the United States continue to serve as conduits enabling violent criminal groups in Haiti. The arrest on 17 July 2025 of a prominent Haitian businessman residing in the United States and former candidate to presidential elections in Haiti exemplifies this dynamic.⁸⁰ United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement cited the resident's alleged engagement in gang-related violence and non-disclosure of ongoing anti-corruption referrals by Haitian authorities, including loan misappropriation investigations, as grounds for removal proceedings under immigration law.⁸¹ The individual was previously referred for prosecution by the Haitian Anti-Corruption Unit for misusing loans, supporting the United States case for removability based on fraud.⁸²

37. Cross-border financing through leading diaspora figures and domestic fund diversion reveal how illicit financial flows are undermining Haitian governance and empowering criminal entities. They also highlight the transnational dimension of the challenge, wherein flows emanating from United States territory combined with domestic corruption sustain gang activity and weaken institutional control. A recent United States government advisory further condemned reported bribery aimed at destabilizing the transitional authorities in Haiti and underscored the need for accountability and stronger financial controls.⁸³ Collectively, these developments point to the urgent need for continued investment in comprehensive strategies that include judicial coordination, financial transparency, capacity-building and regional cooperation, including enhanced anti-money-laundering frameworks.

38. In August 2025, the United States Department of Justice unsealed a federal indictment against Jimmy "Barbecue" Chérizier, leader of the Viv Ansanm gang coalition, along with another United States individual residing in North Carolina.⁸⁴ The indictment charges them with conspiring to violate United States sanctions by facilitating diaspora financing of gang operations through illicit transfers of funds to support recruitment, weapon procurement and operational expenses in Haiti.⁸⁵ The case represents the first criminal application of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act against a Haitian gang leader and is supported by the aforementioned reward for information leading to Jimmy Chérizier's capture.

39. In July 2025, the European Union, acting under its sanctions framework, imposed a new series of restrictive measures against three prominent leaders of Haitian gangs. According to the European Union Council Decision, these individuals are associated with crimes including mass killings, child recruitment, kidnapping, homicide and sexual violence.⁸⁶ The sanctions include asset freezes and travel bans

⁷⁹ Since January, their extortion per container leaving the port has amounted to between \$500 and \$1,000.

⁸⁰ See <https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-arrests-haitian-engaged-violence-and-destabilization-haiti-support-department>.

⁸¹ Ibid. The individual was still under custody as at 14 September 2025.

⁸² See <https://www.gazettehaiti.com/index.php/node/4007>.

⁸³ See <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-us-bribery-destabilize-government-gangs-e74130122d91cd4736de7e30b8b6ce0a>.

⁸⁴ See <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/haitian-gang-leader-barbecue-indicted-conspiracy-violate-us-sanctions>.

⁸⁵ See <https://apnews.com/article/us-jury-indicts-cherizier-barbecue-haiti-gangs-1329d2d13e11afce536bb8bb01a3c9aa>.

⁸⁶ See <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/15/haiti-eu-lists-three-individuals-and-renews-sanctions-regime-for-an-additional-year/>.

to the European Union.⁸⁷ The European Union also amended its restrictive measures to include Gran Grif and Viv Ansanm, following their designation by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022) concerning Haiti on 8 July, and renewed its broader measures under the sanctions regime for an additional year.⁸⁸

40. Within Haiti, enforcement against illicit financial flows has gained renewed momentum. On 16 July 2025, the Anti-Corruption Unit conducted a high-profile search at the Ministry of Youth, Sports and Civic Action, seizing more than 1.2 million gourdes (\$9,165) from a State safe, funds originally allocated for national festivities.⁸⁹ This action underscores once again the persistence of the Unit's anti-corruption efforts and highlights the need for judicial structures capable of bringing such cases to their conclusion. In this regard, following the establishment through the 14 April 2025 decree of two specialized judicial units, one dedicated to financial crimes, including corruption offences, and the other to mass crimes, including sexual violence, the Haitian authorities are actively operationalizing these judicial bodies, notably through the selection of magistrates and the identification of appropriate premises.

41. The operationalization of the specialized judicial units could result in a shift in the country's justice landscape by providing specialized capacity to handle sensitive and complex criminal cases that, in the past, often stalled in the ordinary courts. Numerous corruption files submitted by investigative and control bodies, particularly the Anti-Corruption Unit, remain unresolved for years, neither prosecuted to conviction nor formally discharged.⁹⁰ By concentrating expertise, resources and institutional backing, the specialized judicial units could ensure that such dossiers are systematically adjudicated, thus strengthening accountability and integrity, advancing anti-corruption efforts and closing the gaps throughout the Haitian criminal justice chain.

42. Separately, the concession governing the largest port in Haiti, the public port of Port-au-Prince, raises concerns related to potential integrity risks. Operated by a private company in partnership with the National Port Authority, the port was subject to a new lease signed in late 2023 with the said company, with a duration of nine years, potentially extending to 2059 through automatic renewals, and is alleged not to have respected the legal procedures in place.⁹¹ The new concession gives the company rights and operational control over container handling at the public port of Port-au-Prince, under the control and supervision of the National Port Authority. This operation is estimated to account for about 80 per cent of inbound containers at the national level. The issue was raised by the Transitional Presidential Council in mid-2025, leading its coordinator to call for a review by the Court of Auditors.⁹² A

⁸⁷ See <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-45353-haiti-politic-the-european-union-places-3-haitian-gang-leaders-on-its-sanctions-list.html>.

⁸⁸ See <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/15/haiti-eu-lists-three-individuals-and-renews-sanctions-regime-for-an-additional-year/>.

⁸⁹ See <https://gplmedialibre.com/2025/07/16/perquisition-au-ministere-de-la-jeunesse-lulcc-saisit-plus-dun-million-de-gourdes/>.

⁹⁰ Haiti, Anti-Corruption Unit, "Diagnostic de la loi du 12 mars 2014 portant prévention et répression de la corruption", April 2024.

⁹¹ Widlore Mérancourt, "CPS secures controversial contract for the public port of Port-au-Prince", 19 July 2025, available at <https://ayibopost.com/cps-secures-controversial-contract-for-the-public-port-of-port-au-prince/>.

⁹² Léon Kersivil, "Note du CPT autour du contrat de CPS, Fritz A. Jean 24 heures avant de quitter la tête du CPT, s'en prend au reste du CPT", 6 August 2025, available at <https://www.gazettehaiti.com/node/12594>. Although some Transitional Presidential Council members initially defended the contract, the Council coordinator at the time declined to endorse that position and called for a review by the Court of Auditors.

swift and careful review, accompanied by transparent communication on measures taken by competent authorities, would best provide support in safeguarding public trust and the integrity of port governance.

VI. Recommendations

43. **Redouble efforts towards public security.** With the continued expansion of criminal groups within and outside Port-au-Prince and an escalation in their tactics, the international community should, as requested by Haiti, continue and increase its support to the deployment of international police and military personnel in Haiti, working alongside the Haitian National Police, to restore public security, law and order within a sound human rights compliance and rule of law framework. In this context, the adoption of Security Council resolution [2793 \(2025\)](#) authorizing the transition of the Multinational Security Support Mission to a Gang Suppression Force and requesting the creation of UNSOH to provide logistical and operational support to the Force is a welcome development. Operations should incorporate specific measures to prevent and respond to conflict-related sexual violence, including survivor-centred referral pathways, female officers in mixed teams, and do-no-harm community engagement with women and girls.

44. **Strengthen maritime and port security measures.** Given the country's operational constraints, authorities should prioritize low-cost, high-impact upgrades to maritime and port security, with phased support from UNODC and regional partners. Initial efforts should focus on enhanced cargo screening, vessel tracking and patrol coordination at Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien and Île de la Tortue. Donor partners should consider providing technical assistance and targeted equipment tied to measurable improvements in oversight and interdiction capacity.

45. **Enhance maritime and air monitoring capacity.** The effectiveness of maritime and aerial monitoring in Haiti remains constrained by limited infrastructure and technological capacity. It is recommended that a national maritime radar network be established, complemented by the deployment of a primary surveillance radar system for aeronautical monitoring. Strengthening these capabilities would provide real-time situational awareness, allowing national law enforcement agencies to more effectively detect, deter and disrupt transnational organized crime activities, including drug trafficking, arms smuggling and other illicit movements through maritime and air routes.

46. **Strengthen legal frameworks to increase prosecution of maritime crimes.** Although law enforcement agencies have conducted successful and high-level operations leading to seizures and detentions, the domestic legal frameworks to prosecute maritime crimes require strengthening to increase convictions, thereby strengthening deterrence. This includes a review of existing legal provisions criminalizing armed robbery at sea, piracy, drug trafficking and other crimes committed at sea with a view to closing legislative gaps, harmonizing domestic law with international maritime conventions and ensuring that offences are clearly defined and prosecutable and carry proportionate penalties.

47. **Develop and implement a comprehensive maritime security initiative.** Given the limited resources of law enforcement agencies in Haiti, a unified approach making use of centralized, joint coordination is key to addressing maritime security challenges. This can be achieved not only by enhancing the capabilities of security forces such as the Haitian Coast Guard but also by establishing a maritime security coordination task force or cell within the Haitian National Police to provide an appropriate platform for addressing maritime security threats, including streamlined operations, enhanced information-gathering and targeted responses.

48. **Build criminal intelligence capacities in Haiti.** Given the pace of gang dynamics, escalations of violence and tactics by gangs and increased evidence of their links with regional and international illicit trafficking and organized crime, criminal intelligence is a critical tool to support effective and targeted responses. Haiti, in cooperation with international partners and international organizations, should prioritize establishing a clear legal basis for criminal intelligence collection, analysis and sharing with a strong foundation in human rights. Support in unit vetting, mentored capacity development and the provision of appropriate equipment is also required. With adequate technical capacities and built-in human rights safeguards, including oversight and protection mechanisms, criminal intelligence capacity would not only assist Haiti in its domestic law enforcement efforts but could also contribute to a stronger regional picture and response against organized crime.

49. **Promote regional intelligence and enforcement cooperation.** Given resource limitations, Haiti and regional partners such as Bahamas (The), the Dominican Republic and Jamaica should pursue incremental data-sharing agreements and ad hoc joint operations, leveraging existing platforms of UNODC, the Caribbean Community and the International Criminal Police Organization. Establishing low-cost, secure communication channels for intelligence exchange and joint case coordination can build trust and lay the foundation for more structured collaboration over time while mitigating the risk of cross-border trafficking and violence. Cooperation in investigations and prosecutions around the region would also allow for more targeted disruption efforts against the organized crime groups affecting it.

50. **Expand targeted support to anti-corruption and financial intelligence units.** Support to the Anti-Corruption Unit and the Central Financial Intelligence Unit should be strategically focused, emphasizing basic forensic training, digital security tools and operational autonomy. Donor assistance should align with clearly defined benchmarks, such as the number of actionable investigations advanced or referrals made to judicial authorities. These incremental investments can help to build confidence in the country's capacity to address illicit financial flows without overextending limited resources.

51. **Prioritize feasible enforcement of sanctions regimes.** Given the capacity gaps, Haitian authorities should work with international partners to establish a small, dedicated sanctions liaison cell within the Ministry of Finance. This unit could coordinate with partners such as the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the United States Department of Treasury, the European Union, and Canadian authorities to trace and freeze identifiable assets of sanctioned individuals. Technical support should be sequenced and outcome-oriented, with a focus on simple, achievable measures rather than complex, resource-intensive enforcement frameworks.

52. **Embed practical and context-appropriate human rights safeguards in security operations.** All security activities, including those involving private contractors and the Gang Suppression Force, should incorporate practical and cost-effective human rights safeguards. Developing a basic civilian harm log, with guidance from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, can improve transparency and accountability even in low-resource settings. Over time, a streamlined legal framework governing the use of drones and private security actors should be introduced to align operations with international standards and reduce the risk of abuse.

53. **Strengthen national capacity to investigate and prosecute human trafficking and migrant smuggling cases.** The Haitian authorities, with support from UNODC and regional partners, should build on ongoing anti-human trafficking and migrant smuggling responses to establish specialized investigative units within

the Haitian National Police, initially embedded at the central directorate level and progressively expanded to border areas. Efforts should also be focused on developing bilateral protocols with Bahamas (The) and the Dominican Republic as well as the Turks and Caicos authorities to enhance investigations and information-sharing. Targeted donor support should prioritize capacity-building, investigative tools and secure information-sharing systems to ensure that trafficking victims are identified and protected while criminal networks are effectively disrupted.

54. Strengthen judicial capacities to fight corruption and financial crimes. Priorities include: (a) fast-tracking the operationalization of the specialized judicial units by adopting an expedited recruitment process for magistrates, while strictly upholding the highest standards of integrity, professionalism and transparency; (b) providing the resources required for the specialized judicial units, including adequate premises and infrastructure, and calling upon the international community to support their full operationalization through technical assistance and targeted funding; and (c) introducing integrity screening for magistrates and establishing security measures such as physical protection, secure transportation and confidentiality protocols to safeguard judicial independence; and (d) strengthening cooperation between the Anti-Corruption Unit, Central Financial Intelligence Unit, General Inspectorate of Finance, National Commission for Public Procurement, Financial and Economic Affairs Bureau of the Haitian National Police and specialized judicial units by establishing formal mechanisms for information exchange, structured cooperation and joint investigation teams, ensuring that complex cases of financial crimes are efficiently investigated, prosecuted and adjudicated.

Annex

Firearms seized in Haiti, 2021–2025¹

		<i>Pistol</i>	<i>Revolver</i>	<i>Rifle</i>	<i>Shotgun</i>	<i>Home-made weapons</i>	<i>Total</i>
2021	January	30	2	8	1	9	50
	February	27	1	8	5	–	41
	March	8	2	3	1	5	19
	April	23	4	2	2	8	39
	May	15	5	3	1	3	27
	June	3	1	2	–	6	12
	July	17	1	13	7	7	45
	August	25	3	2	3	4	37
	September	16	6	6	–	12	40
	October	18	1	3	2	2	26
	November	16	–	6	4	3	29
	December	24	3	3	5	1	36
Total		222	29	59	31	60	401
2022	January	19	–	4	1	1	25
	February	10	2	2	1	6	21
	March	26	5	2	3	5	41
	April	15	5	4	3	5	32
	May	29	6	7	–	6	48
	June	13	1	3	–	2	19
	July	30	3	23	2	1	59
	August	11	–	4	2	2	19
	September	4	1	5	3	4	17
	October	9	2	5	–	6	22
	November	16	2	6	1	1	26
	December	10	1	1	1	–	13
Total		192	28	66	17	39	342
2023	January	14	1	7	1	2	25
	February	16	4	3	2	–	25
	March	9	4	3	–	5	21
	April	20	–	10	1	–	31
	May	4	1	5	1	1	12
	June	4	2	5	1	4	16
	July	9	2	3	1	4	19
	August	13	1	1	–	1	16
	September	13	2	4	1	1	21

¹ The report was to include a consolidated list of firearms seized in Haiti between 2021 and 2025. However, the latest data were not available in time for the present reporting cycle. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime will reflect the data, once received, in future updates, as they constitute an important indicator for monitoring the dynamics of illicit arms trafficking.

		<i>Pistol</i>	<i>Revolver</i>	<i>Rifle</i>	<i>Shotgun</i>	<i>Home-made weapons</i>	<i>Total</i>
October		18	3	2	3	5	31
November		10	4	1	—	2	17
December		10	1	6	1	13	31
Total		140	25	50	12	38	265
2024	January	5	1	1	2	1	10
	February	7	1	6	4	3	21
	March	7	1	6	—	3	17
	April	22	—	13	—	—	35
	May	7	3	2	—	1	13
	June	15	—	5	—	5	24
	July	15	1	3	4	4	27
	August	19	3	6	—	—	29
	September	13	3	14	1	—	32
	October	16	1	17	2	5	41
	November	12	3	4	2	1	22
	December	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total		138	17	77	15	24	271
2025	January	10	—	6	2	1	19
	February	18	1	4	1	8	32
	March	21	—	10	2	2	35
	April	16	—	20	2	2	40
	May	..	..	..	..	..	..
	June	..	..	..	..	..	..
	July	..	..	..	..	..	..
	August	..	..	..	..	..	..
	September	..	..	..	..	..	..
Total		65	1	40	7	13	126