



Security Council

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Letter dated 15 January 2024 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you the quarterly report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution [2692 \(2023\)](#). The report includes the requested updated information on the sources and routes of arms trafficking and illicit financial flows, and on relevant United Nations activities and recommendations.

I should be grateful if you would have the present document brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) António **Guterres**



Report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2692 (2023)

I. Introduction

1. The present report is the second report submitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2692 (2023), in which the Council tasked the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) with reporting to the Council every three months, concurrent with the reporting cycle of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), through the Secretary-General, on sources and routes of illicit arms and financial flows, relevant United Nations activities and recommendations.

2. The previous report (S/2023/780) provided an overview of the context in which firearms trafficking occurs in Haiti, including key sources, *modi operandi* and routes used for weapons and ammunition flows. It drew on research presented in the UNODC briefing note entitled “Haiti’s criminal markets: mapping trends in firearms and drug trafficking”,¹ issued on 2 March 2023, which contained observations on a surge in the trafficking of increasingly high-powered and sophisticated weapons since 2021, mostly linked to gang-related activities. Firearms and ammunition appear to be shipped principally from the United States of America, primarily from Florida, and may also arrive in Haiti via intermediaries in the Dominican Republic. In the report, UNODC documented four main trafficking routes. The primary consumers of firearms appear to be G9 and family, the G-Pèp coalition and a host of other gangs in Port-au-Prince and Artibonite.

3. Given the dynamic and clandestine nature of criminal markets in Haiti and the wider Latin American and Caribbean region, the availability of official data is limited, and trend analysis is fragmented. Nevertheless, the present report complements the first report by providing a more comprehensive assessment of the sources and routes of illicit firearms and financial flows both outside and inside Haiti. It includes new information collected in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and the United States.

4. In present report, UNODC considers the regional dynamics of firearms trafficking into Haiti, in particular from the perspectives of source and transit. To that end, UNODC communicated with law enforcement and customs authorities in selected locations, including the United States, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic, as well as with experts and media familiar with firearms dynamics in the wider Caribbean region. UNODC concludes that firearms are being trafficked from Haiti to Jamaica, further illustrating the porosity of the Haitian borders and the potential risk regional destabilization.

5. The report also offers a review of the domestic characteristics of weapons and ammunition trafficking within Haiti, with a particular focus on discerning how, in practical terms, Haitian gangs and related criminal networks procure and distribute firearms between and within groups. UNODC has observed shifting alliances between gangs, including their motives for collusion and competition. This micro-level perspective highlights the complexity of gang networks and the importance of deep empirical diagnostics to shape anti-trafficking and counter-gang activities. UNODC finds that a relatively small number of Haitian gangs are highly specialized in the procurement, storage and distribution of weapons and ammunition.

¹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “Haiti’s criminal markets: mapping trends in firearms and drug trafficking” (2023).


6. Lastly, UNODC considers several actions and activities undertaken by the Anti-Corruption Unit (Unité de lutte contre la corruption)² and the Financial and Economic Affairs Bureau (Bureau des affaires financières et économiques)³ of Haiti, and provides qualitative information on illicit financial flows that fuel organized violence in the country, including in relation to disrupting financial flows connected to the purchase of firearms and ammunition.

Background

7. As noted in the previous report, UNODC identified four primary firearms and ammunition trafficking routes into Haiti (see figure I): (a) from the United States (Florida) directly to Haiti (Port-au-Prince), typically by container vessels from Florida to public and private ports in Port-au-Prince; (b) from the United States (Florida) indirectly to the north and west coasts of Haiti (Port-de-Paix, Saint-Marc and Gonaïves), from Florida, periodically via Turks and Caicos and the Bahamas, then transported on land after arrival in Haiti; (c) via the Dominican Republic to Haiti (Port-au-Prince), including from seaports in the Dominican Republic to one of several formal or informal border crossings with Haiti; and (d) via personal effects, specifically through Cap-Haïtien, typically transported by container ships, fishing vessels, barges or small aircraft.

Figure I

Map of regional flows of firearms to Haiti, 2015–2023



Note: The boundaries and names shown, and the designations used, on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

* Non-Self-Governing Territories.

² The Anti-Corruption Unit, created by decree on 8 September 2004, is an autonomous institution under the supervision of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Its mission, as provided for in article 2 of the decree, is to combat all forms of corruption within the public administration.

³ The Financial and Economic Affairs Bureau is responsible for investigating crimes, offences and contraventions, gathering evidence and bringing perpetrators to trial (see arts. 8 and 9 of the Code of Criminal Investigation).

II. Trafficking in and diversion of arms and ammunition across the region

A. Regional perspective

8. The deepening crisis in Haiti is not occurring in isolation and is linked to the broader Caribbean dynamics, in which illicit firearms are a growing concern. Firearms-related violence, especially between gangs and State law enforcement agencies, remains a pressing issue across the region, with a disproportionate impact on young men and adolescents. Violence is often intertwined with gang-related activities, including drug trafficking, and is dramatically amplified by the ready availability of illegal firearms. In response to the spreading phenomenon of gang violence across the region, some States have declared public health emergencies.

9. During the third annual meeting on the Caribbean Firearms Road Map, in November 2023, States in the Caribbean collectively voiced serious apprehension about the proliferation of illegal firearms in the region and stressed the urgency of addressing that concern by implementing comprehensive measures outlined in the Road Map by 2030. Key objectives include curtailing the flow of illicit arms, reinforcing regulatory frameworks, empowering law enforcement and enhancing data collection and reporting mechanisms.

10. A notable trend in the region's illicit firearms trade is the prevalence of handguns, especially Glock, Taurus, Beretta and Smith and Wesson guns. Unlike other regions where blank-firing pistols may be common, this is not the case among criminal actors in the Caribbean, where conventional firearms are more commonly used, owing in part to their wider availability. Likewise, the emergence of privately made firearms, ranging from homemade or artisanal weapons to "ghost guns" assembled from factory-produced parts, presents regulatory challenges. The identification of such firearms demands specialized training, which law enforcement officers in some Caribbean countries currently lack, thus hindering effective interception.

B. Sources of illicit arms and ammunition

1. United States of America

11. Most of the firearms and ammunition trafficked to Haiti – whether directly or via another country – come from the United States.⁴ Firearms and ammunition are typically procured from federally licensed retail outlets, gun shows and pawn shops through "straw man" purchases. Haitians and Haitian Americans, in particular in Florida and New York, have been arrested and convicted for serving as brokers and intermediaries for illicit weapons and ammunition purchases with the intention to traffic.⁵ Some United States jurisdictions are more susceptible to "straw man" purchases than others. According to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and

⁴ The dependence of Haitian gangs and criminal networks on handguns and long guns manufactured in the United States of America means that they also rely on distinct categories of ammunition, notably 0.38 inch, 9 mm, 5.56 mm and, to a far lesser extent, 7.62 mm cartridges.

⁵ See UNODC, "Haiti's criminal markets: mapping trends in firearms and drug trafficking", for a review of cases issued by the United States Department of Justice and Attorney General against Haitian and Haitian-American nationals involved in illegal firearms acquisition.

Explosives, the states most implicated in eTrace requests involving Caribbean countries, including Haiti, are Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia and Texas.⁶

12. The United States received 8,873 eTrace requests from Caribbean countries between 2017 and 2022, ranging from a low of 1,451 to a high of 2,406 per year.⁷ With respect to Haiti, over 80 per cent of the weapons seized and submitted to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives for tracing were manufactured in or imported from the United States between 2020 and 2022. Of these, over half were handguns and a smaller share were rifles and shotguns (see tables 1–3).⁸ Typically, gangs seek revolvers and pistols for ease of concealment. However, the high ratio of rifles and shotguns traced from Haiti to the United States (a significantly higher share of the total in comparison with neighbouring countries) underlines the growing organization and intensity of gangs and criminal networks operating in the country.

Table 1
Selected Caribbean firearms traces submitted to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, 2020

(Percentage)

	<i>Haiti</i>	<i>Bahamas</i>	<i>Dominican Republic</i>	<i>Jamaica</i>	<i>Trinidad and Tobago</i>
Crime guns manufactured in or imported from the United States	87.7	98.6	73.7	66.9	52
Crime guns traced to United States retail purchasers	84.5	87.9	57.1	44.9	40
Proportion of crime guns that are handguns	51.7	93.1	90.4	92.2	82.2
Proportion of crime guns that are rifles	37	3.3	6.6	4.9	7.4

Source: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, firearms trace data for the Caribbean, 2020 (data source: firearms tracing system, 1 January 2020 to 31 December 2020, as at 10 March 2021). Available at www.atf.gov/resource-center/firearms-trace-data-caribbean-2020#table-1.

⁶ National Firearms Commerce and Trafficking Assessment, “Crime guns recovered outside the United States and traced by law enforcement”, vol. 2, part. IV. Available at www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/report/nfcta-volume-ii-part-iv-crime-guns-recovered-outside-us-and-traced-le/download.

⁷ The eTrace system is overseen by the National Tracing Center and the International Affairs Division of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, with 17 eTrace memorandums of understanding signed with States in the Caribbean. The system conducts an average of 33,000 crime gun traces annually. By contrast, the firearms tracing system of the Caribbean Community traced 6,508 firearms from across the region between October 2019 and July 2023, and determined that 75 per cent of all illicit weapons traced were pistols, with the remainder including revolvers, rifles and shotguns. See Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security and Regional Security System, “Illicit firearms trafficking across the Caribbean”, 30 November 2023, available at www.caricomimpacs.org.

⁸ The most common types of firearms reported were handguns (9 mm, 0.38 inch, 0.40 inch and 0.357 inch) and rifles (7.62 mm, 5.56 mm and 0.223 inch). The most common manufacturers of pistols were Glock, Smith and Wesson, Taurus, Sturm Ruger and Colt; the most common manufacturers of revolvers were Smith and Wesson, Taurus, Sturm Ruger and Colt; and the most common manufacturers of rifles were Romarm/Cugir, Century, Anderson, Colt and DPMS Panther Arms. See National Firearms Commerce and Trafficking Assessment, “Crime guns recovered outside the United States and traced by law enforcement”.

Table 2
Selected Caribbean firearms traces submitted to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, 2021

(Percentage)

	<i>Haiti</i>	<i>Bahamas</i>	<i>Dominican Republic</i>	<i>Jamaica</i>	<i>Trinidad and Tobago</i>
Crime guns manufactured in or imported from the United States	84.8	99.2	94	69.4	51.7
Crime guns traced to United States retail purchasers	75.5	81.8	71.3	52.3	81
Proportion of crime guns that are handguns	68.8	92.9	68.8	93.4	76.2
Proportion of crime guns that are rifles	28.8	7.1	24.8	6.3	17.4

Source: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, firearms trace data for the Caribbean, 2021 (data source: firearms tracing system, 1 January 2021 to 31 December 2021, as at 10 March 2022). Available at www.atf.gov/resource-center/firearms-trace-data-caribbean-2021.

Table 3
Selected Caribbean firearms traces submitted to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, 2022

(Percentage)

	<i>Haiti^a</i>	<i>Bahamas</i>	<i>Dominican Republic</i>	<i>Jamaica</i>	<i>Trinidad and Tobago</i>
Crime guns manufactured in or imported from the United States	Not applicable	98.2	97	77	61.1
Crime guns traced to United States retail purchasers	Not applicable	92	89.2	53	51.8
Proportion of crime guns that are handguns	Not applicable	89.7	81.3	91.9	70.1
Proportion of crime guns that are rifles	Not applicable	9.6	18.7	8	25

Source: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, firearms trace data for the Caribbean, 2022 (data source: firearms tracing system, 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2022, as at 10 March 2023). Available at www.atf.gov/resource-center/firearms-trace-data-caribbean-2022.

^a Data for Haiti in 2022 are not included.

13. According to the reports of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives dated March and September 2023, United States authorities are expanding efforts to curtail and contain firearms trafficking from Florida. UNODC interviews with customs officials in October 2023 indicated a two-fold increase in the frequency of interdiction operations on the Miami River. Inspections conducted by Customs and Border Patrol officers based at the Miami Airport Cargo Clearance Centre led to the routine seizure of firearms, their parts and components, and ammunition. Between September and November 2023, United States customs agents in Miami reportedly seized one shotgun, eight rifles, 30 pistols, one machine gun and 204,000 rounds of ammunition destined for Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

14. Several United States customs and law enforcement agents interviewed expressed concerns related to suspected illegal operations involving unregistered flights and small airports along the coast of south Florida.⁹ There have been cases of

⁹ Interview organized by key informant K25 on 21 November 2023 with United States customs officers.

small aircraft landing in Haiti at official and unofficial airports and landing strips without presenting official flight plans to the relevant authorities.¹⁰ Interviews with several personnel connected with Miami Airport¹¹ suggest the possible involvement of individuals and companies working with sanctioned Haitians to smuggle firearms.¹²

15. Customs and Border Patrol authorities interviewed in Florida report having conducted operations to search cargo warehouses in and around selected seaports and airfields.¹³ For example, between 1 June and 21 November 2023, Customs and Border Patrol officials operating in south Florida reportedly intercepted 15 “low-risk” items destined for Haiti, including weapons magazines, parts and accessories. During the same period, they reported seven operations in which they seized 49 “high-risk” items intended for Haiti, including handguns, long guns and explosives. They also reported collecting another 28 “low-risk” and 23 “high-risk” items destined for the Dominican Republic during the same period.¹⁴

16. Freight forwarders can serve as intermediaries to facilitate the supply chain of illegal firearms and ammunition from the United States to Haiti. Freight forwarders, like freight brokers, are registered at the federal level by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. They provide a range of services for individuals and companies seeking to import and export goods, and they can also provide advice on transportation routes, arrange the warehousing of merchandise, negotiate shipping rates with carriers and handle customs paperwork, among other services.¹⁵ There are reportedly over 1,000 registered freight forwarders in south Florida, with a high level of churning since they frequently relocate, change ownership and close. Some appear to be involved in illegal activities, including the trafficking of firearms, ammunition, parts and components.

17. According to Customs and Border Patrol officials in Florida, illegally procured firearms and ammunition are routinely incorporated into outbound shipments at warehouses near seaports and airports.¹⁶ The integration of illegal and legal products is typically overseen by freight forwarders who work directly or indirectly with smuggling networks. Some freight forwarders circumvent lawful security procedures for a price, in particular when working with managers or senior employees with access to information on logistical movements of specific cargo pallets and receiving warehouses.¹⁷

18. The role of private aircraft and clandestine airstrips in Haiti warrants more scrutiny, in particular in relation to transnational firearms and ammunition trafficking. There are as many as 30 United States-registered private aircraft based in Haiti.¹⁸ According to experts, it is not always possible to monitor the movements of smaller aircraft operating between the two countries. Indeed, Federal Aviation Administration regulations provide that airspace above 18,000 feet be controlled by the air route

¹⁰ Interview with key informant K1 on 21 November 2023.

¹¹ Interviews with key informant K3 on 11 November 2023 and key informant K7 on 18 November 2023.

¹² Interview with key informant K24 on 23 October 2023 and key informants K24 and K25 on 24 October 2023.

¹³ Interview with key informant K24.

¹⁴ Another 9 “low-risk” and 21 “high-risk” items were also reportedly intercepted before being sent to Jamaica.

¹⁵ Freight forwarders have become increasingly widely used in the United States since the late 1980s, having emerged as intermediaries between the shipping cargo and airline cargo industries and clients.

¹⁶ Interview with key informant K24.

¹⁷ Interview with key informants K13, K14 and K24.

¹⁸ Interview with key informant K3.

traffic control centre in Miami. Aircraft travelling below 18,000 feet from the Bahamas to Haiti, for example, are considered domestic flights and do not require official flight plans.¹⁹

19. In addition to the two official international airports, there are another 11 recorded informal or clandestine airstrips in Haiti. Few, if any, are subject to routine satellite or aerial surveillance.²⁰ Airstrips are visible using remote sensing and satellite tools and may be adjacent to populated settlements, within large private properties or in more remote areas near accessible roads (see figure II). Haiti registered an increase in the number of informal airstrips following the earthquake in 2010, many of which were developed for humanitarian and development organizations.²¹ Since then, however, there has been no oversight or maintenance of the airstrips by the Haitian authorities.

Figure II
Clandestine airstrips in Haiti (2023)



Note: The boundaries and names shown, and the designations used, on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

2. Dominican Republic

20. Weapons and ammunition also arrive illegally in Haiti from the Dominican Republic. After being purchased in the United States, primarily New York and Florida, they are first illegally transported to selected seaports in the Dominican Republic, mainly the Haina port in Santo Domingo.²² On arrival in the Dominican Republic, firearms and other goods are transported to official or non-official land border crossings with Haiti. The number of intercepted military artefacts (firearms and ammunition) reportedly doubled between 2018 and 2022.²³ The

¹⁹ Interview with key informant K3.

²⁰ Interview with key informant K3.

²¹ UNODC, "Haiti's criminal markets: mapping trends in firearms and drug trafficking".

²² Roughly three quarters of all firearms traced by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives are sourced from the United States. See Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, firearms trace data for the Caribbean, 2020 (data source: firearms tracing system, 1 January 2020 to 31 December 2020, as at 10 March 2021).

²³ Dominican Today, "DGA seizes more than 400,000 weapons and ammunition in eight months", 22 August 2022, available at <https://dominican.today.com/dr/local/2022/08/22/dga-seizes-more-than-400000-weapons-and-ammunition-in-eight-months>.

ContainerCOMM²⁴ system identified over 150,000 rounds of ammunition of various calibres and dozens of weapons seized by Dominican customs officials in ports, mainly Haina, since 2021. All the firearms, their parts and components, and ammunition were seized during checks on containers from the United States.²⁵

21. There is already a significant number of illegal firearms in circulation in the Dominican Republic. In 2021, the country's President, Luis Abinader, stated that there were as many as three illegal weapons for each of the 238,000 firearms registered in the country.²⁶ While a significant number of illegal firearms, parts, components and ammunition are seized by national authorities,²⁷ it has been noted in previous reports how ammunition and a modest number of firearms are trafficked across borders either inside shipping consignments or as part of an "ant trade" involving individuals (see [S/2023/674](#) and [S/2023/780](#)).

22. In its previous report, UNODC identified an arms and munitions trafficking route originating in the Dominican Republic, specifically at the Belladère/Elias Pina and Malpasse/Jimaní border crossings (ibid.). However, after the closure of the land border in September 2023, these routes have become more difficult to access, and trafficking has been diverted to unofficial crossing points, in particular Hato Viejo de Sabana Cruz.²⁸

3. Jamaica

23. Jamaica receives more illegally trafficked firearms from Haiti than Haiti does from Jamaica. There is robust and persistent demand for firearms from Jamaican gangs.²⁹ Firearms trafficked from Haiti, including weapons issued to the Haitian National Police, have been seized in Jamaica.³⁰ Media reporting on the so-called "guns for drugs" trade between the two countries can be traced back to the early 2000s.³¹ Several Jamaican government officials and subject matter experts report that the Haitian-Jamaican barter economy (including guns for drugs) has grown since 2021, involving several criminal groups.³² Haitian criminal groups that trade with

²⁴ ContainerCOMM is a secure information-exchange system developed by the World Customs Organization to facilitate the transmission of sensitive intelligence. It is a web-based system that is continually enhanced to meet the changing needs of users.

²⁵ Information provided by the ContainerCOMM system. Official data have not been released, so the information remains incomplete.

²⁶ There are roughly 50,000 firearms permits in the country. See *Diario Libre*, "Gobierno comprará armas ilegales en manos de civiles", 22 March 2021, available at www.diariolibre.com/actualidad/gobierno-comprara-armas-ilegales-en-manos-de-civiles-MD25156208.

²⁷ Dominican authorities seized close to 5,000 firearms between 4 April 2019 and 3 March 2022. See InSight Crime, "US guns fuel arms trafficking in the Dominican Republic", 3 June 2022, available at <https://insightcrime.org/news/us-guns-fuel-arms-trafficking-in-the-dominican-republic>.

²⁸ Interview with key informant K9.

²⁹ Confirmed during separate interviews with Anthony Clayton and Lloyd Distant between 2 and 5 November 2023.

³⁰ *The Gleaner*, "Venezuela joins Haiti and US as region's major illegal guns supplier", 4 June 2017, available at <https://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/news/20170608/venezuela-joins-haiti-and-us-regions-major-illegal-guns-supplier>.


³¹ Firearms and handguns used by gangs in Jamaica were traced to the Haitian National Police and other sources, resulting in arrests of Haitians and one Honduran. See *Alter Presse*, "More evidence of drugs-for-guns trade between Jamaica and Haiti", 6 February 2007, available at www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article5654.

³² Interview with Anthony Clayton on 2 November 2023.

Jamaican traffickers are located primarily in the south-western and southern coastal areas of Haiti (see figure III).^{33,34}

Figure III

Mapping firearms for drugs trade between Jamaica and Haiti



Note: The boundaries and names shown, and the designations used, on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

24. In 2021, the Minister of National Security of Jamaica estimated that there were 2,400 guns illegally entering the country every year, mostly from the United States. The Jamaican police reportedly seize a small share of firearms and ammunition trafficked into the country.³⁵ In 2020, one researcher estimated that the guns for drugs trade was worth between \$1.3 million and 1.7 million a year.³⁶

³³ MonActualité, “PNH/affrontement: un dangereux chef de gang tué à Tiburon”, 21 August 2023, available at <https://manoactualite.com/2023/05/22/pnh-affrontement-un-dangereux-chef-de-gang-tue-a-tiburon>; and Fact Checking News, “Haiti/Securité: le caïd de Tiburon tué à Port-au-Prince”, 21 May 2023, available at <https://fcnhaiti.com/haiti-securite-le-caid-de-tiburon-tue-a-port-au-prince>.

³⁴ Some 4,000 pounds of cocaine were seized in Old Harbour Bay, Jamaica, in 2019. See The Gleaner, “Fishing for guns – Old Harbour Bay boatmen rake in profits with drugs-for-arms trafficking to Haiti”, 11 February 2020, available at <https://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20200210/fishing-guns-old-harbour-bay-boatmen-rake-in-profits-drugs-for-arms>.

³⁵ There were 660 seizures of weapons and ammunition in 2019, 718 in 2018 and 857 in 2017. Ammunition seizures in 2019 totalled 14,264 compared with 11,216 in 2018 and 21,756 in 2017. See also The Gleaner, “Fishing for guns – Old Harbour Bay boatmen rake in profits with drugs-for-arms trafficking to Haiti”.

³⁶ Anthony Clayton, professor at the University of West Indies. See also Diálogo Américas, “Firearm trafficking in the Caribbean: Haiti’s unrest and the neighbors next door”, 12 December 2022, available at <https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/firearms-trafficking-in-the-caribbean-haitis-unrest-and-the-neighbors-next-door>.

25. Jamaican authorities have reported significant firearms seizures over the past three years, although only a modest share appear to have been from Haiti.³⁷ For example, between 1 January and 25 November 2023, at least 636 firearms and 9,744 rounds of ammunition were seized in Jamaica, roughly 88 per cent of which were pistols and revolvers and 4 per cent of which were machine guns and shotguns.³⁸

26. The Jamaican authorities are aware of ties between some Jamaican and Haitian gangs, including in relation to trafficking in firearms, drugs and human beings. Criminal actors from Haiti, in particular those active in the Jamaican illicit drugs for guns trade, maintain close ties with Jamaican criminal networks and their resources.³⁹ The authorities have likewise detected evidence of products from Haiti in south-eastern Jamaica, indicating informal trade between fishers. As noted above, the Jamaican police have also made at least three seizures of rifles that were reportedly the property of the Haitian National Police, including in 2015 and 2017.⁴⁰

27. The drugs for guns trade between Haiti and Jamaica has been acknowledged by government officials for over two decades.⁴¹ Haitian and Jamaican nationals are reportedly involved in various aspects of drug supply chains, from production and packaging in Kingston, Saint James, Portmore and Saint Catherine's, where drugs are compressed and prepared for shipment to Haiti.⁴² Cocaine is also trans-shipped via Jamaica, including to Haiti and onward to the Dominican Republic, the United States and Western Europe. The primary exit points in Jamaica include Rocky Point and Old Harbour Bay, though launch sites are distributed across eastern, southern and western Jamaica (see figure IV).⁴³ Boats can make the roughly 600 nautical mile round trip in 36 hours, with some local Jamaican fishing vessels used to facilitate transactions in south-western Haiti.⁴⁴

³⁷ Ministry of National Security of Jamaica, "Crime and security brief: illicit firearms and trafficking activities between criminals in Jamaica and Haiti", 29 November 2023.

³⁸ Compared with 704 firearms seizures in 2021 and 796 in 2021. See Ministry of National Security of Jamaica, "Crime and security brief: illicit firearms and trafficking activities between criminals in Jamaica and Haiti".

³⁹ Ministry of National Security of Jamaica, "Crime and security brief: illicit firearms and trafficking activities between criminals in Jamaica and Haiti".

⁴⁰ The Haitian National Police-registered weapons were seized in the Kingston East and Saint Elizabeth police divisions in Jamaica.


⁴¹ The Minister for National Security of Jamaica noted in February 2019 that over 4,000 lbs of cocaine had been seized in Old Harbour Bay. See *The Gleaner*, "Fishing for guns – Old Harbour Bay boatmen rake in profits with drugs-for-arms trafficking to Haiti".

⁴² See, for example, Jamaica Information Service, "Police to strengthen partnership with Haiti under 'get the guns' campaign", 18 September 2015, available at <https://jis.gov.jm/police-to-strengthen-partnership-with-haiti-under-get-the-guns-campaign>; Haiti Libre, "Haiti-Insecurity: Drugs-for-guns trade between Haiti and Jamaica", 19 January 2022, available at www.haitilibre.com/en/news-35748-haiti-insecurity-drugs-for-guns-trade-between-haiti-and-jamaica.html; and Alter Presse, "More evidence of drugs-for-guns trade between Jamaica and Haiti".

⁴³ Ministry of National Security of Jamaica, "Crime and security brief: illicit firearms and trafficking activities between criminals in Jamaica and Haiti".

⁴⁴ Judy-Ann Neil, "The maritime commons: digital repository of the World Maritime University", World Maritime University dissertations (Malmö, Sweden, 11 April 2018). Available at https://commons.wmu.se/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1656&context=all_dissertations.

Figure IV
Selected drug production and packaging routes in Jamaica



Note: The boundaries and names shown, and the designations used, on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

28. The precise logistical mechanics of the drugs for guns trade between Jamaica and Haiti have yet to be fully clarified. According to experts in Jamaica, fishing boats reportedly leave Jamaica and exchange marijuana and, to a lesser extent, cocaine for firearms from Haitian interlocutors.⁴⁵ Haitian intermediaries and criminal groups use both fishing vessels and speedboats to physically exchange drugs, bringing them to the south-western and southern coast of Haiti, dumping them offshore or offloading them directly at ports in Port-au-Prince. In 2023, Haitian gangs increased control and influence in coastal cities,⁴⁶ including in south-western and southern areas of Haiti, which is believed to facilitate criminal activities.⁴⁷

29. In Haiti, gangs are exerting control over southern key routes and are moving illegal products and drugs. The drugs can then be smuggled directly into the Dominican Republic, shipped to other countries, transported to the Bahamas or sent straight to Florida. Compared with boats, small aircraft take less than two hours to fly from Jamaica to south-western Haiti, although information on the possible trans-shipment of firearms and drugs by air is currently unavailable.

⁴⁵ Interview with Anthony Clayton and Lloyd Right, November 2023.

⁴⁶ The “Hache” gang, led by Ofis, has control over Tiburon at the extreme tip of the south-west region of Haiti. See Le Filet Info, “Haïti-drame: huit personnes tuées par le gang ‘Hache’ dirigé par le nommé Ofis”, 9 August 2023, available at <https://lefiletinfo.com/haïti-drame-huit-personnes-tuees-par-le-gang-hache-dirige-par-le-nomme-ofis>; Mano Actualité, “PNH/affrontement : un dangereux chef de gang tué à Tiburon”, available at <https://manoactualite.com/2023/05/22/pnh-affrontement-un-dangereux-chef-de-gang-tue-a-tiburon>; and Haiti Channel Network, “Insécurité: un grand entrepreneur du pays assassiné”, 7 November 2023, available at <https://haitichannelnetwork.com/insecurite-un-grand-entrepreneur-du-pays-assassine>.

⁴⁷ Netalkole, “Arrestation de deux trafiquants, saisie de matériel et d’importantes sommes d’argent par la police de Saint-Louis du Sud”, 30 November 2023, available at <https://netalkolemedia.com/arrestation-de-deux-trafiquants-saisie-de-materiel-et-dimportantes-sommes-dargent-par-la-police-de-saint-louis-du-sud>. See also the Facebook page of the Haitian National Police, 25 November 2023, “8.980 kg de marijuana saisis, une personne interpellée par la Police dans le Sud”.

4. Turks and Caicos

30. There is rising concern that illegal firearms and ammunition could be transported from Haiti, taking advantage of migratory flows, to other neighbouring countries in the Caribbean. Specifically, the destabilizing situation in Haiti has resulted in a surge of emigration, including to Turks and Caicos. As of 2020, there were an estimated 10,000 Haitians residing in Turks and Caicos,⁴⁸ roughly 20 per cent of the total population and over 80 per cent of the residents of the island of Providenciales.⁴⁹ To stem migration, Turks and Caicos imposed a moratorium on Haitian migration in January 2023 that was extended to July 2023.⁵⁰ At least 2,132 Haitian migrants were intercepted by Turks and Caicos in 2022 and another 3,000 between January and August 2023,⁵¹ many departing from Cap Haïtien over 200 km away.⁵²

31. Certain elements linked to organized crime have taken advantage of the migratory flows to extend their influence in other countries in the region. Boats carrying migrants can also potentially transport drugs, firearms and ammunition.⁵³ At least one Haitian gang leader was reportedly shot in Turks and Caicos by law enforcement officers in 2022. The challenging security situation in Turks and Caicos has resulted in supportive measures from several partners.⁵⁴ A detachment of over 24 specialist firearms officers from the Bahamas has been supporting the Turks and Caicos police since 2022.⁵⁵ The Government of Turks and Caicos has passed several laws to amplify anti-gang measures and has increased sentences for the possession of illegal firearms.

32. Several countries in the Caribbean have taken proactive steps to counter the cross-border flow of illicit firearms, revising firearms legislation, establishing specialized units and focusing on stockpile management. Collaboration with international partners, exemplified by agreements such as the eTrace system of the United States, has facilitated intelligence-sharing and firearms tracing.

⁴⁸ Valerie Lacarte and others, *Migration, Integration, and Diaspora Engagement in the Caribbean: A Policy Review* (Migration Policy Institute and Inter-American Development Bank, March 2023). Available at www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/mpi-idb-caribbean-report-2023-final.pdf.

⁴⁹ Turks and Caicos: Overseas Territory Profile (as of July 2022). Available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/turks-and-caicos-islands/turks-and-caicos-overseas-territory-profile-july-2022>.

⁵⁰ The Sun, “No more visas for Haitians for the next six months”, 17 July 2023, available at <https://suntci.com/no-more-visas-for-haitians-for-the-next-six-months-p9493-129.htm>.

⁵¹ Turks and Caicos Weekly News, “Migration of illegal Haitians to TCI hits 3030 for 2023 – as conditions in Haiti worsens”, 11 August 2023, available at <https://tcweeklynews.com/migration-of-illegal-haitians-to-tci-hits-for-as-conditions-in-h-p13448-127.htm>.

⁵² France 24, “Tiny Turks and Caicos overwhelmed by Haitian influx”, 10 February 2019, available at www.france24.com/en/20190210-tiny-turks-caicos-overwhelmed-haitian-influx.

⁵³ The Sun, “High powered guns in TCI”, available at <https://suntci.com/high-powered-guns-in-tci-p4084-129.htm>; Loop News, “Haiti bears down on TCI, but not deliberately – says TCI Governor”, 3 January 2023, available at <https://caribbean.loopnews.com/content/haiti-bears-down-tci-not-deliberately-says-governor>; and Loop News, “Gang violence surge in Turks and Caicos related to transnational crime”, 3 October 2022, available at <https://caribbean.loopnews.com/content/gang-violence-surge-turks-and-caicos-related-transnational-crime>.

⁵⁴ United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, “UK to step up help to combat Caribbean crimewave”, press release, 11 October 2022, available at www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-step-up-help-to-combat-caribbean-crimewave.

⁵⁵ Turks and Caicos Weekly News, “Bahamian police officers already making an impact in the TCI”, 14 October 2022, available at <https://tcweeklynews.com/bahamian-police-officers-already-making-an-impact-in-the-tci-p12770-127.htm>; and Turks and Caicos Weekly News, “Bahamas officers sworn in as another wave of crime hits Provo”, 8 September 2023, available at <https://tcweeklynews.com/bahamas-officers-sworn-in-as-another-wave-of-crime-hits-provo-p13504-127.htm>.

33. However, persistent challenges, such as data management hurdles, limited resources, legislative gaps and the imperative for capacity-building, remain prevalent across the Caribbean. To address these challenges effectively, there is a critical need to enhance the accuracy of firearm-related data, strengthen enforcement capabilities through increased resources and technological advancements and foster robust collaboration among Caribbean nations and neighbouring countries to counter the cross-border flow of illicit firearms.

34. Moreover, amid collective efforts aligned with the Caribbean Firearms Road Map, sustained support and collaborative action by international allies remain paramount. Bolstered legislation, collaborative initiatives and capacity-building are imperative for the region to effectively address and mitigate the persistent threat posed by firearms-related issues, ensuring the safety and security of its populace.

III. Domestic inter-gang distribution of firearms

35. Armed groups that have been present in Haiti for generations have taken advantage of the availability of weapons and ammunition in the region and continue, in various forms, to use roads to obtain supplies or smuggle arms and ammunition.

36. Firearms and ammunition entering Haiti are typically rerouted to several key provinces and cities, then transported, gifted and sold to gangs located in the capital region. These arms are then used regularly to commit a wide range of criminal activities ranging from lethal violence to robbery and extortion. In the process, heavily armed gangs are involved in invading rival factions' territories and attacking members of the population, government buildings, small- and medium-sized businesses and critical infrastructure.

37. There is growing international awareness and concern about the specific role that firearms play in exacerbating human rights violations in Haiti. On 28 November 2023, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights emphasized that the international community's "focus must continue to be on the implementation of the arms embargo and sanctions targeting those responsible for this untenable situation". In 2023, over 3,960 people were violently killed, 1,432 injured and another 2,951 kidnapped by gangs.⁵⁶

38. Illegal firearms and ammunition enter Haiti by air, land and sea routes, often facilitated by gang leaders and brokers (see S/2023/780).⁵⁷ Several gangs exert a high level of control over the movement of firearms and ammunition.⁵⁸ For example, the blockade of the Varreux terminal and gas storage area in Port-au-Prince by the G9 gang coalition between September and November 2022 demonstrated how powerful gangs can control access to critical infrastructure and even paralyse the flow of imports, including firearms and ammunition, into the country.⁵⁹

39. Several gangs are involved in the physical transportation of firearms and ammunition from the point of entry in Haiti to their strongholds, in particular in Port-au-Prince. These gangs have a demonstrated capability to capture and hold territory, enhancing their ability to oversee firearms and ammunition importation and distribution. The 5^e Segment and 400 Mawozo gangs are involved in purchasing, transporting, selling and distributing firearms and ammunition in Haiti. After illegal

⁵⁶ UN News, "Haiti: gangs move into rural areas as Türk says new force 'must be deployed'", 28 November 2023, available at <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/11/1144067>.

⁵⁷ See also UNODC, "Haiti's criminal markets: mapping trends in firearms and drug trafficking".

⁵⁸ For a comprehensive description of gangs' areas of control and type of criminal activity, see S/2023/674.

⁵⁹ Several other critical infrastructures and routes are under the control of gangs.

merchandise arrives in areas ostensibly under their control, in particular Titanyen, Lafito, Martissant, Tabarre, Thomazeau and Ganthier, it is stored, distributed or sold to other gangs such as Gran Ravine, Kraze Barye, Brooklyn and Canaan 70 and 90.⁶⁰

40. Gangs are aware of the strategic importance of controlling ports and roads. On 7 October 2022, the G-Pèp gang coalition, and specifically the 5 Segond gang, attacked the Lafito area in the north of Port-au-Prince, where at least three important ports are located.⁶¹ It established a presence in the neighbourhood and formed relations with Canaan 70 and 90. A maritime support route for recruits, firearms and ammunition from Village de Dieu was established and is currently active. This strategic access provides G-Pèp with a secure network stretching from Artibonite to Village de Dieu, crossing Port-au-Prince Bay by sea to avoid the areas controlled by opposing gangs. It simplifies the trafficking of arms and munitions. Reports and interviews since July 2023 have indicated that the 5 Segond gang can supply arms and ammunition according to the needs of G-Pèp-affiliated gangs.⁶²

41. The G-Pèp alliance has acquired several strategic benefits from its members storing, distributing and selling firearms and ammunition. For example, when one of its members or allies is threatened or decides to invade a community, allied gangs typically provide aid in the form of armed men and weapons. Controlling the supply chain for firearms and ammunition acts as a “force multiplier” for G-Pèp. Although the relationships between gangs are dynamic and volatile, several incidents reveal how G-Pèp and its members have offered operational support to enable gangs to exert control over specific territories and mobilize their members or provide weapons and ammunition to invade rival neighbourhoods (see figure V).⁶³

42. Several G9-allied gangs control the public port area in Port-au-Prince, as well as the roads leading to the airport and city centre. G9 territory also currently extends to a significant area of public and private land, including critical infrastructure (see figure V). Compared with G-Pèp, G9 does not have equivalent access to or control over coastal areas outside Port-au-Prince or border-crossing points with the Dominican Republic. As a result, it tends to rely on maritime routes in areas under its control to ensure the more predictable supply of weapons and ammunition. Both gang alliances also rely on political and economic sponsors and third-party intermediaries to secure firearms and ammunition.

⁶⁰ Weapons are reportedly stored in Tabarre and Gran Ravine, among other locations. Interview with key informant K22.


⁶¹ The port of Lafito, Les Moulins d’Haiti and Cimenterie Nationale S.E.M. CINA.

⁶² Interviews with key informant K6 on 20 October 2023 and key informant K11 on 29 November 2023. See also: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “Criminal violence extends beyond Port-au-Prince: the situation in lower Artibonite from January 2022 to October 2023”, November 2023: “Firearms and ammunition in gang possession are generally purchased from the Village de Dieu gang and other intermediaries in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. Individuals living outside the country are also said to be able to bring weapons into Artibonite by sea or land. Recent actions by self-defense groups to prevent the supply of weapons to criminal groups have exposed some of these networks” (p. 14); and “At the beginning of January 2023, there was also a change in the groups close to G-Pèp. Having acquired new weapons and ammunition from the Village de Dieu gang” (p. 28).

⁶³ Ibid.: “These various supports and alliances between Port-au-Prince gangs (Village de Dieu and Canaan) and Artibonite gangs (Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras) demonstrate a strategy by the G-Pèp coalition, at the instigation of the Village de Dieu gang leader, to extend its influence in the Artibonite region”; “In April 2023, 18 members of the Village de Dieu gang, who were following this route, were caught and lynched by the local population in the commune of Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite”; and “In February 2023, a member of the Canaan gang, wanted for kidnapping and criminal conspiracy, was killed in l’Estère, during exchanges of fire between members of Kokorat San Ras and the [Haitian National Police]. This suggests that, in times of confrontation, the Canaan gang sends members to reinforce the capabilities of the Kokorat San Ras group” (p. 16).

43. Disputes between rival gang federations can disrupt the supply of firearms and ammunition. Inter- and intra-factional conflicts are common owing to changing economic and territorial interests.⁶⁴ However, with support from the political and economic elite, several gangs have also forged temporary arrangements to facilitate the trans-shipment of drugs, firearms and other illicit goods. For example, in September 2023, leaders of the G9 and G-Pèp alliances proposed a widely publicized “peace treaty” (see [S/2023/674](#), annex 12), which was announced shortly after the closure of the border between the Dominican Republic and Haiti.

Figure V
Areas of control and areas of influence of gangs in Port-au-Prince, as of July 2023 (see [S/2023/674](#))



Note: The boundaries and names shown, and the designations used, on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

⁶⁴ Analysis of the gang's alliance shifts in November 2023 may be shared on request.

44. At the same time that G-Pèp and G9 announced a peace treaty, there was reportedly a significant cocaine shipment trans-shipping Haiti.⁶⁵ It originated from South America and was expected to be smuggled across the Central Plateau in Haiti⁶⁶ to Croix-des-Bouquets and the Lafito port in Port-au-Prince. According to key informants, the 5 Segond gang was tasked with protecting the shipment, which was destined for the United States via Jamaica. However, the shipment appears to have been lost or intercepted between Hinche and Maïssade. The mishandling of the shipment is believed to be linked to an outbreak of inter-factional gang violence in Mirebalais and Saut-d'Eau between 22 and 25 September 2023, resulting in 30 fatalities, 15 injuries and the internal displacement of approximately 800 families.⁶⁷

IV. Illicit financial flows

45. In Haiti, corruption and a pervasive culture of impunity exacerbate political and economic instability and hinder development, while also significantly contributing to the proliferation of organized crime. While the Anti-Corruption Unit and the Financial and Economic Affairs Bureau are increasing efforts to prevent and fight corruption, their effectiveness is hindered by challenges, including insufficient capacity and a lack of forensic equipment and specialized expertise in conducting complex investigations. The limited ability to utilize modern investigative techniques hinders the efforts of Haitian anti-corruption bodies to proactively detect and investigate corruption. The prevailing security environment and lack of an effective, independent and accountable criminal justice system have undermined the effectiveness of such anti-corruption initiatives.⁶⁸

46. In response to these challenges and to the recommendations set out in the first cycle of the Implementation Review Mechanism of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Haiti established an anti-corruption circuit in January 2022 at the initiative of the Anti-Corruption Unit. The circuit is designed to coordinate relevant actors' efforts along the criminal justice chain and enhance the effectiveness of the fight against corruption in Haiti, while providing a framework for continuous training processes. The circuit involves key stakeholders with specific expertise and competence in corruption and economic crime cases, including the Anti-Corruption Unit, the Superior Council of Judicial Power, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, public prosecutors, deans of the courts of first instance, presidents of various courts of appeal and magistrates in penal registries, working together to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate corruption in Haiti. While this initiative marks a crucial first step in improving collaboration among criminal justice actors in the fight against corruption in Haiti, it requires additional enforcement, as well as enhanced coordination and streamlined procedures, to be fully effective.

47. Since its establishment in 2004, the Anti-Corruption Unit has concluded 87 anti-corruption investigations, but only 1 case has progressed to the adjudication stage. On 15 November 2023,⁶⁹ the Unit submitted 11 corruption investigation reports to the Prosecutor's Office (government commissaries), cutting across various sections of the public sector and involving public servants and high-ranking politicians in

⁶⁵ According to key informant K9, the total amount of drugs in question was between 500 kg and 2,000 kg.

⁶⁶ The Central Plateau is also the primary base of sanctioned politicians involved in drug trafficking.

⁶⁷ Le Nouvelliste, "Attaque de bandits armés à Saut-d'Eau et Mirebalais: 30 morts, 15 blessés et 800 familles déplacées", 4 October 2023, available at <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/244715/attaque-de-bandits-armes-a-saut-deau-et-mirebalais-30-morts-15-blesses-et-800-familles-deplacees>.

⁶⁸ Information received from representatives of the Anti-Corruption Unit and the Financial and Economic Affairs Bureau.

⁶⁹ Information received from representatives of the Anti-Corruption Unit.

several public institutions, notably the Senate, the National Port Authority and the National Old-Age Insurance Office.⁷⁰

48. As part of the 11 cases presented by the Anti-Corruption Unit to the prosecuting authorities in November, former senators were accused of embezzlement of public funds, illicit enrichment and false declaration of assets or of being accomplices in the money-laundering of the proceeds of crime, and were summoned to appear before the Prosecutor's Office. Some, although convoked by the Office, were absent during the proceedings.⁷¹ All the accused are prohibited from leaving Haiti.

49. The Financial and Economic Affairs Bureau conducted multiple corruption investigations, including against lawyers, priests and public and private sector officials. In 2022, it presented 24 cases to the prosecuting authorities, including 5 specifically related to corruption. In 2023, over 375 cases were investigated and 75 were handed over to prosecuting authorities, 5 of which concerned corruption.⁷²

50. The situation with regard to money-laundering investigations has remained unchanged since the previous report. No convictions for money-laundering were achieved by the Haitian authorities. UNODC received information on one case developed by the Anti-Corruption Unit that contains elements of a money-laundering offence, by means of a lottery.

51. Concerning the legislative framework on anti-money-laundering and combating financing of terrorism, in addition to the decree of 4 May 2023, which established sanctions for money-laundering, the financing of terrorism and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the Central Bank of Haiti issued several circulars on anti-money-laundering and combating financing of terrorism, including a set of preventive measures for banks, money transfer businesses and exchange operators regarding customer due diligence, the identification of beneficiary owners, politically exposed persons, the responsibilities of compliance officers, the reporting of suspicious financial transactions and the application of sanctions for non-compliance with Haitian regulations on anti-money-laundering and combating financing of terrorism, including the decree of 4 May 2023. These measures would allow the Central Finance Intelligence Unit to receive financial intelligence required for the detection of money-laundering and associated predicate offences.

V. Conclusion and recommendations

52. Haiti is affected by complex regional firearms trafficking dynamics. Firearms and ammunition are trafficked using different routes, primarily from the United States, either directly to Haitian ports or indirectly via the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas and Turks and Caicos. The role of a segment of the Haitian diaspora and freight forwarders serving as "straw man" purchasers and intermediaries, as well as the involvement of small aircraft registered in Haiti and operating between the United States, the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic and Jamaica, warrants additional

⁷⁰ Executive summaries of the 11 investigations published by the Anti-Corruption Unit on 15 November 2023.

⁷¹ Alter Presse, "Haïti-Corruption: l'ULCC épingle plusieurs ex-fonctionnaires publics dans une dizaine de rapports d'enquête", 16 November 2023, available at www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article29849; and Le Nouvelliste, "Les ex-sénateurs Lambert et Fourcand auditionnés, Garcia Delva et Wanique Pierre ont boudé l'invitation du commissaire de gouvernement", 1 December 2023, available at <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/245723/les-ex-senateurs-lambert-et-fourcand-auditionnes-garcia-delva-et-wanique-pierre-ont-boude-linvitation-du-commissaire-du-gouvernement>.

⁷² Official data communicated by the Financial and Economic Affairs Bureau.

scrutiny. Moreover, it appears that some of the weapons and ammunition brought to Haiti are further trafficked to Jamaica.

53. Gang violence is intensifying in urban and rural areas, illustrating the continued availability of weapons and ammunition for the operations of criminal organizations. As noted in previous reports, major metropolitan areas such as Port-au-Prince are experiencing unrelenting homicide, kidnapping, rape and destruction of property by heavily armed criminal groups. The interior of Haiti, including lower Artibonite and the Central Plateau, are also registering heightened insecurity.⁷³ Several large gangs affiliated with the G-Pèp and G9 coalitions are increasing their hold over key territories, including national highway 1. The gangs' federations are alternately competing and colluding within Port-au-Prince. Certain gangs are also acting as brokers or intermediaries to service other factions with firearms and ammunition. Several of the country's political and economic elites, including in lower Artibonite and the Central Plateau, are believed to be involved in influencing gang activity.⁷⁴

54. Recalling the recommendations in its previous report, UNODC reiterates the importance of:

(a) Enhancing national capacities to collect and analyse firearms seizures, including eTrace requests to the United States;

(b) Implementing recommendations in previous UNODC reports to enhance capabilities to register firearms and ammunition; increase accountability and integrity measures for the control of firearms and ammunition; centralize firearms regulation and management, including for firearms belonging to private security companies; and support the safe and secure storage and management of seized illicit firearms and ammunition;

(c) Amplifying the capacities of border and customs control institutions, including on the Haiti-Dominican Republic border, to effectively detect, investigate and prosecute firearms trafficking and related offences and improve inter-agency cooperation.

55. In addition, UNODC recommends that Member States across the Caribbean and the United States also consider doing the following to contribute to reducing the illegal trafficking of firearms and ammunition into Haiti:

(a) Scale up measures to reduce illicit trafficking to Haiti from United States seaports and airports, in particular in south Florida:

(i) Strengthen intelligence-sharing mechanisms between United States law enforcement agencies and Member States in the Caribbean to facilitate the real-time exchange of information on illicit trafficking;

(ii) Implement advanced scanning technologies and increase personnel at key border points, such as seaports and airports in south Florida, to enhance detection capabilities;

⁷³ Between January 2022 and October 2023, at least 1,695 people were killed, injured or kidnapped in lower Artibonite. Another 22,000 were forced to flee rural communities for urban centres after being targeted by gangs. At least 45 per cent of the population of lower Artibonite is living in a situation of acute food insecurity as of September 2023. See OHCHR, "Criminal violence extends beyond Port-au-Prince: the situation in lower Artibonite from January 2022 to October 2023".

⁷⁴ At least 39 Haitians have been targeted with sanctions since 2021, including individuals who are active in Port-au-Prince and other parts of the Artibonite and Central Plateau region. See OHCHR, "Criminal violence extends beyond Port-au-Prince: the situation in lower Artibonite from January 2022 to October 2023".

- (iii) Establish joint task forces with United States agencies to conduct coordinated operations targeting illicit trafficking networks and their financial infrastructure;
- (b) Enhance oversight of international flights involving small aircraft and freight-forwarders' operations:
 - (i) Implement a comprehensive registry for small aircraft to track and monitor their movements in the region, promoting greater accountability and transparency;
 - (ii) Collaborate with international aviation authorities to establish standardized protocols for monitoring and reporting on small aircraft movements;
 - (iii) Utilize advanced technologies, such as satellite surveillance and radar systems, to improve the tracking of small aircraft;
- (c) Improve the data collection and analysis capacity of Member States in the Caribbean to provide updated analysis of firearms trafficking trends related to Haiti to support the implementation of the arms embargo established in Security Council resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#):
 - (i) Provide technical assistance and training programmes to enhance the skills of law enforcement and intelligence personnel in data collection and analysis;
 - (ii) Provide technical assistance and training to identify privately made firearms, ranging from homemade guns to "ghost guns" assembled from factory-produced parts;
 - (iii) Establish a centralized regional database to consolidate information on firearms trafficking trends related to Haiti, ensuring that Member States have access to comprehensive and up-to-date data;
 - (iv) Encourage collaboration with international organizations and agencies to leverage their expertise in developing effective data collection and analysis methodologies;
- (d) Strengthen collaboration between Member States, and specifically between the Jamaican and Haitian authorities, in partnership with the Caribbean Community and the United States, aimed at decreasing the negative impact of the guns for drugs trade:
 - (i) Facilitate regular workshops, training sessions and exchange programmes to build trust and enhance the capacity of Jamaican and Haitian authorities in combating the guns for drugs trade;
 - (ii) Establish a communication platform that enables real-time information-sharing among Member States, the Caribbean Community and the United States to address emerging threats promptly;
 - (iii) Develop a coordinated strategy that combines intelligence-gathering, law enforcement efforts and diplomatic initiatives to disrupt transnational criminal networks involved in the illicit trade.

56. With regard to illicit financial flows, Member States across the Caribbean and the United States should consider doing the following:

- (a) Develop a methodology for the identification and evaluation of corruption risks across the Haitian public sector, focusing on the analysis of institutional frameworks and operational processes to devise corrective actions and recommendations;

- (b) Develop and standardize, based on an in-depth evaluation of the existing operational framework for conducting complex corruption and financial investigations, comprehensive procedures across criminal justice institutions, encompassing investigation, prosecution and adjudication phases, with clear guidelines for evidence collection, case management and inter-agency cooperation, to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in combating corruption;
- (c) Enhance the effectiveness of Haitian institutions combating corruption by bolstering their technical and investigative capacities through specialized training and human resources development and equipping them with essential tools and technology to enable them to perform proactive anti-corruption investigations, as well as following up on existing sanctions with actual investigations;
- (d) Develop a legal and regulatory framework that protects whistle-blowers, ensuring their anonymity and protection against retaliation;
- (e) Support the enhancement of civil society and non-State actors' involvement in anti-corruption efforts by establishing partnerships, providing training and creating platforms for their participation in monitoring, reporting and policy development related to corruption prevention in Haiti;
- (f) Enhance the capacity of investigative and judicial bodies to effectively cooperate with foreign jurisdictions in conducting criminal investigations;
- (g) Enhance the effectiveness of the framework on anti-money-laundering and combating financing of terrorism through continuous training and mentoring for the Central Finance Intelligence Unit, the Financial and Economic Affairs Bureau and penal chain authorities on the detection, investigation and prosecution of money-laundering and associated predicate offences;
- (h) Strengthen the role of the private sector and non-governmental organizations in the detection and reporting of suspicious money-laundering activities and predicate offences.

Annex

List of firearms seized in Haiti, 2021–2023¹

		<i>Pistol</i>	<i>Revolver</i>	<i>Rifle</i>	<i>Shotgun</i>	<i>Home-made weapons</i>	<i>Total</i>
2021	January	30	2	8	1	9	50
	February	27	1	8	5	—	41
	March	8	2	3	1	5	19
	April	23	4	2	2	8	39
	May	15	5	3	1	3	27
	June	3	1	2	—	6	12
	July	17	1	13	7	7	45
	August	25	3	2	3	4	37
	September	16	6	6	—	12	40
	October	18	1	3	2	2	26
	November	16	—	6	4	3	29
	December	24	3	3	5	1	36
	Total	222	29	59	31	60	401
2022	January	19	—	4	1	1	25
	February	10	2	2	1	6	21
	March	26	5	2	3	5	41
	April	15	5	4	3	5	32
	May	29	6	7	—	6	48
	June	13	1	3	—	2	19
	July	30	3	23	2	1	59
	August	11	—	4	2	2	19
	September	4	1	5	3	4	17
	October	9	2	5	—	6	22
	November	16	2	6	1	1	26
	December	10	1	1	1	—	13
	Total	192	28	66	17	39	342
2023	January	14	1	7	1	2	25
	February	16	4	3	2	—	25
	March	9	4	3	—	5	21
	April	20	—	10	1	—	31
	May	4	1	5	1	1	12
	June	4	2	5	1	4	16
	July	9	2	3	1	4	—
	August	13	1	1	—	1	16
	September	13	2	4	1	1	21
	October	5	2	5	—	3	15
	November	—	—	—	—	—	—
	December	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Total	107	19	46	8	21	201

¹ Source: United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti.