

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
27 March 2026

Original: English

**Letter dated 27 March 2026 from the Panel of Experts on Haiti
established pursuant to Security Council resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#)
addressed to the President of the Security Council**

The members of the Panel of Experts on Haiti established pursuant to Security Council resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) have the honour to transmit herewith the interim report, submitted in accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution [2794 \(2025\)](#).

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) concerning Haiti on 16 March 2026 and was considered by the Committee on 27 March 2026.

The Panel would appreciate if the present letter and the interim report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

Panel of Experts on Haiti established pursuant to
Security Council resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#)



Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2794 (2025)

Summary

In the lead-up to the end of the mandate of the Transitional Presidential Council on 7 February 2026, political divisions within the executive intensified, driven by the absence of agreement on post-mandate governance arrangements and political manoeuvring aimed at preserving influence. Significant concerns were raised by Haitian and international stakeholders about the risk of popular mobilization and possible violence, particularly given uncertainty over how gangs might seek to exploit the situation.

Despite these tensions, major destabilization scenarios were avoided, partly due to pressure from international partners. On 7 February, full executive power was transferred to the Council of Ministers, led by the Prime Minister, Didier Fils-Aimé. On 23 February, a National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections was adopted to strengthen cohesion among Haitian stakeholders and support efforts towards the establishment of the security and governance conditions necessary for elections. Following the adoption of the Pact, the Prime Minister formed a ministerial Cabinet in early March.

The security situation continued to deteriorate in the country for most of the transitional period (April 2024 to February 2026), particularly in the West, Centre and Artibonite Departments. In the weeks preceding 7 February, security operations intensified as authorities sought to demonstrate progress and to capitalize on infighting within the Viv Ansanm coalition. Operations benefited from improved coordination within the Haitian security apparatus, new equipment for the Haitian police, and assistance from international private contractors. While security operations disrupted several gangs and slowed their expansion in Port-au-Prince, these gains remain fragile without a sustained security presence. Concerns persist about the risk of renewed gang violence, particularly as further deployment of the Gang Suppression Force is still awaited.

During the reporting period (October 2025 to February 2026), human rights violations remained widespread across Haiti, particularly in Port-au-Prince and the Artibonite and Centre Departments. Gangs continued to carry out indiscriminate attacks against civilians, with sexual violence notably prevalent and some victims raped by groups of 10 or more perpetrators. Gang leaders also continued to recruit children, who often have no alternative means of survival, using them in combat and to shield themselves from law enforcement operations. These operations, including the increased use of drone strikes, resulted in significant casualties, prompting concerns from human rights organizations about the use of lethal force in Haiti.

Gangs and other armed actors are actively seeking to acquire weapons and, more urgently, ammunition. Seizures at ports of exit in the United States of America and ports of entry during the reporting period indicate that the arms embargo continues to be violated. Ammunition diverted from stockpiles in Haiti and the Dominican Republic also represents a notable portion of the materiel used by gangs. The 400 Mawozo gang remains one of the primary illicit importers of arms and ammunition in the country and one of the better armed gangs, taking advantage of its position near the land border.

Regarding illicit financial flows, gangs have adapted their revenue collection methods in response to security operations targeting checkpoints. They have tightened their control over remittance houses, disguised themselves as officers of the Haitian

National Police and carried out extortion activities, including kidnapping for ransom and the use of hidden checkpoints.

Elvers (baby eels) remain one of the most lucrative natural resources in Haiti, though their trade remains poorly regulated. The sector is marked by secrecy and corruption. A network of actors has maintained influence over the industry by controlling who receives licences from the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development, while bribery and smuggling are widespread. These actions deprive the country of the much-needed revenue for development.

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
I. Introduction	5
A. Mandate	5
B. Methodology	5
C. Evolution of the political and security context	6
II. Evolution of gang dynamics amid intensified security operations	7
A. Destabilization of gangs in the northern downtown area and areas surrounding the National Port Authority	7
B. Resilience of Viv Ansanm amid security pressure.	8
C. Other armed actors.	10
III. Acts that violate international human rights law or acts that constitute human rights abuses .	10
A. Sexual and gender-based violence	11
B. Recruitment of children.	12
C. Obstructions of humanitarian access and assistance	12
D. Challenges to the rule of law and human rights protection.	13
IV. Arms embargo violations and domestic diversions of arms, ammunition and related materiel	13
A. Seizures in Haiti.	13
B. Seizures at United States ports of exit and Haitian ports of entry	15
V. Illicit financial flows	16
A. Gang revenue dynamics	16
B. Trends in the elvers sector.	17
C. Other trends in illicit financial flows	19
Annexes	20

I. Introduction

A. Mandate

1. On 17 October 2025, the Security Council adopted resolution [2794 \(2025\)](#), by which it renewed the sanctions regime on Haiti, consisting of an arms embargo as well as a travel ban and an asset freeze against individuals and/or entities designated by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) concerning Haiti as being responsible for, complicit in or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Haiti. Through this resolution, the Council also designated two additional individuals: Dimitri Herard (HTi.008), the former head of the National Palace General Security Unit, for his support to gangs, and Kempes Sanon (HTi.009), the leader of Les Argentins gang located in Bel-Air, Port-au-Prince (see sect. II.A and annex 3). Currently, the sanctions list includes the names of nine individuals and two entities.¹
2. The Council extended, for a period of 13 months from the date of adoption of resolution [2794 \(2025\)](#), the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Haiti, as specified in paragraph 21 of resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#), and further decided that this mandate shall also apply with respect to the measures imposed in resolution [2794 \(2025\)](#).
3. The present interim report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution [2794 \(2025\)](#) and covers investigations conducted up to 1 March 2026.

B. Methodology

4. The Panel conducts its investigations in a professional and technical manner, adhering to the principles of transparency, objectivity, impartiality and independence. The Panel's working methods are in full conformity with the best practices, as recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see [S/2006/997](#)). The Panel placed particular emphasis on transparency and the use of reliable sources, including documentary evidence, independent verifiable sources and the opportunity to reply (see [S/2024/704](#), annex 1). The Panel takes great care not to disclose identifying information, when necessary, in order to protect sources given the extreme levels of insecurity in Haiti.
5. In the course of its investigations, the Panel conducted fact-finding missions in Haiti (Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haïtien), the Dominican Republic (Santo Domingo) and the United States of America (Miami), in October 2025 and February 2026, and is grateful for the support that it received from the respective national authorities, as well as from the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), the United Nations country teams and non-governmental actors on the ground.
6. During its visits to Haiti in October 2025 and February 2026, the Panel met with representatives of Haitian State institutions, including the leadership of the Haitian National Police and the General Customs Administration, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Justice, financial institutions and anti-corruption units, political and private sector actors as well as representatives of civil society organizations, individuals living in gang-controlled areas and other victims of gang-related violence, including sexual and gender-based violence. The Panel also met with representatives of BINUH, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), United Nations humanitarian agencies and diplomats from various missions, as well as the Force

¹ See Security Council, narrative summaries of reasons for listing. Available at <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2653/materials/summaries>.

Commander of the Gang Suppression Force. The Panel visited two sites for internally displaced persons.

7. The Panel has sent a range of requests for information to Member States. The Panel would like to thank those Member States, including Brazil and the Dominican Republic, as well as other entities, that have responded to the Panel's requests and further emphasizes the critical importance of this information in supporting its work.

C. Evolution of the political and security context

8. The period leading up to the end of the mandate of the Transitional Presidential Council mandate on 7 February 2026 was marked by deepening political divisions, driven by the absence of any agreement on post-mandate governance arrangements and political manoeuvring among certain Council members in an attempt to preserve their influence and the advantages associated with office.

9. Growing polarization within the executive generated significant concerns among national and international stakeholders regarding potential popular mobilization and the possible outbreak of violence. These concerns were further compounded by uncertainty as to how gangs might seek to exploit this situation. Despite these tensions, major destabilizing scenarios were averted, in part due to the pressure by international partners.²

10. On 7 February 2026, full executive power was transferred to the Council of Ministers, led by the Prime Minister, Didier Fils-Aimé. The same day the Council of Ministers adopted a decree stipulating that its objectives are: (a) the restoration of public security and of state control across the country; (b) the organization of free and fair elections; and (c) the functioning of institutions and public services. Pursuant to the decree, the executive authority of the Council of Ministers will end with the inauguration of an elected President.³ Since then, consultations with a range of stakeholders resulted in the signing of the National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections on 21 February as a frame to support efforts towards creating the security conditions for the organization of the elections, according to the calendar established by the Provisional Electoral Council.⁴ Under the Pact, it is also specified that the National Commission for Disarmament, Dismantlement and Reintegration is to be re-established. Following the signature of the Pact, the Prime Minister formed a ministerial Cabinet in early March 2026.⁵

11. The overall security situation continued to deteriorate for most of the transitional period (April 2024 to February 2026), including in the West, Centre and Artibonite Departments. However, in the lead-up to 7 February, the imperative to demonstrate progress on security objectives led to an intensification of security

² Juhakenson Blaise, "US Embassy confirms warships in Haiti's water amid political deadline and gang violence", *The Haitian Times*, 4 February 2026, available at <https://haitiantimes.com/2026/02/04/us-military-ships-haiti-waters/>; and United States of America, Department of State, "Visa Restrictions for Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) Members for supporting gangs" press statement, 25 January 2026, available at <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/01/visa-restrictions-for-transitional-presidential-council-tpc-members-for-supporting-gangs>.

³ Haiti, Decree transferring executive power to the Council of Ministers in view of the vacancy in the presidency of the Republic, *Le Moniteur*, 9 February 2026.

⁴ Haiti, National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections, *Le Moniteur*, 23 February 2026.

⁵ Jacqueline Charles, "Haiti Prime Minister overhauls cabinet as he pushes toward year-end elections", *Miami Herald*, 4 March 2026; and St. Kitts and Nevis Observer, "Haiti-PM names new cabinet", 4 March 2026, available at www.thestkittsnevisobserver.com/haiti-pm-names-new-cabinet/.

operations, bolstered by greater cohesion within the Haitian national security apparatus, new equipment for the Haitian National Police and the support of private contractors. Drone strikes facilitated by these contractors have particularly unsettled gang members, who have become more cautious and changed some of their tactics (see sects. II and V). Police operations, including strikes, have caused a significant number of casualties, including among non-gang members (see sect. III.D). Gang activity has become less visible in the capital, particularly downtown, where several groups have been disrupted, resulting in some local gains that remain fragile (see sect. II.A).

12. Six months after the transition of the Multinational Security Support Mission into the Gang Suppression Force (see Security Council resolution [2793 \(2025\)](#)), the force composition has remained unchanged. The full deployment of the Gang Suppression Force remains essential to restore security and support political stabilization and the implementation of the electoral process.

II. Evolution of gang dynamics amid intensified security operations

13. In 2026, gangs continued to control large swathes of the West, Centre and Artibonite Departments, where they hold neighbourhoods, key economic corridors and agricultural regions. The Viv Ansanm alliance has demonstrated sustained resilience and adaptability despite some internal fighting and ongoing security pressure.⁶

14. Intensified security efforts by Haitian authorities, alongside nearly a year of drone strikes enabled by international private contractors, and the actions of self-defence groups, have slowed the advance of gangs in the capital.⁷ Security gains remain, however, fragile and risk reversal without sustained pressure. No gang-controlled territory has been fully retaken by security forces, kidnappings have notably risen in the Delmas area of the capital, and key gang leaders remain at large.

15. Regardless of the apparent calm observed after the transition deadline on 7 February, concerns persist that Viv Ansanm may be consolidating its forces for potential attacks ahead of further deployments of the Gang Suppression Force.⁸

A. Destabilization of gangs in the northern downtown area and areas surrounding the National Port Authority

16. From late 2025, large-scale security operations were launched, notably to establish a buffer zone around the National Port Authority in order to secure truck flows and reopen logistical corridors to the city centre and main roads leading to the north and the south of the country (see annex 2).⁹

17. Closer alignment between the Haitian National Police – bolstered by increased operational capacity and backed by the Gang Suppression Force – and the Task Force

⁶ United Nations Police Division report, 31 October–6 November 2025.

⁷ Interviews with gang analysts, an international security officer and an individual working in gang-controlled areas, January and February 2026; and BINUH, “Quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti, October–December 2025”, available at <https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/binuh/document-library/quarterly-report-human-rights-situation-haiti-october-december-2025>.

⁸ Interviews with gang analysts and individuals working in gang-controlled areas, February 2026.

⁹ Interviews with gang analysts and a former government official working with anti-gang operations, February 2026.

(consisting of police and army officers, as well as international private contractors)¹⁰ enabled them to exploit the weakening of Les Argentins gang, which operated in the Bel-Air neighbourhood (Port-au-Prince commune), following internal clashes within Viv Ansanm (see annex 3). In Port-au-Prince and Delmas communes, security forces then launched operations against bastions of the Krache Dife, La Saline, Delmas 6 and Tokyo gangs (see annex 2). These gangs were significantly destabilized by the killing of gang members, the destruction of several of their houses and checkpoints, and seizures of arms and ammunition (see sect. IV.A).¹¹ This, however, did not amount to their dismantlement, which would entail neutralizing key leaders and disrupting supply lines.¹²

18. While the objective of these operations was to weaken gangs' networks rather than target their leadership,¹³ the fact that all top gang leaders remain at large has been perceived by many Haitian stakeholders as a shortcoming of security operations and linked with broader political dynamics, including tacit arrangements with gangs, ahead of elections.¹⁴ While the logistical and operational capacity of the above-mentioned gangs have been undermined, many members relocated to reinforce other gangs.¹⁵ Jimmy Chérizier (alias "Barbeque", HTi.001) met with other gang leaders in Carrefour commune, the stronghold of the Ti Bwa gang, led by Christ-Roi Chery (alias "Chrisla"), a few days after operations in Delmas 6 in January 2026.¹⁶ Gang leaders have become more cautious in response to drone threats, avoiding public appearances and social media; consequently, they feel more secure in Carrefour, one of the most populous communes in the metropolitan region, which has become a hub for gang activities¹⁷ (see [S/2025/597](#), annex 5).

19. Due to their collusion and infiltration within some police and government institutions, gang leaders are often tipped off in advance of impending operations, with some receiving financial incentives to leave their bastions.¹⁸ They escape alongside their most trusted gang members, leaving lower-level members behind.¹⁹ While operations have brought a relative sense of safety to the northern part of downtown Port-au-Prince, insufficient consolidation of newly reclaimed areas has allowed gangs to continue incursions, however with less freedom.²⁰

B. Resilience of Viv Ansanm amid security pressure

20. Security pressure has hindered gang expansion across parts of the capital, although gangs continue to hold sway over their strongholds. They have leveraged collateral damage from drone strikes (see annex 10) to strengthen their local control.²¹

¹⁰ Interview with a senior government official, 2025.

¹¹ Interviews with gang analysts and a former government official working with anti-gang operations, January and February 2026.

¹² Interviews with gang analysts and individuals living in gang-controlled areas, January and February 2026.

¹³ Interview with a security provider, February 2026.

¹⁴ Interviews with confidential sources, 2025 and 2026.

¹⁵ Interviews with gang analysts and former government official working with anti-gang operations, January and February 2026.

¹⁶ Interview with an individual working in a gang-controlled area, January 2026.

¹⁷ Interviews with gang analysts and individuals living in gang-controlled areas, 2026.

¹⁸ Interviews with a former government official, police officers, an individual working in gang-controlled areas and an individual with a direct link to gangs, January and February 2026.

¹⁹ Interviews with gang analysts and an individual working in a gang-controlled area, January 2026.

²⁰ Interviews with gang and human right analysts, an individual working in a gang-controlled area and a former government official working with anti-gang operations, February 2026.

²¹ Interview with an individual working in a gang-controlled area, February 2026.

Amid gaps in State service provision, certain gangs have offered funeral assistance and financed medical care for residents injured during security operations.²² However, they continue to use the population as human shields²³ and to rely on violence as a social control mechanism. In retaliation for large-scale security operations in mid-November 2026 in Croix-des-Bouquets (see annex 4), the 400 Mawozo gang, led by Wilson Joseph (alias “Lanmo San Jou”, HTi.004), killed 22 residents suspected of collaborating with the police (S/2026/31, para. 17). Moreover, losses in gangs’ ranks have triggered further recruitment of children, as illustrated in a video released by Lanmo San Jou (see annex 5). Children and women have been increasingly mobilized to participate in combat (see sect. III).²⁴

21. Intensified operations have driven gangs into remote and semi-urban areas, where they have enjoyed relative freedom in their criminal operations.²⁵ Over a year since the first attack against Kenscoff (see S/2025/597, annex 6), the hillside and agricultural commune of the West Department has been under constant pressure from 5 Segond, led by the group of Didi, Grand Ravine, led by Renel Destina (alias “Ti Lapli”, HTi.003), Canaan, headed by Jeff Larose (alias “Jeff”), and Ti Bwa gangs.²⁶ While security interventions have been focused on central parts of Port-au-Prince, gangs have used a corridor between Carrefour and Kenscoff to move into the commune and regroup in several areas. The assaults, counting numerous kidnappings and killings – including of a newborn child (see annex 6)²⁷ – are aimed at, among other objectives, opening a new criminal front and compelling security forces to redeploy, undermining their ability to hold recaptured territory in other areas.²⁸

22. In the Centre Department, the 400 Mawozo and Canaan gangs have maintained control over Mirebalais and Saut-d’Eau. In late March 2025, they seized these strategic communes to control key routes to the Dominican border in order to impose illicit taxation and enable trafficking flows (see S/2025/597). They have persistently attempted to seize Lascahobas, lying near the Belladère border town, to scale up trafficking activities, but have been prevented by local security forces supported by Mirebalais Back-Up Feray self-defence group.²⁹

23. Security gains remain fragile while Viv Ansanm functions as a large criminal structure that is embedded into transnational networks that sustain arms supplies and financial resources.³⁰ 400 Mawozo has benefited from its geographical advantage, close to the eastern border, to maintain substantial firepower within the alliance and sustain the supply of weapons and ammunition within it (see sect. IV.A.2). As with other gangs, such as 5 Segond, the Canaan gang leverages its coastal base near ports to replenish supplies and increase illicit revenues, including from drug trafficking (see S/2024/704, sect. II.B.2, and S/2025/597, sect. II.D).³¹

²² Interviews with individuals living in gang-controlled areas, January and February 2026.

²³ Interview with a human rights analyst, January 2026.

²⁴ Interviews with human rights analysts, police officers and a security provider, 2025 and 2026; and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and BINUH, “Children trafficked by gangs in Haiti: rethinking the responses”, February 2026.

²⁵ Interviews with local authorities, security officers and residents of rural areas, January 2026.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Interview with a resident of the affected area, 30 January 2026.

²⁸ Interview with a resident of the affected area, 5 February 2026.

²⁹ Interviews with a government official, security officers and gang analysts, January and February 2026.

³⁰ See S/2025/597, S/2024/704 and S/2023/674, see also S/2026/32; and interviews with a representative of a Member State and analysts, 2026.

³¹ Interviews with gang analysts, an individual working in a gang-controlled area and police officers, 2025 and 2026.

24. In the Artibonite Department, the level of gang violence remained high in late 2025.³² Over a year since the Pont Sondé massacre by the Gran Grif gang (HTe.001) (see S/2025/356), led by Luckson Elan (HTi.007), the gang killed at least 34 residents, during attacks against Pont Sondé town (Saint-Marc commune) between 29 November and 6 December 2025.³³ In other communes (Liancourt, Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite, Montrouis, L'Estère and Verrettes), the Gran Grif, Kokorat San Ras, Raboteau, Délugé and Canaan gangs spread violence through kidnapping, rape and indiscriminate attacks against residents,³⁴ despite the relative decline in violence since early 2026.³⁵

C. Other armed actors

25. The proliferation of self-defence groups is worrisome, as they risk turning to criminal activities and being used to further political objectives, perpetuating the historical cycle of gangs. If their activities remain financially rewarding, they will be reluctant to lay down their arms, most of which are illicitly sourced. Certain groups operating in Port-au-Prince receive payments for protection from private individuals and large businesses.³⁶

26. In the North Department, small local gangs and certain agents of the Protected Areas Security Brigade (S/2024/704, paras. 83–85 and annex 26), under the leadership of Alex Jean-Pierre, have largely specialized in land spoliation.³⁷ They seize land, often from owners living abroad, divide it into plots and sell it, using the proceeds to purchase weapons and uniforms, and build houses and hotels.³⁸ Land spoliation schemes have also been put in place by former politicians in Kenscoff.³⁹

III. Acts that violate international human rights law or acts that constitute human rights abuses

27. During the reporting period, widespread human rights violations persisted throughout Haiti,⁴⁰ concentrated primarily in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, but also affecting the Artibonite and Centre Departments. In 2025, the number of people killed came to a total of 5,915, whereas the number of people injured was 2,708.⁴¹

28. In 2025, a total of 1,606, out of 18,241, schools remained closed across Haiti as a result of ongoing insecurity, depriving an estimated 243,000 students of access to education.⁴² As at January 2026, there were only 37 fully operational health facilities

³² BINUH, “Quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti, October–December 2025”.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ United Nations confidential report, 26 December 2026.

³⁵ BINUH, “Quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti, October–December 2025”.

³⁶ Interviews with gang and political analysts, and an individual working in a gang-affected area, 2026.

³⁷ Interviews with gang analysts, residents of gang-affected areas, victims of spoliation and police officers, 2025 and 2026.

³⁸ Interviews with confidential sources, 2025 and 2026.

³⁹ Interviews with confidential sources, 2025 and 2026.

⁴⁰ See also annex 7 on other human rights violations.

⁴¹ BINUH, “Quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti, October–December 2025”.

⁴² See OHCHR and BINUH, “Children trafficked by gangs in Haiti: rethinking the responses”. See also John Smith Justin, “MENFP shares key data from the 2024–2025 national school census”, *Le Nouvelliste*, 16 December 2025, available at <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/262491/le-menfp-devoile-les-resultats-du-recensement-scolaire-2024-2025>.

out of 100 in Port-au-Prince. Nationwide, no more than 26% of 268 inpatient facilities were fully functional, severely impeding access to health services.⁴³

A. Sexual and gender-based violence⁴⁴

29. Sexual violence continues to be one of the main human rights violations in Haiti. According to a report under the monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements, during 2025, 1,772 incidents were recorded: about 77% of all the incidents were collective rapes and 18% were rapes.⁴⁵ The main perpetrators of sexual violence were gang members belonging to Grand Ravine, led by Renel Destina (HTi.003), Les Argentins, led by Kempes Sanon (HTi.009), 5 Segond, led by Johnson Andre (alias “Izo”, HTi.002), Canaan, led by Jeff Larose, Delmas 6, led by Jimmy Chérizier (HTi.001), 400 Mawozo, led by Wilson Joseph (HTi.004), and the Viv Ansanm alliance.⁴⁶

30. According to Médecins sans frontières, about 57% of victims of sexual and gender-based violence assisted were attacked by gang members. The average number of perpetrators per incident is three. There have been over 100 victims who were attacked by 10 or more perpetrators at a time and nearly 20% of survivors have experienced sexual and gender-based violence multiple times.⁴⁷

31. Timely access to healthcare following sexual and gender-based violence is critical to ensuring effective medical support, particularly given the limited time frames for life-saving interventions, including post-exposure prophylaxis for HIV (within 72 hours) and emergency contraception (within 120 hours). Since 2022, Médecins sans frontières has recorded that about 67% of survivors arrive too late to receive HIV post-exposure prophylaxis and 59% of survivors missed the window for emergency contraception.⁴⁸

32. During the Panel’s visits to sites for internally displaced persons (see annex 9), women reported significant gaps in access to specialized healthcare. In particular, routine gynaecological services were generally unavailable, except in cases where a referral to a specialist was made due to a specific medical condition. Many women interviewed were unable to recall their most recent consultation with a gynaecologist, some of them had never had one. The Panel considers that the absence of regular and preventive women’s health services reflects a broader gap in addressing women’s specific health needs and underscores the importance of strengthening access to comprehensive and routine healthcare.

33. The Panel further notes that responses to sexual and gender-based violence appear to place a disproportionate emphasis on women as the primary subjects of intervention, without sufficiently engaging men and boys in prevention and response efforts. While gang-related violence remains a significant driver of sexual and gender-

⁴³ World Health Organization, “Haiti: WHO health emergency appeal 2026”, 3 February 2026. Available at <https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/haiti--who-health-emergency-appeal-2026>.

⁴⁴ Crimes related to sexual and gender-based violence remain largely underreported owing, inter alia, to stigma, fear of retaliation, mistrust in prosecutorial instances and limited access to essential services.

⁴⁵ The victims were: 1,668 women, 187 girls, 2 men and 6 boys; 27 victims were killed following their rape. Report under the monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements, January 2026.

⁴⁶ Interview with a humanitarian specialist, February 2026.

⁴⁷ Médecins sans frontières, “Report: Sexual and gender-based violence in Port-au-Prince, Haiti”, 28 January 2026. Available at <https://www.msf.org/report-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-port-au-prince>.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

based violence in Haiti, the phenomenon is rooted in broader and deeply entrenched cultural and social norms. In the Panel's opinion, addressing sexual and gender-based violence therefore requires a more comprehensive approach that includes the active participation of men in prevention strategies, community-based dialogue and accountability mechanisms, in order to tackle underlying structural and societal factors contributing to such violence.

B. Recruitment of children and children's rights

34. About 45% of the population of Haiti is under 18 years old.⁴⁹ The number of children recruited and used by gangs in Haiti increased by an estimated 200% in 2025.⁵⁰ Children are often compelled to join gangs due to economic hardship, direct threats or family separation, with some perceiving association with gang members as a means of survival or protection.⁵¹

35. On 15 January 2026, in Montrouis, Artibonite Department, members of the Canaan gang abducted a 17-year-old student from his home. The assailants mutilated the victim and subsequently dragged his remains through the streets of the community.⁵²

C. Obstructions of humanitarian access and assistance

36. The obstruction of humanitarian access and assistance in Haiti continues to pose a grave challenge to addressing the escalating crisis. The Panel remains deeply concerned by persistent threats and attacks perpetrated against humanitarian actors, which severely undermine the delivery of life-saving aid to affected populations.⁵³

37. On 6 January 2026, the Médecins sans frontières facility in Bel-Air was caught in the midst of a security operation against gangs, resulting in at least three deaths and eight injuries from gunfire, including a woman who was shot while holding her one-year-old infant.⁵⁴ Between 29 December 2025 and 12 January 2026, Médecins sans frontières treated 101 violence-related injuries at its Drouillard hospital – exceeding the monthly average for 2025 of 54 gunshot admissions – with 66 gunshot wounds; 30% of the victims were women and 9% were children under the age of 15.⁵⁵

38. Intensified clashes between security forces and gangs in densely populated areas have trapped civilians under constant fire and drone strikes. Patients face blocked

⁴⁹ Daniel Dickinson, "'Alarming increase' in recruitment of children into gangs in Haiti", United Nations News, 20 February 2026. Available at https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/02/1166954?utm_content=buffer16f81&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer.

⁵⁰ United Nations Children's Fund, "Child recruitment in Haiti surges threefold in just one year", 12 February 2026. Available at <https://www.unicef.org/haiti/en/press-releases/child-recruitment-haiti-surges-threefold-just-one-year>.

⁵¹ See OHCHR and BINUH, "Children trafficked by gangs in Haiti: rethinking the responses".

⁵² Interview with a civil society representative, February 2026.

⁵³ United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Haiti - Aperçu des contraintes d'accès humanitaire de décembre 2025 à février 2026", 6 March 2026. Available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-aperçu-des-contraintes-daccès-humanitaire-de-décembre-2025-fevrier-2026>.

⁵⁴ Médecins sans frontières, "Haiti: escalating violence in Bel-Air, Port-au-Prince", 8 January 2026. Available at www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/haiti-escalating-violence-bel-air-port-au-prince.

⁵⁵ Médecins sans frontières, "Port-au-Prince: MSF treats over 100 patients for violence injuries in two weeks", 22 January 2022. Available at www.msf.org/port-au-prince-msf-treats-over-100-patients-violence-injuries-two-weeks.

roads and must traverse active conflict zones to reach care, and it has been over a year since Médecins sans frontières suspended its ambulance service due to repeated attacks.

39. Humanitarian actors⁵⁶ informed the Panel that, during the reporting period, non-governmental organizations and humanitarian personnel were, on several occasions, caught in security forces operations against gangs. Despite attempts by humanitarian organizations to alert the Haitian National Police of the humanitarians' presence, the lack of coordination among the various security forces involved in such operations resulted in explosive drones strikes near humanitarian personnel, exposing them to grave risk.⁵⁷ Some humanitarian organizations have shared their GPS coordinates with the Haitian National Police as a preventive measure.

D. Challenges to the rule of law and human rights protection

40. The rule of law and the effective protection of human rights are fundamental prerequisites for sustainable peace, democratic governance, and the fight against impunity. During the reporting period, the Panel identified three distinct yet interrelated areas of concern that collectively undermine these principles in Haiti: (a) the adoption of a decree establishing a High Court of Justice with exclusive jurisdiction over senior State officials, which, by creating a complex mechanism, renders prosecution of high State officials virtually impossible; (b) the promulgation of a decree regulating freedom of expression, which jeopardizes the right of Haitian people to receive and disseminate information and ideas without fear of prosecution; and, lastly, (c) the conduct of security operations involving the use of lethal force, which raises concerns regarding compliance with international human rights standards (see annex 12).

IV. Arms embargo violations and domestic diversions of arms, ammunition and related materiel

41. With the intensification of security operations in the West Department, gangs are actively seeking to procure weapons and, more urgently, ammunition. Seizures conducted at ports of exit in the United States and ports of entry in Haiti during the reporting period indicate that trafficking from the United States continues. Ammunition diverted from both Haitian and Dominican stockpiles also account for a significant portion of the materiel being used by non-State armed actors, underscoring the critical need for both countries to develop their capacity to prevent, identify and investigate diversions.

A. Seizures in Haiti

1. Analysis of ammunition used by Viv Ansaïn to better understand the sources of its materiel

42. Over the last three years, the Panel has documented several thousand rounds of ammunition, casings and packaging in the West, North and North-West Departments

⁵⁶ Due to security reasons the Panel has decided that unless the humanitarian organization has publicly reported the incident, it will keep information concerning such organization confidential.

⁵⁷ Confidential sources, February 2026.

from seizures at ports of entry, as well as materiel identified as being used by or seized from a range of armed actors, which constitute hard evidence of trafficking trends.

43. During the reporting period, the Panel documented 1,158 rounds of ammunition seized between October 2025 and February 2026 from gangs operating in Kenscoff, Croix-des-Bouquets, Delmas 2 and Bel-Air. These included 5.56 x 45 mm (58%), .223 Remington (3.6%), 7.62 x 39 mm (5%), 7.62 x 51 mm (29%), .308 Winchester (1.8%), and 12.7 x 99 mm/.50-calibre (3%). The ammunition was produced by more than 30 different manufacturers across 20 countries, including in Europe, Asia and the Americas, often exporting for a wide commercial and military or law enforcement market. The Panel contacted several Member States to determine the point at which ammunition was diverted from the licit chains of custody and better understand trafficking patterns. Its preliminary findings are presented below.

44. Of the 510 rounds of 5.56 x 45 mm ammunition that indicate a year of production, more than 80% were produced between 2022 and 2024, indicating a very short “time to crime”,⁵⁸ regular violations of the arms embargo and continuous diversion cycles.

45. A comparison of 5.56 x 45-mm ammunition used by Viv Ansanm gangs indicated that gangs operating in Kenscoff (mostly members of 5 Segond and Grand Ravine), Bel-Air (Jamesley’s group) and Delmas 2 (Krache Dife) share around 50% of the same ammunition types (headstamps), suggesting that groups are exchanging ammunition and/or drawing from similar sources of supply. In contrast, 400 Mawozo has an ammunition profile that is quite different from these groups (see paras. 48–51).

46. While all gangs have some components of Haitian National Police ammunition in their stockpiles, diversions are particularly pronounced for 7.62 x 51-mm rounds. As previously reported by the Panel, diversions from the Haitian National Police have historically constituted a real concern (see [S/2025/597](#), annex 25). Although the Haitian National Police has made arrests of several corrupt officers within its ranks (see [S/2025/597](#), annex 26), diversions continue, including by officers collecting unused ammunition and reselling it illicitly to self-defence groups, gangs, private security companies or individuals looking to protect themselves. Some ammunition donated by international partners to the Haitian National Police was also retrieved from a trafficker in the Artibonite Department in 2025.⁵⁹

47. The Panel documented several boxes and rounds of 5.56 x 45-mm ammunition produced in 2024 being used by gangs in Bel-Air and Kenscoff, as well as by the 400 Mawozo gang, which are consistent with lot numbers of materiel recently procured by the Haitian Armed Forces from the Companhia Brasileira de Cartuchos (CBC) in Brazil. Following a tracing request sent by the Panel, the Brazilian authorities confirmed that the ammunition was consistent with those produced by CBC and that the Haitian Armed Forces had signed a contract with the company in July 2023 to import 1.5 million rounds of this type of ammunition.

2. The 400 Mawozo gang and arms trafficking

48. The 400 Mawozo gang, led by Wilson Joseph (HTi.004), remains one of the primary illicit importers of arms and ammunition in the country and one of the more heavily armed gangs. Since its establishment, the Panel has investigated arms trafficking cases involving the 400 Mawozo leadership, including flows from the United States to Haiti, both directly and via the Dominican Republic, as well as sourcing from the illicit market in the Dominican Republic ([S/2023/674](#), annex 32, and [S/2025/597](#), para. 99). The gang takes advantage of its position and its control of

⁵⁸ The time between legal manufacture and/or transfer and recovery from illicit use.

⁵⁹ Interviews with national and international security officers, 2026.

access to the Malpasse and Belladère border crossings, as well as the Étang Saumâtre lake near the border, enabling it to import materiel easily across the land border.

49. Of a sample of 89 rounds of 5.56-mm ammunition recovered from the gang in 2025 and documented by the Panel, 25 were marked “ERD” (*Ejército República Dominicana* – Army of the Dominican Republic) and had been produced in 2022,⁶⁰ and 16 bear markings consistent with the ammunition diverted from the Dominican police, which the Panel had investigated and reported on in 2025 (see S/2025/597, annex 25). The Panel sent a tracing request to the Dominican authorities who responded that the ammunition marked “ERD” had been procured in 2022 from a producer in Colombia. Furthermore, they explained that, in December 2025, an officer from the Army had been arrested in San Juan de la Maguana Province, Dominican Republic, along with a Haitian national, while transporting 1,516 rounds of ammunition on a motorbike.⁶¹ The prosecution case is ongoing.

50. Through its networks, the leader of 400 Mawozo has obtained several .50-calibre anti-materiel rifles exported from the United States. While one such weapon was seized in the Dominican port of Haina on 25 February 2025 as part of materiel destined to the 400 Mawozo and Canaan gangs, another was retrieved by the Haitian National Police in an operation in Croix-des-Bouquets in November 2025. Both weapons were Barrett 82A1 rifles and had been trafficked by the same network from the United States (S/2025/597, para. 99).

51. Wilson Joseph has posted videos on social media with distinctive surplus .50-calibre ammunition that the Panel had identified as having been produced in the Dominican Republic in the 1950s (see annex 14). Analysis of rounds retrieved from the gang during seizures has further confirmed this, with at least 15 of 32 rounds documented by the Panel produced in the Dominican Republic. However, the precise chain of custody of this surplus ammunition remains unclear, with quantities of these items having been imported for the United States civilian market in the past and still available for purchase on collectors’ sites.⁶² The Panel sent two tracing requests to the Dominican authorities. The authorities provided photographs of ammunition manufactured by the arms factory in San Cristóbal throughout the 1950s up until 1960, and explained that the surplus ammunition was in the process of being destroyed and that they had not detected any diversions.

B. Seizures at United States ports of exit and Haitian ports of entry

52. Several seizures took place at ports of exit in the United States and at ports of entry in Haiti during the reporting period. The typical modus operandi continued to involve maritime trafficking through the concealment of materiel in second-hand goods coming from the United States (see S/2023/674). Between September 2025 and March 2026, there was an increase in seizures from air freight at airports in the United States and in Haiti. Furthermore, counterfeit police and customs uniforms and other items, such as badges and lanyards, have been seized on multiple occasions in Haitian ports (see paras. 55 and 56). Investigations are ongoing and detailed conclusions will be provided in due course (see annex 13 for additional information).

⁶⁰ The Armed Forces of the Dominican Republic apply the good practice of marking their ammunition, which allows for better management of their stockpile and helps to prevent, identify and investigate diversions.

⁶¹ Official communication from the Dominican Republic authorities, March 2026.

⁶² See, for instance, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U60j2JwJ_2Q.

Seizures of materiel coming from the United States at Haitian ports of entry, September 2025 to February 2026

<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Materiel</i>	<i>Mode of transport</i>
23 September 2025	Toussaint Louverture International Airport	.40 handgun 5.56 x 45-mm rifle	Air
24 October 2025	Toussaint Louverture International Airport	245 magazines for handguns 4,000 rounds of inert ammunition	Air
October 2025	Toussaint Louverture International Airport	Rifle	Air
29 December 2025	Cap-Haïtien container terminal	Two 9-mm handguns and two magazines One 7.62 x 39-mm rifle and four magazines 1,800 rounds of 9-mm luger ammunition	Sea
6 January 2026	Cap-Haïtien container terminal	Nine 9-mm handguns and nine magazines 5,500 rounds of 7.62 x 39-mm ammunition	Sea
23 January 2026	Cap-Haïtien container terminal	Two 5.56 x 45-mm rifles Three 9-mm handguns Magazines: three 9-mm and 12 5.56 x 45-mm 3,400 rounds of ammunition	Sea
26 January 2026	Cap-Haïtien container terminal	Ammunition: 2,490 9-mm, 40 7.62 x 39-mm, 40 .30-06 SPRG	Sea

Source: Interviews with Haitian police and customs officials, and confidential reports, 2025 and 2026.

V. Illicit financial flows

A. Gang revenue dynamics

53. Gangs are adopting new ways of collecting revenues in a bid to avoid Haitian National Police operations that tend to target illegal checkpoints. They have intensified their control on remittance houses; they camouflage themselves in Haitian National Police regalia and conduct “operations” aimed at extorting the public, including kidnapping for ransom and maintaining “concealed” checkpoints.⁶³

1. Extorting of remittances

54. The economy of Haiti is traditionally cash-based due to its large informal sector. However, with the growing trend in digital money transfer, digital payments solutions are being adopted as a form of formality and improved efficiency and security. Most Haitian households receive remittances from their kin in the diaspora, with more than

⁶³ At such checkpoints, instead of blocking the road, the extortioner hides (conceals himself) in nearby buildings and watches over the road to note those passing and then follows them to demand an extortion fee. That way, the checkpoint is “concealed”. Interviews with a Haitian National Police officer, a victim of extortion from Delmas and two civil society activists. Port-au-Prince, February 2026.

70% coming from the United States,⁶⁴ largely through these digital platforms, and this helps communities and households to cope, in addition to being an important source of capital for economic growth. Nonetheless, the remittance sector has become a major target for gangs because it is one of the few functioning financial lifelines in the country (see also annex 15).

2. Impersonation of Haitian National Police personnel by gang elements

55. Gangs are increasingly using various tactics that emulate police operations in order to conceal their identity. They impersonate Haitian National Police officers by wearing uniforms, bullet-proof vests and tactical equipment and using Police-branded patrol cars with fake plate numbers, enabling them to move freely. They are able to access even the green zone of Pétion-Ville to conduct surveillance and commit crimes. This can jeopardize police operations, as it can be difficult to differentiate the genuine police from gang impersonators.

56. This practice has been evolving for a while, and in 2022 the Haitian National Police issued a public statement warning people against this issue.⁶⁵ According to sources, this strategy is becoming more prevalent in cases of kidnapping for ransom, especially in high-end residential areas or restricted zones.⁶⁶

3. “Concealed” checkpoints

57. The apparent “reduced” visibility of gang activities does not necessarily mean that they are less operational in terms of revenue collection.⁶⁷ Despite police operations aiding in the reopening of some of the critical road networks, gangs still maintain control over road users, particularly cargo transporters of basic commodities (see annex 16).

B. Trends in the elvers⁶⁸ sector

1. Controlling the trade

58. Elvers remain one of the most lucrative and yet not well-regulated natural sources in Haiti (S/2025/597, paras. 122 and 123). The fishing season for American eel species (*Anguilla rostrata*) runs from 15 September to 14 March of the following year.⁶⁹

59. The elvers sector is fraught with secrecy, cartelism and high-handedness. Some politicians maintain control over the elvers sector by deciding who receives licences from the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development, which, prior to the naming of the new Cabinet in March 2026, was headed by an appointee of one particular political actor’s party. Bribery is a common feature of the licensing

⁶⁴ Haiti Libre, “Haiti - News: zapping...”, 6 January 2026. Available at www.haitilibre.com/en/news-46579-haiti-news-zapping.html.

⁶⁵ Haiti Libre, “Haiti - Insecurity: new measures of the PNH against fake police”, 4 March 2026. Available at www.haitilibre.com/en/news-36093-haiti-insecurity-new-measures-of-the-pnh-against-fake-police.html.

⁶⁶ Interviews with a Haitian National Police official, a gang analyst and a civil society member. Port-au-Prince, February 2026.

⁶⁷ Interview with a fuel tank operator in Pétion-Ville, January 2026.

⁶⁸ “Elvers” are young eels, also known as baby eels, juvenile eels or glass eels, or as “zangi” or “tizangi” in Haitian Creole. These are baby eels undergoing mass migration upriver from the sea. See <https://eeldepot.com/elver/>.

⁶⁹ Interviews with national authorities and actors involved in the elvers sector in the Dominican Republic and Haiti during the Panel’s visit, 15–24 October 2025.

process. Some licensees also offer other favours, such as incorporating the political actor's elver exports into their own exports.⁷⁰

60. Ten export permits issued by the Ministry for the 2025/26 elvers export season were used for exports totalling 2,180 kg between 15 September and 28 February 2026.⁷¹ This is down from about 20 licences recorded by the Panel in the 2024/25 export season (S/2025/597, text box under para. 131).

61. Most names on the permits are of wealthy influential individuals in Haitian society. Sources with inside knowledge of the licensing process informed the Panel that some of the 10 exporters who were denied licences resorted to smuggling of their stocks out of Haiti regardless. This was in addition to about 30 others who have never been licensed, and who regularly export clandestinely.⁷² According to an environmentalist, the eels trade in Haiti is not organized and clear and reliable data are not recorded – whether at the level of the fishermen or the Government. It is more like a criminal network.⁷³ Another source added that “in short, even exports that are accompanied by official documents are often fraudulent, since the taxes are rarely paid and the actual weight is sometimes concealed. The country is losing revenue on all sides. The fact that Haiti is not a Party to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) makes it vulnerable”⁷⁴

2. Smuggling of Haitian elvers

62. In 2026, the approximate wholesale price range for live baby eels from Haiti that are later exported for aquaculture ponds was \$0.34–1.70 per kilogram (see annex 17), while the same goes for \$3,000–5,000 per kilogram (composed of 700–1,000 elvers) on the international markets.⁷⁵

63. The Panel noted that smugglers from countries in the region, operating in conjunction with Haitian nationals, hop from the shores of one island to another in the Caribbean region, including Haiti, to buy elvers from fishermen. Two fishermen from the Bas Limbé area and an elvers transporter from the Borgne area, both in the North Department of Haiti, described to the Panel how traders aboard unmarked boats approach them on the shorelines during fishing sessions at night, offering to pay double the price offered by local buyers.⁷⁶

64. Those denied licences in Haiti sometimes try to smuggle elvers out through neighbouring countries. The Panel documented several such cases (S/2025/356, para. 77).

65. In one instance, the Dominican Council of Fisheries and Aquaculture,⁷⁷ the designated authority that licenses the fishing and export of elvers, explained to the Panel how two Dominican-registered companies had sought permission to transport

⁷⁰ Confidential sources in the elvers supply chain. Port-au-Prince, February 2026.

⁷¹ Based on the export permits used between September and February 2026, and seen by the Panel.

⁷² Interviews with a customs official, a cargo logistics official and a former Minister of Finance. Port-au-Prince, February 2026.

⁷³ Agence France-Presse, “Pictures: Haitian gangs are profiting from baby eels sold abroad”, NDTV World, 18 November 2025. Available at www.ndtv.com/world-news/pictures-haitian-gangs-are-profiting-from-baby-eels-sold-abroad-9654090.

⁷⁴ Interview with a senior customs official. Port-au-Prince, February 2026.

⁷⁵ Yuan Wang, “Priced at thousands of dollars per kilogram, baby eels have set off a global frenzy”, *The Walrus*, 18 February 2026. Available at <https://thewalrus.ca/priced-at-thousands-of-dollars-per-kilogram-baby-eels-have-set-off-a-global-frenzy/>.

⁷⁶ Interviews with two fishermen and a transporter. Cap-Haïtien, 24 October 2025.

⁷⁷ See <https://codopesca.gob.do/todos-los-servicios/>.

eels from Haiti, with transit through the Dominican Republic, to international markets for a period of five years (see annex 18).

66. At the time of drafting, the Dominican Council of Fisheries and Aquaculture informed the Panel that the two companies had cancelled the deal and that it was not aware of any entity handling such transits. The Council concluded that it was an attempt to smuggle elvers out of Haitian territory.

C. Other trends in illicit financial flows

67. The Panel is investigating other trends in illicit financial flows that contribute to the denial of the basic needs of the Haitian people. Some of these cases involve the financing of gang-related activities.

1. Diversion of public funds from critical sectors

68. Further to the list of pending cases of diversion of public resources (S/2025/597, paras. 133–135 and annex 37), the Panel has continued to investigate more cases that have an impact on the critical sectors at the core of the peace, stability and livelihoods of Haitians. As at the time of drafting, the anti-corruption agency had submitted at least 63 investigation reports to the judiciary. The cases relate to embezzlement, mismanagement and corruption in various public sectors that are critical to the livelihoods of Haitians.⁷⁸

2. Financing of gangs

69. One of the 63 reports mentioned in the previous paragraph relates to a case involving a former mayor of l'Arcahaie, West Department, who was arrested on 10 August 2025 in the Dominican Republic on charges of possessing undeclared foreign currency and cheques and is suspected of having links with gangs in Haiti.⁷⁹ Other reports seen by the Panel support information from interviews with several sources with knowledge of the matter, who described how close the suspect is to gang leaders, and the logistical support that she has been providing to gangs.

⁷⁸ Darbouze Figaro, “Seven new ULCC reports expose widespread public fund embezzlement – from the Youth Ministry to State television”, Caribbean Television Network, 29 September 2025. Available at <https://ctninfo.com/seven-new-ulcc-reports-expose-widespread-public-fund-embezzlement-from-the-youth-ministry-to-state-television/>.

⁷⁹ Edxon Francisque and Juhakenson Blaise, “Dominican Republic hands over former Arcahaie mayor in corruption probe”, 15 August 2025. Available at <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/08/15/former-arcahaie-mayor-deported-from-dominican-republic/>.

Annexes

<u>Annex 1: Methodology and Opportunity to Reply</u>	21
<u>Annex 2: Some security operations in Port-au-Prince and Delmas communes conducted from late 2025.....</u>	22
<u>Annex 3: Severe weakening of Les Argentins due to Viv Ansanm infighting</u>	26
<u>Annex 4: Large-scale security operations in Croix-des-Bouquets commune, West department</u>	28
<u>Annex 5: Public display of newly installed gang members, mostly children, by Lanmo San Jou</u>	30
<u>Annex 6: Kenscoff commune under persistent gang pressure</u>	31
<u>Annex 7: Other human rights violations.....</u>	33
<u>Annex 8.1 : Internally Displaced Persons from Pont Sondé in Artibonite as of 2 December 2025.</u>	35
<u>Annex 8.2: Internally Displaced Persons from L'Estère in Artibonite as of 2 December 2025.</u>	36
<u>Annex 8.3: Internally Displaced Persons from Port-au-Prince as of 10 January, 2026.</u>	37
<u>Annex 8.4: Inhabitants of Pont Sondé, Artibonite department, forced to flee their homes due to attacks by the Gran Grif gang, 29 November 2025</u>	38
<u>Annex 9: Panel's visit to IDP sites in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.....</u>	39
<u>Annex 10: Civilian victims of explosive drones in Bel-Air, 6 January 2026.</u>	43
<u>Annex 11: Civilian casualties from police operation in Delmas 6, Port-au-Prince, 14 January 2026.</u>	44
<u>Annex 12: Challenges to the rule of law and human rights protection.....</u>	45
<u>Annex 13: Preliminary findings on recent arms embargo violations.....</u>	47
<u>Annex 14: 12.7x99mm ammunition (.50cal) illicitly acquired by 400 Mawozo</u>	49
<u>Annex 15: The dynamics of gang revenue collection.....</u>	50
<u>Annex 16: Extortion.....</u>	51
<u>Annex 17: A snapshot of the 2026 prices of elvers sourced from Haiti, as of March 2026.</u>	52
<u>Annex 18 : The two letters from CODOPESCA to the Customs. In both letters CODOPESCA explains how two Dominican-registered companies are seeking to transit elvers exports from Haiti through the Dominican Republic's territory. In the letters, CODOPESCA is calling upon the Customs to observe that the transiting elvers meets the set standard and have the correct documentation.....</u>	53

Annex 1: Methodology and Opportunity to Reply

The Panel adopted a decision rule of consensus, meaning that all members of the Panel were required to agree on the text, findings and recommendations of the report. However, if any member of the Panel had a difference of opinion or reservation, the report could still be adopted by a majority vote of three out of four members.

The Panel reviewed social media and other open sources, but no information was used as evidence unless it could be corroborated by multiple independent sources. This was done to ensure that the information was reliable and met the highest achievable standard of proof.

The Panel provides individuals and entities recommended for sanctioning the opportunity to reply. This gives individuals the opportunity to present an alternative narrative and to provide concrete and specific evidence in their support.

The Panel's methodology for the opportunity to reply is as follows:


1. Providing an individual with an opportunity to reply should be the norm.
2. An individual may not be given the opportunity to reply if the Panel concludes, based on their own assessment, that there is a risk that by doing so it would:
 - a) Result in the individual destroying evidence, tampering with a witness or moving assets if they receive advance notice of a possible recommendation for designation;
 - b) Restrict the Panel's further access to places or vital sources;
 - c) Endanger Panel sources or Panel members;
 - d) Jeopardise humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field including the United Nations or any other local or international organizations; or
 - e) For any reason that is clearly justified by the circumstances.

After an individual or entity is designated by the Sanctions Committee, it is possible to request a de-listing process through the mechanism established by the Sanctions Committee.⁸⁰

⁸⁰ See <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2653/guidelines> and see also <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2653/materials/procedures-Delisting>

Annex 2: Some security operations in Port-au-Prince and Delmas communes conducted from late 2025

Since late 2025, intensified security operations have been aiming at establishing a buffer zone around the *Autorité Portuaire Nationale* (APN). This entailed the targeting of the La Saline, Tokyo, Krache Dife and Delmas 6 gangs (in Port-au-Prince commune and Delmas commune) to restore truck traffic and reopen key logistical corridors to the city center as well as national road 2 (RN2) leading to Haiti's southern part.



Source: Map elaborated based on UN data in 2023, modified by the Panel

The boundaries and names shown, and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

According to the HNP, during these operations, several gang members were killed - although no consolidated number on casualties was provided - and weapons and rounds of ammunition were seized. According to some observers, areas such as Delmas 30 (Delmas commune), Nazon and Solino (Port-au-Prince commune), and Christ-Roy (bordering area between Delmas and Port-au-Prince communes) have slowly restarted their daily regular activities. Haitian authorities have also reestablished control over Carrefour Aéroport - an intersection lying along a key route connecting the city center to the area of the international airport, after nearly two years of gang control. The reopening of a police station in the area and the return of street vendors mark nascent signs of recovery. However, many homes and businesses in these areas remain in ruins and residents continue to fear for their safety. From around mid-January to mid-February 2026, there have been no documented cases by BINUH of people killed in Bas Delmas and Bel-Air, except for a few incidents in which gang members returned to carry out reprisals against residents, accusing them of collaborating with the police⁸¹.

HNP operation in Bel-Air (Port-au-Prince commune)	
 Direction de Communication de la Police (DICOP) NOTE DE PRESSE Récupération d'un important arsenal à la suite d'une opération à Bel-Air Port-au-Prince, Mercredi 31 décembre 2025 - La Police Nationale d'Haïti (PNH) annonce avoir mené, le mardi 30 décembre 2025, une opération dans le fief de Jamesley à Bel-Air, ciblant les gangs terroristes qui y sévissent. Cette opération, appuyée par la Task Force, a permis la saisie d'un armement considérable et varié, ainsi que la neutralisation de plusieurs bandits affiliés au groupe de Jamesley. L'arsenal récupéré a été formellement enregistré et attesté par le Service Armement de la Direction de la Logistique de la PNH, selon les procédures en vigueur.  Facebook X Instagram	 Direction de Communication de la Police (DICOP) NOTE DE PRESSE Le matériel saisi comprend un large éventail d'armes et d'équipements. Parmi les pièces notables figurent un drone de type Mavic, des armes de poing (dont des pistolets 9mm et 22mm, certains falsifiés), des armes d'assaut (un fusil M16, un fusil Kalachnikov falsifié, des pistolets mitrailleurs 9mm), ainsi que trois fusils de calibre 12. L'opération a également permis la saisie d'équipements logistiques (batteries, chargeurs, radio) et d'armes blanches (machette, hache). Le plus significatif reste la récupération de plusieurs milliers de munitions de guerre, avec 4 094 cartouches de calibre 5.56mm et 867 cartouches de calibre 7.62mm, démontrant une capacité de nuisance élevée. Cette opération constitue un succès retentissant pour les forces de l'ordre haïtiennes. Elle porte un coup sévère aux capacités opérationnelles des gangs terroristes à Bel-Air en les privant d'un arsenal conséquent, en neutralisant plusieurs de leurs membres et en détruisant la maison du chef de gang. La Police Nationale d'Haïti réaffirme sa détermination absolue à poursuivre et intensifier sans relâche ses interventions sur l'ensemble du territoire national. La traque de Jamesley, en fuite, reste une priorité. L'objectif reste inchangé : traquer, démanteler et éradiquer définitivement ces groupes criminels afin de rétablir la sécurité, la paix publique et l'autorité de l'État pour tous les citoyens. -FIN- Direction de Communication de la Police (DICOP) Facebook X Instagram

Source: Facebook page, 31 December 2025

Operation in the house of gang leader Jamesley, in Bel-Air (Port-au-Prince commune)
 Direksyon Kominikasyon Polis la (DIKOP) KOMINIKasyon POU LAPRES  Yon zam fannfwo, yon jilè pabal ak lòt materyèl sezi nan Bèlè Pòtoprens, Mèkredi 7 janvye 2026 - Nan kad operasyon yo kap mennen nan Bèlè, Polis Nasyonal la sezi plizyè materyèl tankou yon M16, yon chajè, yon jilè pabal Lapolis, 2 longvi, yon kas balistik, ak lòt ankò, mèkredi 7 janvye 2026 lan. Polisyè yo ta jwenn materyèl sa yo nan yon kay ki trouve l nan do kay chèf gang Jamesley. Nan kay sila a, fòs lòd yo ta jwenn yon mesye, yon dam ak de timoun. -FIN- Direksyon Kominikasyon Polis la (DIKOP) Facebook X Instagram

Source: Facebook page, 7 January 2026

⁸¹ Interviews with gang and human right analysts, police officers and former government official working on anti-gang operations, February 2026.

HNP operation in Delmas 2 (Delmas commune), targeting the Krache Dife gang base



Direction de Communication de la Police (DICOP)



NOTE DE PRESSE

Opération policière à Delmas 2 : saisie de matériels dans une base de gang

Delmas, Jeudi 8 janvier 2026 - La Police Nationale d'Haïti (PNH) a mené, dans la soirée du mercredi 7 janvier 2026, une opération ciblée à Delmas 2, dans une zone identifiée comme repaire de l'un des chefs du gang criminel dénommé « Krache Dife », connu sous le nom de Jean Gardy.

Au cours de cette intervention, les forces de l'ordre ont procédé à la saisie d'un important lot de matériels tactiques, policiers, dont plusieurs armes lourdes, susceptibles de constituer une menace sérieuse pour la sécurité publique.

Matériels saisis :

- 5 radios de communication
- 2 bonbonnes de gaz lacrymogène
- 4 gilets pare-balles



Direction de Communication de la Police (DICOP)



NOTE DE PRESSE

- 4 gilets tactiques
- 4 chargeurs pour fusil M14
- 2 plaques balistiques
- 4 uniformes (CIMO, CAT, UDMO, USGPN)
- 2 fusils d'assaut M4,
- 2 fusils calibre 12
- 1 seau de munitions 5.56 mm
- 1 gilet avec l'inscription « Presse »

Cette opération s'inscrit dans la stratégie d'intensification de la lutte contre les gangs armés et leur capacité de nuisance. La PNH réaffirme sa détermination à poursuivre ses actions pour démanteler ces réseaux criminels, protéger la population et rétablir l'ordre dans les zones sous tension.

-FIN-

Direction de Communication de la Police (DICOP)



Source: HNP Facebook page, 8 January 2026

Joint security operation in Delmas 2 (Delmas commune) targeting the Tokyo gang



Direction de Communication de la Police (DICOP)



Saisie d'un important lot d'armes et de munitions comprenant notamment des armes des pistolets des fusils de calibre 12 et de type AR-15 ainsi qu'une quantité considérable de munitions à Tokyo Delmas 2

COMMUNIQUÉ DE PRESSE

Opération à Delmas 2 : plusieurs armes saisies et au moins six (6) mortellement blessés

Delmas, Lundi 19 janvier 2026 - La Direction Communication de la Police (DICOP) informe le public qu'une opération policière d'envergure a été conduite à Delmas 2, précisément dans la zone de Tokyo, par des unités spécialisées de la Police Nationale d'Haïti (PNH).

Au cours de cette intervention, six (6) bandits armés ont été mortellement blessés, tandis que plusieurs autres ont été atteints. Plusieurs véhicules utilisés par les assaillants ont également été détruits lors des échanges avec les forces de l'ordre.

Cette opération a permis la saisie d'un important lot d'armes et de munitions comprenant notamment :

- cinq (5) drones ;
- huit (8) pistolets ;



Direction de Communication de la Police (DICOP)



Saisie d'un important lot d'armes et de munitions comprenant notamment des armes des pistolets des fusils de calibre 12 et de type AR-15 ainsi qu'une quantité considérable de munitions à Tokyo Delmas 2

COMMUNIQUÉ DE PRESSE

- dix-huit (18) fusils de calibre 12 ;
- trois (3) fusils de type AR-15 ;
- un (1) fusil de calibre .22 ;
- une quantité considérable de munitions de calibres 5.56, 12, 7.62, .38 et 9 mm.

Par ailleurs, des uniformes de l'UDMO de couleurs crème et bleue portant des insignes de grade d'Inspecteur de Police ont été récupérés, ainsi que plusieurs gilets pare-balles, des gaz lacrymogènes et des sachets contenant de petites coupures de billets de 2, 10 et 25 gourdes.

La Police Nationale d'Haïti réaffirme sa ferme détermination à lutter sans relâche contre le grand banditisme et à rétablir l'ordre public ainsi que la sécurité sur l'ensemble du territoire national.

-FIN-

Direction de Communication de la Police (DICOP)



Source: HNP Facebook page, 19 January 2026.

**Joint operation at Delmas 6 (Delmas commune), stronghold of Barbeque
with certain of his residences hit by drone strike**



Direksyon Kominikasyon Polis la (DIKOP)

KOMINIKE POU LAPRÈS

Operasyon Lapolis lakay chèf gang Babercue Delma, Mèkredi 14 janvye 2026 - Polis Nasyonal Ayiti (PNH) ap fè popilasyon an konnen pou jodi mèkredi 14 janvye a, gen yon operasyon l ap mennen nan tèt kole ak Fòs Lame Ayiti (FAD'H), Task Fòs, FSG epi PMC lakay chèf gang teworis Barbeque, nan Delma 6.

Operasyon sa a vize dechouke tout bandi teworis ki okipe katye sila a epi tabli lapè ladan l.

-FINI-

Direksyon Kominikasyon Polis la (DIKOP)



Source: Facebook page, 14 January 2026

Stills from video shared on social media, 15 January 2026

Annex 3: Severe weakening of Les Argentins⁸² due to *Viv Ansanm* infighting

Jimmy Chérizier (alias “Barbeque” - HTi.001), the spokesperson for *Viv Ansanm*, has regularly depicted gangs as advancing a political cause, including announcing the launch of *Viv Ansanm* as a political party, in January 2025 (see paragraph 18 of S/2025/356). However, this did not result in any substantive follow-up action. Gang leaders - including Barbeque, Christ-Roi Chery (alias “Chrisla”) and Wilson Joseph (alias “Lanmo San Jou” - HTi. 004) - label their gangs as armed groups or *nèg ak zam* (‘men with weapons’ in Haitian Creole) to assert a degree of social legitimacy.

To preserve their narrative that *Viv Ansanm* is acting in the interests of the population, Kempes Sanon (alias “Kempes”, HTi.009), the head of Les Argentins which controls the Bel-Air area (Port-au-Prince commune), was warned by some of the alliance’s main gang leaders to halt all kidnapping activity. Kempes ignored the warning and continued to conduct further kidnappings⁸³, which has typically constituted a significant portion of the gang’s revenues (see S/2025/597, S/2024/704, S/2023/674).

Kempes first ignored Wilson Joseph’s call to release an elderly woman who could not pay the ransom, a decision that angered other *Viv Ansanm* leaders. Yet the decisive factor for the significant destabilization of Les Argentins came when the gang kidnapped two female relatives of a leader of Krache Dife in Delmas 31 (Delmas commune). This prompted the Krache Dife gang leader, Jean Gardy (alias “Pece Pim Pim”), to mobilise his gang and the Tokyo one, led by Wooddensley Saintilaire (alias “Chalè”) to attack Les Argentins⁸⁴. Consequently, on 8 and 9 December 2025, at least 63 members of the Les Argentins gang were killed (including 42 men, 11 women and 10 boys) and 11 others (8 men and 3 boys)⁸⁵ injured and their houses burned by the Krache Dife and Tokyo gangs. Dèdè, a senior figure within the gang was decapitated.

A few days later, on 10 December 2025, Jimmy Chérizier appeared in a video with six people, including a 12-year-old girl and an 18-year-old man, that he claimed were former hostages of Kempes and were released by *Viv Ansanm*, which he said was “fighting for the country”⁸⁶.



⁸² This annex is based on interviews with gang and human rights analysts, a senior police officer as well as with an individual living in gang-controlled area and a former government officer working on anti-gang operations, 2026.

⁸³ Interviews with gang analysts, former government officer working on anti-gang operations, individual working on gang-controlled area. 2026.

⁸⁴ Interviews with gang analysts, January 2026.

⁸⁵ Interview with human rights analyst and BINUH Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti: October-December 2025.

⁸⁶ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vGw5tyuB2N0>

Kempes was taken to to be ‘judged’ by him. His life was spared to convey an image of fraternity among *Viv Ansanm* leaders⁸⁷, however, around fifteen members of Les Argentins accompanying Kempes were executed⁸⁸. Kempes has sought refuge with other gang leaders, first with Jeff Larose (alias “Jeff”), head of the Canaan gang, and later with Renel Destina (alias “Ti Lapli” – HTi.003), leader of the Grand Ravine gang⁸⁹. Kempes was replaced by Jamesley, deployed by Barbeque to control the area. Security forces took advantage of this episode of infighting to make gains in the area (see Annex 2).



Following the Les Argentins’s severe weakening, Bel-Air was under pressure from the 5 Second gang, led by Johnson André (alias “Izo” – HTi.002), who placed members of his *Unité Village de Dieu* (UVD – see Annex 24 of the Panel’s final report S/2024/704) team in Bel-Air.

⁸⁷ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KgaQRXeZySg>


⁸⁸ Interview with gang analysts, January and February 2026, and BINUH Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti: October-December 2025

⁸⁹ Interviews with gang analysts, individual working in gang-controlled area and former government official working on anti-gang operations, February 2026.

Annex 4: Large-scale security operations in Croix-des-Bouquets commune, West department

The year 2025 closed with a large-scale coordinated security operation - involving the HNP, the FAd'H, the GSF and private contractors - deployed mid-November 2025 in areas of the Croix-des-Bouquets commune, aiming at weakening the capacity of the 400 Mawozo gang. The gang had blocked several sections of the National Road 3 (RN3) and significantly expanded its influence over the Artibonite and Centre departments, since March 2025, alongside the Canaan gang (see section II.A.3 of S/2025/597).

Ground and aerial operations led to the seizure of weapons and ammunition, including a Barrett M82 rifle - retrieved at the residence of Ti-Lion, a key 400 Mawozo gang member and close associate of its leader, Lanmo San Jou⁹⁰ (see section IV.A)- and other material, such as a bulldozer used to erect road barricades and destroy State infrastructure. The UN reported at least 101 male gang members killed (including at least 12 children aged 15 to 17-years old) and 13 adult male gang members injured⁹¹.



The mid-November operations involving several specialized police units, many armoured vehicles, and aerial capacity, came few days after gang members from the 400 Mawozo gang stormed the premises of a prominent Haitian family, in Croix-des-Bouquets⁹².

Operations have continued in Croix-des-Bouquets commune aimed at including clearing strategic axes and weakening the Mawozo 400 gang, notably in Carrefour Marassa, Duval and Santo 25. According to police officers and individuals working on anti-gang operations⁹³, extremely well-armed gangs have intensified their methods, currently using trenches, traps, and Molotov cocktails, particularly in the West and Artibonite departments.


⁹⁰ Interviews with police officer, gang analysts, former government official working on anti-gang operations, 2025 and 2026.

⁹¹ UN confidential report, 21 November 2025.

⁹² <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VbY7JxEy6dE>; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oggdTYV7MbA>

⁹³ Interviews with police officers and individuals working in anti-gang operations, 2025 and 2026.

Trenches and road blockages in Croix-des-Bouquets prevent movement in the area



Stills from drone images shared in February 2026 provided by the HNP

Cocktails Molotov seized by the Police in Carrefour Marassa, late February 2026



Source: HNP Facebook page, 27 February 2026.

Annex 5: Public display of newly installed gang members, mostly children, by Lanmo San Jou

Video showing newly recruited gang members of the 400 Mawozo gang, underscoring their young age, being initiated through a ritual ceremony	
	
	
Source: Stills from video shared with the Panel on 30 January 2026	

Annex 6: Kenscoff commune under persistent gang pressure

The commune of Carrefour, under the control of the Ti Bwa gang, has been consistently used as a haven for gangs, from where gang members are notably advancing towards Kenscoff.



Source: UN Global Service Centre, © OpenStreetMap contributors – modified by the Panel. Visited March 2026.

The boundaries and names shown, and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

After the first major attack against Kenscoff, on 27 January 2025 (see Annex 5 of S/2025/597), gangs such as 5 Second, Grand Ravine, Canaan and Ti Bwa still occupy areas across the communal sections of Bongars, Nouvelle-Touraine, Sourcailles and Grand Fond⁹⁴.

Children and weapons belonging to the 5 Second gang in Kenscoff



Stills from video and photos shared on social media on 26 January 2026

⁹⁴ Interview with local authority, 23 January 2026.

During the reporting period, several attacks occurred – including in Madeleine, Morne Tranchant, Tête-K-Jaques and Galette⁹⁵. For instance, the locality of Tête K-Jaques in the Nouvelle-Touraine communal section was the scene of extreme violence. On 30 November 2025, gang members killed nine residents – including hacking some to death with machetes and burning their bodies – and set their homes on fire⁹⁶. Another violent raid against the same area, in late January 2026, resulted in the killing of at least ten people – including a four-month child that was killed by a gang member from 5 Second group led by Didi⁹⁷.

On 27 December 2025, in Galette, members of the same group deliberately opened fire on a group of farmers as they were heading to their fields, resulting in at least four casualties⁹⁸. Moreover, the locality of Madeleine was attacked on 16 January 2026. Several houses were burned, plantations destroyed and livestock stolen.

Early February 2026, 80 additional members from the Ti Bwa gang, led by Christ-Roi Chery (alias “Chrisla”), arrived in the locality of Belot; with some heading to Viard, in the communal section of Sourçailles⁹⁹. Later, during the night of 2 to 3 February 2026, Viard was attacked, leading to casualties and the burning of properties¹⁰⁰.

Despite these and many other attacks that have killed a large number of individuals and led to kidnappings in the commune, no major security operation has been carried out since 24 August 2025. The security pressure over gangs in downtown area has pushed gang members into the remote areas of Kenscoff, which are hard for security forces to access, due to mountainous paths. Local authorities have been actively calling on central state authorities to provide more resources to combat gangs in the commune, particularly in areas like Belot, Godet, and Sourçailles (see Annex 6 of S/2025/597).

Victims of 5 Second attack against Tête K-Jaques, during the night of 29 to 30 January 2026	
Four-month-old boy killed by a gang member named Barak (His mother was injured)	
Graphic images with gruesome content	Graphic images with gruesome content
Graphic images with gruesome content	Graphic images with gruesome content
Source: Photos shared with the Panel on 31 January 2026	

⁹⁵ Interview with local authority, November 2025.
⁹⁶ Interviews with local authority and UNPOL report, 28 November to 4 December 2025.
⁹⁷ Interview with resident of affected area, 30 January 2026.
⁹⁸ UNPOL report, 2 to 8 January 2026.
⁹⁹ Confidential sources, 4 February 2026.
¹⁰⁰ UNPOL report, 30 January to 5 February 2026.

Annex 7: Other human rights violations

In accordance with its mandate, the Panel has adopted a comprehensive approach to investigating human rights violations in Haiti. While gangs remain the primary perpetrators of such violations, the Panel has also documented the role of certain public officials, former politicians, and economic actors who either directly support gangs or contribute to the weakening of State institutions mandated to counter them.

As Haiti continues to face a critical multidimensional crisis, the Panel remains committed to investigating all parties involved in these violations. In addition to the violations documented in the present report, including sexual and gender-based violence, the recruitment of children, obstructions of humanitarian access and assistance, and the use of lethal force, the Panel is closely monitoring the following human rights concerns:

1. Food insecurity

From September 2025 to February 2026, 5.7 million people faced acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 1.9 million in emergency conditions (IPC Phase 4) and 3.8 million in crisis (IPC Phase 3). A deterioration of the situation is projected for March-June 2026.¹⁰¹ As of January 2026, more than 130,000 children under five were affected by acute malnutrition.¹⁰²

Gang violence in Haiti has severely disrupted local economies through multiple interrelated mechanisms. Gangs control strategic zones—including access to ports, commercial routes, and urban business districts—impose systematic extortion on merchants, small businesses, and market vendors. On key transport corridors, gangs operate illegal checkpoints where they tax buses, trucks, and public vehicles, effectively controlling access to markets and paralyzing the flow of goods between departments. Agricultural production has also been directly targeted, with attacks on farmers and rural communities in the Artibonite and Centre departments destroying crops, livestock, and livelihoods as well as conducting land spoliation. These are some of factors that contribute to the food insecurity in Haiti.

2. IDPs, returnees and deportees

a) IDP's

According to the IOM, as of 6 January 2026, a total of 1,450,254 are internally displaced across Haiti,¹⁰³ representing a 39 per cent increase since the end of 2024. This surge is directly linked to the deteriorating security situation, particularly in the Artibonite and Centre departments, where intensified gang violence has forced thousands to flee their homes. The Artibonite department recorded the highest increase during the reporting period (23 per cent), while the most pronounced spikes since late 2024 were observed in the Centre (140 per cent), Great North (98 per cent), and Artibonite (77 per cent) regions.¹⁰⁴ See Annex 8.

About 32 per cent of IDPs have been forced to move multiple times, with repeated displacement more acutely affecting households residing in sites (40 per cent) compared to those living with host families (29 per cent). The capital remains the sole region where site-based accommodation predominates, hosting 68 per cent of its IDP population in 95 spontaneous sites, with an average density of 2,078 persons per site. In contrast, only 2 per cent of IDPs in the provinces reside in sites, spread across 134 sites averaging just 149 persons each.¹⁰⁵

Since November 2025, the number of active spontaneous sites has increased from 219 to 229. The metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince continues to host 91 per cent of all site-based IDPs. During its visit to IDP sites, the Panel observed overcrowding and appalling living conditions and in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. The Panel also noted that spontaneous sites, although intended as temporary, have become increasingly permanent, generating friction¹⁰⁶ with property owners

¹⁰¹ See <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1159760/>

¹⁰² See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/unicef-haiti-humanitarian-situation-report-no-8-31-december-2025>

¹⁰³ See <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-report-internal-displacement-situation-round-12-december-2025?close=true>

¹⁰⁴ See <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-report-internal-displacement-situation-round-12-december-2025?close=true>

¹⁰⁵ Idem.

¹⁰⁶ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-rapport-danalyse-cohabitation-personnes-deplacees-interne-communautes-hotes-impacts-socio-economiques-historique-de-deplacement-et-intentions-de-retour-septembre-2025>

(including schools, private residences, and churches) and straining already fragile social services, leading to tensions with neighboring communities.

Many IDPs interviewed by the Panel expressed concerns regarding the lack of personal identification documents (birth certificates and identity cards (*carte d'identification nationale*)). The absence of such documentation undermines their rights to legal personality and to identity, as recognized under articles 6 and 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 16 and 24 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Furthermore, this situation may constitute a significant impediment to the exercise of their right to vote in the upcoming elections, thereby threatening their broader participation in public life.

b) Deportees and returnees

The commune of Belladère, Centre department, is the main point of entry for returnees from the Dominican Republic, being the destination for more than half of all arrivals in 2025.¹⁰⁷ Between 800 to 1,000 deportees arrive daily in Belladère, and approximately 110,241 IDPs fleeing violence reside there.¹⁰⁸ Most of the deportees become IDPs as they entered Haiti. Since they are unable to return to their communities of origin or to move to a safer place.

The Dominican General Directorate of Migration reported that during 2025, a total of 379,553 Haitian nationals in an irregular immigration situation were deported from the Dominican Republic to Haiti. This figure represents an 84 per cent increase compared to the cumulative number of deportations recorded between 2021 and 2025, and is ten times higher than the number of deportations documented in 2016.¹⁰⁹

On 6 February 2026, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) raised concerns over Dominican Republic migration measures affecting people in human mobility, including healthcare access and detention conditions. It noted the expulsion of 310,499 Haitians in the first ten months of 2025 and urged compliance with international human rights standards.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ See <https://fscluster.org/haiti/document/haiti-secteur-securite-alimentaire-28>


¹⁰⁸ See <https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ECHO-Products/Echo-Flash#/echo-flash-items/30231> Regarding the number of Haitian nationals deported from the Dominican Republic, it is important to note that many individuals return to the Dominican Republic shortly after being deported, resulting in a circular pattern of movement. Consequently, the figures reflect the total number of deportation events recorded during the reporting period, rather than the number of unique individuals, as a single person may be subject to multiple deportations over time.

¹⁰⁹ <https://migracion.gob.do/dgm-deporto-379553-extranjeros-irregulares-en-2025-y-proceso-20-4-millones-de-documentos-de-viajeros/>

¹¹⁰ See <https://www.oas.org/en/IACHR/jsForm/?File=/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2026/023.asp>

Annex 8.1: Internally Displaced Persons from Pont Sondé in Artibonite as of 2 December 2025.

Following gang attacks that occurred on 29 and 30 November 2025 in Pont Sondé, Artibonite department, approximately 5,351 people (1,292 households) were displaced, in addition to the loss of life and the destruction of homes by fire.




“International Organization for Migration (IOM), Dec 02 2025. DTM Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 80 — Displacement following armed attacks in Pont Sondé in Artibonite (29 November - 1 December 2025). IOM, Haiti.” Available at <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-80-displacement-following-armed-attacks-pont-sonde-artibonite?close=true> visited January 2026

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the above map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 8.2: Internally Displaced Persons from L'Estère in Artibonite as of 2 December 2025.

Following gang attacks that occurred on 1 December 2025 in L'Estère, Artibonite department, approximately 6,342 people (1,512 households) were displaced.




"International Organization for Migration (IOM), Dec 02, 2025. DTM Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 81 — Displacement following armed attacks in L'Estère in Artibonite (1 - 2 December 2025). IOM, Haiti." Available at <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-81-displacement-following-armed-attacks-lestere-artibonite-1> visited January 2026.

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the above map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 8.3: Internally Displaced Persons from Port-au-Prince as of 10 January 2026.

Following various clashes between State security forces and gangs on 8 January 2026 in the localities of Bel-Air, Wharf de la Saline, and Delmas 2 – Saint-Martin – Tokyo, in the municipality of Port-au-Prince, approximately 5,836 individuals (1,635 households) were displaced.



“International Organization for Migration (IOM), Jan 10, 2026. DTM Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 83 — Displacement following armed violence in Port-au-Prince (8 - 9 January 2026). IOM, Haiti.” Available at <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-83-displacement-following-armed-violences-port-au-prince-8-9?close=true> Visited February 2026.

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the above map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 8.4: Inhabitants of Pont Sondé, Artibonite department, forced to flee their homes due to attacks by the Gran Grif gang, 29 November 2025



Confidential Source.

Annex 9: Panel's visit to IDP sites in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area

On 18 February 2026, the Panel visited two sites hosting internally displaced persons as well as a community resource center providing social programs to displaced populations in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.

For security and confidentiality reasons, the Panel has decided not to disclose the names or specific locations of the sites visited.

Site 1





Source: Photos taken by the Panel, February 2026.

IDP site 1 has a population of about 6765 persons. Note: at the time of the Panel's visit the IDP site had not received any food since December 2025.

Site 2





Source: Photos taken by the Panel, February 2026.

IDP site 2 has a population of about 1531 persons. The population at this site was suffering from severe overcrowding and lack of basic services.

Annex 10: Civilian victims of explosive drones in Bel-Air, 6 January 2026

Graphic images with gruesome content

Confidential source.

Annex 11: Civilian casualties from police operation in Delmas 6, Port-au-Prince, 14 January 2026

Graphic images with gruesome content

Annex 12: Challenges to the rule of law and human rights protection

The Panel finds that the following actions jeopardizes the rule of law and human rights protection in Haiti.

1. Decree on the Organization and Functioning of the High Court of Justice

On 17 December 2025, the Transitional Presidential Council adopted a decree establishing the High Court of Justice as the exclusive judicial body with jurisdiction to prosecute current or former high-ranking State officials for crimes and misdemeanours committed in the exercise of their functions.¹¹¹ The decree establishes a complex procedural mechanism requiring a two-thirds majority vote in the Senate for any decision, and removes the jurisdiction of ordinary courts over such cases. Reports from anti-corruption and financial intelligence institutions must undergo multiple layers of validation, including review by the Council of Ministers, before transmission to the Chamber of Deputies.

The decree was adopted by the TPC a few weeks before the end of its mandate. According to most Haitian stakeholders the Panel spoke to, the aim of the decree might have been that the TPC was trying to shield high ranking public officials implicated in corruption from effective prosecution. It is important to recall that before the adoption of this decree, corruption charges had been filed against three out of nine members of the then TPC (see para 79 of S/2025/356).

Civil society organizations¹¹² and legal experts¹¹³ have raised concerns that the decree introduces procedural obstacles that may render prosecution of senior officials virtually impossible, effectively shielding them from accountability. The Panel recalls that Haiti is bound by its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantees the right to a fair trial before a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.

2. Freedom of Expression and Press Freedom

On 18 December 2025, the TPC adopted a decree regulating the exercise of freedom of expression, establishing a legal framework for the prevention and repression of defamation and press-related offenses. The decree introduces broadly formulated categories of prohibited speech, including dissemination of false information that may alter public order, incitement to violence or hatred, cyber-bullying, and attacks on dignity.¹¹⁴

The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has expressed concern regarding the scope and potential negative effects of the decree. Human rights defenders indicate that certain formulations may expand the scope of criminal liability and executive discretion in regulating media activity, raising questions regarding legal certainty and foreseeability.¹¹⁵ In the context of Haiti's ongoing political transition and security crisis, such measures may have implications for independent journalism and public debate.¹¹⁶

The Panel recalls Haiti's obligations under Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantee the right to freedom of expression subject only to restrictions that are provided by law and are necessary and proportionate to legitimate aims.

¹¹¹ Decree on file with the Panel.

¹¹² Letter from Nègès Mawon, Nou Pap Dòmi, POHDH and RNDDH addressed to the Prime Minister requesting him to repeal the 17 December 2025 decree creating the High Court of Justice, 16 January 2026. On file with the Panel.

¹¹³ Interviews with civil society members, state officials and international specialists, February, 2026.

¹¹⁴ Decree on file with the Panel.

¹¹⁵ https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/expression/media_center/preleases/2026/019.asp The Special Rapporteur indicates that he reiterated these conclusions and recommendations during the public hearing on "Haiti: Arms trafficking and its impact on human rights", held in November 2025 at the 194th Regular Period of Sessions of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), however, the State did not send representatives to the hearing.

¹¹⁶ See for instance: <https://ayibopost.com/reynold-deeb-seeks-to-have-negative-articles-mentioning-him-removed/> and <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/264925/preoccupe-le-cpj-appelle-le-pm-fils-aime-a-abroger-le-decret-sur-la-liberte-dexpression-et-la-diffamation>

3. Use of lethal force

As previously underscored by the Panel (S/2025/597), the use of force must be strictly regulated and exercised within a legal framework consistent with international human rights law, grounded in the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality, non-discrimination, precaution, and accountability. In that same report, the Panel expressed concern regarding the use of lethal force through drones in Haiti, particularly in densely populated areas.

The Haitian State, as well as any other entities acting on its behalf or with its authorization, must respect the right to life as protected under Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. Force must be used only as a last resort, and lethal force only when strictly unavoidable to protect life.

Based on a comprehensive review of United Nations data for 2025¹¹⁷, as well as testimonies obtained from victims and interviews conducted with human rights defenders and representatives of non-governmental organizations, the Panel finds that the number of civilians killed in security operations consistently exceeds the number of civilians injured. This pattern raises serious concerns regarding compliance with international human rights standards governing the use of lethal force.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ See <https://binuh.unmissions.org/fr/binuh/rapports-sur-la-situation-des-droits-de-lhomme>

¹¹⁸ See <https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/03/10/haiti-drone-strikes-put-residents-at-risk>

Annex 13: Preliminary findings on recent arms embargo violations

- 1) On 23 September 2025, two firearms – a .40 caliber handgun and a 5.56x45mm semi-automatic AR 15 pattern rifle – were seized in the cargo area of Port-au-Prince International Airport (PAP)¹¹⁹. A 78-year-old woman was arrested but quickly released.
- 2) On 24 October 2025, 245 magazines for handguns and 4,000 rounds of inert ammunition, as well as police uniforms, were seized by Customs at PAP Airport from unclaimed parcels delivered by Amerijet.



Seizure of 24 October 2025

Source: Haitian National Customs, 2025

- 3) In December 2025 and January 2026, a series of seizures were conducted in Cap-Haitien. Clement Mary Junior Thelusma was arrested in Cap-Haitien on 29 December 2025, following the seizure of two handguns, an AK-type rifle and 1800 rounds of ammunition from a container shipped from the United States. On 23 January 2026, a second parcel belonging to Mr. Thelusma was seized in another container in Cap-Haitien. The parcel contained two 5.56x45mm rifles, three 9mm handguns, twelve 5.56x45mm magazines, three 9mm magazines, as well as 3400 rounds of ammunition of various calibers. On 26 January 2026, a third seizure recovered 1,850 rounds of ammunition and two expired passports belonging to Mr. Thelusma.

While the Panel is still investigating the case, preliminary findings indicate that Mr. Thelusma is a US citizen who travels back and forth between the United States and Cap-Haitien, and regularly smuggles small quantities of materiel into the country in containers.



Seizure of 29 December 2025

Source: confidential

¹¹⁹ Information provided by Haitian Customs, October 2025.



Seizure of 23 January 2026

Source : HNP Facebook page, 25 January 2026



Seizure of 26 January 2026

Source : confidential

- 4) On 7 January 2026, the Haitian police arrested Joseph Cedernier as he arrived at a container terminal in Cap-Haitien to pick up a parcel that contained nine handguns and 5,500 rounds of 7.62x39mm ammunition.



Seizure of 6 January 2026

Source: confidential

Annex 14: 12.7x99mm ammunition (.50cal) illicitly acquired by 400 Mawozo

The images below are stills from videos posted on social media by Wilson Joseph, alias “Lanmo San Jou” (Hti.004), leader of the 400 Mawozo gang, showing 50. Cal ammunition with a distinctive yellow tip.



Source: Video shared on social media, 2024

Ammunition seized from 400 Mawozo in 2025 and documented by the Panel:



50 cal. Ammunition produced in 1958 in the Dominican Republic

Annex 15: The dynamics of gang revenue collection

The ongoing security operations, particularly the use of drone attacks have sent fear among some gangs. Gangs have adapted to the situation by adopting new ways in which they collect revenue, and/or by concealing the way they do it. Notable among the many ways they do this include:

1. Extortion of remittances

According to four victims of gang extortion,¹²⁰ gangs have recruited agents working in some of those remittance houses as informants. In other cases, they deploy “watchers”. These individuals identify recipients of significant amounts of cash and communicate the information to gang members who then waylay the targeted persons along the way, at a distance from points of remittance collection. One victim whose \$1,700USD was robbed from him in Delmas 6, and a mother of four whose \$800USD for subsistence were robbed from her in Tabarre, narrated to the Panel the circumstances leading to their losses in January and February 2026 respectfully.

Another victim from Kenscoff stated that on 15 February 2025, he went to withdraw \$1,200USD sent by his brother in the diaspora to his digital account, only for the agent to deduct a mandatory “facilitation” fee of \$30USD. The victim was compelled to sign two registers, one being an official one and another, which had no title, belonged to a gang that controlled the area, and on it the \$30USD was indicated against the recipient’s name and signature. “Practically the \$30USD was gang fee, and all money houses are obliged to deduct and remit to the gang at the end of the day or two days. When in doubt, gangs may ask to compare their register against the official one. If the figures do not tally then the agency may be forced to close its operations in the area...,” stated the victim, adding that in his locality there were 11 such remittance houses.

Gangs also compel some remittance outlets to pay “protection” fees as a safeguard against vandalism. Dealerships that fail to pay are usually ransacked and the cash looted. Because the outlets have to pay out cash to their clients, they are bound to transport cash from main town centres, particularly Port-au-Prince. For those located outside Pétion-Ville, payment of extortion fees to gangs is unavoidable. These costs are often added onto their client’s costs.¹²¹ Some local authorities in gang-controlled areas are exploiting the situation to also erect tolling booths along road networks to extort the public¹²².

¹²⁰ Interviews with two victims of gang extortion from Tabarre, a remittance shop owner from Delmas 6 and a civil society leader. Port-au-Prince, February 2026.

¹²¹ Interviews with a remittance house owner in Kenscoff, a banker and two civil society activities, January and March 2026.

¹²² UNPOL report, January 2026 and interviews with gang analysts and individual working in a gang-controlled area, 2026.

Annex 16: Extortion

Seaports and their surroundings have been prone to gang extortion for a long time.¹²³ The main targets have been cargo trucks leading in and out of the Port of Varreux – the country’s main fuel terminal (see para 80 of S/2023/674) and the Autorité Portuaire Nationale – APN (see Annex 38 of S/2024/704). The dismantling of some checkpoints in areas surrounding ports – notably Varreux and APN – triggered gangs to find new ways to extort cargo trucks and other vehicles. To avoid being a target for drone strikes, gangs keep records of their main targets, and so they send instructions as to how the extortion fees should be paid offsite (away from the road). Often gangs deploy watchers on targeted roads to record notable commercial users and then approach their business premises later to collect the “taxes.”¹²⁴ “...This approach has created a bond-like relationship between gangs and major businesses in every suburb of West Department. It’s a form of racketeering where gangs in return “protect” the merchandise and interests of the enterprises they extort...it’s a kind of *Viv Ansanm* phenomenon.”¹²⁵ Although some studies have found that extortion alone generates between US\$60 million and US\$75 million annually for gangs targeting container transport¹²⁶, the total revenue generated from extorting the public transport sector, retail petrol stations, ransom paid to rescue kidnapped victims and tokenism from economic actors and/or political actors, is several times higher.¹²⁷

¹²³ Terminal Varreux contrôlé par des gangs, l’APPE tire la sonnette d’alarme
<https://endijenenfo.com/terminal-varreux-contrrole-par-des-gangs-lappe-tire-la-sonnette-dalarme/>

¹²⁴ Interviews with a Supermarket owner based in Kenscoff, a retail petrol dealer and a cargo agent. Port-au-Prince, February 2026.

¹²⁵ Interviews with a logistics operator based in West Department, January 2026.

¹²⁶ [From criminal governance to community fragmentation: Addressing Haiti’s escalating crisis | Global Initiative](#)

¹²⁷ Interview with a customs officer and three logistics experts. Port-au-Prince, February 2026.

Annex 17: A snapshot of the 2026 prices of elvers sourced from Haiti, as of March 2026.

Also see: https://www.selinawamucii.com/insights/prices/haiti/live-eels/#google_vignette

Get Real-Time Haiti Live Eels Prices

Join 50,000+ traders accessing live market prices, verified buyers, and direct selling opportunities

[View Market Prices →](#)

- ✓ Live Price Updates
- ✓ Direct Buyer Access
- ✓ Market Analysis Tools

- [Click here to check yesterday's Live Eels price](#)
- [Click here to check this week's Live Eels price](#)

Wholesale prices

In 2026, the approximate wholesale price range for Haiti live eels is between US\$ 0.34 and US\$ 1.70 per kilogram or between US\$ 0.15 and US\$ 0.77 per pound(lb).

- [Are you searching for Haiti live eels to purchase? Request our sourcing service for premium bulk Haiti live eels.](#)

Annex 18: The two letters from CODOPESCA to the Customs. In both letters CODOPESCA explains how two Dominican-registered companies are seeking to transit elvers exports from Haiti through the Dominican Republic's territory. In the letters, CODOPESCA is calling upon the Customs to observe that the transiting elvers meets the set standard and have the correct documentation.

Letter 1:

 **CODOPESCA**
CONSEJO DOMINICANO DE PESCA Y ACUICULTURA

DIRECCIÓN EJECUTIVA

DE-203-25

Santo Domingo, D.N.
06 de octubre de 2025


Director General de Aduanas
Su Despacho. –




06 OCT 2025

Distinguido Director:

Después de un cordial saludo, informamos que, el Consejo Dominicano de Pesca y Acuicultura (CODOPESCA), tiene



La mercancía descrita constituye un cargamento de tránsito internacional, es decir, no será desembalada, distribuida, comercializada ni manipulada en territorio dominicano. El propósito es únicamente el tránsito terrestre rápido y directo desde la frontera entre Haití y República Dominicana hasta el puerto o aeropuerto de salida para su posterior envío a la . Por lo cual es responsabilidad de su institución el seguimiento de dicha mercancía. Por lo cual es responsabilidad de su institución el seguimiento de dicha mercancía.

Siempre y cuando 
se compromete cumplir con la DGA

1. Cumplir estrictamente con el protocolo de tránsito que su dirección establezca.
2. Garantizar que la mercancía viaje en condiciones adecuadas de bioseguridad (camión refrigerado) para evitar cualquier riesgo sanitario.
3. Proveer la documentación de respaldo que demuestre la legalidad y sanidad del producto.
4. Anexar como requisito fundamental, el permiso correspondiente del ministerio de agricultura de la República de Haití.

 Aeropuerto Duarte KM 6 1/2 Los Jardines del Norte, Santo Domingo, D.N. República Dominicana.  info@codopesca.gob.do  www.codopesca.gob.do  Tel. (809) 338-0802



DE-203-25

5. Cumplir con todos los requerimientos exigidos por la DGA, tales como: manifiesto de carga, conocimiento de embarques, factura comercial del proveedor al cliente final, carta de ruta DGA.

Con sentimiento de alta consideración y estima, queda de usted.

Muy atentamente,



SOLICITUD DE SERVICIOS

518-25-317851



Fecha	06/10/2025 14:16:32
Servicio	Comunicaciones al Director
Nombre	CONSEJO DOMINICANO DE PESCA Y
RNC	430 04178-5
Asunto	SOLICITUD DE INFORMACION

Documentos Requeridos:

1. Comunicación Recibida

Para consultar el estado de esta solicitud, visite nuestra página web <https://aduana.gob.do>



 **Asfotopista Duarte** KM 6 1/2 Los Jardines del Norte, Santo Domingo, D.N. República Dominicana.

 info@codepesca.gov

REV. (207) 338-0802

Letter 2:

DE-202-25

CODOPESCA
CONSEJO DOMINICANO DE PESCA Y ACUICULTURA
LEY 807-04

DIRECCIÓN EJECUTIVA

Santo Domingo, D.N.
06 de octubre de 2025

DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE ADUANAS
SECCIÓN CORRESPONDENCIA Y ARCHIVO
DGA
ADUANAS
Santo Domingo, D.N.

06 OCT 2025

Director General de Aduanas
Su Despacho, -

Distinguido Director:

Después de un cordial saludo, informamos que, el Consejo Dominicano de Pesca y Acuicultura (CODOPESCA),

[REDACTED]

Domingo Distrito Nacional República Dominicana, tiene el interés de transportar desde la República de Haití con tránsito en la República Dominicana y destino final hacia [REDACTED], por un período de cinco años, Anguilla rostrata o Anguilla sp.

La mercancía descrita constituye un cargamento de tránsito internacional, es decir, no será desembalada, distribuida, comercializada ni manipulada en territorio dominicano. El propósito es únicamente el tránsito terrestre rápido y directo desde la frontera entre Haití y República Dominicana hasta el puerto o aeropuerto de salida para su posterior envío a [REDACTED]. Por lo cual es responsabilidad de su institución el seguimiento de dicha mercancía.

Siempre y cuando la empresa [REDACTED] se compromete cumplir con la DGA

1. Cumplir estrictamente con el protocolo de tránsito que su dirección establezca.
2. Garantizar que la mercancía viaje en condiciones adecuadas de bioseguridad (camión refrigerado) para evitar cualquier riesgo sanitario.
3. Proveer la documentación de respaldo que demuestre la legalidad y sanidad del producto.
4. Anexar como requisito fundamental, el permiso correspondiente del ministerio de agricultura de la República de Haití.

Autopista Duarte KM 4 1/2 Los Jardines del Norte, Santo Domingo, D.N. República Dominicana. info@codopecsa.gob.do www.codopecsa.gob.do Tel. (809) 338-0802



CODOPESCA
CONSEJO DOMINICANO DE PESCA Y ACUICULTURA

DE-202-25

5. Cumplir con todos los requerimientos exigidos por la DGA, tales como: manifiesto de carga, conocimiento de embarques, factura comercial del suplidor al cliente final, carta de ruta DGA.

Con sentimiento de alta consideración y estima, queda de usted.

Muy atentamente,



CODOPESCA



DGA
DIRECCION GENERAL DE ADUANAS
Avenida Arshem Uribe 141 (C.D.) RNC: 430275243

SOLICITUD DE SERVICIOS

S18-25-317850



Fecha	06/10/2025 14:14:43
Servicio	Comunicaciones al Director
Nombre	CONSEJO DOMINICANO DE PESCA Y /
RNC	430-04178-6
Asunto	SOLICITUD DE INFORMACION

Documentos Requeridos:

1. Comunicacion Recibida

Para consultar el estado de esta solicitud, visita nuestra pagina
web <https://aduanas.gob.do>





Autopista Duarte KM 6 1/2 Los
Jardines del Norte, Santo Domingo,
D.N. República Dominicana.



info@codopesca.gob.do



www.codopesca.gob.do



Tel. (809) 338-0802

56/56

26-03344