



Security Council

Distr.: General
10 September 2026
English
Original: French

Letter dated 10 September 2026 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to Security Council resolution [2793 \(2025\)](#), I have the honour to transmit herewith the letter dated 31 August 2026 from the Special Representative for the Gang Suppression Force, Jack Christofides, conveying to the Council the Force's first annual progress report (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) António **Guterres**



Annex

[Original: English]

Pursuant to Security Council resolution [2793 \(2025\)](#), in which the Council requested that I keep it informed of developments relating to the security and stabilization situation in Haiti, I have the honour to transmit the first progress report of the Gang Suppression Force, covering the period from the establishment of the Force until 31 August 2026 (see enclosure).*

Since its authorization, the Force has progressed from the force-generation and initial deployment phase to the conduct of sustained operational activities. As at 31 August, 1,166 uniformed personnel from six troop-contributing countries had been deployed, representing 73% of the Force's initial operational capability. Four bases had been established, including in Gonaïves, marking the Force's first deployment outside Port-au-Prince.

The Force is conducting intelligence-led patrols and joint operations with the Haitian National Police and has concluded key institutional agreements with the Government of Haiti, including the status agreement signed on 27 July and the detainee handover agreement. While continuing to expand its operational presence, the Force remains focused on completing force generation and further strengthening its human rights, protection and prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse frameworks, as detailed in the report.

I would be grateful if you would arrange for the present letter and the report to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jack **Christofides**
Special Representative

* The enclosure is being issued without formal editing.

Enclosure

GANG SUPPRESSION FORCE IN HAITI
ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT

Submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution [2793 \(2025\)](#)

Reporting period
1 April through 31 August 2026

Executive Summary

Since the adoption of Security Council resolution [2793 \(2025\)](#), the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) has focused on force generation, initial deployments, operational start-up, and the establishment of its legal, administrative and accountability frameworks. This report covers GSF activities from 1 April to 31 August 2026.

During the reporting period, the GSF continued to implement its operating model through intelligence-led operations, the establishment of forward operating bases (FOBs), including outside Port-au-Prince, and coordination with the Haitian National Police (HNP) and other Haitian authorities. These efforts contributed to localized security gains in some areas, including temporary reductions in gang activity and improved conditions for civilian movement. However, the sustainability and scalability of these gains remain constrained by persistent operational challenges, including limitations in force generation, mobility, intelligence, logistics, and other enabling capabilities. Addressing these constraints will be critical to maintaining operational momentum and achieving broader and more durable security effects. On 29 June 2026, the GSF submitted its strategy and metrics, providing the Security Council with benchmarks to assess progress, identify gaps, and strengthen accountability.

Despite these achievements, mandate implementation continues to be constrained by insufficient uniformed personnel and outstanding institutional arrangements, including agreements on privileges and immunities and provisions for death and disability benefits for deployed personnel.

The GSF has also strengthened partnerships with the HNP, United Nations entities, civil society organizations, humanitarian actors, and the diplomatic community.

Looking ahead, the GSF will focus on transitioning from initial operations to the sustained expansion of its operating model. Priority efforts will include completing force generation, consolidating and extending forward operating bases, expanding joint operations with the HNP and coordination with the Haitian Armed Forces, protecting critical infrastructure, and addressing remaining capability and sustainment gaps.

I. Security Environment

1. Haiti's gangs control or exert significant influence over the country's main roads into and out of Port-au-Prince, using illegal checkpoints, extortion, and other coercive practices to generate revenue. This includes National Roads 3 and 8 towards the principal border crossings with the Dominican Republic at Belladère and Malpasse, National Road 1 to the north, and National Road 2 to the south. In the capital, gangs also influence access to critical economic infrastructure, including the main container port, fuel terminal, and bulk goods port, often imposing transit fees on transport operators. Kidnapping, racketeering and trafficking remain major sources of income.
2. The security crisis is concentrated in the Ouest, Artibonite, and Centre Departments. The Ouest Department, particularly the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, remains the epicenter of gang activity. The Artibonite Department continues to be the main contested rural area, while growing gang activity in the Centre Department has increasingly affected local communities and transport routes to the Dominican Republic.
3. Gang territorial control is well established, although uneven across different areas. Control of major trade, distribution, and transport routes continues to provide gangs with significant financial resources and access to weapons and ammunition. In the north and east of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, the Canaan and 400 Mawozo gangs maintained influence over key road networks. In the south, an alliance of gangs centred around 5 Second dominated access routes to the southern departments. In Artibonite, Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras remained the principal gangs, retaining the ability to disrupt freedom of movement and state authority across a wide area.
4. The reporting period saw indications of reduced visibility and influence among some prominent gang leaders. The operational profile and public prominence of Jimmy Chérizier ("Barbecue"), associated with the Delmas 6 gang and the G9 and Viv Ansanm gang coalitions, appeared to decline. Similar trends were observed regarding Vitelhomme Innocent of the Kraze Baryè gang in the Tabarre neighborhood of Port-au-Prince. These developments coincided with the establishment of a GSF presence in Tabarre and Bas Delmas, although a direct link is difficult to establish.
5. Some gangs continued to demonstrate increasing levels of militarization and tactical adaptation. They constructed fortified positions and physical barriers along strategic routes and adopted their tactics to counter security-force operations, including through the use of improvised incendiary devices against police stations and public institutions, and were accompanied by kidnapping, child recruitment, sexual violence, arson, intimidation of communities, destruction of residential areas, and forced displacement.
6. While security operations have disrupted gang activities and inflicted losses, gangs retain the ability to recruit, adapt, and re-establish positions in contested areas. Sustained operations by the HNP and other security forces weakened gang presence in areas such as Kenscoff, Village de Dieu, Gressier, and Artibonite. However, these gains have not fundamentally changed the broader pattern of territorial control, and gangs have continued to demonstrate the capacity to retaliate against communities following security operations.
7. The persistent threat of retaliation was starkly illustrated by a coordinated attack in Kenscoff and surrounding localities on 23 and 24 August 2026. Members of the 5 Second gang and the broader Viv Ansanm coalition targeted displaced civilians sheltering in a local church, executing residents, burning down over 25 homes, a church, and a public school, and displacing populations toward Pétion-Ville. The

United Nations estimates at least 47 people were killed, including five children, 22 injured, and more than 50 abducted. During the response, HNP units halted the gang's advance using explosive drones, loitering munitions, leaving at least two officers wounded. In response, gang leadership released video threats to execute the hostages if security forces continue using explosive drones or launch further counteroperations. This assault highlights the expansion of gang operations into previously quieter agricultural areas as groups adopt to security pressures elsewhere in the capital.

II. GSF operational activities

8. The GSF is authorized to deploy up to 5,500 uniformed personnel and 50 civilians, with an initial operational capability requirement of 1,500 uniformed personnel. The Special Representative arrived in Port-au-Prince on 1 April 2026, and the Force Commander and the first elements of the GSF Force Headquarters arrived on 15 May. The first contingent from Chad arrived on 1 April.

9. As of 31 August 2026, 1,213 uniformed personnel were deployed, representing 22 per cent of the uniformed personnel ceiling and 78.5 per cent of initial operational capability. This includes 36 female uniformed personnel, a proportion of 2.9 per cent. Six countries have uniformed personnel in theatre, contributing infantry, engineering, aviation, military police, training, force protection and headquarters elements. Twenty-nine civilians have been recruited with 22 having deployed, of which 45 per cent are female staff.

Force composition by contributing country as of 31 August 2026

Contributing country	Capability	Strength
Chad	Infantry battalion	397
Sri Lanka	Main body	349
Guatemala	Military police company	150
El Salvador	Aviation unit (4 medium utility helicopters)	125
Mongolia	Force Commander, Headquarters staff, and base defence company	172
Jamaica	DFC, Headquarters staff, and military training team	20
Total	Six contributing countries	1,213

10. Additional deployments are planned for the fourth quarter of 2026, including formed police units, special weapons and tactics and enabling elements, and further force headquarters personnel. In accordance with the deployment plan, over 5,000 uniformed personnel should be in the country by mid-January 2027.

11. The GSF has established four bases, three in Port-au-Prince, including one adjacent to the Toussaint Louverture International Airport, and one in Gonaïves in the Artibonite Department. The deployment to Gonaïves was the first outside the capital and a test of the GSF's and the United Nations Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH)'s logistical capabilities. The FOB in the Bas Delmas neighborhood of Port-au-Prince allowed the GSF to maintain a continuous presence in a key area of the city.

12. The GSF air component maintains four medium utility helicopters with military crews, operating from Toussaint Louverture International Airport. GSF air assets face regular threats from small arms fire. During the reporting period, GSF helicopters came under attack on four occasions, resulting in two bullet impacts.

13. Medical support for GSF personnel includes one Level 2 hospital and three Level 1 facilities, with referral arrangements to specialist hospitals in the Dominican Republic. The GSF has ground and air (civilian and military) casualty evacuation assets as well as casualty evacuation is coordinated with UNSOH through by military air is executed under an agreed clinical timeline with the evacuation coordination cell embedded in the joint operations center, an arrangement first exercised during the Gonaïves deployment. Preventive measures have included cholera vaccination and health surveillance, and no significant disease outbreak affected operational readiness.

Security Operations

14. The GSF conducted independent and joint operations with Haitian security institutions, including 441 patrols (398 independent and 52 joint), six cordon and search operations, three clearing operations, and 18 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance missions. It removed 40 barricades, and dismantled two illegal checkpoints, denying gangs road control and the illicit taxation opportunities, seizing nine weapons and hundreds of incendiary materials. During the reporting period, 16 suspected gang members were detained and three were neutralized. Of those detained, 13 were subsequently released. GSF patrols, static positions and operations also served to protect critical infrastructure and key roads. In addition, the GSF maintained daily perimeter and site security along the airport corridor.

15. Seventeen air reconnaissance missions were flown to conduct route and area assessments across the overall area of responsibility, while six joint reconnaissance missions with UNSOH supported planned expansion of the GSF.

16. GSF unmanned aerial systems provided intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in direct support of operations, which improved objective identification, enhanced the security of assaulting elements, and better equipped operations to achieve their intended effect.

17. Joint planning, combined patrolling, and shared operational reporting improved interoperability with the HNP and Armed Forces of Haiti, and reinforced Haitian ownership of the security effort. In areas where the GSF established a sustained presence, including in Tabarre and Bas Delmas, there were indications of increased commercial activity and a gradual return of some residents. These localized developments nevertheless remain dependent on the continued provision of security and basic services by the Haitian government.

Assessed effect in Tabarre and Delmas

18. Qualitative indicators from operational reporting and post-operational assessments, including observations of residents and small businesses returning to previously affected areas, suggest an improvement in the security situation. The GSF has assessed a reduction in gang activity and territorial control across the two municipalities where it has maintained a continuous presence. However, it is not yet able to quantify these changes, as it is still refining its assessment methodology and developing the metrics required to produce reliable and evidence-based analyses.

19. In Tabarre, continuous patrolling dismantled gang positions, cleared barricades, and yielded weapons and incendiary materials. Consequently, residual gang elements now operate in smaller groups and avoid direct confrontation with the GSF. Their capacity to control roads and levy illegal taxation has been substantially reduced, while civilian freedom of movement has increased and some small businesses have reopened at previously abandoned intersections. In Delmas, regular patrols from the GSF FOB have reduced gang influence along major roads and resulted in the seizure

of more incendiary materials. This assessment is corroborated by two independent streams of evidence: the return of residents and an increase in commercial activity, indicating that the population assesses the risk of return to be acceptable. There has also been a marked decline in the reported activity and public profile of gang leadership in both municipalities. Information gathered from community engagement, humanitarian coordination and interaction with local stakeholders indicated improved civilian movement and confidence in areas where the GSF established a sustained presence, while access remained highly constrained in areas affected by continuing gang activity.

20. This progress, notwithstanding several sectors of these areas, remains contested and gangs continue to exploit gaps during periods of reduced patrol and at night. Several humanitarian organizations suspended operations across five neighborhoods following the Cité Soleil crisis, more than 18,000 people were newly displaced, and informal encampments consolidated along the airport road, placing a growing displaced population astride a critical movement corridor.

21. Conditions for humanitarian access remained closely linked to local security environments. The expanding GSF presence therefore improved the security environment in some areas but did not by itself resolve the *wider structural* constraints on humanitarian access.

III. Partnerships and Community Engagement

22. Cooperation with the Government of Haiti remains essential to implementation of the GSF mandate. Cooperation with the HNP has intensified during the reporting period through weekly senior-level meetings, combined planning, joint patrolling, and operational information-sharing. The GSF also continued engagement with the Haitian Armed Forces, with whom it shares a base in Port-au-Prince, as well as key government institutions, including the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Office of the Prime Minister.

23. The GSF maintained regular engagement with humanitarian partners, including the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Médecins Sans Frontières, other United Nations entities and other humanitarian actors. These engagements focused on security developments, operational constraints and humanitarian priorities. As the GSF expanded its operational footprint, civil-military coordination became the primary mechanism for dialogue with the humanitarian community. This engagement informed the development of guidance on humanitarian notification, information-sharing and operational coordination, helping to balance security requirements with humanitarian principles. Civil environment assessments, supported by ongoing monitoring of open sources and local media, further informed operational planning and humanitarian coordination.

24. Coordination efforts also increasingly encompassed strategic communications and community engagement. The Haiti Communications Group, as a sub-group of the Standing Group of Partners, served as a regular platform for aligning communication priorities among contributing partners. The GSF also worked with partners and specialized organizations to better understand community perceptions and public sentiment, informing its community engagement and strategic communications activities. These mechanisms helped promote consistent messaging while respecting the distinct mandates and responsibilities of the GSF, the United Nations and Haitian authorities.

25. Engagement with local authorities, community representatives, and other key stakeholders across seven municipalities provided the GSF with valuable insights into local security conditions, humanitarian needs, access challenges, and public perceptions. Consultations with mayors and other authorities in gang-affected areas, including those convened by the Ministry of the Interior, strengthened understanding of local priorities and concerns, informing environment assessments and operational planning. These engagements established direct channels of communication between the GSF, local authorities and humanitarian actors, helping to reduce misunderstanding and support a more coordinated approach among security, humanitarian and community actors.

26. The GSF also extended its engagement with other Government institutions, including the National Commission for Disarmament, Dismantlement and Reintegration (CNDDR), as well as development partners and civil society organizations. These engagements supported dialogue on stabilization, DDR and community violence reduction, and on the restoration of State presence, services and conditions necessary to sustain security gains.

27. The GSF does not seek to replace the roles of humanitarian organizations, development partners, or Haitian state institutions. However, the sustainability of security gains depends on the ability of Haitian institutions and civilian partners to rapidly restore basic services, support the return of displaced populations, and reestablish state presence in areas where security conditions have improved, thus affording space and time to address the underlying conditions that empower armed gangs.

IV. Institutional developments

28. Since 1 April 2026, the GSF has established key institutional and administrative frameworks to support mandate implementation and operational effectiveness. During the reporting period, it issued its Concept of Operations, Operations Order, Rules of Engagement, Directive on Detention, Searches and Use of Force, Command and Control Policy, and Directive on Disciplinary Matters.

29. The GSF also concluded several key agreements with the Government of Haiti. These included the Status Agreement of 27 July 2026, which defines the GSF's legal status, privileges and immunities in Haiti, and the Detainee Handover Agreement, which sets out procedures for the transfer, treatment and monitoring of individuals apprehended by the GSF. In addition, arrangements governing the privileges and immunities of the Office of the Special Representative were agreed between the Standing Group of Partners and the Organization of American States (OAS). The OAS also administers a Global Affairs Canada-funded project in support of the Office of the Special Representative.

30. The GSF continued to strengthen the institutional and administrative foundations necessary to support its operations. While several participating States concluded Status Protection Agreements with the Government of Haiti and Memoranda of Understanding with Government of the Dominican Republic on medical evacuation arrangements, others remain outstanding. The GSF also finalized casualty evacuation procedures with UNSOH.

31. Civilian protection remains as integral component of GSF operations. Operational planning incorporates assessment of civilian presence, critical infrastructure, patterns of life, and humanitarian considerations through community engagement and, where available, the use of unarmed aerial surveillance and

helicopters. Protection considerations are embedded throughout all operational planning and training.

32. The GSF and UNSOH strengthened cooperation on human rights compliance. They established a dialogue forum, a dedicated working group, and a risk mitigation framework to support implementation of the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy. Human rights considerations were further integrated into the GSF training through United Nations-supported pre-deployment, mission induction and validation programmes.

33. Consultations with United Nations entities, civil society organizations and other stakeholders continued to inform the development of a Human Rights Compliance and Oversight Mechanism, aimed at providing a robust framework for monitoring and ensuring GSF compliance with international human rights standards. In addition, the Senior Leadership Coordination Forum was established to bring together United Nations and GSF leaders on a regular basis to align priorities, deconflict activities, and strengthen information-sharing.

34. The GSF established the foundations of a mission-wide framework for the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA) through policy development, training, operational planning, and partnerships. The Force Commander approved a PSEA Directive setting out standards of conduct, prevention measures, and reporting responsibilities. PSEA was incorporated into pre-deployment, induction, and validation training. An initial joint civilian-military PSEA risk assessment was conducted for the first FOB, creating a model for future deployments. Cooperation with the Office of the Special Coordinator on Improving the United Nations Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse was formalized through terms of reference for technical support to develop the mission-wide framework. Engagement with Haitian women's organizations and United Nations entities also strengthened survivor-centred approaches, confidential reporting and referral arrangements.

35. The GSF continued to engage with Haitian authorities on post-handover monitoring arrangements to promote the humane treatment of detainees and mitigate risks of ill-treatment. The Detainee Handover Agreement requires all individuals transferred by the GSF to be treated in full accordance with applicable international human rights standards, to ensure humane treatment of detainees and address risks of ill treatment. The Handover Agreement includes specific obligations on the Government to treat all detainees handed over by the GSF in full compliance with applicable international human rights standards.

V. Resource and Financial Overview

36. The GSF is supported through United Nations assessed contributions via UNSOH and a trust fund established by the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution [2699 \(2023\)](#) administered by the United Nations Department of Operational Support. As of 31 July 2026, the trust fund had received pledges of USD 223.9 million from 15 Member States; USD 184.2 million has been received in cash of which USD 70.4 million has been disbursed.

37. The trust fund finances personnel reimbursements, the acquisition of equipment for contingents, supports requirements provided by offices and departments of the United Nations Secretariat to ensure the provision of logistical or other support, training and technical assistance. UNSOH's support to the GSF is detailed in operative paragraph 10 (a) to (d) of Security Council resolution [2793 \(2025\)](#).

VI. Observations

38. The pace of deployment remains the most significant constraint on GSF effectiveness. With fewer than 1,500 uniformed personnel deployed, the GSF lacks the capacity to maintain a persistent presence across key areas or consistently deny gangs freedom of movement. This limits its ability to consolidate gains following operations. Shortfalls in combat engineering, protected mobility, and aerial surveillance capabilities further limits its ability to dismantle fortified gang positions, gather intelligence, protect personnel, and mitigate harm to civilians.

39. The GSF's experience to date has demonstrated that persistent, intelligence-led operations conducted in coordination with Haitian security institutions are more likely to produce sustained security effects than episodic operations alone. Intensifying cooperation between the GSF, HNP and the Haitian Armed Forces is intended to address some of these shortcomings. The GSF expresses its appreciation to the leadership of Haitian security institutions for their partnership, which will allow us to fulfill our respective mandates.

40. The establishment of FOBs and persistent security presence has improved the ability to consolidate gains. However, long-term success depends on the timely restoration of state authority, public services, reintegration efforts, and the safe return of displaced civilian populations in secured areas. The impact of the GSF is therefore closely linked to the capacity of Haitian authorities, with the support of relevant international partners, to effectively leverage the security space created by its operations and prevent the reestablishment of gang influence or control.

41. Operational activity alone is not a sufficient measure of success. Progress must be assessed against clear objectives and measurable indicators. As outlined in the GSF strategy and metrics report of 29 June (S/2026/554), the mission's objectives are to: i) eliminate gang control over territory; ii) secure critical infrastructure through GSF-led or joint operations; and iii) strengthen the capacity of Haitian authorities to contain and prevent gang violence as part of broader stabilization efforts.

42. The GSF is working with key partners, including the Haitian Government and United Nations entities, to further refine indicators and our metrics to better measure operational impact and progress toward these objectives.

43. With the first round of elections scheduled for 13 December 2026, the GSF will support the HNP, Haitian Armed Force, and Haitian institution in creating security conditions conducive to holding elections. This support will be guided by consultations with relevant partners, realistic assessments of available capabilities, and the prioritization of mandated tasks.

44. Managing public expectations remains both an operational and strategic challenge. To address this, the GSF is developing a comprehensive information operations framework to communicate its activities and impact effectively, while countering disinformation and other hostile narratives intended to undermine confidence in its mandate and operations.

45. The GSF has identified four immediate operational priorities: completing force generation; consolidating and expanding FOBs to sustain presence in key areas; expanding joint operations with the HNP and strengthening coordination with the Haitian Armed Forces; and enhancing the protection of critical infrastructure.

46. The GSF acknowledges the important support provided by UNSOH and underscores the need to finalize the compact governing service delivery, performance standards, change management, and dispute resolution. The GSF also highlights the importance of establishing adequate arrangements for the safety and security of

deployed personnel, including death and disability benefits for GSF uniformed personnel, noting that the absence of such arrangements has negatively affected personnel morale and the sustainability of contributions.

47. Participating States are encouraged to conclude outstanding Status Protection Agreements with Haiti and medical evacuation arrangements with the Dominican Republic. These agreements, together with other applicable personnel protection measures, are essential to ensure the protection and welfare of deployed personnel.

48. The continued effectiveness and independence of the GSF requires clear legal status, privileges, and immunities for the mission and its personnel, including its uniformed personnel. Building on the Status Agreement concluded with Haiti on 27 July 2026, the GSF encourages the Council to take appropriate action, building on the Status Agreement of 27 July 2026 agreed with the Government of Haiti, to include language in its forthcoming resolution that will achieve that objective, and ensure that all Member States accord to the GSF and its personnel such status, privileges and immunities, as are necessary for the independent and effective exercise of their functions.

49. The GSF expresses its appreciation to its uniformed and civilian personnel, the Standing Group of Partners, and the Security Council for their continued commitment and support in advancing the mission's mandate.
