

National Human Rights Defense Network (RNDDH)



***30th Anniversary of the Haitian National Police (PNH):
RNDDH Commends the Struggle of Police Officers to Restore Security***

June 12, 2025

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I. Introduction

1. June 12, 2025, marks the thirtieth (30th) anniversary of the creation of the Haitian National Police (PNH), a republican institution born from the desire to provide the country with a professional and apolitical public security force.

2. On this occasion, the National Human Rights Defense Network (RNDDH) shares with the public its observations on the functioning of the police institution and the conditions under which PNH officers are expected to work.

3. This document reviews, among other things, the impact of the security situation on PNH officers, the budget allocated to the police institution for the current fiscal year, efforts to strengthen its capacity, and the fight against armed gangs. It also describes the conditions under which officers were killed between June 2024 and June 2025, and offers recommendations to the transitional authorities.

II. Impact of the Security Situation on PNH Officers

4. The various armed attacks carried out between 2019 and 2024 by criminal gangs in the neighborhoods of Carrefour-Feuilles, Delmas, and Solino have had a serious impact on PNH officers, as these areas have long been known as police strongholds due to the high number of officers residing there.

5. Consequently, since these areas fell under the control of the armed gangs affiliated with the terrorist coalition *Viv Ansanm*, many officers have been forced to live with friends, relatives, or within the premises of the police stations to which they are assigned.

6. This situation, which does not appear to be of major concern to the members of the High Council of the National Police (CSPN), has been observed in several police stations, including the Port-au-Prince and Delmas police stations, and the Canapé-Vert substation, as well as in several specialized PNH units such as the Motorized Intervention Brigade (BIM), where officers live in unacceptable conditions, lacking the bare minimum in terms of infrastructure.

III. PNH Budget

7. On April 21, 2025, the transitional authorities adopted a revised budget, allocating to the police institution the sum of thirty-two billion, nine hundred thirty-four million, six hundred twenty-five thousand, three hundred forty-four (32,934,625,344) gourdes, broken down as follows:

- Twenty-four billion, thirty-one million, seven hundred fifty-five thousand, four hundred thirty-four (24,031,755,434) gourdes allocated to operational expenses;

- Eight billion, nine hundred two million, eight hundred sixty-nine thousand, nine hundred ten (8,902,869,910) gourdes allocated to investment.

8. This amount, which represents just over 10% of the national budget, was presented well before its adoption as a wartime budget. Of this total, 73% is allocated to personnel expenses, including salaries, wages, and social benefits for police personnel. Only 27% is allocated to investment expenses, which include, among other things, the purchase of equipment and police materials, the construction and renovation of police infrastructure, etc. The investment portion represents 3% of the national budget.

IV. Salaries, Promotions, and Bonuses Granted to PNH Officers

9. In general, police officers receive compensation that is largely insufficient given their responsibilities and the daily risks they face. Officers operate in an extremely hostile environment, marked by the proliferation of heavily armed gangs and frequent attacks they suffer simply because of their status as police agents. Moreover, they work under very demanding schedules. Yet, the salaries they receive do not reflect these conditions. Calls for improved compensation consistently go unheard by the relevant authorities. It was only recently, on December 12, 2024, that the Prime Minister's Office announced a decision to double the value of the debit cards issued to officers. However, these cards continue to be reloaded sporadically.

10. Regarding risk compensation, a Decree establishing a special risk allowance for the benefit of PNH officers involved in special police operations was adopted on July 1, 2022. Under this decree, an allowance is granted to officers engaged in police operations—or to their dependents—when they are harmed in the line of duty. This allowance applies to accidents resulting in physical or moral injury causing any form of disability, as well as in the event of death.

11. The special operations covered under Article 2 of the decree include:

- Protection of people and property during anti-riot actions;
- Prevention and repression of crime and delinquency;
- Maintenance of public order;
- Interventions or raids in hostile and unfamiliar environments;
- Close protection and escort of VIPs or individuals subject to an official mission order.

12. Articles 3 and 5 specify the amounts of accident and death allowances to be paid, depending on the case, to the officers or their spouse or common-law partner.

13. However, because the mechanism and procedure to access these benefits have not been clearly defined, many officers have died in the line of duty without any meaningful measures being taken to honor their memory or support their families. This institutional neglect deeply undermines the morale of the force.

14. Furthermore, beyond the issue of risk allowances, it is important to note that the process for obtaining care for officers injured in the line of duty is lengthy and burdensome. The same applies to organizing travel abroad for those who require specialized treatment after being seriously wounded during operations.

15. Additionally, on April 23, 2024, a Ministerial Order was issued amending the previous Order of June 20, 2013, which established the special status of PNH personnel and outlined the career plan within the institution. According to this new order, “Rewards recognize merit... They must be granted judiciously and without delay to maintain their value. They are awarded for the following reasons: a) acts of courage and dedication, b) exemplary service efficiency, c) commitment to the community.” This, too, is a legal provision that remains largely unenforced.

V. Recruitment and Training of PNH Officers

16. From June 2024 to June 2025, at least one (1) new class of officers was trained, and at least three (3) continuing education sessions were conducted:

- On June 18, 2024, four hundred fifty-five (455) officers, including fifty (50) women—representing 10.98%, mostly from the 33rd class of the PNH, participated in a twelve (12)-week intensive training session at the National Police Academy (ANP). Afterward, they were assigned to various PNH specialized units;
- On January 10, 2025, the graduation ceremony for the 34th class of the PNH took place. This class, named *Vertières*, brought in seven hundred thirty-nine (739) new officers, including two hundred thirteen (213) women, who made up 28.8% of the class;
- From May 26 to 30, 2025, fifty (50) police officers and administrative personnel from the PNH participated in sign language training. This training was organized by the PNH’s Welfare Directorate (DBE), in collaboration with the Office of the Secretary of State for the Integration of Persons with Disabilities (BSEIPH);
- At the initiative of PNH partners, including the French Embassy in Haiti—and notably with the expertise of a team from RAID (Research, Assistance, Intervention, Deterrence), an elite unit of the French National Police specialized in high-risk operations—at least three hundred sixty (360) officers assigned to various PNH specialized units were trained in firearms handling, drone usage, and the fight against major criminal activity.

VI. Provision of Equipment and Police Gear to the PNH

17. Between June 2024 and June 2025, the Haitian National Police (PNH) received various types of police equipment and gear, including weapons, ammunition, armored vehicles, and protective equipment:

- Between October 28 and November 3, 2024, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) delivered a shipment of police and military equipment to Haiti to support both the PNH and the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS);
- On December 7, 2024, the PNH received four (4) armored vehicles from the French Embassy in Haiti;
- On December 12, 2024, the Canadian Embassy in Haiti donated twenty-two (22) Toyota Land Cruiser all-terrain vehicles to the PNH;
- On February 10, 2025, the United States Embassy delivered six hundred (600) rifles to the PNH, along with a fleet of vehicles that included nine (9) cars, two (2) trucks, two (2) backhoe loaders, two (2) wheel loaders, and one (1) lowboy trailer;
- On February 6, 2025, Canada and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) provided the PNH with a batch of seventy-three (73) vehicles. This included forty-two (42) Toyota Land Cruisers from the Canadian Embassy in Haiti, intended to strengthen the capacity of the Directorate of Prison Administration (DAP), and thirty-one (31) other all-terrain vehicles from UNODC, designated for the Land Border Police (POLIFRONT).

18. It is important to note that the previous administration had also acquired armored vehicles, which, according to their statements, were meant to allow officers to confront armed gangs. However, these vehicles were of very poor quality and are not fit for combat purposes. As a result, they can only be used for troop transport.

19. Regarding the current administration, it was only on March 29, 2025, that the government announced the acquisition of police materials and equipment. If these items are already available, they have yet to be distributed to law enforcement units.

VII. Fight Against Armed Gangs

20. In recent months, efforts have been made to curb the expansion of armed gangs and regain control of areas previously taken over by criminal gangs. Operations have been carried out in several areas, including Tabarre, Arcahaie, Léogâne, Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite, Pernier, Torcel, Grand-Ravine, Village de Dieu, and other parts of downtown and central Port-au-Prince, which had fallen under gang control.

21. On March 1, 2025, in a message published on the platform X, Prime Minister Alix Didier FILS-AIMÉ informed the public of the establishment of a Task Force by the Prime Minister's Office and the Transitional Presidential Council (CPT), tasked with conducting large-scale operations against armed gangs and their strongholds. Presidential advisor Emmanuel VERTILAIRE, who has been indicted in connection with the ongoing investigation into the corruption scandal involving the National Credit Bank (BNC), also posted a message to that effect on the same platform. This marked the beginning of the

use of kamikaze drones in operations. Several operations have indeed been carried out. Here are a few examples:

- From March 1 to 12, 2025, operations were conducted in the communes of Delmas and Pétion-Ville;
- On April 19, 2025, an operation was conducted in Kenscoff;
- On the afternoon of May 4, 2025, an operation was carried out in Grand-Ravine;
- On May 20, 2025, several drones were deployed in the stronghold of gang leader Renel DESTINA, alias “Ti Lapli”;
- On May 22, 2025, several kamikaze drones were launched in the neighborhoods of Torcel and Pernier;
- On the afternoon of May 25, 2025, several kamikaze drones were launched in the Village de Dieu neighborhood, controlled by gang leader Johnson ANDRÉ, alias “Izo 5 secondes”;
- On June 1, 2025, an operation was conducted in the neighborhoods of Village de Dieu and Grand-Ravine;
- On June 3, 2025, several kamikaze drones were deployed in downtown Port-au-Prince;
- From June 9 to 11, 2025, several kamikaze drones were launched in the neighborhoods of Solino, downtown Port-au-Prince, and Grand-Ravine.

22. At first, the Task Force was directed solely by the Prime Minister’s Office, without the involvement of law enforcement on the ground. However, since Fritz Alphonse JEAN assumed the presidency of the CPT, several meetings have been held between the Prime Minister’s Office, the CPT, and representatives of the various security forces on the ground, including the PNH, the Armed Forces of Haiti (FAD’H), and the Multinational Security Support Mission (MMAS). As a result of these discussions, a coordination team for drone operations was created. This team includes members from the CPT, the Prime Minister’s Office, and representatives of law enforcement. However, this coordination team has never been made operational, and to date, the PNH has had no involvement in the planning or coordination of drone-based operations.

23. It is worth noting that since the use of kamikaze drones began, at least three hundred (300) armed terrorist gang members have been killed, and more than four hundred (400) others have been injured, some of them seriously.

24. In addition, other ground operations have been carried out by PNH officers. However, once the officers leave after their interventions, the armed terrorist gangs quickly return, reoccupy the areas, and continue committing acts of violence aimed at terrorizing local communities. As an example, RNDDH points to the case of the Solino neighborhood, which had long resisted attacks from armed gangs and was finally overtaken on October 14, 2024. It was later retaken by security forces. But, because this victory was not followed by a permanent police presence, Solino quickly fell back under gang control. The same pattern has occurred in the neighboring areas of Delmas 30 and Nazon.

VIII. General Inspectorate of the PNH

25. Since the creation of the police institution, the General Inspectorate of the Haitian National Police (IGPNH) has limited itself to acting as the internal affairs body, or “police of the police.” However, that is not its only mandated role. According to Article 38 of the Law of November 29, 1994, which established the creation, organization, and operation of the National Police, the Inspectorate is also a body of counsel, oversight, and investigation at the disposal of the Director General of the institution and the Minister of Justice and Public Security.

26. The IGPNH is specifically tasked with:

- Conducting periodic inspections and evaluations of central and regional police services, as well as police training and continuing education institutions;
- Informing the Minister of Justice and Public Security and the Director General of the PNH about the general condition of the police force and any issues that hinder its effective operation;
- Conducting studies and investigations to provide recommendations that support the development and efficiency of the PNH.

27. In line with this article, the problems mentioned earlier in the report should be subject to investigation and recommendation by the IGPNH to the Director General and the Minister of Justice. These include:

- The impact of the country's security situation on the lives of police officers, many of whom are forced to live in the stations where they are assigned;
- The lack of police materials and equipment needed to ensure effective interventions;
- The excessive delays in providing medical care for injured officers or in organizing funerals for those killed in the line of duty;
- The criteria and procedures through which promotions are granted within the institution;
- The granting and procedural clarity surrounding risk bonuses and other rewards;
- Delays in salary payments and irregular loading of officers' debit cards.

28. Furthermore, since recent leadership changes within the General Inspectorate, even the basic oversight function it once fulfilled, acting as the internal affairs office, has essentially been abandoned. Complaints are no longer followed up or investigated.

Attacks on Police and Prison Infrastructure

29. From June 2024 to June 2025, at least ten (10) armed attacks were carried out against police patrols and several police and prison facilities. Here are some examples:

- On June 30, 2024, the Gressier police station was partially set on fire. The following day, July 1, 2024, the building was partially demolished by armed gangs;
- On July 2, 2024, the Saint-Charles police station was looted and then set on fire by armed gangs who had taken control of Carrefour;
- During the night of July 13 to 14, 2024, the Pat-Chwal substation in Pont-Sondé, Artibonite department, was attacked by armed gangs;
- On March 24, 2025, armed gang members from the *Taliban of Canaan* and *400 Mawozo* from Croix-des-Bouquets demolished the Terre-Rouge substation, located at the border of Mirebalais and Croix-des-Bouquets. For some time, the building had already been abandoned by the officers previously stationed there;
- On the night of March 30 to 31, 2025, members of the *Taliban of Canaan* and *400 Mawozo* gangs stormed the Mirebalais police station and set fire to the Mirebalais Civil Prison after facilitating the escape of the inmates who were incarcerated there;
- On April 7, 2025, armed members of the *Taliban of Canaan* gang completely destroyed the Saut-d'Eau substation after taking full control of the commune during the night of April 2 to 3, 2025;
- During the night of April 11 to 12, 2025, several POLIFRONT officers were on duty when they were attacked in Godet, Kenscoff. At least five (5) officers were injured, and one (1) is reported missing. Three (3) police vehicles were burned, and the attackers took weapons, ammunition, and several other sensitive materials belonging to the police;
- On April 14, 2025, gang members from the *Taliban of Canaan* and *400 Mawozo* completely demolished the police station in the city of Mirebalais;
- During the night of May 8 to 9, 2025, armed gang members operating in Kenscoff attacked the Furcy substation. They took control of the building and seized weapons and ammunition;
- On May 13, 2025, the Anse-d'Hainault police station was set on fire by local residents in protest, following the violent arrest and death of two (2) members of the same family.

X. Police Officers Killed from June 2024 to June 2025

30. Between June 2024 and June 2025, at least thirty-three (33) police officers were killed. Sixteen (16) of them, representing 48.5%, were killed between January 5 and June 4, 2025.

31. Sixteen (16) of the victims (48.5%) were assigned to specialized units, and sixteen (16) were killed during operations aimed at removing armed gangs or in direct confrontations with them. The following individuals are among those killed:

- Emelin FERMETUS, Peterson CLOVIS, and Jean Junior Wilkens PITON – killed in Delmas 18 on the afternoon of June 9, 2024. They were all assigned to the Temporary Anti-Gang Unit (UTAG);
- Télémaque LOZAMA and Yves NORD, both divisional inspectors – killed by armed individuals on July 4, 2024, in Arcachon 32, Carrefour. The perpetrators fled with their bodies;
- James DORSAINVIL, alias *Ti blan Awayi* – killed August 15, 2024, in Solino during a confrontation between PNH officers and gangs attacking Solino, Fort-National, and Delmas 24;
- Inspector Wilson LAMARTINIERE (assigned to the Directorate of Prison Administration - DAP) and Maxine Hans AGENOR (assigned to the National Palace Security Unit - USGPN) – both killed on the evening of August 15, 2024, during a police operation in Clercine 14, near the Anvayi Hotel in Tabarre;
- Michelle Nathanielle MEGINE – shot and killed on the morning of August 28, 2024, on Rue Cassagnol (Catalpa area) while heading to her post;
- Wisly VILLEFRANCHE – killed on September 5, 2024, on Rue Magloire Ambroise during a police operation. He was part of the Port-au-Prince Intervention Brigade;
- Stevenson LUCAS, alias *Baby* – killed in Verettes during the night of September 6–7, 2024, by locals. He was under IGPNH investigation and had deserted his post;
- Scudéry DORCE (Swat Team agent) – injured in clashes in Gressier on September 10, 2024, and died from his wounds due to lack of transport for surgery;
- Dieuné PIERRE-LOUIS – shot and killed early on September 23, 2024, in Delmas 19 during a routine check on a minibus. Armed passengers opened fire;
- Ralph ISAAC – killed October 24, 2024, during a police operation in Solino;
- Jeff PETIT-DIEU – fatally wounded during a November 13, 2024, operation in Solino. He died hours later. He was a Swat Team member;
- Mario JEAN-LOUIS – shot on December 6, 2024, near Carrefour Samida. He died in hospital. He was part of the Departmental Unit for Maintaining Order (UDMO);
- Daniel RENAUD – killed December 24, 2024, during an attack on the State University Hospital (HUEH) by gangs during its reopening ceremony. Another officer was injured;
- Jean Roody VILMOND – shot on the evening of January 5, 2025, in Delmas 39. He worked at the Financial Affairs Bureau of the Central Directorate of Judicial Police (BAFE/DCPJ);

- Jacques Romain BELL – died on January 14, 2025, after being accidentally shot by a colleague handling a firearm;
- Jeffton SALOMON (Swat Team) – killed January 19, 2025, in Ti Savann;
- Harold THEODORE – shot during a January 27, 2025, operation on Rue Magloire Ambroise. Died later in the hospital. He was assigned to the Port-au-Prince police station;
- Fils Emmanuel THOMAS – fatally shot during a February 12, 2025, police operation in Montrouis. He died in the hospital;
- Grégory PIERRE MICHEL (Agent IV, Port-au-Prince police station) and Stanley DENIZE (Agent II, USGPN) – both killed on February 14, 2025, at the Kay Lymborbe nightclub in Delmas 40B under unclear circumstances;
- John Peter Schneider SAINT-FELIX (UTAG) – shot February 17, 2025, during a police operation in Kenscoff. He died in the hospital;
- Steeve Emmanuel LAGUERRE, alias *Fito* – killed February 19, 2025, in Fort-National during a confrontation with gang members. He was part of the Anti-Drug Trafficking Brigade (BLTS);
- Kervens BILLY (Departmental Operations and Intervention Brigade - BOID) – shot in the head during clashes on February 20, 2025, at Corridor Carrier, Fort-National;
- Garry Junior LUMA (UTAG) – killed April 8, 2025, in Carrefour Peligre, Mirebalais, during an armed confrontation;
- Rony JOSE and Job SULMOND (divisional inspectors, UDMO) – fatally shot on April 9, 2025, near DHL on the Airport Road while intervening to prevent a kidnapping;
- Junior PANEL (UDMO) – injured at a nightclub in Delmas 75 on May 10, 2025; died from his injuries on May 14;
- Junior SAINTILUS (USGPN) – assassinated May 29, 2025, in Delmas 75, Faustin 1er area, by unidentified armed individuals;
- Esdras HILAIRE – killed June 4, 2025, in Pacot during an operation against armed gangs. He was a Swat Team member.

XI. Comments and Recommendations

32. The 30th anniversary of the Haitian National Police (PNH) is being commemorated in a sociopolitical climate marked by extreme violence, despair, and instability.

33. The widespread insecurity stemming from this alarming context has severely affected many police officers, particularly those who lived in neighborhoods such as Carrefour-Feuilles, Delmas, and Solino, areas now under the control of armed gangs that are part of the *Viv Ansanm* terrorist coalition. These officers, like the rest of their communities, have been forced to abandon their homes and neighborhoods. Since then, they have taken refuge with friends, relatives, or have been living at their duty stations, without any sign that this situation concerns the members of the High Council of the National Police (CSPN).

34. The Transitional Presidential Council (CPT), in its effort to justify the revised budget adopted by its administration in October 2024, launched a campaign promoting the idea of a *war budget*, supposedly intended to provide the police institution with the proportional and adequate means to confront armed gangs. However, the revised budget in question includes:

- Only 10% allocated to the PNH;
- 73% of the PNH budget allocated to personnel expenses, such as salaries, wages, and social benefits;
- Only 27% allocated to investment expenses, including purchases of police materials and equipment, construction, and rehabilitation of police infrastructure;
- These investment expenses account for just 3% of the national budget.

35. This is what the transitional authorities call a war budget, a budget that, according to RNDDH, is a *war budget* in name only.

36. Meanwhile, enormous sums are made available to the Executive Branch. The CPT, the Prime Minister's Office, and various ministries live lavishly, while delivering no concrete results. Yet one of the most significant obstacles to the PNH's operational capacity is its severely limited budget, which prevents the institution from developing and implementing a comprehensive national security plan

37. Since the establishment of this transitional government, all equipment and supplies received by the Haitian National Police (PNH) have been donated by foreign partners. The materials previously purchased by the former administration were, for the most part, of poor quality and unsuitable. It was only on March 29, 2025, that this transitional government announced the acquisition of new police equipment, which has yet to be delivered to the institution.

38. On this point in particular, RNDDH regrets that PNH officers have such limited access to modern defense equipment such as high-tech weapons, bulletproof vests, and armored vehicles. As demonstrated, the institution relies far too heavily on international cooperation for its supplies. This dependence places officers in a position of extreme vulnerability when facing armed members of the *Viv Ansanm* terrorist coalition, who, on their side, have access to modern and sophisticated weaponry.

39. Moreover, new recruits have been trained, and capacity-building sessions have been organized to increase the PNH workforce and strengthen officers' skills. RNDDH commends these efforts and encourages police authorities to continue in this direction, since the effectiveness of the PNH depends largely on the police-to-population ratio and the quality of training provided to officers, training that must be rooted in the principles and values of human rights.

40. The thirtieth anniversary of the PNH comes at a time when the institution urgently needs deep reform focused on valuing its officers and their work. In this context, RNDDH believes that the demands of the police, calling for fair salaries, benefits, risk allowances, compensation, career planning, and promotions, are legitimate and must be addressed. It is not enough to adopt the Decree of July 1, 2022, granting special risk allowances for officers

engaged in special police operations, or the Order of April 23, 2024, which revises the Order of June 20, 2013, establishing the career plan within the institution. The provisions of these instruments must be implemented with full transparency.

41. Many police officers have never stopped fighting to restore order and security, confronting armed gangs—often at the risk of their lives. The armed attacks against patrols, police stations, substations, and prisons, as well as the number of officers killed between June 2024 and June 2025, clearly reflect this reality: ten (10) armed attacks targeted police and prison infrastructure, and thirty-three (33) police officers were killed. Of these, 48.5% were assigned to specialized units, and another 48.5% were killed during active operations.

42. These data show just how dangerous police work has become. It is clear that officers involved in special operations to dismantle armed gangs, as well as those assigned to police posts located in high-risk areas, are carrying out their duties under constant external threat.

43. Therefore, in alignment with Article 2 of the Ministerial Order dated April 23, 2024, the RNDDH believes that risk allowances and rewards must be granted with care, without delay, and above all, with full transparency.

44. Furthermore, special attention must be given to the situation of police officers injured in the line of duty. In this regard, RNDDH considers that procedures for accessing medical care and transferring injured officers to hospitals abroad should be simplified by the police administration. The same applies to the arrangements for funerals of officers killed during operations or confrontations with armed gangs.

45. RNDDH also believes that within the institution, issues such as professional stagnation, lack of transparent promotion opportunities, lack of recognition of merit, and unequal access to training programs are demotivating officers. Many feel that their commitment and sacrifices are not being properly acknowledged, neither by the Haitian state nor by the high command of the PNH.

46. Moreover, RNDDH takes note of the various operations carried out by the Task Force led by the Prime Minister's Office, which uses kamikaze drones to dislodge armed gang members: more than three hundred (300) gang members have been killed and over four hundred (400) wounded, some seriously. RNDDH acknowledges that these operations, welcomed by the public, mark a significant turning point in the fight against armed gangs, especially since many of these gangs were once protected by influential political figures and members of the PNH high command. However, it must also be recognized that these operations remain ineffective to date, as no area has been permanently reclaimed and no major gang leader has been apprehended or held accountable.

47. On this point, RNDDH again highlights the threat to democracy posed by the practice of politically appointed authorities directing teams tasked with conducting special operations against gangs, gangs that, for years, were used by those same authorities to obtain or retain power. RNDDH believes that these operations could have been more effective if they had been planned and executed by the coordination team established in April 2025, which includes representatives from the security forces currently operating in the field, namely the

PNH, the Armed Forces of Haiti (FAD'H), and the Multinational Security Support Mission (MMAS), alongside the Prime Minister's Office.

48. Finally, RNDDH recalls that, according to Article 38 of the Law establishing, organizing, and regulating the Haitian National Police (PNH), the General Inspectorate of the PNH (IGPNH) is not meant to limit itself to acting as the internal affairs unit. It must also examine the overall conditions within the institution, identify issues hindering effective police operations, and report its findings to the Director General of the PNH and the Minister of Justice and Public Security. This includes assessing the impact of the country's security situation on officers who are forced to live at their posts, the lack of adequate equipment and materials, burdensome medical access procedures for wounded officers, lack of transparency in promotions and rewards, salary payment delays, and the irregular funding of officers' debit cards. RNDDH believes it is the responsibility of IGPNH to report on these issues and make the appropriate recommendations to the relevant authorities.

49. Based on all of the above, RNDDH recommends that the transitional authorities:

- Intensify efforts to end the reign of armed gangs by providing police officers with adequate equipment and materials that reflect their operational needs;
- Strengthen capacity-building efforts for the personnel of the police institution;
- Grant police officers a sufficient salary that allows them to support themselves and their families with dignity;
- Fully implement both the Decree of July 1, 2022, and the Order of April 23, 2024, which establish a special risk allowance for officers engaged in special police operations and define the special status and career plan for personnel of the Haitian National Police;
- Divert intelligence funds to the police institution, which, given the current insecurity, urgently needs the ability to gather real-time information and intelligence to intervene effectively on the ground;
- Ensure the inclusion of on-the-ground security forces (PNH, FAD'H, MMAS) in the coordination of police operations involving the use of kamikaze drones.