



COORDINATION NATIONALE DE LA SÉCURITÉ ALIMENTAIRE

Strategic Orientations for Humanitarian Aid Targeting in Haiti

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Humanitarian aid targeting

...the process of identifying the intended beneficiaries of a programme and then ensuring that as far as possible, the benefits actually reach those people and not others.

Sharp, K. 1997. *Targeting Food Aid in Ethiopia*. London, Save the Children Fund.

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1. OBJECTIVE OF THIS GUIDE

This document is a summary of CNSA's more comprehensive, **Report on Beneficiary Targeting in Haiti: Detection Strategies**. It is meant as a summary of that report and a beneficiary selection guide for organizations working in the humanitarian aid and development sectors. With input from Haiti's CNSA, the World Food Program (WFP), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), USAID, Oxfam, and a long-list of other Humanitarian agencies, the guide refines the fundamental best practices of beneficiary targeting in the Haiti. The discussion begins by defining what is meant when we say targeting. Focus then narrows to the following specific challenges encountered in Haiti,

- Definition of Targeting
- Basic Tenets
- Characteristics of a Robust Targeting Strategy
- The Humanitarian Aid Targeting Chain
- Best Practices in Haiti

2. DEFINITION OF TARGETING

Targeting strategies are as old as humanitarian aid, but the formal study of Targeting is recent, beginning in the past decade. WFP (2006b:1) defines targeting as follows,

At its broadest, targeting encompasses everything from initial assessment of the context, extent and magnitude of need through strategic planning and modality selection to eligibility selection and screening, which in turn leads to re-assessment of need through monitoring and evaluation

According to the World Bank (2013),

Targeting seeks to deliver benefits to a selected group of participants, in particular poor and vulnerable people. Targeting mechanisms attempt to link a project's specific purposes with its intended group of beneficiaries. There are many ways to target programs, and most projects use more than one targeting mechanism. They include geographic mapping, household surveys, censuses, qualitative surveys, and "self-targeting."ⁱ

Textbox 1: THE "OTHER" BENEFICIARIES

Although this guide is concerned with how decisions define who is a beneficiary (selection)--and *not* with how decisions impact the transfer or delivery of aid (logistics) or how the integrity of the process is guaranteed (feedback)—logistics and feedback may have more to do with who ultimately gets the aid than the choice of intended beneficiaries. The *de facto* greatest beneficiaries of most aid programs are often consultants and aid workers. Other beneficiaries include nationals hired as staff, accountants, drivers, and mechanics. In the case of food distributions they include those who lease out warehouse space, those who provide freight services as well as dock workers and porters. In the case of voucher programs *de facto* beneficiaries include businesses that produce the coupons and vendors who exchange the coupons for food, tools, seeds or other goods. *De facto* humanitarian aid beneficiaries also include elites who rent apartments and houses to NGO and UN agency staff, the banks that transfer money, and phone companies that provide communication services. All are beneficiaries of aid projects and often at monetary figures far greater than the value of what reaches the targeted beneficiaries.



3. BASIC TENETS OF TARGETING

Those who have sought to codify the targeting process have usually begun by defining the most basic objectives and guidelines. These include,

1. reach those most in need of food (WFP 2006b)ⁱⁱ
2. maximize the use and impact of limited resources (WFP 2006b)
3. not over-supply food aid, which may result in negative impacts on communities, for example dependency and displacement of traditional social reciprocity networks, and on markets, for example lower prices and disincentives to production (WFP 2006b; Maxwell et. al 2009:4)^{iii,iv}

Despite the emphasis on food aid and emergency relief, targeting is not just about aid to the hungry or disaster stricken. Programs that begin with targeting who will benefit or participate include,

- those who attempt to disseminate knowledge such as how to avoid disease or how citizenry can organize to defend themselves and to petition for change or services
- subsidy programs that provide lifesaving interventions
- programs that seek to provide improved production in agricultural and crafts so to increase income among the economically active who in turn share those resources with needy family members.

With this in mind, WFP has posited that the underlying objectives of targeting should also include,

4. target those at risk of losing their livelihoods (WFP 2006a:7)
5. empower populations to feed and care for themselves (ibid)

Textbox 2

INSTITUTIONAL PARTNERS AND ACCOUNTABILITY

For Targeting to be effective, the institutions that distribute aid must also be effective. They must be at least moderately uncorrupted. Moreover, organizations and capacities are capable of changing rapidly. This is true for better and for worse. In some cases institutional capacity develops; in other cases credible institutions become corrupt. In this way it can be said that effective targeting depends on current knowledge, transparency, and ongoing evaluation of the organizations involved in getting aid to beneficiaries. Change for the better (i.e. less corruption) will only occur if there are mechanisms in place that make the implementers of targeting and the custodians of aid accountable and their performance known. Where there is no strong central government coordinating the aid process—the case in Haiti-- what is needed is an independent monitoring entity that can evaluate institutional performance and make recommendations regarding which institutions are credible and expose those that are not. BUT, there must be recognition of the State, cooperation, and coordination, if not then aid de facto works against the legitimacy of the State, depriving it of credibility and can even helping to destroy it, making the development and food security problem even more acute (see Text box 3).

4. ROBUSTNESS & IDEAL TARGETING MODEL

There is no magic formula that makes a targeting system effective. But we can identify and agree on basic tenets that point the way toward sound methods that maximize the probability intended beneficiaries will be reached, that reduce waste, and that also work toward longer term development goals of maintaining the viability of existing livelihood strategies, promoting self-sufficiency, and reinforcing legitimate state institutions. The most effective way to summarize this is that the ideal targeting strategy should be statistically, methodologically and socio-developmentally **robust**,

1) It should be statistically **robust** in that it has the following qualities,

- Validity: beneficiary selection corresponds with beneficiary criteria
- Ability to detect social capital: measures those socio-economic resources that support an individual or that the individual can depend on in times of need
- Sensitivity to changes: detects or can be adapted to detect changes in beneficiary status, i.e. determine when a beneficiary no longer qualifies or a non-beneficiary suddenly does

2) It should be methodologically **robust** in that it is,

- Effective after disaster, i.e. is useful in detecting beneficiaries after a disaster
- Effective during non-disaster, i.e. useful in detecting beneficiaries during normal times
- Cost Effective in terms of both time and money needed to deploy and maintain the strategy

3) It should be socio-developmentally **robust** in that it is,

- Bottom up, i.e. rooted in the community
- Supportive of legitimate representatives of local government
- Resistant to corruption
- Achieves community buy-in at the local level, meaning that it is accepted among members of the community as a just means to determine who deserves assistance
- Built in Monitoring capacity: self-regulating in that it has the capacity to taps beneficiary knowledge to correct corruption, targeting and distribution error

Textbox 3

BENEFICIARY TARGETING AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE

Targeting is a fundamental component in the State provision of services, economic development programs, and guarantees of social security. It is precisely these undertakings—assistance and services to the citizenry—that reinforces the State and gives it credibility and support among its citizenry. The inverse of the State being reinforced in the role of protector and nurturer of the population is that targeting, governance, and provision of services and social security that does not involve the State works against the integrity of State institutions. It undermines the credibility of the State. Targeting in which local AZEK, KAZEK, Mayors, Departmental and National government entities are excluded creates competing power brokers. Indeed, with little or no other services and aid, targeting that does not involve State entities runs the risk of rendering them inert, or worse, pushing State functionaries into a role of opponent or antagonist of aid and services intended for the good of the population.

The Government of Haiti (2010) developed the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti., a whole-of-government approach built on three strategic pillars,

- a) investment in agriculture
- b) provision of basic social services for improving health, education, and nutrition, and
- c) creation of social safety nets for the most vulnerable and during crisis

The plan involves multiple ministries (MAST, MCPE, MARNDR, MCI, MSPP, MEF, MCFDF), para-State agencies (CNSA, FAES, IHSI), international donors (USAID, IFAD, WFP, EU, WB, IDB, IMF), international governance and facilitating agencies (WFP, FAO, UNDP, UNICEF, PAHO, OEA), and NGO implementing partners (CARE, ACF, WV, Concern, PADF, CRS, Oxfam, and ACTED, to name only a few).

A crucial ingredient to the success of all these programs, from agricultural assistance to farmers to nutritional relief to the most vulnerable households, is correctly identifying the recipients: Targeting.



Haiti Food Riots 2008.

Photograph: Kena Betancur/EPA



Haiti Food Riots 2008.

Photograph: Eduardo Munoz/Reuters


5. THE HUMANITARIAN AID TARGETING CHAIN

Although most discussions of Targeting define it as step by step process confined to the actual selection of beneficiaries, Targeting should also be understood as a dimension of aid that, whether by design or consequence, is embedded in every operational decision an organization makes:

- beginning with the moment an organization defines itself as dedicated to a particular type of assistance (e.g. disaster relief vs. development, medical care vs. sanitation, agricultural vs. conservation, financial vs. educational sectors)
- to the selection of the region, country or zone, or ethnic group the organization will work with (Asia or the Americas, Guatemala or Haiti, Urban or Rural, ecologic-economic zone)
- to deciding on the specific type of aid it will give (preventative vs. curative medical care, seeds vs. food, money vs. vouchers)
- to deciding how the aid will be distributed or transferred (subsidies vs. direct aid, food vs. vouchers vs. cash transfers)
- to selecting the beneficiary units that will receive the aid (school, health clinic, association, household, individual)
- to determining the criteria that will define a beneficiary (low income, landless, HIV positive, malnourished, disabled, pregnant, farmer...)
- to deciding how the individuals who fit the criteria will be detected (committees, networks of extension agents, surveyors)

Those aspects of aid or state services where a targeting dimension is present can be divided into three phases or categories with a total of 12 links connected in a Humanitarian Aid Targeting Chain.


Figure 1: The Targeting Chain



6. BENEFICIARY DETECTION STRATEGY

For this guide we focus on one aspect of the aid chain, Beneficiary Detection Strategy, and most importantly, Beneficiary Selection or how beneficiaries should be selected to maximize what we defined above as a statistically, methodologically and socio-developmentally **robust** targeting strategy.

Figure 2
Beneficiary Detection Strategy



Geographic Criteria

Geographic Criteria refers to how an organization decides where it will select beneficiaries. The category is principally divided according to political districting (country, state, township), or some configuration of population density (urban/rural), economic-occupational zone (agricultural, pastoral, fishing), or ecological area (forest, mountain, plain, desert). In Haiti the standard geographical criteria that humanitarian and state agencies use are Departments and Communes and six ecological-occupational zones, 1) agricultural mountain humid, 2) agro-pastoral semi-humid, 3) agro-pastoral plateau, 4) agro-pastoral dry, 5) mono-cultural plain, and 6) dry agricultural and fishing. Most variables differ between Departments and ecological-occupational zones so slightly that it can be said that the most fantastic aspect of geographical profiles in Haiti is homogeneity. The same figures vary by survey, a probable consequence of sampling error;^{vi} and they vary yearly in response to variations in weather, political, and economic shocks. The variation over time can be seen in nutritional status of children per department (see Figure 3, below). Indeed, in light of the extremes of vulnerability moving from department or commune to another, those targeting the vulnerable should ask: to what degree are the differences observed between households a consequence of temporary impacts?^{vi vii}

Table 1	
Comparison of Range on Key Measures of Vulnerability by Ecological-Occupation Zone	
Coping Strategy (scale 7-63)	20.8 -24.0
Comparison of Range on Key Measures of Vulnerability by Department (excluding West)	
Gini Coefficient (scale 0-100)	32.9 – 40.5
Population Living on less \$1.25 per day (2001)	62%-84%
Population of adults illiterate	23% - 34%
Children 6 to 12 years old in school	79% -91%
Chronically malnourished Children 5 years and under	17% - 28%





Figure 4
The Evolving Character of Vulnerability:
Cartes De Vulnérabilité from CNSA/FEWSNET

ARTE DE VULNERABILITE
 VULNERABILITE A L'INSECURITE ALIMENTAIRE
 Mesure de la Vulnérabilité à l'insécurité Alimentaire
 de ménages vulnérables : par Département


ACSAM03	
DATE: 04/03/08	
Indicateur de la Vulnérabilité	Indicateur de la Vulnérabilité
40-50% - Très forte insécurité	40-50% - Très forte insécurité
30-40% - Forte insécurité	30-40% - Forte insécurité
20-30% - Insécurité modérée	20-30% - Insécurité modérée
10-20% - Insécurité faible	10-20% - Insécurité faible
0-10% - Insécurité très faible	0-10% - Insécurité très faible
Limite Région	Limite Département




2007



2008



2009



2011



2013



2014


Beneficiary Unit

Beneficiary Unit can be separated into intermediary units (e.g. school, church, association, business) and primary units, (principally households vs. individuals). Putting aside school feeding programs and the associations that help vector cash and food-for-work programs, the most common targeting unit in Haiti is the household. Because organizations focus on giving, they tend to define and conceptualize the household as a unit of consumption. For example,

A household is defined as a group of people, with or without blood relation, who have been living together in the same lodging (under the same roof) for at least six months—or who have the intention of remaining in the household—and who share food and recognize the authority of the same household head (man or woman). CNSA/WFP 2013

The definition is logical from the perspective of emergency food aid: it views the household as a unit of consumption. But a great deal of insight can be garnered from looking at rural households in Haiti, not as an object of a safety net, but as part of one. In other words, they can be viewed as productive units or enterprises adapted to surviving in a harsh natural and economic environment characterized by unpredictable political upheavals that, in case of Haiti, have made economic isolation the norm. The consequence is that few if any households in rural Haiti depend on a single production strategy. Rather, they depend on an array of productive endeavors: typically agriculture, livestock rearing, fishing, charcoal production, fruit tree cultivation, and artisanship. Moreover, rural Haitian household livelihood security strategies are linked through a vibrant and intensely integrated marketing system that have roots in pre-Columbian and colonial strategies of survival but have evolved during 200 years of independence. The best way to conceptualize the money from produce sold in the market is as a medium of storage, one in which consumption of the stored household surplus can first be sold and, second, the surplus prolonged by rolling the cash over in the market, producing petty profits.


Figure 5
Integrated Household Livelihood Strategies




Textbox 4

CAKE OF VULNERABILITY IN HAITI

People living in rural Haiti should not be understood as passive victims of poverty and harsh climates. They meet the daily challenges of life within the context of a vibrant and multidimensional socio-economic system adapted to production, reproduction, and periodic crisis,--environmental (e.g. hurricane), economic (e.g. embargo) or internal household (illness of productive member). The task of Humanitarian Aid Targeting should arguably not be to change the system but to intervene at critical points and on behalf of those unable to cope within the existing system.





Beneficiary Criteria

Beneficiary Criteria refers to parameters that define who qualifies as a beneficiary, such as people who are handicapped, pregnant women, lactating mothers, or orphans. Other criteria used to target vulnerable households are “high dependency ratio,” “crowding,” “presence of handicapped” and “female headship.”

Especially important in understanding beneficiary criteria in Haiti is that the state-of-the-art technique for identifying criteria is Proxy Means Testing (PMT), a strategy in which survey research is used to discriminate statistically significant multidimensional set of parameters by which qualifying households or individuals can be defined as vulnerable. After the criteria has been determined, applying the criteria to identify vulnerable households entails some type of additional survey—even if qualitative--and verification that the households fit the algorithm. For these reasons “Proxy Means Testing” is better classified not with ‘Beneficiary Selection Techniques’—as typically done-- but rather with ‘Criteria’ and, even more specifically, as a strategy for developing a criteria.^{viii}

Because the use of PMT is considered state-of-the-art and because it so effectively summarizes the problems that come with developing beneficiary criteria—such as actually identifying those who are truly vulnerable and the less vulnerable and achieving community buy-in—we elaborate on its use here.

PMT has received much praise as “scientific.” It is also the conceptual basis for USAID supported Kore Lavi and World Bank supported Kore Fanmi programs. The problem is that in Haiti the search has yielded exceedingly weak Statistical results. Indeed, for those who find the scientific utility of statistical probability appealing, the one thing we stands out the most is that PMT in rural Haiti has been shown as essentially “scientifically” invalid. Nor do most stand up to ethnographic scrutiny. Indeed, when we look at the logic behind the common criteria used in targeting rural Haitian households, many can be re-conceptualized as indicators, not of high, but of low vulnerability

For example, high numbers of elderly adults or very young children may suggest remittances; high numbers of children over 7 years of age may suggest greater household work capacity; crowding may indicate a temporary high level of resources; presence of handicapped may indicate long-term capacity to care for a non-contributing household member; there is even strong and consistent statistical data to suggest that the most common criterion for vulnerability—female headed households—is actually indicative of a level of vulnerability lower than that of the average male headed household. (see Textbox 5, following page).

Other criteria commonly used in Haiti in recent PMT applications are related to infrastructure, such as access to electricity, water, waste disposal and latrines. They are criteria that make sense in many other countries or urban areas but that are not applicable to rural Haiti, where only 15% of households have electricity and, rather ironically, the poor are twice as likely to have it as the non-poor. Similarly, only 20% of households in rural Haiti have what qualifies as an “improved latrine”, and we can infer that most of those were built by aid organizations.

Textbox 5: Proxy Means Testing. Why it Doesn't Work

PMT depends on what Hashemi, and de Montesquiou (2011) call “easily verifiable indicators, such as family size, and type of housing.” In rural Haiti they are neither easily identifiable nor is there much statistical support for them. Using the algorithm for the most statistically significant predictors of children malnutrition found in the 2013 CNSA survey, the Proxy Means Test would be wrong 68% of the time. A history of PMT investigations yielded similarly poor results (HLCS 2001; Wiens and Sobrado 1998; IDB 1999; FAFO 2003, 2001; 2006; EMMUS 1995, 2000, 2005, 2012; Schreiner 2006; CFSVA 2007/2008; Verner 2008; ECHO 2011; ENSA 2011). The poor statistical applicability of “criteria” in can be understood in part by the fact that people living comprise a mass of poverty that includes some ~80% of the population. In the historical absence of any State social security system, the people have adapted to surviving lean times by depending on one another. They invest heavily in social capital. Thus, households already living on the margins of subsistence are interlocked in a network of reciprocal relations that support one another, reducing the vulnerability of the lone household and leveling out poverty across the population. Also important to understand is that detecting differential rural vulnerability using material variables is obscured by the orientation toward urban migration, i.e. it is difficult to detect material differences in the rural areas when most people living there are trying to migrate to the city or overseas. People prefer to invest in urban rather than rural residences and they make heavy investments in getting their children into urban schools or to the US and Canada.

Examples of the Most Common Beneficiary Criteria Used in Rural Haiti And that Do Not Apply ¹	
Criteria	Reason it does not apply
Electricity	85% of rural HH's have no electricity; and more “non-poor” vs. “poor”
Cooking Fuel	73% of rural HH's use wood
Water source	95.2% of rural have <i>no</i> water; 42.6% travel over 30 minutes to get it
Latrine	20% of rural HH's have an ‘improved’ latrine; 67% have either a simple hole in the ground no latrine at all
Waste disposal	100% of rural HH's either burn trash or throw it in a ravine
Single Female Headed	No survey has found them significantly poorer than average HH; most find them equal and some find them less vulnerable
Crowding	Rural houses are highly standardized in size; membership tends to increase with temporary or long term increase in resources
Child Dependency Ratios	More children 7+ years of age = greater labor force
Elderly	May be an indication <i>not</i> of poverty, but wealth and land ownership or remittances from descendants living overseas
Handicapped	May indicate long-term capacity to care for a non-contributing household member
Coping Strategy Index	Refers to 7 days before survey: confounded by respondent aid-fishing
No land	Increase in 1 hectare of land results in only a 2% increase in income; salaried labor—not land-- is <i>least</i> vulnerable income category.
No livestock	Livestock difficult to impossible to confirm and even if confirmed could be temporary due to sell-off
No labor capacity	Definition of labor capacity obscure; rotating labor groups, hired labor and family labor not resident in household may compensate
Dependent on petty trade	Commerce is a major source of income
House construction	Multi-household ownership and tendency to invest in urban homes
Presence of orphans	25% of children raised by grandparents or other family member

Beneficiary Selection

Beneficiary Selection: “Beneficiary Selection” is the core of the Beneficiary Detection Process. It can be thought of as a two phase process: ‘Selection of who will choose the beneficiaries’ and ‘Selection of how the beneficiaries will be chosen.’ Each phase has a limited number of options.

Phase 1: Organization (Who Does the Selecting)

Community Based Targeting (CBT) is the managed use of community committees to select beneficiaries. **Extension Targeting (ET)** is the use of existing systems of health agents, social workers, or other auxiliaries working for NGO, government, or international organizations, and community based organizations (e.g. existing associations, schools, hospitals, churches or local governmental agencies whose staff are already working with the community in some capacity) to select beneficiaries who meet criteria. **Survey Targeting** refers to a trained quantitative or qualitative survey team that gathers data on individuals, households, or some other group to determine who qualifies as a beneficiary. Qualitative survey targeting includes focus groups or Fonkoze, Concern International, and FAES community-participatory qualitative poverty ranking systems. An example of quantitative Survey Targeting is the traditional household survey or census. A significant conditioning factor in all these selection strategies is how those who choose beneficiaries are themselves chosen: specifically whether they are chosen by donor agencies or implementing partners or by members of the community. An important quality of who makes the targeting decision is whether it is *top down vs. bottom-up* selection. It is at this juncture, the “organization of targeting,” that the role of legitimate representatives of the state must be respected.

Figure 6
Community Based Targeting



Figure 7: Extension Targeting






Figure 8: Survey Targeting



Textbox 6: WFP COMMUNITY-BASED TARGETING BASIC GUIDANCE
 (Source: Basic Guidance Community-Based Targeting: WFP 2013)



Textbox 7: COMMUNITY EXTENSION TARGETING



Emergency extension targeting networks in Haiti are problematic. Employees and volunteers, even the many who are urban based, might otherwise qualify as beneficiaries themselves, or at least have extensive family and friends who should qualify. Moreover, it is nearly impossible to verify effective targeting. Haitian monitors who make ambitious inquiries and question the validity of target lists often encounter non-cooperation and cover-up. For foreigners the density of Haitian social networks and the inscrutability of the culture makes investigation nearly impossible. Ernest past investigations that have extended beyond the office and inventory lists frequently resulted in programs being shut down and staff transferred or dismissed. Moreover, while it may be politically inexpedient to acknowledge the extent to which the aid process has been corrupted, for 50 years now most evaluation reports end recommending that Monitoring and Evaluation be reinforced.



Textbox 8: LONG HISTORY OF CBT & EXTENSION TARGETING IN HAITI

During the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s Community Councils were the prevailing targeting strategy and considered highly effective (USAID 1983). By the 1980s the consensus among those who studied them had changed. Maguire (1979: 28) was calling the *gran neg* (Big Man) who had been instrumental in making the councils successful their “gravest problem.” Honorat (cited in McClure 1984) wrote that the councils had “became ‘citified’” and composed of “clusters of people waiting to receive and control some development project benefit.” Smucker (1986, p. 109) too concluded that they, “became project oriented and the widespread perception was that they became dependent on the Food and tried to capture it.” In the 1990s, Kaufman (1996, p. 10) described the CBOs that had succeeded the Councils as “formed in response to community development programs” and little more than, “groups of symbolic participation.” Even Jennie Smith (2001), a champion of Haiti rural grassroots organizations, referred to them up as “plagued with corruption, mismanagement and other problems.”

Arguably the best way to understand what had happened is in the context of increasing migration out of rural areas. Before the 1970s and 1980s, rural community leaders invested in property and social capital; this made Community Based Targeting not only viable but organic and arguably unavoidable. With support from community leaders-- “gran neg” and “gran dam”--humanitarian aid programs won community buy-in and support. But in the 1980s, 1990s until the present, political instability and migration out of the rural areas has sapped rural society of its hierarchical integrity. By the 1990s most traditional leaders and their children were gone. With their exodus export production and post-harvest processing industries all but completely disappeared from the rural areas. International aid soon took their place as the greatest sources of rural revenue. The extent to which humanitarian aid became a business is evident in the fact that while in the 1950s and 1960s humanitarian aid organizations had to partner with a rural elite comprised of traders, big farmers, and local politicians in order to reach the most vulnerable; but by the 1990s those same organizations found themselves dealing with an elite comprise of individuals who had made their money off of aid itself: pastors, orphanage owners and cooperative presidents. The trends are reflected in national statistics for declining agricultural production and skyrocketing emigration rates, both of which were occurring simultaneously with the apparent rise in corruption of Community Based and Extension Targeting resources.



PHASE 2: Selection Mechanism (How the Selecting Gets Done)

The second phase of beneficiary selection is what mechanism is used to choose beneficiaries (how they are chosen). The choices can be broken down into **Self-Selection**- individuals come to the program based on their own volition and need, such that cash-for-work programs where pay is set at such a low level that it draws only individuals willing to work for low pay; **Admin-List Selection** (ALS), meaning selection made from tax rolls, lists of land ownership, fish catches, hunting quotas or any other compendium or data base available from a formal institution that provides information on consumption, assets, or receivables. **Survey results** are also a type of admin-list. **Network Selection**, similar to what in statistical sampling is called snow-ball surveys, where beneficiaries are detected through individual networks. In choosing which of the preceding detection strategies should be used, the first decisions are made easy or complex based on

- if self-selection is deemed an option
- whether the targeting criteria is categorical vs. multivariate discriminatory
- the capacity of State, local, and international institutions already working in the area
- whether confronted with an emergency or non-emergency situation


Because of costs and effectiveness, self-selection should be considered an option when associated with building infrastructure with cash or food for work. However, in cases where the goal is to directly reach the most vulnerable, the incapacity of many vulnerable people to perform work makes self-selection a poor choice.

Whether or not the criteria are *categorical* vs. *multivariate discriminatory* criteria defines the complexity of the task. Programs that focus on pregnant women, malnourished children, HIV or even peanut growers are **categorical** and require little effort in determining whether one qualifies as a beneficiary. Based on a pregnancy or HIV test a woman either is or is not pregnant and is or is not HIV positive; based on health status a child either is or is not malnourished; a farmer has or has not planted peanuts or a specific area of land. In these cases the challenge is not beneficiary selection but who will make up the lists (Phase 1: “Selecting who chooses the beneficiaries”).

In areas where strong State institutions, strong traditional grassroots institutions and leadership, or effective networks of auxiliary social workers are present the challenge of beneficiary detection is made even easier, or even made for us, as when the State, military or local tribal leaders enforce their authority over the process. In Haiti this is not case, which means that for those for multivariate discriminatory, such as most

indicators of vulnerability, it comes done to Admin-list selection from Survey targeting, network selected list from CBT and Extension Targeting.

Figure 9: Beneficiary Selection Phase Decision Diagram



Whether Community Based or Extension Targeting are used, the actual beneficiary selection in rural Haiti is almost always conducted along the line of networks. The committees use associations and what they identify as *notab*, notable individuals in the community. It is committee members—not beneficiaries-- decide who qualifies as a *notab*. And here, in choosing *notab* and the *notab*'s choice of who receives aid, we arrive at the most significant obstacle to Community Based and Extension Targeting. In the words of Anthropologists White and Smucker (1998:4),

The overall scarcity of resources in Rural Haiti--where estimates place 40% to 70% of the population as living on less than \$1.25 per day and perhaps 90% of the population living on less than \$3.00 per day--means that while outsiders might see an AZEK or extension agent as corrupt because he or she gives aid to family and friends, those families and friends see the extension agent or AZEK as corrupt if she or he does not. The social pressure is such that many AZEK welcome a strategy that relieves them of the onus of excluding family and friends.

Scenario A



A stick figure diagram illustrating a family network. A central stick figure with a dollar sign on its chest is connected by arrows to eight surrounding nodes, each representing a family role: Cousin, Sister, 2nd Wife, Half Brother, Son, Outside children, Daughter, and Niece. The diagram is set against a yellow background with many small stick figures.

Textbox 10: SURVEY ADMIN LISTS SELECTION

With surveys a trained team gathers data on individuals or households to determine who qualifies as a beneficiary. Surveys can be conceptualized along a continuum from Quantitative to Qualitative. Quantitative surveys include large demographic baseline surveys where techniques based on probability theory are used to devise statistically representative sampling strategies and sizes. Researchers then visit and interview selected individuals or household members and interview them using a standardized questionnaire. The data is then compiled into a program like Excel or SPSS and analyzed to make inferences about the population in general.

Qualitative surveys typically do not depend on probability theory and the term “qualitative” is often a euphemism for opportunistic and poorly defined research methodology. An example of an effective and representative qualitative survey targeting technique is WEALTH RANKING SURVEY SELECTION. Some Humanitarian aid organizations in Haiti have such as the Ministry of Finance’s development branch FAES have experimented with participatory version of wealth ranking. Fonkoze and Concern follow the BRAC targeting model of Survey Targeting using mapping and wealth ranking strategy that includes the following steps:

- Create a poverty map using ranking to identify the poorest households
- Conduct traditional surveys using proxy means to verify vulnerability
- Cross-verify. Experienced staff visit all selection households

An advantage to the qualitative wealth-ranking or other strategies that draw on community participation is that they tap local knowledge and provide data that can discriminate inter-household vulnerability to degrees that we can never hope to achieve with quantitative surveys. They also achieve high levels of community buy-in because criteria and ranking is determined in consultation with the community. Expected advantage of quantitative surveys is objective

Drawbacks of both Survey Targeting approaches is that there is a trade-off between cost of the survey, the quality and how fast it can be accomplished, a relationship illustrated in the “impossible triangle” in the figure to the right. High cost and the fact that, as seen elsewhere,


poverty may be better understood as a fluid rather than a fixed state that can change from week, to month, to year make surveys impractical targeting tool.. Surveys also suffer from the same nepotism, unmitigated family loyalty and corruption that undermines Community Based, Extension and Network Targeting, But more than anything else surveys are unsuitable for a targeting tool because of they the cannot readily measure social capital, they are based erroneous assumptions, and they are do not readily detect change in vulnerability status, i.e. they must be done frequently (see text boxes ##)



Textbox 11 CURRENT STATE, UN, & NGO TARGETING STRATEGIES IN HAITI					
Community Based Targeting	International	State	Para-Statal	Community Based	Survey
ACDI VOCA Solidarite PADF- CADEC CRS CONCERN CARE CF FAO Oxfam World Vision FAES	RED CROSS HHF CARITAS HAS Hosp. A. Schweitzer Haiti Baptist Mission Fonkoze Concern CDS CRS COSMOS MSF SAVE TdH Rhasade World Vision UNICEF Zanmi Lasante	RESPEG BAC/ MARNDR MSPP KORE FANMI TI MANMAN CHERI	DPC DNSO	CODAB MPP Tet Kole UCHADER Local Authorities: (Mairies, KAZEK, AZEK...)	Fonkoze Concern International Brac

THE TWO MOST IMPORTANT DIMENSIONS TO VULNERABILITY
AND THE HARDEST TO MEASURE^{ix}

Textbox 12: SOCIAL CAPITAL



Textbox 13: TRANSIENT VULNERABILITY

To be effective, a safety net must account for the fact that the worse shocks to households come, not from regional calamities, but internal household crisis. In a 10 year longitudinal study of 35,000 low-income households in five countries, illness and the debt related to it was the culprit in 69% of those cases where households slipped into, or back into, abject poverty (Krishna 2010). There is good reason to believe the pattern holds true in Haiti as well. Far and away the worse shock reported by rural Haitians in the 3,050 household CNSA/CFSV (2007) survey was illness of a household member. Sickness of a mother who is a principal contributor of income through her trading or a father chiefly responsible for tending fields and livestock can plunge a household into the ranks of the destitute. On the other hand, a household receiving benefits because of vulnerability may become secure overnight if, for example, a family member arrives overseas or a person in the household enters into a romantic relationship with someone living in the US or Canada — increasingly common with access to internet in rural areas. Underscoring the point, overseas remittances are by far the single greatest source of revenue for the entire country, estimated at a minimum of 2 billion in 2012 (per capita US\$200). If informal transfers are included, remittances may account for as much as half of the country's revenue (IRIN 2010).

Worst Shocks to Households Livelihood Security	
Shocks	Respondents
Disease/Accident of household	30.8%
Death of a household member	11.7%
Cyclone Flood	11.4%
Increase in food prices	10.1%
Animal diseases	9.5%
Drought	4.8%
Crop diseases	4.5%
Rarity food stuffs on the market	2.1%
Theft kidnapping	2.1%
Drop in wages	1.6%
Drop in relative agricultural	1.1%
Increase in seed prices	1.0%

Source: World Bank 2011 Vulnerability before and after the Earthquake. Policy Research Working Paper 5850. By Damien Echevin. P 20. Date is drawn from CNSA/CFSVA 2007.

Textbox 14

EIGHT GUIDING QUESTIONS ABOUT TARGETING THE VULNERABLE IN HAITI

Question 1: ***If so many people in rural Haiti are so close to the margin of survival, how is it that with all the crises most are able to survive recurrent disasters and shocks?*** Answer: For 200 years it has been the household—and not international aid agencies—that has functioned as the first social security net for men, women and children in rural Haiti. The household has functioned as such by virtue of being the organizational focus of a multiple integrated risk averting endeavors; specifically agriculture, livestock rearing, fishing, charcoal and craft production. In accomplishing this tasks, family labor is organized around the household. Sale and production is interlinked through dependency on the regional rotating market system. Members draw on a second tier of social security, investment in social capital discussed earlier, such as kinship, reciprocal exchange with other households, and patron-client relationships.

Question 2: ***What happens, in the absence of aid agencies, when social capital is exhausted and the household can no longer continue as a productive enterprise?*** Answer: They go to live in other households, with other family; they migrate, or reconstitute themselves elsewhere

Question 3: ***If when aid agencies intercede, detect those vulnerable households closest to the point of dissolution and provide subsidies to help maintain them, are they in effect encouraging the proliferation of non-viable households that will face severe crisis in the event that donors cannot sustain an external safety net?*** Answer: we do not know

Question 4: ***How stable is the group of households that comprise the most vulnerable: Is it the same people who we see at the bottom in 2007 that we see in 2008, i.e. to what extent does the composition of the poorest change from day to day, week to week, month to month, year to year?*** Answer: we do not know

Question 5: ***What proportion of the most vulnerable households are vulnerable because the head is promiscuous, alcoholic, simply a bad parent, lazy, or someone who neighbors otherwise see as a burden and undeserving of aid?*** Answer: we do not know

Question 6: ***Just how many people in the community would see the dysfunctional people mentioned above as deserving of aid?*** Answer: we do not know


Question 7: ***If 40% to 60% of the rural population is among the rural extremely poor, but we can only reach 8%, what is the impact on relations among people in the community when the aid only goes to a minority of them?*** Answer: we do not know

Question 8: ***Why can't we just ask people in the communities to identify the most vulnerable households among them?*** The irony of the search for the ideal targeting mechanism is that we are trying to determine something that, if people in communities were forthcoming, they could tell us. And that is precisely the problem. What most aid workers know but it is politically incorrect to say is that the entire endeavor to find an effective targeting strategy is and long has been about keeping people from gaming the system. And in Haiti, whoever's fault it may ultimately be—donors, implementing partners, the State ,or simply ###-- there has been a great deal of gaming going on. This is precisely what renders strategies such as WFP Consumption Scores invalid, because they are basically asking directly, 'are you one of the most vulnerable?'

Freq-Listing

If we consider the task of targeting as a purely methodical challenge of identifying who needs the aid, then the best way to identify the most vulnerable would be through something similar to Frequency Listings (Freq-Listing), from the Freelistings technique used in Cultural Consensus Analysis (Romney et. al. 1986; Borgatti 1992). The technique is designed to document categorical knowledge, usually among non-literate people. For example, a researcher may wish to learn about the types of local foliage rural Haitian leaf doctors use to concoct herbal remedies. The researcher would ask a sample of 20 to 30 traditional healers to give the names of plants they use to make remedies. Responses are then correlated. Those plants mentioned often-- for example, by more than 5 respondents--are accepted as part of the semantic category of 'plants that Haitian leaf doctors use to make herbal remedies.'

The technique is simple in its conception and application and yields a depth of information. The more frequently an herb is mentioned the more commonly we can assume healers use it. A correlation in order of responses suggests the importance of that particular item, in this case a plant or leaf. Further analysis can be done to uncover relationships between different herbs and, very importantly, a cross-correlation of responses can detect who gives the most reliable responses, allowing for the development of statistically valid lists of "experts."




In applying the technique to Humanitarian Aid Beneficiary Targeting, surveys ask for *notab*-- honest local leaders who they would trust in times of crisis. Responses are then correlated to detect the most frequently cited *notab*. The *notab* are then used as a resource for identifying beneficiaries. Each *notab* is asked to provide a list of the most vulnerable people in his or her area. The lists are then correlated to identify those individuals mentioned by more than one *notab*. Similar to the healer with his or her herbal remedies, the typically competent *notab* can be thought of as a type of expert in judging the resources and social capital of his or her friends, and neighbors. *Notab* who are experts, tend to pack the same vulnerable people. In this was exceptionally competent *notab* can be identifies in a methodical and objective manner (those *notab* . expert at detecting the most vulnerable or, put another way, sincere and reporting truly vulnerable individuals. Another advantage of what we are calling Freq-Listing is that it increases the credibility of the choice of the vulnerable. The community rather than outsiders have identified the most vulnerable household. The technique allows community members to censure the lists for people they see as undeserving. Once we have a data base of *notab*, it can be drawn on at any time using cell phones to compile beneficiary lists.



Validation of those who meet beneficiary criteria should come after beneficiary lists have been made--whether based on survey, proxy means, or community committee. This can be accomplished through sample survey, review by other subcommittees, or open community meetings. It may but usually does not involve publication of the lists.

In the case of validation by survey, samples of 10% are standard; if 10% of those in the sample do not meet the intended criteria the list is rejected and the selection process redone. However, in practice rigorous validation is rare. When it does occur it is often semi-formal and when a list is corrupted it is quickly evident to those doing the validation—if they themselves are sincere and not involved in the corruption-- and completion of the total 10% of sampling is unnecessary to reject the list.

Coupled with validation is verification of the beneficiary's identity and the issuing of a beneficiary identify card or voucher that can serve as evidence for receipt of benefits.



Textbox 15 Monitoring



Lack of or weak monitoring creates an environment of competitive corruption, infighting, and resentment among those who are supposed to oversee the targeting process. The individual who successfully steals or embezzles aid will become more powerful than those who are honest. The honest worker or volunteer is discouraged and distracted from performing his or her job and in many cases their honesty and integrity may be seen as a threat to those benefitting from corruption. The consequence is the ironic situation where high moral standards make the individual a pariah and put him or her in physical danger. It also destroys credibility of the program and community buy-in. The general population inevitably come to know and understand the extent of the corruption far better than donors. Not least of all a flood of imported and low cost foods and goods embezzled from aid projects may crash local and national markets. This reduces the money that farmers and local craftspeople are able to obtain for their own products and, in extreme cases, drives farmers out of business or back into simpler, less costly subsistence strategies. Arguably the most important element is monitoring, a task that is often *not* rigorously conducted in Haiti and that can and often does undermine the entire Targeting and Aid Delivery process by creating the opportunity for corruption. On the other hand, an effective monitoring strategy means built in learning and a program capable of incorporating lessons into practice.


Textbox 16

TO MAKE PUBLIC OR NOT MAKE PUBLIC

When it comes to Validation there is a catch 22: on the one hand validation is done to assure that the choices of beneficiaries are valid. Validation is especially important where nepotism and a tradition of corruption are strong. But validation can also vitiate also what may have otherwise been an honest and accurate selection. This is especially true when committees of local leadership is used as a validation mechanism. It can become like a second chance to corrupt the selection process. The most effective and cost efficient means of dealing with the validation conundrum

with transparency. More specifically, to publically post beneficiary lists, announce them over the radio, or announce them in open community meetings. Doing so taps into the most powerful mechanism of keeping people honest in rural Haiti: community opinion and censure, i.e. shaming those who receive aid and do not need it while simultaneously focusing attention on those who do. But there is also the fear among donors that transparency will shame those who do need aid. The potential for seeding controversy and even violent conflict makes some donors prefer to eschew open public meetings as well. In trying to derive a resolution for the transparency dilemma, the point most certain is that it should be publicly stated how many beneficiaries in each region receive aid. This process should be taken to the sub-commune level, that of Habitation, and in keeping with the goal of robustness it should involve the legitimate and democratically elected representative of the State, the AZEK. Just as importantly as making sure that the AZEK is a recognized host under whose auspices the process is being conducted is to assure that the AZEK is not credited with having made the decision, something that becomes, in the all too common event that there is not enough aid, grounds to criticize and condemn the AZEK for favoritism. In short, finding an impartial mechanism for selecting beneficiaries can be a favor to the AZEK.


Beneficiaries
who agree with names being
announced on radio



(Lafiteau; n = 258)

Textbox 17: CLOSING THE LOOP

“Vouchers” or “Coupons” have created the potential for a revolution in reaching the most vulnerable. It means no more need for marine transport, no more broken truck axles on washed out roads, no more rotting food, no more embezzled food, no more sacked warehouses. It should also mean no more exorbitant costs that come with it all. All of which means less spent on the “other beneficiaries” and more aid for those targeted to receive it.



Vouchers also introduce the potential to fulfill one of the primary objectives of Haiti’s National Plan for Food Security: Food Sovereignty. By channeling vouchers into the purchase of local foods, international aid can act as an incentive to Haiti’s sagging agriculture production. With USAID support, CARE, ACF and CNSA have been trying to do just this, channel vouchers into the purchase of local produce. But there are two impediments. First, the complexity of aggregating local produce in Haiti where the average farm family works only 2 acres. The difficulty in aggregating produce has meant that most vouchers are restricted to redemption with major vendors of imported rice and cooking oil. Effective targeting can resolve the problem. The lowest cost and most nutritious staples in Haiti are not imported. They are local breadfruit, sweet potatoes, yams, avocados, greens, and fruits. Thus, economic logic should mean that if we simply get cash to the poorest and hungriest they will buy the cheapest foods: local foods. The second impediment is making the cash transfers so they can buy the food. Despite millions of dollars that USAID and the world Bank has given cell phone companies in Haiti to create a viable mobile money system, the companies have, for whatever reason, failed to make a system that the poor actually use. The irony is that many popular class Haitians already transfer minutes to family and friends in a type of informal economy of telephone minutes. Even in conducting research for this guide the investigators paid rural assistants by transferring telephone minutes. This suggests that if the phone companies were mandated to buy back their minutes, the mobile money economy would take off on its own. Aid organizations would only have to distribute phone cards. A simple law mandating redemption of minutes might be all that is necessary. Mobile money could be fixed with a simple stroke of a legislature’s pen.

7. MOST IMPORTANT POINTS ABOUT THE TARGETING CHAIN IN HAITI

CATEGORY	WHAT WE KNOW	SOLUTION
Geo Criteria	The vulnerable are distributed evenly, meaning that priority is not where the poor are located or in what category, but that assistance is efficiently distributed.	Donor coordination
Beneficiary Unit	Because of the importance of social capital, Individual may be more important unit in understanding differential status and who to target: but household is more practical in terms of distribution to the most vulnerable, and livelihood security.	Target households for food security
Criteria	Proxy Means Testing is costly, has yielded unsatisfactory criteria for vulnerability and may be socially disruptive strategy for selecting criteria. The only criteria that can be practically targeted by non-locals are categorical variables such as child malnutrition, HIV, pregnant and lactating mothers, farming strategies. But with caveats. Does aid to families with malnourished children cause some families to starve children? Many aid technicians and missionaries believe it does. Does aid to pregnant women cause poor girls to get pregnant? Many rural Haitians think it does	Dispense with proxy means testing. Only use categorical criteria and/or devise system of local knowledge
Selection: Phase 1 Organization	Nepotism, outmigration, an industry of aid capture, and community leaders with families friends, homes, investment, and legal residence overseas al- make Community Based and Extension targeting poor stand-alone choices for organization of Targeting; dependence on network selection strategy increases likelihood of excluding the most vulnerable; the importance of supporting legitimate representatives of the State in bottom up manner underscores need to give AZEK a leading role as targeting host and guarantor.	Rely more heavily on sub-commune level decision making bodies led by AZEK and KAZEK
Selection Phase 2 Mechanism	The only cost effective bottom-up mechanism that taps local knowledge, measures social capital, can be readily repeated to capture poverty transience, is useful for both disaster and non disaster targeting and can include AZEK as principal benefactor is Freq-Listing.	Integrate standing freq-list systems into targeting strategy
Validation	Beneficiary selection in Haiti should not be conducted in secret; most respondents do not object to public declaration they receive aid; the truly needy object less; community censure is the most powerful, cost-efficient and arguable an indispensable ingredient in any effective monitoring strategy. Radio is most popular means of announcing distribution, number of beneficiaries, area—but not specific recipients.	Devise validation system integrated with public censure

8. EVALUATING TARGETING STRATEGY ROBUSTNESS

To evaluate what course of action should be taken to most effectively target beneficiaries, we return to the Robustness at the beginning of this guide and by which a sound targeting strategy should ultimately be judged. Below we evaluate both Phase 1 (who selects) and Phase 2 according to these criteria (how they select).

Table 2: Robustness Scale for Beneficiary Selection Phase 1: Who Selects Beneficiaries (Targeting)						
Potentialities	Community Based	Extension		Survey		
		No State	State	No State	State	Freq Listing
Bottom up	**	**	*	****	**	*****
Resistant to corruption	***	*	*	****	**	****
Supports legitimate state structure	***	*	**	*	***	****
Achieves Community Buy-in	**	**	*	**	**	****
Effective after disaster	**	**	*	*	*	****
Effective during non-disaster	***	**	*	***	***	****


Table 3: Robustness Scale for Beneficiary Selection Phase 2: How Beneficiaries Are Selected					
Potentials	Self-selection	Admin-List Selection		Network Selection	Freq Listing
		Surveys	Org. lists		
Validity	***	****	***	**	*****
Sensitivity to changes	*****	***	**	***	*****
Capacity to Detect social capital	***	**	*	***	*****
Effective after disaster	**	*	*	***	****
Effective during non-disaster	****	***	**	***	*****
Cost Effective	*****	**	*****	***	***
Resistant to corruption	*	***	*	*	****
Community buy-in/acceptance	****	***	**	***	****

9. CONCLUSION

We can approach a conclusion and a basic guide for targeting by defining what should be done at each stage based on

- the tenets of targeting seen in the introduction,
- the lessons of targeting discussed throughout the previous pages and that come from 50 years of shared State, NGO, and UN agency's experiences working in Haiti,
- the intuitive mandates of Robustness seen at the beginning of this guide and used above in assessing the different forms of Targeting Selection Organization and Selection Mechanisms and that include,
- support for legitimate and elected state authorities at the local level,
- costs, and
- the challenges of detecting social capital and transient vulnerability,

Figure 11: CNSA Targeting Guide Diagram



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NOTES

ⁱ Design & Implementation: Targeting and Selection

<http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/communitydrivendevelopment/brief/cdd-targeting-selection>

ⁱⁱ Implied in this is just distribution of aid as, “[a]ssistance will be guided solely by need and will not discriminate in terms of ethnic origin, nationality, political opinion, gender, race or religion. In a country, assistance will be targeted to those most at risk from the consequences of food shortages, following a sound assessment that considers the different needs and” Humanitarian Principles (WFP/EB.A/2004/5-C).

ⁱⁱⁱ “... ensuring that food goes to people who need it and only those who need is critical to minimizing the collateral harm done by aid” (WFP 2009 Targeting in Complex Emergencies, Programme Guidance Notes p 2).

^{iv} Whether aid programs have achieved, the objectives of relieving suffering and promoting sovereignty are topics of contention. Whether or not harm has been done is vague and even in those cases where harm clearly has been one, it is seldom clear whether the good outweighs the bad: does saving 1,000 starving children while crashing the local agricultural market for 50,000 farmers justify the intervention?

^v This situation only slightly improved in 1999, as 48.0% were then categorized as poor. In 2001, the HLCS stated that 55.6% of households lived with less than US\$1 per day (Echevin 2011: 2)

^{vi}

Criteria	References
Gini Coefficient	EMMUS 2012
Population Living on less \$1.25 per day	Sletten and Eget 2004
Population of adults illiterate	EMMUS 2012
Children 6 to 12 years old in school	ENSA 2001
Chronically malnourished Children 5 years and under	EMMUS 2012

^{vii} To be sure, there are some differences, for example in regional migration patterns, remittances, and slight differences in dependency on agricultural strategies. CNSA/FEWSNET (2009) documented differences in vulnerability and infrastructure at the sub-department level.

^{viii} In this sense Proxy Means Testing has two connotations, a) it describes a technique of searching for and/or validating criteria according to statistical significance and b) it describes the use of multiple criteria bundled together.

^{ix} Krishna, Anirudh 2010 "One Illness Away: Why People Become Poor and How they Escape Poverty" Oxford University Press.