


Sociopolitical crisis and insecurity limit food access despite decelerating inflation


Key Messages

- **Between February and September 2026, 3 to 3.5 million people are expected to be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or Emergency (IPC Phase 4),** with the most affected populations concentrated in the Port-au-Prince Metropolitan Area (ZMPP), Artibonite, Centre, and certain communes in the North-West. Persistent insecurity, high seasonal food prices, and prolonged weakness in income continue to limit food access.
- **Although overall inflation has decelerated, declining from 32.2 percent in October 2025 to 25 percent in December,** according to [IHSI](#), food commodity prices remain largely above the five-year average, with differences reaching up to 130 percent depending on markets and products. High transportation costs, linked notably to movement restrictions and illegal payments on strategic routes (RN1, RN2, RN3), continue to sustain these atypically high price levels. Additional pressure on the purchasing power of poor households will be accentuated by the upward trend in prices of local products during the lean season (February-June).
- The territorial control exercised by armed groups in the ZMPP and along the main national corridors **restricts the movement of people and goods, fragments supply chains, increases transaction costs and disrupts livelihoods.** This dynamic maintains significant pressure on income from petty trade, day labor, and agricultural activities, particularly in Artibonite and Centre.
- From February to May 2026, seasonal deterioration is expected to maintain Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes for very poor urban households and internally displaced persons (IDPs) living in sites in the ZMPP, while the majority of rural areas will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). From June to September, spring harvests are expected to lead to a partial seasonal improvement, but below-average agricultural performance in areas affected by insecurity is expected to limit this improvement, maintaining Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in most areas, with pockets persisting in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

Projected area-level acute food insecurity outcomes, February - May 2026



Projected area-level acute food insecurity outcomes, June - September 2026



IPC 3.1 acute food insecurity classification

Sub-national level data

1: Minimal	3: Crisis	5: Famine
2: Stressed	4: Emergency	

Symbols

! Would likely be at least one phase worse without current or planned humanitarian food assistance

FEWS NET classification is IPC-compatible. IPC-compatible analysis follows key IPC protocols but does not necessarily reflect the consensus of national food security partners. For full disclosure, see endnotes.

Source: FEWS NET

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of February 15, 2026.



FEWS NET is a United States Government-funded activity. The content of this report does not necessarily reflect the view of the United States Government.

FEWS NET Haiti

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Food Security Context

Insecurity remains one of the principal determining factors of food insecurity in Haiti. Despite the intensification of law enforcement interventions against armed gangs, violence remains heavily concentrated in the Ouest Department, particularly in the ZMPP, where armed gangs still control nearly 90 percent of the territory. This domination has profoundly disrupted the urban economy, particularly informal sector activities, notably small-scale commerce, street vending, and daily wage labor, which constitute the primary source of income for more than 90 percent of poor urban households. In parallel, the installation of checkpoints on major national routes linking Port-au-Prince to the north, center, and south of the country has resulted in the imposition of illegal payments, disrupting the movement of people and goods, as well as market supply. The mandatory passage fees imposed on users **compromise the supply of markets in the capital and the rest of the country with local and imported goods and petroleum products.**

According to the latest situation report from [International Organization for Migration \(IOM\)](#), **approximately 1.45 million people (12 percent of the population) are displaced**, of which nearly 212,000 live on sites where living conditions, including food, access to livelihoods, water, and health services, are very precarious. Recent flows of displaced persons are also observed, resulting from clashes in Artibonite ([7,000](#) people) in December and in the capital (nearly [6,000](#) people) since January 8. **Approximately 85 percent of displaced persons are hosted by host families, often in rural areas**, which increases pressure on already limited resources and affects the livelihoods of host households. Furthermore, [UNICEF](#) notes an increasing number of children among displaced persons. **The number of displaced children increases from 551,000 in December 2024 to more than 740,000 in December 2025, representing an increase of 36 percent.**

The country has experienced seven consecutive years of economic contraction between 2019 and 2025. The GDP, having already recorded a decrease of [4.2 percent](#) during the 2023/24 fiscal year, is contracting again in 2024/25 by [2.7 percent](#), given the current context of sociopolitical and security crisis, as well as the slowdown in various activity sectors. Despite a slowdown in the pace of inflation observed since October 2025, the general price level remains high, with annual food inflation exceeding 26 percent in December 2025. Moreover, although prices of imported products have been relatively stable for three years, they continue to remain above the five-year average, which keeps household purchasing power under pressure and limits households' access to markets, the main source of food supply.

Agriculture, although secondary to imports, remains an essential source of income and food for rural households. **National agricultural production is also affected by insecurity**, access constraints to inputs, and weak investments. In certain key areas, such as Liancourt, Verrettes, and Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite, gangs control irrigation systems and impose illegal payments for access to water. Spring constitutes the main agricultural season among the three (spring, fall and winter), as it contributes 60 percent to national production. However, **the abandonment of arable land, particularly in the Artibonite, Centre, and Ouest departments**, and below-average rainfall recorded during the first half of 2025, have contributed to **a below-average agricultural production**, a trend observed since 2022/23.

The incomes of poor households are decreasing. The decrease in income from the sale of agricultural products in 2025 is due to limited market access and the high cost of inputs. Agricultural labor is contracting, with demand below average, resulting in wages stagnating at below-average rates. Non-agricultural activities are also declining due to insecurity and weak demand.

In the ZMPP, the typical source of income for the poor, petty trade, is also declining, suffering the full brunt of the consequences of insecurity. **In displacement camps, the income configuration does not differ significantly from that of non-displaced households.** IDPs can only meet their basic food needs with immediate emergency food assistance, and not through livelihood activities.

Learn more

The following links provide additional information:

- Haiti Food Security Outlook Report: [October 2025 – May 2026](#)
- Latest Food Security Outlook Update for Haiti: [December – May 2026](#)
- Haiti Key Messages Update: [January 2026](#)
- Overview of [FEWS NET's scenario development methodology](#)
- FEWS NET's approach to estimating the [population in need](#)
- Overview of the [IPC and IPC-compatible analysis](#)
- FEWS NET's approach to [humanitarian food assistance analysis](#)

Current anomalies in food security conditions as of February 2026

The mandate of the Transitional Presidential Council ended on February 7, 2026, complicating the planning and implementation of economic and humanitarian activities in a context marked by persistent insecurity, displacement, market disruptions, and irregular agroclimatic conditions.

Insecurity remains high in the ZMPP, Bas-Artibonite, and Centre, despite the intensification of law enforcement operations. The majority of violent incidents remain concentrated in the Ouest Department, where **armed groups maintain control over vast portions of the territory.** According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project ([ACLED](#)), **1,750 violent events were recorded in 2025** (or 146 cases per month), of which **more than 72 percent were in Ouest**, compared to **13 percent in Artibonite and nearly 6 percent in Centre.** Despite a relative decrease in incidents in January-February 2026, the main routes connecting the capital to other departments remain under armed influence, **with illegal fees and increased risks for transporters and delays, which persistently disrupt commercial flows and access to livelihoods.**


The situation of the 1.45 million **IDPs (approximately 12 percent of the national population)** remains **concerning.** More than **212,000 are living in precarious conditions**, with limited access to food, water, sanitation, and healthcare. The majority of displaced persons (approximately 85 percent) are hosted by host families, often in rural areas, which is atypical compared to more localized crises, and increases pressure on already limited resources. **In Artibonite and the capital, recent displacements are maintaining elevated needs and increased nutritional risks,** particularly among a growing proportion of displaced children.

The analysis of market and corridor functioning (Figure 1) shows significant access anomalies. Several departmental markets (Hinche, Jérémie, Les Cayes, Fond-des-Nègres, Ouanaminthe and, to a certain extent, Gonaïves) remain operational, but their supply depends on heavily disrupted flows. **The prolonged closure of the Croix-des-Bossales market has shifted trade toward Pétiön-Ville and Delmas.** Armed control of key national roads (RN1, RN2) **increases transportation costs and the volatility of supply.** Secondary and cross-border corridors (Cap-Haïtien–Ouanaminthe, Grand Sud) remain relatively more functional, without compensating for the disruption of the national redistribution system, maintaining upward pressure on prices and food access for poor households.

Between late December 2025 and January 2026, **above-average cumulative rainfall** was observed, with **marked intra-seasonal variability.** These irregular conditions, combined with the residual effects of Hurricane Melissa in October 2025, are contributing to **below-average fall and winter harvests** in several areas.

Figure 1

Market function and route accessibility, February 2026



Source: FEWS NET

Economic anomalies persist, with a seventh year of contraction and a GDP decline of **2.7 percent in 2025**. Although some macroeconomic indicators show relative stabilization (such as a **decrease in inflation between October and January 2026**, exchange rate stability, and the absence of monetary financing in 2025), this reflects a slowdown in deterioration rather than a return to typical conditions. Although overall inflation decelerated, falling from 32.2 percent in October 2025 to 25 percent in December, according to **IHSI**, **food prices remain largely above the five-year average, reaching up to 130 percent above average depending on markets and products**. The increased dependence on diaspora remittances (estimated by the Bank of the Republic of Haiti at **4.4 billion USD for fiscal year 2024/25**) also reveals the weakness of domestic income and the high sensitivity of households to any disruption in external financial flows.

The incomes of poor households continue to decrease. In rural areas, the reduction in agricultural sales and work opportunities, combined with high input costs and difficulties accessing markets, limit agricultural incomes. According to a **REACH** report in 2025, in the ZMPP, incomes are mainly from petty trade (43 percent) and daily labor (22 percent), and are insufficient to cover food expenditures in a context of high prices.

According to the **Nutrition Cluster**, **among 496,546 children under five years of age screened through December 2025, nearly 30 percent suffer from acute malnutrition**. In the Ouest Department, this proportion reaches 44 percent. However, these results must be interpreted with caution: they are based solely on children who were screened and do not include those who were not screened or who did not have access to health services, therefore do not necessarily reflect the situation of the entire population.

Humanitarian food assistance

Between January and November 2025, according to the **Food Security Cluster**, emergency food assistance reached approximately **2 million** people, primarily through **in-kind distributions** and **cash transfers/vouchers**. Assistance remained **irregular** and **short-term**, and the **value of transfers** did not keep pace with the increase in prices, limiting its impact on consumption. Overall, assistance covers less than 25 percent of essential needs.

The nutrition response remains limited: screening and services cover approximately **47.5 percent** of the at-risk population, in a context of insecurity and restricted access. These limitations are aggravated by marked **underfunding**: according to the **UN**, **24 percent** of the humanitarian response plan was funded in 2025; however, as of early February 2026, the appeal was funded at **less than 4 percent**.

Current acute food insecurity outcomes as of February 2026

Food insecurity is widespread, with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels ongoing. IDPs living in sites in the ZMPP remain in **Emergency (IPC Phase 4)**, due to the loss of their livelihoods and lack of income opportunities. **Household coping strategies continue to deteriorate**; households resort to begging, asset sales, and child labor. The communes of **Port-au-Prince, Cité Soleil, Croix-des-Bouquets, Cornillon, and Ganthier, where violence, the decrease in daily income, and high prices severely limit food access, are classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4)**, while the rest of the ZMPP remains in **Crisis (IPC Phase 3)**.

The analysis of the cost of the minimum caloric basket in reference markets between 2020 and 2025 (Figure 2) highlights a major inflationary shock in 2022-2023, followed by partial stabilization in 2024-2025, without a return to pre-crisis levels. It should be noted that the price levels of 2022-2023 were determined by a combination of international shocks and internal instability due to increased insecurity, political uncertainty, and a reduction in domestic production.

In the ZMPP, market functioning remains severely disrupted by insecurity. Markets constitute the primary source of food supply, and more than 80 percent of households purchase their food with cash, a proportion reaching 95 percent in Carrefour and 93 percent in Port-au-Prince. The closure of Croix-des-Bossales and the relocation of wholesalers to Delmas and Pétiön-Ville have altered trade flows.


Prices of basic commodities remain high. In December 2025, the minimum cost of the food basket reached 12,000 to 14,000 HTG in the ZMPP (14,000 to 16,000 at the national level), significantly higher than the five-year average.

The **WFP standard basket** exceeds 25,000 HTG per month for a household of five people. According to the **MSNA 2025**, the median food expenditure of poor households is insufficient, amounting to 10,000 HTG per month, representing only 71 to 83 percent of minimum caloric needs. It is even lower in Croix-des-Bouquets (3,000 HTG) and in Cité Soleil (less than 6,000 HTG), reflecting **significant consumption deficits**.

At the national level, the cost of the food basket increased from approximately 6,610 HTG in 2020 to a peak of more than 16,000 HTG in 2023, representing an increase of more than 140 percent, **before declining in 2025 (down 29 percent compared to 2024)**. Despite this recent decrease, **current levels remain significantly higher than those observed before 2022**. In several key markets, the cost remains above the five-year average, notably Ouanaminthe (32 percent), Jacmel (28 percent), and Port-au-Prince (23 percent). Persistent structural constraints, including logistical disruptions and high transportation costs, are linked to insecurity and heavy dependence on imports. Despite a cyclical improvement in 2025, **the purchasing power of poor households remains severely eroded**, particularly in urban centers where market dependence is highest, which continues to limit economic access to food and sustain Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) food insecurity outcomes.

The majority of the country is in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), having recorded poor autumn and winter harvests leading to income losses for the poor, with pockets of Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in the Northwest, particularly in the communes of Baie-de-Henne, Bombardopolis, La Tortue, Môle-Saint-Nicolas, and Jean-Rabel. Also, in Artibonite and Centre, the expansion of armed groups is disrupting access to markets and strategic routes (RN1, RN3) leading to supply disruptions in Saint-Marc, Gonaïves and Mirebalais, with pockets in La Chapelle, Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite, Liancourt, Mirebalais, Saut-d'Eau and Lascahobas.

Current area-level acute food insecurity outcomes, February 2026



IPC 3.1 acute food insecurity classification

Sub-national level data

1: Minimal	3: Crisis	5: Famine
2: Stressed	4: Emergency	

Symbols

! Would likely be at least one phase worse without current or planned humanitarian food assistance

FEWS NET classification is IPC-compatible. IPC-compatible analysis follows key IPC protocols but does not necessarily reflect the consensus of national food security partners. For full disclosure, see endnotes.

Source: FEWS NET

Off-farm income is declining, pushing households to adopt negative coping strategies, such as selling non-productive or household assets to purchase food, reducing non-food expenditures, selling non-productive animals more than typical due to lack of food or money, and internal migration. At the same time, a significant percentage is engaging in more severe livelihood strategies such as begging, sending children to eat outside the household, and, in urban areas most affected by insecurity and unemployment, involvement in high-risk illicit activities, among others.

According to [UNICEF](#), data indicate that nearly **130,000 children under five suffer from global acute malnutrition (GAM)**. In 2025, **60,202** children suffering from severe acute malnutrition (SAM) were admitted (approximately 47 percent of the target), out of **496,546** children screened, but access and funding limited coverage. Despite treatment outcomes consistent with SPHERE standards, underfunding (approximately 16 percent in 2025), insecurity and displacement, as well as episodes of [cholera](#) reported in IDP sites, continue to increase nutritional risks. FEWS NET estimates that the acute malnutrition situation has likely deteriorated since the last SMART survey in 2023, with some localities potentially experiencing a worsening of approximately one phase. The most concerning areas remain Artibonite, Nord-Ouest, and the ZMPP, where the 2023 survey reported a GAM prevalence of approximately 12 percent.


In the Grand Sud, despite locally near-average harvests, the influx of displaced persons, illegal tolls on National Road 2, and the impacts of flooding resulting from Hurricane Melissa have reduced agricultural income and increased pressure on host households. This is leading to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, with some pockets of households still in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) on the southern coast (Tiburon), in Grand'Anse (Les Irois, Anse D'hainault, Pestel, Corail), in Nippes (Grand Bouquant, Arnaud), and in the South-East (Belle-Anse, Grand Gosier).

Key assumptions about atypical food security conditions underpinning the most likely scenario through September 2026

- **Violence is expected to remain elevated in Port-au-Prince, although slightly lower than the peaks observed in late 2024-early 2025**, as security forces continue to prioritize control of strategic infrastructure. However, it remains unlikely that gangs will be dislodged from the capital. **Their expansion is expected to continue in the Centre, Artibonite, and certain parts of Ouest** (Montrouis, Arcahaie, Kenscoff, Croix-des-Bouquets), maintaining access restrictions around Port-au-Prince, disrupting commercial flows, agricultural activities, and causing additional population displacements.
- **A transition from typical conditions to El Niño is expected, which will result in below-average and irregular rainfall, combined with above-average temperatures** during the rainy season. These agroclimatic conditions are likely to limit agricultural yields, particularly in non-irrigated areas. Moreover, limited access to agricultural inputs and weak investments, exacerbated by insecurity, are also expected to maintain below-average agricultural performance, particularly for spring harvests in July.
- Despite the decrease in precipitation, an **average start to the spring season is expected**, between February and May, in most agroecological zones of the country. In addition, the 2026 hurricane season will begin on June first and is expected to be average, which would compensate for the precipitation deficit, likely to compromise the typical growth of seasonal crops.
- **The exchange rate (HTG/USD) is expected to remain generally stable** during the projection period. It will be supported by the continuation of monetary management measures implemented by the Bank of the Republic of Haiti (BRH), including strict control of foreign currency liquidity and regulation of foreign exchange operations. However, this stability is expected to remain fragile and depend on the maintenance of these measures as well as the absence of major external shocks, such as a significant increase in imports, a decrease in remittances

Figure 2

Trend in the cost of the minimum calorie basket in reference markets, 2020-2025



Source: FEWS NET

from the diaspora, or a worsening of political instability.

- **Food inflation is expected to remain above 20 percent** due to persistently high transportation costs, linked, among other factors, to illegal fees imposed by gangs and logistical disruptions.
- **Prices of imported products (rice, flour, oil) are expected to remain relatively stable** due to favorable conditions on international markets and the stability of the HTG/USD exchange rate. Despite this, gains for households will remain limited by internal costs (transport, margins) and insecurity. Prices of local products (maize, beans, roots, and tubers) are expected to follow an upward seasonal trend and remain above the five-year average, due to the lean season, market access constraints, and below-average production.
- **The functioning of urban and rural markets is expected to remain disrupted, particularly around the ZMPP**, due to movement restrictions, insecurity on national roads, and high transportation costs. The incomes of poor market-dependent households are expected to remain below the five-year average, given the impact of insecurity and the residual effects of previous weather shocks. In rural areas, demand for agricultural labor would remain limited by weak agricultural investments and insecurity. In urban areas, small-scale trade and informal activities will continue to be affected by the contraction of demand and security risks.
- For the period from February to September 2026, **GAM and mortality risk are expected to follow their typical seasonal dynamics, but at levels generally higher than typical due to persistent economic and security constraints.**

Humanitarian food assistance

- From February to September 2026, humanitarian food assistance is expected to reach a limited proportion of households, due to persistent constraints related to funding, targeting, and safe access, particularly in the ZMPP, Artibonite, and certain areas of Centre. This assistance in partial rations will cover on average less than 20 percent of monthly caloric needs, without regularity and effective coverage of distributions, especially for hard-to-reach populations and displacement sites.
- As typically observed, the lean season (February-May) is expected to lead to a moderate seasonal increase in GAM over approximately three to four months, with a peak around April-May, affecting poor households, IDPs, and precarious or isolated urban areas more severely (particularly in the ZMPP, Artibonite, and Centre). Starting in June, spring harvests are expected to induce a gradual improvement over two to three months; however, this seasonal decrease is expected to remain partial and uneven, particularly in areas of persistent insecurity. Mortality is expected to evolve in a similar manner, with increased risk during the lean season followed by relative stabilization after the harvests. However, it will not return to the lowest seasonal levels in areas presenting the highest mortality risk.

Projected acute food insecurity outcomes through September 2026

Between February and September 2026, acute food insecurity is expected to remain **widespread in Haiti**, with approximately **3 to 3.5 million people** in need facing **Crisis (IPC Phase 3)** or **Emergency (IPC Phase 4)** outcomes. The outlook remains dominated by persistent insecurity, low incomes, atypically high food prices, and limited humanitarian assistance.

During this lean season, **the early depletion of stocks from below-average harvests will increase dependence on the market.** Prices of local products are expected to follow their seasonal increase and remain well above the five-year average, while agricultural and non-agricultural incomes are expected to remain below average due to insecurity and low labor demand. Poor rural households are expected to maintain minimal food consumption primarily at the cost of negative coping strategies (asset sales, debt, partial migration). **Market-dependent very poor urban households and IDPs are expected to continue experiencing consumption deficits, with increased reliance on negative coping strategies.**

GAM is expected to increase seasonally between February and May, with a peak likely around April-May, and will most likely fall within a range corresponding to Alert (IPC Phase 2) to Serious (IPC Phase 3) in most of the country. Partial and localized improvement is expected during the harvest period, particularly outside the main conflict hotspots. The peak will more significantly affect IDPs, poor urban households, and isolated areas of Artibonite, Centre, and ZMPP. However, the areas most likely to experience temporary deterioration during the lean season are Artibonite, Nord-Ouest, and Ouest. Mortality risk is expected to evolve in parallel, with moderate deterioration in the most vulnerable areas.

The majority of rural areas is expected to remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), with pockets of households experiencing more severe outcomes in the Northwest, Artibonite, Center, and Belle-Anse. In the ZMPP, IDPs and very poor urban households are expected to remain in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

From June to September 2026, the majority of areas are expected to remain in **Crisis (IPC Phase 3)**, with limited seasonal improvement. In the ZMPP and certain communes under strong armed influence, **Emergency (IPC Phase 4)** outcomes are expected to persist among IDPs and very poor urban households.

Spring harvests are expected to temporarily improve food availability and agricultural income, supporting a seasonal increase in own consumption and agricultural labor opportunities. However, agricultural performance is expected to remain below average in several areas affected by insecurity and rainfall irregularities, while non-agricultural income is expected to remain low.

Food consumption is expected to improve temporarily in rural areas, without allowing for significant asset reconstitution. Food commodity prices are expected to remain above the five-year average, and humanitarian assistance is not expected to reach a significant level as defined by IPC protocols. Malnutrition is expected to experience a gradual seasonal improvement starting in June, without a widespread return to the lowest seasonal levels, particularly in areas with high concentrations of displaced persons and under armed influence.

Annex 1: Key sources of evidence used in this analysis

Evidence	Source	Data format	Food security element of analysis
Livelihood profiles	FEWS NET	Qualitative	Typical sources of food and income by livelihood zone
Monetary policy note, July–September 2025	BRH	Qualitative/ Quantitative	Inflation, exchange rate, money supply, and their impacts on purchasing power and food prices
Food Security Cluster assistance distribution plans, including an analysis of historical trends	FSC	Qualitative/ Quantitative	Geographic and temporal coverage of food assistance, number of beneficiaries, and trends in humanitarian coverage
Haiti — Emergency Tracking 83 — Displacement following armed violence in Port-au-Prince (January 8–9, 2026)	OIM	Qualitative/ Quantitative	Number of IDPs, causes of displacement, areas of concentration, and impacts on livelihoods and access to food
Conflict analyses	ACLED	Qualitative/ Quantitative	Number of violent incidents, affected areas, evolution of conflicts, and their impacts on market access, production, and displacement
Interviews with key informants, including FEWS NET price collectors, community leaders, among others	FEWS NET	Qualitative/ Quantitative	Field information on prices, food availability, coping strategies, local perceptions, and market trends
Food security survey	REACH	Qualitative/ Quantitative	Field information collected by region on food security conditions, consumption, livelihoods, and coping strategies
Consumer Price Index	IHSI	Quantitative	Information on inflation rates for food and non-food products, both local and imported
Humanitarian reports and bulletins	OCHA	Qualitative/ Quantitative	Monitoring of the humanitarian situation, sectoral coverage, funding of assistance, priority intervention areas, and intersectoral coordination
Haitian market monitoring, August 2025	WFP	Qualitative/ Quantitative	Food security analysis report
Analytical report	WFP	Qualitative	Analysis of the impact of violence on food security in the Haitian capital in a context of reduced food assistance


Annex 2: FEWS NET's analytical approach explained

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. [Scenario Development](#) is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers' needs by developing a "most likely" scenario of the future.

FEWS NET's scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household's risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household's vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household's ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET's scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF's Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the [Integrated Food Security Phase Classification](#) (IPC) analytical framework.

- **How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes?** FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase [Integrated Food Security Phase Classification \(IPC\) scale](#) to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, [FEWS NET applies the "!" symbol](#) to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
- **How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario?** A key step in FEWS NET's scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the "most likely" scenario.
- **How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes?** Using the key assumptions that underpin the "most likely" scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households' ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the "!" symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
- **How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance?** Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is "significant" (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET's guidance on [Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development](#).

Annex 3: Seasonal calendar



Annex 4: Events that would likely change projected acute food insecurity outcomes

While FEWS NET's projections are considered the "most likely" scenario, there is always a **degree of uncertainty** in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET's scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a **credible alternative scenario** and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National

Major security deterioration or rapid expansion of territorial control by armed groups

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: The rapid expansion of territorial control by armed groups would lead to increased disruption of national trade flows, prolonged closure of additional markets, and a significant increase in transportation costs. Humanitarian access would be further restricted, limiting the coverage of food and nutrition assistance. In rural areas, land abandonment and reduced area cultivated could compromise the spring and summer agricultural seasons, resulting in food availability deficits in the second half of the year. In urban areas, the contraction of informal income and the increase in prices would exacerbate consumption deficits. In this scenario, the number of people in **Crisis (IPC Phase 3)** and **Emergency (IPC Phase 4)** would increase beyond the 3 to 3.5 million projected, with a risk of geographic expansion of areas in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), particularly in Artibonite, Centre, and certain parts of the Grand South.

Major weather shock affecting the spring 2026 agricultural season

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: A weather shock, particularly during the cyclone season, would significantly reduce agricultural yields in agricultural zones such as the southern and western peninsulas. This would limit seasonal income related to agricultural labor and decrease rural households' consumption of own-produced food stocks. Production losses would lead to a more pronounced seasonal increase in prices of local products (maize, beans, tubers), worsening the current decline in purchasing power. Poor households, already weakened by insecurity and economic contraction, would be forced to intensify negative coping strategies (sale of productive assets, increased debt). In precarious areas of the Northwest, Artibonite, Center and southern peninsula, an increase in pockets of **Emergency (IPC Phase 4)** would be likely.

Annex 5: A closer look at the situation of IDPs in Haiti, and its impacts on food security outcomes

The prolonged security crisis has resulted in **1.45 million internally displaced persons** in 2025, a 39 percent increase compared to 2024, with an exceptional concentration in the **Port-au-Prince Metropolitan Area (ZMPP)**. The main hotspots are located around Port-au-Prince, Delmas, and Cité Soleil, while significant flows are directed toward the Grand South (notably in the South, Southeast, and Grand'Anse departments), Centre, and to a lesser extent, Artibonite (Figure 3). Most importantly, the majority of displaced persons are women and children.

The majority of displaced households have lost their assets and income sources and depend largely on markets and especially humanitarian assistance to meet their basic needs of food, hygiene conditions, health care, and sanitation. In this context, a significant proportion of IDPs face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, with pockets in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

In terms of food availability, the massive displacements are occurring in an environment where markets are functioning in a disrupted manner. In the ZMPP, persistent insecurity on the main road axes limits the fluidity of supply flows and increases transportation costs. Central markets often operate below their typical capacity, which affects the regularity of supply. In Artibonite, instability in certain strategic rice-growing areas has indirect implications on regional supply. In rural host areas, local production remains constrained by insecurity, the high cost of inputs, and increased pressure on agricultural land amid the arrival of new households. Humanitarian assistance contributes to supporting overall availability for displaced households, but it is often insufficient and irregular, limiting stabilizing effects.


Food access constitutes the most immediate constraint for IDPs. Economically, the near-total loss of livelihoods sharply reduces their purchasing capacity as food prices remain above the five-year average. Dependence on urban markets, combined with persistent inflation, erodes purchasing power and accentuates consumption deficits. In host areas, the influx of displaced persons intensifies competition for daily labor and informal activities, further compressing available income. Physical access to markets is also affected by movement restrictions, informal barriers, and insecurity, particularly in certain urban neighborhoods. Displaced households frequently resort to negative coping strategies, such as reducing the size and frequency of meals, selling residual assets, incurring debt, or begging.

IDPs' food consumption is often characterized by low dietary diversity, with increased dependence on staple cereals and pasta, and a reduction in proteins and fresh products. In high-density urban sites, limited access to safe drinking water, sanitation infrastructure, and health services increases health risks in hosting sites. This combination of food deficits and precarious environmental conditions increases nutritional vulnerability, particularly among children under five and pregnant or lactating women. The risks of acute malnutrition are therefore closely linked not only to insufficient consumption, but also to poor hygiene and health conditions.

Finally, persistent insecurity, limited access to basic services, constraints on access to livelihoods, and land tenure precarity contribute to high instability in displacement sites. This situation is confirmed by the **IOM Stability Index (DTM)**, which highlights low levels of stability in many sites, particularly in the West. This instability is accentuated by the mobile nature of displaced households, a significant portion of which make repeated movements between sites, to other regions of the country, and between different host communities, according to security developments and assistance or income-earning opportunities. Consequently, their food security outcomes are often transitory: some households may experience Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes for a few months, then temporarily relocate to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) areas, before finding themselves once again exposed to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) conditions in another area or another site. Although some host areas present relatively more favorable conditions, their absorption

Figure 3

Concentration and movements of IDPs across Haiti, February 2026



Source: FEWS NET

capacities remain limited and could be rapidly saturated in the event of new displacements. In the short and medium term, the prospects for massive returns appear low, which suggests a risk of prolonged, even structural, displacements within a largely transitory displaced population whose food stability remains fragile.

Overall, the situation of IDPs illustrates a simultaneous deterioration of the four pillars of food security. Availability is weakened by market disruptions and production constraints. Economic and physical access is severely restricted by loss of income and insecurity. Consumption is compromised by poor food quality and degraded sanitary conditions. Finally, stability is threatened by the persistence of conflict and the absence of sustainable stabilization prospects. Without significant improvement in security, humanitarian access, and economic opportunities, the risks of maintaining or worsening Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will remain high in both departure zones and host zones.

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* FEWS NET classification is **IPC**-compatible with limited exceptions. IPC-compatible analysis follows key IPC protocols but does not necessarily reflect the consensus of national food security partners. As of IPC 3.0, the IPC no longer assesses the impact of food assistance on classification and thus no longer maps the (!). However, FEWS NET continues to produce food security maps inclusive of the (!) as well as maps compatible with IPC 3.0/3.1, which include the mapping of food security assistance bags. In rare cases, FEWS NET classification is IPC-aligned but not IPC-compatible. IPC-aligned analysis is evidence-based but some types of evidence required for IPC-compatibility were not available.

Food Security Outlook

To project food security outcomes, FEWS NET develops a set of assumptions about likely events, their effects, and the probable responses of various actors. FEWS NET analyzes these assumptions in the context of current conditions and local livelihoods to arrive at a most likely scenario for the coming eight months. Learn more [here](#).