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DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

IF YOU HAVE TO DO SOMETHING...

Social and Solidarity Economy and International Cooperation in Haiti:

Development without the State?

DISSERTATION

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirement for the

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by

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Acknowledgement

This essay is result of a combination of my interests: Social and Solidarity Economy, International Cooperation for Development, and Post-Crisis Recovery. These topics summarise well my master study at Graduate Institute Geneva, applied research on early recovery, and internship at United Nations Research Institute in Social Development. It keeps into some extent my previous research work – on International Cooperation and National Identity in Timor-Leste, however changing a bit in terms of the application – from a cultural concept to a grassroots development policy.

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Abstract

The massive international humanitarian and development aid following the earthquake and the cholera outbreak of 2010 have quickly become rooted in Haitian processes of development. Because of the evaluated shortage of local government's capacity – as in a typical post-crisis setting – international development actors exercise great influence in the country, bringing resources and personnel, along with development expertise and projects. Some resources have been directed to the Social and Solidarity Economy (SSE), a recently popularised concept in reference to cooperatives, associations, and other self-managed social economic organisations and enterprises, sometimes including also microfinance and social enterprises. Whilst most SSE look-a-like interventions are unplanned or coincidental, the lack of the State justifies the rest of SSE projects by both Haitian and international actors. This study looks into the reasons of the international cooperation for SSE in Haiti, as well as the potential of SSE for post-crisis settings.

Keywords: Social and Solidarity Economy, International Cooperation, Haiti;

Abbreviations

ABCP	Association de base de cotisation et de prêt
AIM	International Association of Mutual Benefit Societies
ANACAPH	Association Nationale des Caisses Populaires Haïtiennes
ASEC	Asian Solidarity Economy Council
AVEC	Association villageoise d'épargne et crédit
BC	Banques communautaires ou villageoise
BRH	Banque de la République d'Haïti
BSR	Bureau de Service et de Renforcement des organisations paysannes
BTC	Belgian Development Agency
CARICOM	Caribbean Community and Common Market
CNLAMCA	Comité national de liaison des activités mutualistes coopératives et associatives
COE-EHM	Coordination des Programmes de Développement de l'Église Méthodiste d'Haïti
COHE	Coordination Haiti-Europe
CROSE	Coordination régionale des organisations du Sud-Est
CUT	Central Única dos Trabalhadores
DP	Développement et Paix Haïti
EESC	European Economic and Social Committee
EMES	EMergence des Entreprises Sociales en Europe
EU	European Union
FIDA	Foundation for International Development Assistance
FOROLACFR	Foro Latinoamericano y del Caribe de Finanzas Rurales
GESQ	Groupe d'économie solidaire du Québec
GRAMIR	Groupe de recherche et d'Appui au Milieu Rural
HAMPCO	Haitian-American Meat and Products Company

HTG	Haiti-Gourde
ICA	International Co-operative Alliance
IMOFOR	Institut Mobile de Formation du KNFP
INAISE	International Association of Investors in the Social Economy
ITECA	Institut de Technologie et d'Animation
IHRC	Interim Haitian Reconstruction Commission
ILO	International Labour Organisation
KNFP	Konseyl Nasyonal Finansman Popilè
KOFIP	Collectif de financement populaire
MFI	Microfinance Institution
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MPCE	Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe
MPNKP	Mouvement paysan national du Congrès de Papaye
MPP	Mouvman Peyizan Papay/Movement Paysan Papaye
MuSo	Mutuelles de Solidarité
NGO	Non-governmental organizations
PAPDA	Plaidoyer pour un Développement Alternatif
pcH	productive cooperatives HAITI
RAESS	Réseau africain d'économie sociale et solidaire
RIPESS	Réseau intercontinental de promotion de l'économie sociale solidaire
SSE	Social and Solidarity Economy
SENAES	Secretaria Nacional de Economia Solidária
SOFA	Solidarite Fanm Ayisyèn
UCAONG	Unité de Coordination des Activités des ONG
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development

UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDA	US Department of Agriculture

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Introduction

The recent massive international humanitarian and development aid following the earthquake and the cholera outbreak of 2010 have quickly become rooted in Haitian processes of development. Because of the evaluated shortage of local government's capacity – as in a typical post-conflict setting – international development actors exercise great influence in the country, bringing expertise and development projects, leading in many sectors ranging from security to education, from humanitarian relief to economic activities.

Meanwhile, international interventions have also been challenged by public opinions and local forces, facing a variety of accusations from the illegitimate deployment of a peacekeeping army to the introduction of the cholera epidemic. The United Nations and other main international actors such as Brazil and United States faced a great loss of credibility, whilst the international community is still responsible for continuing their duty in the country.

Social and Solidarity Economy (SSE), a recently popularised concept in the international development environment in reference to cooperatives, credit associations, and other self-managed social economic organisations and enterprises, is very relevant to the Haitian context. With the focus on localised and collective forms of economy, Social and Solidarity Economy is considered by many as an alternative development method, if compared to both private enterprises and public services. In the case of Haiti, our preliminary research found narratives that justify the promotion of SSE based on the benefits of the economic model.

Prior to the field research, the author was first under the impression that international actors may have played a significant role in promoting and supporting activities using the concept of SSE by introducing an “alternative” development model to the post-crisis Haitian context, due to the advocacy of the potential benefits of SSE (e.g. economic, social and environmental objectives, in

association with donors' own preferences and interests). Since international support is visible in all SSE projects found online, the research objective was, therefore, to investigate the reasons why international donors support SSE projects and policies as an exogenous phenomenon.

After an exploratory field research, visits and interviews, the following observations came to light: first, most SSE actors and organisations are Haitian and operating in Haiti before the post-2010 massive aid influx; second, the development of SSE and its network find their particularities in Haiti's social, political and economic history, with its unique and diverse dynamics; third, SSE projects are actually rather absent in donors' agenda in Haiti as a category of intervention. These observations obtained from the field challenge the previous assumptions, at same time revealing major questions: why is SSE not widely supported and what can explain the support when it does happen?

The Haiti case study aims to exemplify the relationship between SSE and the international cooperation, which could potentially reveal the advantages and limits of SSE in a post-crisis scenario, as well to illustrate how "alternative" development policies are securing their space – if they are – in the domain of international cooperation for development today. Through this research, more will be known about, first, the development and evolution of SSE in Haiti; second, the evolution of alternative development models; third, the processes of economic and social reconstruction in a post-conflict and crisis scenario; fourth, the dynamics of international cooperation for development through a very contemporary case. Furthermore, this research may also contribute to explaining the relationships between international cooperation and local development actors and how processes of development may be influenced by international dynamics and vice-versa, addressing a broader concern: how to have the international assistance suitable for the local needs.

In order to answer the previous and these new questions, both field research and desk research were employed in this study. The primary resources was the first-hand information collected from the actors with whom the author met in Haiti, including discourses and narratives through interviews, official documents, and promotional materials. To initiate and complement the primary resources,

additional data were results of general and specific desk research, including analysis and descriptions of other cases, theories and practices of SSE, of international cooperation, and of post-conflict scenarios. In term of methodology, the research was conducted using qualitative methods with an inclination to anthropological "thick description". The analytical focus would be the narratives of the actors: first identifying their views and then analysing the interaction between actors and the justifications and implications of their statements.

This method is most appropriate in understanding SSE in Haiti because other methods, whilst performing better at theorising by applying political or sociological concepts and positivism, may fall short in coping with actors' perceived interests and justifications. Nevertheless, the reach and accuracy of this research is limited by the availability of information (interviews with actors, reachable data), communications capacities (social and linguistic restraints) and time of observation in the field. With an interdisciplinary and pragmatic approach, this study will refrain from digging in-depth into the concepts and theories; however, hopefully its investigation and findings may be insightful in reviewing and reflecting upon existing theories and literatures.

Thus, this study will first present the country's contexts and particularities, including the international cooperation for development; then it will map SSE actors and networks in Haiti and its connection with the international cooperation; and last it will identify the reasons behind the international support for SSE projects in Haiti through a collection of actors' discourses. As result, this study is structured in six parts: the Introduction, proposing the research and its elements; Chapter I as a literature review on SSE concept and its political economy; Chapter II on context and background, providing an overview of Haiti's history and the role of international cooperation with the earthquake of 2010 as a watershed moment; Chapter III on Social and Solidarity Economy, examining its concepts, narratives, history and networking in Haiti; Chapter IV on the international cooperation for SSE, focusing on the SSE projects, resources and reasons; and the Conclusion, summarising the study and suggesting further research possibilities.

Chapter I: Conceptual Framework

Despite recent popularity of SSE, there are very few works about the SSE in a post-crisis scenario, in relation to the State, or a Fragile State. In this Chapter, we will review first the practices and the history of the concept of Social and Solidarity Economy; then its recent popularisation globally, both at international level and at country level; and last, discuss its relations in a context of a fragile state.

1.1. What is or should be Social and Solidarity Economy?

1.1.1. Concept and practices of SSE

According to Laville, three stages of development started taking place before today's Social and Solidarity Economy – the “modern solidarity” exemplified by workers' associations in the first half of XIXth century, the “philanthropic solidarity” such as charities in the second half of XIXth century, and the “redistributive solidarity” such as different social protection policies in the XXth century. (P. Laville, 2015)

The “modern solidarity”, called by Laville, refers to societal solidarity links that go beyond the ties of blood, “characterised by an open political community that overcomes differences and promotes equality through the recognition of public spaces”, for example, all types of workers and producers' associations that emerged in the XXth Century, gathering people if economic and political membership-based organisations.

Later, accompanying dissatisfaction against liberalism and pauperism, a “philanthropic solidarity” that fights against the poverty took over the previous fight for equality (idem), “encouraging charities and patronising associations”. It was the expression of the industrial era's progress with a private

concern over poverty, yet, insufficient to tackle the inner causes of social threats and conflicts (P. Laville, 2015).

Last, in the XXth Century, solidarity became public again, however placed as market control measures through the State (idem). For example, promoting workers' rights or social protection policies in a private-led market. It was then an interventionist model e.g. Keynesian state "to find stable ways to accommodate the particular interests of enterprises alongside the general interest of society." (Laville, 2015, p. 45) Therefore, at this stage it is emphasised the redistributive role of the state fulfilling demands of solidarity.

In the 1970s, tells Laville, increasing contestation over the past models revealed the limitations of the previous developments – as both subordination of economy that leads to totalitarianism to a political and market society that justifies inequality as individual freedom are extremes. Representation or charity were not sufficient if compared to the trend of workers' self-management, with distribution of value-added. More ingredients were added to the previous tension between the market and the state, such as environmental and feminist concerns, questioning the "very basis of the development model" – that is the idea of progress, productivity, and growth. Therefore, both basis of the market and the state – and its synergy – were challenged. (P. Laville, 2015)

In this context, new ways or experiments of production model took place, rejecting both the state and the market. The "social innovations" include

Local proximity services, fair trade, solidarity tourism, organic agriculture, ethical consumption, short supply chains, renewable energies, recycling and waste valorisation, heritage preservation, microfinance and social currencies, for example. (Laville, 2015, p.46)

Classifying the XIXth century's efforts – cooperatives, associations, mutual societies – as "social economy", and the XXth century's innovations – because of their intrinsic political dimensions – as "solidarity economy", Laville stresses Defourny et al' definition of Social Economy as including

[...] all economic activities conducted by enterprises, primarily cooperatives, associations and mutual benefit societies, whose ethics convey the following principles: placing service to members or the community ahead of profit; autonomous management; a democratic decision-making process; the primacy of people and work over capital in the distribution of revenues.

Laville affirms that the Solidarity Economy “gained prominence during the past two decades, particularly in Europe and Latin America”. (P. Laville, 2015). And, as defined by (Polanyi, 1944), is based on the following:

- The market principle, which allows the supply of and demand for goods and services to meet – exchange happens on the basis of the setting of prices;
- Redistribution, which is the principle according to which production is delegated to a central authority responsible for allocating it; and
- Reciprocity, which corresponds to the relationship established among groups or individuals thanks to actions that make sense only insofar as they express a will to demonstrate a social link among the stakeholders.

Commenting on popular trend of social enterprises or social business – including microfinance, Laville sees it as the return of philanthropic solidarity. Preferred by international financial organisations, it is still “prefers individual engagement and ethical awareness over norms emanating from public authorities and political questions.” Therefore, social and solidarity economy should go to the direction of a democratic solidarity, dealing with the three economic principles – market, redistribution and reciprocity – even with different ways and approaches, in an effort of democratising both the civil society (private sectors) and the public institutions.

In order to exemplify Europe and Latin America, we will resort to a study on SSE in France and Brazil (J.-L. Laville et al. 2005) – not only in the last decades, but starting – yet briefly – with the development of SSE as comparable yet contrasting backgrounds for Haiti.

In France, the democratic revolutions, such as 1789's French Revolution, brought not only "mouvement vers l'individualisme" but also "mouvement vers l'association" or *l'associationnisme* – such as the labor and socialist movement and Saint-Simonian utopic associative projects. The same authors agree that labour movements became "laboratoire des forms associatives", giving birth to "projets de la constitutions d'une économie 'fraternelle' or 'solidaire'", such as Phillippe Buchez' short-lived *associations de production*, also expanding previous existent models of *compagnonnages*¹ and *sociétés de secours mutuel*. In 1848, Paris knew another "effervescence associative", with numerous corporations that became syndicat-governed associations,

gouvernées par le suffrage universel, fondées sur la souveraineté du travail et régies par le principe d'association. Les associations fraternelles de métiers d'organisent d'abord autor de revendications concrètes, pour fixer les tarifs, organiser l'assistance, prévenir le chômage, maintenir les salaires, limiter la durée du travail, réguler la concurrence, abolir le marchandage. (J.-L. Laville et al., 2005)

The 1848 revolution also brought *l'État social* ou *l'État providence* to France, starting the process of institutionalisation of social economy. A series of laws was promulgated: 1864, le droit de grève; 1884, la liberté syndicale; 1898, recognising the status of mutualité; and finally *l'association loi 1901* defining the freedom of association. Modern cooperative model and movement, that started in England by Rochdale, was echoed in France in the XX century, however formally regulated only by the *Loi de 1947 sur les cooperative*. The previous experiments were, therefore, summarised in three type of juridical status – coopératif, mutualiste et associative.

In the case of Brazil, the roots of SSE back to the Old Republic (1889-1930), when religious charities "assumed the predominant role in taking care of poors and excluded." In 1891, first cooperative was created, the Associação Cooperativa dos Empregados da Companhia Telefônica, following by a wave of cooperatives, and later in 1907, the Decree 1.637 was adopted regulating the cooperativism. Whilst in the 1930 during Vargas presidency, the Brazilian Welfare State took place, expanding the provision

¹ Compagnonnage refers to associations/syndicates of craftsmen that exist until today.

of public services to the population – promulgating in 1932 the Decree 22.239 instituting cooperatives according to Rochdale principles. (Andion & Serva, 2006)

In the next decades, democratisation movement – of both the market and the State – started first in the civil society, with the creation of NGOs (non-governmental organizations) during military governments in the 50s and 60s that received relevant support of the international community and the Catholic Church – especially those following the Liberation Theology; and later in the State, following the redemocratisation in the 80s, culminating in the massive thrive of NGOs and social organisations in the 1990s. a Solidarity Economy Movement became stronger in the 1990s, when it was incorporated into Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT), Brazilian trade union centre’s agenda – motivated partly because of the transformation of bankrupted industries into workers’ cooperatives, saving therefore employments of many people. Advocated first by Paul Singer, *economia solidaria* became a concept that umbrelled and substituted similar concepts. (Singer, 1996). Concepts such as “*economia social, economia de solidariedade, socioeconomia solidária, economia popular e solidária, economia do trabalho*”, receiving a diversity of

entitites, institutions and peoples around same objectives, that is, a diferenciaded way of organizing a series of existing practices, gaining a greater meaning beyond a form of workers’ resistance – into a social and economic alternative in a context of globalisation and neoliberal expression in Brazil, marked by unemployment risis, by liberalisation of markets and by processes of social exclusion. (Andion & Serva, 2006)

1.2. International popularisation of SSE

In the last decades, we can observe an international trend of SSE gaining greater visibility, both at national level of different countries and at international level. Nationally, SSE became more popularised and institutionalised, with creation of specific secretaries or ministries within the government – gaining public support; Internationally, SSE is increasingly being debated in the international cooperation, experiencing efforts in advancing it as an agenda for regional and global

development. In both processes, the SSE concept and practices are becoming more clearly defined and on track toward convergence.

1.2.1. Country Level: Brazil, France; Latin America and Europe.

Continuing on the case of Brazil, after the first use of *economia solidária* by Paul Singer, the concept was integrated in left-wing parties campaigns', becoming a publically supported social policy. Worth remembering that Paul Singer was also a founding member of Workers' Party and a well-known figure among left-wing politicians. The politically organised social movement has successfully promoted solidarity economy into both the market and the State, resulting in a series of organisations: *Cáritas Brasileira* and other church-linked organisations following Theology of Freedom, NGOs, national-level confederations and associations, and *syndicats* subsidiaries. Finally, SSE actors were gathered during Forum Social Mundial of 2001, resulting in the creation, at the government-level, of the *Secretaria Nacional de Economia Solidária (SENAES)* in 2003 under Ministry of Labour and Employment, following the election of Lula da Silva, from workers' party, as president of Brazil, with Paul Singer as its first secretary. (Andion & Serva, 2006)

Coming back to France, processes of institutionalisation also happened in a similar way, with social movements pushing for the public recognition and support toward SSE. In the 1970s, it was founded the *Comité national de liaison des activités mutualistes coopératives et associatives (CNLAMCA)*; in 1980, *économie sociale* became integrant of *Partie Socialiste's* policy during François Mitterand, with the creation of a *délégation interministérielle* and a *Secrétariat d'État de l'économie sociale*, naming Jean Gatel – also from *Partie Socialiste* – as its first secretary, followed mostly by socialist successors. Since then, the secretary has remained, despite frequent institutional changes, and, since 2012, carrying direct mention of “*l'Économie sociale et solidaire*” in its name. In 2014, the *Loi Économie sociale et solidaire* was adopted, marking the public support.(J.-L. Laville et al., 2005)

Without aprofunding in the national cases, the strengthening of SSE movement and its public recognition seems increased in many other countries. In Latin America, Argentina published in 2003 a “Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Local y Economía Social ‘Manos a la Obra’”, placing official support under Ministerio de Desarrollo Social; Venezuela will protect and promote the SSE as in the article 308 of Consitution of 1999:

El Estado protegerá y promoverá la pequeña y mediana industria, las cooperativas, las cajas de ahorro, así como también la empresa familiar, la microempresa y cualquier otra forma de asociación comunitaria para el trabajo, el ahorro y el consumo, bajo régimen de propiedad colectiva, con el fin de fortalecer el desarrollo económico del país, sustentándolo en la iniciativa popular;

Bolivia has also written the SSE practices into into the constitution of 2009, defining the Bolivian economic model as “plural” in article 306, that

articula las diferentes formas de organización económica sobre los principios de complementariedad, reciprocidad, solidaridad, redistribución, igualdad, seguridad jurídica, sustentabilidad, equilibrio, justicia y transparencia. La economía social y comunitaria complementará el interés individual con el vivir bien colectivo;

and Ecuadorian Constitution of 2006 also incorporated SSE practices in several articles, as of the article 319, recognizing

[...] diversas formas de organización de la producción en la economía, entre otras las comunitarias, cooperativas, empresariales públicas o privadas, asociativas, familiares, domésticas, autónomas y mixtas;

In Europe, Luxembourg has elevated SSE to ministry level with the Ministère du Travail, de l'Emploi et de l'Économie sociale et solidaire in 2013; Portugal has created “Lei de Bases da Economia Social” in 2013; Spain has also approved in 2011 “Ley de Economía Social”, recognizing the importance of

“experiencias cooperativas, asociativas y mutualistas”; and Greece also promulgated a law in 2011 on Social Economy and Social Entrepreneurship. In all other continents such as Asian, Africa, North America, Central America, Oceania, SSE movements gained increasing visibility, culminating in national associations, forums, and public legislations and institutions as responses to the demands.

1.2.2. International Level:

Accompanying countries’ attention toward SSE, the internationalisation of SSE movement also gained relevancy in the recent decade. Despite the diversity, numerous SSE organisations, associations, regional and international networks were established, and international organisations and associations also started SSE into their agenda, as we will see some examples below.

Réseau intercontinental de promotion de l’économie sociale solidaire (“Histoire du RIPESS,” 2016),² for example, has origin in 1997 in Lima³, gathering SSE actors and networks from around the world, including

grassroots, farmers, natives, women, youth organizations; employers’ organizations; working communities; cooperatives, micro-enterprises associations; associations of the Church; Non Governmental Organizations; groups of environmentalists, associations of technologists; development networks; groups on social economy and a coalitions of 32 countries. (“La déclaration de Lima,” 1997)

Since then, through several meetings each four years, RIPESS is now a a large international SSE network, composed by five continental SSE networks: Réseau africain d’économie sociale et solidaire (RAESS), Asian Solidarity Economy Council (ASEC), RIPESS-NA, RIPESS-LAC, RIPESS Europe –

³ Although the name of RIPESS was defined in its 2001’s meeting in Quebec, the first meeting that structured the network was held in Lima, 1997.

with member organisations and national and regional networks from 62 countries.{Citation} With clear definition and advocacy of SSE, in its Charter published in 2008, the concept was defined as

based on human values and principles of solidarityThe social solidarity economy includes activities and organizations of associative, cooperative, and mutual nature created to respond to the need for jobs and the well-being of people, as well as those citizen movements geared toward democratizing and transforming the economy; (RIPESS Charter, 2008)

Following its last meeting in Manila 2013 – the 5th International Meeting of Social and Solidarity Economy, the Global Vision of RIPESS was published stating the transformative potential of SSE for a systemic change, believing it to be “an alternative to capitalism and other authoritarian, statedominated economic systems.” (“Histoire du RIPESS,” 2016) RIPESS as stated its international strategy – on behalf of the SSE movement – as comprising the following components:

- Building practice on the ground
- Building and Strengthening SSE networks
- Research
- Policy work on local, regional, national and international levels
- Advocacy
- Access to markets
- Raising visibility through education and communication.

As a very comprehensive movement, RIPESS embraces a diversity of forms of Social Economy and Solidarity Economy – including social enterprises – predominant at its Asian network ASEC. However, RIPESS’ SSE actors are more inclined to collective-onwership entities, with little interest on microfinance, for example. (“Histoire du RIPESS,” 2016)

There is a number of international forums, networks and events similar to RIPESS, such as – to cite a few – les Rencontres du Mont-Blanc⁴ – International Forum of Social and Solidarity Economy Entrepreneurs, reuniting larger social economy entrepreneurs e.g. French Crédit Agricole, and Quebecois Caisse Desjardins, Global Social Economy Forum, gathering local governments, social economy networks and organisations since 2013; and EMES International Research Network, associating social economy researchers; International Co-operative Alliance (ICA); International Association of Mutual Benefit Societies (AIM). Most of these networks – as RIPESS, engage in active advocacy activities, engaging governments at national and regional level to promote Social and Solidarity Economy. (“Histoire du RIPESS,” 2016)

At inter-governmental level, with the effort of civil society and SSE movement actors, European Union has incorporated Social Economy as an agenda since the 1980s, creating in 1989 a Social Economy Unit in the European Commission. Later, European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) hosted a “social economy category”, publishing consultative opinions for the European Union for the EU; and the European Parliament, set a ‘European Parliament Social Economy Intergroup’ in 1990, stressing the importance of SSE. The EU budget e.g. through European Social Funds, has been allocating to promote SSE policies and projects across EU countries. In December 2015, Luxembourg has promoted SSE during its EU presidency by launching the “Luxembourg Declaration on the Social and Solidarity Economy in Europe”, affirming the employment potential of the SSE.

At international organisations, Social and Solidarity Economy has also received growing attention. International Labour Organisation, for example, has been an active supporter of SSE, especially cooperatives. In 2009, the organisation held a “ILO Regional Conference on Social Economy” in Johannesburg, and started since 2010 a training programme called “Social and Solidarity Economy Academy” – with publication of a series of studies and research in SSE focusing in developing

⁴ (“The MBM’s members | Les Rencontres du Mont-Blanc,” 2011), Web, accessed at <http://www.rencontres-montblanc.coop/en/page/mbms-members>

countries.⁵ In 2013, was created within the United Nations a Inter-Agency Task Force on Social and Soidarity Economy leaded by UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD)– now having 14 UN agencies as members, with the previously mentioned GSEF, Rencontres du Mont-Blanc, RIPESS, EMES, ICA, EESC as observer-members.⁶

In 2014, a “Leading Group on Social and Solidarity Economy” was formed with Rencontres du Mont-Blanc’s initiative, composed by States – France, Ecuador, Morocco, Colombia, Luxembourg, and Quebec – SSE networks and UN institutions.⁷ The last meeting "Social and Solidarity Economy for a Better Financing for Sustainable Development in the Post-2015 Agenda" was organised during the III International Conference on Financing for Development, in Addis Ababa, with clear objective of promoting the SSE into the global development agenda.

Finally, we also found on case of State development agency that does have SSE has a portfolio – Belgian cooperation for development. Belgian Development Agency (BTC) started it in 2012 as a “theme” for Belgian development cooperation, among others such as Agriculture & rural development, Health care, Gender equality, Water & sanitation, etc, marking a specific area of intervention. According to BTC,

There are more and more interventions that focus on supporting value chains (horticulture and seeds in Rwanda; milk in Vietnam; llama, fruits and wood in Bolivia, wheat in Mali...). They become part of the Social and Solidarity Economy in two ways: through the participation of farmers' organisations and through the use of financing tools. Through the farmers' organisations 'market deficiencies', which are typical for most of the agricultural economies in which BTC operates, are corrected. The financing tools mostly favour cooperatives and mutual assistance organisations.

⁵ (“ILO Social and Solidarity Economy Academy, 2010). Web, accessed at <http://socialeconomy.ilo.org/en/background>

⁶ (“United Nations a Inter-Agency Task Force on Social and Soidarity Economy”, 2016), Web, accessed at http://unsse.org/?page_id=4

⁷ (“International Leading Groupe of the SSE,” 2016), Web, accessed at <http://www.rencontres-montblanc.coop/en/page/international-leading-groupe-sse>

Additionally, USAID, also sustains a Cooperative Development Program worldwide since 2002, aiming “key cooperative development challenges”:

- Restrictive cooperative laws and regulations
- Policy-based governance
- Raising member financial participation as a major element in self-reliance
- Achieving scale consistent with quality
- Reducing the dependency that can result from external assistance
- Building mutually-beneficial business and trade relationships between U.S. and partner cooperatives
- Expanding access to cooperatives throughout USAID partner countries. (“Cooperative Development Program,” 2013)

Therefore, in consideration of this context of growing international attention – and several aspirations and advocacies, from different paths – toward SSE, we will start our investigation on the case of Haiti, in order to discover if whether popularisation of SSE have somehow impacted the international cooperation in Haiti.

1.3. SSE and Fragile State

1.3.1. State as welfare provider

States have become the most common form of organization among societies across the world. Following a Weberian notion, the State is an entity that claims the monopoly over the legitimate means of violence over a particular territory, with a certain degree of legitimacy among this population and its international peers.(Weber, 2013) . As Hobbes (1996) suggested, its legitimacy flows from its guardian role of the “Social Contract.”

The Social Contract, according to the contractualism, is the bedrock pact agreed by the people. It substantiates society (and the State), defines their rights and duties (citizenship) and also invests the

social body (the State) with the power to fulfill such rights.(Hobbes, 1996; Locke, 2011; Rousseau, 2013)
If in the beginning, the State solely responsibility was was the provision of security, (Hobbes, 1996), it changed completely during the last centuries in Europe.

In the XVIII, the classical economists started the discussion regarding the relationship of the State with other spheres of society, as the Market. The advent of industrialization had two main effects on the perception of the role of the State, its role in the economic development and its role in the provision of social welfare.(Esping-Andersen, 1990)

First, the gap between England – the first industrialized country - and its peers started to enlarge. As economic strengthen and military power were closely related, some thinkers, as the German School, highlighted how State and the economic development of a Nation were connected. They underlined the necessity of the State to act as a discipliner to promote development – especially in nations which were still lagging behind. Economic power, then, would translate in a State more capable of fulfilling its role as the provider of security and to advance the Nation's interests. (Esping-Andersen, 1990)

The industrialization did not only affect Nations but also changed the society. The advent of the industrialization destroyed in a great degree the welfare provision structure of the traditional society. The emergence of the proletariat, orphan of the social fabric from pre-industrialization- raised the demand for the State to step out from its almost exclusive focus on security and extraction of revenues to take a provider role of social services. (Esping-Andersen, 1990)

Such new role of the State, however, just come to full fruition in a century: after a robust and capable bureaucracy was developed (essential to the provision of social welfare) and after the inclusion of the proletariat in the political system, in which, they were finally able to renegotiate the terms of the social contract.(Esping-Andersen, 1990)

The role of the State and its relationship with the Society and Market – how much intervention the State would perform in both spheres, varied across Europe and North America. It varied because the terms of the social contract renegotiation varied accordingly to socio-political configurations. As Esping-Andersen (1990) explains, the Welfare State is the structured relations between State-Market and Families (understood as the private and communal sphere that also provide individuals with goods and services).

1.3.2. Turning State and Development upside-down

In recent decades, there is a growing literature regarding the Failed States. Far from the long process of development that the European States passed and continuing expansion of its roles, the States from the Third World were born with a high burden to construct themselves while pressured to deliver certain services and gain legitimacy. As Gros, (1996) states, the unique nature of the States in the periphery tends to make it difficult to even apply the European State welfare standards when analysing these States.

Some of these States, however, failed, being almost absent from the triad State-Market-Family. These Failed States suffer from an acute weakness caused by their lack of legitimacy and disorganized and weak bureaucracy, which undermine their capacity to extract resources from its populations. Their lack of resources and bureaucratic weakness hamper their ability to fulfill essential functions like security and basic welfare provision. Their lack of functionality further undermines its legitimacy and capacity, since it hinders economic development, and fosters a fertile soil for fratricide wars. (Fukuyama, 2005)

This vicious circle of State Failure has trapped several countries the world. Although the main way to solve this loop is to address the State capacity, such change faces a major obstacle. Although Fukuyama (2005) argues that we should insist on supporting these States, the central fact is that the inefficient nature of these States and their frequently patent corruption diverges significant part of the resources

invested in them. Thus, these populations ended up by not relying on and not expecting anything from the State. The political, social and economic spheres become increasingly disconnected.

In these circumstances, an alternative solution to this impasse would be a bottom-up development, the so-called social solidarity economy that disentangled from the State can provide some essential social and economic goods while the State moved away to perform its very initial function of security provision.

The virtue of the social solidarity economy is that it helps to strength and develop the economic and social fabric of a particular society since it spreads principles of autonomy, empowerment, and knowledge-sharing, an outcome that a purely Market approach would be able to deliver.(Amorim, Dale, Fakhri-Kairouz, & International Labour Office, 2015)

The International Community can play a significant role in the development of such economies by providing the necessary linkages with resources and know-how (Amorim, Dale, Fakhri-Kairouz, & International Labour Office, 2015). Far from weakening the State, the social solidary economy can give the necessary previous step to rebuild society from within and promote minimum economic development, which in turn, would impact the State positively.

Chapter II: Context and Background

Well known as being the first African republic in the world and the first independent country of Latin America, Haiti's history, regardless of the teller, has been one that combines heroic figures and frequent occurrences of instability, crises and natural disasters. In terms of occupations and interventions, it was first colonised by Spain in the XVth century, then was shifted to French rule until the XVIIIth century. After its independence in 1804, British, German and U.S. armies also exercised their influence to different extents in Haiti. In the last decades, dictatorships and several coups d'état arrived one after another, resulting in the MINUSTAH (United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti) peacekeeping mission whose mandate started in 2004. Recently, the earthquake of 2010 and the ongoing cholera epidemic portray the country through international media to a global audience.

However, the current political, social, cultural, and economic factors have indeed strong roots and have evolved over the last two centuries are at play in the country (Zanotti, 2010). We will thus look into Haiti's history: first a historical overview with selected episodes; then the international cooperation in Haiti; and last since 2000s to today, highlighting the MINUSTAH efforts and the post-2010 development framework.

2.1. Historical Background of Haiti

2.1.1. From independence to today

According to the official history of Haiti on the website of its Presidency⁸, Haiti's history is divided into 10 "periods": Pre-Colombian period, Spanish Period, French Influence, Haitian Revolution, Fight for Freedom, Instability, US occupation, Role of the Military Junta, Duvalier Dynasty, and Duvalier's heritage. To briefly summarize this official narrative, the pre-colombian Taïnos people, living in what

⁸ (Présidence de la République d'Haiti, 2016), Web

was called Quisqueya, were “docile, calme et très hospitalière”; Spanish rulers arrived in 1492, “ont exploité les ressources d’or et ont réduit les Taïnos à l’esclavage,” and started introducing black Africans as slaves in 1503, after Bartolomé de Las Casas’ denunciation of the exploitation of indigenous people; then French colonizers took from the Spanish in 1697 half of the Hispaniola Island⁹ and imported millions of slaves from Africa to accelerate the wealth generated from Haiti, “la colonie la plus prospère du monde.”

In 1789, same year as the French Revolution, the Haitian Revolution started from the clash of interests between mulattos and white colonial authorities, followed by rebellions and resistances of black slaves – followers of vodou – against the plantation system. In 1791, Toussaint Louverture, one of Haiti’s founding fathers, organised slaves in one army and engaged in warfare with French soldiers, and was martyred for “la première république indépendante noire” proclaimed in January 1st 1804. Isolated in international scenario and internally split between mulattos and blacks, the first decades following Haiti’s independence were marked by instability, until the US occupation in 1915. The US Army justified its invasion with the Doctrine Monroe and Roosevelt Corollary, and controlled the country until 1934. Following its retreat, the Haitian Military Junta governed the country, facing broad demonstrations and unrests until the election of François Duvalier in 1957.

Self-declared President for Life, François Duvalier strengthened his personal army force, while millions of Haitians escaped the country. Upon his death, his 19-year old son, Jean-Claude Duvalier, extended the Duvalier Dynasty in 1971, also gaining the US’ support. In exchange, he ordered the slaughter of all Haitian pigs to substitute them with the US aid agency’s imported ones, destroying Haitian farmers’ livelihoods, provoking public resentment, and resulting in this government’s fall in 1986. As part of the Duvaliers’ legacy, after the demise and departure of Jean-Claude Duvalier, the country was fragmented again with a succession of military governments and coups d’état.

⁹ The Caribbean Island hosting Haiti, in the West, and Dominican Republic, in the East.

In 2000, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, previously overturned by the military, won the election again. Yet, election frauds were denounced by the “international community” and in 2004, demonstrations against economic crisis and corruption pressured both the government and the international community to expel President Aristide. In this context, the MINUSTAH was installed. In 2006, after an election marked by “l’incertitude et des démonstrations populaires”, Aristide’s colleague René Préval won the presidential run. In 2011, Michel Joseph Martelly, was elected with 67.57% of votes.

2.1.2. Dictators, interventions, and instabilities

As might be expected, some recent episodes and peculiarities of Haitian history were missing in this official version. First, the Duvaliers stayed 30 years in power, depicted by most of international media as ruthless dictators. François Duvalier, or better known as “Papa Doc”, rigged the constitutional referendum to win with 99.9% in favour of his Presidency for Life, committed extrajudicial killings and executions of political enemies of between 30,000 to 60,000 people, before leaving the power to his son. (Grenne, 2001) Despite being called “Baby Doc”, Jean-Claude, son of François, always faced accusations of corruption, human rights abuses, involvement in the drug and organ trade, while upgrading the personal guards to “Leopards” with the US’ support. Social and civil movements were harshly repressed during this period, including the cooperative movement.¹⁰

Second, both coups against Jean-Bertrand Aristide were controversial. In 1991, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was overthrown by the army a few months after his victory in Haiti’s first post-Duvaliers election. Many observed that the opposition came from the traditional Haitian elite against Aristide’s reformist policies. During his exile, the UN imposed sanctions over coup leaders, and the first peacekeeping operation – United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) – was carried out between 1993 and 1996 under the United States’ lead, restoring Aristide’s government to power. In this context, in 1995, Aristide ordered the dissolution of the Haitian army.(Roupert, 2011)

The coup of 2004, for many Haitian and international scholars, is a result of power struggles and international politics. The second election of Aristide, which placed him as President in 2000, was contested by the United States, yet supported by the Caricom countries. Some observers noted the popularity and wide support Aristide had at that moment, and suspected that his unfriendliness toward Western countries may explain his exit.(Grenne, 2001) During the armed conflict raised against Aristide, Caricom's request for peacekeeping was rejected by the Security Council. ("UN News - CARICOM, Haiti appeal to Security Council for help as security worsens," 2004).

Aristide was forced therefore to resign – yet later claiming that he was removed by a coup d'état orchestrated by the US. ("Aristide says U.S. deposed him in 'coup d'etat'," 2004). Following Aristide's abdication, the UNSC approved a new peacekeeping request from the interim government, and established MINUSTAH – United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. The MINUSTAH that was established soon after his exile, however, did not aim to bring him back like the last time, but rather assisted the transitional government instead. The Haitian population and parties such as Fanmi Lavalas and supporters of the exiled president were against the UN Mission, seeing it as a new form of foreign occupation and intervention.(Miller, 2004)

Third, the last elected president, Michel Joseph Martelly (2006-2011), was accused of having been involved in both coups d'état against Aristide and having won his own fraudulent election with help of the US. He was accused of delaying parliamentary elections on purpose, while governing the country by decrees, and of inciting street violence.(Maguire, 2015; Robles, 2015) The 2015 Presidential Election held in October was suspended after its first round due to alleged frauds and contested results regarding how Martelly's chosen candidate Jovenel Moïse, at 6% in the poll went to the run-off with 31.81% of votes. The run-off for a possible new election has been postponed since December 2016 until now. In November 2015, a special verification commission was set up following the complaints to investigate election irregularities; on April 2016, an interim President was elected succeeding Martelly. Run-off deadlines were missed several times, until May 30th, 2016, when the election verification commission recommended a new election instead.

2.2. International Cooperation in Haiti

In January 2010, a 7.0Mw magnitude earthquake and a series of aftershocks hit Haiti's central area, affecting around 3 million people in Port-au-Prince and nearby, causing 220,000 deaths according to government figures, alongside massive destruction of residences and infrastructure, including hospitals, ports and roads. When talking about international cooperation in Haiti, the first image that comes to mind is the humanitarian assistance following the earthquake, with blue-helmets and aid workers rescuing people amidst the debris, or distributing food by helicopter. As the largest natural disaster in Haiti's history, the post-earthquake humanitarian assistance was, indeed, unprecedented in terms of resources and the number of actors involved. International assistance, both humanitarian and for development, nevertheless accompanies the Haitian history and its several foreign interventions. Therefore, international cooperation for development had a role in Haiti long before 2010's catastrophe. We will first track it back to the United States' intervention in the early XX century, then to the post-2010 period.

2.2.1. Until the 1990s

According to Haggerty (1991), the United States invested in infrastructure and public services during its occupation of Haiti between 1915 and 1934:

[...] Roads were improved and expanded. Almost all roads, however, led to Port-au-Prince, resulting in a gradual concentration of economic activity in the capital. Bridges went up throughout the country; a telephone system began to function; several towns gained access to clean water; and a construction boom (in some cases employing forced labor) helped restore wharves, lighthouses, schools, and hospitals. Public health improved, partially because of United States-directed campaigns against malaria and yaws (a crippling disease caused by a spirochete). Sound fiscal management kept Haiti

current on its foreign-debt payments at a time when default among Latin American nations was common. [...] (Haggerty, 1991, p. 226))

Despite the aid, local resistance and almost two decades of unrest resulted in US withdrawal in 1934. It is hard to argue that infrastructure investment during occupation is foreign assistance; however, US assistance has continued since then. Buss and Gardener (2009) point out that “since 1944, Haiti has relied heavily upon on-again, off-again foreign assistance from the United States and the international community.” The foreign aid accompanied US influence to Haiti, later, with the institutionalisation of Truman’s Point Four Programme into the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)¹¹. Assistance to Haiti was an integrant part of US foreign policy during the Cold War.

In the early 1980s, what we can consider the first aid disaster took place: concerned by the spreading of African Swine Fever, the United States together with Canada, Mexico, the FAO, the International Development Bank and the OAS imposed a swine fever eradication plan on Haiti by killing all 1.2 million of infected Haitian swine¹². According to Ebert (1985), the project aimed not only to prevent the spread of swine fever, but also to modernise Haiti’s livestock production model, fostering a dependent industrialisation once labourers were freed from unproductive swine breeding. A new model was introduced involving a foreign breed from the US and Mexico, imposed feeding formula, care and vaccines, and central processing through the Haitian-American Meat and Products Company (HAMPCO). For the peasants, “they have become the hapless victims of an ‘aid’ project thrust upon them by foreign agencies in collaboration with their own government” (Ebert, 1985). The imported breed was not adapted to Haitian conditions, the repopulation failed, the compensation was not properly done and most peasants lost their livelihood, leaving the market in the hands of Port-au-Prince elites and the US agribusiness industry.

¹¹ Created in 1961, succeeding previous foreign aid agencies such as International Cooperation Administration, Development Loan Fund.

¹² African Swine Fever Eradication and Swine Industry Development Project (PEPPADEP) was launched in 1981, by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; the IICA, a branch of the Organization of American States; the International Development Bank; the governments of Mexico, Canada, the United States; and finally, the government of Haiti.

During its authoritarian regimes, a significant proportion of the Haitian population emigrated – known as Haitian diaspora – to countries like the Dominican Republic, the US, Canada, Cuba, and France (Erikson, 2014). Haiti's struggle became better known to international civil society partly because of this massive emigration. At the same time, foreign civil actors also brought assistance to Haiti and some have remained until now. CARE International, for example, started with humanitarian assistance in Haiti in 1954, rescuing victims from Hurricane Hazel; Développement et Paix (Caritas Canada), for example, started working with Haiti in 1970; Caritas Haïti was founded in 1975; Oxfam Quebec, in turn, started its activity in Haiti in 1978; Foundation for International Development Assistance productive cooperatives HAITI (FIDA-pCH), of Quebecois origin, started operations in 1984; the "Groupe de recherche et d'Appui au Milieu Rural" – le GRAMIR, with Swiss funding, was founded in 1986.

2.2.2. From 1990s to 2000s.

In 1995, in an effort to regulate the country's NGO sector, the government recorded that 309 recognised NGOs were operating in Haiti, of which 74 exist before 1984, and 61 NGOs were founded – in a leap – from 1985 to 1994. The Swiss-Haitian GRAMIR, in 1989, classified NGOs in Haiti into four types: humanitarian and direct services; medium or long-term development; long-term participatory development; and advocacy groups that focus on social justice (Mathurin, Mathurin, & Zaugg, 1989). While the figures reflect the general trends during the 80s and 90s when NGOs were more present worldwide, Schuller (2007) observed that the leap in number coincided with two particular events: the popular unrest from 1985 to 1987, also known as *dechoukaj*, following Duvaliers' fall, and the coup d'état between 1991 and 1994. For us, it also indicates a proliferation of international civil actors on development cooperation, aka NGOs, that follows the evaluated fragilisation of the State.

Although the democracy was claimed as restored in 1994 by the United States, official aid – through USAID to Government of Haiti – was suspended in 1995 and attempts from the US aimed at

weakening Aristide's government, while supporting directly NGOs in Haiti, bypassing the State.¹³ In the following years, Canada and European countries also suspended their official assistance to Aristide's government. As result, resources – and often donors' strategies – were outsourced to the NGOs instead, greatly strengthening the latter. According to Morton (1997) only between 1992-1994, a total of USD 100 million of international support was given to NGOs. Schuller (2007) explains that is because

“donors were reluctant to resume funding that had been suspended during the Cédras regime¹⁴ because of their ‘fear of decreased implementation efficiency and effectiveness’ in the government and because of a perception that the ‘absorptive capacity of the GOH is severely limited’.” (Schuller, 2007, p100)

On this regard, Schuller noted that “most donor policies and practices fund NGOs instead of the government, nearly all ‘development’ occurs through the many NGOs. (idem)” Already in the 1990s, NGOs in Haiti covered a wide array of services, such as Health, Education, Agriculture, Social Assistance, Community Development, Credit, Human Rights, Women, Environment and Literacy. For Schuller (idem), this change in aid distribution, since then, resumed the tension between the NGO sector and the State, even with the government willing – yet unable – to oversee the roles of NGOs.

2.3. From 2000s to nowadays

¹³

There are different narratives regarding this episode: Washington Post journalist Lippman (1995) affirmed it was a republican maneuver to delay resources for the U.S.-sponsored election in 1995, therefore weakening Aristide and supporters (“U.S. AID FOR HAITI IS HELD UP - The Washington Post,” n.d.); Schuller, (2007) quoted that the “official reason was that the Préval government presided over a collapse of the Parliament, which is the institution constitutionally authorized to ratify international treaties, including bilateral aid agréments (idem, p100)”; Buss and Gardner (2009) argued that Aid suspension was advocated by Aristide whilst in exile in the United States in order to repress the coup government, yet it was not resumed timely when he returned later to power; finally, Edmonds, (2013), citing believed that the United States, in an evaluation of Haiti as a corrupt and fragile State – preferred to direct the aid to NGOs, bypassing the State;

¹⁴ the interim government that ruled de facto Haiti during Aristide's exile.

2.3.1. MINUSTAH

Established in 2004, MINUSTAH has now a total of around 6,000 personnel, of which around 4,500 are soldiers and police¹⁵ and UN agencies have altogether more than 1,500 staff in Haiti, of which around 1,350 are national staff.¹⁶ While substituting the disbanded Haitian army and training the national police force, MINUSTAH also became the main responsible body for all “stabilisation”-related tasks, such as emergency rescue, humanitarian assistance, support to the elections, assisting in judicial reforms and training of public servants, etc., sometimes even being a donor in financing small projects.

The eleven years of intervention in Haiti have placed the UN in the sequence of uncomfortable Spanish, French and American influence, especially when a recent allegation against peacekeepers as the source of the cholera outbreak generated a wide-wave of resentments and public rejection(Ives). This and other scandal allegations were instrumental to the withdrawal of the MINUSTAH(“UN confirms Minustah’s withdrawal,” 2015); however, the UN Security Council renewed the MINUSTAH’s mandate again as expected(UNSC/RES/2180, 2014), indicating at least one more year of a bitter stay. It can be said that the UN started with a damaging image and lack of legitimacy among Haitians. Afterwards, the accusations against the UN can be roughly classified into 3 categories: supporting the governing elite, involvement in sexual assault and human right abuses, and being possibly the source of the cholera outbreak.

In 2005, MINUSTAH held a highly controversial operation in the shanty town of Cité Soleil; while officially chasing after gang leaders, it was blamed for repressing members of Fanmi Lavalas and supporters of the former president Aristide in the shanty town. The operation caused many civilian deaths and a humanitarian crisis, wounding near 700 people. (Revol, 2006). Leaked documents in 2011

¹⁵ In 2004, MINUSTAH had an 8940 soldiers and 3711 police officers body. The figures have been decreasing following every mandate renewal.(United Nations, n.d.-a)

¹⁶ United Nations, 'UN in Haiti | United Nations in Haiti' 2015, <http://www.onu-haiti.org/un-in-haiti/>. [Last accessed December 18, 2015]

pointed out that the operation was conducted under American pressure in favour of coup-plotters under the name of “robust” peacekeeping, forcing MINUSTAH to execute it.(Ives, 2011; Kolbe & Hutson, 2006)¹⁷ In several other occasions Haitian media denounced the role of MINUSTAH in repressing social movement and protests that have caused many civilian deaths.(Batay Ouvriye, 2008).

In 2006, a survey investigation on civilian casualties and sexual assaults reported that the Haitian National Police and anti-Lavalas groups accounted for 24.4% of identified perpetrators of sexual assault, and UN soldiers were also frequently identified.¹⁸ Meanwhile, a 2015 UN internal report revealed many other abuses, including the common practice of transactional sex with local women, trading "jewellery, 'church' shoes, dresses, fancy underwear, perfume, cell phones, radios, televisions and, in a few cases, laptops.(United Nations OIOS, 2015)

Last, and most importantly, evidence is gradually pointing to UN responsibility over the cause of the cholera outbreak of October 2010. The epidemic that infected 700,000 and killed around 9,000 Haitians was tracked, in 2010, to have origin in a MINUSTAH military base of Nepalese soldiers.(Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, 2015) In 2013, the UN start changing its tone, and its independent experts confirmed that MINUSTAH troops “most likely” caused the cholera epidemic.(The Center for Economic and Policy Research, 2013). In a recent public conference in Geneva, the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti observed the local outrage against the UN mission’s presence, as the UN pledged for more resources to fight against the cholera in Haiti (Lindstrom, 2015). In this scenario, the UN’s presence, and the wider international community’s presence in Haiti, for local people, media and observers, has a component of a moral duty.(Weisbrot, 2012)

¹⁷ Months after, the Brazilian commander of MINUSTAH was found dead in his hotel’s balcony, whilst reasons of death have been changing from firearm accident to confirmed suicide, then to suspected assassination. After these incidents, the credibility of both Brazilian army and the UN – poorly established – was cast into doubt.

¹⁸The survey counted that “8000 individuals were murdered” since 2004, whilst 35.000 women – half younger than 18 years – were victims of sexual assault (Kolbe & Hutson, 2006). In 2007, a peacekeepers sexual abuse scandal was exposed to the public, leading to an UN internal investigation which revealed 114 members of MINUSTAH responsible for sexual abuse and statutory rape (United Nations OIOS, 2015).

2.3.2. More NGOs since 2010

For observers, NGOs and MINUSTAH have substituted the Haitian State or its institutions. Zanutti (2010, 757) noted that “before the January earthquake there were between 8000 and 9000 NGOs in Haiti with very different agendas, budget size and sponsorship”, and that “More than 70 per cent of available health care was provided by NGOs, but 72 per cent of the population had no access to health care at all. Eighty-five percent of education was provided by private schools, which were mostly run by NGOs.”

Plagued by political instabilities and natural disasters¹⁹, and circumvented by foreign aid (Buss, 2015; Edmonds, 2014; Etienne, 1997; Lessard, 2010; Schuller, 2007; Zanutti, 2010), after the earthquake of 2010, the fragile state became for many a failed state, as the natural disaster destroyed even further Haiti’s infrastructure and remaining government capacity. According to Edmond Mulet, appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of mission of MINUSTAH after the earthquake, “Almost one-third of public servants died during the earthquake, 18,000 of them. Even before the earthquake, the fragility of the institutions and the state was there, and now it is much worse.” (“Battle for Haiti - Interviews - Edmond Mulet,” 2011)

It is of general perception both in the academic literature and actors in the field that Haiti’s humanitarian response and rescue efforts were almost entirely international, and mostly American, symbolised by the US former president Bill Clinton leading the Interim Haitian Reconstruction Commission (IHRC). While the response was counted as having resources “more than \$9bn (£5.6bn)

¹⁹ Noted by Buss (2015), “From 1993 to 2012, it experienced one earthquake, two droughts, 31 floods, and 26 tropical storms or hurricanes. Every time Haiti progresses in its development, a disaster undoes it, making the country worse off. In the past decade alone, Haiti was battered by Hurricane Jeanne in 2004, causing losses of 7% gross domestic product (GDP); Hurricane Fay and tropical storms Gustav, Hannah, and Ike in 2008, resulting in losses of 15% GDP and destroying 40% of Haiti’s harvestable crop, creating a food crisis; and the 2010 earthquake producing a loss of 120% GDP, or U.S.\$8 billion”

in public and private donations”,(Walz & Ramachandran, 2013)²⁰ it is widely understood that the money didn’t go to the Haitian government, but paying largely donors’ own expenses or to international NGOs (Mathurin et al., 1989) (Buss 2015; Edmonds, 2014; Zanotti, 2010; Walz and Ramachandran, 2013) – all criticising the humanitarian response’s failure by excluding the Haitian government.




Figure 1. Recipients of Humanitarian Funding. (Walz and Ramachandran, 2013)

While 572 recognised NGOs were listed at l’Unité de Coordination des Activités des ONG (UCAONG) of the Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe (MPCE)²¹, Edmond Mulet said Haiti hosts almost 10,000 NGOs after the earthquake, and that “the international community was partly responsible for the weakness of the Haitian state, because it did not trust -- and so consistently bypassed -- successive governments.” (“Special Report - Is aid doing Haiti more harm than good? | Reuters,” 2010)

"We created this Republic of NGOs, almost 10,000 NGOs, some of them are extremely responsible and doing good work, but many, many other ones are there, and nobody knows what they do, and nobody knows where the money comes from or is going to."
 (“Special Report - Is aid doing Haiti more harm than good?” , 2010)

²⁰ The Guardian. <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/jan/14/haiti-earthquake-where-did-money-go>

²¹

In this chapter, we reviewed briefly Haiti's history through, and gradually complementing, its "official version". First, through other authors' lenses, we have seen that international assistance is greatly linked with Haitian and international politics and crisis: noticeable in several episodes, including US intervention, Aristide's government and coups, UN peacekeeping missions, and the several humanitarian emergencies. Second, we realised that at least three elements have contributed to the fragility of Haiti's public institutions: its political instability with occurrences of coup d'état; frequent natural and man-made disasters culminating in the 2010 earthquake and cholera outbreak; and international cooperation's policy of avoiding the State in aid distribution.

Third, we have observed a number of critics against the presence international cooperation, namely the United States, UN and its missions, and the NGOs – accusing their political bias, ill-management, scandals and negative roles in Haitian crisis. In the next chapters on Social and Solidarity Economy and its International Cooperation, we will recurrently refer to this context.

Chapter III: Social and Solidarity Economy

Despite recent increasing international popularity, Social and Solidarity Economy (SSE) is a concept that has been used and practiced for more than a century, even with different ranges of coverage, interpretations and practices. Commonly referring to cooperatives, credit associations, other member-based associations and/or social economies, in Haiti a variety of actors practice SSE-type projects and/or promote SSE's strengths and potential, yet with different objectives and *modi operandi*. While some advocate for SSE as a path for an alternative development for Haiti, like Plateforme Haïtienne de Plaidoyer pour un Développement Alternatif (PAPDA) that criticise development cooperation policies that violate Haiti's food sovereignty, others remain apolitical, like l'Association Nationale des Caisses Populaires Haïtiennes (ANACAPH), developing popular finance more as a business model. Still others are unaware of what SSE is, like productive cooperatives Haiti (pcH), despite having promoted rural cooperatives in Haiti for more than 30 years.

This chapter will be descriptive, with document, academic literature and interview sources, first, on SSE's history in Haiti both as a concept and its attributed practices, then on its current state in Haiti, including actors, networks and advocacies, and last, the international support for SSE in Haiti, illustrated by four interviewed cases.

3.1. Development of SSE in Haiti

Many authors and interviewees placed the evolution of SSE in Haiti's historical context, explaining the historical roots of many of today's practices. In an interview with us, Ernest Mathurin, director of GRAMIR, stated that social and solidarity, prior of being a concept that encompasses cooperatives and modern SSE practices, has historical roots in Haiti. Mathurin describes three lines of SSE development in Haiti: first, historical SSE traditions can be tracked back to colonial times, in resistance movements;

second, after the US occupation, while Haitian intellectuals introduced the cooperative model into Haiti, and Catholic Church intellectuals started with popular financing experiments; and third, in the NGO age of Haiti since the 50s, with community-based projects that serve as the foundation for today's prevalence of SSE-like projects. It is important to observe that the stages are not "evolutionary" but coexistent, even nowadays. It is important to observe that the stages are not "evolutionary" but coexistent into certain extent until nowadays.

A similar historical frame is also observed by actors like Gayot (1983) : the first period after Haiti's independence in 1804 was characterised by groups of collective workers paid in kind or in cash; the second period started in 1937 with the creation of the first modern cooperative and, in 1950, the creation of the saving and credit cooperatives similar to the Quebecois Caisse populaire Desjardins; and a third period began around the 1960's with a burst of cooperatives of agriculture, production, consumers, and craftsmanship.

3.1.1. Roots in the colonial *mawonaj*

Mathurin et al. (1989) tracks the origin of Haiti's SSE back to slave resistance during colonisation – even before the Independence – to have three components: i) fleeing slaves that installed themselves in the hill country with self-governing structures and productions; ii) passive slave resistances in the form of "marronage" or "mawonaj", that constituted social and cultural solidarity *bandes marrons* – that later, combining with first two components, achieved independence. After the independence, two social divisions took place with "deux projets de nation": i), a "petit France noir, independent et catholique", continuing the French model and the plantations mode of production, wished by *d'affranchis* or *mulâtres*, and rebel army's leaders; and ii) an Haiti with small-producers economy, with its own national culture, faith (voodoo) and language (creole) comprised of both *mulâtres* and black people was hoped by the freed or previously fled slaves.

Mathurin et al. (1989) advanced further, stating that the first group, despite securing power, confiscating land and other means of production, still never managed to appease the social tension, giving birth to a parallel “Haiti de montagne” that persisted for more than 180 years, alongside traditional SSE organisations and practices until today: the *konbi*, as an example, is a collaborative rotating working system for planting and harvesting among peasants.

White & Smucker (1998) analysing the first traces of solidarity that the elite inherited the national governing structure from the colonisers, and the former slaves escaped the plantations establishing isolated communities, often out of the reach of the new State – both in term of institutions and policies.

In this context of an absence of positive state interventions and exploitative market relations, the peasantry devised new institutions and customs to protect themselves from -the government, to regulate access to land, labor, and capital. Repressive social and political arrangements tended to foster growing rural impoverishment over time. The exclusion of peasants from national institutions also encouraged peasant society to emerge as largely self-regulating and defensive. (p.2)

Small community-based social structures were born in this context, such as *mawonaj* – “the traditional peasant practice of maintaining a low profile, avoiding the apparatus of state, and establishing furtive agricultural units on the margins of society”).²² White and Smucker (1998) further affirm this phenomenon of

[...] horizontal forms of social capital are indigenous, autonomous, local, and specialized in function. They tend to have a democratic character and emphasize collective activities along horizontal lines among scial peers. The groups are self-selecting, self-governed, stable and repetitive, and based on the rule of reciprocity. People organize specialized groups for well-defined purposes, such as entertainment (for example, *kontradans*), religion (*bann rara*), secret societies (*hann champwel*), rotating access to credit (*sang*),

²² To balance the singular use of “Society”, we will resort to Maguire (1996, in: Fatton, 2002), describing *mawonaj* as “a strategy from the country’s pas and evocative of runaway slaves that boils down to ‘resistance through elusiveness.’ When threatened, leaders and groups blended into the wood-work until it was safe to reemerge. This practice would serve them well, not just during their early days of organizations, but in the future. Using *mawonaj*, Haiti’s evolving grassroots movement survived Duvalier and the rapacious military regimes led by Henri Namphy, Prosper Avril, and, finally, Raoul Cédras and his cohorts.”

and rotating access to labor (*èskwad*). In addition to these examples, there are other specialized groups, a rich lexicon of localized Creole names, and a broad range of local and regional variants. (p.3)

Lundhal (2010) describing “Haitian tradition of solidarity highlighted ‘*lakou*’, the ‘*konbit*’ and the ‘*sang*,’ all representing “a cooperative tradition with roots going way back into the early nineteenth century.” *Lakou*, was an extended family structure that was both “patriarchate and cooperative”: an extended family structure that was both “patriarchate and cooperative”, in which

The ‘*pè*’ (the oldest male) made the decisions, but the ‘*lakou*’ also served to ensure that food and work were shared, that pressing needs were taken care of and that the extended family appeared as a socially respectable tight-knit unit vis-à-vis the outside world. (Lundahl 2012, p.120)

Derived from *lakou* structure, *Eskwad* or *konbit* were also popular soon after independence, says Lundahl (2010), that it was inspired by West African practice.²³ The independence wars caused a loss of labour, therefore adopting a collective rotative working system in farming and harvesting. In the 1920s, *konbit* developed into *sosyete*, a larger and more elaborate solidarityat

not only served to mobilise cooperative labour, but in addition they were mutual benefit societies, they afforded protection and they provided social entertainment during the work, including music. Units of up to 180 members are known to have existed. (p. 114).

And last, the *sang* – traditional rotating credit association – was also born in the XIX century. Practiced in other parts of the world, it is a crowd-funding solution that involves pooling money first before serving a particular member in turn. According to Lundahl (2010), all these labour exchange and rotative credit groups are bases for a “Community-based entrepreneurship”²⁴, using Peredo and Chrisman’s definition of “a community acting corporately as both entrepreneur and enterprise in pursuit of the common good.” White and Smucker (1998) believe that “these social trajectories

²³ Robillard (2013)

²⁴ A common reference in SSE scholarship, considered as one type of SSE, like cooperatives, mutual benefit associations, social enterprises, people’s associations, savings groups, among others.

continued unchecked for well into the nineteenth century, as Haiti's treatment as pariah state following the revolution left it isolated from the rest of the world.”

3.1.2. Cooperative movement since the 1930s

Mathurin et al. (1989) tell that around the 1930 to 1950s, after the US occupation, Haitian intellectuals introduced the cooperative movement into Haiti, while intellectuals linked with the Catholic Church started in Haiti experiments on popular finance – *caisse d'épargne et des crédits* - establishing the first rural credit cooperatives. In 1937, la Société Coopérative Agricole de Source Chaude (Terre-Neuve/Artibonite) was created as the first modern cooperative of Haiti, despite the first ventures being mostly short-lived (Lundahl, 2015). According to Shaffer's Historical Dictionary of the Cooperative Movement, “Cooperatives for consumers, credit and transport were formed in the 1940s, followed by a cooperative development project financed by the United States Government in 1951. (Shaffer, 1999.p 42)”

Around 1950s, according to (Develtere & Fonteneau, 2004), Canadian missionaries introduced “saving and credit cooperatives similar to the Caisse populaire Desjardins,” , creating first saving and credit cooperative in 1946. Some still exist today, like la Caisse CAPOSAC, created in 1949. Since then, Haiti saw the first boom of cooperatives of agriculture, production, consumers and craftsmanship, culminating in the creation of Conseil National des Coopératives (CNC) in 1953.

Between the 1950s and mid-1980s, peasant “community councils” were established throughout Haiti, primarily by international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). And a *gwoupment* movement, “based on small groups of peasant farmers operating pre-cooperative ventures” (White and Smucker, 1998) was also promoted by grass-roots support organization. For White and Smucker (1998, p.5), *gwoupment* were a forerunner of today's “producer groups, cooperatives, and community-wide federations of small groups” “firmly rooted in horizontal relations among peers, direct participation

by all members, and small face-to-face groupings” (p.4), that greatly enhanced “the success of grass-roots development efforts.

However, Mathurin et al. (1989) remembered that this trend was harshly repressed during the 60s under Papa Doc, when growing power centralisation and anti-communist policies affected self-organised groups: the authoritarian government seized community initiatives into authoritarian controls under military jurisdiction while repressing other self-governance structures, resulting in persecutions (e.g. extra-judicial killing of young cooperativists around 1962-64). This episode was also remembered in the interview with pcH, as the cooperative movement and the proto-cooperative movement – such as *gwoupment* – suffered serious political repressions and threats in Haiti.

In the 1980s, at the climax of the cooperative movement, Haiti was estimated to have 68,000 cooperatives (Develtere and Fonteneau, 2004), including a large number of credit unions, 80 coffee cooperatives, a dozen cocoa cooperatives and several craftmanship cooperatives. Also suffering from political instabilities in this period, supportive public policy was limited, and some community organisations became grassroots and social movements, such as today's well-known Haitian SSE actors MPP and Tèt Kòle.

Yves Charles and Legrand Charles, coordinators of pcH – productive cooperatives Haiti - in interview with us, told that cooperatives, particularly credit cooperatives, reached another boom in the 2000's under Aristide's government that largely promoted the cooperative model, stressing that Haiti, as stated in the Constitution, is a “république coopératiste”; therefore, it should have cooperatives as a national economic model. In this attempt to capture or allegedly democratise financial services in a called “fièvre de coopératives” between 2001 and 2002, the number of credit cooperatives increased exponentially. Claiming a 10% or even 15% return rate, these initiatives soon were revealed as pyramid or money laundering schemes, taking away US \$200 million savings from Haitian people (Gonzalez, 2002). Beside economic losses, the cooperative movement was greatly harmed since then. This episode

was remembered by many of the interviewees with lingering fear, such as ANACAPH, KNFP, and prof. Franz Piard.

3.1.3. Community-development NGOs from the 1950s

According to Mathurin et al. (1989) , the NGOs boom in the 50s was accompanied by two trends that could be considered carrying the SSE values: i) by encouraging organisational processes based on community development; and ii) by undertaking development projects with a critical political advocacy. The first group, concomitant with the creation of credit cooperatives, was linked with the Catholic Church. It was a result that arose from the Second Vatican Council, when Theology of Freedom's claims became more expressive and were translated into the Church's development policies through its social branches (e.g. Caritas). Growing support was directed to peasants organisations, for example, the rural production cooperatives, and more SSE-like institutions were created in this context. Later, in the 1980s, these community organisations and initiatives became more laicised – also impacted by the authoritarian regimes as indicated also by White and Smucker (1998) – and most credit unions became business initiatives rather than Catholic development initiatives.

While the second group pointed the roots of Haiti's development problems lay in the politics, criticising and acting against Duvaliers' regimes and the lack of democracy. Develtere and Fonteneau (2004, p 13) confirmed that

Une partie des associations, groupements, coopératives et mutuelles s'arriment aux structures sociopolitiques du pays. Ceci est particulièrement vrai pour ceux créés par des mouvements paysans et syndicaux qui ont joué un rôle important dans le renversement du régime duvaliériste.

After the dictatorship, Mathurin observes, many SSE-like actors started having the character of a social movement, contrary to previous repressed community organisations. White and Smucker (1998, p. 4)

observed that with “the advent of free speech and a free press”, soon after Jean-Claude Duvalier’s fall, Haiti had

an exuberant explosion of new and often ephemeral civic groups, political parties, pressure groups, neighborhood committees in urban slums, local NGOs, external NGOs linked to the Haitian overseas community, and rapid expansion of the gwoupman movement in rural areas.

This proliferation of actors could be called by Develtere and Fonteneau (2004) as “l’éveil de la conscience sociale”. Although difficult to affirm the existence of a coherent social movement, as it was denied by all interviewees, they admitted that peasant organisations had important roles in the political developments in the redemocratisation processes.

3.2. SSE nowadays: Practice, Actors, and Advocacies

Following this historical development of SSEs, we can now look into the actual configuration of the domain of SSE in Haiti, bearing in mind different historical trends that contributed to their development. According to Mathurin et al. (1989), informal and daily SSE practices of Haitian people inherited the first stage, cooperatives and caisses kept the second stage’s progresses, and many Haitian social organisations advanced the advocacies of the third stage.

Therefore, today’s SSE practices in Haiti could be divided roughly into the following: informal and popular solidarityives, faith-based organisations as well as NGO community development projects, and peasant organisations and advocacy groups, without excluding a number of transversal network organisations of SSE or public agencies. , and peasant organisations and advocacy groups – without excluding a number of transversal network organisations of SSE or public agencies.

3.2.1. Popular SSE practices

Of informal and daily SSE practices, many do have traces of the past. In our interview, Haitian scholar Prof. Frantz Piard²⁵ cited the *sabotaj* as an example of popular SSE practices, that remembers previously mentioned *sang*. According to Piard, *sabotaj* is a tontine-alike rotative saving system between Haitian families, co-workers, street vendors of normally of short duration. It polls saving amounts of, for example, 150 HTG per member per day²⁶, and withdrawn rotatively on a daily basis to each member and “sabotating” the fund and, therefore, the name. It could be elaborate and involving high amounts, especially among street vendors who has more liquidity at the end of the day. Stressing its popularity, Piard believes that it is often practiced between the Haitian workers of the French Embassy, like *sòl*, another popular SSE practices.

According to Bell (2010) *sòl* is another revolving loan system popular in Haiti with longer periodicity than *sòl* – accruing on a weekly or monthly basis; *mèn ansanm*, following a similar logic of *sòl* and *sabotaj*, occurs among business initiatives to crowdsource money to be later rotatively shared; and *tròk*, is a barter-alike informal exchange practice, exemplified by Bell as “with a woman giving milk from her cow for another woman’s baby whilst the other gives back beans from her garden.” *Konbit* systems that we mentioned earlier, according to Roubillard (2013), despite observed decline, is still relevant in urban and rural areas and used by people for multiple purposes, from agricultural works, to reforestation, road building and city cleaning, and even symbolic uses. Roubillard (2013) advocates for the promotion of *konbit* practices over monetised works, in order to renew the solidarity relations among people in Haiti.

²⁵ At the time of interview professor of École Normale Supérieure de Port-au-Prince and Chargé de coopération universitaire de l’Ambassade de la France en Haïti.

²⁶ We understood 150 HTG or gourdes as a high amount, considering our informally surveyed average Haitian monthly income of around 4000 gourdes. 150 HTG were around USD 2.4 at the time of interview.

Thus, we have the “people” as the first actors of SSE in Haiti. These and other practices are considered by Bell (2010) and interviewees such as Mathurin as bearing legacies for solidarity (e.g. cooperatives and community NGOs, as we will describe below).

3.2.2. Interviewed cases: FINCA, pcH, KNFP, and PAPDA

The increasing use and popularisation of the term “Social and Solidarity Economy” in Haiti is shared as a trend of convergence among SSE actors of all kinds: credit cooperatives, rural cooperatives, advocacy groups, social enterprises, networks, Haitian and international NGOs, universities, research institutions, and finance institutions, etc. Nonetheless, it is hard to identify a “SSE movement” in Haiti. The reality is that, despite recent efforts and growing identification with the term, SSE actors are often decentralised, isolated, bearing very different aims and advocacies, as well as their understanding and expectations about SSE.

In our study, we came across a myriad of SSE organisations or initiatives that carry out SSE practices and interviewed a number of them. In this section, we will present four of the interviewed organisations: a microfinance institution – FINCA Haïti, a cooperative supporting NGO – FIDA-pcH, a solidarity finance network – KNFP (Konsey Nasyonal Finansman Popilè), and a advocacy institution – PAPDA (Plateforme haïtienne de Plaidoyer pour un Développement Alternatif). A similar descriptive structure will be applied in this section to summarise the interviews: their activities, perceptions of SSE network and movement in Haiti, and their objectives and advocacies. While all were asked on the international cooperation in SSE and its political economy, we will explore this information in the next chapter.

3.2.2.1. FINCA Haïti

We met with Emiel Johannes Bouwens, FINCA chief operations officer, on several occasions in Port-au-Prince and nearby, focusing on FINCA's activities in Haiti and the microfinance sector in the country.

Village Banking in Haiti since 1989

Created in 1984 as an NGO, with its headquarters in the US, FINCA is now a well-known international microfinance institution (MFI), with branches on all continents using the "Village Banking" or "Banque Villageoise" model created by John Hatch. In 1989, FINCA Haïti (henceforth FINCA) was founded, becoming nowadays one of the major MFIs in Haiti with nine branches across the country. The MFI offers a diversity of services such as loans (e.g. "agricultural loan, individual loan, small and medium enterprise loans (SME)") and money exchange, remittances and mobile reimbursement, although it is centred in group lending using the "village banking" model.

According to the institution's website, the model is "based on the principle of group or communal solidarity30,000 HTGs to a self-selected group of between 9 to 25 people, needing no collateral or other guarantors. Group members should be from the same area, with each one having own "business and household". Reimbursements are between four to eight months and repayments "are made every 28 days", with FINCA providing the "best rate possible." guarantors. Group members should be from the same area, with each one having own "business and household". Reimbursements are between four to eight months and repayments "are made every 28 days", with FINCA providing "best rate possible."

According to Bouwens, Haiti's formal banking system is "bureaucratic, slow and formalistic", and small business won't go to bank to access financing. Although many banks in Haiti created a microfinance portfolio, now the largest three are FINCA, ACME (Association pour la Coopération avec la Micro Entreprise) and Fonkoze (Sevis Finansye Fonkoze), integrating with other MFIs the ANIMH – Association Nationale des Institutions de Microfinance d'Haïti. At the time of the

interviews, FINCA had 36,000 clients in the country, with a growing rate of 700 clients per month, and a total credit portfolio of around USD 8,7 million – 95% in HTG and 5% in USD. It is interesting to observe that FINCA uses HTG in all accounting, despite its fluctuation and depreciation, and the reporting currency in USD. The repayment rate has been at 98%, apart from the earthquake aftermath that took many people's lives, including FINCA's clients and personnel, losing 30% of the portfolio. FINCA receives its international group's funding, investment and grants from international donors and social investors that we will detail in the next chapter.

Haitian financial systems

When we inquired about the Haitian financing system and how people access finance, Bouwens cited the informal money lenders, who charge at least 30-40% per month, while compared to FINCA's 3-5% per month, a slightly cheaper but comparable rate to the microfinance market in Haiti. The informal money lender often uses lands, or its using rights, as collaterals in a system called *plané*. Bouwens remembered that, even after a national land reform, the land onwership and entitling system is highly unreliable in Haiti to be widely accepted by formal institutions as trusted collaterals. Beside informal money lenders, *caisse populaire* and credit cooperatives are very popular in Haiti, but with very uneven quality.

Very interestingly, people do not have banking accounts with FINCA like most MFIs that are not allowed by the BRH (Banque de la République d'Haïti) to take savings. Fonkèse is the only MFI that does take savings in a exceptional basis, even not being a bank. Bouwens observes that most Haitian people do not keep a bank account, but rather invest in assets (e.g. livelihood) because Haitian banks' savings interest rate is "extremely low".²⁷

It is interestingly to observe that FINCA's clients are almost all natural persons, with "less than 1% as legal persons", even considering the existent portfolio on SME because of better "liability and stability".

²⁷ According to World Bank, deposit interest rate was at lowest in 2011 of 0.28%, and last measured in 2014 of 2.61%.

It means to us that MFIs like FINCA are not typically intermediary financial institutions of other SSEs. Bouwens explains that cooperatives and other collective initiatives often have “no clear ownership”, “not only in Haiti, but generally in other countries” as well. As an example, the registered name of the responsible to the authorities is often not the actual responsible of the organisation, therefore creating risks for MFIs lending.

Social Impact

Finally, asking about the social impact of FINCA’s services, Bouwens affirms that the social impact is delivered through the “Village Banking” model, covering 1/3 of the total portfolio, and impressively 92% of the clients. He commented that no business analysis is needed for group lending and that the very high repayment rate is ensured through the prevalence of the principle of solidarity. While business advice is provided, the solidarity among members is limited to social pressure, and not often on mutual assistance in others’ business. Business advices are provided, the solidarity among members are limited to social pressure, and not often on mutual helps in others’ business.

Similarly to other group lending microfinances, women are the main borrowers: there are never more than 3 men in a group of borrowers. Inquiring about women's predominance, Bouwens’ answer was that first, women have the financial control of the household in Haiti, and second, women are much more compliant repayers than men.

In order to obtain grants from USDA – US Department of Agriculture - an independent and discreet assessment on the social impact of FINCA shows that “social improvement and empowerment is happening”, that clients of FINCA are having more stable and sustainable financial incomes, increasing consumption and are more resilient to shocks.

3.2.2.2. FIDA-pcH

We met with the executive director Betsy Wall, coordinateur programme agricole Legrand Charles, and coordinateur développement coopérative Yves Charles of Foundation for International Assistance - productive cooperatives HAITI - (henceforth pcH), focusing on its activities, advocacy and the cooperative movement and its international cooperation in Haiti.

Supporting agriculture cooperatives since 1984

pcH is a cooperative-supporting NGO founded in 1984 by a 60-year-old Canadian couple who “sold most of their possessions and moved to Port-au-Prince, Haiti” “to work with the poorest of the poor in rural communities, to enable them to achieve a level of productivity and economic activity to provide for themselves and their families.” pcH, the working arm of the FIDA foundation, has now 30 staff in Haiti, partnering with “25 cooperatives representing over 7,000 members” in Haiti.

pcH promotes Haiti the “productive agricultural cooperative model”, by providing

agricultural credit and training in cooperative management and sustainable agriculture/environmental practices to help increase productivity and generate economic activity. [contributing] to the building of grain storage units, agricultural supply stores and health clinics, all within the context of the cooperative model. In 2000, an extensive non-formal adult education program was introduced to address the endemic themes of fear and mistrust that so inhibit the cooperative movement in Haiti. The program has successfully improved the quality of life for cooperative members, not only by providing an opportunity for them to improve their literacy and numeracy proficiency, but also through the teaching value added subjects like conflict resolution, servant leadership, and gender issues. (pcH, 2009)

pcH has conducted/ is conducting 28 projects, mostly of direct support to agricultural cooperatives, but also training, education, watershed management and irrigation rehabilitation, and post-

earthquake aid and recovery through cooperatives, community motivation and mobilization, cholera prevention, research and evaluation. The cooperative model is not restricted to agricultural production, but also cooperative clinics, housing and management of resources.

Nonetheless, pcH's cooperatives are not yet all financially self-sustainable. The reasons are natural disasters such as the 2010's earthquake, climate change, economic instability such as gourdes' fluctuation, market changes, and also aid failures. pcH relies on FIDA's direct financial support coming from donations and revenues from Wall's International Guest House, established by the founding couple Jack and Anne Wall, as well on international assistance.

Cooperative movement

As a convicted promoter of the cooperative model, pcH believes that "this model is viewed as the most appropriate when addressing the economic issues of poverty, and given a context wherein the country lacks political will, national infrastructure, and general security." The organisation has as objectives "to foster economic development and social transformation in rural communities through the productive agricultural cooperative model," with "strict adherence to the principles of participatory methodology."

This model, for pcH, should provide "much needed infrastructure at the rural community level where there exists none", "is designed to address economic adversity", "is a democratic model requiring transparency and accountability", "requires individual commitment and cooperation", and adheres to the Rochdale's "Seven International Principles of Cooperative":

1. Voluntary and Open Membership
2. Democratic Member Control
3. Members' Economic Participation
4. Autonomy and Independence
5. Education, Training and Information
6. Cooperation Amongst Cooperatives

7. Concern for Community

Yves Charles and Legrand Charles told us that they believe in the cooperative movement, as a “organisation modèle que nous aide à compléter d’autres missions”, because “la coopératif par excellence peut aider le développement intégral”. The cooperative model, that is “inclusive, démocratique”, and promotes “développement indigène”, is not restricted to agriculture, but applied widely to other sectors like hotelery, health, education, etc. However, when asked about the advocacy and if it bears political claims, Yves Charles and Legrand Charles affirmed that pcH remains “purement technique”, that may have been inspired by “philosophie chrétienne”, however remains emphatically “sans la politique.”

“What is this ‘Social and Solidarity Economy’?”

Wall was surprised by the term, claiming that he never heard about it in 32 years with pcH, despite having been actively promoting activities very similar to what we describe to be SSE. pcH interviewees are very familiar with the history of the cooperative movement in Haiti, all the peaks and valleys, and today’s existent network. On the relative prominence of cooperatives in Aristide period, Yves Charles and Legrand Charles affirm that “maintenant, ces coopératives de la fièvre ont disparus”, and “les ‘vrais’ coopératives existent jusqu’à aujourd’hui.” Therefore, “tout le monde connaît” the cooperative model, however, the negative impact remained, not only on credit cooperatives but on the model as a whole. pcH had to undertake an “effort extraordinaire” to overcome the damages caused, such as the mistrust of the people towards the cooperative model.

Yves Charles and Legrand Charles seem to be more familiar with the network and are aware of the concept of SSE. They warned that despite numerous cooperatives, NGOs and organisations that claim to be working with cooperatives, few are principled followers of the movement. They criticised the credit cooperatives or caisses populaires, citing that most are problematic in their “méthode de gestion”; despite being cooperatives, they “fonctionne comme des banques” with “membres pauvres” et “administrateurs riches”, leaving behind the cooperative mission.

Finally, pcH listed some like-minded SSE actors in Haiti: le Développement et Paix – by promoting “économie solidaire” and “financement populaires” and organising events with pcH’s participation and exchanges); le Mouvman Peyizan Papay/Movement Paysan Papaye (MPP), with whom pcH has worked as well; le Partenariat pour le Développement Local (PDL) – a network of organisations in all Haiti and promoter of the cooperative model²⁸; World Renew – also working with cooperatives; l’Institut de technologie et d’animation (ITECA) and L’institut Culturel Karl Lévêque (ICKL)²⁹, which develop supportive programmes toward the *gwoupment*.

3.2.2.3. KNFP

We met with Dieudonné Eugène, responsible for le Bureau de Service et de Renforcement des organisations paysannes (BSR) of Konsèy national de financement populaire (KNFP) and discussed about KNFP’s activities and SSE’s actors, networks, advocacies and international cooperation in Haiti.

A rural finance network organisation

Founded in 1998, le Konsèy national de financement populaire, henceforth KNFP, is the main Haitian SSE network organisation on popular finance – excluding credit cooperatives – that umbrellas nine members³⁰, while hosting three network-level units: L’Institut Mobile de Formation du KNFP (IMOFOR), le Bureau de Service et de Renforcement des organisations paysannes (BSR), and Kaypam, a conference and hostel facility. According to its official website, KNFP “travaille à la promotion et au renforcement du financement populaire en Haïti avec un positionnement marqué pour le milieu rural.”

²⁸ However not in full compliance with the principles, noted pcH.

²⁹ Well-known advocate of SSE in Haiti.

³⁰ “COD-EMH : Coordination des Programmes de Développement de l’Eglise Méthodiste d’Haïti ; GRAIFSI : Groupe pour l’Intégration de la Femme du Secteur Informel ; KOFIP : Kolektif Finansman Popilè ; Par la suite, les trois fondateurs ont été depuis rejoints par d’autres membres tels : ACLAM : Action contre la misère ; CRS : Catholic Relief Service ; FONDESPOIR ; FIDES- Haïti : Fonds International de Développement Economique et Social ; FHAF : Fonds Haïtien d’Aide à la Femme ; FOBNO : Fédération des Organisations du Bas Nord-Ouest ; Les neuf (9) membres pris ensemble rassemblent en 2005 plus de 3,000 structures de financement de base (banques communautaires ou mutuelles de solidarité (BC/MUSO), soit environ 65000 à 70000 chefs de ménages répartis dans les dix (10) départements géographiques du pays. L’immense majorité (80%) vit en milieu rural.” (KNFP, 2010).

It engages in training, promotion, and research of rural financing in Haiti, specially the *Mutuelles de Solidarité (MUSO)* and the *banques communautaires ou villageoise (BC)*.

MuSo and BC

According to a KNFP study (Mathieu, 2015), mutuelles de solidarité had its first appearance in 1995 in Senegal, and was introduced into Haiti in 1997 after a training seminar by KOFIP – Collectif de financement populaire. Mathieu (idem) counted more than 1,000 MuSo in Haiti created by a number of organisations, some today members of KNFP. KNFP itself, through its training facility IMOFOR, also promotes the MuSo model. BC, in turn, was a model created in 1984 by John K. and Maguerite Sakir Hatch of FINCA, and practiced in Haiti by Coordination des Programmes de Développement de l'Église Méthodiste d'Haïti (COE-EHM), Catholic Relief Service (CRS), and other MFIs.

For Mathieu (2015), MuSo and BC could

- 1) Permettre aux populations pauvres de s'organiser et d'échanger sur les problèmes qui les concernent.
- 2) Financer des activités créatrices de revenus.
- 3) Réduire les coûts d'intermédiation.
- 4) Renforcer la solidarité de la communauté.
- 5) Favoriser la circulation de l'argent dans le milieu.

Eugène, and Mathieu (2015), describe that a MuSo or BC normally are constituted at around 15-30 members, pooling the money into 3 types of boxes: *caisse verte* or *caisse des affaires*, *caisse rouge* or *caisse de secours*, and *caisse bleue* or *caisse de refinancement*. The amounts are determined by the members, with the *caisse vert* as a credit fund between the members, the *caisse rouge* as an assurance solidarity fund for emergencies and other non-recoverable spending, and the *caisse bleue* as an institutional fund that is not limited to the members, operating external lending or receiving external funding. During a MuSo meeting, the box holder meets with the key holder, and an accounting journal is kept for each *caisse*, securing the transparency.

According to KNFP's statistics, from 2003 to 2013, IMOFOR has trained 6,530 people on MuSo and BC models: 60% of them are women, and KNFP counted more than 7,000 *association de base de cotisation et de prêt* (ABCP) in Haiti, including around 3,500 MuSo, 2,000 BCs and 1,000 AVECs (Association villageoise d'épargne et crédit), totalizing 140,000 users, mobilising 400 million gourdes³¹.

We do SSE

Eugène affirms that KNFP was founded in 1998 inscribed in the term of "économie sociale et solidaire", as "finance solidaire," with the belief that "finance comme outil pour permettre le développement sociaux et économique des acteurs" and that "l'homme est situé au centre des actions du KNFP". KNFP is member of many international SSE networks, such as International Association of Investors in the Social Economy (INAISE) and Foro Latinoamericano y del Caribe de Finanzas Rurales (FOROLACFR). While in Haiti, KNFP actively promotes SSE, forming a plateforme/réseaux de l'économie sociale et solidaire in Haiti with other SSE actors through the joint organisation – with ANACAPH, INAISE, FOROLACFR – of *Premier atelier international sur le financement de l'économie sociale* in March 2014. Eugène also remembered a number of studies him and Lionel Fleuristin, president of KNFP, realised on the SSE in Haiti and the role of KNFP.

Eugène told us that KNFP is among the rare SSE organisations that do have a "lobby" dimension, as it is in the organisation's strategic plan. Therefore, KNFP's activities toward small and medium enterprises and peasants organisations have SSE as a base, that is understood by Eugène as having in common principles such as "gouvernance démocratique et autogestion", intrinsic values of cooperatives and solidarity finance. The *makom*, a KNFP supported civil society organisational model, for example, gathers people in a community in a solidarity group, and became in many places an important stakeholder for local politicians. Candidates present their plans to *makom* members before

³¹ The total cotisation is up to date until Sep 1st, 2015. (Le Nouvelliste, 2016)
<http://lenouvelliste.com/lenouvelliste/article/149325/Les-Mutuelles-de-Solidarite-et-linclusion-financiere-en-Haiti>

the election, and once elected, have to report periodically to the *makom*, ensuring the political accountability and democratic participation through a SSE initiative.

Haitian SSE

The SSE in Haiti, according to Eugène, involve a diversity of actors and practices, including “fondations, coopératives de production, coopératives financières, ONGs qui travaillent dans le développement avec un racinement local” like ITECA, peasant organisations and federations like MPP, Coordination régionale des organisations du Sud-Est (CROSE), and 4G Kontre³²; and some still-used yet declining mutual-help practices of *konbit* or its varieties (e.g. *malanga* or *èsqwad*).

According to Eugène, the SSE in the financial sector in Haiti, or Social and Solidarity Finance, are well-structured such as by KNFP, ANACAPH, Le LEVIER – covering globally the actors of the cooperative financing - and by ANIMH – representing non-cooperative MFIs, but without a positioning of SSE. KNFP, ANACAPH and ANIMH are supporting associations of financial institutions, KNFP on MuSo and BCs, ANACAPH on *caisses populaires d’épargne et credit*, and AMINH on MFIs. Le LEVIER is a network but also a financial institution per se, offering integrated financial services for its membered credit unions.

Meanwhile, the SSE in the productive sector is more diverse, including peasant movement, rural cooperatives, education, infrastructure, tourism, migration, agriculture, local development, and community-reinforcement. However, the actors are not as structured as the financial sector at the national level. There are some relevant actors, such as MPP, a regional peasant movement in the Central region of Haiti that gathers 4,184 “goupements (hommes, femmes, mixtes, jeunes)” with a total of 53,680 membres (MPP, 2012); le CROSE is another regional peasant movement in the South-East of Haiti; while 4G Kontre is a advocacy network formed by MPP, MPNKP (Mouvement paysan national du Congrès de Papaye, a national-level movement founded by MPP), and Tèt Kole, a

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national-level peasant movement. For Eugène, unfortunately this is still not a single movement or network of productive SSEs in Haiti.

Similarly, the myriad of NGOs that undertake SSE projects are also scattered. Each NGO works very independently. COHE, Coordination Haiti-Europe, for example, gathers a large number of NGOs, but only those with European partners. Nonetheless, despite the diversity of activities and advocacies of the SSE in Haiti, for Eugène, the actors share a common point ideologically: “le point central c’est de favoriser le bien-être, l’épanouissement des gens du milieu rural.”

3.2.2.4. PAPDA

We met with Ricot Jean-Pierre, directeur de programme du PAPDA, debating primarily PAPDA’s activities, and the political advocacy of SSE movement.

PAPDA – Plateforme haïtienne de Plaidoyer pour un Développement Alternatif, was founded in 1995, and is now composed of eight members: la SOFA (Solidarite Fanm Ayisyèn), le MITPA (Mouvman Inite Ti Peyizan Latibonit), l’ITECA (Institut de Technologie et d’Animation), l’ICKL (Institut culturel Karl Levesque), le CRAD (Centre de Recherches Actions pour le Développement), l’ANDAH (Association Nationale des Agro-professionnels Haïtiens), le COHPÉDA (Collectif haïtien pour la protection de l’environnement et le Développement Alternatif), and le FONHADES (Fondation haïtienne pour le Développement économique et sociale).

It lists many social movements and organisations as partners, including POHDH (la Plate-forme des Organisations Haïtiennes des Droits Humains) et le RNDDH (Le Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains), le GARR (Le Groupe d'Appui aux Rapatriés et Réfugiés), le SAKS (Sosyete Animasyon ak Kominikasyon Sosya/Société d’Animation et de Communication Sociale), and trade union federations (e.g. Batay Ouvriye (BO) – the most critical trade union federation in Haiti). Thus, PAPDA represents

un regroupement de mouvements sociaux et d'organisations de la société civile haïtienne qui travaille sur les politiques publiques par le biais de l'information, la formation, l'analyse critique et l'élaboration de propositions alternatives. ("PAPDA," 2006)

PAPDA works on Social and Solidarity Economy, and topics such as food sovereignty, alternative economic integration, external debt, and participative democracy through a journal in French "Justice Économique" - a monthly newsletter in Créole Yon lòt Ayiti posib - their website www.papda.org, community radio programmes and many events conferences, including the well-known Université populaire d'été.

Recent yet complex SSE

According to Jean-Pierre, the use of the term "économie sociale et solidaire" is recent in Haiti, dating back only to the 1990s to 2000s. The concept quickly became very popular among community actors since then, as it can find its historical and cultural roots and references in Haiti. Although regarded by many as a palliative remedy to the lack of support and services or informal substitute of the formal economy, PAPDA believes in a "dynamique politique, économique et culturelle par derrière" the SSE. It is therefore "un système alternatif à l'économie capitaliste" that marginalises local initiatives and creates more poverty. In this perspective, SSE actors are actually participating in a definition of a system "politique, économique et culturelle qui répondre au défis majeurs connu par la société qui est une forme même de l'organisation de la société."

For Jean-Pierre, in the economic dimension, solidarity enterprises have the potential for transforming the profound social relations in both the community and global trade; in the cultural dimension, through solidarity mechanisms, community population could be engaged in participating and influencing in "construire une alternative"; and last in the political dimension, a political education through SSE would bring a national-level political project at building a non-capitalist society, renewing the social dialogue. So SSE in PAPDA's framework vision is not only isolated interventions, but a social movement. For Jean-Pierre, it could find parallels in some other countries of Latin America,

particularly Brazil (a bottom-up social movement), Venezuela (State-led transformation), and countries like Ecuador, Bolivia and Argentina. He cited the article of *The relationship between solidarity economy and State in Latin America: contrasting dynamics in Brazil and Venezuela* by Lemaître and Richer (2009).

Political advocacy and Université populaire d'été

Jean-Pierrer recognises different approaches SSE actors are adopting to solve diverse problems, such as the financial sector using SSE at targetting the financial problems, or isolated interventions on family farming, filling the absence left by the State. However, he criticised the trend in the financial sector that doesn't adopt an integral answer with SSE, but rather becoming an intermediary to the capitalism and the existing banking system. Meanwhile, the credit sector, the *caisses populaires d'épargne et crédit* in Haiti "finance de moins en moins des activités productives," with less than 15% of their portfolio for these activities, although 80-90% of the fund are deposited in commercial banks. Thus, they do the hard work that traditional banks are not willing to do - that is the capture of the savings from the poorest, while failling at their original and primary objective, that is, mobilising community savings for local development. They should not be considered anymore – for Jean-Pierre – as SSE actors, and the same skepticism goes for business ventures that claim to be SSE.

For PAPDA, the SSE would be an important grassroot rebuilding effort, benefiting small farmers and their subsistence agriculture, while fighting against development policies promoted by some international donors (e.g. the USAID of export-led agriculture and low-wage assembly plants). Additionally, PAPDA, using a reported from Grassroots International, warned that "development plans of some donor countries will rely on foreign troops for implementation, which may lead to more dependency and social unrest", remembering the credibility loss of the UN peacekeeping force. (Richardson, 1997)

PAPDA, in turn, seeing the "économie solidaire comme le troisième voie", alongside the market and the State, adopts a political approach. Asked if the SSE movement demands are voiced in formal

political participation (e.g. through parties and elections). Eugène lamented that there is no true and representative left-wing movement in Haiti or in the government, except for few sympathizers in the government. It engages instead in promotion, advocacy, popular education, influencing the policy-making and public opinion on SSE as an alternative system at both community and at government levels. The institution organised, for example, the *Université populaire d'été* for the past 10 years.

The *Université populaire d'été* is an annual event of national and international participation organised by PAPDA, its members and partners, inviting Haitian and International social movement actors, supporters and scholars. The last three editions of Université have been “économie sociale et solidaire”. The 2015 edition was held in Port-au-Prince, gathering 110 participants from 39 rural and urban organisations of Haiti, and foreign organisations and scholars from Europe, the US, Latin America and Africa. *Entraide et Fraternité* (2015) listed some of the shared SSE experiences:

- la mutuelle de solidarité de Carrefour (département de l'Ouest) ainsi que du département du Nord-Est ;
- l'expérience de boulangerie alternative dans la commune d'Aquin, à Belle Fontaine sur la commune de la Croix-des-Bouquets, et sur la commune de Petit-Goâve ;
- l'expérience d'une coopérative agricole de riz dans l'Artibonite [...] et la construction d'une fédération nationale de producteurs de riz dans 5 départements du pays [...]
- l'expérience d'une coopérative de production et de commercialisation de mangues sur la commune de Gros-Morne.

Finally, PAPDA adds that SSE is not only a topic for Haiti's popular university, but taught and researched in formal universities in Haiti as well. For example, Université d'État d'Haïti (UEH) has created recently a master programme in “économie sociale et solidaire”, hosted by UEH's Université de formation continue of Faculté des Sciences Humaines.

In this chapter, we went through the history of SSE's development in Haiti in three stages: pre-independence SSE practices rooted in anti-colonial solidarity resistance; cooperative movement since the 1930s; and community-development NGOs from the 1950s. These stages marked concomitant trends of SSE evolution in Haiti, giving birth to today's SSE diversity in Haiti in term of actors, network and advocacies. In a summary balancing the literature and interviews, we can observe the following groups of SSE – in lacto census – nowadays in Haiti: i) popular SSE practices among the population, such as *konbit*, with the people as actors; ii) financial SSEs, including self-help mutual and community banks (represented by KNFP), credit cooperatives (*caisses populaires d'épargne et credit* represented by ANACAPH), and non-cooperative MFIs such as FINCA (represented by AMINH); iii) productive SSEs, such as rural cooperatives and supporting organisations such as pcH, and many social enterprises for example those promoted by DP³³; and last, iv) SSE advocacy organisations, including peasant movements (e.g. MPP, CROSE, 4G Kontre), and SSE advocacy organisations such as PAPDA and its member or partners. The different actors, as we saw, bear very different views of the SSE and advocacies.

Therefore, there is not a large SSE movement in Haiti, like other cases of Latin America. The ownership of the concept SSE in Haiti, as we observed, is more scattered in actors' own narratives, far from being institutionalised. Nonetheless, there is to some extent an informal network among SSE actors, in terms of mutual knowledge, facilitated in many cases by events and by media.

³³ To be described in the next chapter. Considering Développement et Paix (Caritas Canada) as an international actor – despite its relevancy in Haiti – favors better our analysis.

Chapter IV: International Cooperation for SSE

When invited to comment on international cooperation, the SSE actors often do not associate the term with their international partners or the funding donors, but more commonly viewing it as part of a wider context of international intervention, criticising how such intervention contributed to the fragility and weakness of today's Haiti. Doing justice to Haiti's history that we previously described, the international cooperation does have two dimensions in SSE: first, as providing context in reference to both the military intervention and aid, and the post-2010 humanitarian response; second, as specific partners of each SSE actor or funders of their projects.

Despite the diversity of the activities and advocacies, all SSE actors we looked into and/or interviewed receive support – whether financially or not – from international development organisations, from faith-based organisations (e.g. Développement et Paix, Entraide et Fraternité), international SSE networks or organisations (e.g. INAISE, Caisse Desjardins), or state development agencies (e.g. USAID, CIDA), social investors (e.g. Triodos Bank, KfW Entwicklungsbank), or even universities and research institutions.

In this chapter, we will explore the international cooperation for SSE: first surveying actors' perception on international cooperation in Haiti, then a more direct survey of the main supporters of the Haitian SSE sector, as well as their stated reasons, and last a political economy analysis behind the promotion of SSE in Haiti.

4.1. International Cooperation VS SSE

4.1.1. Unwelcomed international cooperation

Jean-Max St-Fleur³⁴, a media specialist, gave us a panorama of the perception of international cooperation in Haitian media; for Haitian people, international actors have an “image mitigée” – to not say that it is all bad. St-Fleur cited that some donors, such as Cuba, Venezuela, and Brazil, despite their involvement with the discredited MINUSTAH, have performed better in this regard, having therefore a better image for Haitian people. However, the same perception doesn’t hold for most of the other international actors.

Pointing out that protests are recurrent and heard on a daily basis on Haitian radio and other media, especially in rural areas, St-Fleur observes that peasants are often protesting against two groups: “l’État haitien” and “la communauté internationale”. It is very commonly perceived by peasants that the internationals “ils sont venu en notre detriment”, with projects that often don’t benefit the farmers but the governing elite. St-Fleur cited an example of the Haitian banana sector: between 1989 and 2000, when the national production was harmed by diseases and climate changes, the government showed no support to the sector, but increased importation from Dominican Republic, damaging deeply the farmers’ livelihoods.

While investment in national agriculture (e.g. cooperatives) is extremely insufficient, the donors, many still considering Haiti as a humanitarian crisis, prefer to spend millions ineffectively in food distribution and “capacity-building” programmes, marginalising the recovery of rural productivity. Episodes like this are very common in Haiti – says St-Fleur – and justifies the protests and complaints of syndicates, associations and peasant movements.

Eugène also remembered the damages caused by international cooperation, noting that donors never have the local needs as the priority, whereas they are always motivated by other reasons that favour either themselves or local elite. He cited the Dominican Republic (DR)–Haiti road financed by the

³⁴ Journalist and National expert for UNDP-Haiti’s Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) unit at the time of the interview.

European Union as an example, questioning this intervention that prioritises first the DR-Haiti road transport while transportation infrastructure between Haitian's own departments were left behind. Without judging the initial motivation, this international road ended up with massive dumping of DR products with nearly zero taxes into Haiti since the earthquake³⁵, and Haiti's rural producers all over the country, especially North to the capital, need urgently transport infrastructures for the market integration.

PAPDA, in turn, is also well-known for its critical articles and announcements in the Haitian press and media, repudiating publically the international cooperation lead by local elite, US intervention and UN army. In April 13th 2016, PAPDA denounced the donation of 500 tons of peanuts dumped by the US into Haiti, harming its national market already saturated with its own production. Opposed to the MINUSTAH since its creation, in a 2014 press note, PAPDA criticised Ban Ki Moon's report on Haiti's situation that renewed the peacekeeping for one more year:

Le rapport montre une méconnaissance totale des problèmes vécus par notre pays et présente une image idyllique des résultats de la Mission en refusant de reconnaître son échec et les nombreuses violations, constantes et systématiques, des droits fondamentaux commises par la Minustah au cours de ces 10 années d'occupation de notre territoire .

A parcel of critics also focused on the foreign NGOs in Haiti. Most interviewees criticised the lack of knowledge of NGOs about Haiti, and how blind humanitarian aid actually became more harmful than helpful to the country and its people. Mathurin, from GRAMIR, told us that the organisation has worked for decades in the “reorientation et conscientisation” of the NGOs in Haiti by emphasising i) the needed coordination and network, ii) co-management with local community, iii) exit strategy toward the independence of local capacity, and iv) good partnering. Many trustworthy NGOs or non-state development actors worked in Haiti long before the 2010 earthquake and the international solidarity was indeed important for the country's recovery, as Mathurin noted. However, he adds, each

³⁵ In our way on the bus from DR to Haiti, we have observed a massive inflow of merchandises – mostly DR produced banane, food, drinks, and necessities – from DR into Haiti with nearly no customs control.

humanitarian disaster brings a massive wave of passionate and unprepared NGOs into Haiti, injuring often the existent development efforts from within the country.

4.1.2. No portfolio on SSE

As St-Fleur recalls, no state actors or UN agencies have a portfolio on SSE. WFP, UNDP and other UN agencies had some interventions (e.g. cash for work or cash for assets) that may have had an impact on cooperatives or solidarity-based groups, yet there were many more humanitarian and short-term projects, and not long-term recoveries or SSE-strengthening plans.

KNFP's programme head Eugène also views that donors, including most KNFP project funders (e.g. EU, France) do not have SSE as a portfolio or objective:

Je pense pas à mon avis je ne sens pas que les donateurs sont été . Moi je pense pas, je pense plutôt que des donateurs financents des choses qui, pdans leur intérêt, mais, par compte, ça peut rencontrer le champ de l'économie sociale et solidaire. Ça rencontre les organisations de l'ESS.

Yolène Jacquet, directrice exécutive of ANACAPH also observes that the donors do not carry a SSE advocacy or portfolio. The EU, Jacquet affirms, renewed its partnership with ANACAPH more because it sees the latter as a reliable partner at delivering the results, but with no specific preference on the credit union model. Even some external known as SSE actors – such as Caisse Desjardins, develop its activity in partnership with ANACAPH as a business outreach and extension, without any particular concern over the SSE advocacy.

Bouwens, chief operations officer of FINCA, also adds to our observation that most project are coincidental in a rush for funding. As Bouwens observes, donors have at their disposal an considerable amount of resources that need to be spent on no matter what project – through funding application, friendship, or private network. Therefore, this funding-model existent in Haiti favors not necessarily the fullfuling of local needs, but of the documents and reports of the funders.

Through a comprehensive search into the major donors, we confirm the observations of the interviewees: no major donor applies an agenda of SSE in Haiti. Belgian cooperation (BTC), the only state donor that has SSE as a portfolio, does not develop any direct projects in Haiti. USAID, who has a cooperative development programme worldwide, also has no project specifically under this portfolio, but rather most cooperative-related projects are within the “Food and Economic Security” pillar. There is a USAID project called Konbit, to “strengthen Haitian civil society organizations and business service providers.”(USAID, 2016) Interestingly, we found a reference in Roubillard (2013, 57)’s paper, stating that

Many NGOs, including large international aid organizations like USAID, use the word "Konbit" in their project titles, even though these are top-down heavily-financed activities that do not reflect the principles of konbit. At the core the principle they reflect is that of the people being controlled for the objective of the donor; this may be “participation,” it may be “collaboration,” and it even may also be “solidarity”—but simply being these three is not konbit. Konbit requires that the ownership and the desire for participation, collaboration, and solidarity come from the people, not from external control.

There are, nonetheless, some “exceptions”, as a number of donors' funding agencies do support microfinance and social enterprises, and a number of non-state actors, including faith-based organisations, do have explicit objectives on SSE when supporting donors, as we will see in the next section.

4.2. International cooperation *for* SSE: Why?

In recent years, many international events in Haiti had explicit mention of the term “Social and Solidarity Economy”. To cite a few, in June 2012, La Via Campesina issued a declaration with its “allies” in favor of the “économie solidaire”; in May 2013, the Centre de la Francophonie des Ameriques organised in Haiti the “First meeting of the Francophone Social and Solidarity Economy Network of

the Americas” (CED, 2016); in August 2013, the same organisation supported the first “Caravane National sur l’économie sociale et solidaire” in Haiti”(Cincir, 2016).

And, since last year, in September 2015, the Groupe d’économie solidaire du Québec (GESQ) organised a one-day workshop “Apports et potentialités de l’économie sociale et solidaire: L’agroalimentaire en Haïti”, and inaugurated the first of two summer universities on SSE in Haiti, with the second to be held in September 2016 (CED, 2016); in October 2015, Développement et Paix organised the symposium “Économie sociale et solidaire (ÉSS) et entrepreneuriat social en Haïti. État des lieux, enjeux, défis et perspectives”(DP, 2015); and recently, in December 2015, Quebecois Services Conseil (S2L) and Chantier de l’économie sociale launched a new accelerating programme for Social and Solidarity Economy.(CED, 2015)

During the the First meeting of the Francophone Social and Solidarity Economy Network of the Americas in 2013, Poirier, from the Canadian Community Economic Development Network affirmed that the promotion of SSE in Haiti would “scale up the international linkages and partnerships of our members in order to foster the emergence of a globalized civil society solidarity(CED, 2013)

La Via Campesina in its declaration jointly with its Haitian member organisations, namely MPP, MPNKP, Tèt Kole and allied organisations including PAPDA, affirmed solidarity, as alternative ways of development. They considered these areas as important steps, marching “to say no to green capitalism, no to domination by transnational corporations, no to the destruction of the planet,” and also fighting against the production of agrofuels or GMOs instead of food for subsistence. as important steps as they were marching “to say no to green capitalism, no to domination by transnational corporations, no to the destruction of the planet,” also fighting against the production of agrofuels or GMOs instead of food for subsistence. (La Via Campesina, 2012)

Furthermore, David Leduc, Director of Développement et Paix, affirmed in 2015 that “L’économie sociale et solidaire constitue un engagement fort en faveur de la justice sociale, car elle permet aux personnes les plus marginalisées et exclues du monde de l’économie d’en devenir des acteurs.”

4.2.1. DP: aid-independence

Développement et Paix Haïti (henceforth DP), now called Caritas Canada, is perhaps the most active supporter of SSE in Haiti. Operating in Haiti since 1970, “le programme d’économie sociale et solidaire” is now the last panel of DP’s reconstruction programme, integrating the domains of “développement économique et social” and of “souveraineté alimentaire.”

DP has engaged in development activities in Haiti by supporting projects and actors under the domains of “l’aide humanitaire mais également la reconstruction d’infrastructures, l’alimentation, le renforcement de la démocratie et de la participation citoyenne, l’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes, et plus largement de la défense des droits de la personne.”

In October 2015, DP organised the symposium “Économie sociale et solidaire (ÉSS) et entrepreneuriat social en Haïti. État des lieux, enjeux, défis et perspectives” (DP, 2015), and in April 2016, we met with DP’s Jean-Claude Jean, head of Développement et Paix’s office in Haïti.

Promotion of ESS and social entrepreneurship

Held at Hotel Montana in Port-au-Prince from 14th to 16th of October 2015, the Symposium “Économie sociale et solidaire (ÉSS) et entrepreneuriat social en Haïti. État des lieux, enjeux, défis et perspectives” (DP, 2015), reunited around 200 people of civil society, trade unions, cooperatives, public sector, private enterprises, Haitian expats, students, researchers and engaged citizens. The opening ceremony counted with the presence of Haiti’s Prime-Minister Évangéline Chirak, UQAM’s professor Gérald Larose – also President of Caisse d’économie sociale Desjardins.

For D&P, the symposium is in the context of the last stage of DP's reconstruction programme following 2010's earthquake. At this stage, 3 million dollars were delivered to create "une douzaine d'entreprises sociales." Haitian PM Évangéline Chacón, in the opening session, expressed this gratitude toward D&P's engagement.

According to D&P, with a USD 3 million budget, 657 jobs were created, of those 138 direct and 519 indirect. The social enterprises created are present in 7 of 10 Haitian departments, with 55% of them in the sector of agriculture, 21% in housing, 12% in textile and confection, 10% in food production and 1% in tourism and entertainment. In conclusion, D&P affirmed that SSE is "un levier qui brise le cercle de la dépendance", by regrouping "des organisations produisant des biens et des services à grande utilité sociale (DP, 2015).

Before and after the Earthquake

Traditionally, DP's work in Haiti has been of supporting human rights, justice and peace through development projects, promotion and protection of human rights, protection of environment, and improvement of gender issues. To advance this agenda in a country like Haiti where "l'État est faible", it needs "une société civile forte et dynamique" to consolidate the democracy, that could "faire face à l'État pour pouvoir faire de demande", expressing le "voix de citoyen". Thus, DP chose to support initiatives at the community level in order to realise its social and political justice agenda, at the same time working together with Human Rights organisations to defend Human Rights violation victims of and giving legal assistance to Haitian people.

After the 2010 earthquake, DP established a post-seism reconstruction programme, engaging in the first stage in humanitarian relief (e.g. food distribution) to render assistance to the victims, and in the second stage, after 6 months of the disaster, in recovery activities. Jean affirms that DP is a development organisation, therefore planned with emphasis on the recovery – in the short and long-term – even during the emergency. For Jean, the tragedy of the earthquake was amplified by the weakness of the State, but the roots of structural problems lie in the society. Therefore, to recover the

productivity and building a stronger civil society, DP has chosen “l’économie sociale et solidaire” that was an ideal answer, right in their path.

SSE as in the times of less aid

Most importantly, most local organisations rely on external resources, while humanitarian organisations are already leaving the country, decreasing their funding toward Haiti. Therefore, the current development path that is dependent on foreign aid is no longer sustainable, given the international financial crisis and diminishing international assistance. To a certain extent, the recent years of post-earthquake Haiti reflect this new context of international cooperation, urging for a “transformation de paramètre/paradigme de l’aide internationale”.

Thus, at the end of DP’s humanitarian response, the SSE showed potential to answer both concerns of building stronger civil society and aid-independent actors. On one hand, SSE would be useful for the “construction et reconstruction de l’organisation et bâtiment sociaux”, at same time recovering “la capacité productive des rganisations paysans,” supporting therefore the country’s response capacity to both food and nutritional security and food sovereignty; on the other hand, it could generate revenues sufficient to support its social actions, without needing external aids.

Pas de contradiction entre l’économique et le sociale

Jean notes that, previously, social projects were always aid-dependent, since “l’engagement sociale n’arrive pas à se donner son propre moyen d’existence.” Social actors had no economic concern and economic actors had no social concerns. So by generating and reusing the profit for social actions, there is no contradiction “entre l’économie et le sociale.”

Asked about the difference of social economy and solidarity economy – and if SSE needed to be restricted to membership-based initiatives and profit-sharing – Jean revoked such differentiation. He affirms that except in the ideology dimension – from Marxist or even Christian traditions, that reject the economic and its dynamics, seeing it as “pécamineuse ou immorale” – there is no such opposition.

There are, indeed, scepticals about social enterprises, that have “superstition à l’égard de l’économie,” and one should view the social and the economic integrally, without putting the economic in a different sphere. Because, “l’économie au départ il est neutre.”

Therefore, for Jean, the problem – as for exploitation – does not lie in the profit-seeking concept, but in the use of the profit. Therefore, DP’s promotion of social enterprises looks into the support and professionalisation of social-economy activities.

4.2.2. pcH: understand the mission

Betsy Wall, from productive cooperatives Haiti (pcH), affirms first that “agriculture cooperatives in Haiti are not well-supported,” because donors have “no interest in the cooperative movement” and Haiti’s “agriculture production is never a priority.” They also share the feeling that most donors actually don’t care about their work but mostly operate under political rationing. Since

[...] disaster, disease and poverty are all about getting money. Investment in the ability of people to provide for themselves is never a priority.

Too many people make money on Haiti’s poverty, to export subsidised-products into this country, or by addressing the poor’s’ neediness as it is a commodity for the NGOs.

As an organisation like pcH, that is the purest form saying that we truly believe in the ability of people to provide for themselves does not make you popular.

Wall observes that donors often seek through its local partners the realisation of their objectives, without listening to what Haitian organisations’ opinion. Since most NGOs and that aid industry that came to Haiti “needy for money”, they often match with donors own interest, with no real interest in the development of the country.

Wall affirms that in the last 35 years of pcH operation in Haiti, in only few exceptional cases donors tried to understand and identify pcH’s mission before pouring money in. Donors with little knowledge

of the rural Haiti often insisted in their methods and results surpassing the local partners. For Wall, most resulted in aid failures and irreparable disasters to the local population. After several regrettable experience – mostly involving ignorant donors, pcH became very cautious in choosing donors, since it does not follow donors' agenda.

Additionally, most donors reached pcH because its activities contain keywords they were looking for – says Wall – such as “local participation”, “participatory approach or process”, and very often “sustainable economic development.” Whilst “they have no idea what they are talking about” and know nothing on the organisation's own values and missions. Wall cited an example with ADRA, Adventist Development and Relief Agency Canada, who looked after “local participation.” which insisted in implementing its own approach in the project, ignoring peasants and pcH's tested method in training, farming – even trying to introduce seeds that were not previously tested in the locality.

In another episode, a pcH budget report was praised by the donor, however questioned on the lack of international consult's name in the report, without believing that the consults are Haitians educated in Haiti – as it is in the case of pcH.

Therefore, even among the supporters, the identification with the the cooperative movement mission and values, while basing the project on local needs without imposing interference are deemed as necessary by pcH. On this regard, pcH highlighted, from the past partners donors, Oxfam Quebec, John Deere Foundation, and Hope International as exceptional “lucid donors” that understood well pcH's work.

4.3. If you have to do something... without the State

According to Develtere and Fonteneau (2004), social and solidarity economy is intrinsic to the Haitian sociopolitical world – a world that lacks State regulation or enforcement on what should be the SSE.

Develtere and Fonteneau (2004) became very critical on the association of SSE and international cooperation in a stateless environment:

Parmi les effets multiples de cette absence d'un alter ego politique, l'hybridation de l'économie sociale avec la coopération internationale semble la plus dévastatrice. Sur la scène haïtienne, de nombreuses initiatives d'économie sociale manquent d'éthique sociale et deviennent des regroupements à but privé et politique. En l'absence de ressources et de politique d'État, les acteurs de l'économie sociale locale cherchent des alliances avec des bailleurs de fonds étrangers pour un appui financier. (idem, p.13)

In this regard, they warn us against the national economy being seized by donors' policies. Although with the stated independence and self-sustainability, Haiti's SSE are still very dependent "en fonction des logiques et priorités de la coopération internationale, puisque celle-ci est la seule interlocutrice active de ce type d'initiatives."

Swiss cooperation's director Stefano Berti, in interview with us, also observes that because of the absence of the State, many international actors and donors go to the community level, following the logic "Il faut faire le développement où il n'y a pas d'état." However he notes the high dependency of local SSE actors on international aid. Even the most active peasant movements, such as MPP, "il est c'est qu'il est grâce à l'aide". In this way, Berti sees as of same importance the strengthening of state capacity and structure at same time of grassroots development. Therefore, in accordance with Develtere and Fonteneau, Berti doubts the "nativeness" of the SSE movements – because there were mostly created and now sustained by the international cooperation. In areas where the public power is absent, local grouping became the substitute of public governance – supported by the foreign aid.

Into the same direction, prof. Frantz Piard commented that SSE is just a palliative in the urgency – unfortunately almost a permanent condition in Haiti. In this context, "l'urgence est devenu tellement prioritaire" that people ignore or postpone the in-depth answer. State's spending is also directed toward emergency and humanitarian needs, purchasing foreign rice and distributing in the country, but not investing in infrastructure such as public schools and hospitals. In this constant sacrifice of

rural areas and agriculture productions, SSE movement and practices are therefore justified and thriving on the absence of a State development strategy.

In contrast to SSE advocacies that see the practice as an alternative development model, Piard comments that SSE is often limited in the short-term, to the informality and daily subsistence – as the *caisses populaires* or microfinance. The solidarity-practices is, therefore, the “face cachée de la pauvreté et de la misère” and does not address the structural problem of Haiti. The international cooperation for development in Haiti became a systematic support structure and invaded in the country’s development.

Nonetheless, it is also a consensus among interviewees, both practioners and scholars, that Haitian State is controlled by a oligarchic elite since the independence, no real political movement has been seen and the democratic participation that could change the country is still remote.

Conclusion

While aimed at answering “why international cooperation support SSE in Haiti” – sounding like a decision-making research question, we fell gladly into a much more complex situation. History, society, culture, economics and politics are mixed together in this interdisciplinary masters thesis.

In this study, we explored first, in Chapter I, the literature that explore the concept of SSE and the context of a state with limited capacity. Then, in Chapter II, we looked into the very complex political history of Haiti and the frequent occurrence of instabilities, crises and natural disasters that have left the State with limited capacity. Into this context, the international cooperation and the country’s development paths are inserted. While international actors, especially those following the 2010 earthquake, are vital suppliers of social services in Haiti, their images are seriously hampered by recurrent controversies and scandals and the perception that they are concomitant with foreign political intervention.

Under this scenario, we noted, in Chapter III, that practices and movements that could be considered as Social and Solidarity Economy have been in place in Haiti prior to the entrance of the post-2010 international aid or the recent popularisation of the concept. The Haitian SSE practices are better known in the field of popular finance – extendable to microfinance – and in rural cooperatives. While there is a loose network between these actors to some extent, they often differ in term of objectives and advocacies to be considered as a single SSE movement: some are ideology-oriented, some are just business models, and some are not even aware of the concept and its networking.

Therefore, contrary to our previous assumptions, SSE is more an endogenous response to Haiti’s own socio-political dynamics. Despite the fact that most SSE projects received some kind of international support, we learned in Chapter IV that it is not a priority or a portfolio for most of the international

donors. With very few exceptions, international cooperation in Haiti do not have a focus on “SSE”, excluding microfinance and social enterprises. Most financial assistance toward SSE projects are unintentional, without envisioning a specific intervention on the SSE advocacies; while explaining the explicit support toward SSE, the “lack of State” is the most cited reason. Non-state actors including faith-based organisations of Christian/Catholic origins, cooperative movement network, international social movements, and critical scholarship are the most active supporters of SSE in Haiti.

Bearing in mind the diversity of objectives from both Haitian and international actors, we observed different conceptions and expectations of SSE. On one hand, SSE is praised for its social, economic, and political potential, such as women empowerment, environmental and financial sustainability, crisis-resistance, and local economic development, promising an alternative development for Haiti and elsewhere. On the other hand, it is viewed as a palliative or intermediary stage of development, anterior or in the lack of better development properly speaking. Meanwhile, the need for development because of the “lack” of the State seems to be shared between the actors, resorting to self-help organisations, relying on community’s own capacities in production and provision of social and financial services in a post-crisis scenario.

While unveiling an unexplored issue, this study faced several limitations: first, the method is based solely on existing literature and narratives of actors instead of being an investigative study on the potential and limits of the SSE organisations and projects in Haiti. Second, it does not measure the contribution of SSE in quantitative language in terms of its advocated potentials (e.g. economic recovery, employment rate, and social or environmental impact). Third, our research is an exploratory effort into very complex domains – on the evolution of a specific type of self-provided development policy in Haiti’s historical conjectures and societal dynamics, and on the choice and support of this model in the international cooperation. Fourth, we worked within time and capacity constraints to better map, describe and follow-up the SSE initiatives, actors, and narratives and its international supporters.

Considering the advocated potentials of SSE and its peculiarities in term of organisation and operation, the case of Haiti reveals a previously overlooked aspect of SSE: its potential in a post-crisis scenario toward socio-economic recovery. Yet its benefits in other post-crisis or post-conflict cases remain to be explored, as well as its long-term promise in favor of social/environmental sustainable development. A series of new questions arise: for example, could SSE be promoted in favor of a genuine sustainable development without risking it becoming just a new buzzword? Should SSE and its international support circumvent/substitute the role of the State? How is SSE growing internationally? Could SSE effectively bridge the humanitarian and development gap?

These doubts also shake our initial objective: to promote SSE as an effective recovery policy in a post-crisis scenario. The case of Haiti showcases much more failures based on good will than success stories.

To answer these and other questions, further research is much needed in three levels: at a micro-level, to study the operation and development of a specific SSE project in a post-humanitarian crisis setting (for example, illustrating this topic with an in-depth research on the cooperative energy company erected by UNEP); at a country-level, to study comparatively another case of a similar setting, revealing SSE potential and limits for post-crisis development; and at an international level, to study the SSE policies and outreach from the side of the international actors and its donors.

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ANNEX I – Interviewees

Name of the interviewee	Organisation	Date	Place
Jean Max St-Fleur	Media specialist; National Expert EPR – UNDP	April 9 th , 2016	Port-au-Prince
Emiel Johannes Bouwens	Chief Operations Officer – FINCA Haïti	April 15- 25 th , 2016	Port-au-Prince
Ernest Mathurin	Director, GRAMIR	April 19 th , 2016	Port-au-Prince
Jollette Joseph	NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM OFFICER – Swiss Embassy/ Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)	April 20 th , 2016	Port-au-Prince
Betsy Wall	Executive Director – FIDA-pcH	April 20 th , 2016	Port-au-Prince
Yves Charles	Coordinateur développement coopérative	April 20 th , 2016	Port-au-Prince
Legrand Charles	Coordinateur programme agricole	April 20 th , 2016	Port-au-Prince
Franz Piard	Professor – École Normale Supérieure de Port-au-Prince; Chargé de coopération universitaire – Ambassade de la France en Haïti	April 22 nd , 2016	Port-au-Prince
Dieudonné Eugène	Responsable du Bureau de Service et de Renforcement - KNFP	April 21 st , 2016	Port-au-Prince
Diego Vela Grau	Director Ejecutivo – América Solidaria	April 21 st , 2016	Port-au-Prince
Fernanda Soto Mastrantonio	Fotógrafa; KO.LO.M.M, “koopertiv lojman man and man”, (Cooperativa de Vivienda Mano con Mano)	April 21 st , 2016	Port-au-Prince
Yolène Jacquet	Directrice exécutive – ANACAPH	April 22 nd , 2016	Port-au-Prince
Ricot Jean-Pierre	Directeur de programme – PAPDA	April 22 nd , 2016	Port-au-Prince
Adrienne Stork	Environment Project Manager – UNEP	April 23 rd , 2016	Port-au-Prince
Jean-Claude Jean	Directeur – Développement et Paix en Haïti	April 25 th , 2016	Port-au-Prince
Stefano Berti	Premier collaborateur/Directeur résident suppléant – Bureau de la Coopération Suisse	April 25 th , 2016	Port-au-Prince

ANNEX II – Haiti Aid Map in 2011.



Figure 1. Haiti Aid Map, an interactive visual mapping platform, depicting individual aid projects being conducted in Haiti.

Status: January 2011. (Source: New Security Beat, 2011, January 24)

ANNEX III – Haiti Aid Map in 2016.




Figure 2. Haiti Aid Map. Status: June 2016. (Source: NGO Aid Map, 2016, June 15)

ANNEX III – Distribution of MFIs in Haiti in 2008

(Cooperative and Non-Cooperative MFIs)





Figure 3. Distribution of Microfinance Institutions in Haiti. (Source: USAID MSME (Micro Small Medium Enterprises) Haiti Program, July 2008.

ANNEX IV – Financial Cooperative Locations in Haiti in 2008

Financial Cooperative Locations in Haiti



Note: Data were not available for the location of each cooperative in Haiti. Thus, only 187 cooperative locations are shown despite the country having 220 cooperatives.

Source: USAID MSME (Micro Small Medium Enterprises) Haiti Program, July 2008.

Figure 4. Financial Cooperative Locations in Haiti. (Source: Whiteside and Wardle, 2009, p. 14)

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