

HAITI RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT

/OCTOBER 2024/

A report prepared by the government of the Republic of Haiti with the support of the European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations, and the World Bank.



This Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment (RCIA) report for Haiti is a collaborative product authored jointly by the government of Haiti and the staff of the European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations, and the World Bank. Acknowledging the institutions' different mandates and areas of expertise, the findings, conclusions, and recommendations expressed in the RCIA do not necessarily constitute the views or formal recommendations of the European Union, United Nations, Inter-American Development Bank, or World Bank on all issues, nor do they reflect the views of the governing bodies of these institutions or their member states.


It is also recognized that because of different mandates, not all of the collaborating institutions will share or engage in all activities set forth or proposed in the report, and it is further understood that each institution will carry out or be engaged with any such activities in accordance with its mandate and operational policies and procedures.

HAITI RAPID CRISIS **IMPACT** ASSESSMENT

/OCTOBER 2024/



Communes Included in the Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment within the Port-au-Prince Metropolitan Area



Acknowledgments

The Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment was carried out jointly by the European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations, and the World Bank, under the leadership and participation of the Government of Haiti.

The contributions provided by senior government officials were essential, among them from the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, the Ministry of Interior and Territorial Communities, the Ministry of Public Health and Population, and the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications, as well as various other government agencies.

The authors appreciate the strong support and contributions of the various national stakeholders that made this effort possible, as well as the leadership and technical contributions of each of the partner institutions.



Table of Contents

iii Acknowledgments

Acronyms and Abbreviations

1 Executive Summary

- 1 Methodology
 - 1 Summary of the Impact Assessment
 - 3 Investment Needs (2024–2026)
 - 3 Crisis Recovery Framework
 - 4 Institutional framework
-

5 I: Introduction

- 6 Background and Rationale
 - 6 Objectives
 - 6 Assessment Methodology
 - 8 Structure of the Report
-


9 II: Context of the Crisis in Haiti

- 10 Macroeconomic Context
 - 13 Crisis and Violence Context
 - 14 Scenarios and Risks
-

17 III: Crisis Impact and Priority Needs

- 18 **Priority Axis 1:**
Economic Recovery, Support for Economic Diversification,
and Strengthening of Economic Governance
 - 19 Context
 - 20 Agriculture
 - 20 Industry
 - 21 Services
 - 24 Governance
 - 27 Transparency and Accountability
 - 27 Overview of Recovery Needs
- 29 **Priority Axis 2:**
Rehabilitation of Economic and Social Infrastructure and Reduction
of Vulnerabilities to Natural and Climate Shocks
 - 29 Transportation Infrastructure
 - 29 Electric Infrastructure
 - 30 Water and Sanitation
 - 30 Telecommunications and Digital Infrastructure
 - 31 Housing
 - 31 Public Buildings
 - 32 Overview of Recovery and Reconstruction Needs

34	Priority Axis 3:
	Promotion of Access to Health Care, Education and Other Basic Social Services;
	Social Inclusion and Food Security
34	Internal Displacement
35	Social Protection
36	Infrastructure for Elementary and Secondary Education
36	Higher Education Infrastructure
37	Food Security and Nutrition
38	Health Infrastructure
39	Overview of Recovery Needs
41	Priority Axis 4:
	Strengthening Rule of Law and Public Security
41	Justice System
41	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
42	Police
42	Penitentiary System
43	Community Violence Reduction
43	Overview of Recovery and Reconstruction Needs
46	IV: Crisis Recovery Framework
47	Crisis Recovery Vision, Strategic Objectives, and Core Principles
48	Programmatic Framework for Recovery
48	Prioritization and Sequencing
50	Transversal Issues
50	Assumptions, Prerequisites, and Risks
52	V: Institutional Arrangements
53	Institutional Framework
54	Monitoring Arrangements
55	VI: Investment Plan
56	Investment Plan
58	Financing Platform
59	References
62	Appendix A: Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment Programmatic Framework (2024–26)
75	Appendix B: Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment Investment Plan



Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
BINUH	United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti
CPI	Consumer Price Index
CRF	Crisis recovery framework
DAP	Directorate of Penitentiary Administration
DGI	General Directorate of Taxes
DINEPA	National Directorate for Drinking Water and Sanitation
GBV	Gender-based violence
GDP	Gross domestic product
HNP	Haitian National Police
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
IDP	Internally displaced person
IHSI	Haitian Institute of Statistics and Informatics
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
MEB	Minimum expenditure basket
MEF	Ministry of Economy and Finance
MSSM	Multinational Security Support Mission
OMU	Operational monitoring unit
PPP	Purchasing power parity
RCG	Recovery coordination group
RCIA	Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment
SGBV	Sexual and gender-based violence
SIMAST	Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor database
ZMPP	Port-au-Prince metropolitan area

Executive Summary

After having several multidimensional crises affect Haiti for years, the country is at a critical juncture. The Kingston Declaration of March 11, 2024, concluded negotiations among various Haitian actors and led to the April 3 Political Agreement for a Peaceful and Orderly Transition. The agreement involved a wide range of Haitian stakeholders and established a transitional institutional architecture consisting of the Presidential Transition Council (TPC) and a transitional government to oversee the transition process. This agreement was formalized in the May 27 decree establishing the organization and functioning of the TPC, identifying the five strategic objectives for the transition period (see Section II). After years of crises, this transition process presents a window of opportunity to end the cycle of violence and forge a path out of fragility.

Recognizing that tangible economic, social, and institutional recovery must accompany progress in the political transition, the government of Haiti launched the Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment (RCIA) in May 2024. The RCIA has been undertaken under the leadership of the Ministry of Economy and Finance and with the support of the World Bank, United Nations, European Union, and Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). The RCIA was conducted between July and October 2024 and had the following three objectives:

- **Assess the impact of the crisis (2021–24)** in areas most affected by the security crisis, particularly the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area (ZMPP, see map above), on the population, the economy and poverty, physical infrastructure, and basic services and institutions. Where possible, the assessment included other affected areas, notably the Artibonite Department.
- **Define a recovery framework and investment plan** for fiscal years 2025 and 2026, and identify – where possible – initial provisions for the medium-term (2026–30) to consolidate recovery and development gains.
- **Strengthen coordination of actions and interventions** between the government and technical and financial partners with the support of the European Union, IADB, United Nations, and the World Bank.

This report summarizes the findings and recommendations of the RCIA. It evaluates the impact of the 2021–24 crisis and defines urgent stabilization and recovery priorities, complementing broader security, political, and humanitarian efforts. As the RCIA assessment took place at a time in which the security crisis remains unresolved, future

assessments will complement the present evaluation. To facilitate such future assessments, the RCIA establishes a recovery framework to allow for progressive expansion to other parts of the country as security conditions improve.

Methodology

The RCIA follows a rapid assessment methodology drawing from post-conflict and post-disaster approaches. Given time and access constraints, the RCIA drew on existing data and analyses and consultations with an extensive network of stakeholders. Given the urgency to define immediate recovery needs, the RCIA identifies and quantifies damages and short-term priority needs based on rapid assessment methodologies. It goes on to develop an investment plan to address the identified priorities leveraging existing programs where possible and based on previous experiences and absorption capacities. As such, the RCIA does not apply the standard methodology of Recovery and Peace Building Assessments and Post Disaster Needs Assessments but develops standardized prioritization criteria to ensure a targeted, selective approach to identifying critical interventions, results, and investment requirements. Although recognizing that the security crisis extends beyond the metropolitan area, the RCIA has prioritized ZMPP as the most affected area by the crisis.

The RCIA is structured around four priority axes of intervention covering economic recovery, infrastructure rehabilitation, social security and services, and rule of law. These priority axes, and corresponding sectors and subsectors, were identified in joint workshops under the leadership of the Government of Haiti and are aligned with the strategic objectives outlined in the May 27 decree establishing the organization and functioning of the TPC. They also reflect the guidance received during the May 31 meeting of the TPC, with the four institutions outlining the parameters of the RCIA.

Summary of the Impact Assessment

The 2021–24 crisis has had a devastating impact on Port-au-Prince and the country as a whole. The impact of this crisis has been far reaching, affecting most of the population in the metropolitan area and resulting in disruptions, damages, and losses across all sectors, spanning economic productivity, critical infrastructure,

basic social services, and the ability of the state to provide essential institutional functions, including public security and law and order. Although the RCIA focuses on the most-affected areas and populations of the ZMPP, the crisis had cascading effects throughout the country, given regional commercial, financial, transport, and other dependencies.

The core findings of the impact assessment in the four axes are summarized below:

AXIS 1

ECONOMIC SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION, AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE

- **Private Sector:** The security crisis has led to a significant decline in economic activity and employment, notably through looting, pillaging, and disruption of transportation routes. The secondary (manufacturing and industry) and tertiary (services) sectors have suffered the greatest losses. In the secondary sector, manufacturing, construction, and public utilities (electricity and water) with economic activity declined by 16 percent, 23 percent, and 43 percent. The apparel sector, for example, accounts for about 90 percent of manufactured exports yet witnessed a 20 percent decline in exports and lost approximately 30,000 jobs (54 percent), with 15 companies ceasing operations between 2022 and 2024. In the tertiary sector, formal and informal trade and the hospitality industry experienced a decline in economic activity by 26 percent and 23 percent.

- **Governance:** The crisis has exacerbated deficiencies in essential functions of human resource management. Public sector employment fell from 112,631 in September 2021 to 104,029 in June 2024, a 7.8 percent reduction in the workforce. More than half of the departing civil servants were technical staff. This situation has also greatly affected the personnel of local administrations in affected areas, where dozens of employees have left. In some places, such as Gressier, municipal offices have been closed and abandoned.

AXIS 2

REHABILITATION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND REDUCTION IN VULNERABILITY TO NATURAL AND CLIMATE SHOCKS

- **Transportation infrastructure:** The transportation infrastructure (roads, ports, airports) and associated services (drainage, waste management, transportation of people and goods) have suffered damages of US\$220 million, with a loss of US\$15 million for the ports of Port-au-Prince and an additional cost of US\$6.5 million for securing the international airport.

- **Electric infrastructure:** Between 2021 and 2024, six

substations and twenty distribution lines have been damaged by gang violence, affecting 60 percent of the customer base in the ZMPP. The closure of the Martissant terminal has reduced energy storage capacity by 11 percent, and the transport of hydrocarbons has become extremely difficult, increasing prices by 15 to 20 percent.

- **Water and sanitation:** Since 2022, gang violence further reduced the limited potable water coverage available, with 55 percent of sites of the National Directorate for Drinking Water and Sanitation damaged by gang violence. Damage is estimated at US\$70 million, with revenue loss of US\$3.6 million for the ZMPP and Croix des Bouquets technical operating centers. The crisis has also led to loss of human resources and made the only official landfill site inaccessible, affecting solid waste collection.

- **Telecommunications and digital infrastructure:** Lack of access, high prices, and poor quality of broadband networks are major constraints on growth of the digital sector and expansion of digital payments. Armed groups threaten infrastructure, limiting maintenance and fuel supply. Between September and November 2023, 85 percent of Digicel (a mobile telephone service provider) sites in the capital and 40 to 60 percent in small towns were operational, but rural sites were almost all out of service.

- **Public buildings:** Armed groups have targeted public buildings in conflict zones, vandalizing them and stealing equipment. Communal and national buildings have been looted and burned, totaling damages of US\$9.2 million. Several entities have had to relocate operations.

- **Housing:** The housing sector was deficient before the crisis, with most real estate transactions being informal and vulnerable populations living in high-risk areas. Since 2021, more than 700,000 people have left their residences, and 3.2 million people are in need of shelters. The crisis has led to abandonment of entire neighborhoods, reduction in the housing stock, and an increase in rents of up to 200 percent.

AXIS 3

PROMOTION OF ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE, EDUCATION, AND OTHER BASIC SERVICES; SOCIAL INCLUSION; AND FOOD SECURITY

- **Food security and nutrition:** Gang violence has contributed to unprecedented levels of hunger. In the ZMPP alone, the number of people in the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Phase 3 crisis or higher has increased from 856,000 in 2019 to more than 1,118,000 in 2023. Overall, the IPC of September 2024 indicates a disastrous situation throughout the country, with 50 percent of the analyzed population, 5.4 million people, experiencing acute food insecurity, an increase of more than 600,000 people

since August 2023 and more than 850,000 since the assassination of President Moïse in July 2021.

- **Displacement:** The rise in violence, particularly in and around Port-au-Prince, has rendered entire neighborhoods uninhabitable. A significant proportion of the displaced population is from the ZMPP alone, with many residents fleeing to safer areas of the city or other regions of the country. As of September 2024, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) recorded 702,973 internally displaced persons, a 22 percent increase from the previous assessment in June.

- **Access to basic services:** Gang violence has left a large portion of educational and health care infrastructure damaged or destroyed. Of 93 health care institutions with beds in the ZMPP, 2 private hospitals have been destroyed, 11 hospitals partially damaged, 14 health centers with beds partially or totally damaged or looted, and 38 health care institutions closed. In terms of education, 233 of 6,774 schools were vandalized or damaged and 418 closed due to gang violence in the ZMPP, affecting more than 140,000 students.

AXIS 4

RULE OF LAW, PUBLIC SECURITY, AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

- **Rule of law and justice:** The security crisis has weakened the judicial system, particularly in the ZMPP. Courts have been burned and looted, and gangs have threatened and killed judicial actors. Many judges have left the country, while many courts, including the tribunaux de première instance of Port-au-Prince and Croix-des-Bouquets, have had to be relocated to cramped, insecure premises, significantly affecting the judicial system's ability to function. According to the Tribunal de Première Instance of Port-au-Prince, the volume of cases has decreased by 67 percent since 2020.

- **Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV):** The level of violence has increased substantially in the ZMPP since 2021. Data from Kay Fanm, an SGBV service provider based in Port-au-Prince, indicates a 340 percent increase in the number of cases per year between 2020 and 2023. In some neighborhoods, up to 80 percent of women and young girls are survivors of SGBV. SGBV response services are also affected, facing institutional and systemic challenges that limit their capacity to address the problem.

- **Haitian National Police:** Since 2021, the Haitian National Police (HNP) has lost a significant number of staff, as 86 police officers have died and many more have been injured, while more than 1,000 have left their posts. Infrastructure was heavily damaged as well. Of 412 HNP buildings, 76 are nonfunctional while 146 require major rehabilitation. In the first eight months of 2024 alone, 81 gang attacks

destroyed 47 police stations and 2 prisons, and damaged 13 other buildings.

- **Prison system:** Between 2022 and 2024, the Directorate of Penitentiary Administration (DAP) witnessed a reduction of more than 33 percent of its staff, from 1,224 to only 809 agents. Of these 809 agents, 787 are available for field duty, but only 262 are present simultaneously to oversee 11,273 detainees—a ratio of 43 detainees per agent. Most of the buildings are former military buildings that are unsuitable as prisons.

- **Community violence:** Since 2023, armed groups have controlled approximately 80 percent of the ZMPP. Between April 1 and June 30, 2024, the Human Rights Service of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti documented 1,379 people murdered or injured and 428 kidnapped; 88 percent of the murders were in Port-au-Prince, often due to gang attacks.

Investment Needs (2024–2026)

The RCIA indicates the need for investment of approximately **US\$1.34 billion from 2024 to 2026**: US\$450 million (34 percent) for infrastructure, US\$388 million (29 percent) for security and rule of law, US\$386 million (29 percent) for social protection (of which US\$150 million for essential recovery and social protection functions and US\$118 million for access to basic services), and US\$114 million (9 percent) for economic recovery and economic governance.

Where possible, the RCIA includes provisions for the **medium term (2026–30)**. The assessment recognizes that the investments needed for the transition period will require additional investments to consolidate the recovery and realize development gains. For 2026–30, the RCIA identifies provisional investment needs of US\$2.3 billion: US\$1.85 billion for infrastructure, US\$270 million for security, US\$153 million for social security and services, and US\$24 million for economic recovery and governance.

Crisis Recovery Framework

Implementation of the RCIA will be based on the overarching vision for recovery as articulated in the **April 2024 Political Agreement for a Peaceful and Orderly Transition** “to put Haiti back on the road to dignity,

democratic legitimacy, stability, and sovereignty, and to ensure the proper functioning of the State's institutions.”¹

This vision is based on a dual approach to recovery: addressing the immediate impact of the crisis while advancing longer-term reforms and structural changes that address deep-rooted drivers of instability and fragility. For the first two years of RCIA implementation, the overarching goal is to support recovery of communities most affected by the 2021–24 security crisis.

Prioritization and sequencing: The environment for implementing recovery interventions will remain challenging over the short term, with enabling conditions emerging progressively over time as progress is made on the security and political fronts. This will require a flexible and agile approach to coordinating implementation of efforts across the strategic objectives and sectors of the RCIA. A three-stage approach to prioritization and sequencing of program implementation will be developed as a basis for coordination between the sectors, comprising geographic and temporal prioritization and sequencing of interventions where security conditions allow, operational phasing of interventions to account for variations in project delivery capacities and timelines, and prioritization of funding and resource allocations to ensure that the most urgent and essential interventions are adequately financed in a timely manner.

Transversal issues: The RCIA has followed an inclusive, participatory approach involving consultations with national and local authorities, international partners, civil society, and the private sector. Factors such as gender and age have played a key role in understanding the needs and abilities of individuals and the risks they face in this crisis. Each priority axis reflects a range of cross-sectoral issues, including gender, children and youth, and climate. Implementation of identified investments will ensure that the targeting mechanisms reach the most vulnerable populations.

Institutional Framework

Ensuring alignment of national and international efforts in implementing post-crisis recovery efforts requires adequate institutional capacity for recovery planning coordination and monitoring. Building on international best practice and experience, a three-level structure is proposed for the institutional framework for implementation of recovery efforts identified in the RCIA. This architecture, which will be further developed and agreed between the government and its partners at the start of RCIA implementation, will also provide the framework for managing future revisions, updates, and expansion of recovery efforts as conditions evolve. This framework will complement—and not duplicate—

existing coordination arrangements in Haiti, including those related to humanitarian and security assistance, and will be linked accordingly.

It is proposed that the government lead an institutional arrangement supported by a dedicated intergovernmental body responsible for overall coordination of recovery efforts. The proposed institutional framework for post-crisis recovery consists of the following groups:

- **A recovery steering committee** should be established with overall responsibility for recovery efforts, including strategic oversight and decision-making on implementation and financing. As in other countries, it is proposed that the head of government lead this committee, which should be comprised of relevant line ministries, the four partner institutions, and international partners.

- **A recovery coordination group (RCG)** should be established with responsibility for programmatic and operational coordination, implementation, monitoring, review, and updating of the crisis recovery framework (CRF). It is proposed that the head of an operational monitoring unit (OMU) will chair the RCG, which will comprise technical representatives from relevant ministries and international partners. The RCG will constitute a forum for ensuring coordination across the four priority axes of the RCIA.

- **Thematic groups**, corresponding to each of the four RCIA strategic objectives, should be established with responsibility for sectoral-level coordination, implementation, and monitoring.

To support this institutional framework, the government proposes to establish an OMU to ensure coordination with international partners and enable effective mobilization and allocation of international financing. The proposed OMU will support the government ministries, organizations, and general directorates in the technical and financial planning, implementation, and monitoring of the RCIA. It is proposed that the World Bank, United Nations, European Union, and IADB support the OMU by providing technical advice and capacity-building support.

- **Monitoring arrangements:** The RCIA monitoring framework will be based on the RCIA program framework and will be used to measure progress against three main aspects of RCIA implementation: progress toward programmatic outputs, results, and outcomes during RCIA implementation; a set of milestones articulating actions that will serve as stepping stones for achieving the objectives; and transparent tracking of aid flows (pledges, commitments, disbursements) and indicators for increasing aid effectiveness.

¹Article 16, Political Agreement for a Peaceful and Orderly Transition



I. Introduction

Background and Rationale

1. After having experienced several multidimensional crises for years, Haiti is at a critical juncture. The Kingston Declaration of March 11, 2024, concluded negotiations among various Haitian actors for an inclusive political transition and led to the April 3 Political Agreement for a Peaceful and Orderly Transition, bringing together a wide range of Haitian stakeholders and establishing a transitional institutional architecture that includes a bicameral executive with a Presidential Transition Council and a transitional government. After weeks of consultations, the Presidential Transition Council was officially established on April 25, 2024, a transitional prime minister was designated on May 28, 2024, and a cabinet was appointed to implement a program aimed at concluding the transition process (see Section II). After the escalation of political and social instability since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in 2021, this transition process presents a window of opportunity to end the cycle of violence and forge a path out of fragility.

2. Recognizing that improvements in infrastructure and services must accompany progress in the political process, the government requested support for a rapid crisis impact assessment (RCIA). In May 2024, the government requested assistance from the World Bank, United Nations, European Union, and Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) (the partner institutions) in assessing the impact of the 2021–24 crisis and developing an investment plan to address immediate stabilization and recovery priorities. The RCIA has been undertaken under the leadership of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) with the participation of relevant government ministries and expert teams from the four partner institutions. It was conducted between July and October 2024 based on the 2008 Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning² and follows the established methodology and global practice that has been used to support governments in similar post-crisis assessment and planning.

3. This report summarizes the findings and recommendations of the RCIA. It evaluates the impact of the 2021–24 crisis and defines urgent stabilization and recovery priorities, complementing broader security, political, and humanitarian efforts. In light of the dynamic nature of the situation, the RCIA identifies recovery priority interventions for 2024–26 with a focus on the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area (ZMPP) and establishes a recovery framework to guide the expansion of interventions to other parts of the country as security conditions improve.

² The Joint Declaration seeks to mobilize the resources of the European Commission, the United Nations Development Group, and the World Bank to harmonize and coordinate post-crisis response frameworks to enhance

Objectives

4. The RCIA will guide efforts to address immediate stabilization and recovery priorities. The priorities are designed to create conditions for a peaceful long-term trajectory of development and growth. Building on the vision for transition and recovery articulated in the April 3 agreement, as well as the transitional government's roadmap, the RCIA has three objectives.

- Assess the impact of the crisis (2021–24) in the most affected regions, particularly the ZMPP, on the population, the economy and poverty, physical infrastructure, and basic services and institutions.
- Define a recovery framework and investment plan for fiscal 2025 and 2026 aligned with the priorities outlined in the prime minister's roadmap for the transition period.
- Strengthen coordination of actions and interventions between the government and technical and financial partners with the support of the World Bank, United Nations, European Union, and IADB.

5. The RCIA is structured around four priority axes of intervention: economic recovery, infrastructure rehabilitation, social services, and rule of law. These priority axes, and corresponding sectors and subsectors, were identified in joint workshops under the leadership of the Government Haiti (GoH), reflecting government programs and priorities for the transition period (Figure 1). The relevant government ministry and partner institution co-led the work under each axis, depending on their mandate and comparative advantage.

Assessment Methodology

6. Development of the RCIA followed a three-phased approach: an initial preparatory phase to define the scope, objectives, and parameters of the assessment (June/July); an assessment phase to conduct the impact and needs assessment (August); and a consolidation phase to develop the RCIA reports, recovery framework, and investment plan (August/September).

7. The RCIA follows a rapid assessment methodology that draws from post-conflict and post-disaster approaches and builds on ongoing government programs and mobilization of local expertise through projects and partners to develop estimates of damages and needs as a basis for

country resilience to crises by meeting the recovery needs of vulnerable populations and increasing the capacity of national institutions for effective prevention, response, and recovery.

FIGURE 1:

Overview of Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment Priority Axes

PRIORITY AXIS 1	PRIORITY AXIS 2	PRIORITY AXIS 3	PRIORITY AXIS 4
 Economic recovery and diversification and institutional strengthening LEADS: MEF - WBG/EU	 Rehabilitation of infrastructure and reduction of vulnerabilities LEADS: MTPTC - IADB	 Promote access to basic social services, social inclusion and food security LEADS: MAST - IADB/WBG	 Rule of law, public security and institutional reforms LEADS: MTPTC - UN
1 Private Sector	1 Transportation	1 Internal Displacement	1 Justice
2 Administrative Governance	2 Electricity	2 Social Protection	2 SGBV
3 Economic & Financial Governance	3 Water & Sanitation	3 Education	3 Police
4 Transparency /Accountability	4 Telecoms & Digital	4 Food Security	4 Prisons
	5 Housing	5 Health	5 Community Violence Reduction
	6 Public Buildings		

prioritizing investments in recovery and reconstruction. To arrive at these estimates, the RCIA differentiates direct from indirect impacts. Direct impacts are damage and losses to physical and human capital (e.g., destruction of infrastructure, death, population displacement, environmental risks), and indirect impacts encompass broader social and economic consequences (e.g., losses in access to markets, education, or employment; increases in malnutrition, mortality, and crime).

8. The RCIA methodology also draws on lessons learned from implementation of the 2004 Emergency Assistance Programs for Post-Conflict Crisis and from initiatives related to the 2010 and 2021 post-disaster needs assessments. The RCIA identifies priority interventions, results, and investment requirements and provides the foundation for long-term recovery planning to ensure sustained support to security, governance, infrastructure, and social services.

9. In addition to the analysis of crisis impact and associated recovery needs, the RCIA includes development of a crisis recovery framework that defines a set of priority actions and an associated investment plan for 2024–26. This recovery framework is designed to help operationalize the RCIA, facilitate operational alignment between national and international partners, and ensure that adequate financing is allocated. The assessments of damages and needs provided in this report are estimates that will be refined during the implementation stages, as the security crisis remains unresolved at the time of this writing.

10. The RCIA was undertaken on the basis of the following parameters (Box 1).

- **Rapid assessment approach:** Recognizing the urgency of the situation, the RCIA has drawn on existing data and analyses as well as consultations with an extensive network of stakeholders. Given the paucity of existing primary data, targeted field assessments and primary data collection have been undertaken where critical information gaps persist.

- **Limited timeframe:** The RCIA identifies and quantifies short-term priority needs for the transition period of 2024–26, although implementation of associated projects may extend beyond the first two years. Where possible, the assessment includes provisions for the medium term (2026–30) to identify investments necessary to consolidate recovery and development gains.

- **Prioritization of needs:** Given the two-year investment planning period agreed upon for the RCIA, a set of standardized prioritization criteria were applied as part of the needs assessment.

- **Geographic focus:** While recognizing that the security crisis extends beyond the ZMPP, the RCIA has prioritized the communes that the crisis has affected most (see map above and Section II). Wherever possible, given the constraints in time and access, the RCIA does cover the Artibonite Department (notably for Axes 2 and 3). The results and the associated recovery framework establish the basis upon which further assessments can be conducted, including in areas outside of Port-au-Prince.

- **Inclusive, agile coordination:** The RCIA was conducted by government and partner institutions and involved technical teams drawn from across all relevant ministries

and sectors. With the government leading the process, the RCIA has included consultations with national and local authorities, international partners, civil society, and the private sector.

• **Complementarity:**

The RCIA programs complement and do not duplicate other assessment and planning processes such as the Humanitarian Action Plan. Implementation and funding appeals will be coordinated with these other processes.

BOX 1:
RCIA Prioritization Criteria

Mandatory Criteria
• The activity aligns with the five priority areas defined in the April 3, 2024 Agreement and the Transitional Government’s roadmap. • The activity will have an immediate and visible impact on the restarting of economic activity and public services. • The activity will have an immediate and visible impact on the poorest and most vulnerable groups or households in the population. • The activity can be feasibly implemented within the proposed timeline, considering the current security context, available implementation capacities, and financial constraints.
Additional Criteria
• The activity builds trust and momentum for the transition by restoring state authority and presence, improving security, reducing violence, and facilitating the return of displaced populations. • The activity lays the groundwork for long-term investments in recovery and development.

11. Constraints and limitations: The RCIA was conducted within a short time frame and in a context of ongoing violence in the ZMPP, with virtually no access to the geographic areas of focus. This placed significant constraints on the types, amount, and accuracy of data available to conduct the impact and needs assessment across a range of sectors. Where possible, the teams used geospatial technologies and modeling to complement existing data and analyses from the government and the partner institutions. As such, the results of the RCIA are estimates that require further development as data availability improves.

Structure of the Report

12. This report has two main components. The first (Sections II and III) outlines context and summarizes the outcomes of the RCIA, and the second (Sections IV to VI) presents a recovery framework and investment plan for operationalizing the RCIA and ensuring a structured, coherent approach to the coordination, implementation, and financing of priority interventions for 2024–26 while establishing a process for expanding recovery efforts as conditions evolve.





II. Context of the Crisis in Haiti

13. Haiti's political transition provides a window of opportunity to exit the cycle of violence. After the resignation of the government under Prime Minister Ariel Henry in March 2024, political factions reached consensus on the provisions of the transition process and modalities for political decision-making during this process, including a transitional presidential council and a transitional government led by a prime minister. The transitional presidential council assumes the functions of the president and includes nine representatives from various political parties and civil society (seven voting members, two observers). A transitional government was inaugurated to create the conditions for improving security and preparing and implementing elections. During the transition period, retaining the integrity of government and the presidential council will remain critical to sustaining political stability and ensuring implementation of critical investments.

14. Transition authorities committed to the implementation of a roadmap, pursuing five objectives: public and national security; economic recovery, infrastructure rehabilitation, food and health security; constitutional issues; rule of law and justice; and elections for the renewal of political personnel. The last pillar highlights that the authorities have committed to conclude the transition in February 2026 by installing newly elected officials after general elections with the support of international partners.

15. While elections are supposed to conclude the transition period, the brevity of the transition requires swift action to improve livelihoods of violence-affected populations. With the last general elections held in 2015, parliament, the senate, and many local governments have exhausted their political mandates. In the present context, organizing of general elections requires a complex set of constitutional amendments and administrative preparations. Notably, a substantial improvement of security conditions remains a precondition to ensure an environment in which elections can be held that yield results that are widely accepted among political parties and will not be contested *ex post*. Past experiences indicate that gangs may be used to garner votes for candidates, which would undermine the credibility of the outcome. An improvement in the security environment will not only depend on advances in law enforcement but need to be complemented by progress in political processes. The living conditions of populations affected by violence need to be improved swiftly, notably in areas where state authority is reestablished, to sustain government control and strengthen the resilience of local communities against gang infiltration and violence.

16. International support for additional investments in Haiti's social, economic, and physical infrastructure will be critical to generate confidence in the transition process and ensure improvements in service delivery and economic opportunities. Considering the economic

contraction, the transition government has limited fiscal space to advance the necessary investments. On August 19, the council of ministers issued an amended budget decree for fiscal 2024 that reduced the overall budget available by 20.5 percent due to a shortfall in projected resources. Similarly, the execution rate of capital spending remains low (see Section III), highlighting that the ongoing multidimensional crisis has further limited institutional capacities due to brain drain that the upsurge in emigration has generated. In light of these constraints and the damage and losses due to the crisis, increased international support for the funding and implementation of investment priorities remains indispensable for the success of the transition period.


Macroeconomic Context

17. Haiti's economy has contracted by an estimated 8.5 percent over the past decade as longstanding structural challenges increased vulnerability to shocks.³ Structural challenges include state capture by vested interests, a non-enabling business environment, underinvestment in human capital, and deficient infrastructure. Underdeveloped financial markets and limited market contestability have contributed to a large informal economy, limiting domestic resource mobilization and fiscal space. Disaster risk management and response systems are inadequate to address vulnerability to natural hazards and climate change, which disproportionately affects the poor. In this context, Haiti has been highly vulnerable to a series of significant shocks since 2018, including the COVID-19 pandemic, a surge in international commodity prices after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, earthquakes and storms, and most recently, escalation of violence and political instability.

18. The business environment deteriorated progressively since 2018 and then sharply beginning in 2021 because of a series of sociopolitical disturbances, creating a challenging operating environment for enterprises. Social unrest and waves of violence, including several episodes of complete paralysis of the economy, characterized 2018 and 2019. In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic introduced shocks that led to economic contraction and layoffs. The increase in gang-related violence by the end of 2021 disrupted domestic supply chains, including fuel and food distribution. For firms, this resulted in a reduction in productive activities and profits because of partial or permanent closure of production sites or firms, increasing security costs, staff resignations due to emigration, and pillaging and vandalism that have resulted in losses and damage to capital stock (physical and human).


³ Contraction in real gross domestic product (GDP) from 2015 to 2024, including estimates for 2023 and forecasted values for 2024.

FIGURE 2:
Inflation, Annual Percentage Change



Source:
L'Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d'Informatique.
"Indice des Prix à la Consommation."
https://ihsi.gouv.ht/publications/publications_regulieres.
Note: CPI, Consumer Price Index.

FIGURE 3:
Share of Population Living Below Lower-Middle-Income (US\$3.65) and International (US\$2.15) Poverty Lines



Source:
World Bank 2024a.
Note: PPP, purchasing power parity.

19. Inflation accelerated in 2020 and surged in 2022 as Haiti navigated shocks and logistical disruptions.


Sharp depreciation of the Haitian gourde in 2020 led to higher import prices in local currency terms. Central Bank intervention briefly slowed inflation in 2021, before a commodity price shock led to monetization of the deficit, weakening the gourde. Inflation accelerated in late 2022 and early 2023 as food and fuel prices surged, following disruptions at the ports due to gang violence. Headline inflation is trending down, but food inflation remains high, affecting poor households the most (Figure 2). Living standards have deteriorated, with 36.4 percent of Haitians living in extreme poverty in 2024 (less than US\$2.15/day

2017 purchasing power parity), up from 29.9 percent in 2020 (Figure 3).


20. Changes in nighttime light intensity reflect Haiti's prolonged economic contraction, illustrating the particularly severe impact of insecurity on Port-au-Prince.

Nighttime light intensity is strongly correlated with economic activity and is often used to assess GDP (Beyer, Hu, and Yao 2022; Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil 2012; Morris and Zhang 2019; Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin 2016). Nighttime light intensity in Haiti is highest in the urban centers of Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien, where economic activity is concentrated. Figures 4a and 4b illustrate the substantial

FIGURE 4:
Change in Nighttime Light Intensity, 2018–2024,
According to (a) Urban Area and (b) Department



Source:
Román et al. 2018.




Source:
Román et al. 2018.

and persistent decline in nighttime light intensity in Port-au-Prince, which declined by an estimated 45.9 percent from January 2018 to August 2024.

21. Haiti's trade deficit has widened, led by a decline in exports since 2019. As in other countries, the COVID-19 pandemic dampened demand for exports in 2020, particularly in the apparel sector. Exports continued to decline in US dollar terms in 2023 and 2024, amidst widespread insecurity and disruptions to port operations (Figure 5). Imports also decreased during the pandemic but rapidly increased as global commodity prices rose in 2021 and 2022. Persistent economic contraction and depreciation of the gourde have limited demand for imports. Remittance inflows have been an important external source of stability, helping finance an increasing trade deficit. Remittances have increased with more workers leaving the country. The current account balance has oscillated as a result of changes in the trade balance and remittances, moving from deficit in 2019 to a surplus in 2020 as imports contracted and back into a deficit as international commodity prices surged in 2022 and 2023, resulting in an increase in the import bill. Higher remittance inflows are expected to narrow the current account deficit to 0.2 percent of GDP in 2024.

22. Fiscal and monetary underperformance reflect the challenging economic, political, and security context. Revenues and expenditures have declined as a percentage of GDP since 2015 (Figure 6). As Haiti collects more than 50 percent of tax revenue at the border, the contraction in trade has compressed government revenues. The fiscal deficit widened substantially during and after the pandemic. Part of the deficit was monetized, contributing to inflationary


FIGURE 5:
Trade Balance and Remittance Inflows



Sources:
Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances (MEF),
World Bank estimates and forecast for 2023 and 2024.


pressure and leading to depreciation of the currency. Subdued economic activity and weakened administrative capacity have reduced sales tax revenues. Sales tax data (value-added tax on large taxpayers⁴ in the ZMPP) shows that accumulated losses reached 8.9 million gourdes at April 2018 prices⁵ (equivalent to approximately US\$67.7 million) compared with an alternative estimated scenario of collections under normalized conditions (Figure 7). Revenue collection strengthened moderately in 2023 following administrative reforms in customs and an increase in fuel tax revenue, whereas an increase in violence impaired implementation of capital projects in 2024. As a result, the deficit has narrowed, and for the first time in many years, monetary financing remained within statutory limits of 20 percent of the previous fiscal year's tax revenues.

FIGURE 6:
Revenue, Expenditures, and Fiscal Balance



Sources:
MEF (2024); World Bank estimates and forecast for 2023 and 2024.

FIGURE 7:
Monthly Sales Tax Revenues, Realized and under Counterfactual Scenario, Large Taxpayers, Metropolitan Area of Port-au-Prince, Million Haitian Gourdes at 2018 Prices




Source:
Calculations by CEPAL based on data provided by the General Directorate of Taxes, Ministry of Economy and Finances

⁴ In the terminology Haitian tax authorities indicate, this category includes taxpayers whose annual revenue is 10 million gourdes or more (~US\$75,000).

⁵ Similar results are obtained by projecting the evolution of turnover tax using econometric techniques using the Hodrick-Prescott filter and by weighting the participation of the distributive trades sector in total economic activity.

FIGURE 8:
Estimated Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Losses,
2018–2024



	PERCENTAGE OF 2024 GDP			US\$ BILLION		
	2018–20	2021–24	TOTAL	2018-20	2021-24	TOTAL
TOTAL	-18.4	-20.7	-39.0	-4.6	-5.1	-9.7
Agriculture	-1.8	-4.5	-6.3	-0.5	-1.1	-1.6
Industry	-9.3	-5.9	-15.2	-2.3	-1.5	-3.8
Services	-4.9	-11.8	-16.7	-1.2	-2.9	-4.2
Net taxes on production	-2.4	1.5	-0.9	-0.6	0.4	-0.2

Source:

World Bank (2018), (2020).

Note: U.S. dollar estimates based on 2024 exchange rates.

23. Comparing Haiti's economic performance with precrisis forecasts can provide a framework with which to estimate total economic losses. A 2018 forecast serves as an upper estimate of Haiti's economic trajectory prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and a subsequent period of deepening political instability and violence (Figure 8). A late 2020 forecast provides an adjusted estimate of economic growth incorporating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Actual economic growth is estimated using national accounts supplemented by recent estimates for 2023 and a forecast of 2024 growth. This approach provides an estimate of lost economic output over two periods: 2018–20 (the pandemic period) and 2021–24 (corresponding to the RCIA). These estimates provide initial quantification of losses and analysis of the economic sectors most affected.

24. Total lost output since 2018 is estimated at 39.0 percent of 2024 GDP (US\$9.7 billion). The services sector lost the most output (16.7 percent of 2024 GDP), followed by industry (15.2 percent) and agriculture (6.3 percent). Total output lost can be decomposed between the pandemic period (18.4 percent of GDP) and the 2021–24 period (39.0 percent of GDP). The channels of transmission of the crisis in the respective economic subsectors are further analyzed in Section III.

Crisis and Violence Context


25. The security context has gradually worsened since 2018 and remains volatile. Since the resignation of former Prime Minister Ariel Henry on April 25, 2024, the number of violent events and fatalities remains high and above the long-term average. According to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), the number of violent events rose from 463 in 2018 to 1,623 in 2023 and 1,449 in the first eight months of 2024 (Figure 9). Data from the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH)⁶ indicate a declining trend in Q2 of 2024, recording 2,113 gang-related killings from January to April and 1,340 from May to August. Since 2018, waves of violence have increased in severity, with the standard deviation of the count of all violent events of one particular year increasing from below 10 in 2018 to above 60 in 2024 (Figure 10). At the same time, the share of protests and riots to violent events decreased, with volatility within previous ranges despite significant risks of renewed periods of large-scale civil unrest.

26. While reporting on fatalities from gang violence varies among data sources, the average lethality of a violent event appears to have declined in 2024 from previous

⁶ Reported numbers of fatalities differ between ACLED and BINUH due to different methodologies. While ACLED relies mostly on newspaper articles


and social media posts, BINUH relies on personal networks within affected communities.

FIGURE 9:
Number of Violent Events (left axis)
and Fatalities (right axis), 2018–24



Source:
See Armed Conflict Location & Event Data
(accessed September 1, 2024), <https://acleddata.com/>.

FIGURE 10:
Share (left axis) and Standard Deviation (SD)
(right axis) of Violent Events, Protests, and Riots



Source:
See Armed Conflict Location & Event Data
(accessed September 1, 2024), <https://acleddata.com/>.

years. From January to August 2024, ACLED counted 1,020 conflict-related fatalities (a decrease of almost 44 percent compared with the same period in 2023). For the same period, BINUH counted an increase of 15 percent from 2,999 fatalities in 2023 to 3,456 in 2024, highlighting the challenges of monitoring, verifying, and classifying violent events in Haiti's context.⁷ According to ACLED, the month with the single most violent events was in 2024, although the average count of fatalities has largely remained below the 2023 average (Figure 11). Tabarre, Gressier, and Port-au-Prince emerge as hotspots in terms of relative violence intensity. Per 100,000 population, Tabarre registered more than 76 fatalities in 2023 and 2024, Gressier 65, and Port-au-Prince 54 (Figure 12), significantly above the average of many other countries affected by conflict or violence. Areas such as Carrefour, Delmas, and Kenscoff are subject to violence yet registered fewer fatalities relative to their population size. At the same time, serious human rights violations remain of major concern. Between January and September, BINUH counted more than 1,054 kidnappings for ransom and a significant increase in cases of sexual violence against women and girls (BINUH 2024).

27. Violence remains concentrated in the Ouest Department.⁸ Gangs have sought to expand their areas of influence outside of the ZMPP. They have attacked government infrastructure in the south of the ZMPP and in downtown Port-au-Prince and gained control of all routes

in and out of Port-au-Prince, disrupting transportation and limiting access to humanitarian aid. During the summer of 2024, gangs launched attacks in previously largely violence-free communities such as Carrefour, Ganthier, and Gressier and expelled the Haitian National Police (HNP), causing serious damage to police infrastructure. Gangs also attempted to gain control over Arcahaie and Cabaret, although up to September 2024, their advances were limited amid resistance from local communities and the HNP. The Ouest Department accounted for more than 80 percent of all violent events between 2018 and August 2024 (Figure 13). Artibonite is the second most affected department and witnessed the largest relative increase in violence between 2022 and 2023, severely limiting economic and agricultural activities in the area (BINUH 2023).


Scenarios and Risks

28. Improvements in the security environment of Port-au-Prince will depend both on the success of the transition process as well as the support for the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSSM) and the HNP. The MSSM became operational throughout the summer of 2024

⁷ Various factors can affect the error margin of methodologies relying on media analysis, such as cellphone penetration and internet coverage (Dietrich and Eck 2020).


⁸ ACLED may underreport violent events in areas outside metropolitan Port-au-Prince due to lack of access to internet or media outlets, which may contribute to more comprehensive coverage of events in Port-au-Prince.

FIGURE 11:
Average Fatalities per Month from Violent Events,
2018–24




Source:
See Armed Conflict Location & Event Data
(accessed September 1, 2024), <https://acleddata.com/>.

FIGURE 12:
Fatalities per 100,000 Population by Commune,
September 2023 to August 2024



Source:
See Armed Conflict Location & Event Data
(accessed September 1, 2024), <https://acleddata.com/>.

FIGURE 13:
Share of Violent Events According to Department



Source:
See Armed Conflict Location & Event Data
(accessed September 1, 2024), <https://acleddata.com/>.

with the deployment of a contingent of approximately 400 officers (out of 2,500 officers initially anticipated).⁹ In initial operations with the HNP, the MSSM helped secure some key infrastructure and temporarily liberated, among others, the Varreux terminal as well as road corridors from gang

control. The MSSM cooperates closely with the HNP to clear areas from gang control, with a number of successful operations amid continuous support from Kenya for the MSSM and pledges for additional deployment of personnel by other countries. However, persistent shortages of

⁹ At the time of this writing, support from Caribbean nations remains well below projected levels, with only 24 officers from Jamaica arriving instead of 250 expected from the Bahamas, Belize, and Jamaica.

personnel, resources, and appropriate equipment are limiting its operational effectiveness and ability to maintain control of liberated areas.

29. Most major political factions came to align on the priority of improving security conditions, including with the help of external security forces.

The MSSM is the latest in a series of security support missions in Haiti, some of which have created significant resistance against external intervention. While differences persist, Haiti's political leadership and population have increased their support for the MSSM. While the renewal of the United Nations Security Council mandate for the MSSM until October 2025 does not envision its transformation, the debate on the future of the MSSM highlights the need to equip the MSSM with sufficient resources and equipment to achieve the goal of establishing a secure environment for general elections. At the same time, it showcases a broad consensus to ensure reliable, sufficient funding for the MSSM, with a predictable long-term horizon.

30. Three broad scenarios are conceivable, determining the extent to which the RCIA investment plan can be implemented.

Under an optimistic scenario, political stability sustains and supports an expansion of the operations of the HNP, supported by the MSSM. Legislative and administrative preparations for the elections are concluded in time, made possible by a gradual improvement in security conditions. Elections are held with no or only small delay. In such a scenario, investments in social capital and physical infrastructure can play an important role in improving social cohesion and reducing violence. Procurement and implementation of projects, notably for infrastructure rehabilitation, improve, and access to affected neighborhoods for social protection and employment schemes increases. As the election results are widely accepted, projects will be able to operate and disburse after the transition period ends.

31. Under a second scenario, the consensus on the transition process begins to fail, threatening political stability, fueling violence, and undermining the ability of authorities to base political decisions on a broad consensus.

Allegations of corruption and government reshuffles or other high-level disputes can undermine political stability and the integrity of the transition institutions, drawing attention away from recovery and stabilization efforts. The MSSM continues to operate in support of the HNP but has difficulty maintaining security in liberated areas as a political consensus is lacking or delayed on how to expand service provisioning and deal with current or former gang members. Elections are held but contested. Security conditions improve, and investment projects proceed, yet the time horizon is limited due to the risk of political unrest and gang activities, including persistent threats to the national ports and airports.

32. Under a pessimistic scenario, political instability undermines the advances of the HNP and MSSM and may risk the missions' sustainability over political disagreements on external support.

As security conditions remain poor, few investments can proceed, with challenges in procurement and access prevailing for all investments foreseen in the RCIA. The sustainability of commenced projects depends on whether elections can be held in time and peacefully.

33. The second and third scenarios entail significant risks.

Gangs would be likely to reinforce their established criminal networks in the neighborhoods under their control and extend them to newly infiltrated areas. With strong territorial control, gangs risk gaining political and social capital and credibility by claiming that political and economic elites, as well as the international community, would remain unable to protect the population and provide services. At the same time, attacks against the population to consolidate or expand territorial control are likely to increase, including in areas outside the ZMPP. The illicit economy linked to international illegal trafficking networks would grow as gangs' violence capacity increases, undermining confidence of the population of the ability of the state to protect its population and infrastructure.



III. Crisis Impact and Priority Needs

34. The 2021–24 crisis has had a devastating impact on Port-au-Prince and on the country as a whole. The impact of this crisis has been far-reaching, affecting most of the population in the metropolitan area and resulting in disruption, damage, and losses across all sectors, spanning economic productivity, critical infrastructure, basic social services, and the ability of the state to provide essential institutional functions, including public security and law and order. While the RCIA focuses on the most affected areas and populations of the ZMPP, the crisis has had cascading effects throughout the country, given regional commercial, financial, transportation, and other dependencies.

35. This section summarizes the impact assessment of and corresponding needs to stabilize the respective sectors and facilitate economic and social recovery. In the short term (2024–26), the RCIA has identified needs of US\$1.34 billion. US\$450 million (34 percent) is needed for infrastructure, US\$388 million (29 percent) for security and rule of law, US\$386 million (29 percent) for social protection (of which US\$150 million is for essential social protection programs and US\$118 million for access to basic services), and US\$114 million (9 percent) is needed for economic recovery and governance (Figure 14).

36. Recovery needs for 2024 to 2026 were selected using a rigorous prioritization process that informed the definition of priority programs and interventions and associated investment requirements across the four priority axes and corresponding sectors. This section summarizes the results of the RCIA and needs identification for all four priority axes. Where possible, estimates for medium-term recovery needs (2026–30) have been included, which will be further developed in future reviews of the RCIA recovery and investment framework.


Priority Axis 1

ECONOMIC RECOVERY, SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION, AND STRENGTHENING OF ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE

37. The security crisis has had widespread, persistent impacts on every sector of the economy. As illustrated in Section 1, comparing Haiti's economic performance with precrisis forecasts can provide a framework to estimate total economic losses. Total lost output since 2018 is estimated to be 39.0 percent of 2024 GDP (US\$9.7 billion), which includes losses originating in the 2018–20 period (18.4 percent of 2024 GDP) and the 2021–24 period (20.7 percent of 2024 GDP). The substantial decline in economic activity is confirmed by a statistical analysis of economic activity, declining intensity of nighttime lights, and a sharp decline in port traffic. The 2021–24 security crisis has led to a significant decline in economic activity and employment, notably through looting, pillaging, and disruption of transportation routes.

38. The security crisis has also exacerbated deficiencies in essential functions of economic governance at the national and local levels. Public sector employment fell from 112,631 in September 2021 to 104,029 in June 2024, a 7.8 percent reduction in the workforce. More than one-half of departing civil servants were technical staff. This situation has also significantly affected the personnel of local administrations in affected areas, where dozens of employees have left. In other cases, such as in Gressier, municipal offices have been closed and abandoned.

FIGURE 14:
Financing Needs by Axis, 2024–26



CONTEXT

39. The business environment has deteriorated progressively since 2018 and sharply since 2021, creating an extremely difficult operating environment for enterprises.

The 2018–2019 period was characterized by social unrest, waves of violence, and several episodes of complete paralysis of the economy (“*peyi lòk*”). In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic introduced several shocks that led to economic contraction and layoffs. The increase in gang-related violence by the end of 2021 disrupted domestic supply chains, including fuel and food distribution. For firms, this resulted in a reduction in productive activities and reduced profits because of the partial or permanent closure of production sites or firms, increasing costs for security, staff resignations due to emigration, and pillaging and vandalism that resulted in losses and damage to capital stock (physical and human).

40. Indicators of economic activity point to a persistent decline.

The Haitian Institute of Statistics and Informatics Economic Activity Indicator is a broad measure of economic activity across the primary (agriculture), secondary (industry), and tertiary (services) sectors. Between the first quarter of 2019 and the second quarter of 2024, the Economic Activity Indicator declined by 17 percent. In the secondary sector, manufacturing, construction, and utilities (electricity and water) were severely affected, with a decline in economic activity of 16, 23, and 43 percent. In the tertiary sector, trade and the hotel industry (restaurants and hotels) suffered

the greatest losses, with 26 and 23 percent declines. Data from economic activity on social media confirm the sizable impacts on sectors such as utility services.¹⁰

41. The composition of employment has changed dramatically in the past four years.

According to the Haiti High-Frequency Phone Survey, the share of employed respondents holding retail jobs—typically small-scale trading activities—increased from 27.8 to 43.2 percent between 2020 and 2023. At the same time, the share of employed respondents primarily engaged in public administration and education—core government functions—fell from 3.3 percent in 2020 to 2.4 percent in 2023, and the share primarily engaged in manufacturing almost halved, from 5.2 to 2.9 percent. High levels of informality prevail, and noncompliance with social security contribution payments rose from 78.9 percent in 2021 to 85.8 percent in 2023.

42. The labor market is increasingly characterized by in-work poverty.

The High-Frequency Phone Survey 2021–23 shows that, despite dropping initially between 2020 and 2021, the share of working-age Haitians in employment increased between 2020 and 2023 by around 10.6 percentage points. At the same time, the marginal progress in poverty reduction between 2012 and 2018 has been reversed over the past three years amid further reduction in living standards. These developments suggest that an increasing share of the population is left in poverty despite employment, seeking alternative activities to sustain their livelihoods to cope with income shocks.

FIGURE 15:
Forecast vs. Actual Agriculture Growth





FIGURE 16:
Economic Activity Indicator, Indexed to Q1 2019



Estimated Losses Compared with Forecasted AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

	PERCENTAGE OF 2024 GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT			US\$ BILLION		
	2018–20	2021–24	TOTAL	2018–20	2021–24	TOTAL
Agriculture	-1.8	-4.5	-6.3	-0.5	-1.1	-1.6

¹⁰ Grazzi, Llamas, Lotti and Peña (forthcoming) use activity by firms on Facebook and nighttime lights as proxies for economic activity, and using a two-way fixed-effects model, explore how increases in political events

(battles, riots involving mob violence, explosions or episodes of remote violence, violence against civilians) and civil events (explosions or episodes of remote violence targeting civilians, general episodes of violence against civilians) can affect economic activity.

AGRICULTURE

43. Insecurity has caused supply chain disruptions, with dire consequences for millions of farmers. Total lost output in the agriculture sector from 2021 to 2024 is estimated at 4.5 percent of 2024 GDP (US\$1.1 billion) (Figures 15 and 16). The agricultural sector is the main source of labor income for a large share of the population. The last household survey (2012) indicated that agriculture accounted for 39 percent of employment in Haiti. The sector is also an important contributor to export earnings. In 2021, agricultural exports included vetiver essential oil, which accounted for 4 percent of exports (US\$46 million), followed by fisheries and crustaceans (US\$27 million), tropical fruits (US\$12 million, primarily mangoes), and cocoa (US\$9 million). Gang control of the main road connecting the metropolitan zone with the south has essentially cut off road travel to the southern peninsula, where most vetiver production and some cocoa production occurs. Gang control of the roads connecting Port-au-Prince with the northern departments created disruptions for mango exports, and gang control of the road leading east through Croix-des-Bouquets threatens transport of coffee from Thiotte.

44. Due to insecurity, mangos can no longer be precleared for export to the United States, removing access to the main export market and drastically reducing income for farmers. Before the crisis, mango exports accounted for US\$12 million annually, an essential source of income for hundreds of thousands of informal farmers. After a 48 percent decline in mango exports in

2022 due to issues related to lack of security, exports to the United States were halted in October 2022. The U.S. Department of Agriculture suspended the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services preclearance program because inspectors' safety could not be guaranteed. The preclearance program was formally closed in January 2023 (Haiti Libre 2022) and has not been reinstated, making it unlikely that the U.S. market will reopen to Haitian farmers for the 2025 mango season.

INDUSTRY

45. An industrial contraction began during the COVID-19 pandemic and deepened during the 2021–24 security crisis. The decline in industrial growth has been broad (Figure 17), with the Economic Activity Indicator showing a decline in manufacturing, construction, electricity and water, and mining activity (Figure 18). The estimated loss in output from the industrial sector is 15.2 percent of 2024 GDP, including the pandemic period (9.3 percent of 2024 GDP) and the 2021–24 period (5.9 percent of GDP). This decline corresponds to severe disruptions in electricity supply, as insecurity has constrained fuel shipments. Lower construction activity is reflective of the impact of insecurity on private investment and low execution rates of public investment capital projects.

46. In the manufacturing sector, the apparel sector has lost more than one-half of its formal employment since 2019, with losses concentrated in Port-au-Prince. Apparel

FIGURE 17:
Forecast vs. Actual Industrial Growth






FIGURE 18:
Economic Activity Indicator, Indexed to Q1 2019



Estimated Losses Compared with Forecasted INDUSTRIAL SECTOR

	PERCENTAGE OF 2024 GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT			US\$ BILLION		
	2018–20	2021–24	TOTAL	2018–20	2021–24	TOTAL
Industry	-9.3	-5.9	-15.2	-2.3	-1.5	-3.8

FIGURE 19:**U.S. Textile and Apparel Imports from Haiti**

Source:
Office of Textiles and Apparel Trade Data, U.S. Department of Commerce,
<https://www.trade.gov/otexa-trade-data-page>.

was Haiti's top export, accounting for 82 percent of total exports and 90 percent of manufactured exports in 2019. The sector exported US\$1.09 billion worldwide and employed nearly 53,000 people in 2019 (Vijil, Lewis-Bynoe, and Amo 2021). Duty-free access to the United States¹¹ and speed to market were among Haiti's most significant competitive advantages (World Bank 2013). The COVID-19 pandemic constrained factory operations and output capacity, and U.S. orders declined precipitously. As worsening security conditions disrupted transport routes and availability of raw materials, the sector lost approximately 30,000 jobs (54 percent), and 15 enterprises stopped operations between 2022 and 2024. Approximately 55 percent of job losses overall occurred in the ZMPP (16,594, or 75 percent of all jobs in the garment industry in the ZMPP) in the same period. In June 2024, there were 18 enterprises employing 25,694 workers at a national level, of which only 5,396 remained in the ZMPP.¹² The decline in apparel exports to the United States from Haiti are evident from textile and apparel import data (Figure 19). The 12-month moving average of exports to the United States declined from US\$1.0 billion in January 2019 to US\$0.7 billion in 2024.

SERVICES

47. The services sector accounts for the largest share of lost output from 2021 to 2024, estimated at 11.8 percent of 2024 GDP (Figures 20 and 21). This is reflective of the large share of services in the Haitian economy and the profound impacts of the security crisis on transportation, restaurants and hotels, and commerce, compounding the losses that began in the pandemic period.

TRANSPORTATION

48. Transportation has been severely disrupted, as reflected in declining port traffic in Port-au-Prince.

Since 2021, gangs have progressively increased control of the three main roads from and to the ZMPP (north via Tabarre and Canaan, south via Martissant, east via Croix des Bouquets), establishing checkpoints and threatening passengers and cargo in return for bribes. Control of these main arteries in and out of the capital has had devastating spillover effects on tourism, agriculture, apparel, and other sectors whose operations require the transport of persons or goods. In addition, the port (La Saline) and the airport of Port-au-Prince have been subject to gang attacks or seizures, resulting in their temporary closure, with serious consequences on virtually all aspects of supply and resulting in a sharp decline in import and export shipment volumes in Port-au-Prince between 2019 and 2024 (Figures 22a and 22b).

FINANCIAL SECTOR

49. The worsening economic crisis and deteriorating operating environment for private enterprises has deeply affected the functioning and performance of the financial system.

Credit activities in the financial sector have been severely affected. The rate of nonperforming loans has progressively risen, from 2.5 percent of loans in September 2018 to 6.7 percent in 2022 and 12.7 percent by March 31, 2024 (BRH 2024).¹³ Exposure of the financial system to credit risk increased sharply, from 4.9 percent in September 2023 to 12.8 percent by March 31, 2024. A decrease in interest revenue has led to a decrease in return on assets, from 1.9 percent in 2021 to 1.1 percent

¹¹Through the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act and Haiti Economic Lift Program.

¹²Data from the Better Work Programme Haiti of the ILO.

¹³Évaluation d'impacts et Programme d'Appui aux Institutions Financières et Entreprises Débitrices du Système Financier Victimes de la Crise Socio-Politique, Banque de la République d'Haiti, Juillet 2024.

FIGURE 20:
Forecast vs. Actual Services Growth





FIGURE 21:
Economic Activity Indicator, Indexed to Q1 2019




Estimated Losses Compared with Forecasted SERVICES SECTOR

	PERCENTAGE OF 2024 GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT			US\$ BILLION		
	2018–20	2021–24	TOTAL	2018–20	2021–24	TOTAL
Services	-4.9%	-11.8%	-16.7%	-1.2	-2.9	-4.2

in 2024. Of all loans in difficulty, 68 percent are in the commerce sector and 17 percent the industrial sector. The same trends are visible in the microfinance sector. The nonperforming loan rate of savings and credit cooperatives rose from 8.5 percent in September 2021 to 11.1 percent in September 2023, and the nonregulated microfinance institutions' nonperforming loan rate increased from 18.9


percent in September 2021 to 30.7 percent in September 2023 (BRH 2024). Financial institutions have also been victims of vandalism and violence. By September 2022, 41 bank branches across the country had been victims of aggression, pillaging, or arson, causing their closure. By March 2024, 18 more bank branches were vandalized or closed in the ZMPP.

FIGURE 22:
Volume of (a) Imports and (b) Exports




Sources:
UN Global Platform, <https://www.officialstatistics.org/>; IMF PortWatch
<https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/faqs>.

FIGURE 23:
Number of Mobile Connections
According to Network Type




Source:
GSMA Intelligence (database) (accessed September 2024),
<https://www.gsmainelligence.com/data/>.

FIGURE 24:
Percentage of Population Covered According
to Network Type




Source:
GSMA Intelligence (database) (accessed September 2024),
<https://www.gsmainelligence.com/data/>.

FIGURE 25:
Mobile Data Consumption per Connection,
Megabytes per Month of Data



Source:
GSMA Intelligence (database) (accessed September 2024),
<https://www.gsmainelligence.com/data/>.

FIGURE 26:
Data Consumption per Connection in Neighboring
Countries, Megabytes per Month



Source:
GSMA Intelligence (database) (accessed September 2024),
<https://www.gsmainelligence.com/data/>.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

50. Mobile telecommunications operators have remained remarkably resilient to challenging security conditions.

As in other sectors, the two main mobile telecommunications operators have navigated kidnappings, fuel shortages, and disrupted transportation routes to maintain services. Remarkably, sector data indicate continued expansion of mobile connections, reaching nearly 10 million by mid-2024, covering 6.2 million unique subscribers because many users have multiple SIM cards (Figure 23). The unique subscriber penetration rate is approximately 52 percent

in Haiti, still lagging other countries in the region such as El Salvador (74 percent) and the Dominican Republic (64 percent). The quality of connection has gradually improved with the rollout of 4G, which now accounts for roughly 69.6 percent of all mobile connections. Insecurity may have limited expansion of 4G coverage to more areas of the country. The 3G network covers approximately 95 percent of the population while 4G coverage reaches only 72 percent (Figure 24). Mobile data consumption has continued to increase exponentially, reaching 1.4 gigabytes per connection per month by mid-2024 (Figure 25), although this significantly lags other countries in the region (Figure 26).

Ensuring efficient mobile network operations will be critical to maintaining connectivity and implementing recovery plans to support growth of Haiti's services sector over the medium term.

TOURISM


51. The tourism sector was already in a recession in 2019, but worsening conditions have devastated business owners, especially in tourism enclaves such as Côte des Arcadins and in the south. In 2019, demand for tourism services was growing, especially for accommodations. International arrivals had been increasing at an annual average rate of more than 6 percent since 2012, with visitor arrivals exceeding 1.2 million per year. International investors and global tourism agencies were expressing interest in Haiti, and a network of guesthouses had emerged during the post-earthquake reconstruction phase to respond to the increasing demand for accommodations, but the increase in crime, violent civil unrest in 2018 and 2019, and the subsequent decision by the United States to place Haiti in its level 4 “do not travel” ban category prompted a recession in the tourism sector (Vijil, Lewis-Bynoe, and Amo 2021). The COVID-19 pandemic amplified difficulties in the tourism industry. Gang occupation of the Martissant area essentially cut off road access to the southern peninsula, severely disrupting tourism in that region. As a result, many firms in the tourism sector (e.g., tour operators, transporters, restaurants) have leveraged a moratorium on loan payments established by the Central Bank.

GOVERNANCE

52. The security crisis has weakened central and local government institutions, limiting their ability to manage public resources and provide services to citizens. Political instability and increasing violence have contributed to systematic weakening of institutions, which are increasingly under-resourced, captured by vested interests, and severely limited in their ability to perform essential public functions. The lack of transparency and accountability in the management of public resources continues to limit service delivery and erode citizens' trust in government (World Bank 2022; 2023). Accordingly, indicators of institutional quality have declined significantly. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index highlights that democratic and economic governance has decreased significantly since 2020 (Figure 27). Similarly, the Worldwide Governance Indicators show that government effectiveness and regulatory quality have experienced particularly troubling declines since 2019 (Figure 28).


53. The crisis has also hampered the government's ability to collect and use data to develop and implement public policies. Timely, reliable data on households, businesses, and public services are crucial for policy success. Haiti's last population census was conducted in 2003, and data on the civil service cannot be systematically updated.

FIGURE 27:
Governance and Institutional Quality in Haiti,
2010–24



Source:
Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2024: Media Kit.
<https://www.bti-project.org>.

FIGURE 28:
Worldwide Governance Indicators,
2010–22



Source:
Worldwide Governance Indicators 2024.
<https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/worldwide-governance-indicators>.

ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNANCE

54. The civil service has lost 7.8 percent of its staff since September 2021, most of whom were technical managers. Government data indicate that 8,602 public sector employees left the country, reducing the total workforce from 112,631 in September 2021 to 104,029 in June 2024 amid a continuing downward trend (DGB 2024). This situation has also affected local government staff in violence-affected areas, where many employees have left their posts. In some cases, such as the municipality of Gressier, offices are closed and abandoned.

55. The loss of capacity in public administration reversed the growth of the workforce employed in the public sector until 2021. From January 2008 to the end of 2021, the civil service grew from 55,728 to 112,648 employees (102 percent) and then declined by approximately 6.5 percent from January 2022 to April 2024 (Figure 29). The size of the workforce has not changed uniformly across ministries and varies according to sector and type of employment. Ministries such as health and justice have seen the largest decline, whereas defense slightly increased. The decline was also not homogeneous among the different types of staff, with technical staff the most likely to leave the civil service. Importantly, the losses recorded are likely to be underestimated due to a high number of ghost employees who stopped going to work. Many government offices have been abandoned or vandalized, with customs and the General Directorate of Taxes (DGI) being particularly affected.

56. The crisis has exacerbated deficiencies in the core functions of human resources management. The lack of


an integrated human resources management information system further aggravates the situation, which is essential for effective recruitment, monitoring, and payroll management. In addition, the absence of an adequate framework for managing and controlling staff and jobs hinders formulation of policies necessary for attracting and retaining qualified, adequately compensated civil servants. Civil service remuneration is low, with a high level of wage compression between the highest and lowest salaries, indicating that compensation levels are insufficient to retain highly qualified staff.

57. Many reform projects and initiatives have been abandoned, have been implemented at an extremely slow pace, or continue to be delayed, as in the case of the new population census. For example, the security situation continues to delay the 5th General Population and Housing Census, which is essential for the development and targeting of policies to improve public services. It was formally interrupted in early 2023 because it was impossible to deploy the 18,000 agents of the Haitian Institute of Statistics and Informatics needed for the count, particularly in the departments of Ouest and Artibonite. In addition, census equipment worth US\$1.3 million was reported lost in January 2022, while the batteries in the tablets and laptops necessary for the enumeration field work had deteriorated.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE

58. The crisis has had an important impact on tax revenues, which remain very low at an estimated 7.4 percent of GDP in FY24.¹⁴ Between 2014 and 2018, DGI's

FIGURE 29:
Evolution of Workforce and Wage Bill,
January 2008 to April 2024



Source:
DGB (2024)

¹⁴ World Bank, Macro Poverty Outlook, Fall 2024.

revenues had increased by an average of 17 percent per year and fell to 2 percent of GDP between 2018 and 2020.¹⁵ From 2020 to 2023, revenues remained stagnant because of challenges with tax collection and the economic recession. The finances of communes in the ZMPP have faced similar challenges. Overall, the 11 communes in the ZMPP record a drop in revenues from 26,170 billion gourdes in fiscal 2018 to 15,369 billion gourdes in fiscal 2020. Cité Soleil and Tabarre are the most affected communes, with decreases of more than 50 percent in 2020. In light of the deteriorating security context, it is highly likely that this drop in revenues continued at the national and local levels (Figure 30).


59. Customs revenues have become the government's main source of revenue, but gang violence undermines effective customs administration. The revenue collected by customs increased substantially in 2023, thanks to better valuation of imported products, despite a drop of more than 50 percent in the volume of imported containers. Customs revenues rose from 46.5 percent of total revenues in fiscal 2022 to 60.0 percent in fiscal 2023 (World Bank 2024b), although customs continues to face significant challenges, mainly resulting from the impact of insecurity on international trade, limited Customs presence and control, and constraints on the agency's ability to combat fraudulent practices. Customs is trying to address these challenges, particularly through digitalization, but a number of priority reforms remain to be implemented to strengthen collection capacity and improve performance.

60. Reforms necessary to ensure effective management of public funds have not been implemented. Since 2017, the Directorate General of Budget has been working to implement the performance-based budgeting reform and to transition to accrual accounting to increase effectiveness,

transparency, and accountability. However, the implementation of these much-needed reforms, mandated by law since 2016, remains protracted. Similarly, the implementation of the integrated financial management information system, designed to support these reforms, has faced significant delays since 2022 despite a promising start at the end of 2021. As of September 15, 2024, only 21 of 30 ministries and institutions had gone live with the system, and at least 30 percent of integrated financial management information system deployment work needs to be redone due to substantial losses in key staff.

61. Various factors continue to hamper management of public investment, including the security crisis, which has a direct impact on quantity and quality of public services provided. Total public investment spending in Haiti was 3.4 percent of GDP in 2022—below the regional average of 4.4 percent (IMF 2022).¹⁶ The execution rate of capital expenditures remains low at 40.5 percent in fiscal 2023, reflecting the limited implementation capacity of government agencies to execute infrastructure projects. Expenditure levels in the social sector are stable, but implementation remains difficult. Public investments have not led to significant improvements in access to or quality of public services. The efficiency of public investment in Haiti, defined as the ability to increase the volume and improve the quality of infrastructure assets for a given level of spending, remains one of the lowest in the world (IMF 2022).¹⁷ Partly as a result of the security crisis, weaknesses persist in i) planning, allocating, and executing budgetary resources, including: (i) the absence of permanent fiscal rules and effective preparation of a Medium Term Budgetary Framework (MBTF) to align budget preparation with fiscal policy; ii) the quasi-absence of ex-ante evaluation of public projects despite the existence of a procedures manual

FIGURE 30:
Change in Revenues of Five Largest Communes
(in percent, left axis) and Revenues of All Communes
in the Metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince (in billions
of gourdes, right axis), 2015–20



Source:
Based on data received from the General Directorate of Taxes.

¹⁵ According to data provided by DGI.

¹⁶ See World Economic Outlook Database.
<https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2024/April>
(accessed September 1, 2024)

¹⁷ World Economic Outlook Database, International Monetary Fund.
<https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2022/April>
(accessed September 1, 2022)

describing the methodology; iii) insufficient project selection criteria; iv) non-application of multi-year budgeting; v) low funding for maintenance; vi) difficulty in mobilizing funding, and poor asset monitoring (IMF 2022).

TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

62. The crisis has delayed efforts to strengthen internal and external control institutions.¹⁸ Virtually all control institutions continue to lack the technical capacity and regulatory framework to increase transparency and accountability in the management of public funds. The recent crises have further undermined the functioning of these agencies, with a significant number of specialized staff having left. For instance, the Supreme Audit Institution has lost 50 percent of qualified staff trained to conduct audits, and the National Commission for Public Procurement has lost 16 percent of its staff and has not been able to replace the auditors who have left. As a result, capacity-building initiatives have not yielded substantial improvements.¹⁹

OVERVIEW OF RECOVERY NEEDS

63. For 2024–26, US\$116.8 million is needed for economic and private sector recovery and economic and administrative governance. Only a few financing needs for the medium term could be determined because of the substantial uncertainties that the security environment has caused. Identified costs amount to a partial total of US\$24 million (Table 1).

64. The security crisis affected the private sector through all four commonly identified transmission channels of shocks and crises, the demand, supply, financial, and uncertainty channels. The disruption of supply chains led to demand shocks from reductions in consumer spending on goods and services, sales to other firms, and exports. A supply shock resulted from closures and reductions in access to imported inputs, business hours, worker absenteeism, and labor productivity. A liquidity squeeze and companies' inability to service debt led to a financial shock amid significant uncertainty about the duration of the crises. Literature on post-crisis recovery, including from the COVID-19 pandemic, emphasizes the central role of small and medium-sized enterprises as engines of growth to address root causes of conflicts created by the lack of jobs and economic opportunities. Lessons from previous crises and stocktaking of policy responses relevant for firms in the recovery phase indicate a need to: (i) restore credit flows to boost investment; (ii) reactivate trade flows and value chain participation; and (iii) implement small and medium-sized enterprise programs to promote firm and productivity growth.

65. The costs of the proposed recovery interventions are estimated to be US\$85 million. The RCIA is based on lessons learned from previous crises and proposes programs that address the channels through which the crisis affected the private sector. Under Priority Action 1, the RCIA proposes a program to restore access to credit for vandalized and non-vandalized firms (e.g., line of credit, partial credit guarantee) and business support services (e.g., training and matching grants) for small and medium-sized enterprises to promote productivity growth. Support of microfinance institutions is also included under Priority Action 1 to target vulnerable groups, in particular small, informal firms. Support provided through microfinance institutions will provide short-term balance sheet support to enable them to absorb repayment and liquidity challenges. Priority Action 2 is designed to help reactivate trade flows and value chain participation, in particular for the export-oriented agricultural and apparel industries. Priority Action 3 is designed to support business environment reforms.

66. For economic governance, the investment plan prioritizes interventions with short-term impact while establishing the foundations for long-term stability. The interventions were identified using the following prioritization criteria: activities to strengthen core government functions to allow the restart of basic service delivery to citizens and businesses and for effective management of public resources, interventions to address capacity constraints in the core government agencies responsible for policy design and implementation to build resilience, activities to promote sustainability and monitoring of policy making, and interventions to revitalize a government culture of transparency and accountability to rebuild citizen trust.

67. The proposed programs address the various ways in which the crisis has affected the public sector. Under Priority Action 4, the RCIA proposes programs to increase the revenue mobilization capacity of customs and DGI (with complementary activities proposed under Priority Action 3), which is essential to creating the fiscal space to fund the necessary investments, the statistical capacity to produce and analyze the data necessary to inform allocation of public resources, and the sectoral capacity to prepare and execute prioritized investments. Under Priority Action 5, the RCIA proposes programs to mitigate losses in human resources and retain and attract staff by strengthening core human resource management functions and improving working conditions and to support the resilience of key public financial management institutions and the national statistical agency by acquiring cloud-based solutions for data storage and management and establishing secure virtual work environments. Under Priority Action 6, the RCIA proposes programs that can increase transparency and accountability by increasing the capacity of internal and external control institutions and publishing key data on collection and spending of public resources.

¹⁸ National Commission for Public Procurement, Supreme Audit Institution, Anti-Corruption Unit, General Inspectorate of Finance.

¹⁹ Some actions to be implemented to increase transparency and accountability are related to the justice sector and are addressed in Priority Axis 1.

TABLE 1:
Needs for Economic Recovery and Administrative Governance

Priority Action	Program	Short-term needs, US\$ (2024–26)	Medium-term needs, US\$ (2026–30)
Revive economy through targeted support for private investment that generates wealth and decent jobs.	Micro, small, and medium-sized enterprise recovery program: support recovery of vandalized businesses and financial institutions and revival of productive activities of micro, small, and medium-sized enterprise.	70,000,000	To be developed
Support development of value chains in processing and production sectors.	Economic diversification support program and support for productive sectors and industries: support value chains with higher added value to restart productive activities, support reestablishment of supply chain links, expand access to markets and investment opportunities.	8,000,000	17,000,000
Implement quick-result actions to improve the business environment.	Improving the business environment: support business recovery and investment by continuing to improve business environment through sector-specific and economy-wide regulatory reforms.	5,750,000	6,900,000
	Customs strengthening program: strengthen customs infrastructure and surveillance capacities by acquiring physical equipment and personal protective equipment.		
Provide economic and financial governance.	Strengthen strategic framework for public finance reform.	7,000,000	To be developed
	Strengthen national statistics.		
	Improve performance of collection administrations (administrative and information technology strengthening).		
	Implement fiscal reform and public investment management.		
	Strengthen General Directorate of Treasury and Public Accounting.		
Provide administrative governance.	Strengthen human resources (including at local levels) and establish integrated human resources management system.	22,200,000	To be developed
	Improve working conditions (spaces and equipment).		
	Implement secure digital work infrastructure.		
	Implement fiscal reform and public investment management.		
	Strengthen General Directorate of Treasury and Public Accounting.		
Increase transparency and accountability.	Increase capacity of oversight and anti-corruption institutions.	3,850,000	To be developed
	Increase transparency and citizen participation.		
TOTAL		116,800,000	23,900,000

Priority Axis 2

REHABILITATION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND REDUCTION OF VULNERABILITIES TO NATURAL AND CLIMATE SHOCKS

68. The security crisis has severely affected transportation infrastructure (roads, ports, airports, related services), inflicting an estimated US\$235 million in damage to roads, US\$62 million to ports, and US\$2.9 million to maritime infrastructure. Securing the international airport has incurred an additional cost of US\$6.5 million. The compounded effects of natural disasters and lack of maintenance have exacerbated the impacts of damage to infrastructure, isolating regions during the rainy season and hindering socioeconomic activities and economic recovery (Stokenberga et al. 2023).

69. For the electricity sector, gang violence has damaged five substations and twenty distribution lines, affecting 60 percent of the customer base in the metropolitan area. Haiti already had the lowest electricity consumption per capita in the region before the crisis (36 kWh/year). In 2020, only 45 percent of Haitians had access to electricity, with just 12.5 percent legally connected. Bill recovery was 45 percent, leading to an annual deficit of US\$250 million to US\$300 million. The closure of the Martissant terminal in 2021 reduced energy storage capacity by 11 percent, and transport of hydrocarbons has become extremely difficult, increasing prices by 15 to 20 percent. The sector's infrastructure is aging and in urgent need of repair, with technical and non-technical losses contributing to high costs and inefficiencies.²⁰

70. Since 2022, potable water coverage has decreased. Gang violence damaged 55 percent of National Directorate for Drinking Water and Sanitation (DINEPA) sites, causing an estimated US\$70.0 million in damages and revenue loss of US\$3.6 million for the ZMPP and Croix des Bouquets technical exploitation centers. The estimated potable water need of the ZMPP is 320,000 m³/day, while DINEPA provided only 140,000 m³/day in 2020. The crisis has led to loss of human resources and made the only official landfill site inaccessible, limiting solid waste collection services.

71. The telecommunications and digital infrastructure sectors face significant constraints due to armed groups threatening equipment, limiting maintenance, and interrupting fuel supply. Between September and November 2023, 85 percent of Digicel sites in the capital and 40 to 60 percent in small towns were operational, but rural sites were almost all out of service, disrupting business continuity and delaying public budget execution (Dorval, Verdeil, and Prevost 2023).

TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE

72. The security crisis has exacerbated deterioration of already insufficient infrastructure, with vandalism, armed violence, and neglect having damaged roads, ports, and airports. Transportation infrastructure includes roads, ports, airports, and associated services such as drainage, waste management, and transport of people and goods. Before the crisis, the road network had already deteriorated significantly because of lack of maintenance. Port and airport infrastructure is insufficient and fails to meet the standards of international traffic regulations and the needs of local traffic. The drainage network, which is insufficient and clogged with waste, has also contributed to the deterioration of ports.

73. The damages to infrastructure amount to more than US\$307 million, including US\$235 million in the road transportation sector alone (Table 2) (World Bank 2021). Gang violence has led to losses of at least US\$62.5 million in terms of port revenue and direct damage to the three main ports of Port-au-Prince of US\$2.9 million. Reinforcement of the security measures at the Port-au-Prince International Airport (security perimeter, watchtowers) has generated an additional cost of US\$6.5 million. These estimated damages are not equal to short-term recovery needs given the deterioration of infrastructure that preceded the 2021 crisis.

TABLE 2:
Damage to Transportation Infrastructure, 2021–24

Sector	Amount (US\$)
Road	235,027,524
Maritime	2,862,653
Port	62,437,500
Airport	6,500,000
TOTAL	306,827,678

ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE

74. The electricity sector in Haiti was already facing significant challenges before the latest crisis. At the national level, energy consumption per capita is approximately 36 kWh/year, the lowest in the region. In 2020, only 45.0 percent of Haitians had access to electricity, and only 12.5 percent were legally connected to the grid. Bill recovery is

²⁰ World Bank. 2021. *Haiti-Rebuilding Energy Infrastructure and Access Project*. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.
<https://documentsinternal.worldbank.org/search/33311180>

estimated at 45 percent. These conditions result in high tariffs that are nonetheless insufficient to cover operational costs, leading to an annual deficit of US\$250 million to US\$300 million (~1.5 percent of national GDP).

75. Insecurity has damaged five substations and twenty distribution lines, affecting 60 percent of the customer base in the ZMPP.

The most-affected municipalities are Arcahaie, Carrefour, Croix des Bouquets, Croix des Missions, Martissant, Rivière Froide, Toussaint Brave, and Varreux.

- **Generation:** The Varreux site (up to 20 MW exploitable, but generally 10 MW available) and the Carrefour power plants (typically 60 MW available plus 15 MW depending on fuel supply) are shut down and not maintained. The provincial power plants (Cayes, Jacmel, Jérémie, Petit Goave), which depend on fuel supply from Port-au-Prince, have also been affected.

- **Transmission:** Projectiles damaged several conductors on two branches of the 69-kV transmission network (166.3 km three-phase) connecting the 10 electrical substations of the network. The North branch, covering approximately 40 percent of the high-voltage network and mainly located in gang-controlled areas, and the South branch, representing approximately 60 percent of the high-voltage network, are still supplied but are unstable and weakened by the numerous emergency repairs. Insecurity has also caused significant delays to ongoing construction work on new high-voltage lines to connect Arcahaie to Nouveau Delmas and Varreux to Carrefour.

- **Distribution:** Five substations and twenty medium- and low-voltage distribution lines are damaged: Carrefour Feuille (7.36 MW), Croix des Bouquets (16 MW), Croix des Mission (16 MW), Martissant (16 MW), and Varreux (32 MW). Control has been regained at the Rivière Froide substation (24 MW), which is back in service, but construction work for its extension remains suspended. The five substations are operating in difficult conditions and at 70 percent capacity, with restricted access for maintenance teams.

- **Commercialization:** The theft of connection equipment affecting the distribution network and the shutdown of five inaccessible substations led to approximately 60 percent of customers in the ZMPP being disconnected. These losses also resulted in the complete loss of equipment and tools. New customer connections have also been compromised.

- **Hydrocarbons:** The closure of the Martissant terminal in June 2021 decreased the country's energy storage capacity by 11 percent. Transport of hydrocarbons is extremely difficult on the Carrefour–City Center and Carrefour–Leogâne axes. Prices are 15 to 20 percent higher than the prices that the authorities have set.

WATER AND SANITATION

76. The crisis has affected distribution of drinking water in the ZMPP because gangs took control over pumping stations and sources in Carrefour and Plaine.

The drinking water needs of the ZMPP are estimated to be 320,000 m³ per day. With 17 springs and 18 boreholes, DINEPA supplied an average of 140,000 m³ per day in 2020, less than one-half of identified needs. Since 2022, the supply of drinking water has decreased further in the targeted areas, with 55 percent of the 34 sites with DINEPA water and sanitation infrastructure having been damaged. An estimated 10 springs and boreholes were vandalized, with some protection infrastructure occupied by squatters; pumping stations on boreholes and reservoirs have been sabotaged with theft of equipment; and the only sewage treatment center has been vandalized.

77. The initial estimate of needs amounts to US\$70 million.

It is estimated that US\$3.6 million in revenue from the technical operating centers in ZMPP and Croix des Bouquets has been lost because of deficiencies in service and reductions in the collection of invoices. In addition to the financial losses, loss of human resources include the death of three employees and the resignation of 65 DINEPA executives and technicians. This crisis has also affected solid waste collection services that the National Solid Waste Management Service and the municipalities provide. Due to gang violence and fuel shortages, waste collection is sporadic, and the only official landfill in the region is no longer accessible.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE

78. Lack of access, high prices, and poor quality of broadband networks constrain the growth of the digital sector and the digital transformation of public administration.

Operators are facing a challenging operating environment. The crisis has resulted in several types of damage: telecommunications sites are inaccessible because armed gangs occupy them, equipment and supplies (generators, solar panels, fuel) have been stolen from remote sites, equipment has been vandalized to extract money from operators, and operators' showrooms have been looted. During September to November 2023, Digicel reported that 85 percent of sites in the capital and 40 to 60 percent in smaller towns were still operational, but sites in rural and remote areas were almost all out of service. Despite the damage, prices are falling rather than increasing, although frequent interruptions in service and diminished network quality force

users to spend more to subscribe to two connections or increase their bandwidth. On the positive side, the crisis and the deterioration in the quality of service have encouraged the entry of new players that offer competitive alternatives for a large number of users, such as Starlink, into the market.

79. Gang activities have prevented Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) employees from accessing data centers, and the building housing the civil pension service has been damaged. This has interfered with the business continuity and integrity of critical information systems that the MEF manages, including payment systems, the check issuing system, the civil service salary payment system, the procurement supplier payment system, the expenditure system, and the pension system.

HOUSING

80. Before the crisis, the housing sector was facing serious deficiencies. Real estate development and financial products are accessible only to the top percentile of the population. Most real estate market transactions are informal. In addition, in areas of high demographic pressure, the most vulnerable populations are found in areas with low land value and in high-risk areas (riverbanks, ravines, the coast) and areas without basic services.

81. A striking feature of this crisis is the abandonment of entire neighborhoods that armed groups have occupied or looted (Table 3). Between January 2021 and April 2024, the population of the ZMPP decreased at an annual rate of 0.59 percent (Flowminder Foundation 2024). The communal sections with the greatest population losses are the first section of Turgeau (Port-au-Prince), the tenth section of Thor (Carrefour), and the third section of Bellevue (Tabarre). The crisis has reduced the housing stock and increased rental costs in the ZMPP by up to 200 percent. The estimated loss of revenue from the housing sector is US\$200 million.

PUBLIC BUILDINGS

82. Armed groups have vandalized public buildings in insecure areas. Office and power-generating equipment has been stolen and buildings vandalized. In the Ouest Department, the premises of the municipal administrations of Cabaret, Croix-des-Bouquets, Ganthier, Gressier, and Thomazeau have been partially or completely looted, as have the premises of elected officials in the municipalities of l’Estère, Gros Morne, Liancourt, and Petite Rivière in the Artibonite Department. The premises of national administrations have also been vandalized. The Ministry of Agriculture building in Croix-des-Bouquets and Ministry of

TABLE 3:
Partial list of abandoned neighborhoods

Port-au-Prince	Delmas	Tabare	Petion-Ville
Manigat City, Martissant 4, New City, Sanatorium, Charity, Carrefour Feuilles, Lelio, Savanne Pistache, Bas-Peu-de-chose, Morne-à-Tuf Bel-air, Fort National, Merchant Post, Wireless	Cite Marc, Solino, Carrefour Péan, Delmas 2, St. Martin	Torcelle, Tecina Village	Pernier

TABLE 4:
Damage to Public Buildings

	Quantity	Cost Per Unit, US\$ Million	Total Cost, US\$ Million
Public buildings housing town halls and councils of administration of communal sections offices partially or completely looted or vandalized	9	0.2	1.8
Ministries partially or completely looted and vandalized	3		5.0
Public agencies partially or completely looted and vandalized	4	0.3	1.2
Public agencies inaccessible and relocated loss over 3 years	4	0.3	1.2
TOTAL			9.2

the Interior and the Ministry of Culture and Communication buildings in Port-au-Prince have been vandalized. The offices of the Office of Vehicle Insurance Against Third Parties, the Public Company for the Promotion of Social Housing, the Pension Civile, and an annex of the National Old Age Insurance Office in the municipalities of Croix-de-Bouquets, Delmas, Port-au-Prince, and Tabarre were burned and looted. Other entities had to relocate their operations. The prime minister's office and other public services, such as those of the Bureau of Monetization of Development Aid Programs, the Haitian Institute of Statistics and Informatics, and the electric utility, have been relocated. Damage is estimated at US\$9.2 million (Table 4).

OVERVIEW OF RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION NEEDS

83. For 2024–26, recovery and reconstruction needs amount to approximately US\$444 million. For 2026–30, reconstruction needs are higher, exceeding US\$1.85 billion (Table 5).

84. Transportation. US\$192 million in investment is needed for the recovery period. Total transportation infrastructure needs far exceed the impact of the crisis. However, in the present security environment, the damages related to gang violence in the past two years (US\$307 million) cannot be fully addressed. The following sequence of investments for 2024–26 is proposed:

- Rehabilitation of priority urban and interurban road infrastructure, for example (non-exhaustive list and priorities to be defined): National Road #1 (RN1–RN3 link) RN1 intersection (Bon Repos)–Morne Cabri intersection, Road to intersection (Bizoton)–Gressier, Boulevard 15 Octobre, Road to intersection by rail, Rue Poupelard, Route de Frères, Construction of three bridges over the Rivière Grise (one at each of the following localities: Pernier, Soisson and Fleuriot), maintenance of streets in the ZMPP.
- Drain and irrigation channel cleaning (priorities to be defined).
- Rehabilitation and equipment of port centers (port of Port-au-Prince, coastal ports of Wharf Jérémie, and in the commune of Carrefour).
- Completion of securing the Port-au-Prince International Airport (project under construction).

85. Electricity. For the recovery period, investment needs are estimated to be US\$68.5 million. Restoration is needed in all segments of the sector. Network operability and

oritized as soon as conditions allow. Construction of new generation units and new high-voltage transmission lines involves procedures for remobilizing contractors or selecting new companies through competitive procurement processes, which will require long-term investments.

86. Water and sanitation. For the recovery period, investment needs for water distribution are estimated to be US\$35.8 million, US\$60 million for stormwater drainage and irrigation activities, and US\$18.9 million for solid waste management. Recovery needs include six types of activities.

- Network rehabilitation and construction: Conduct network tests (supply and distribution) to detect anomalies and perform repairs, give priority to disadvantaged neighborhoods, perform all new and repair work to upgrade the service. Interventions to be scheduled on storage, transfer, and distribution to be implemented gradually as neighborhoods are liberated.
- Restoration of production (pumping stations on boreholes and reservoirs), recovery of source perimeters, and strengthening of the security of these areas as protected zones.
- Recovery, rehabilitation, securing, and return to service of the Morne à Cabri waste treatment plant.
- Behavior change campaigns with an awareness program on water conservation at home and support for DINEPA human resources. Supervision of the technical operating centers of Croix de Bouquets, Gressier, and the ZMPP (e.g., recruitment, staff training, provision of equipment and materials).
- Stormwater channel drainage and irrigation works: urban and rural irrigation channel drainage.
- Solid waste management projects, including rehabilitation of six landfills in the ZMPP.

87. Telecommunications and digital infrastructure. For the recovery period, investment needs are estimated to be US\$25 million. Restoration of telecommunications infrastructure remains the responsibility of private operators. However, the government can implement interventions to support these efforts, while restoring and improving government digital infrastructure, which is currently decentralized in several departments and ministries. This includes intergovernmental connectivity, data hosting centers, and servers. The next step is to redeploy shared digital solutions, such as central data hosting centers, cloud computing, intergovernmental connections, digital document management, and e-signature and e-payment systems.

88. Housing. For the recovery period, investment needs have been estimated to be US\$43.2 million. The two prior-

TABLE 5:
Priority Needs for Infrastructure

Priority Action	Programs	Short-Term Needs, US\$ (2024–26)	Medium-Term Needs, US\$ (2026–30)
Transport Infrastructure	Roads (<i>road rehabilitation, surfacing; road surfaces; cleaning work; repair of drainage structures</i>)	171,344,785	644,582,763
	Maritime transport and navigation aids (<i>lighthouses, access channels, equipment, human resources</i>)	2,862,654	Tbd
	Port infrastructure (<i>Port-au-Prince, Cap Haïtien, coastal ports</i>)	8,325,000	407,925,000
	Security of Port-au-Prince Airport	6,500,000	Tbd
	Airport infrastructure (Les Cayes Airport)	3,000,000	47,000,000
Electricity	Generation	20,000,000	203,590,000
	Transmission	13,500,000	30,000,000
	Distribution	20,000,000	60,000,000
	Commercialization	15,000,000	64,208,898
	Rural and off-grid electrification (<i>excluding Port-au-Prince metropolitan area</i>)		5,000,0000
Water and Sanitation	Water distribution and waste management	35,800,000	38,000,000
	Stormwater drainage and irrigation	60,000,000	190,000,000
	Solid waste management	18,860,000	132,000,000
Telecommunications and Digital Infrastructure	Strengthening of digital infrastructure	9,000,000	30,000,000
	Deployment of digital solutions	12,400,000	Tbd
	Repair of premises	4,000,000	Tbd
Housing	Housing repair grants to affected households	40,000,000	Tbd
	Training of beneficiaries on repairs	3,200,000	
Public Buildings	Rehabilitating municipal buildings (<i>relocation or repair</i>)	2,700,000	Tbd
	Rehabilitating services of public agencies (<i>relocation or repair</i>)	1,600,000	Tbd
	Rehabilitating ministerial buildings (<i>relocation or repair</i>)	2,100,000	Tbd
TOTAL		450,192,439	1,852,306,662

ity actions for the housing sector are a subsidy to families for housing repairs and support for repairs made in accordance with construction standards. This budget includes support for households in the Artibonite Department.

• **Priority Action 1:** The program offers a rental assistance of 50,000 gourdes per household to which 12,000 to 18,500 gourdes can be added to cover electricity, water, and other costs for one year. For rehabilitation of houses damaged by earthquakes and cyclones, the program plans for 72,369 gourdes (US\$550). For this program, a

modest subsidy program of 50,000 gourdes to displaced households requires an investment of US\$40 million. This subsidy will have to be refined for each target group.

• **Priority Action 2:** Training men and women on construction and repair techniques, particularly of earthquake- and cyclone-resistant construction, and establishment of an association of construction professionals, which will support job creation and formalization of the construction sector. This intervention requires US\$3.2 million.

89. Public Buildings. For the recovery period, investment needs are estimated to be US\$6.4 million. Three priority actions are envisaged to make public buildings functional and allow for resumption of essential public and administrative services. Restoration of vandalized premises involves repair of buildings, and replacement of furniture and IT infrastructure. When repair is not feasible, relocation is envisaged, and support for office rental is offered for two years.

- **Priority Action 1:** Repair of municipal buildings. The repair or relocation needs of municipal administrations are estimated to be US\$300,000 per building.

- **Priority Action 2:** Rehabilitation of public agencies. The repair needs of public agencies in Port-au-Prince are estimated to be US\$400,000 per agency.

- **Priority Action 3:** Rehabilitation of ministries. The repair needs of vandalized ministries is estimated to be US\$1,600,000.

Priority Axis 3

PROMOTION OF ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE, EDUCATION, AND OTHER BASIC SOCIAL SERVICES; SOCIAL INCLUSION; AND FOOD SECURITY

90. The security crisis has precipitated unprecedented deterioration in all fields of humanitarian protection.

Foremost, violence has led to unprecedented hunger. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) results for March to June 2024 indicate a disastrous situation, with 50 percent of the analyzed population, nearly 5 million people, experiencing acute food and nutrition insecurity. This is the highest share of food insecure people ever recorded in Haiti and makes Haiti one of the most food insecure countries in the world, third only behind Gaza and South Sudan. This represents an increase of more than 600,000 people since August 2023 and more than 850,000 since the assassination of President Moïse in July 2021.

91. The rise in violence has also rendered entire neighborhoods uninhabitable. The ZMPP alone accounts for a significant proportion of the displaced population, with many residents fleeing to safer areas of the city or other regions of the country. As of September 2024, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) had reached 702,973—22 percent more than in the June assessment. This increase is directly linked to the deteriorating security situation, especially in the ZMPP, where gang violence has forced thousands of families to flee. In displacement sites, the International Organization for Migration has documented

severe protection issues (overcrowding, lack of separation of women's and men's toilets, lack of privacy, and lack of site lighting, which increase the risks of violence against women and girls).

92. The security crisis has severely damaged or destroyed much of the educational and health care infrastructure.

Of 93 health care institutions with beds evaluated in the ZMPP, only 37 percent are fully functional. The security crisis has also worsened learning conditions, with an estimated 1.2 million children (90 percent of children in the studied sites) unable to attend school regularly in 2024. School closures expose children to educational setbacks and the risk of recruitment by armed groups. Private schools report attrition of up to 60 percent, threatening their operational viability. And while the provision of higher education was already insufficient and largely private before the crisis, many higher education institutions in the ZMPP were significantly impacted by violence. The discontinuity of the functioning of universities has directly affected more than 66,000 students.

INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

93. The security crisis has led to a dramatic increase in internal displacement.

As of September 2024, the number of IDPs had risen to 703,000, a 20 percent increase from the previous assessment in June. This increase is directly linked to the worsening security situation, particularly in the ZMPP, where gang violence has forced thousands of families to flee their homes. The majority of IDPs are women and girls (54 percent) and have sought refuge in provinces outside the ZMPP (68 percent), often staying with host families. Approximately 32 percent of IDPs remain within the ZMPP, residing in overcrowded, unsanitary sites (96 identified sites within the ZMPP housing 112,851 IDPs). Conditions in these sites, often located in schools, churches, and other communal spaces, are dire, with limited access to basic services such as clean water, health care, and sanitation.

94. The displacement crisis has severely dampened economic activity.

Displaced individuals, many of whom were previously economically active, now face significant barriers to employment and income generation. This loss of livelihoods contributes to a broader economic decline in regions heavily affected by displacement, exacerbating poverty. The social fabric of communities has also been strained, with the influx of IDPs placing additional pressure on already-limited public resources and services. In provinces such as the Grand Sud, IDPs account for nearly 47 percent of the local population and place an immense strain on local communities and governments.

95. The displacement crisis has also resulted in substantial financial burdens for IDPs. Annual rent for a single room in the ZMPP varies from approximately 25,000 to 150,000 gourdes (average ~44,363 gourdes, median 40,000 gourdes). This cost is a significant financial burden on displaced families, particularly when coupled with other living expenses. Most IDPs originate from Port-au-Prince, accounting for the majority of associated needs for relocation and subsistence. Thirty-two percent of renters have experienced a rent increase since moving into their current residence, paying on average 200 percent more than they did previously. This sharp rise in rental costs further strains the financial resources of displaced families and contributes to the broader economic challenges that IDPs face.

SOCIAL PROTECTION

96. Escalation of gang violence since 2021 has exacerbated the socioeconomic conditions of most of the population in the ZMPP. Marginal progress in poverty reduction between 2012 and 2018 is estimated to have been reversed over the past three years (see Section II). As a result, the size of the vulnerable population in need of social protection has significantly increased.

97. Given the compounding economic shocks of the recent past, eradicating poverty in Port-au-Prince would require more than US\$0.5 billion per year. Based on data from the 2012 Enquête sur les Conditions de Vie des Ménages Après le Séisme (Obama 2014) and projections of population and poverty trends in Port-au-Prince, the Macro Poverty Outlook of 2024 was used to estimate the poverty gap. This approach suggests that it would cost US\$40.0 million per year to eliminate extreme poverty—calculated using the lower national poverty line—and as much as US\$572.9 million per year to eliminate overall poverty—calculated using the upper national poverty line. This can be estimated by calculating the poverty gap ratio and multiplying it by the population and the poverty line. A further 25 percent is added to account for the costs of targeting and registering recipients, cash transfer delivery fees, and program administration and evaluation. While these scenarios are not likely to be practicable because they rely on giving poor individuals just enough to reach the poverty line (so each person receives different amounts), they help benchmark the options outlined below.

98. Various cost scenarios could be used to set up a social assistance program in the ZMPP, depending on the size of the target population and the social assistance benefit. Four scenarios are considered. The first and second correspond to the number of people living in the ZMPP below the lower national poverty line (~220,000 people) and the

upper national poverty line (~1.1 million people) according to the Macro Poverty Outlook projections. A third scenario is taken from the Cash in the City report, which uses household and geospatial data to assess vulnerability in Port-au-Prince, identifying a vulnerable population of approximately 360,000 people (D'Oust et al. 2022). A fourth scenario is taken from the April 2024 World Food Program Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping bulletin, which estimates that 1.75 million people in Port-au-Prince have insufficient food (WFP 2024).

99. Benefit amounts are calculated as a share of the minimum expenditure basket (MEB) needed for a household to cover the cost of basic food and non-food essentials. The benefit amounts are calculated using the basic food MEB and total (food and non-food) MEB cited in the World Food Program Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping bulletin from July 2024, which uses the latest data on the price of essential food and non-food items. The food-only MEB is estimated to be 29,108 gourdes per month for a family of five, which corresponds to US\$1.43 (current) per person per day.^{22, 23} The total MEB is estimated to be 54,743 gourdes per month for a family of five, which corresponds to US\$2.76 (current) per person per day—roughly halfway between the upper and lower national poverty lines.^{24, 25} Including non-food items in this way can inform the amounts needed for a multipurpose cash-transfer program, which would differ from a program seeking to provide only minimal food consumption. The benefit amounts correspond to transferring 20 percent of the food and overall MEBs to each person for 12 months or making a one-off transfer of 70 percent of the MEBs. This one-off amount is the type of transfer that would be made to smooth consumption and promote recovery to help households respond to a shock or humanitarian crisis. Such one-off payments are unlikely to improve livelihoods as much as regular smaller transfers.

100. The sizable variation in the annual costs of these scenarios highlights the need to specify the objectives of any intervention and collect additional information on households. Depending on the size of the target population and benefit amounts, the annual cost of delivering social assistance varies from US\$8.5 million to US\$434.9 million per year (Table 6). The recovery needs are estimated based

²² The Haiti Cash Working Group calculated the food and non-food components of the MEBs in March 2024. Further details can be found on the Initiative *Conjointe de Suivi des Marchés* dashboard at <https://dashboards.impact-initiatives.org/hti/icsm2023/>.

²³ The MEB is calculated in adult-equivalent terms, but for the individual-level estimations that follow, the MEB is simply divided by five. All of the estimations are done at the individual level so that they can be benchmarked against the poverty gap ratio.

²⁴ The MEB is calculated using national-level data. The minimum expenditure required for food and non-food items for Port-au-Prince may be higher, given the effects of the security crisis on local markets.

²⁵ These calculations are in current U.S. dollars rather than 2017 U.S. dollar PPP, which would normally be used for international poverty calculations, to calculate current costs of social protection in Haiti.

²¹ This is likely to be a conservative estimate because the Macro Poverty Outlook applies GDP growth (or decline) evenly across the population. In reality, living standards in Port-au-Prince have declined more than in the rest of Haiti (see Section II).

TABLE 6:
Estimated Costs of Social Assistance Options
for Port-au-Prince

Targeting Options	Individual Beneficiaries (N)	Annual Budget (Current US\$)			
		Food-Only MEB		Total MEB	
		20% Paid Monthly	70% One-Off Payment	20% Paid Monthly	70% One Off Payment
Below lower poverty line in 2024	1,083,081	29,232,827	8,526,241	54,977,761	16,035,180
Below upper poverty line in 2024	1,083,081	143,117,145	41,742,501	269,158,371	78,504,525
Cash in the City (2020)	356,907	47,161,303	13,755,380	88,695,589	25,869,547
Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping, April 2024	1,750,000	231,243,096	67,445,903	434,895,589	126,844,547

Sources:

Obama (2014); D'Aoust et al. (2022); WFP (2024).

Note:

Food-only minimum expenditure basket (MEB) estimated at 29,108 gourdes per month for a family of five. Total MEB, including non-food items, estimated at 54,743 gourdes per month for a family of five.

TABLE 7:
Damage to Education Infrastructure

Infrastructure	Port-au-Prince metropolitan area	Artibonite
Schools	6,774	2,472
Schools vandalized or damaged	233	51
Schools closed completely	418	97
Schools partially closed	398	6
Students affected by discontinuity of school services	140,352	15,347

102. School closures for security reasons expose children not only to setbacks and loss of education, but also to the risk of recruitment by armed groups. According to a rapid gender assessment that UN Women conducted in June 2024 in IDP sites in Port-au-Prince, 90 percent of children living in the sites surveyed were no longer in school. In addition to recurring obstacles such as cost and inadequate infrastructure, most schools are no longer functional, and some are being used to house IDPs.

103. Damage has affected the communes of Delmas, Liancourt, Port-au-Prince, and Tabarre the most. In the ZMPP, 233 of 6,774 schools were affected, with 233 vandalized or damaged (Table 7). In the Artibonite Department, 51 of 2,472 schools were affected, with 21 vandalized and 30 damaged. This has affected 140,352 students in the ZMPP and 15,347 in Artibonite. The replacement costs for furniture and equipment such as benches, desks, tables, chairs, bookcases, and computer equipment amount to US\$710,000. In addition, private schools have reported a loss in tuition fees because of a 60 percent attrition rate.

ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION

101. The deteriorating security environment has worsened learning conditions. In 2024, nearly 1.2 million children, including 200,000 IDPs, have not been able to attend school regularly. In 2022 and 2023, protests against the decision to cancel the subsidy on petroleum products resulted in the loss of more than 40 days of school. However, the cost of education (school fees, educational materials, transportation, food) remains one of the greatest barriers to education as 85 percent of school infrastructure is private, and 77 percent of students attend non-public schools. In the 2022/23 school year, 39 percent of school-aged children did not attend school because of costs, which average US\$140 per year per student for basic education.

HIGHER EDUCATION INFRASTRUCTURE

104. More than 20 percent of all higher education institutions have been completely or partially damaged, affecting more than 66,000 students. Three-quarters of all higher education institutions are located in the Ouest Department. The Directorate of Higher Education and Scientific Research of the Ministry of National Education listed 158 private higher education institutions in August 2024. Public higher education institutions comprise 10 regional public universities; 8 training centers or schools attached

TABLE 8:
Damaged Educational Institutions

	Public			Private		TOTAL
	State University of Haiti	Regional public university	Ministries	Conference of Haitian Rectors, University Presidents and Heads of Higher Education Institutions	Other	
Universities	23	10	8	30	128	198
Faculties Vandalized Or Damaged	8	0	3	9		19
Faculties Completely Closed	8	0	2	3		12
Faculties Partially Closed	4	0	0	5		9
Students Affected By Discontinuity Of University Services	30,000	11,682	–	25,000		66,682

to ministries, four of which have had to relocate their operations; and 23 faculties of the State University of Haiti, an autonomous public institution, 8 of which have been looted (Table 8). Of 30 private universities that are members of the Conference of Haitian Rectors, University Presidents and Heads of Higher Education Institutions, nine have been looted, with damage amounting to more than US\$7 million. Three campuses renovated in the last seven years have been looted, including technical laboratories for research and teaching specializing in medicine, agriculture, dentistry, engineering, and science. The damage jeopardizes the international accreditation of many educational programs and threatens their ability to continue operations. It is estimated that private universities have lost more than US\$5.2 million in revenue (tuition fees), with a student attrition rate of 70.0 to 97.5 percent, affecting more than 66,600 students. Higher education institutions in Port-au-Prince have experienced the most damage and have the greatest short-term recovery needs (Table 9). The two regional public universities in Artibonite Department have not recorded any damage.

FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION

105. The security crisis has precipitated unprecedented levels of hunger. In the ZMPP alone, the overall food security of households in the metropolitan area has deteriorated over the past four years. In 2019, approximately 856,000 people were in IPC Phase 3 (crisis) or higher, which increased to 980,000 in 2021 and 1,114,000 in 2022 and is estimated to have been more than 1,118,000 in 2023. Although the increase in the population in IPC Phase 3 or higher has slowed in the last year, it has risen by more than

TABLE 9:
Damage and Needs in the Most-Affected Communities (US\$)

Commune	Damage	Needs
	U.S. dollars	
Cabaret	665,400	510,000
Croix-des-Bouquets	1,000,872	7,476,339
Delmas	70,000	180,000
Port-au-Prince	4,729,231	23,476,219
Tabarre	2,350,000	3,831,250
TOTAL	8,805,503	35,475,808

30 percent over the past four years. The number of people in IPC Phase 4 (emergency) or higher has more than doubled, from 227,660 in 2019 to 480,262 in 2023, now including nearly 21 percent of households analyzed. More than two-thirds of those in IPC Phase 4 (~326,000 people) are concentrated in the poor and very poor neighborhoods of Cité Soleil and Port-au-Prince.

106. In addition, the deteriorating security situation and increasing armed conflicts have contributed to increasing malnutrition rates. According to the IPC analysis of acute malnutrition from December 2023 to May 2024, the commune of Croix-des-Bouquets is in Phase 4 (critical), with the highest prevalence of acute malnutrition (19.2 percent), based on a recent SMART survey conducted from January to March 2023 (Table 10). The situation is expected to worsen during the cyclone season and other harsh weather conditions. The poor nutritional status is due

TABLE 10:

Acute Food Insecurity Situation According to Commune (Projected March–June 2024)

Commune	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Phase 3+	Acute Food Insecurity as a Percentage of Total Population
Carrefour	154,497	45
Cité-Soleil	230,475	60
Croix-des-Bouquets	46,803	60
Delmas	160,977	45
Fonds Parisien	Not available	
Ganthier	Not available	
Gressier	Not available	
Kenscoff	Not available	
Pétion-Ville	76,004	45
Port-au-Prince	573,276	60
Tabarre	17,355	55
Thomazeau	Not available	
TOTAL	1,260,000	54

to inadequate food diversity and frequency and high rates of morbidity, particularly respiratory infections, diarrhea, and malaria in children.

107. The current level of inflation has eroded household purchasing power. More than 33 percent of households reported experiencing an economic shock (rising prices of commodities or fuel, job loss, reduced business) since the beginning of April, making it difficult to afford the cost of the MEB; 94 percent of households have no food stocks and purchase their food on a daily basis.

HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE

108. The health care infrastructure has been severely damaged since 2021, drastically reducing its functioning. In the ZMPP alone, the overall food security of households in the metropolitan area has deteriorated over the past four years. In 2019, approximately 856,000 people were in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or higher, which increased to 980,000 in 2021 and 1,114,000 in 2022 and is estimated to have been more than 1,118,000 in 2023. Although the increase in the population in IPC Phase 3 or higher has slowed in the last year, it has risen by more than 30 percent over the past four years. The number of people in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) or higher has more than doubled,

TABLE 11:

Damage to Public Health care Facilities

Facilities	Port-au-Prince Metropolitan area	Artibonite
Health care institutions with beds	93	25
Hospitals destroyed	2 (private)	0
Hospitals partially damaged	11 (6 public, 5 private)	0
Health care centers with beds partially or totally damaged or looted	14 (6 public, 8 private)	0
Hospitals and CALs with partially or totally damaged or looted equipment	33	
Closed Health care Institutions	38	6

from 227,660 in 2019 to 480,262 in 2023, now including nearly 21 percent of households analyzed. More than two-thirds of those in IPC Phase 4 (~326,000 people) are concentrated in the poor and very poor neighborhoods of Cité Soleil and Port-au-Prince. In areas controlled by armed groups lack adequate human resources.

109. Only 5 percent of health care facilities with inpatient beds continue to function normally. A Pan American Health Organization study found that 94.6 percent of 93 healthcare facilities in the ZMPP with inpatient beds were not or only partially operational due to insecurity; lack of human resources, supplies, medicines, and funding; and other causes; 42 percent were partially functional, 37 percent were fully functional; and 18 percent were non-functional (Table 11). Nearly 80 percent of healthcare is delivered in private institutions. Of the 93 institutions, only 19 are public and provide services to the most disadvantaged populations, and only 2 of these can provide all required services without interruption. The municipalities that the non-functionality or partial functioning of the healthcare infrastructure has affected most are Carrefour, Cité Soleil, Croix-Des-Bouquets, Delmas, Kenscoff, Pétion-Ville, Port-au-Prince, and Tabarre. Facilities without inpatient beds (level one of the health system) were not included in the assessment due to data limitations.

TABLE 12:
Investment Needs for Social Security

Priority Actions	Programs	Short-Term Needs (2024–26)	Medium-Term Needs (2026–30)
		U.S. Dollars	
Support internally displaced populations	Support for relocation or return of internally displaced persons to their homes	19,756,250	Tbd
Create emergency employment and income for young people, especially women, in areas affected by violence	Professional training and intermediation	15,500,000	Tbd
Restore education infrastructure and make available for start of school year	Ensuring October return to school for public and private schools in West and Artibonite departments	108,975,808	153,000,000
	Restoring functioning of affected universities		
Strengthen shock response mechanisms using cash transfers for vulnerable households	Social safety net for most vulnerable households	77,214,254	Tbd
	Expansion and modernization of Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor social register		
Increase food and nutritional security	Establishment of school cafeterias, based on local purchases	45,000,000	Tbd
Guarantee access to basic social services, particularly in disadvantaged areas affected by violence, considering people with disabilities and respecting gender equity	Ensuring access to health care infrastructure in vulnerable areas affected by violence	118,790,438	Tbd
	Community centers for seniors		
	Early childhood centers		
TOTAL		385,941,400	153,000,000

110. A shortage of health care professionals is another major challenge. From October 2021 to December 2023, the number of staff at the Ministry of Public Health and Population decreased by 17 percent, from 13,800 to 11,500 employees. At the national level, there are 7.3 essential personnel per 10,000 inhabitants, below the Pan American Health Organization/World Health Organization recommendation of 25 per 10,000. The number of available medical staff, who often cannot go to work for safety reasons, is also decreasing. The United Nations Children’s Fund (2024) estimates that approximately 40 percent of health care providers have recently left the country “due to extreme levels of insecurity.”

OVERVIEW OF RECOVERY NEEDS

111. For the recovery period, US\$386 million is needed for social services, social safety nets, and food security (Table 12). Additional data and situational assessments are needed to calculate medium-term needs. US\$153 million is needed for the education sector alone.

112. Internal displacement. Short-term programs should provide IDPs with support to cover relocation and basic needs. Based on detailed market assessments and cost analyses, the estimated monthly cost of such cash transfers ranges from US\$299 (for a prolonged crisis scenario) to US\$358 (for an emergency scenario) per household. These figures represent the minimum expenditure required to sustain a household’s basic needs, including food, shelter, and other essentials, during the displacement period. The shares of IDPs among local populations highlights how important a sustainable support system is to maintain social cohesion. Losses accrued to municipalities and services at the place of destination of the IDPs have not been part of the assessment beyond the assessment in Priority Axis 1, as most IDPs reside outside the ZMPP and are therefore not within the scope of the RICA.

113. Emergency employment. In light of the loss of employment and livelihood opportunities (Priority Axis 1), job formation programs will be an immediate priority, especially in newly liberated areas. Notably, labor-intensive construction and rehabilitation projects have a huge potential for job creation for young men and women, including IDPs, and

would be a major contribution for sustainable socioeconomic inclusion and, recovery, as well as poverty reduction. Mainstreaming decent work principles in such investment projects have the potential to address root causes of conflicts created by the lack of jobs and economic opportunities. In addition to the rehabilitation programs under Axis 2, programs in Axis 3 will include apprenticeship programs and vocational training based on market needs. A program for vocational training for establishment of a network of social workers and childcare and a program to strengthen public employment services, including a program to digitize intermediation services, will also be established.

114. Education. US\$73.5 million is needed for immediate recovery needs in four areas: adapting school infrastructure to meet the needs of all children, including those with disabilities; supporting continuity of school services; providing psychosocial support; and strengthening institutions. These activities are planned over a 24-month period, divided into short-, medium-, and long-term phases. In the short term, efforts include renovating schools that IDPs attend, creating temporary teaching spaces, distributing school materials, supporting poor families to increase enrollment, providing school meals, offering remedial courses, and providing psychosocial support to students and teachers. In the medium term, the focus is placed on constructing and rehabilitating school infrastructure, with an emphasis on safety, resilience to climate-related disasters, and training teachers on risk management. In the long term, curricula will be reformed to incorporate resilience and risk management, and a national policy and strategy for education during crises and emergencies will be developed.

TABLE 13:
Social Assistance Needs According to Commune

Commune	Needs (US\$) ^a
Carrefour	9,566,419
Cité-Soleil	4,959,063
Croix-des-Bouquets	4,670,123
Delmas	7,394,652
Ganthier	1,169,921
Gressier	681,969
Kenscoff	1,074,496
Pétion-Ville	7,049,908
Port-au-Prince	18,470,920
Tabarre	2,437,378
Thomazeau	990,799
TOTAL	58,465,654

a. Needs estimates at the commune level are estimated by weighting total needs by commune population size.

115. Higher education. US\$35.5 million is needed, with a focus on four priority actions. Priority Action 1 involves repairing damaged structures and replacing energy sources. Priority Action 2 focuses on restoring specialized laboratories, equipment, and furniture. Priority Action 3 provides psychosocial support for students and teachers. Priority Action 4 builds capacity for distance learning, including purchasing necessary equipment. The Conference of Haitian Rectors, University Presidents and Heads of Higher Education Institutions has proposed a strategy to finance private universities through a tuition fee subsidy for students, enabling these institutions to cover losses.

116. Social protection. It is estimated that US\$58 million is needed to meet immediate needs for social assistance programs for highly vulnerable households. In the short term, the priority will be implementation of a cash transfer program to address the most pressing needs of households living below the lower poverty line. The program will deliver monthly unconditional cash transfers of 20 percent of the MEB to identified poor households over 24 months (Table 13).²⁶ Such a program can be expanded quickly as security conditions allow.

117. To increase food and nutrition security, early recovery priorities must align with the government food systems roadmap for 2030 and the national social protection policy. Key actions include supporting demand for local food products by extending the homegrown school meal program to all schools in the ZMPP, expanding social assistance to the most vulnerable households to address food insecurity and malnutrition, and implementing fiscal and tariff reforms to transform food systems. Key actions for the medium term include supporting the demand for local food products by extending the school feeding program to all schools in the ZMPP and implementing fiscal and tariff reforms to transform food systems.

118. More than US\$55 million is needed for the health care sector. Priority programs focus on six actions to ensure the safety of institutions, patients, and staff; access to health care services (including reopening institutions in the most affected communes); and provision of necessary resources to health care institutions (staff, supplies): reconstructing and rehabilitating hospitals (estimated cost US\$910,000 per institution); reconstructing and rehabilitating health care centers with beds (estimated cost US\$300,000 per institution); purchasing medical equipment and supplies for health care institutions (estimated cost US\$7,000,000); installing energy systems (distribution and generation) to ensure operation of centers and hospitals (estimated cost US\$22,000,000); supplying National Ambulance Center with equipped ambulances, spare parts, and materials (estimated cost US\$4,000,000); and providing initial stock of supplies to enable rehabilitat-

²⁶ Detailed calculations are available upon request

ed structures to function in the first months, with national budget covering staff costs. These needs exclude reconstruction of private hospitals and address only public institutions, provided that security in the affected areas is ensured. The operational resources (staff and supplies) will be determined after prioritizing the infrastructure to be rehabilitated and will be included in the national budget.

Priority Axis 4

STRENGTHENING RULE OF LAW AND PUBLIC SECURITY

119. The security crisis exacerbated communal violence and significantly affected the justice and security sectors, as well as the rule of law. The justice system faced heavy losses as courts were burned and looted, and 57 percent of the judges of the Court of First Instance in Port-au-Prince left their posts. Nine courts, including several peace courts, were damaged or relocated, while the Judicial School has not been able to train new judges for two years, causing the number of active lawyers to plummet.

120. Gender-based violence (GBV) increased significantly in the ZMPP, with a 340 percent increase in reported cases between 2020 and 2023. In 2024, nearly 3,949 incidents of GBV were reported, 72 percent of which were sexual violence. Up to seven women's protection centers were closed or damaged, limiting access to essential services for survivors.

121. In terms of public security, the crisis has aggravated preexisting lack of equipment and staff of the HNP. Of the 12,870 police officers listed, only 11,335 were active as of September 30, 2024, with a ratio of 1.02 police officers to every 1,000 inhabitants. Since 2021, 174 police officers have been killed, and an estimated 2,500 have left their posts. In 2024 alone, gang attacks have led to the destruction of over 50 police stations and three prisons, with estimated losses in infrastructure and equipment of US\$39.1 million.

JUSTICE SYSTEM

122. Since 2021, Haiti has faced a severe political and security crisis that has profoundly weakened its judicial system. The crisis has led to the burning and looting of courts, and threats to or killings of judicial actors, resulting in the departure of 57 percent of judges from the Tribunal de Première Instance of Port-au-Prince. The volume of cases has consequently plummeted by 67 percent since 2020. Despite a mass escape of more than 4,000 inmates in

March 2024, the pretrial detention rate remains alarmingly high (83 percent).

123. The School of Magistracy has been unable to conduct initial training for the past two years because it is located in a high-risk area, although with international support, it has been able to organize training on financial crimes.²⁷ Legal assistance, funded by donors for 25 years, was used to establish the National Council for Legal Assistance (CNAL) in 2018, which opened 13 offices in 18 jurisdictions. However, lack of security has hindered the opening of offices in certain areas, and the council has lost 15 employees due to insecurity.

124. The crisis has also significantly reduced the number of lawyers, from 4,430 to 2,200, with only 110 being women. Many lawyers have left the profession or sought alternative income sources because of the dysfunction of the courts and tribunals. The relocation of the International Criminal Court has disrupted the operations of the Port-au-Prince Bar Association. Significant challenges include addressing pending cases and combating prolonged pretrial detention.

125. The judicial infrastructure has suffered significant damage. The Tribunal of First Instance, two peace courts (north and south), and a children's court have been severely damaged, while the courts in Port-au-Prince and Croix-des-Bouquets have been relocated to cramped, unsafe facilities, drastically reducing their capacity to handle cases. This relocation has led to a 66 percent decrease in criminal cases and a 33 percent decrease in civil cases. Other affected areas include Carrefour, Delmas, Gressier, Pétion-Ville, and Thomazeau, where several peace courts have also been damaged. The estimated cost of rehabilitating each damaged court ranges from US\$200,000 to US\$500,000, with a total estimated rehabilitation cost of US\$1.8 million to US\$4.5 million for the nine identified courts. This financial burden adds to the already strained resources of the judicial system, complicating efforts to restore normal operations.²⁸

SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

126. Since 2021, GBV, particularly sexual violence, has increased significantly in the ZMPP. This violence includes incidents during armed group attacks and those occurring outside such attacks. In some neighborhoods, up to 80 percent of women and girls are survivors of GBV. Data from Kay Fanm, a GBV service provider in Port-au-Prince, shows a 340 percent increase in cases from 2020 to 2023. In displacement sites, the International Organization for Migration has documented severe protection issues, such as lack of privacy and inadequate lighting, which heighten the risk of violence against women and girls.

²⁷ A 2017 study revealed that Haiti has 62 law education institutions, but only 3 percent of the teachers hold PhDs, and some faculties operate with as few as four professors for 10 subjects.

²⁸ Limitations of this study include inability to access courts because of the danger of entry, which restricted data collection. Many cases are inaccessible because they are located in gang-occupied areas, and there are no reliable statistics or a functioning national system.

127. From January to May 2024, 3,949 GBV incidents were reported, with 72 percent being sexual violence.

The number of reported GBV incidents has been rising continuously, with approximately five times as many incidents in March 2024 as in January and February 2024, increasing from 250 to 1,543. Between March and May 2024, the number of new cases rose by approximately 40 percent, from 1,543 to 2,156. Most incidents occurred in the Ouest (70 percent) and Artibonite (26 percent) departments. Most survivors are women (75 percent) and girls (20 percent), with 61 percent being IDPs—43 percent living in the community and 18 percent in displacement sites.

128. Despite a slight improvement in access to services within 72 hours of a rape, from 25 percent in March to 27 percent in May 2024, access remains limited.

Lack of adequate support structures, forced closures, insufficient trained personnel, and the country's security situation are major obstacles. The referral mechanism for survivors is weak, and safe spaces or temporary emergency shelters for survivors are precarious and insufficient. The effects of GBV are felt throughout the metropolitan area, with reported cases concentrated in Port-au-Prince (44 percent), Cité Soleil (11 percent), Delmas (8 percent), and Croix-des-Bouquets (2 percent).

129. The impact of GBV extends beyond survivors to their families, communities, and society at large, causing physical, psychological, economic, social, and behavioral consequences.

Secondary impacts include intergenerational effects, communal conflicts, and strain on institutions and services. Gang violence has led to the closure or damage of five to seven women's protection centers. Rehabilitation costs for these centers range from US\$200,000 to US\$500,000 each, totaling US\$1 million to US\$3.5 million. Closure of these centers has resulted in the loss of 50 to 105 jobs for professionals such as psychologists, social workers, and legal advisers, with an estimated economic loss of US\$400,000 to US\$1.575 million annually.²⁹

POLICE

130. As the crisis has led to a significant increase in homicides (see Section II), security forces are suffering significant losses.

The HNP³⁰ currently employs 12,870 police officers, of whom only 1,561 are women (12 percent), leaving a ratio of 1.02 officers per 1,000 inhabitants, significantly lower than regional standard of 2.20 officers per 1,000 inhabitants. Between, January 2021 to 31, August 2024, 174 police officers have been killed and estimated 2,500 have left their posts to due unsafe conditions, emigration, post abandonment, dismissal, or deaths in the first one-half of 2024 alone, 23 police office were killed and 48 injured.

131. Infrastructure and equipment have been primary targets of gang attacks.

Of 412 HNP facilities, 76 are non functional, 146 require major rehabilitation, and 57 have been recently damaged. Between 2021 and 2024, 81 gang attacks destroyed 47 police stations and 2 prisons and damaged 13 other buildings, as well as 40 light vehicles and 11 armored police vehicles. The HNP is confronted with a significant number of illegal weapons in circulation with only limited equipment and capacity in personnel. The Anti-Kidnapping Unit, which was reactivated in 2021, has not been able to curb the increase in kidnappings, which have doubled each year since 2020 from 124 documented cases in 2020 to 1,418 cases reported in the first eight months of 2024. The Destruction of prisons and frequent release of alleged rapists and other criminals increase the risks for GBV survivors. Due to the loss of equipment and lack of vehicles (1 for every 15 officers), the HNP also has prolonged response times. Implementation of community policing, despite a new commitment in 2022 to strengthen local cooperation, is progressing slowly. A specialized GBV unit exists but lacks resources.

132. Losses in the security sector amount to US\$39.1 million.

Nationwide, out of a total of 412 police facilities, 74 remain non-operational, 49 of these located in the West Department, and 7 in the Artibonite Department. In Port-au-Prince, 21 police stations have been damaged or destroyed, including Martissant, Delmas 2/DCPR, and the Highway Police Directorate, the HNP Central Garage, and Martissant, resulting in losses of approximately US\$21.2 million. In Croix-des-Bouquets, nine police stations, including Bon Repos, suffered losses estimated at US\$4.4 million. In other locations, such as Cabaret, Carrefour, Ganthier, Gressier, and Thomassin, losses are approximately US\$8 million. In addition, the central HNP garage suffered losses related to the maintenance of equipment and infrastructure (40 vehicles parked for repair or burned), evaluated at US\$4.5 million. Losses from lost or damaged equipment, such as radios, weapons, bulletproof vests, and computers amount to US\$1 million.

PENITENTIARY SYSTEM

133. The prison system was of major concern even before the security crisis.

The Directorate of Penitentiary Administration (DAP) manages 16 of 20 functional establishments. These include two correctional institutions for male convicts (Fort-Liberté II and Arcahaie), a women's prison in Cabaret—currently nonfunctional due to repeated assaults by gangs—and a juvenile center in Delmas 33. As of 2024, the DAP employs 809 officers, including 128 women, a significant decrease from 1,224 officers in 2022—representing a 33 percent reduction attributed to deaths, resignations, and officers leaving the country. Out of these 809 personnel, 787 are designated for field duty. However, only 262 are on duty at any given time to moni-

²⁹ Access to gang-occupied municipalities, lack of direct information from victims of GBV, lack of access to local associations potentially holding data, and lack of a reliable database due to underreporting of cases limited this study.

³⁰ Public security is managed by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, which develops security policies, the Secretariat of State for Public Security, which ensures their implementation, and the Haitian National Police (HNP), responsible for the protection of citizens.

tor an estimated prison population of approximately 7,500 inmates, resulting in a critically low ratio of 29 inmates per officer. Illegal detention remains a pressing issue, with around 85 percent of inmates held in pretrial detention and many of whom are held in inadequate police custody cells.

134. Most of the infrastructure consists of old, unsuitable military buildings. The majority of the infrastructure consists of outdated and unsuitable military buildings. The average space of 0.44 m² per prisoner is far from the 4.5 m² required. Overcrowding has worsened due to the breaches at the Civil Prison of Port-au-Prince and Croix des Bouquets prison, which have drastically reduced the prison system's capacity. The Center for the Reintegration of Minors in Conflict with the Law, originally designed for 93 minors, now accommodates an average of 400 inmates, including 133 women transferred from Cabaret prison, and 140 adult males due to the current lack of male adult prison facilities in the ZMPP. This severe overcrowding, combined with poor conditions, endangers the physical and mental health of inmates and prevents any rehabilitation activities. Moreover, the presence of different categories of inmates within the same facility increases the risk of violence in an already highly precarious environment.

COMMUNITY VIOLENCE REDUCTION

135. Eighty-eight percent of murders were recorded in Port-au-Prince, often due to gang attacks, as armed groups are estimated to control 80 percent of the ZMPP. Communal violence remains high, despite a 20.3 percent drop in kidnappings in the first one-half of 2024 year-over-year. Lynchings by self-defense groups, called “vigilantes,” have multiplied, with at least 160 individuals allegedly linked to the gangs killed in the first one-half of 2024, as documented by BINUH. A study by the Climate Security Group highlights the links between climate and human security, highlighting poor water and sanitation conditions in crowded urban areas. Gangs often control access to water, exacerbating communal violence. Haitian children and youth are particularly vulnerable to these risks, including young women exposed to GBV while searching for resources.

136. In addition to the direct impacts of destruction of infrastructure, injury, and death, urban violence has indirect impacts, including physical trauma and mental health disorders. Secondary impacts have broader consequences, including transmission of the cycle of violence, normalization of violence, pressure on services, erosion of social cohesion, and degradation of the legitimacy of authorities.³¹ Moreover, many of the members of gangs are minors, which makes community violence an intergenerational challenge and makes the reintegration of minors, and youth into society critical for future stability.

OVERVIEW OF RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION NEEDS

137. For 2024–26, US\$389 million will be needed for recovery and reconstruction. For 2026–30, US\$271 million will be needed (Table 14).

138. Immediate intervention in Haiti's judicial system should prioritize programs addressing critical needs, such as reviving courts and reducing pretrial detentions. Efforts should focus on improving citizens' quality of life by reducing judicial delays and enhancing access to fair justice. Projects that lower barriers to justice, especially for vulnerable populations, are essential. Strengthening institutional capacity through training, legal reforms, and transparent governance is critical. Programs should also promote inclusion and equity, ensuring access to justice for women and vulnerable groups while maintaining financial viability and long-term sustainability.

139. Revitalizing Haiti's judicial system will require approximately US\$33 million. Key initiatives include accountability programs for judicial actors, identifying secure spaces for relocating courts, infrastructure rehabilitation, and enhancing the National Identification Office. Investments will be required in specialized court programs, financial intelligence units, and judicial inspections. Implementation of the new penal code includes drafting laws, conducting training seminars, and making infrastructure recommendations. A requirement for investment is also foreseen for training and protection programs for magistrates and construction of legal assistance offices. Informal justice mechanisms and infrastructure projects, including rehabilitation, reconstruction, and equipment, are also prioritize.

140. Recovery needs related to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) require comprehensive interventions that consider immediate and long-term consequences for the entire crisis-affected ZMPP. The investment framework outlines a comprehensive plan to address GBV with a total budget of US\$7,070,000. The prevention program focuses on education and awareness, training of community and religious leaders, community dialogues, and media campaigns to reduce social tolerance of GBV and promote gender equality, with a combined budget of US\$819,999. The response program includes community surveillance mechanisms, women's civil society organizations, multi-sectoral support services, professional training for GBV response, and safe spaces, totaling US\$10,494,488. The institutional strengthening program is designed to establish networks and coordination mechanisms among various institutions for an integrated GBV response, with a budget of US\$300,000.

TABLE 14:
Security Sector Recovery Needs

Subsector	Program	Short-term needs (2024–26)	Medium-term needs (2026–30)
Justice	Court and tribunal recovery program	13,088,993	13,411,008
	Accountability program for judicial actors	9,289,286	5,289,286
	Implementation of new penal code and criminal procedure code	1,000,000	3,600,000
	Specialized court program	4,233,169	6,766,832
	Program for promotion of informal justice mechanisms	2,000,000	3,000,000
	Infrastructure program	3,250,000	6,250,000
Sexual and Gender-Based Violence	Prevention	820,000	2,180,000
	Response	5,950,000	9,950,000
	Institutional strengthening (sectoral)	300,000	700,000
Public Security: Police	Legal, institutional, command and control framework	4,800,000	300,000
	Human resources, functions, working conditions	29,696,000	29,660,000
	Administration And Communication	8,000,000	4,600,000
	Public Safety And Judicial Police	161,000,000	80,500,000
	Infrastructure Framework	40,600,000	60,200,000
Public Security: Prisons	Normative, institutional, command and control framework	842,500	187,500
	Human resources, functions, working conditions	5,285,000	1,295,000
	Institutional capacity of Directorate of Penitentiary Administration	1,500,000	500,000
	Security of prisons	15,875,000	5,685,000
	Infrastructure framework	35,000,000	12,010,000
	Improvement of detention conditions	2,000,000	1,000,000
Community Violence Reduction	Weapons and ammunition management	4,100,000	1,800,000
	Economic recovery and community capacity building	31,500,000	18,000,000
	Social and community mobilization and civic engagement	2,600,000	1,300,000
	Protection	6,250,000	2,650,000
TOTAL		388,979,947	270,834,625

141. Given the prevalence of violence, establishment of a social assistance program is imperative to support survivors. This program will complement medical and psychosocial care services with financial assistance to survivors of GBV. The proposed benefit will be equivalent to six months of the minimum wage (paid in the form of monthly cash transfers or in a single payment), based on analysis of each case and adapted to the economic situation. The Ministry for the Status of Women and Women's Rights and the Institute of Social Welfare and Research of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor will implement the program.

142. The prioritization criteria emphasize rapid intervention, violence reduction, protection of women, and socioeconomic support. Programs that provide immediate response, such as community surveillance mechanisms and safe spaces, take precedence to protect survivors quickly. Activities with high potential to reduce GBV, including media campaigns and community dialogues that shift social norms, are prioritized. Initiatives that directly enhance women's safety, including creating safe spaces and strengthening women-led civil society organizations, are favored. Programs offering sustainable support to survivors, such as multisectoral support services and professional training for GBV response actors, are encouraged.

143. Needs in the security and penitentiary sectors have been clearly defined based on the five strategic axes of the HNP's 2017-2021 Strategic Development Plan.


Interventions should follow the following five prioritization criteria.

- **Rapid improvement on community safety:** Initiatives should be designed to improve community safety and reduce crime immediately.
- **Improving the rule of law:** Actions should increase public confidence in judicial institutions and ensure fair application of the law.
- **Protection of vulnerable populations:** It is essential to implement measures to protect at-risk groups, including women, children, and minorities.
- **Improve prison conditions:** Efforts must focus on rehabilitating prisoners and ensuring decent living conditions.
- **Prevention of GBV:** Programs should be geared toward protection of women and girls and providing appropriate support services.

144. Needs for community violence reduction were identified based on the four axes of the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration–Community Violence Reduction Strategy 2021-2030, signed in June 2021. Moreover, the needs reflect the results of local consultations on community violence reduction, which the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration–Community Violence Reduction Task Force conducted in the 10 departments in 2023 with the support of the United Nations Development Program and BINUH. Interventions should follow the following prioritization criteria.

- **Task force priority actions:** The relevant working groups should identify the priorities of initiatives to ensure coordination among institutions and programs.
- **Immediate impact on physical security:** Actions should be designed to increase security in communities rapidly, addressing urgent protection needs.
- **Community character:** Initiatives must encourage active participation of community members, which strengthens the social fabric and local solidarity.
- **Promotion of sustainable peace:** Interventions should help establish foundations for sustainable peace at the local level by reducing tensions and promoting dialogue between parties.





IV. Crisis Recovery Framework

145. This section describes a crisis recovery framework (CRF) in the form of a strategic, dynamic implementation plan and coordination framework for operationalization of initial recovery and stabilization activities. The CRF is expected to play a critical role in ensuring coordinated, prioritized implementation of the recovery interventions identified in the RCIA. In a context marked by uncertainty and high risk, the CRF will adopt a flexible, pragmatic approach while providing institutional, financing, and program management arrangements for long-term post-crisis recovery throughout the country, as conditions allow. The CRF will provide a government-owned platform for government, development partners, and other stakeholders to use for future assessments, planning, and programming to ensure the effectiveness of international assistance as a complement to national budgetary planning and private sector investment.

146. The CRF is intended to strengthen the humanitarian–peace–development nexus. The RCIA provides only initial geographic and sectoral prioritization of investments to support stabilization and recovery in an ongoing crisis and therefore complements rather than replaces coordination and planning for sustainable development investments, reforms, and projects consistent with the 2012 Haiti Strategic Development Plan and other current and future humanitarian, security, and development policies, planning frameworks, and programs.

CRISIS RECOVERY VISION, STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES, AND CORE PRINCIPLES

147. Crisis recovery vision. Implementation of the RCIA through the CRF is based on the overarching vision for recovery as articulated in the April 2024 Political Agreement for a Peaceful and Orderly Transition (“to put Haiti back on the road to dignity, democratic legitimacy, stability and sovereignty and to ensure the proper functioning of the State’s institutions”³¹), as well as the five major priorities of the transitional period and the May 27 decree establishing the organization and functioning of the TPC. The vision asserts that postcrisis recovery is based on a dual approach, addressing the immediate impact of the crisis while advancing longer-term reforms and structural changes that address deep-rooted drivers of instability and fragility.

148. Strategic objectives. For the first two years of RCIA implementation, the overarching goal is to support recovery of Haitian communities affected by the 2021–24 crisis, with a focus on reducing acute vulnerability and restoring economic and social stability and the presence and services of state institutions. These strategic objectives will be updated, revised, and expanded as part

of a regular review process and future assessment and planning exercises. Strategic recovery objectives for the initial 2024–26 period are to:

- **Restore livelihoods, economic activity, and essential governance functions (Priority Axis 1):** Enable economic recovery through recapitalization of private sector businesses, greater access to business financing and advisory services, and improvements to the business environment and increase core state institutional capacity in economic and fiscal governance, public administration, and transparency and accountability.

- **Restore essential public infrastructure and services (Priority Axis 2):** Enable socioeconomic recovery through restoration of essential infrastructure and public services by repairing and rehabilitating transportation, telecommunications, electricity and water infrastructure; providing access to affordable housing and housing repair; and rehabilitating key government facilities and infrastructure.

- **Restore key social services to crisis-affected households and communities, with a focus on reducing acute vulnerability (Priority Axis 3):** Restore access to health care and education services and infrastructure and strengthen social safety nets for the most vulnerable (including IDPs) through targeted cash transfers and enhanced food security.

- **Support Public security and rule of law (Priority Axis 4):** Support restoration of public security and the rule of law by revitalizing and strengthening the judicial system and rehabilitating justice infrastructure, initiating targeted prevention and response interventions to reduce SGBV, enhancing law enforcement through the institutional and operational strengthening of the HNP, restoring and expanding penitentiary capacity and the effectiveness of the prison administration, and promoting community-based approaches to reducing violence.

149. Core principles. Addressing urgent stabilization and recovery needs in Haiti during a fragile transition process and context marked by continued uncertainty and volatility requires a well-coordinated, agile, efficient approach to implementation. Drawing on lessons from previous post-crisis and post-disaster assessments in Haiti and other countries, the following core principles will underpin the CRF.

- **National and local ownership.** The implementation of the RCIA will be led by the GoH with the support of the World Bank, United Nations, European Union, and IADB. The RCIA recovery plan and investment framework build on existing programs and initiatives to ensure alignment and sustainability. The RCIA will be implemented in an

³¹ Article 16, Political Agreement for a Peaceful and Orderly Transition.

in an inclusive participatory manner involving ongoing consultations with national and local authorities, international partners, civil society, and the private sector.

- **Integrated, holistic response.** The impact of the crisis across all domains of economic and social activity requires an integrated, multisectoral response for the effectiveness and sustainability of recovery efforts. Robust coordination at sectoral and cross-sectoral levels as part of RCIA implementation will be essential.

- **Targeting the most vulnerable.** RCIA implementation will prioritize populations most affected by the crisis, including the poorest and most vulnerable; IDPs; and social groups disproportionately affected by the crisis, including women, youth, children, and elderly adults.

- **Balancing urgent needs with medium-term goals.** While the focus of RCIA implementation from 2024 to 2026 will be on addressing urgent short-term recovery priorities, interventions will be designed on the basis of “build back better” principles, to the extent possible, to take advantage of opportunities to address preexisting structural and other deficiencies and constraints.

- **Prioritized, flexible, adaptive implementation approach.** Coordination, planning, and implementation of RCIA interventions will need to take into account a dynamic, evolving operational context and prioritize flexible project design and operational modalities to enable an adaptive, flexible, responsive programmatic approach across all sectors.

- **Ensuring transparency and accountability.** Through a common programmatic, investment, and reporting framework, the RCIA will ensure a transparent process of strategic programmatic decision-making, as well as accountability through regular monitoring and public dissemination of results and progress.

- **Humanitarian–development–peace nexus.** The RCIA will directly complement and contribute to broader humanitarian, development, and security efforts to support a seamless transition from emergency response to sustainable recovery.

- **Gender equity and social inclusion.** The RCIA recognizes that considerations of disability, gender, and age are key in understanding peoples’ needs and abilities and the risks that they are exposed to in this context of crisis and ensuring a tailored, effective response to recovery. RCIA interventions across all strategic objectives and sectors will integrate this differentiated, targeted approach by addressing a range of cross-sectoral issues, notably internal displacement, gender, and youth.

- **Conflict sensitivity.** All interventions and programs developed within the RCIA framework will be designed to strengthen social cohesion, resilience, and local peacebuilding while ensuring that they do not aggravate existing or create new tensions, grievances, and violence.

PROGRAMMATIC FRAMEWORK FOR RECOVERY

150. The programmatic framework for recovery in Haiti provides an overview of the priority interventions, results, outcomes, and funding required to achieve crisis-recovery objectives while ensuring a coherent, coordinated approach to implementation between national and international partners. It will also function as a management tool for strategic planning, operational prioritization, implementation monitoring, and assurance of transparency and accountability. Programmatic indicators will focus on results achievable in the short term but will be linked to medium- and long-term recovery objectives.

151. The programmatic framework is based on a two-year planning horizon (2024–26) according to the four strategic objectives outlined above and builds on the assessment results and prioritized needs. It focuses on those interventions that are expected to be implemented and achieve results in this period and for which state institutions have sufficient capacity to implement. This programmatic framework will be constituted as a dynamic framework to be revised, updated and expanded based on future assessments and recovery planning exercises. Table 15 provides an overview of the programmatic framework for recovery for 2024–26. Appendix A provides additional details.

PRIORITIZATION AND SEQUENCING

152. The environment for implementing recovery interventions will remain challenging over the short term. This will require a flexible, adaptive approach to coordinating implementation of efforts across the strategic objectives and sectors of the CRF. A three-stage approach to prioritization and sequencing of program implementation will be developed as a basis for coordination between and across the CRF sectors.

153. Spatial and temporal prioritization and sequencing of interventions. A coordinated approach will be required across all sectors, with the ability to adapt to the emergence of enabling conditions (e.g., security, access) for recovery interventions across the ZMPP. This could take the form of area-based recovery plans (at commune or higher levels)

TABLE 15:
Overview of RCIA Strategic and Programmatic
Priorities (2024–26)

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1	STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2
Restore Economic Activity And Essential Governance Functions	Restore Essential Public Infrastructure And Services
1. Relaunch the economy through targeted support for private investment, generating wealth, and decent jobs. 2. Support development of value chains in the processing and production sectors. 3. Implement quick results measures to improve the business environment. 4. Strengthen economic and financial governance. 5. Strengthen public administration. 6. Strengthen the framework for accountability, transparency, and anticorruption measures.	1. Rehabilitate transportation, water and sanitation, electricity, and telecommunications infrastructure in metropolitan areas, Artibonite, and other areas affected by gang violence. 2. Implement labor-intensive sanitation and cleaning projects and income-generating activities with small and medium-sized enterprises and the support of municipalities. 3. Implement a strategic air transport plan and improve the main airports intended to accommodate international flights. 4. Rehabilitate homes and neighborhoods in metropolitan areas, Artibonite, and other areas affected by gang violence. 5. Repair and re-equip public buildings.
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3	STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 4
Improve access to basic social services, decrease acute vulnerability, and improve food security	Support restoration of public security and rule of law and reduce violence
1. Support IDPs (relocation and returns). 2. Facilitate creation of emergency employment and income for young people, especially women, in areas affected by violence. 3. Restore educational infrastructure and make schools available for the start of the school year. 4. Strengthen shock response mechanisms using cash transfers for vulnerable households. 5. Improve food and nutritional security. 6. Guarantee access to basic social services, particularly in disadvantaged areas affected by violence, taking into account people with disabilities and respecting gender equity.	1. Guarantee proper functioning of justice institutions and the fight against impunity. 2. Strengthen prevention and response to SGBV. 3. Restore public security by strengthening the police and prison systems. 4. Address socioeconomic drivers of violence by reducing community violence.

developed based on the interventions identified in the RCIA programmatic framework. These recovery plans will combine interventions across relevant RCIA sectors into a package of interventions to be implemented in the targeted areas when enabling conditions (e.g., security, access) have been satisfied.

154. Operational phasing of interventions. Interventions will need to be prioritized and sequenced according to implementation requirements, available delivery capacities,

and time frames for specific projects to deliver results (e.g., infrastructure projects with long implementation cycles vs. short-term job-creation interventions). These will be reflected in the detailed operational planning to be undertaken in each sector and should develop a nominal sequencing of interventions based on implementation timelines and requirements.

155. Prioritization of funding and resource mobilization. Availability of sufficient funds to implement recovery

interventions will likely constitute a significant challenge throughout the initial two-year recovery period. This will require strict prioritization of what needs to be resourced first from available funds and a robust mechanism to convey these priorities as the basis of fundraising and fund allocation processes.

156. Given uncertainty about the transition, a scenario-based approach to RCIA implementation will likely be required to frame initial operational coordination of efforts based on prevailing assumptions on how conditions are expected to evolve throughout the ZMPP.

This could include a conservative scenario with frontloaded area recovery plans limited to central (downtown) Port-au-Prince and foreseeing eventual extension to other more heavily affected communes at a later stage (e.g., Cité Soleil, Martissant) or a more optimistic scenario envisioning simultaneous implementation across most communes in the ZMPP but with specific sequencing of intervention categories within that process (e.g., starting with the introduction of cash transfer or job creation across the city, followed by infrastructure rehabilitation).

TRANSVERSAL ISSUES

157. The RCIA has followed an inclusive, participatory approach involving consultations with national and local authorities, international partners, civil society, and the private sector. Factors such as gender and age have played a key role in understanding the needs, abilities and risks that individuals are exposed to in this crisis. Each RCIA priority axis reflects a range of cross-sectoral challenges, including gender, youth, and climate. An important consideration for implementation of identified investments will be targeting mechanisms to ensure that the most vulnerable populations are reached.

- **Gender.** The security crisis in Haiti has severely compromised public safety, particularly affecting women and girls. Market fires (e.g., 2018 Iron Market fire, 2023 Delmas 29 Market fire) and market inaccessibility have particularly affected the activities of Madan Sara, representing a large share of Haiti's informal labor market and serving as the primary source of income for most women and their families. More than 54 percent of those displaced by the crisis and living in difficult conditions due to the lack of basic necessities are female. Of significant concern is the exponential increase of sexual violence (see Priority Axis 4). Poverty and unemployment mean that women and girls are often encouraged by their own families or friends to form "relationships" with members of armed groups to meet their basic needs. While recognizing the importance of gender-specific targeting of economic and social recovery activities, the RCIA has a dedicated focus on SGBV in Priority Axis 4, with supporting activities in Priority Axis 3.

- **Children and youth.** Figures up to May 2024 indicate that more than 500,000 Haitian children live in areas dominated by armed gangs, increasing their risks of being recruited or exposed to violence. Recruitment and use of children, particularly boys, by armed groups constitutes a serious violation of their rights. At the same time, armed group violence has led to closure and displacement of schools (see Priority Axis 3). The RCIA, through Priority Axis 3, maintains a focus on identifying priority needs for reopening schools and restarting education programs from early childhood through tertiary education. The impact analysis of Priority Axis 4 also takes into consideration the specific needs and concerns of youth in relation to the provision of rule of law and justice in Haiti.

- **Climate.** The RCIA investment plan will serve as a foundation for additional investment and a path to sustainable development. With the aim of building back better, a key focus throughout the RCIA is laying the foundation for mobilization of green finance as a key contributor to sustainable recovery. Haitian youth are particularly affected by security risks related to climate change. In this context, the RCIA recommends green financing as a key source of sustainable recovery financing and advocates for a policy framework to mobilize international environmental resources (related to climate, nature, and pollution). Haiti's political commitment is a key success factor in establishing a national policy framework, ensuring effective implementation of green financing.

ASSUMPTIONS, PREREQUISITES, AND RISKS

158. The RCIA will be implemented in what is expected to remain a volatile, complex, high-risk environment.

Decisions on the strategic directions of the RCIA, as well on programs, operations, and financing, will need to be informed by a clear understanding of risks. These include:

- **Security and public order.** Implementation of development projects requires security and access. A core assumption is that restoration of security and access throughout Port-au-Prince will be progressive and incremental, which must be reflected in a sequenced approach to implementation of interventions. Regardless of how security is restored, risks associated with violence and insecurity are expected to remain high for the entire period. This will require extensive operational security measures, including alternative implementation approaches, third-party monitoring, and site and personnel security.


- **Political transition process.** Continued progress in the Haitian political transition, including organization

of elections, key governance reforms, and institutional strengthening, is an important prerequisite of RCIA interventions insofar as they are expected to increase institutional capacity for organizing recovery efforts and lead to a more constructive and productive relationship between the government, the private sector, and civil society. Risks associated with lack of progress in the political transition could hinder or constrain the extent, speed, and effectiveness of recovery efforts.

- **Implementation capacities.** The operating environment in the ZMPP will remain challenging throughout the RCIA implementation period for a range of reasons. This will require capacity for implementation and specialized modalities for supervision, monitoring, procurement, staffing, and other aspects of operations. Key risks include absence of sufficient and specialized capacity within government, civil society, and international implementing entities, which could increase project costs and result in delays. Key mitigating measures will include an up-front assessment of required and existing capacity and consideration of a broad range of implementation modalities.

- **Availability of financing.** Availability of adequate, flexible financing across all sectors is critical to achieving short-term recovery and stabilization objectives. Delayed or insufficient financing in individual sectors could affect other aspects of the RCIA recovery framework. Key risks include the possibility that funding from the national budget, international community, and private sector falls short of total estimated needs in the RCIA investment plan, hindering progress in achieving key recovery objectives and targets. Mitigating this risk will require strict prioritization and sequencing of investments, commitment by current funding partners to align existing resources with RCIA investment priorities, and proactive engagement by all stakeholders to mobilize additional financial resources from within Haiti and abroad.





V. Institutional Arrangements

159. Given the challenging institutional and financial context, the success of the RCIA investment framework and plan will depend on achieving quick, tangible results that benefit affected communities. These results must also support the political transition and efforts to restore security and public order. This will require significant strengthening of national policy, program, budget, fiduciary, and coordination capacities and a strong strategic and operational partnership and coordination between the government and international partners to ensure a coherent, adequately resourced recovery effort.

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

160. On September 9, 2024, the prime minister instructed all officers of the public administration to ensure that the 2024/25 budget addresses the priority needs identified in the RCIA investment plan, structured around the five major priorities defined in the April 3, 2024, agreement. The MEF and the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation have also been mandated to facilitate mobilization of international assistance and to ensure its alignment with government priorities and the national budget. The RCIA and CRF are also aligned with other policy and strategic frameworks, including the transition roadmap as defined in the Agreement of April 3, 2024, as well as institution-specific cooperation agreements and frameworks, including the United Nations Framework for Sustainable Development 2023–2027 and the World Bank’s forthcoming Country Partnership Framework.

161. Ensuring alignment of national and international efforts in the implementation of post-crisis recovery efforts requires dedicated institutional capacities for planning, coordination, and monitoring. Building on international best practice and experience, a three-level structure is proposed for implementation of recovery efforts identified in the RCIA. This architecture, which will be further developed and agreed between the government and its partners at the start of RCIA implementation, will also provide the framework for managing future revisions, updates, and expansion of recovery efforts as conditions evolve. This framework will complement—and not duplicate—existing coordination arrangements in Haiti, including those related to humanitarian and security assistance, and will be linked accordingly.

162. The government will lead implementation of the institutional framework, supported by a dedicated inter-governmental body responsible for overall coordination of recovery efforts. The government proposes to establish an operational monitoring unit (OMU) tasked with supporting the ministries in charge of implementing the projects of the investment plan and providing government authorities

with information to ensure strategic management of this plan. This unit will be attached to the office of the Prime Minister or the Minister of Economy and Finance and will ensure coordination with international partners and ensure effective mobilization and allocation of international financing according to the government’s economic and financial orientation. More specifically, the OMU will support sectoral ministries, organizations, and general directorates in technical and financial planning, implementation, and monitoring of the RCIA. The World Bank, United Nations, European Union, and IADB will support the OMU by providing technical advice and capacity-building support.

163. In line with international practice and experience in coordinating complex multi-stakeholder and multi-sectoral recovery efforts, a three-tiered institutional arrangement is proposed for the CRF. These institutional arrangements are based on the following principles for effective and coherent coordination of recovery efforts:

- Establish effective national ownership, leadership, and institutional capacities to implement RCIA priorities and coordinate national and international stakeholder efforts;
- Integrate RCIA priorities into country programs and operations of individual international stakeholder institutions, including the four partners institutions and the broader aid community;
- Enable effective and inclusive coordination of national and international stakeholder efforts; and
- Facilitate standardized monitoring of and reporting on RCIA implementation to measure progress and inform decision-making.

164. Accordingly, the following basic institutional framework for post-crisis recovery is proposed for discussion between the government and international partners, to be further developed following the launch of the RCIA:

- A **recovery steering committee** is proposed with overall responsibility for recovery efforts, including decision-making on implementation and financing. This body should be chaired by the head of government or his or her representative. The steering committee should comprise representatives from relevant line ministries, the four partner institutions, and international partners.
- A **recovery coordination group (RCG)** is proposed with responsibility for the operational coordination, implementation, monitoring, review, and updating of the CRF. The head of the OMU should chair the RCG, which will comprise technical representatives from relevant ministries and international partners. The RCG should constitute a forum for ensuring coordination across the four priority axes of the CRF.

- **Thematic groups** are proposed, corresponding to each of the four RCIA strategic axes, with responsibility for sectoral level coordination, implementation, and monitoring.

165. The CRF could also support ad hoc committees, which will allow mobilization of communities, the private sector, and local stakeholders in the monitoring and prioritization of activities and the validation of impact and plans under the RCIA.

MONITORING ARRANGEMENTS


66. The monitoring framework is a core element of the RCIA recovery framework and is essential for measuring implementation progress, informing decision-making, and communicating results to citizens. The RCIA monitoring framework will be based on the RCIA program framework and will be used to measure progress against three main facets of RCIA implementation.

- Progress toward programmatic outputs, results, and outcomes during RCIA implementation
- A set of milestones articulating concrete actions that will serve as steppingstones for achieving objectives.
- Transparent tracking of aid flows (pledges, commitments, disbursements) and indicators for measuring aid effectiveness.

167. An annual progress report will be produced to communicate results to citizens, stakeholders, and partners, and a dashboard will be created to present information on tangible development outcomes (e.g., number of functional schools, mobile phone network coverage, availability of transport) and report on citizen perceptions (e.g., security, trust, whether life is improving) more regularly to inform decision-making.

168. The dashboard will draw on available statistics demonstrating tangible outcomes for citizens alongside indicators measuring citizen perceptions. These indicators will be measured regularly over the course of implementation to demonstrate trends over time and, to the extent possible, will be aligned with Sustainable Development Goal indicators to avoid proliferation of monitoring frameworks.

169. This monitoring mechanism will be reviewed at the end of the two-year implementation period and can be extended to cover longer recovery needs.





VI. Investment Plan

170. The RCIA investment plan identifies the resources required to address recovery interventions identified in the RCIA as a priority for 2024–26. While existing public, private sector, and international development resources are expected to cover a portion of 2024–26 investment needs (US\$266 million), a gap of US\$989 million will need to be covered rapidly to ensure timely implementation of critical recovery interventions. This section presents the RCIA investment plan and the core elements of a proposed financing platform to address this gap through effective identification, channeling, and management of recovery financing from the national budget, the private sector, and international development partners.

171. In developing the RCIA investment plan, attention has been paid to identifying priority short-term investment needs not already covered in other planning and investment frameworks. Investment needs under Priority Axes 1 and 3, for instance, have been designed to complement, and not duplicate, humanitarian assistance requirements outlined in the forthcoming Humanitarian Response Plan. Likewise, investments in Priority Axis 4 relate to priorities for improving government security and rule of law capacities in the ZMPP in the immediate future. As such, they are intended to complement investment needs related to the MSSM and provide a basis for aligning current and future donor assistance for the security sector.

Investment Plan

172. The investment plan was developed as an integral part of the RCIA based on the needs assessment and the associated programmatic framework that identifies priority interventions and associated resource requirements. The investment plan provides a detailed breakdown of investment requirements disaggregated according to strategic objective, sector, program, and investment types, as well as chronologically and geographically. The investment plan provides further disaggregation according to funding sources, identifying resources available from the national budget, private sector, and international development partners. Table 16 and Figures 31 and 32 summarize the investment plan according to these breakdowns, and Appendix B provides the full investment plan.

TABLE 16:
Security Sector Recovery Needs

PRIORITY AXIS	BUDGET (2024–26)	SOURCES				BUDGET Medium-Term (2026–30)
		National Budget	International resources	Private sector resources	Resources to mobilize	
1	116,800,000	–	32,750,000	–	84,050,000	23,900,000
2	450,192,439	–	63,900,000	16,400,000	369,892,439	1,852,306,662
3	385,941,400	25,887,985	32,279,000	–	327,774,415	153,000,000
4	388,979,947	45,000,000	136,816,000	–	207,163,947	270,834,625
TOTAL	1,341,913,786	70,887,985	265,745,000	16,400,000	988,880,801	2,300,041,287







FIGURE 31:
PRIORITY AXIS 1



PRIORITY AXIS 2



PRIORITY AXIS 3



PRIORITY AXIS 4





FIGURE 32:
Total Budget, Available Funding, and Funding Gap
for the Transition Period (2024–26)



Financing Platform

173. The current situation, characterized by continued insecurity, limited presence of international development partners and donors, and weak government institutional capacities, poses challenges for the rapid mobilization and allocation of resources. To address this, a recovery financing platform is proposed to facilitate alignment of national, international, and private sector financing and funding instruments with the RCIA investment plan to ensure coverage across the four strategic objectives; enable a coherent, strategically prioritized approach to addressing recovery needs; and address key financing gaps and underfinanced priorities.

174. The proposed recovery financing platform should be directly integrated into the broader institutional framework for RCIA implementation, as outlined in the previous section. Key responsibilities can include overseeing and coordinating the distribution of resources (including through a dedicated financing subgroup as needed). The key functions of the RCG in this regard would be to:

- Facilitate dialogue between the government and its partners on addressing RCIA investment needs in a timely and flexible manner.
- Ensure a coherent, coordinated approach to prioritization, allocation, and tracking of financial allocations against the RCIA investment plan consistent with international aid effectiveness principles.
- Enable a responsive approach to aid coordination to en-

sure flexible, rapid financing and disbursement to accommodate changes in needs and priorities


- Provide a mechanism for expanding financing to accommodate future needs in a context of eventual expansion of the RCIA recovery framework beyond Port-au-Prince or enlargement of a recovery scope to include longer-term recovery and reform needs.

- Facilitate outreach to other stakeholders with potential interest in contributing to the RCIA investment plan, including the private sector, private charities, and other international partners.

175. Depending on interests and needs that the government and its international partners identify, a broader RCIA financing strategy for recovery could be developed. Consistent with international practice in other countries, the following elements could be considered as part of this eventual broader framework.

- Modalities for periodically reviewing and adjusting the investment plan based on emerging needs and priorities.
- Assessment of the financing context for recovery in Haiti, including risks, implementation capacities of potential partners, and identification of key operational and fiduciary constraints
- Mapping of the funding and donor landscape, including in-country donor presence, programs, and associated financing instruments and current aid flows and gaps in relation to RCIA priorities.
- Assessment of national institutional capacities for fiduciary management and execution, including the national budget and national and local public financial mechanisms.

References



ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data). 2023. “ACLED Conflict Severity Index: A New Measure of the Complexities of Conflict.” <https://acleddata.com/conflict-index/index-january-2023/>.

Beyer, Robert, Yingyao Hu, and Jiaoxiong. Yao. 2022. “Measuring Quarterly Economic Growth from Outer Space.” Policy Research Working Paper 9893. World Bank, Washington, DC.

BINUH (United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti). 2023. “Criminal Violence Extends Beyond Port-au-Prince—The Situation in Lower Artibonite from January 2022 to October 2023.”

https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/rapport_artibonite_en_vf.pdf.

BINUH 2024. “Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti—April—June 2024.”

https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti.pdf.

BRH (Banque de la République d’Haïti). 2024. “Évaluation d’impacts et Programme d’Appui aux Institutions Financières et Entreprises Débitrices du Système Financier Victimes de la Crise Socio-Politique.” BRH, Port-au-Prince.

D’Aoust, Olivia Severine, Julius Gunneman, Karishma Vijay Patel, and Caroline Anne Isabelle Tassot. 2022. “Cash in the City: The Case of Port-au-Prince (English).” Social Protection and Jobs Discussion Paper no. 2203. World Bank Group, Washington, DC.

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099755004052229567IDU09eb3d5e00298d043ee09e740fa2adfe56744>.

DGB (General Budget Directorate). 2024. “Effectif et Masse Salariale de la Fonction Publique.” General Budget Directorate, Ministry of Economy and Finances, Port-au-Prince.

Dietrich, Nick, and Kristine Eck. 2020. “Known Unknowns: Media Bias in the Reporting of Political Violence.” *International Interactions* 46 (6): 1043–1060.

Dorval, Farah A., Véronique Verdeil, and Christophe Prevost. 2023. “Making Development Strides in Haiti’s Water Sector.” World Bank, Washington, DC. <https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/water/making-development-strides-haitis-water-sector>.

Flowminder Foundation. 2024. “Impact de la Crise en Haïti sur la Mobilité: Flux de Population depuis la Zone Métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince (01 janvier 2020 -30 avril 2024).”

<https://www.flowminder.org/resources/publications-reports/impact-de-la-crise-en-haiti-sur-la-mobilite-flux-de-population-depuis-la-zone-metropolitaine-de-port-au-prince-01-janvier-2020-30-avril-2024>.

Grazzi, Matteo, Llamas, Paola, Lotti, Giulia and Peña, Werner (forthcoming), “The Economic Fallout of Social Conflict: Evidence from Social Media and Satellite Images”. IDB Working Paper Series, Washington, DC.

Haiti Libre. 2022. “Haiti—Agriculture: Export of Mangoes to the USA Suspended.”

<https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-37969-haiti-agriculture-export-of-mangoes-to-the-usa-suspended.html>.

Henderson, J. Vernon, Adam Storeygard, and David N. Weil. 2012. “Measuring Economic Growth from Outer Space.” *American Economic Review* 102 (2): 994–1028.

IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2022. “Haiti—Evaluation de la Gestion des Investissements Publics—PIMA et PIMA Changement Climatique.” IMF, Washington, DC.

MEF (Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances). 2024. “Finance and Budget Law.”

<https://www.mef.gouv.ht/budgets/lois>.

Morris, Stephen D., and Junjie Zhang. 2019. “Validating China’s Output Data Using Satellite Observations.” *Macroeconomic Dynamics* 23 (8): 3327–3354.

Obama, Guy Oswald. 2014. “Enquête sur les Conditions de Vie des Ménages Après le Séisme.” Available at:

<https://www.haiti-now.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2012-13-ENQUETE-SUR-LES-CONDITIONS-DE-VIE.pdf?srsltid=AfmBOopmwnDemUO3TIKZWn5eq9vzzSeOaR1NL3Zktsu1qfPaO8cAsHjZ>.

Pinkovskiy, Maxim, and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 2016. "Lights, Camera... Income! Illuminating the National Accounts-Household Surveys Debate." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 131 (2): 579–631.

Román, Miguel O., Zhuosen Wang, Qingsong Sun, Virginia Kalb, Steven D. Miller, Andrew Molthan, Lori Schultz, Jordan Bell, Eleanor C. Stokes, Bhartendu Pandey, Karen C. Seto, Dorothy Hall, Tomohiro Oda, Robert E. Wolfe, Gary Lin, Navid Golpayegani, Sadashiva Devadiga, Carol Davidson, Sudipta Sarkar, Cid Praderas, Jeffrey Schmaltz, Ryan Boller, Joshua Stevens, Olga M. Ramos González, Elizabeth Padilla, José Alonso, Yasmín Detrés, Roy Armstrong, Ismael Miranda, Yasmín Conte, Nitza Marrero, Kytt MacManus, Thomas Esch, Edward J. Masuoka. 2018. "NASA's Black Marble Nighttime Lights Product Suite." *Remote Sensing of Environment* 210: 113–143. doi:10.1016/j.rse.2018.03.017.

Stokenberga, Aiga, Cecilia Nallely Escalante Hernandez, Karla Dominguez Gonzalez, Xavier Espinet Alegre, and Malaika Becoulet. 2023. *The Rough Road to Services and Livelihood Opportunities in Rural Haiti and the Added Impact of Natural Disasters*. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.

United Nations Children's Fund. 2024. "Haïti: Le Système de Santé s'Effondre face à la Violence." United Nations, New York. <https://www.unicef.fr/article/haïti-le-systeme-de-sante-seffondre-face-a-la-violence/>.

Vijil, Mariana, Denny Mahalia Lewis-Bynoe, and Pedro Andres Amo. 2021. *Country Private Sector Diagnostic: Creating Markets in Haiti—Leveraging Private Investment for Inclusive Growth (English)*. Country Private Sector Diagnostic. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099149206272240174/IDU02fac0c370b37d049030afb40a976a79b02a1>.

WFP (World Food Program). 2024. "Haiti: WFP VAM Bulletin—Food Security Analysis." <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-wfp-vam-bulletin-food-security-analysis-april-2024>.

World Bank. 2013. "Strengthening Competitiveness and Promoting Diversification in Haiti: Diagnostic Trade Integration Study." World Bank, Washington, DC.

World Bank. 2018. "Debt Sustainability Analysis: Haiti." World Bank, Washington, DC.

World Bank. 2020. "Macro Poverty Outlook: Haiti, 2020 Annual Meetings Report." <https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/macro-poverty-outlook#download>.

World Bank. 2021. "Haiti—Rebuilding Energy Infrastructure and Access Project." Washington, DC: World Bank Group.

World Bank. 2022. "Haiti Systematic Country Diagnostic." (unpublished). World Bank, Washington, DC.


World Bank. 2023. "Haiti Risk and Resilience Assessment." (unpublished). World Bank, Washington DC.

World Bank. 2024a. "Macro Poverty Outlook: Haiti." World Bank, Washington, DC. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/macro-poverty-outlook>

World Bank. 2024b. "Haiti: Strengthening Customs Administration in an Insecure Environment (English)." World Bank Group, Washington, DC. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099051724102532865/P18025713dadcb0bf1aa581c9ab8215e82b>.

APPENDIX A

RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT
PROGRAMMATIC FRAMEWORK
(2024–26)



Priority Axis 1

ECONOMIC RECOVERY, SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION, AND STRENGTHENING OF ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE

Priority Actions	Programs	Subprograms	Indicators	Budget, US\$ (2024-2026)
Relaunch The Economy Through Targeted Support For Private Investment, Generating Wealth And Decent Jobs	Micro, small, and medium-sized enterprise recovery program	Dedicated credit line for vandalized businesses with or without bank or non-bank loans	Vandalized companies receiving restructured or new loans to restart their productive activities	70,000,000
		Funds dedicated to micro and small enterprises in the semi-formal or informal sector having loans with non-mutual microfinance institutions and savings and credit funds	Semi-formal or informal businesses and entrepreneurs benefiting from restructured loans or new loans to restart productive activities	
		Partial credit guarantee fund and line of credit	Loans introduced into the fund by participating financial institutions	
		Business and youth development services (including matching grants)	Companies or young entrepreneurs trained, or beneficiaries of matching grants	
Support Development Of Value Chains In Processing And Production Sectors	Program to support economic diversification and support for productive sectors and industries, including the business climate	Support for development of agricultural value chains	Number of cooperatives or enterprises able to reestablish value chains and establish links with higher-value markets such as Port-au-Prince or exports	8,000,000
		Support for textile and clothing sector (including upgrading and strengthening environmental and social standards for decarbonization)	Increase in number of clothing companies	
			Number of jobs created in textile and clothing sector	
Implement Quick Results Measures To Improve Business Environment	Improving business environment	Business climate reform	Sectoral business environment reforms	5,750,000
			Economy-wide business environment reforms, led by Business Climate Working Group	
	Customs strengthening program	Support for Customs modernization	Simplification of customs procedures and establishment of a single window at the port of Port-au-Prince	
		Rehabilitation of targeted customs offices (border posts)	Percentage of customs duties paid online	
		Strengthening of Customs surveillance capacities by acquiring physical equipment (scanners, radios, GPS) and personal protective equipment (see Priority Axis 4)	Number of rehabilitated customs offices	
			Number of scanners acquired	
			Number of customs offices equipped	

Priority Actions	Programs	Subprograms	Indicators	Budget, US\$ (2024-2026)
Strengthen Economic And Financial Governance	Strengthening strategic framework for public finance reform	Development of sectoral strategies	Development and approval of strategy of each ministry	7,000,000
		Implementation of sectoral medium-term expenditure frameworks	Number of institutions with a medium-term expenditure framework	
		Facilitation of public procurement through an e-procurement solution	Percentage of public procurement contracts awarded online	
	Strengthening statistics	Improvement in collection and processing of economic and financial data	Establishment of statistical analysis units Production of monthly data on performance of customs and the DGI	
		Harmonization of data on revenues of collection administrations	Effective implementation of the interface between the revenue management system, computerized customs system, Central Bank Treasury system, and integrated financial management information system	
	Improving management of revenue collection	Installation of a revenue management system in all sites currently using Tax Solution or DLVR	Number of sites where a revenue management system is installed and functional	
		Installation of a computerized customs system in customs stations	Number of workstations where a computerized customs system is installed and functional	
		Development of DGI online payment	Percentage of payments made online	
	Budget reform	Move to performance-based budgeting	Number of institutions having prepared their budget in program mode	
		Operationalization of integrated financial management information system	Number of institutions with integrated financial management information system installed and operational	
		Selection and execution of public investment projects	Percentage of projects registered in having met selection criteria listed in the GIP manual	
	Strengthening of General Directorate of Treasury and Public Accounting	Institutional strengthening of General Directorate of Treasury and Public Accounting	Development of framework for the management of public accountants	
		Effective operation of the single Treasury account	Percentage of income deposited in the single Treasury account	
			Percentage of expenses that pass through the single Treasury account	
		Expansion of network of public accountants of the Treasury throughout the country	Number of new accounting positions installed and operational	

Priority Actions	Programs	Subprograms	Indicators	Budget, US\$ (2024-2026)
Strengthen public administration	Strengthening human resources	Reallocation of human resources	Percentage of employees reassigned and promoted based on needs	22,200,000
		Replacement of lost employees	Percentage of employees replaced	
		Systematization of remote work	Staff of economic and financial governance institutions with access to remote working tools (e.g., internet, computers)	
		Continuing education and skills development	Reopening of national schools of public administration, assessment of needs, and development of reference documents on training	
		Audit of payroll and development of integrated human resources management system	Integration of MEF and DGI (payment issuance data and tax identification number) and National Identification Office (national identification number) data	
			Integration of MEF payment issuance systems and sectoral ministry human resources systems	
			Interface between integrated financial management information system and MEF payment issuance systems	
			Identification and reduction of number of employees not attending work	
		Improving the system of salary payments	Actual payment of salaries	
			Increase of payments by bank transfer	
		Improving human resources policies	Increase the offer of trainings Granting of incentives (risk and performance bonuses, performance certificate, public recognition)	
	Improving working conditions	Improvement in and redevelopment of workspaces (relocation of institutions: DGI, IHSI, customs)	Number of institutions rehabilitated or relocated	
		Work equipment	Equipment and number of computers per employee	
		Equipping structures with alternative energy sources	Number of structures equipped with alternative energy sources	
		Provision of vehicles to various institutions (MEF, Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation, Ministry of the Interior, DGI, Customs, IHSI, National Commission for Public Procurement, Supreme Audit Institution)	Replacement of vehicles lost during the crisis	
	Digitalization and digital technology	Institutional strengthening of IHSI	Implementation of digital infrastructure for centralization of administrative data produced by public entities	
		Digital strengthening of MEF and Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation	Restoring data center operations	
		Development and adoption of information technology master plan	Master plan validated	
		Construction of secure digital infrastructure to increase resilience to crises	Number of servers and applications running on the cloud Number of institutions with functional virtual desktops	

Priority Actions	Programs	Subprograms	Indicators	Budget, US\$ (2024-2026)
Strengthen framework for accountability, transparency, and anticorruption measures	Capacity building of oversight and anticorruption institutions	Strengthening of Anti-Corruption Unit	Validation of preliminary draft law on organization and operation of the institution for its elevation to the rank of an office (National Office for the Fight against Corruption) Development of new strategy for fight against corruption	22,200,000
		Strengthening of Supreme Audit Institution	Validation of strategic plan and operational plan of Supreme Audit Institution Audits of public accounts	
		Increase in internal audit capacity of General Inspectorate of Finance	Implementation of National Internal Audit Charter Number of risk-based audits	
		Strengthening of National Commission for Public Procurement	Publication of National Commission for Public Procurement audit reports	
	Transparency and citizen participation	Promoting transparency	Publication of quantitative reports on performance of DGI and Customs Submission to Court of Auditors within specified time limits of annual financial statements produced using integrated financial management information system Publication of budget execution reports at municipal level	
		Citizen participation in local governance	Development and dissemination of citizen budget Number of municipalities having developed local development plans in a participatory manner	

Note:

DGI, General Directorate of Taxes; IHSI, Haitian Institute of Statistics and Informatics; MEF, Ministry of Economy and Finance.

Priority Axis 2

REHABILITATION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND REDUCTION OF VULNERABILITY TO NATURAL AND CLIMATE SHOCKS

Priority Actions	Sector	Programs	Subprograms	Indicators	Budget, US\$ (2024-2026)
Rehabilitate transportation, water and sanitation, and electricity infrastructure in metropolitan areas, Artibonite, and other areas affected by gang violence	Water and sanitation	Network rehabilitation and construction	Cumulative number of subscribers registered after resumption of services in affected areas (<i>reintegration and new subscribers</i>)	Percentage of production sites restored (<i>drilling sites, functional relay stations, controlled source perimeters</i>)	312,232,439
		Rehabilitation of waste treatment plant	Volume of fecal sludge received per day at Morne a Cabri treatment plant	TBD	
		Recovery of production in ZMPP	Number of source and catchment protection areas recovered and protected	Functional station	
		Services and human impact (<i>behavior change, human resources</i>)	Number of households without service in neighborhoods with access to home water conservation program	Number of technical operations centers or drinking water supply and sanitation committees	
	Electricity	Generation	Rehabilitation and continuation of construction of power plants	Average monthly production available on the network	
		Transmission	Construction of transmission lines	Lines completed and put into service	
		Distribution	Restoration of operation and construction of substations and the MT/BT network	Substations completed and put into service MT/BT lines completed and put into service	
		Commercialization	Installation of connection equipment and reduction of technical and nontechnical losses	Connections restored to existing customers New connections	
		Rural and off-grid electrification, public-private partnership concessions	Rural and off-grid electrification—public-private partnership concessions	Number of public-private partnership concessions	
		Rural electrification and commissioning of three power stations in the northeast	Commissioning of Capotille, Mont Organisé, and Vallière power plants with cumulative capacity of approximately 1MW	Number of connections to the three sites	
	Road transportation and ports	Road (<i>road rehabilitation, road surfacing, cleaning, repair of drainage structures</i>)	Road (<i>road rehabilitation, road surfacing, cleaning, repair of drainage structures</i>)	Percentage of disbursement	
		Maritime transport and navigation aid (<i>lighthouses, access channel, equipment, human resources</i>)	Maritime transport and navigation aid (<i>lighthouses, access channel, equipment, human resources</i>)	Percentage of progress of disbursement	
		Port infrastructure (<i>Port-au-Prince, Cap Haïtien, coastal ports</i>)	Port infrastructure (<i>Port-au-Prince, Cap Haïtien, coastal ports</i>)	Percentage of disbursement	

Priority Actions	Sector	Programs	Subprograms	Indicators	Budget, US\$ (2024-2026)
	Telecommunications and digital infrastructures	Strengthening of digital infrastructure	Restoration of interdepartmental connectivity and database hosting services	Number of public institutions connected to networks	
		Deployment of digital solutions	System update SYSCHECK System update SYSDEP System update SYSPAY System update SYSCOMPTE		
		Repair of premises	Repair of premises		
Implement labor-intensive sanitation and cleaning projects and income-generating activities conducted with small and medium-sized enterprises and support of municipalities	Stormwater drainage and irrigation	Urban drainage	Urban drainage	Meters of drainages cleared	78,860,000
		Rural drainage (<i>repair of canals and construction of tanks</i>)	Rural drainage (<i>repair of canals and construction of tanks</i>)	Meters of drainages cleared	
		Irrigation (<i>drain cleaning, canal cleaning, equipment</i>)	Irrigation (<i>drain cleaning, canal cleaning, equipment</i>)	Meters of drainages cleared	
	Solid waste management	Infrastructure (<i>rehabilitation of 6 landfill sites</i>)	Upgrading of Truitier landfill, development of eight collection points, acquisition of collection equipment	Number of landfills rehabilitated	
		Delegation of services	Delegation of services	Tbd	
		Human resources and materials	Human resources and materials	To be specified (<i>number of staff, amount of equipment</i>)	
Implement strategic air transportation plan and improve main airports intended to accommodate international flights	Airport infrastructure	Securing of Port-au-Prince airport	Securing Port-au-Prince airport	Miles of fence built	9,500,000
		Airport infrastructure (<i>Les Cayes Airport</i>)	Airport infrastructure (<i>Les Cayes Airport</i>)	Percentage of airport rehabilitated	
Rehabilitate homes and neighborhoods in metropolitan areas, Artibonite, and other areas affected by gang violence	Housing	Subsidization of vulnerable households	Grants for internally displaced persons to return home	Housing repaired	43,200,000
		Training of beneficiaries in construction and repair techniques that meet earthquake and cyclone standards	Training program	Number of households trained	
Repair public buildings	Government infrastructure	Rehabilitation of municipal buildings (relocation or repair)	Repair of buildings	Square meters repaired	6,400,000
			Purchase of furniture and computer equipment	Number of desks and computers purchased	
			Rehabilitation of energy, sanitation, and other services	Kilowatts in service	
		Rehabilitation of public agency services (relocation or repair)	Repair of buildings	Square meters repaired	
			Purchase of furniture and computer equipment	Number of desks and computers purchased	
			Rehabilitation of energy, sanitation and other services	Kilowatts in service	
		Rehabilitation of ministries (relocation or repair)	Repair of buildings	Square meters repaired	
			Purchase of furniture and computer equipment	Number of desks and computers purchased	
			Rehabilitation of energy, sanitation, and other services	Kilowatts in service	

Priority Axis 3

PROMOTION OF ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE, EDUCATION AND OTHER BASIC SOCIAL SERVICES; SOCIAL INCLUSION; AND FOOD SECURITY

Priority Actions	Programs	Subprograms	Indicators	Budget, US\$ (2024-2026)
Support IDPs	Support for relocation or return home of IDPs	Conditional cash transfers to support relocation or return of IDPs (US\$1,000\$ per household)	Number of IDP households receiving cash transfers	19,756,250
Create emergency employment and income for young people, especially women, in areas affected by violence	Professional training and professional intermediation	Professional training for establishment of a network of social and childcare workers	Number of people trained	15,500,000
		Professional training in promising sectors (see Axis 1)	Number of people trained	
		Strengthening of public employment services to bring together job supply and demand, including digitalization of professional intermediation services	Number of job seekers registered by intermediation services Number of job seekers recruited through intermediation services	
		Pilot program for good-quality apprenticeships, based on labor market needs (<i>public and private</i>)	Young people involved in apprenticeship program	
Restore education infrastructure and make schools available for the start of the school year	Return to school for public and private schools in Artibonite and Ouest departments	Infrastructure rehabilitation	Number of schools repaired	108,975,808
		Support for service continuity		
		Psychosocial support	Number of participants in psychosocial programs (<i>gender, age</i>)	
		Short-term institutional strengthening	Tbd	
	Restoration of functioning of affected universities	Repair of higher education buildings	Number of schools repaired	
		Improvement in distance learning		
		Replacement of equipment, laboratories, and furniture	Number of participants in psychosocial programs (<i>gender, age</i>)	
Strengthen shock response mechanisms using cash transfers for vulnerable households	Social safety net for most vulnerable households	Psychosocial support for students and teachers	Tbd	77,214,254
		Monthly unconditional cash transfers for households in extreme poverty for 24 months	Number of individuals benefiting from the cash transfers Percentage of women directly benefiting from the cash transfers	
		Additional support measures for recipients (<i>health/nutrition training and awareness, digital financial inclusion, prevention of GBV</i>)	Number of beneficiaries of support measures	
	Expansion and modernization of SIMAST social register	Cash transfers for GBV survivors	Number of cash transfer recipients	
		Inclusion of 250,000 households from the West Department in SIMAST	Number of new households registered in SIMAST	
		Establishment of SIMAST registration counters in western municipalities	Number of counters established Number of registration applications filed	
		Establishment of SIMAST registration and update counters in nine other departments	Number of counters established Number of registration applications filed	
		Training of administrative staff and service agents on SIMAST and the collection of household data	Number of civil servants trained on SIMAST and data collection	

Priority Actions	Programs	Subprograms	Indicators	Budget, US\$ (2024-2026)
Increase food and nutritional security	School cafeterias based on local food purchases	Ensure coverage of school cafeterias, buying food locally	Number of children receiving school meals	45,000,000
Guarantee access to basic social services, particularly in disadvantaged areas affected by violence, considering people with disabilities and respecting gender equity	Ensuring access to health infrastructure in vulnerable areas affected by violence	Exemption from fees for maternal and child health care, sexual and reproductive health care services for vulnerable households with pregnant and lactating women, persons with disabilities	Number of people receiving essential care packages without fees	118,790,438
		Reconstruction or rehabilitation of hospitals	Number of hospitals rehabilitated or rebuilt	
		Reconstruction or rehabilitation of health care center with beds	Number of centers rebuilt	
		Purchase of equipment and material for health care infrastructure (<i>hospitals and health care centers</i>)	Number of material for hospitals	
		Ensure electricity coverage for centers and hospitals	Number of KW hours of electricity provided	
		Support for centers that remained open and are affected by the massive influx of patients	Number of health care centers receiving support	
		Equipping national ambulance centers (equipped ambulances, spare parts, equipment)	Number of fleets functional	
		Provide start-up inventories of inputs (<i>personnel costs borne by the national budget</i>)	Number of centers receiving a start-up stock	
	Establishment of senior centers	Establishment of community centers for people ages 65 and older	Number of centers established	
	Establishment of early childhood centers	Establishment of early childhood centers (<i>care for children younger than four</i>)	Number of early childhood centers established	

Note:

IDP, internally displaced person; GBV, gender-based violence; SIMAST, Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour database.

Priority Axis 4

STRENGTHENING RULE OF LAW AND PUBLIC SECURITY

Priority Actions	Programs	Subprograms	Indicators	Budget, US\$ (2024-2026)
Guarantee proper functioning of justice and the fight against impunity	Court and tribunal recovery program	Accountability program for judicial actors	Percentage of judicial actors trained on accountability mechanisms	28,861,447
		Identify spaces that are sufficiently secure and large to relocate the two tribunaux de première instance	Number of secure and suitable spaces identified	
		Infrastructure rehabilitation	Number of judicial buildings rehabilitated	
		Strengthen the National Identification Office	Percentage of population with access to official identification via National Identification Office	
	Accountability program for judicial actors	Specialized courts program	Number of operational specialized courts	
		Strengthening of central financial intelligence unit	Percentage increase in financial investigations conducted by central financial intelligence unit	
		Strengthening of judicial inspection of Ministry of Justice and Public Security and High Council of the Judiciary of the Technical Certification Commission	Number of inspections conducted in the courts	
		Implementation of internal control mechanisms within courts and reinitiation of computerized management of judicial cases program	Number of courts with internal control mechanisms in place and functional computerized management of judicial cases program	
	Implementation of new penal and criminal procedure codes	Development of draft laws to accompany codes	Number of draft laws developed	
		Participation in training seminars	Number of training seminars organized	
		Make recommendations for infrastructure and organize a popularization campaign	Number of recommendations proposed and campaign conducted	
	Specialized court program	Training programs for magistrates	Number of magistrates trained	
		Victim and witness protection programs for magistrates	Number of protection programs in place	
		18 jurisdictions benefit from a legal assistance office	Number of jurisdictions benefiting from legal assistance office and new legal assistance offices built	
		Construction of six new legal assistance offices		
		Strengthening of National Council for Legal Assistance through its 2021–26 strategic plan	Number of measures of the National Council of Legal Assistance	
		Standardization of legal assistance programs offered by other organizations, including nongovernmental organizations	Number of standardized programs	
	Infrastructure program	Rehabilitation	Number of buildings rehabilitated	
		Reconstruction	Number of buildings rebuilt	
		Equipment	Amount of equipment provided	

Priority Actions	Programs	Subprograms	Indicators	Budget, US\$ (2024-2026)
Strengthening prevention and response to SGBV	Prevention of SGBV	Education and awareness	Number of awareness campaigns conducted	7,070,000
		Training of community and religious leaders	Number of leaders trained	
		Community dialogue	Number of community dialogues organized	
		Media campaigns	Number of media campaigns broadcast	
	Response to SGBV	Community monitoring mechanisms	Number of monitoring mechanisms in place	
		Multisector support services	Number of people receiving multisectoral support services	
		Training of professionals	Number of professionals trained	
Police	Legal, institutional, command and control framework	Safe spaces	Number of safe spaces established	138,960,000
		Consolidation of legal, institutional and structural framework of HNP	Number of consolidated legal and institutional frameworks	
		Strengthening of gender policy within HNP and provide it with legal instruments to combat gender-based violence	Number of gender policies strengthened	
	Human resources and working conditions	Establishment of internal control mechanisms within HNP	Number of internal control mechanisms established	
		Increasing training capacity of the HNP (exiting project)	Number of training projects initiated	
		Development of human capital	Number of human capital development programs implemented	
		Strengthening of institutional capacity of HNP	Tbd	
	Administration and communication	Improvement in working conditions by providing work material and equipment	Amount of material and equipment provided	
		Consolidation of HNP's communication capabilities	Level of improvement in communication skills	
	Public safety and judicial police	Increase in operational capacity of intervention units	Number of reinforced intervention units	
		Increase in intelligence and intelligence capabilities of the HNP	Level of increase in intelligence and intelligence capabilities	
		Increase in operational capacity of HNP in terms of border control	Number of border controls units reinforced	
		Increase in operational capacity of HNP in fight against maritime crime	Number of operations against maritime crime initiated	
		Increase in operational capacity of HNP in fight against human trafficking	Number of operations against human trafficking initiated	
	Infrastructure framework	Increase in investigation capacity of HNP	Number of investigations initiated by HNP	
		Increase accessibility of HNP	Tbd	
		Improvement of infrastructure of HNP through construction, relocation, and rehabilitation (long term)	Number of construction, relocation, and rehabilitation projects completed	

Priority Actions	Programs	Subprograms	Indicators	Budget, US\$ (2024-2026)
Prisons	Normative, institutional, command and control framework	Consolidation of legal, institutional, and structural framework of HNP	Number of consolidated legal and institutional frameworks	7,070,000
		Strengthening of gender policy within DAP and mechanisms to combat gender-based violence	Number of gender policies strengthened	
		Strengthening of internal control mechanisms of DAP	Number of internal control mechanisms promoted	
		Increase in administrative and operational autonomy of DAP	Level of administrative autonomy achieved	
	Human resources and working conditions	Increase in DAP workforce	Number of staff hired	
		Increase in institutional capacity of DAP through continuing training	Number of continuing training courses carried out	
		Improve working conditions	Tbd	
	Increase in institutional capacity of the DAP	Improvement in DAP's communication capabilities	Level of improvement in communication skills	
	Increase in security of prisons	Development of policy for management and security of prisons	Number of management policies implemented	
		Acquisition of materials and equipment for prison surveillance	Amount of surveillance equipment acquired	
		Increase in operational capacity of the Intervention and Escort Team	Number of operational teams reinforced	
	Infrastructure framework	Increase in infrastructural capacity of DAP through construction and rehabilitation of prisons	Number of construction and rehabilitation projects completed	
	Improvement in detention conditions	Improving prison life	Number of measures implemented	


Priority Actions	Programs	Subprograms	Indicators	Budget, US\$ (2024-2026)
Community violence reduction	Weapons and ammunition management	Entry point control mechanisms	Number of control mechanisms implemented or strengthened	44,450,000
		Strengthening of legal mechanisms	Number of legal mechanisms amended	
		Development of the National Strategy for Disarmament, Dismantling and Reintegration / Reduction of Community Violence	National Strategy for Disarmament, Dismantling and Reintegration / Reduction of Community Violence action plan developed	
		Institutional and operational strengthening	Level of institutional and operational strengthening	
	Economic recovery and community capacity building	Local dialogue mechanisms		
		Income-generating activities	Percentage of beneficiaries expressing satisfaction with economic and entrepreneurial empowerment initiatives by 2026	
		Community projects	Number of community projects supporting restoration of basic social services implemented	
		Community safety mechanisms	Number of security mechanisms implemented	
	Community mobilization and civic engagement	Youth training	Percentage of people trained by the project who undertake activities to promote peace and change behaviors in support of social cohesion structures by 2026	
		Local conflict prevention mechanisms	Percentage of local conflict resolution and prevention mechanisms identified or created that have received technical and material support by 2026	
	Protection	Campaign to promote protection	Percentage of people in project intervention areas who feel they have been made aware of protection through the campaign	
		Training	Number of community protection facilitators trained in first aid through public protection institutions	
		Victim support	Number of victims supported	
		Institutional and operational strengthening	Level of institutional and operational strengthening	

Note:

DAP, Directorate of Penitentiary Administration; HNP, Haitian National Police; SGBV, sexual and gender-based violence.

APPENDIX B

RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT INVESTMENT PLAN



AXIS 1	Budget (2024–26)	FUNDING SOURCES			
		National budget	International resources	Private sector resources	Resources to mobilize
		U.S. DOLLARS			
Revive economy through targeted support for private investment that generates wealth and decent jobs	70,000,000	–	15,000,000	–	55,000,000
Support development of value chains in processing and productive sectors	8,000,000	–	1,500,000	–	6,500,000
Implement rapid-result actions to improve business environment	5,750,000	–	5,550,000	–	200,000
Strengthen public finance reform	7,000,000	–	6,850,000	–	150,000
Continue public administration reform	22,200,000	–	-	–	22,200,000
Strengthen accountability, transparency, and anticorruption framework	3,850,000	–	3,850,000	–	-
TOTAL	116,800,000	–	32,750,000	–	84,050,000

AXIS 2	Budget (2024–26)	FUNDING SOURCES			
		National budget	International resources	Private sector resources	Resources to mobilize
		U.S. DOLLARS			
Rehabilitate transportation, water and sanitation, and electricity infrastructure in metropolitan areas, Artibonite, and other areas affected by gang violence	312,232,439	–	54,000,000	16,400,000	241,832,439
Implement labor-intensive projects and income-generating activities conducted with small and medium-sized enterprises and support of municipalities (sanitation and cleaning projects to create temporary public employment)	78,860,000	–	–	–	78,860,000
Establish strategic air transportation plan and improve major airports intended to accommodate international flights	9,500,000	–	9,500,000	–	–
Rehabilitate houses and neighborhoods in metropolitan areas, Artibonite, and other areas affected by gang violence	43,200,000	–	-	–	43,200,000
Make public buildings functional	6,400,000	–	400,000	–	6,000,000
TOTAL	450,192,439	–	63,900,000	16,400,000	369,892,439

AXIS 3	Budget (2024–26)	FUNDING SOURCES			
		National budget	International resources	Private sector resources	Resources to mobilize
		U.S. DOLLARS			
Implement urgent actions to support displaced persons	19,756,250	-	-	-	19,756,240
Create emergency jobs and income for young people, particularly women, in areas affected by violence	15,500,000	-	-	-	15,500,000
Establish free schools available at the start of the school year	108,975,808	25,887,985	21,279,000	-	61,808,823
Strengthen of shock response mechanisms using cash transfers for vulnerable households	77,918,904	-	-	-	77,918,904
Improve food and nutritional security	45,000,000	-	10,000,000	-	35,000,000
Guarantee access to basic social services, particularly in disadvantaged areas affected by violence, taking into account people with disabilities and respecting gender equity	118,790,438	-	1,000,000	-	117,790,438
TOTAL	385,941,400	25,887,985	32,279,000	-	342,018,165

AXIS 4	Budget (2024–26)	FUNDING SOURCES			
		National budget	International resources	Private sector resources	Resources to mobilize
		U.S. DOLLARS			
Guarantee the proper functioning of justice and the fight against impunity	32,861,447	-	5,550,000	-	27,311,447
Sexual and gender-based violence	7,070,000	-	-	-	7,070,000
Police	244,096,000	35,000,000	109,636,000	-	99,460,000
Prisons	60,502,500	10,000,000	21,630,000	-	28,872,500
Reducen community violence	44,450,000	-	-	-	44,450,000
TOTAL	388,979,947	45,000,000	136,816,000	-	207,163,947

