



Security Council

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Letter dated 25 March 2024 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) have the honour to transmit herewith the interim report, submitted in accordance with paragraph 20 of resolution [2700 \(2023\)](#).

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) concerning Haiti on 1 March 2024 and was considered by the Committee on 15 March 2024.

The Panel would appreciate if the present letter and the interim report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

Panel of Experts on Haiti established pursuant to
Security Council resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#)



Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2700 (2023)

Summary

The reporting period 13 November 2023–15 February 2024 was marked by a further deterioration of the situation in Haiti. The stalling of the political transition, the limited visible impact of the sanctions regime to date and the delay in the deployment of the Multinational Security Support Mission are contributing to give gangs free reign to expand their territory, and creating fertile ground for civil unrest.

Gang violence has reached unprecedented levels and geographical spread, with sanctioned gang leaders continuing to engage in intense armed violence in spite of their designation. In the West department, fighting both within and between gangs marked not only the fracturing of the G9 coalition but also the aggressive expansion of G-Pèp, which has increased its presence in the main gateways of the capital, in addition to consolidating alliances with gangs from the Artibonite department.

The gangs' territorial expansion continues to asphyxiate the country's economy and other activities, with the tightening of control over major roads leading to the capital, a strategic lifeline for the population and one of the main sources of gang revenue. For example, recent clashes and blockades by several actors in Mariani have had a devastating impact on the entire southern part of the country, cutting supply routes and further restricting freedom of movement.

Gangs continue to commit atrocious violations of human rights, including indiscriminate attacks against the population, as well as murder, rape, torture and kidnappings, notably in the West and Artibonite departments. Since November 2023, gang violence has resulted in the displacement of an additional 100,000 people within the country, while tens of thousands of people have fled abroad. Children in particular are suffering from the crisis through displacement, malnutrition, deprivation of access to education, and gang violence, including sexual violence and forced recruitment.

Despite its efforts, the Haitian National Police has had difficulty in regaining and retaining control over territory and containing gang expansion. The number of police officers continues to decline, primarily owing to resignations, but also to disciplinary suspensions and killings; Haitian National Police facilities have repeatedly been targeted by gangs in the weeks prior to reporting. The deployment of the Multinational Security Support Mission is now critical and urgent.

Despite the imposition of a territorial arms embargo in October 2023 pursuant to Security Council resolution 2699 (2023), gangs and other non-State actors continue to procure arms and ammunition illicitly. The Panel of Experts is currently looking into several violations of the arms embargo involving small arms and ammunition. Implementation of the arms embargo has been further hampered by a lack of awareness of its provisions among those Haitian institutions meant to enforce them.

During the reporting period, a range of actors were involved in protesting and fomenting civil unrest, including demanding that the Prime Minister step down, while some called for a revolution and openly displayed support from armed men such as members of the Brigade de surveillance des aires protégées. Those actors also found increased momentum in the run-up to 7 February 2024, the deadline set by the 21 December Accord of 2022 for a newly elected government to take office. Since the start of 2024, multiple sizeable demonstrations have flared up in different parts of the country; however, at the time of reporting, the levels of mobilization in Port-au-Prince have remained relatively limited.

In addition to gang leaders, the current chaos in the country is being exploited by a range of actors aiming to increase their wealth and influence, including private sector actors, politicians and former government officials – none of those roles being mutually exclusive. The Panel continues to investigate illicit financial flows contributing to the instability of Haiti.

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I. Introduction

A. Mandate

1. On 19 October 2023, the Security Council, by its resolution [2700 \(2023\)](#), renewed the sanctions regime on Haiti, consisting of a travel ban, an assets freeze and an arms embargo. The Council extended, for a period of 13 months from the date of adoption of the resolution, the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as set out in paragraph 21 of its resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#), and further decided that that mandate should also apply with respect to the measures imposed under resolution [2700 \(2023\)](#) (see paras. 9–11 below).
2. Following the designation by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) of four individuals on 8 December 2023, the list of individuals and entities designated pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) is currently composed of five individuals, all of whom are gang leaders from the West department of Haiti.¹
3. The present interim report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 20 of resolution [2700 \(2023\)](#) and covers investigations conducted from 13 November 2023 to 15 February 2024. Owing to word count limitations, the Panel of Experts has detailed some of its analyses in the annexes.

B. Methodology

4. The Panel conducts its investigations in a professional and technical manner, adhering to the principles of transparency, objectivity, impartiality and independence (see [S/2023/674](#), paras. 8–10 and annex 1). The Panel takes great care not to disclose identifying information, when necessary, in order to protect sources, given the extreme levels of insecurity in Haiti.
5. Following the publication of its final report in September 2023 ([S/2023/674](#)), the Panel received information volunteered by and about a range of actors cited in the report. The Panel reviewed the material and shared it, along with its observations, with the Committee.
6. The Panel has sent requests for information to Member States. The Panel would like to thank those Member States that have responded to its requests and further emphasizes the critical importance of such information in supporting its work.
7. Since its appointment in October 2023, the Panel has conducted investigations in Haiti, as well as fact-finding missions in the Dominican Republic and the United States of America and, in line with paragraph 21 of resolution [2700 \(2023\)](#), has continued to cooperate with the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and maintains an open engagement with the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). The Panel has received excellent support from BINUH, for which it is very grateful. The Panel welcomes the continuous collaboration it has received from the Haitian authorities and institutions.
8. The Panel continues to investigate potential violations of the sanctions regime and to gather information on individuals and entities meeting the designation criteria.

¹ See www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2653/materials/summaries.

C. Development of the United Nations sanctions regime on Haiti

9. The renewal of the sanctions regime was perceived positively by the vast majority of the Haitian population, who are strongly expecting the sanctioning of additional actors, in particular those who are backing the gangs.

10. While the sanctioning of four gang leaders by the Committee in December 2023 sent a positive message, the effect of that sanctioning remains extremely limited, as gang leaders and the activities of their gangs are largely unaffected by the measures. Those gang leaders are among the most powerful in the country and have continued to build their arsenals, extend their control over territory and increase their numbers, despite the sanctions imposed against them (see sect. II). Given the dire situation in the country, it is critical that the sanctions regime play a more meaningful role in addressing those other key actors who continue to threaten the peace and stability of the country.

11. By significantly enlarging the scope of the arms embargo from a targeted embargo to a territorial one, the Council has adopted a key measure to contribute to tackling the significant issue of arms and ammunition trafficking. However, it is still early in the process, and the implementation of the enlarged scope of the arms embargo remains weak with limited resources to enforce it in Haiti and the region. There is also a lack of awareness of the provisions of the embargo by those actors expected to enforce them (see para. 74 below).

D. Political and security context

1. Political process

12. Since the publication of the Panel's final report in September 2023 (see [S/2023/674](#), paras. 12–16), little progress has been made in the implementation of the National Consensus for an Inclusive Transition and Transparent Elections – also known as the “21 December Accord” – with a range of Haitian stakeholders blaming the inaction of the Government.

13. The CARICOM Eminent Persons Group, which is engaged in supporting political mediation in Haiti, visited the country several times during the reporting period to support inclusive dialogue and the brokering of a new agreement. While efforts at dialogue between political actors have continued, deep divisions remain, with some members of the opposition insisting on the resignation of the Prime Minister as a precondition for any negotiations.

14. The stalling of the political transition process remains a critical obstacle to the organization of elections and the improvement of the situation in the country.

2. Security situation

15. The reporting period was marked by increasing gang violence and civil unrest. The security situation continues to deteriorate, in particular in the West, Artibonite and Centre departments, resulting in thousands of killings, atrocious violations of human rights, including sexual violence, as well as further displacement and many people leaving the country (see sect. III below).

16. Gangs in the West department continue to engage in heavy fighting and attacks against the population, with the fracturing of the G9 coalition and the G-Pèp alliance gaining significant new ground (see sect. II below). For many stakeholders, the approval of the Multinational Security Support Mission pursuant to Security Council resolution [2699 \(2023\)](#) led to the further entrenchment of gangs, including by seizing

territories outside of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and seizing control of new access roads, as well as increasing recruitment efforts and acquiring more weapons and ammunition. The delay in the deployment has given gangs free reign to increase the intensity of their activities, with gang violence currently engulfing new territories in the south of Port-au-Prince.

17. Despite its efforts and ongoing operations, the Haitian National Police remains unable to control the expansion of gang activity. Police personnel and facilities are the constant target of gangs. The delayed deployment of the Multinational Security Support Mission is having a detrimental impact on the morale of the police. In 2023, the number of police officers fell by 1,665, with 48 killed and the vast majority leaving the country.²

18. The judicial system remains largely dysfunctional owing to generalized violence, corruption, strikes and political interference. A number of judges, including some who were recently certified, are still waiting for their mandates to be renewed, severely affecting cases against individuals that are undermining the stability of Haiti. The work of others has been impeded by the threats they receive and the absence of protection. Furthermore, multiple arrest warrants that have been issued remain pending.

19. Gang violence, coupled with weak State security and impunity, have resulted in the reinforcement of vigilante movements, who in turn commit violations of human rights (see annex 14).

3. Recent mobilization against the Government

20. The deteriorating situation and the absence of any foreseeable relief – either elections, the deployment of the Multinational Security Support Mission or the sanctioning of other actors besides gang leaders – create fertile ground for growing support for radical positions and for a range of actors trying to foment civil unrest.

21. Those actors also found increased momentum in the run-up to 7 February 2024, the deadline set up by the 21 December Accord for a newly elected government to take office.³ Since the beginning of the year, significant demonstrations led by political actors calling for the Prime Minister to step down have enflamed parts of the country, with mobilization in Port-au-Prince remaining relatively limited at the time of reporting.

22. After six years of imprisonment in the United States for conspiring to launder money derived from drug trafficking,⁴ Guy Philippe, a former senior commissaire of the Haitian National Police who led an armed rebellion in 2004 leading to the overthrow of the former President, Jean Bertrand Aristide, returned to Haiti in November 2023.⁵ Since then, he has led public rallies and demonstrations, in particular in the south of the country, calling for a revolution.⁶

23. Mr. Philippe has also been supported by the Brigade de surveillance des aires protégées, which was created by the Agence nationale des aires protégées, a directorate of the Ministry of the Environment. Despite that, the current Government

² United Nations data, 2024.

³ See art. 20 of the *Consensus national pour une transitions inclusive et des elections transparentes*, available at <https://www.haitilibre.com/docs/Consensus-National-pour-une-transition-inclusive-et-des-elections-transparentes.pdf>.

⁴ See www.justice.gov/opa/pr/haitian-national-pleads-guilty-conspiring-launder-money-derived-drug-trafficking.

⁵ www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article282500613.html, and interviews with official sources, 2024.

⁶ See, for instance, www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1147137756661939.

has had no control over the Brigade. Requests from the Government to be provided with a list of agents and their armed capacity remained unfulfilled. Sources informed the Panel that many Brigade agents do not receive salaries, pay to join the Brigade and have to provide their own firearms, which they are likely to have procured illicitly.

24. In late January 2024, the Government issued several orders to address the situation, including to dismiss the Director of the Agence nationale des aires protégées, Jeantel Joseph, who effectively led the chain of command. The Government also created a committee responsible for restructuring the Agence, requested its personnel to register formally with the Ministry of the Environment and banned armed agents from circulating in urban areas.⁷ While some members of the Brigade complied, others did not and have continued to recognize Joseph as their leader and to circulate in towns with their firearms, including during the February 2024 demonstrations in several cities.

25. During the climax of demonstrations, between 5 and 8 February 2024, multiple acts of violence were committed throughout the country, including lootings of private and public properties, roadblocks and violations of human rights, resulting in the disruption of economic life and education. For instance, in Gonaïves (Artibonite department), individuals vandalized the office of the Haitian Red Cross, the town hall and part of the civil tribunal. In Port-au-Prince, exchanges of gunfire between the Brigade de surveillance des aires protégées and the Haitian National Police resulted in the deaths of five Brigade agents. Cases of the excessive use of force by the police were also reported, and investigations were ongoing. In Mirebalais, Brigade agents killed two civilians and injured another two.⁸ Between 20 January and 7 February, at least 16 people were killed and 29 others injured, primarily in confrontations between protesters and the police.⁹

II. Gang dynamics¹⁰

26. Despite the intentions of G9 and G-Pèp to *Viv Ansam* (“live together”) (see annex 1), gang violence has reached unprecedented levels, making January 2024 the most violent month in two years (see paras. 45–47 below).¹¹

27. Severe fighting both within and between gangs marked not only the fracturing of the G9 coalition but also the aggressive expansion of G-Pèp, including over the main gateways of the capital (see annex 2), in addition to consolidating alliances with Artibonite gangs.¹²

⁷ See <https://communication.gouv.ht/2024/01/communiqué-de-presse-18/>.

⁸ Interview with government officials in Plateau Central, February 2024.

⁹ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-turk-warns-deepening-human-rights-crisis-following-most-violent-month-two-years>.

¹⁰ The information contained in the present section is presented on the basis of interviews with national and international gang analysts, former gang members, government officials, Haitian National Police officers, individuals living in gang-controlled areas and civil society representatives, as well as on published and confidential material and verified open sources.

¹¹ Confidential report, 2024.

¹² Although without a clear chain of command, the alliance first led by Ti Gabriel has been largely influenced by the leaders of the 5 Segond and Grand Ravine gangs.

A. Fracturing of G9 and escalation of violence in Cité Soleil and Port-au-Prince communes

28. A key trigger for the growing ruptures within G9 was its punitive execution on 26 September 2023 of Tysson, the leader of the G9-affiliated Carrefour Drouillard gang, for ignoring instructions of the alliance. His death triggered clashes in the Cité Soleil commune among G9-affiliated gangs (see annex 3). Later, the accidental death on 12 November 2023 of Iskar Andrice¹³ (alias “Iskar”), leader of the Belekou gang and co-founder of G9, dealt another blow to the G9 alliance, leading to the resurgence of territorial disputes between G9 and G-Pèp (see annex 4).

29. In the Port-au-Prince commune of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, another factor that prompted clashes between G9 gangs was the building of a wall in mid-October by the La Saline, Fort Touron and Fort Dimanche gangs to prevent the hijacking of trucks by the Wharf Jérémie gang.¹⁴ La Saline and Wharf Jérémie engaged in renewed fighting, the intensity of which reached a peak between 27 and 31 January 2024. Members of the Projet de La Saline gang,¹⁵ who supported La Saline, killed the chief of La Saline, Marc, on 30 January 2024.¹⁶

30. Meanwhile, faced with the fragmentation of G9 and the growing threat by G-Pèp to the territory he controls, Jimmy Chérizier (alias “Barbeque” – HTi.001) has increasingly used a political narrative against the Government. In January, Barbeque published videos declaring that, while he was not aligned with Mr. Philippe, he respected his mission to get the country out of the hands of the Prime Minister, Ariel Henry. Barbeque also called for a revolution to change the existing political system for the benefit of all Haitians.¹⁷

31. Despite recent spikes in gang fighting, relationships between the various gangs and their respective alliances are fluid. Some G9 and G-Pèp leaders may seek to reactivate the *Viv Ansam* alliance as a way of forming a common front against the Government and/or the future Multinational Security Support Mission.¹⁸

B. Expansion of G-Pèp footprint

1. G-Pèp pressure over G-9 stronghold

32. G-Pèp has exerted heavy pressure on the G9 stronghold in the Cité Soleil, Port-au-Prince and Delmas communes of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, inter alia, to benefit from: (a) the imposition of illegal tolls in the vicinities of the Varreux fuel terminal and the national port authority (Autorité portuaire nationale), as well as along access roads and the national road RN1; (b) the extortion of street vendors, traders and private actors operating at industrial parks; and (c) drug trafficking.¹⁹

33. In Cité Soleil, Gabriel Jean-Pierre (alias “Ti Gabriel”) benefited from the G9 void to come out of his Brooklyn neighbourhood, which had been besieged by G9

¹³ Iskar was replaced by his lieutenant David Ganier (alias “Black Alex Mana”), who was killed on 21 November 2023 by a fellow gang member.

¹⁴ Interviews with gang analysts and individual living in gang-controlled area in 2023 and former gang members, January 2024.

¹⁵ Interview with gang analysts, January and February 2024, as well as confidential report, January 2024.

¹⁶ Confidential report, 2024, and interviews with gang analysts and former gang members, January and February 2024.

¹⁷ Videos saved in the Panel’s files.

¹⁸ Interviews with national and international gang analysts, February 2024.

¹⁹ The Panel is currently investigating cases of drug trafficking, including marijuana and cocaine, and will report on this in due course.

gangs (see [S/2023/674](#)), to try to consolidate his foothold in territories such as Boston, Belekou and Carrefour Drouillard. He finally succeeded in taking over Carrefour Drouillard and the neighbouring Nan Raket area, on 30 January.²⁰

34. A few kilometres south of Cité Soleil, in the Port-au-Prince commune, the 5 Segond and Grand Ravine gangs attempted to secure control over the long-coveted area of La Saline, notably to allow 5 Segond's leader, Johnson André (alias "Izo" – HTi.002), to extend his control over Port-au-Prince's bay coast, which would facilitate his drug trafficking activities.²¹ After Marc's killing, on 30 January, Izo and Renel Destina (alias "Ti Lapli" – HTi.003), leader of Grand Ravine, offered reinforcements, including weapons and men, to the Projet de La Saline gang in the assaults against Wharf Jérémie. In exchange, Izo requested control over the vicinities of the national port authority terminal and the Varreux fuel terminal, and Ti Lapli requested control over the "Croix-des-Bossales" market.²² Meanwhile, Ti Lapli (see annex 5) also extended his control from the southern part of the city (see paras. 37–40 below) to the city centre, by setting up gang cells at the cemetery of Port-au-Prince, close to the Palais National.²³

35. In the meantime, in Delmas commune, Kempes Sanon (alias "Kempes"), leader of the Bel Air gang (also known as the Les Argentins gang), supported by Ti Lapli, exerted pressure on Barbeque's zone, while attacking the Solino neighbourhood (see annex 6), since 14 January, to secure a passage to move hostages.²⁴

36. In February, the carnival festivities in the Champ de Mars in Port-au-Prince and the surrounding areas were disrupted when Kempes' men fired automatic weapons, wounding carnival-goers, while the allied Grand Ravine gang kidnapped five individuals (see annex 7).

2. Control over southern Port-au-Prince suffocating the entire South

37. Since Ti Lapli took control of the Carrefour-Feuilles area in Port-au-Prince in August 2023 (see [S/2023/674](#)), Grand Ravine and 5 Segond significantly expanded their influence southwards to bring in more revenue through kidnapping, drug trafficking, extortion, illegal tolls and truck hijacking along the national road RN2, the main route connecting the capital to the south. Since 31 October 2023, they prompted a new outbreak of violence in the Carrefour, Gressier and Leogane communes, resulting in high numbers of fatalities and displacements. On 1 November 2023, Grand Ravine set up a cell in Mariani, Carrefour commune,²⁵ under the command of Beliose Louis Jeune (alias "Bout Ba") (see annex 8).

38. Against the backdrop of deadlier violence, the sea route between the national port authority terminal and the Petit-Goâve port has been used to bypass gang-controlled areas and the roadblock (see annex 9), despite being a more expensive and riskier journey (see paras. 84–88 below).

39. The Mariani blockade has affected trade between the West and the southern departments (including South, South-Est, Grand'Anse and Nippes, in addition to southern communes of the West department), resulting in a shortage of supplies and an increase in the price of commodities (see para. 94 below), as well as limited access

²⁰ United Nations sources and interview with a gang analyst, February 2024.

²¹ Interviews with gang analysts and individuals living in gang-controlled areas, in 2023 and January and February 2024.

²² Confidential report, 2024 and interview with a gang analyst, January and February 2024.

²³ Interviews with national and international gang analysts and former gang members, January and February 2024.

²⁴ United Nations sources and interview with gang analyst, February 2024.

²⁵ United Nations confidential document, 28 November 2023; United Nations confidential report, 20 November 2023.

to essential services. The proximity to Mariani has also placed southern localities on high alert, owing to the potential spread of violence.

40. Meanwhile, in a bid to extend control in order to extort the users of secondary routes, the Ti Bois gang, led by Christ-Roi Chery (alias “Chrisla”) has also undertaken armed incursions against localities of the Carrefour commune (see annex 10).

3. Northern and eastern areas of the West department

41. North of the capital, in addition to pursuing illegal tolls along RN1 and criminal activities around key economic areas (see annex 11), the Canaan gang of Jeff Larose (alias “Jeff”) has provided “armed services” to land spoliators in the Arcahaie and Montrouis communes.²⁶ Jeff has also been mobilized by Izo for drug trafficking activities, such as during the assault against the Saut-d’Eau commune, Centre department, in late September 2023, reportedly motivated by Izo’s intention to recover a substantial shipment of drugs and firearms.²⁷

42. Meanwhile, in Morne-à-Cabri, the 400 Mawozo gang, led by Joseph Wilson (alias “Lanmo Sanjou”, HTi.004), has continuously obstructed traffic and kidnapped passengers. The gang has become very active, following the reinforcement of its personnel, including by an offshoot of the Kraze Barye gang, which opposes the leadership of Vitelhomme Innocent (HTi.005).²⁸ Since November 2023, those gangs have engaged in deadly clashes (see annex 12) over territory in areas neighbouring the Pétion-Ville commune and localities in the Tabarre commune. Its increase in activity is bringing 400 Mawozo dangerously close to the eastern communes of Malpassee and Cornillon, which border the Dominican Republic.²⁹

C. Artibonite department

43. Gangs such as Gran Grif, led by Luckson Elan (alias “General Luckson”), and Kokorat San Ras, led by Ferdens Tilus (alias “Meyer”) (see S/2023/674, sect. III.A, and annex 14 to the present report), have continued to commit murders, kidnappings, rapes and attacks on agricultural property, livestock and transport vehicles. Through extreme violence (see annex 13), they have contributed to the reduction of cultivated land, displacing thousands of villagers to urban centres and altering local dynamics. Their alliance with G-Pèp gangs (5 Segond and Canaan) has reinforced their capacity both in terms of firepower and personnel and strengthened their control over strategic territory, to the benefit of their criminal economy.³⁰

44. The Raboteau gang, along with its allies from Kokorat San Ras, participated in the demonstrations that took place in early February 2024 in Gonaïves, as well as in the ransacking of the civilian tribunal.³¹

²⁶ Interviews with gang analysts and a government official, January and February 2024.

²⁷ Interviews with national and international gang analysts, government officials, Haitian National Police officers, civil society representatives and health staff, 2023 and January, February 2024.

²⁸ United Nations confidential report, 2023, and interview with gang analysts, January and February 2024.

²⁹ Interview with gang analysts, January and February 2024.

³⁰ See www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/criminal-violence-extends-beyond-port-au-prince-situation-lower, and interviews with gang analysts and individuals living in gang-controlled areas, 2023 and January and February 2024.

³¹ Interview with law enforcement officer, February 2024.

III. Acts that violate international human rights law or acts that constitute human rights abuses

A. General data on violence³²

45. Pervasive insecurity continues to hinder the freedom of movement and impede access to humanitarian assistance, as well as to essential goods and services such as food, water, health care and education.

46. In 2023, reported homicides increased by nearly 120 per cent compared with the previous year and by more than 600 per cent compared with 2018, with 4,789 victims recorded in 2023, including 465 women, 93 boys and 48 girls. This represents a ratio of 40.9 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. In addition, the number of kidnapping victims rose from 1,359 in 2022 to 2,490 in 2023, representing a 83.2 per cent increase.³³

47. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights reported that January 2024 had been the most violent month in over two years, with at least 806 non-participants in violent confrontations killed, injured or kidnapped, along with around 300 gang members, totalling 1,106 affected individuals – more than three times the number reported in January 2023.³⁴

B. Humanitarian impact of gangs' criminal activities

48. Gang-related violence is causing an increase in the number of internally displaced persons in the country. As of January 2024, the total number of internally displaced persons surpassed 313,000. Of the 146,584 internally displaced persons in the West Department, 139,853 are located in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.³⁵ More than 60 per cent of all the forced displacements occurred in 2023, and 94 per cent of internally displaced persons came from the West department, with the capital city being the main point of origin.³⁶ The whole south of the country has also been affected by the violence in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince (see annex 16).

49. Concerning some of the specific incidents mentioned in section II above, the humanitarian toll includes the following:

(a) On 1 November 2023, violence erupted in the Mariani area (see sect. II above), resulting in the internal displacement of 2,487 persons as at 6 November (see annex 17). Mariani is an evolving situation, the humanitarian effects of which are expanding to other regions of the country, in particular the south;

(b) Since September 2023, clashes among gangs in the Cité Soleil have intensified and extended to the areas of Belekou, Boston, Brooklyn, Pierre VI and Terre Noire, resulting in the deaths or injury of 268 persons in the second half of November alone, including 9 children, most of whom were targeted in sniper-style attacks, and leading to the displacement of more than 1,000 people (see annex 18);

³² See annexes 14 and 15.

³³ United Nations police data, January 2024.

³⁴ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haïti/haïti-turk-warns-deepening-human-rights-crisis-following-most-violent-month-two-years>.

³⁵ See <https://dtm.iom.int/report-product-series/cumulative-displacement-report>; interview with humanitarian actor, January 2024.

³⁶ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haïti/haïti-more-60-forced-displacements-happened-2023-year-growing-brutality-0>; in interviews, humanitarian actors confirmed to the Panel the rising numbers of internally displaced persons and their widespread distribution across the territory, January 2024.

(c) Clashes over land disputes in the commune of Arcahaie (West Department) around 15 November 2023 led to the deaths of 53 individuals and displacement of more than 10,000 (see annex 19);³⁷

(d) In the first two weeks of 2024, almost 8,000 individuals, mostly women and children, were displaced owing to clashes in the Solino and Gabelliste areas of Port-au-Prince;³⁸

(e) Around 10,000 internally displaced persons fled armed clashes between gangs in Carrefour, Cité Soleil and Tabarre between 5 and 13 February 2024 (see annex 20).

50. The above are only snapshots of specific incidents. As clashes continue in all those areas, the number of victims (i.e. persons killed, wounded, internally displaced, etc.) is likely to increase.

51. On 20 January 2024, the Panel visited the internally displaced persons site at Jean Marie Vincent school in Tabarre, Port-au-Prince, which hosts 779 internally displaced families, totalling over 3,000 individuals, including 900 children (see annex 21), with persistent food and water scarcity. On 25 July 2023, most internally displaced persons fled clashes between the Kraze Barye gang, led by Vitelhomme (HTi.005), and the 400 Mawozo gang, led by Lanmo Sanjou (HTi.004). Renewed clashes brought further waves of internally displaced persons (see annex 22). Testimonies obtained by the Panel revealed indiscriminate shootings during gang clashes, as well as killings, beatings and rapes of women.³⁹

52. Also significant is the number of Haitian returnees. According to the authorities of the Dominican Republic, 497,692 Haitians returned to Haiti in 2023, of which 246,678 returned voluntarily.⁴⁰

C. Sexual and gender-based violence

53. Gangs systematically use sexual violence to exert control over communities, targeting women and girls as young as 3 years old⁴¹ with ambushes and collective rapes (see S/2023/674). Cases are underreported owing to stigma, lack of trust in the police and judiciary and fears of reprisal. This hampers prosecution efforts.⁴² In addition, challenges in data collection⁴³ hinder the understanding of the phenomenon.

54. The Panel met with representatives of the Unit to Combat Sexual Violence of the Haitian National Police, who indicated that half of its personnel had departed in the previous six months, posing a significant operational challenge. They highlighted the near impossibility of travelling to high-risk areas and conducting investigations due to the prevailing security situation.

³⁷ Interview with a gang analyst, February 2024.

³⁸ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/iom-haiti-situation-report-january-2024>.

³⁹ Interviews with several victims, January 2024.

⁴⁰ See <https://www.diariolibre.com/actualidad/nacional/2024/01/30/deportaciones-de-haitianos-en-2023-medio-millon-devueltos/2591068>.

⁴¹ Confidential source, January 2024.

⁴² In addition, the inexistence of any State system is making access to gender-based violence services (in particular safety and legal services) a seemingly impossible task. See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/addressing-gender-based-violence-haiti-june-2023>.

⁴³ Quantifying the extend of gender-based violence or sexual violence in Haiti is impossible. The lack of any standardized system to document gender-based violence cases, and the many such cases left ignored or unreported, make available data incomplete or unreliable. See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/addressing-gender-based-violence-haiti-june-2023>.

55. In an interview with the Panel, a survivor of rape indicated that, in December 2023, members of Vitelhomme Innocent's gang (HTi.005) raped her while she was trying to retrieve some of her belongings from her house in the Tabarre area.⁴⁴

D. Violations of children's rights

56. Children in Haiti face severe human rights violations and life-threatening conditions, marking a historic crisis exacerbated by political instability, poverty, outbreaks of disease, malnutrition, natural disasters and escalating armed violence. This has resulted in nearly 170,000 displaced children within the country and over 3 million children in need of humanitarian aid.⁴⁵

57. In 2023, 167 children were killed or injured by gunshot (see annexes 23 and 24). Some were executed by gangs or self-defence groups for their suspected support for rivals, while others were raped (see annex 14).⁴⁶

58. Since mid-January 2024, widespread social unrest has resulted in the temporary shutdown of over 1,000 schools nationwide, particularly affecting the West, Grand'Anse, North-East, Nippes and Artibonite departments.⁴⁷

59. The Brigade for the Protection of Minors of the Haitian National Police explained to the Panel some of the challenges they faced when investigating cases, relating to personnel shortages and frequent attacks on police facilities nationwide. In 2023, the Brigade recorded 318 incidents involving crimes against minors, 8 of which involved sexual assault.

Recruitment of children

60. Children in gang-controlled areas face the risk not only of being harmed or killed during clashes but also of being drawn into gangs owing to the lack of socioeconomic and educational opportunities. Confidential sources from gang-controlled areas indicated that most children joined gangs out of economic necessity. After a probationary period, during which they are observed by other gang members, they are assigned small tasks, such as monitoring checkpoints or scouting for and spying on potential kidnapping victims. Gradually, children are given more significant responsibilities, including participating in clashes against rival gangs. Some individuals noted that leaving certain gangs, particularly those aligned with G-Pèp, is simply not possible.⁴⁸

61. According to confidential sources, once recruited, children receive a minimum weekly "salary" of 5,000 gourdes (approximately \$38–\$40) (see [S/2023/674](#)). According to some analysts, the gangs of Grand Ravine, led by Ti Lapli (HTi.003), and 5 Second, led by Izo (HTi.002), have been identified as the most active in the forceful recruitment of children. Moreover, Vitelhomme's (HTi.005) gang has around 40 children within its ranks.⁴⁹

⁴⁴ Confidential source, January 2024.

⁴⁵ See www.unicef.org/haiti/en/press-releases/unicef-urges-all-parties-safeguard-children-amid-latest-unrest-haiti.

⁴⁶ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-turk-warns-deepening-human-rights-crisis-following-most-violent-month-two-years>.

⁴⁷ See www.unocha.org/publications/report/haiti/haiti-impact-civil-unrest-humanitarian-response-flash-update-5-7-february-2024; information corroborated by humanitarian actors, January 2024.

⁴⁸ Interviews with confidential sources, January 2024; a humanitarian actor, January 2024; and a human rights defender, January and February 2024.

⁴⁹ Confidential sources, 2024.

E. Trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants

62. On 16 October 2023, four minors, all girls, were reportedly coerced into participating in sexual acts as part of a birthday celebration for a gang member.⁵⁰

63. The Panel is investigating several reports of trafficking in persons for the purpose of sexual exploitation in Haiti.

64. In 2023, a record number of 520,085 persons crossed the area known as Darien on the border between Colombia and Panama. Of that number, nearly 10 per cent were Haitians.⁵¹

65. The Panel continues its investigations into the networks of smuggling of migrants in the region.

IV. Arms trafficking

A. Cross-border arms trafficking and violations of the arms embargo

66. The increasing levels of gang violence and recruitment, as well as the expansion of gangs' territorial control during the reporting period, indicate that gangs continue to procure weapons and ammunition despite the embargo. Interviews with Haitian National Police field officers further confirmed that gangs do not seem to face any shortages of ammunition. Furthermore, in the absence of adequate State security provisions, civilians and private sector entities continue to acquire arms and ammunition illicitly to ensure their own protection. While the Panel is investigating several regional trafficking trends since the imposition of the territorial arms embargo pursuant to Security Council resolution 2699 (2023), several seizures have been made at ports of departure in the United States and ports of entry in Haiti.

1. Trafficking from the United States

67. In the United States, small arms and ammunition were seized on their way to Haiti in November 2023.⁵² In Haiti, on 2 December 2023, at the Toussaint Louverture International Airport, authorities seized 265 rounds of ammunition of various calibres, six radios, one flak jacket, a number of surveillance cameras and \$10,000 in cash from a passenger travelling on a commercial flight from New York.⁵³ On 22 December 2023, in Cap-Haitien, the Haitian authorities seized a 9-mm handgun, a 5.56-mm semi-automatic rifle and 223 rounds of ammunition found in a container coming from the United States, as well as one helmet and three flak jackets.⁵⁴

68. The Panel is currently investigating the above cases and has contacted multiple law enforcement and border control agencies and sent tracing requests to the Member States concerned. Since the establishment of the sanctions regime, the Panel has requested several manufacturing States to provide support in tracing illicit weapons either seized on their way to Haiti or in Haiti itself. In 2023, the Panel sent 74 tracing requests for handguns and semi-automatic rifles to three Member States, only one of which has responded to date.

⁵⁰ Confidential sources, January and February 2024.

⁵¹ See <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/106698>; testimonies from Haitians in Mexico have confirmed some of the routes in the region, notably through the Darien area in Panama.

⁵² Data from United States Customs and Border Protection, 2024.

⁵³ Interviews with a customs representative, December 2023, and with a representative of a police unit investigating the case, February 2024.

⁵⁴ Confidential report, 2023; and interview with Haitian National Police officer, January 2024.

2. Trafficking from the Dominican Republic

69. At the time of the Panel's visit to the Dominican Republic in January 2024, the authorities had not recorded any seizures of arms or ammunition on their way to or from Haiti since the imposition of the territorial arms embargo in October 2023. However, sources in Haiti indicate that trafficking networks still procure materiel from the illicit market in the Dominican Republic (see [S/2023/674](#)).⁵⁵

70. For instance, in December 2023, the Haitian National Police arrested three individuals in Mirebalais (Centre department) who had been transporting 9,960 rounds of ammunition. From the Panel's physical inspection of the seizure, the ammunition included 5.56 x 45-mm rounds for semi-automatic or automatic rifles. The ammunition was produced by various manufacturers in the United States and Europe, some as recently as in 2022. According to the investigation made by the police, the ammunition was sent across the border from the Dominican Republic and collected by individuals on the Haitian side.⁵⁶

B. Domestic trafficking

71. In 2023, the Haitian National Police seized at least 265 firearms, including 155 handguns, 62 rifles and 38 improvised firearms.⁵⁷ The seizures provide an indication of the types of illicit materiel in circulation and include exclusively small arms. The amount of ammunition seized is unknown.

72. During the reporting period, the Haitian National Police also arrested several individuals responsible for procuring and transporting ammunition for gangs. For instance, on 13 January 2024, the police arrested one individual in charge of transporting ammunition between the Grand Ravine gang, led by Ti Lapli (HTi.003), and the Bel-Air gang, led by Kempes.⁵⁸ On 19 January, three individuals were killed by the police while transporting a batch of 7.62 x 39-mm ammunition from the Grand Ravine gang to Bel Air while Kempes was attacking Solino (see sect. II above).⁵⁹

73. Such seizures allow for a better understanding of gang dynamics, relationships and procurement capacity.⁶⁰ The above-mentioned support from Grand Ravine to Bel Air indicates that Ti Lapli (HTi.003), despite being designated, continues to be involved in significant procurement of arms and ammunition (see sect. II above, annex 5 to the present report, and [S/2023/674](#)).

74. The Panel continues to investigate the sources of arms and ammunition of gangs, including cases involving political and private sector actors.

C. Lack of awareness impeding the implementations of the arms embargo

75. In November 2023, the scope of the arms embargo was expanded to cover the whole territory; however, during its recent visit to Haiti, the Panel noticed that many

⁵⁵ Interviews with Haitian National Police officers, December 2023 and January 2024; interviews with representatives of local authorities from the Centre department neighbouring the Dominican Republic, February 2024.

⁵⁶ Interviews with a senior police officer and one Haitian National Police investigator, January 2024; interview with a Mirebalais local authority, February 2024. See also official Haitian National Police Facebook page, 10 January 2024.

⁵⁷ United Nations police data, 2024.

⁵⁸ See official Haitian National Police Facebook page, 13 January 2024.

⁵⁹ See official Haitian National Police Facebook page, 20 January 2024.

⁶⁰ For more information on inter-gang distribution of firearms, see [S/2024/79](#), sect. III.

of the national authorities are not aware of the provisions of the arms embargo, including members of key institutions responsible for enforcing it, such as the Haitian National Police and customs. For instance, private security companies have continued to import 12-gauge shotguns, in violation of the arms embargo.⁶¹ It is urgent and critical that the Haitian authorities engage more to build greater awareness of the issue among all relevant institutions at the central and local levels and disseminate information to all relevant actors in the country.

D. Weapons and ammunition management capacity of the Haitian authorities

76. The reporting period saw various efforts to improve the weapons and ammunition management capacity of the Haitian National Police, including with the support of international partners, such as the reinforcement of the physical security and stockpile management of the main police bunker and delivery of various training courses for staff involved in weapons and ammunition management-related activities.⁶² Processes to manage recovered arms and ammunition remain weak despite the significant number of seizures.

V. Illicit financial flows

A. State of the economy

77. The economic and social development of Haiti continues to be negatively affected by increasing gang violence and political instability. As of October 2023, the annual percentage change in the consumer price index stood at 13.4 per cent, the second highest since 1980 (see annex 27), and this is likely to worsen owing to ongoing gang violence.

78. By targeting key road networks, gangs have disrupted supply chain systems of food, fuel and other essential services. For instance, by erecting tolls on roads linking seaports, agricultural areas and Port-au-Prince, they have disrupted the food supply and subsequently food production, leading to food scarcity and higher prices beyond the affordability of ordinary households (see also annex 28).⁶³

79. Currently, nearly 5 million people (half of the population of Haiti) are facing acute food insecurity, with children and women most affected (see annex 26).⁶⁴ According to the World Bank, today, a child born in Haiti will grow up to be only 45 per cent as productive as they could be if he or she had enjoyed full access to quality education and health care.⁶⁵

80. The long-standing relationship between gangs, the private sector and some political actors, coupled with embezzlement of public funds, are additional factors that exacerbate illicit financial flows and pose a threat to the country's peace, security and stability. The Panel continues to investigate those trends in line with its mandate.

⁶¹ Interview with a client of a private security company, January 2024; interview with a customs officer, February 2024.

⁶² United Nations reports, 2024; interviews with Haitian National Police officers, 2024.

⁶³ Interviews with two retailers based in the Kenscoff commune of Port-au-Prince, 2024.

⁶⁴ See www.wfp.org/operations/ht03-haiti-country-strategic-plan-2024-2028.

⁶⁵ See www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview.

B. Diversion of public funds

81. Corruption in the private and public sectors and the misuse of public funds within public enterprises continue to have a negative impact on the ability of the Government of Haiti to provide services to its population (see [S/2023/674](#)).

82. Despite low prosecution rates (see [S/2023/674](#), para. 30), the country's specialized governmental anti-corruption units continue to undertake investigations into several individuals. For instance, in November 2023, the Unité de lutte contre la corruption submitted 11 investigation reports on public officials for prosecution. Of the total number of cases pending prosecution, those 11 alone were said to have accounted for more than 4 billion gourdes, or 2 per cent of the 2023–2024 national budget.⁶⁶

83. The Panel continues to investigate cases of illicit financial flows related to the diversion of public funds, tax evasion and criminal activities that fuel violence and affect the peace, security and stability of Haiti.

C. Gangs, seaports and illicit financing

84. Although gangs have maintained their diverse sources of revenue, as previously reported (see [S/2023/674](#), para. 18), they have intensified extortion activities on public transport networks along the roads they control by erecting more tolls, in particular on RN2 and around Mariani (see paras. 37–40 and annex 9). By targeting the transport sector, gangs are disrupting people's access to food and other commodities, contributing to inflation and hampering access to essential services and humanitarian aid (see annex 14).

85. Gangs also compete for the control of seaports and the roads leading to and from them for extortion (see [S/2023/674](#), and annex 30 to the present document). Transport operators in the three main port terminals that serve the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area – Caribbean Port Services, Lafito and Varreux (see annex 29) – have been the targets of intensified gang activities. The gangs use various extortion methods (see annex 30).

86. The G9 and G-Pèp allied gangs have been competing for control of the route leading to and from the national port authority terminal (within which Caribbean Port Services is located). In the reporting period, the security situation around the national port authority terminal deteriorated further.⁶⁷ Clashes in the area of La Saline increased as a result of a contested wall being built by G9 gangs to prevent the Wharf Jérémie gang from hijacking of trucks to and from the Caribbean Port Services port (see also sect. II above).

87. Extortion fees are determined on the basis of the size and number of containers and the circumstances at the time (e.g. if a gang is facing threats from rival gangs, the "tax" increases). For instance, in November 2023, during G9 in-fighting (see sect. II), trucks leaving the Caribbean Port Services container terminal were forced to pay pre-negotiated fees of 15,000–30,000 gourdes (\$114–\$228) per container to the gang controlling the first "checkpoint", with lesser amounts to subsequent ones.⁶⁸ With a

⁶⁶ Interviews with three representatives of Haitian anti-corruption bodies and an economic analyst, January 2024. See also <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/245391/onze-rapports-denquetes-sur-des-faits-de-corruption-evalues-a-quatre-milliards-de-gourdes-transmis-a-la-justice>.

⁶⁷ Interviews with a truck driver, a gang analyst and a port operator familiar with the matter, 2024.

⁶⁸ Interviews with a port agent, a truck driver and a customs officer, 2024; as at 9 February 2024, 15,000 gourdes was the worth 114.0326 dollars.

minimum of 200 containers leaving the terminal, the Wharf Jérémie gang could make at least \$22,000 per day from this form of extortion.

88. All of these costs are passed on to the consumer, making commodities more expensive. Port Varreux and Port of Lafito are also affected in a similar way (see annex 30).

D. Links between members of the elite and gangs

89. In Haiti, political, civil service and private sector positions are not mutually exclusive, and some individuals hold several roles simultaneously. For instance, a wealthy businessperson can also be a politician – with the aim of influencing policies in their favour, including tax evasion – and may also sponsor gangs (see S/2023/674, paras. 73 and 76).

90. The historical interdependency between gangs, economic actors and politicians has, over time, bolstered the activities of gangs, which have expanded their territories with the aim of increasing illicit revenue collection (see S/2023/674). Because of the tight grip gangs have over their territories, very little can happen without their authorization. For instance, to organize a public demonstration, politicians and economic actors seek “help” from gangs to gain access to and/or mobilize the population from the areas they control.

91. A politician or business actor seeking to organize a public demonstration in Port-au-Prince would pay a gang representative a “facilitation fee” (*“frais de facilitation”*) of between \$8,000 and \$10,000 to mobilize a group numbering as few as 100 to 200 people for a 4–6 hour demonstration, although the pricing and duration of demonstrations are highly negotiable. An opponent can also hire demonstrators from the same gang to counter the other demonstration. Often, demonstrators come from the densely populated suburbs of Port-au-Prince.⁶⁹ Anti-Government protests and *péyi lok* (country-wide lockdown) situations remain opportunities that gangs exploit to receive payment from economic and political actors (see S/2023/674, para. 79).

92. Some private port operators also engage gangs to paralyze the activities of their rivals. Similarly, gangs have been used to deter customs officials from inspecting containers belonging to some economic actors, in order to avoid paying import duties.⁷⁰

E. Customs bribery as a tool in business competition

93. Some economic actors bribe customs officials to release their containers without undertaking the required customs processes. This was the case in the July 2023 dismissal of a deputy customs director in Port-au-Prince who had authorized the release of several containers from two private ports without the proper documentation and before verifying the cargo.⁷¹ In other cases, business competitors bribe⁷² customs agents to block containers belonging to their rivals. The Panel continues to investigate such cases.

⁶⁹ Interviews with a Haitian National Police officer, a Cité Soleil civil society actor, a La Saline resident and a gang analyst, 2024.

⁷⁰ Interviews with customs officials, an economic crimes investigator, a civil society actor and a gang analyst, 2024.

⁷¹ Interviews with customs officials, an economic crimes investigator and a Haitian National Police officer, 2024. See also <https://metronomehaiti.com/corruption-nettoyage-a-lagd/#>.

⁷² Interview with a main importer of goods who was a victim of the situation, 2024.

F. Economic impact of gang activities in Mariani

94. Since November 2023, the Mariani district of the Carrefour commune in the southern part of the West department fell under the control of a Grand Ravine cell led by Bout Ba that erected a roadblock along RN2 (see paras. 37–40 and annex 9). This hampered the movement of people, goods and services along RN2 between the southern departments (Nippes, South, South-East and Grand’Anse) and the West department. According to one source, “anything that moves along the highway is subject to extortion or hijacking”.⁷³ A taxi operating between Port-au-Prince and Jacmel or Les Cayes might pay the following: 3,500 gourdes (\$26) at the Martissant roadblock; 2,000 gourdes (\$15) at the Fontamara roadblock; 1,500 to 3,000 gourdes (\$11–\$22) at the Christophe Chanel roadblock, depending on the size of the taxi; 1,500 gourdes (\$11) at the Mariani roadblock; and 100 gourdes (\$0.75) at the Le Lambi roadblock. Some instead opt to use the maritime route to bypass these restrictions, which comes with heavy financial and safety consequences (see annex 31). The disruption of the transport system between the southern ports of Jacmel, Jérémie and Les Cayes has in turn affected customs revenue generation, in particular during the fourth quarter of 2023 (see annex 32).

VI. Recommendations

95. The Panel of Experts on Haiti makes the following recommendations to the Committee:

(a) Continue to consider the statements of cases submitted by the Panel in 2023 and update the list of individuals and entities designated pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#);

(b) Sensitize the leadership of the Multinational Security Support Mission about the sanctions regime on Haiti established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#), including the mandate of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) and that of the Panel, in particular paragraph 14 of Council resolution [2700 \(2023\)](#);

(c) Encourage Member States to further support the strengthening of the Haitian National Police, the judiciary and the prison system, and the effective implementation of the national strategy on disarmament, dismantlement and reintegration and community violence reduction, which is crucial for a successful political transition, the implementation of the mandate of the Multinational Security Support Mission and the long-term stability of the country;

(d) Encourage the Haitian authorities to raise awareness of the territorial arms embargo among the leadership of all relevant national institutions involved in its enforcement, by sharing its detailed provisions, as laid out in paragraph 14 of resolution [2699 \(2023\)](#).

⁷³ Interview with a member of the Association des Propriétaire et Chauffeurs d’Haïti, 2024.

Annexes

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Annex 1: Attempt of rapprochement between G9 and G-Pèp

Some of the leaders of the two main gang coalitions, the G9 and the G-Pèp, made several announcements in 2023 indicating a rapprochement and a potential wider alliance, through which they promised to end violence. However, the regrouping did not materialized while gangs engaged in heavy fighting between them and carried out attacks against the civilian population.

First, in July 2023 a peace pledge was broken between Jimmy Chérizier (alias ‘Barbeque’) (HTi.001), Iskar Andrice and Mathias Sainthil of G9 and Ti Gabriel of G-Pèp (see final report [S/2023/674](#) section III.2.1). The gang leaders promised “to work hard to end violence, to bring peace to all people”. Second, on 18 September 2023, Jimmy Chérizier, the leader of the G9 coalition, led a demonstration in Delmas, Port-au-Prince, where he announced that the gangs under his control would be establishing with their hitherto rivals, the G-Pèp coalition, a *Viv Ansam* (Haitian Creole for ‘living together’) movement. He was followed by prominent gang leaders⁷⁴ who voiced a collective message urging the population to move freely and the diaspora to return to the country.

This rapprochement coincided with Haitian and international efforts to establish the Multinational Security Support mission, and was reportedly prompted by the intention of gangs to consolidate their resources and territorial positions, counter future any security offensive, exert control over large constituencies for future elections, and to potentially benefit from amnesty in the future⁷⁵.


The peace pledge and the Viv Ansam alliance were quickly thrown into question when gang violence broke out again in the West, Centre and Artibonite departments. However, despite severe fighting both within and between gangs during the reporting period - marking not only the fracturing of the G9 coalition but also the aggressive expansion of G-Pèp -, sources told the Panel that main gang leaders from both alliances continue to communicate with each other, and might be willing to reactivate the *Viv Ansam* framework against the government and the future MSS.

⁷⁴ Those include, from G-Pèp: Izo (5 Segond); Ti Lapli and Kilik (Grand Ravine); Vitelhomme Innocent (Kraze Barye); Lanmo San Jou (400 Mawozo); Luckson Elan (Gran Grif); Jeff (Canaan). From G9: Barbeque (Delmas 6); Matthias (Boston); Chrisla (Ti Bois); Micanor (Wharf Jérémie); Iskar (Belekou) and Chyen Mechan (Chyen Mechan).

⁷⁵ Interviews with national and international gang analysts, and confidential report, 2023.

Annex 2: Gang presence on main access roads in the West and Artibonite departments as of 15 February 2024


West department



Source: Map elaborated based on UN data and information provided to the Panel by civil society representatives, HNP officials and gang analysts.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Artibonite department



Source: Map elaborated based on UN data and information provided to the Panel by civil society representatives, HNP officials and gang analysts.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 3: Killing of Tysson as a key trigger for ruptures within G9⁷⁶

The leader of the G9-affiliated Carrefour Drouillard gang, Tysson, was killed in a G9 plot orchestrated by his allies (Belekou, Boston, Terre Noire and Pierre VI gangs), that aimed also to assassinate Claudy Célestin (alias “Chyen Mechan”), close friend of Tysson and leader of the G9-allied Chyen Mechan gang.

His death has triggered clashes in Cité Soleil commune between two G9 camps (Boston, Belekou, Terre Noire and Pierre VI against Chyen Mechan and Carrefour Drouillard, supported by the G-Pèp-Brooklyn gang)

As Chyen Mechan has vowed to avenge Tysson, since 27 September 2023, he has been regularly attacking his former allies of Terre Noire and Pierre VI. On 9 and 10 February 2024, he attacked Terre Noire and Pierre VI groups in several neighbourhoods, also setting fire to houses, targeting families of rival gang members and executing members of the local population.

⁷⁶ Interviews with former gang members and gang analysts, January 2024.

Annex 4: Brutal execution of Brooklyn gang members by Pierre VI gang led by Wilson Pierre (alias “Ti Sonson”), on 15 November 2023.

Photographs removed due to gruesome content (On file with the Panel)

Annex 5: Ti Lapli announces the beginning of the “Port-au-Prince battle”, while offering arms to those wanting to join them.



Still from video filmed on 19 January 2024

Annex 6: Woman killed on 16 January 2024 by Bel Air gang, led by Kempes Sanon, during its attacks against Solino




Photo showing the body of a dead woman with several bullet wounds

Annex 7: Bel Air and Grand Ravine gangs disrupt Carnival festivities in Champ-de-Mars, Port-au-Prince, on 12 February 2024




Carnival participant shot by Bel Air gang members

Photo shared with the Panel

Haït/Culture
Festivités carnavalesques/
Deuxieme jours gras
Des crépitements d'armes
automatiques entendues dans
l'air du [#ChampsdeMars](#) et dans
quequels artères périphériques. 5
cas d'enlèvements ont été signalés à
l'avenue John Brown et trois à la Rue
Capois .



Annex 8: Bout Ba exhibits “his good life” while mocking most vulnerable and the police.




Stills from a video filmed on 17 January 2024



Stills from video shared on 2 February 2024

Annex 9: Roadblocks mounted by gangs around Mariani along RN2 blocking access to the South as of 15 February 2024



Source: Google Map. Map produced by the Panel based on interviews with gang analysts, police officers and civil society representatives

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Along the RN#2, which connects the capital to southern departments, road users are forced to pay illegal tolls to several gangs. Besides the already existing illegal roadblocks of Grand Ravine, 5 Second and Ti Bois gangs, Grand Ravine has established a new illegal toll in Mariani city, in Carrefour commune. The insecurity in the area triggered a strong reaction from a Carrefour-based self-defense group popularly known as Caravane gang, made of presumed active and former policemen, which also established roadblocks at the northern and southern ends of Mariani. As a result, since late December 2023, the traffic and the movement through the area has been blocked due to both police operations and the deteriorated insecurity. As an alternative some users – who can afford and are willing to take the risk – have opted to move between the APN and Petit Goave by sea. Mariani's gang – a Grand Ravine cell -, supported by 5 Second, has orchestrated attacks on sailboats, killing passengers, beheading captains, and undertaking collective kidnappings (see also Section V.F). Of note, the use of the Thor terminal, which was previously utilized to by-pass gang-controlled areas, has been impracticable, considering the increased gang violence, notably with the illegal tolls of Caravane self-defense group and Grand Ravine gang.


Annex 10: Ti Bois gang members taking over HNP Rivière Froide police station.



Stills from video filmed on 10 February 2024

Annex 11: Canaan gang members stormed, looted, and torched the Cabaret women's prison.


(The prison was empty, as women inmates had been transferred in May 2023 due to the insecurity)



Stills from video filmed on 30 January 2024


Annex 12: Victims of 400 Mawozo and Kraze Barye in Croix-des-Bouquets commune

Victims of 400 Mawozo's attack on Meyer neighborhood, on 1 November 2023



Photographs of bodies of people who died from gunshots, including women

Pernier schoolteacher, with eyes gouged by Kraze Barye gang members, on 30 January 2024



Attack of Kraze Barye's offshoot over Pernier, on 31 January 2024

(47 victims, including 11 gang members)



Photograph removed due
to gruesome content

(on file with the Panel)


Photograph removed due
to gruesome content

(on file with the Panel)

Stills from video filmed on 31 January 2024 showing dead bodies, including women and minors


Annex 13: Torture on hostages by Artibonite-based gangs

Torture by Kokorat San Ras




Stills from video shared on 29 January 2024

Torture by Gran Grif (video shared in January 2024)




Stills from video showing severe open wounds inflicted by a blunt weapon

Torture by Gran Grif



Photograph removed due
to gruesome content

(on file with the Panel)



Photograph removed due
to gruesome content

(on file with the Panel)

Stills from video showing people being burnt, 17 February 2024

Annex 14: Other human rights violations

The Haitian multidimensional crisis is eroding the country's social fabric. Key elements fueling this web of insecurity include: political instability, gang violence, lack of or dysfunctional state institutions, deficient governance, progressive decline of law enforcement capabilities, rampant impunity and illicit financial flows, collusion of political and economic actors to undermine state institutions and profiting from chaos and pervasive poverty.⁷⁷

In the West and Artibonite departments of Haiti, gangs are escalating human rights abuses, including killings, rape, kidnapping, extortion, and public and private property destruction, to expand their control. Many people face dangers like stray bullets and mass shootings, while gangs continue recruiting minors.

In the last quarter of 2023, at least 1,634 people were killed or injured as a result of violence by criminal groups. Most were victims of bullets fired during extremely violent attacks, particularly in the communes of Carrefour, Cité Soleil, Gressier and Port-au-Prince (West Department).⁷⁸

According to an NGO, the humanitarian impact of gang's criminal activities in Mariani since November 2023 until mid-January resulted in 77 deaths, 35 wounded, 9 houses destroyed and more than 427 houses abandoned and widespread looting and destructions⁷⁹. The HNP lost 3 armored vehicles torched by the gangs in the same area.

Mass kidnappings of people travelling in public transport vehicles continue on the main roads as the metropolitan area remains surrounded by gangs.

Gangs deliberately targeted administrative buildings, especially those housing the judiciary and police, in an effort to undermine state institutions. For example, on 7 February, the police station of Gros Morne (Artibonite department) was attacked by Kokorat San Ras gang. On the same day, in Gonaïves, Raboteau gang members attacked the civilian courts and the Office Assurances Véhicules Contre Tiers (Car Insurance Office) were looted.⁸⁰

Civil unrest has also caused damages to public buildings. For example, on 29 January, there were attempts by anti-government protesters to set fire to Jérémie's City Hall (Grand'Anse department). Subsequently, on 31 January, unidentified intruders broke into and looted the city hall, stealing office equipment, solar panels, and batteries. In Ouanaminthe, located in the Northeast department, gunmen stormed the Office National d'Assurance-Vieillesse (ONA), while in Hinche, situated in the Center department, demonstrators tried to set fire to the customs office and issued threats to burn down administration buildings.⁸¹

Justice

During the reporting period the already dysfunctional judicial system also faced the strikes of the Haitian Magistrates organization, the National Association of Haitian Court Clerks and public prosecutors suspended hearings from 20 November to 11 December 2023 demanding higher salaries and improved working conditions.⁸²

⁷⁷ See for instance, <https://www.ijdh.org/news-and-resources/publications/>

⁷⁸ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/rapport-trimestriel-sur-la-situation-des-droits-de-lhomme-en-haiti-octobre-decembre-2023>

⁷⁹ Plateforme Nationale pour le Progrès des Droits Humains (PNPDH), “ Enprise (sic) des Hommes ames(sic) sur la population civil de Mariani depuis 1er Novembre 2023 a 19 Janvier 2024.” On file with the Panel.

⁸⁰ See <https://reznodwes.com/?p=328156&>

⁸¹ UNPOL data, February 2024.

⁸² UNPOL data, December 2023.

In October 2023, the CSPJ certified 16 magistrates, with 4 candidates failing and 3 undergoing further revision⁸³. Nonetheless, human rights organizations raised concerns about some of the certified individuals.⁸⁴ In January and February 2024, the CSPJ examined 60 files of judges, 30 were certified, 12 were not and 18 were held for additional clarifications.⁸⁵

On 15 December 2023, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security admonished the Government Commissioners of Miragoâne and Les Cayes for their involvement in unlawful activities.⁸⁶ Human rights defenders have accused the Miragoâne Government Commissioner of being responsible for the extrajudicial killings of at least 10 individuals suspected of gang ties in 2022 and 2023. They have also highlighted to the Ministry of Justice the disproportionate nature of an admonishment in relation to the severity of the alleged crimes committed by the commissioner.⁸⁷ Despite these accusations, no legal action has been taken against those persons.

Food insecurity

Haiti faces a severe food crisis, ranking among the worst globally in terms of affected population. Over 4.35 million Haitians, approximately 40% of the population, suffer from acute food insecurity (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification - IPC) phase 3 and about 1.4 million people fall under IPC 4 (Emergency). Children are particularly vulnerable, with a 30% increase in severe acute malnutrition cases (see Annex 26). Indeed, the number of Haitians in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) has steadily increased over the past four years.⁸⁸

Human rights defenders

Human rights defenders continue to be at risk, according to an NGO, from January to September 2023 there were 38 incidents (attacks, theft, threats, confines, etc) against NGOs in Haiti.⁸⁹

For example, on 29 October 2023 a staff member of the Centre d'analyse et recherche en droits de l'homme (CARDH), was kidnapped and threats were directed against his director. This situation led to the organization's temporary suspension of activities on 22 November.⁹⁰

Several LGBTQI+ organizations have indicated that LGBTQI+ persons are particularly at risk of gang violence as they are stigmatized and discriminated against. The lack of support from State authorities makes them also more vulnerable. Thus, 13 cases of aggression against LGBTQI+ persons were recorded between January and October 2023.⁹¹

Also, women organizations have suffered threats following demonstration for abortion rights in September 2023.⁹²

⁸³ CSPJ. 2023. Procès-verbal. 9 October.

⁸⁴ See <https://web.rnddh.org/fonctionnement-de-lappareil-judiciaire-haitien-au-cours-de-lannee-2022-2023/> Interviews with humanitarian actors January 2024.

⁸⁵ CSPJ. Procès-verbal des opérations de certification. 2 February. and Interview with human rights defender, January 2024.

⁸⁶ See for example letter from the Ministry of Justice addressed to the Commissaire of Miragoâne on file with the Panel.

⁸⁷ Confidential sources, February 2024. See also <https://haiti.loopnews.com/content/le-mjsp-blame-les-commissaires-du-gouvernement-de-miragoane-et-cayes>

⁸⁸ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2024>

⁸⁹ See <https://ngosafety.org/analysis-reports/> Interview with humanitarian actor, January 2024. Interview with human rights defender January and February 2024.

⁹⁰ See <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/haiti-human-rights-group-suspends-operations-after-threats-2023-11-23/>

⁹¹ See a <https://www.negesmawon.org/documents-a-consulter/> visited January 2023. Confidential sources, January 2024.

⁹² See for example Comprehensive Written Submission of Civil Society Hearing on Widespread Sexual Violence Against Women And Girls In Haiti, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 186th Period of Sessions, 2023. Available at <https://cgrs.uclawsf.edu/sites/default/files/IACHR%20Haiti%20SGBV%20Written%20Submission.pdf> visited January 2024.

Bwa Kale and vigilante groups

The Panel expresses concern over ongoing killings perpetrated by the population, either through vigilante groups or mob justice known as Bwa Kale (see S/2023/674). Between October and December 2023, vigilante groups killed at least 76 individuals accused of various crimes or affiliations with gangs. Nearly 80% of those crimes occurred in the West department.⁹³

Between October and December 2023, the Caravane self-defence group popularly known as ‘Caravane gang’, based in Carrefour, composed of civilians, as well as current and former police officers killed and wounded at least 17 individuals accused of gang affiliations.⁹⁴

On 10 December, in Tiburon commune (South department), during a police operation against a local gang resulted in the killing of 19 individuals and at least in three cases vigilante group members participated in such attacks.⁹⁵

On 23 December, four persons were killed for allegedly being part of gang operating in the Sèvre area (South department).⁹⁶

Attacks on public transportation.

On 4 December 2023, in Gonaïves (Artibonite department), the Kokorat San Ras gang members, led by Meyer hijacked several transported goods and kidnapped at least 12 persons.⁹⁷

On 18 December 2023, the Gran Grif gang, ambushed a goods convoy escorted by police en route to St-Marc (Artibonite department). This attack resulted in the deaths of at least five passengers and left a dozen others wounded.⁹⁸

On 19 December 2023, in Liancourt, Artibonite department, Kokorat San Ras gang members assaulted a minibus, killing the driver and one passenger, with three additional passengers sustaining serious injuries.⁹⁹

On 29 December 2023, Gran Grif gang members attacked a mini-bus near Carrefour-Paye (Artibonite department), at least five passengers were wounded.¹⁰⁰

On 14 January 2024, Ti Bois gang members in Gros-Morne (Artibonite department) attacked a public transport bus, kidnapping all 35 passengers.¹⁰¹

On 30 January 2024, in Cité- Soleil, members of the Brooklyn gang, controlled by Ti Gabriel, attacked the Nan Raket area which resulted in at least seven people killed, and 30 others injured. Those attacks resulted in more than 4000 displaced people.¹⁰²

⁹³ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haïti/rapport-trimestriel-sur-la-situation-des-droits-de-l'homme-en-haïti-octobre-décembre-2023>

⁹⁴ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haïti/rapport-trimestriel-sur-la-situation-des-droits-de-l'homme-en-haïti-octobre-décembre-2023>

⁹⁵ UNPOL data, December 2023.

⁹⁶ UNPOL data, December 2023.

⁹⁷ Confidential source, January 2024.

⁹⁸ UNPOL data, December 2023.

⁹⁹ UNPOL data, December 2023.

¹⁰⁰ UNPOL data, January 2024.

¹⁰¹ See <https://vantbefinfo.com/un-bus-transportant-35-passagers-pris-en-otage-a-gros-morne/>

¹⁰² “International Organization for Migration (IOM), January 2024. Emergency Tracking Tool #36.1 at Port-au-Prince, Pétion Ville and Cité Soleil. IOM, Haiti.” Available at <https://dtm.iom.int/haïti>.

On 31 January 2024, gang members led by Bout Ba hijacked a boat en route from Port-au-Prince to Grand'Anse.¹⁰³ The boat was carrying goods and nearly 70 passengers, including women and children, all of whom were held hostage.¹⁰⁴

On 12 January 2024, in the Carrefour-Paye area (Artibonite department) members of the Gran Grif gang hijacked a bus transporting an unspecified number of passengers from Port-au-Prince to Gonaïves.¹⁰⁵

Attacks against clerics, worshipers and places of worship

Between 30 November to 1 December 2023, Gran Grif gang members kidnapped an undetermined number of worshippers of a church in Petite-Rivière of the Artibonite. They were released without paying a ransom.¹⁰⁶

On 11 January 2024, four pastors were kidnapped in Croix-des-Bouquets (West department) one of whom was released against the payment of a ransom.¹⁰⁷

On 18 January 2024, Bel Air gang members led by Kempes attacked and looted a church in Delmas 24 (Annex 25).

On 19 January 2024, in Port-au-Prince, members of the 5 Second gang abducted six nuns and two workers from the St. Anne Order. They were released on 24 January, but no details were provided regarding the conditions of their release or whether a ransom was paid.¹⁰⁸

Violations to the right to life and physical integrity of children

Children continue to be victims of gang violence. For example, on 6 November 2023, a ten-year-old boy, was intercepted in Mariani area by Grand Ravine gang members who accused him of being a spy. He was then executed.¹⁰⁹

On 25 December 2023, a family in Croix-des-Bouquets (West department) was assaulted in their residence by 400 Mawozo gang members. The assailants ruthlessly killed four individuals, including two young girls aged 10 and 6 (see Annex 23). Furthermore, the gang kidnapped four members of the same family, including the father of the children, who served as the director of a school. Testimonies collected by the Panel substantiated the involvement of members from the 400 Mawozo gang.¹¹⁰

On 19 January 2024, in Mariani (West department), during clashes between gang members and police officers at least seven children were injured according to a local NGO.¹¹¹

On 17 February 2024, in Carrefour-Feuilles (West department), the body of a child partially burnt was left on the street for several days and partially devoured by dogs. The child was killed during clashed between the HNP and Grand Ravine gang members (see Annex 24).

¹⁰³ Many Haitians have resorted to sailing boats as the only way to travel to the south from Port-au-Prince since gangs have blocked all roads.

¹⁰⁴ See <https://www.tripfoumi.com/blog/2024/02/03/70-personnes-enlevees-a-bord-dun-mini-bateau-a-mariani/>

¹⁰⁵ UNPOL data, January 2024.

¹⁰⁶ Confidential source, January 2024.

¹⁰⁷ Confidential source, January 2024.

¹⁰⁸ Confidential sources, January and February 2024.

¹⁰⁹ Confidential source, January 2024.

¹¹⁰ Confidential sources, January 2024.

¹¹¹ Confidential source, January 2024.

Obstruction to children's right to education

The 2023 Ministry of Education national assessment revealed that, in July 2023, 139 schools were used as shelters for 23 gangs and IDPs. Of these, 108 were in Artibonite and 31 in the West department. Additionally, 755 schools were closed, with 402 in Artibonite and 353 in the West, out of a total of 7,402 schools.¹¹² Moreover, more than 130,000 students are missing out on the school feeding program because of violence¹¹³, sometimes the only meal children receive for the day.

Between 13 and 15 October 2023, more than 400 children as well as teachers and nuns, were trapped inside their catholic school at La Saline, Port-au-Prince due to intense clashes between the gangs of Wharf Jérémie and La Saline. On 14 October, about 200 male students were able to evacuate. However, some 115 students, mostly girls, between the ages of 6 and 15, were forced to spend another night at the school. The last 60 students were rescued on 15 October, thanks to the intervention of UN agencies and governmental institutions.¹¹⁴

Also on 13 October 2023, the Lycée national de la Saline in Cité Soleil, was looted by gangs and forced to close.¹¹⁵

According to an NGO in the Mariani area, between November 2023 and January 2024, at least 29 schools have closed due to gang violence.¹¹⁶

Sexual violence against children

The Panel continues its investigations into incidents of sexual and gender-based violence, including against minors. As impunity is rampant and gangs continue to expand their territorial control, cases in areas such as the Artibonite department continue to rise.

UN agencies indicate that, in the Artibonite department, gangs such as Gran Grif, Kokorat San Ras and Ti Grif use sexual violence, particularly rape, as means to inflict fear and punish local populations during attacks against rival villages. Minors are among the victims of those attacks¹¹⁷

On 3 November 2023, a 13-year-old girl who was raped by Ti Bois gang members in Carrefour, Port-au-Prince.¹¹⁸

Obstruction to humanitarian access

The increasing insecurity has compelled the Haitian Red Cross (HRC) to restrict its ambulance services to specific areas within Port-au-Prince.¹¹⁹

Also, the escalating violence in Mariani has severely constrained WFP from reaching the southern peninsula of Haiti¹²⁰ (see Sections II.B.2 and Annex 9).¹²¹

¹¹² See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/unicef-haiti-humanitarian-situation-report-no-9-november-2023>

¹¹³ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/latin-america-caribbean-weekly-situation-update-18-january-2024>

¹¹⁴ Confidential sources, January 2024. See also <https://www.unicef.org/haiti/en/stories/children-trapped-amid-gang-violence-find-safety-and-security>

¹¹⁵ Interview with a humanitarian actor, January 2024.

¹¹⁶ Plateforme Nationale pour le Progrès des Droits Humains (PNPDH), “Enprise (sic) des Hommes ames(sic) sur la population civil de Mariani depuis 1er Novembre 2023 a 19 Janvier 2024.” On file with the Panel.

¹¹⁷ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/criminal-violence-extends-beyond-port-au-prince-situation-lower-artibonite-january-2022-october-2023-november-2023>

¹¹⁸ Confidential source, January 2024.

¹¹⁹ <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/haiti-delivering-health-care-amid-growing-insecurity>

¹²⁰ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/wfp-haiti-country-brief-december-2023>

¹²¹ See <https://www.unocha.org/news/todays-top-news-occupied-palestinian-territory-haiti>

According to a humanitarian NGO, to reach Port-de-Paix (Northwest department) it is necessary to pass at least four check points set up by different gangs and pay extortionary fees.¹²²

Between 5 and 7 February 2024, significant civil unrest occurred in various Haitian cities, including Port-au-Prince, Ouanaminthe (North East department), Gonaives (Artibonite department), and Mirebalais (Centre department) which resulted in the suspension of almost all humanitarian activities. Furthermore, the office of an international NGO operating in the South department was looted, severely hindering its future operations.¹²³

3.1.2 Violations to right to health

Attacks against healthcare facilities and workers have major humanitarian repercussions as they serve a large population and can often make the difference between life and death for patients. In late 2023, Haiti faced a widespread cholera outbreak, particularly affecting the southern part of the country. Nationwide, approximately 73,000 confirmed and suspected cases were reported, 80% of cases were women and children. The actual number of cholera cases is likely higher due to limitations in the epidemiological surveillance system, worsened by the country's violence. Access to basic sanitation services remains limited, 55% of households have access to drinking water and 39% to latrines.¹²⁴

On 26 September 2023, the University Hospital of Mirebalais was attacked by members of Izo's and Jeff's gangs resulting in the departure of significant numbers of staff. Insecurity and shortage of personnel has significantly impacted the population seeking healthcare.¹²⁵

On 17 October 2023, criminal activities by armed gangs in Croix-des-Bouquets, notably in Morne-à-Cabri (West department), disrupted the operations of the Sainte Thérèse hospital.¹²⁶

On 20 October 2023, the Saint-Damien Nos Petits Frères et Sœurs hospital (Tabarre Commune) had to close its maternity ward due to security concerns.¹²⁷

On 15 November 2023, the Fontaine Hospital in Cité Soleil¹²⁸ was attacked by members of Ti Gabriel's gang causing patients and staff to relocate to other Port-au-Prince medical centers, reducing healthcare accessibility.¹²⁹ This has especially endangered pregnant women's well-being and hindered the United Nations Population Fund's (UNFPA) assistance to the hospital.¹³⁰

On 12 December 2023, a Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) ambulance was taking a seriously wounded patient to a hospital when gang members stopped it, took out the patient and killed him on the road.¹³¹

¹²² Confidential source, January 2024.

¹²³ See <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/haiti/haiti-impact-civil-unrest-humanitarian-response-flash-update-5-7-february-2024>

¹²⁴ See <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4034480?ln=en>

¹²⁵ Confidential source, January 2024.

¹²⁶ See <https://www.tripfoumi.com/blog/2023/10/18/lhopital-sainte-therese-de-hinche-au-bord-du-precipice-en-raison-de-linsecurite/>

¹²⁷ Interview with humanitarian, January 2024. See also <https://www.medicinssansfrontieres.ca/haiti-la-recrudescence-de-la-violence-a-cite-soleil-affecte-lacces-aux-soins-de-sante/>

¹²⁸ See <https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/video/2024/01/25/haiti-caught-crossfire>

¹²⁹ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-medical-care-severely-affected-clashes-cite-soleil>

¹³⁰ Confidential source, January 2024.

¹³¹ Interview with a humanitarian actor, January 2024. See also MSF Communiqué 14 December 2023, on file with the Panel.

Annex 15: Challenges to the Prison System

As of 8 February 2024, Haiti's prisons held a total of 11,834 inmates, with the vast majority of 9,914 detainees being held in pre-trial detention. This represents 83.78% of inmates being held in pre-trial detention, with a cell occupancy rate of about 307.45%, indicating an average of approximately 0.33 square meters per inmate. Among the prison population are 372 women, 232 boys, and 14 girls.¹³² The National Penitentiary alone had just over 3,700 inmates.¹³³

Despite efforts from the Haitian Government and UN agencies, the penitentiary system in Haiti teeters on the brink of collapse. Prisons across the nation suffer from severe overcrowding, shortages of essential resources such as food, medical supplies, and cooking gas, as well as significant issues with sewage and garbage disposal. Gang attacks on prisons are also a constant threat.

On 30 January 2024, the Canaan gang led by Jeff Larose, attacked the Cabaret women's prison. While the prisoners had already been evacuated in May 2023, the infrastructure was ransacked and burnt. It remains under the control of the gang.¹³⁴ Additionally, prisons such as in Croix-des-Bouquets face threats from multiple armed gangs, while facilities like the Center for the Rehabilitation of Minors in Conflict with the Law struggles with mixed-gender populations and dire resource shortages.

The situation is particularly dire in Jacmel (South-East department), where increased police operations have led to a surge in the prison population, which was built to house 139 inmates but currently holds 738 inmates, an occupancy rate of approximately 531% of the prison space exacerbating already strained living conditions.¹³⁵

Efforts to reduce overcrowding, such as the Humanitarian Program for the Reduction of Prolonged Preventive Detention - "Programme Humanitaire de Réduction de la Détention Préventive Prolongée" (PHRDPP)- resulted in 163 inmates released in December 2023.¹³⁶

Prisons in the south of the country are increasingly suffering from disruptions of the supply of basic goods, medical equipment and food resulting from the blockade in the Mariani area (see Sections II.B.2, V.F and Annex 9). Other problems, include issues with septic tanks and waste disposal, in Jérémie, Hinche, and Croix-des-Bouquets.

Efforts to manage resources and budgets within the prison system have been hampered by inefficiencies and allegations of corruption, as evidenced by the case related to the head of the Cap Haïtien civil prison who faced charges of embezzlement in December 2023.¹³⁷

¹³² UNPOL data, February 2024. Human rights defenders and confidential sources highlighted the dire conditions of Haitian prisons and expressed concerns about how the penitentiary system might cope with the upcoming MSS. Interviews February 2024.

¹³³ Confidential source, January 2024.


¹³⁴ Between 19 and 20 May 2023, all the 84 inmates incarcerated in the facility were transferred to the Centre de Rééducation des Mineurs en Conflit avec la Loi (CERMICOL) due to security concerns.

¹³⁵ UNPOL data, January 2024.

¹³⁶ Confidential source, January 2024.

¹³⁷ Confidential sources, January 2024.

Annex 16: Mobility map in the Great South (departments of the South, South-East, Nippes and Grand'Anse)




Organisation Internationale pour les Migrations (OIM), décembre 2023, Cartographie de mobilité dans le Grand-Sud. OIM, Haïti. Available at <https://dtm.iom.int/haïti> visit February 2024.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 17: IDPs from Mariani

IDPs following armed clashes between gangs on 1 November 2023 in the Mariani area.




"International Organization for Migration (IOM), Nov 06 2023. DTM Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 27 — Displacement at Mariani in the Municipality of Carrefour (01 — 06 November 2023). IOM, Haiti." Available at <https://dtm.iom.int/haiti> visit January 2024.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 18: IDPs from Belekou, Terre Noire-Blanchard, Duvivier, Bas Fontaine and Sarhe, in the municipality of Cité Soleil

IDPs following armed attacks after the death of Belekou gang leader Iskar Andrice in the municipality of Cité of Soleil on 13 November.




“International Organization for Migration (IOM), Nov 16 2023. DTM Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 28 — Displacement following attacks in Cité Soleil (15 — 16 November 2023). IOM, Haiti.” Available at <https://dtm.iom.int/haitei> visit January 2024.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 19: IDPs from Arcahaie

IDPs following a land conflict in the Fonds Baptiste section (Municipality of Arcahaie, West department) on 15 November 2023.




"International Organization for Migration (IOM), Nov 29 2023. DTM Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 29 — Displacement following clashes due to a land conflict in the municipality of Arcahaie (29 November 2023). IOM, Haiti." Available at <https://dtm.iom.int/haiti> visit January 2024.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 20: IDPs from Carrefour, Cité Soleil and Tabarre, February 2024

IDP following armed clashes between gangs in Carrefour, Cité Soleil and Tabarre (05 — 13 February 2024).



“International Organization for Migration (IOM), February 2024. Emergency Tracking Tool #37.1 at Carrefour, Cité Soleil and Tabarre. IOM, Haiti.” Available at <https://dtm.iom.int/haiti> visit February 2024.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.


Annex 21 : IDP site located at the Lycee Jean Marie Vincent, Port-au-Prince

All pictures taken by the Panel on 19.01.24.



Annex 22: IDPs from Tabarre

IDPs following armed attacks that occurred on 8 December 2023, in the municipality of Tabarre, particularly in the neighborhoods of HT Monquette, Truitier, Tapage and Dumornay.



"International Organization for Migration (IOM), December 2023. Emergency Tracking Tool #31 at Tabarre. IOM, Haiti." Available at <https://dtm.iom.int/haiti> visit January 2024.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.


Annex 23: Children killed by 400 Mawozo



Photograph removed due to gruesome content
(on file with the Panel)

Still from a video recording showing the dead bodies of two children, provided by a confidential source, January 2024.

Annex 24: Child killed during clashes between HNP and Grand Ravine gang members.



This child was killed during clashes between the HNP and Grand Ravine gang members. His body was left in the street for several days while dogs fed on his corpse.

Carrefour Feuilles, 17 February 2024.

Picture provided to the Panel by confidential source, February 2024.

Annex 25: Attack on a Church

Stills taken from a video circulating on social media. On 18 January 2024, members of the Bel Air gang wreak havoc on a Church in Delmas 24, Port-au-Prince.¹³⁸



¹³⁸ Confidential sources, January and February 2024.

Annex 26: Haiti: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for August 2023 - February 2024


Current Acute Food Insecurity | August 2023 - February 2024



About 4.35 million people analysed are experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) in Haiti between August 2023 - February 2024




44% of the analysed population is in IPC Phase 3 or above (Crisis or worse).



1 - None
2 - Stressed
3 - Crisis
4 - Emergency
5 - Catastrophe

Current situation: August 2023 – February 2024



LEGEND

IPC Acute Food Insecurity Phase Classification

- 1 - Minimal
- 2 - Stress
- 3 - Crisis
- 4 - Emergency
- 5 - Famine
- Areas not analysed

Area receives significant humanitarian food assistance
(accounted for in Phase classification)


> 25% of households meet 25-50% of caloric needs through assistance

Around 1.4 million people are classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) and around 2.95 million people are in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis). Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC). Available at <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156571/?iso3=HTI> visited February 2024.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 27: A graph showing the corresponding relationship between real GDP and inflation over the years.

As shown, the annual percentage change in consumer price index stood at 13.4%, as at October 2023, one of the highest in last about 45 years. Source: <https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/HTI>.



Annex 28: Impact of inflation at the household level

Between September 2023 and January 2024, food prices have dramatically increased. For instance, before September 2023, a 25kg (or 55lbs) – (9 “marmites”) of Tchako, Bongu or Mega imported rice-type cost between \$32USD and \$35USD. In January 2024, the price had reached \$40USD minimum, according to traders interviewed by the Panel.¹³⁹ According to them, half of their local customers could no longer afford to buy in cash and had resorted to buying on credit and whenever their debts accumulated, they switched to a different shop, leaving the shopkeepers with the debts. As a result, many shops in Kenscoff commune in Port-au-Prince are virtually empty and operate only on certain days and hours of the week, due to reduced business. This situation is typical of most small-scale businesses in the Port-au-Prince metropole.

The situation is even worse regarding locally produced foodstuff. According to the traders for instance, Haitian rice costs twice as much as the imported one. and the same can be said for the locally produced fruits and Haitian reared chicken, beef, eggs, etc. This is due to the costs of farm inputs and transport from farms to markets, amidst gang violence. As a result, many local farmers have abandoned agriculture, and their market space has been filled with imported products. “In another 5 years Haiti will be completely dependent on imported food,” concluded one of the traders.

¹³⁹ During January 2024, the Panel interviewed economists, policy actors, transporters, port operators and traders on the impact of gang violence on the economy and food supply, and they all provided related responses to these issues, summed here. Of the three traders, two traders are based in Kenscoff commune, and one is based in Pétion-Ville.

Annex 29 : Ports serving Port-au-Prince

CPS is a container terminal located at a public port in Port-au-Prince, called the ‘Autorité Portuaire Nationale (APN) Port’. CPS handles over 80% of the cargo coming into Port-au-Prince;¹⁴⁰ it is privately owned and operated and is used by several shipping agents importing commodities. It was licensed to operate in June 2013¹⁴¹ and is managed under a private-public partnership and receives mostly cargo vessels. Information on ports’ Logistics Capacity Assessment (LCA) indicates that although it is classified as private-public partnership, it performs the function of a public port, and is owned by the GB Group.¹⁴² The Port of Varreux, located in Carrefour and Cité Soleil neighbourhoods, is a private terminal, that mainly imports petrochemicals, gas, vegetable oil, grains, cement among other items.¹⁴³ Next to it is Shodecosa, Haiti’s largest industrial park; a warehouse that stores about 93 percent of the country’s imported food.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁰ See, <https://www.projectcargo-weekly.com/2018/10/04/caribbean-port-services-port-au-prince-haiti/>.

¹⁴¹ A confidential report seen by the Panel.

¹⁴² Haiti Port of Lafito, <https://dlca.logcluster.org/214-haiti-port-lafito>.

¹⁴³ <https://dlca.logcluster.org/211a-haiti-port-terminal-varreux>.

¹⁴⁴ Interview with two wholesale traders. Also see, <https://www.twincities.com/2021/10/27/in-haiti-the-difficult-relationship-of-gangs-and-business/>.

Annex 30: Extortion methods around ports

Gangs use different ways of extorting their targeted victims. The method used depends on the circumstances, the value of the goods, and the imminent threats posed by rival gangs. For instance, most expensive cargo such as oil tanks will require a higher payment (often \$1000USD and above) which is pre-negotiated and paid from a secret location such as someone's premises, away from the tolling area (the road).

This is to prevent any potential disruption or attacks from competing gangs. For instance in the case of the APN Port, before a container truck sets off, either the owner of the container or truck must first pay for the passage, sometimes several days before sending the truck to collect the goods from the port.

This is done by locating the gang representative ("watcher or spotter") who often operates within the vicinity of the road, in the nearest town centre. According to sources, truck owners know what to do and gangs rarely mount roadblocks except in isolated cases of non-payment. In cases of "smaller" amounts and where the threat of attacks from rival gangs or HNP are lower, gangs erect roadblocks and extort on the spot¹⁴⁵.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

Annex 31: A map and pictures showing roadblocks mounted by gangs along the RN2 highway

Source: WFP report see <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/wfp-haiti-impacts-mariani-roadblock-food-prices-grand-sud-january-2024>.

See also Annex 9 which shows the roadblocks in Mariani area.

Gang activities (extortion and hijacking) has led to a shortage of essential supplies between the South department and the West department, hiking prices for the basic commodities and transport. From November 2023 when gangs mounted a roadblock in Mariani to extort transporters, the supply of manufactured goods (vegetable oil, petroleum, etc) coming from the West department, and agricultural products (beef, beans, sugar, etc) coming from the South was disrupted. The gangs also engage in trafficking of drugs and smuggling of counterfeit products.¹⁴⁶ Today, the relationship between gangs and transporters has “...almost ‘normalised’ explained a representative of a transport workers association. Each party knows the dos and don’ts,” and even before reaching Mariani, there are several roadblocks. For the taxis to recover these costs, they levy them on the passengers. A trip that used to cost 425HTG per head before November 2023 (Port-au-Prince to Jacmel) now costs 1,250HTG per head (inclusive of roadblock fees).¹⁴⁷ As an alternative to RN2 route, some cargo transporters and travellers have opted to use maritime transport between other departments and the cities in the South. However, the maritime route is far more costly, with a one-way trip for a container from the APN port in Port-au-Prince to Petit Goave costing between \$500USD and \$700USD compared to roughly \$150USD by road before November 2023.¹⁴⁸ Increasingly, gangs are now also attacking maritime vessels being used by the population as an alternative route. For instance, on 6 January 2024, gangs attacked a boat in Mariani area, killing 7 people.¹⁴⁹




Left to right: A photo of food trucks at Le Lambi roadblock mounted by gangs (9 November 2023); Queue of public taxis and cargo trucks at Le Lambi roadblock (4 January 2024) and a public bus and private cars at Le Lambi roadblock (7 January 2024). The vehicles were waiting to pay the toll fees to the gangs before they could proceed. Video and photos shared by a representative of a transport workers association.

¹⁴⁶ Interview with a truck loader and two traders, 2024.

¹⁴⁷ Interview with a Mariani resident, a member of the Association Propriétaire Chauffeur d’Haiti (APCH), 2024.

¹⁴⁸ Interviews with a Kenscoff-based trader, a customs officer and a government official, 2024.

¹⁴⁹ See, <https://haitiantimes.com/2024/01/10/haiti-insecurity-gangs-mariana-pnh/>.



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Annex 32: Customs revenue based on import duty generated by various ports of entry for the last quarter of 2023

See <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/246192/customs-over-11-billion-gourdes-in-revenue-in-december-2023>. Also verified with a customs official, 2024.

As shown in the table below, the ports of Jacmel, Les Cayes and Jérémie recorded no revenue for the last quarter of 2023. This was partly occasioned by the blockade of the RN2 at Mariani by gangs.

 REPUBLIQUE D'HAÏTI ADMINISTRATION GENERALE DES DOUANES TABLEAU ANALYTIQUE DES PERCEPTIONS DOUANIERES A L'IMPORTATION BASE ENCAISSEMENT TOUS LES BUREAUX DE DOUANE Exercices 2022-2023 par Bureau / Mois (Montants en Gourdes)					
Bureau	Oct-23	Nov-23	Dec-22	Total	%
Port de PAP	7,436,177,942.33	9,013,940,033.63	9,762,106,624.70	26,212,224,600.66	88.71
Aéroport de PAP	223,542,928.90	182,633,415.57	215,709,997.11	621,886,341.58	2.10
Sonapi	18,000.00	232,707.19	165,169.33	415,876.52	0.00
Cap-Haitien	432,697,840.34	606,592,280.90	1,107,559,084.35	2,146,849,205.59	7.27
Gonaives	21,513.35	125,281.41	-	146,794.76	0.00
Saint-Marc	26,799,644.76	28,029,197.27	24,595,271.22	79,424,113.25	0.27
Miragoane	21,259,030.30	23,328,256.14	31,575,658.55	76,162,944.99	0.26
Petit-Goave	-	-	18,666,024.42	18,666,024.42	0.06
Port de Paix	4,251,209.69	900,007.45	4,701,184.38	9,852,401.52	0.03
Jacmel	-	-	2,700,173.39	2,700,173.39	0.01
Cayes	-	-	-	-	-
Jérémie	-	-	-	-	-
Malpasse	-	2,051,104.97	5,064,217.16	7,115,322.13	0.02
Ouanaminthe	9,294,813.99	7,310,800.99	10,968,253.44	27,573,868.42	0.09
Belladères	2,952,064.38	138,940,382.65	192,398,761.75	334,291,208.78	1.13
Thomassique	-	2,302,380.65	3,001,050.00	5,303,430.65	0.02
Anse-à-Pitres	1,298,055.65	2,316,052.10	-	3,614,107.75	0.01