Gas prices and insecurity worsen food access in Haiti

Key Messages

- **From April to September 2026, most of the country is expected to remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Certain communes in the Port-au-Prince Metropolitan Area (ZMPP), particularly Cité Soleil and Croix-des-Bouquets,** are expected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes, with internally displaced persons (IDPs) especially affected. Pockets of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) are also expected in Artibonite, Centre, and some communes in the Nord-Ouest. These households, highly exposed to one or more forms of violence, deteriorating purchasing power, or rainfall irregularities, will continue to rely on negative coping strategies and face significant food consumption deficits.

- **Rising global oil prices linked to tensions in the Middle East forced the Haitian government to increase domestic fuel prices (29 percent for gasoline and 37 percent for diesel).** The increase has driven up transportation and distribution costs by more than 50 percent on some routes, intensifying pressure on already high food prices, even though overall inflation declined from 25 percent in December 2025 to 22.1 percent in February 2026, according to the Haitian Institute of Statistics and Informatics (**IHSI**).

- **Insecurity continues to disrupt markets and livelihoods.** The continued control of road corridors by gangs is increasing transaction costs, disrupting trade flows, and limiting households' access — especially displaced and poor urban households — to markets and income-earning opportunities, particularly in the Port-au-Prince Metropolitan Area, Artibonite, and Centre.

- **Agricultural performance is expected to remain below average** due to constrained access to inputs (seeds, labor) and land. Despite a limited seasonal improvement in food availability expected from June onward with the spring harvests, it will likely be insufficient to offset the combined effects of insecurity, rising production costs, and weak incomes, thereby maintaining high levels of food insecurity across the country.

Projected area-level acute food insecurity outcomes, April - May 2026



Projected area-level acute food insecurity outcomes, June - September 2026



IPC 3.1 acute food insecurity classification

Sub-national level data

1: Minimal | 2: Stressed | 3: Crisis | 4: Emergency | 5: Famine

Symbols

! Would likely be at least one phase worse without current or planned humanitarian food assistance

FEWS NET classification is IPC-compatible. IPC-compatible analysis follows key IPC protocols but does not necessarily reflect the consensus of national food security partners. For full disclosure, see endnotes.

Source: FEWS NET

This report provides an update to the February to September 2026 Food Security Outlook and March 2026 Key Message Update. The analysis is based on information available as of April 15, 2026.

FEWS NET is a United States Government-funded activity. The content of this report does not necessarily reflect the view of the United States Government.

FEWS NET Haiti
haiti@fews.net
fews.net/latin-america-and-caribbean/haiti

Current anomalies in food security conditions as of April 2026

Insecurity remains one of the main drivers of food insecurity in Haiti (Figure 1), particularly in the ZMPP, Lower Artibonite, and Centre. Despite ongoing security operations and the deployment of anti-gang forces, gangs continue to maintain and expand their control over strategic routes, especially National Road 1 (RN1), imposing movement restrictions, illegal payments, and heightened risks for transporters.

Recent attacks confirm a worsening of violence, particularly in Centre and Artibonite. Incidents in **Jean-Denis**, **Pont Sondé, and Pont Benoît**, which caused around 70 civilian deaths and dozens of injuries, illustrate an intensification of violence, accompanied by new displacement waves and greater disruption of livelihoods.

The geographic expansion of armed gangs is spreading into new areas, including strategic agricultural zones, with incursions reported in the Sud-Est (Seguin and Marigot). This dynamic reflects a strategy aimed at strengthening control over secondary roads and production basins, further constraining economic and agricultural activities.

Figure 1

Factors limiting food access in Haiti (April 2026)



Source: FEWS NET

The entrenchment of a conflict economy is reinforcing constraints on market access and livelihoods. Gang control over trade routes and production zones continues to be a key driver of acute food insecurity, while the recent increase in fuel prices is expected to further raise transport costs and potentially informal road tolls, worsening market access difficulties and worsening food security conditions.

The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) remains extremely high (more than 1.45 million), with particularly precarious living conditions in displacement sites. Pressure on host households in rural areas is increasing nutritional risks, especially for children. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), a new wave of displacement involving approximately 5,291 people (1,359 households) was recorded in Artibonite following violence at the end of March. Among these households, 81 percent were hosted by families, while 19 percent settled in displacement sites, further straining already limited resources. Around 52 percent of displaced persons are concentrated in Dessalines commune, intensifying pressure on basic services, local markets, and rural food systems.

Market function remains generally active but highly disrupted. Tensions in the Middle East contributed to **rising international oil prices**, leading to **increases in domestic fuel prices on April 2 (37 percent for diesel and 29 percent for gasoline). Trade flows remain irregular due to armed control of key corridors (RN1, RN2, RN3) and high transportation costs for food commodities.** This dynamic has also resulted in a significant increase in public transportation costs. Thus, despite slowing overall inflation (22.1 percent in February 2026), food prices remain far above the five-year average, severely limiting poor households' access to food.

Poor household incomes remain below average, both in nominal terms and due to the high prices of goods and services. In urban areas, informal activities (small trade, daily labor) are heavily affected by insecurity. In rural areas, declining agricultural incomes, combined with high input costs and limited market access, are maintaining strong market dependence in a context of continuously deteriorating purchasing power and annual inflation above 20 percent.

Humanitarian food assistance

The **2026 Humanitarian Response Plan**, targeting around 4.2 million people with a budget of 880 million USD, remains severely underfunded, particularly since the beginning of the year. Assistance continues to be irregular and provided for only short time periods, while the value of transfers or food rations remains below monthly food needs. These factors hinder the ability of humanitarian actors to scale up and regularize assistance, while also limiting the impacts on food consumption gaps due to rising prices.

According to **reports** from **UNICEF** and humanitarian partners, the nutrition response remains constrained, with increasing needs among children under five and insufficient coverage of screening and treatment services. In this context, food and nutrition assistance continues to have only a limited impact in mitigating food security outcomes, particularly in areas most affected by insecurity and internal displacement. Major actors, especially the WFP and its partners, continue to provide assistance through food distributions, hot meals, and cash/voucher transfers. However, interventions remain targeted and sporadic and are still largely insufficient given the millions of people facing acute food insecurity.

Updates to key assumptions about atypical food security conditions through September 2026

Most of the assumptions that underpinned FEWS NET's analysis of the most likely scenario for the **Haiti Food Security Outlook from February to September 2026** remain valid; however, the following updates have been made to incorporate new evidence:

- According to U.S. Geological Survey forecasts, rainfall during the first rainy season (April-June) is expected to be generally near average. However, rainfall is expected to gradually decline, becoming below average toward the end of June. **For the autumn agricultural season, below-average rainfall** combined with above-average temperatures are expected to slow planting, crop growth, and development, resulting in lower yields.
- **Food prices are expected to face upward pressure due to the ongoing energy shock.** Rising international oil prices driven by tensions in the Middle East are expected to increase domestic fuel prices, further raising transportation and distribution costs and, consequently, food prices, despite the slowdown in overall inflation.
- **The relative stability of imported food prices is becoming less likely to persist.** Although supplies of imported staple products (rice, wheat flour, vegetable oil) are expected to remain generally stable, prices are increasingly exposed to external shocks, particularly through transport, insurance, and distribution costs. The transmission of the fuel price shock is expected to keep prices of both imported and locally produced foods above the five-year average, with additional pressure during the lean season.
- **The direct impact of rising fertilizer prices remains limited at the national level but significant for certain agricultural systems.** Fertilizer use in Haiti remains very low (around 3.8 kilograms/hectare) compared with the Latin America and Caribbean average (approximately 100 kilograms/hectare), which limits the direct impact of price increases at the national level. However, these increases are expected to more significantly affect irrigated areas and peri-urban farming systems where input use is higher. In these areas, rising fertilizer costs could reduce input use, increase production costs, and limit yields, contributing to below-average agricultural performance.

Projected acute food insecurity outcomes through September 2026

From April to September 2026, most of the country is expected to remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Certain communes in the ZMPP, particularly Cité Soleil and Croix-des-Bouquets, are expected to be classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). In addition, households living in IDP sites within the ZMPP are also expected to face Emergency outcomes. Outside the ZMPP, pockets of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) are expected in Artibonite, Centre, and some communes in the Nord-Ouest.

During the lean season (April-May), dependence on markets is expected to remain high across the country. Rising international oil prices have increased transportation and distribution costs, sustaining higher food prices and further reducing the purchasing power of poor households. In this context, poor households are expected to continue relying on **negative coping strategies** such as begging, engaging in illegal and/or precarious activities, and selling productive assets, including seed stocks, among others. **Global acute malnutrition** is expected to reach its seasonal peak between April and May at **above-normal levels**, particularly in the ZMPP, Artibonite, and Centre, with a parallel increase in mortality risk. Populations in areas most affected by displacement and insecurity are likely to face the highest risk of malnutrition.

From **June through September 2026**, a **partial seasonal improvement** is expected with the spring harvests, temporarily supporting food availability and agricultural incomes. However, this improvement is **expected to remain limited** due to constraints on access to inputs, insecurity, and rainfall variability. As a result, most areas are expected to remain in **Crisis (IPC Phase 3), while Emergency (IPC Phase 4)** outcomes are expected to persist in the ZMPP and in some areas under strong armed group influence. Food consumption is expected to improve temporarily without allowing for meaningful livelihood recovery, and malnutrition is expected to remain above normal, especially in areas with high concentrations of displaced populations.

ZMPP: Very poor urban households and **IDPs** are expected to continue facing **significant food consumption deficits** due to persistent violence, restricted access to markets and income-generating activities, and rising transport and food costs. Certain communes, particularly **Cité Soleil and Croix-des-Bouquets, are expected to remain in Emergency (IPC Phase 4)**, with increased reliance on negative coping strategies.

Lower Artibonite and Centre corridors: In these areas affected by the spread of insecurity, disruptions to markets, agricultural activities, and trade flows are expected to keep most households in **Crisis (IPC Phase 3)**. **Pockets of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4)** are expected to persist, particularly in isolated areas or those recently affected by displacement, where access to income and markets remains severely restricted.

Grand Sud: Despite relatively lower levels of insecurity, poor households are expected to remain in **Crisis (IPC Phase 3)** due to weak agricultural and non-agricultural incomes and high food prices. The combined effects of elevated transportation costs and below-average agricultural performance are expected to limit significant improvements in food consumption.

Nord-Ouest: In some communes of the Nord-Ouest, households are expected to continue facing structural constraints to food access linked to weak agricultural production, limited income-earning opportunities, and high prices, maintaining **Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, with some pockets of households facing even more difficult living conditions.**

Annex 1: Updates to events that would likely change projected acute food insecurity outcomes

While FEWS NET's projections are considered the "most likely" scenario, there is always a ***degree of uncertainty*** *in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET's scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a* ***credible alternative scenario*** *and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.*

National

Escalation of conflict in the Middle East

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: A worsening of the conflict in the Middle East, in the absence of an agreement between the parties, could lead to a prolonged and more volatile increase in international oil prices. Haiti is highly dependent on fuel imports, and escalating conflict would increase the likelihood of further domestic fuel price hikes beyond the recent adjustments, with cumulative effects on transportation and distribution costs.

This dynamic would exert sustained inflationary pressure on food prices, particularly in areas highly dependent on markets. The continued rise in logistical costs, combined with internal security constraints, would further disrupt trade flows and increasingly limit the regular supply of markets.

In addition, the prolonged increase in agricultural input costs (fertilizer, transport) could reduce cultivated areas and crop yields, undermining not only the spring agricultural season but also medium-term agricultural prospects. Since the government's capacity to mitigate these shocks through subsidies is limited, a growing share of the costs would transmit to consumers.

Under this scenario, the purchasing power of poor households — particularly urban households, displaced populations, and households in isolated areas — would continue to deteriorate, leading to worsening food consumption deficits. This could result in an increase in the number of households facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes and a geographic expansion of affected areas, particularly in the ZMPP, Artibonite, Centre, and parts of the Grand Sud.

Annex 2: Updates to key sources of evidence used in this analysis

Many of the key sources of evidence utilized for FEWS NET's **February to September 2026 Food Security Outlook** remain the same; however, new and additional sources of evidence are listed below.

Evidence	Source	Data format	Food security element of analysis
Climate condition models	**NOAA**	Qualitative and quantitative	ENSO probabilities, rainfall, and sea surface temperatures
Monetary policy note, October–December 2025	**BRH**	Qualitative and quantitative	Inflation, exchange rates, money supply, and their impacts on purchasing power and food prices
Haiti — Emergency Tracking 88.2 — Update on displacement related to armed attacks in Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite and Dessalines (March 28 – April 6, 2026)	**IOM**	Qualitative and quantitative	Number of IDPs, causes of displacement, areas of concentration, and impacts on livelihoods and food access
Consumer Price Index (CPI)	**IHSI**	Quantitatives	Information on inflation rates for food and non-food products, including local and imported goods

Annex 3: Seasonal calendar

Recommended citation: FEWS NET. Haiti Food Security Outlook Update April - September 2026: Gas prices and insecurity worsen food access in Haiti, 2026.



Source: FEWS NET

* FEWS NET classification is **IPC**-compatible with limited exceptions. IPC-compatible analysis follows key IPC protocols but does not necessarily reflect the consensus of national food security partners. As of IPC 3.0, the IPC no longer assesses the impact of food assistance on classification and thus no longer maps the (!). However, FEWS NET continues to produce food security maps inclusive of the (!) as well as maps compatible with IPC 3.0/3.1, which include the mapping of food security assistance bags. In rare cases, FEWS NET classification is IPC-aligned but not IPC-compatible. IPC-aligned analysis is evidence-based but some types of evidence required for IPC-compatibility were not available.

Food Security Outlook Update

This Food Security Outlook Update provides an analysis of current acute food insecurity conditions and any changes to FEWS NET's latest projection of acute food insecurity outcomes in the specified geography over the next six months. Learn more **here**.