



COORDINATION NATIONALE DE LA SÉCURITÉ ALIMENTAIRE

Report on

**Beneficiary Targeting in Haiti :
Detection Strategies**

Timothy T Schwartz

with

Elie Melech Desir , Anthony DeMattee, and Emile Pharrel

Supervised by Nathalie Lamaute-Brisson

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Coordinator of Maissade Survey

Harold Maass

Survey Field Director

Emile Pharrel

Accounting and Logistics

Stephanie Pierre

Supervisor of Telephone surveys

Almathe Jean

Field Survey Supervisors

Renaud Previllon

Egain Ambeau

Syvestre Prophet

Telephone Surveyors

Keely Brookes

Erika Childs

Nahomie Jeannis

Vanessa Henry

Dieula Lacombe

Field Surveyors

Markenson Emile

Othelo Bisnet

Jeudy Lidnor

Evens Paul Bernard

Kerline Vaval

Christine Jean Simon

Leonne Milfleur

Andre Donald

Ernst Vertus

Gregory Mondely

Gregory Jean Baptiste

Lanel Pierre

Chadson Pierre

Rony Desire

Sabine Vilfort

Jimmy Plaisir

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ARISTE Sonel	FAO
ARTHUR Anne	FAES
BARRETO Carolina	PAM
BRUTUS Jn Robert	UNAG
CADET Marie Florence	USAID
COULANGE Mesadieu Erline	UNAG
DEBROUWER Thomas	ACF
DESIR Elie Melech	FAO
ELISEE Dagobert	ONPES
ERNEST Manirambona	FAO
FABIUS Anais	FAES
FLIPPINI Suze Perry	PAM
FRANCOIS Hary	USAID
GUERISMA Jyminor	USAID
LAMOUR Frantz	ONPES
LAURENT Carell	USAID
MATHIEU Gary	CNSA
OLIVIER Djems	Ministere Delegue aux Droits de l'Homme et la Lutte contre la Pauvrete
PIRIOU Cedric	ACF /CLIO
RENARD Antoine	PAM
SATHYR Desilhomme	CNSA
SAVAGE Ron	USAID
THOMAS Hans Muller	FAES
TORRES Jordi	OXFAM

ACRONYMS

ACF Action Contre Le Faim
ACTED Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development
AGD Administration Générale des Douanes
BDM Bureau de Monetization
BMPAD Bureau de Monétisation du Programme d'Aide au Développement
CARE Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CFW Cash For Work
CNSA Coordination Nationale de la Sécurité Alimentaire
CRS Catholic Relief Services
DR Dominican Republic
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
FFW Food For Work
GOH Government of Haiti
HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
IDB Inter-American Development Bank
IICA Inter-American Institute for Cooperation in Agriculture
IMF International Monetary Fund
IOM International Organisation for Migration
MARNDR Ministère de l'Agriculture, des Ressources Naturelles et du Développement Rural
MAST Ministère des Affaires Sociales et du Travail (Ministry of Social Affairs and
MCFDF Ministère à la Condition Féminine et aux Droits des Femmes
MCHN Maternal Child Health and Nutrition
MCI Ministre du Commerce et de l'Industrie
MEF Ministre de l'Economie et des Finances,
MEFP Ministère de l'Education nationale et de la Formation Professionnelle
MICTSN Ministère de l'Intérieur, des Collectivités Territoriales et de la Sécurité Nationale
MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MPECE Ministère de la Planification, de l'Environnement et de la Coopération Externe
MSPP Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population
MSPP Ministère de la santé publique et de la population (Haitian Ministry for Public Health and
MTPTC Ministère des Travaux Publics, Transports et Communications (Haitian Ministry of
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
OAS Organization of American States
PADF Panamerican Development Foundation
PAHO Pan American Health Organization
PAHO Pan American Health Organization
PAM Programme Alimentaire Mondial (World Food Program)
PDNA Post Disaster Needs Assessment
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WB World Bank
WFP World Food Programme
WHO World Health Organisation
WV World Vision

Humanitarian Aid Beneficiary Targeting

“...the process of identifying the intended beneficiaries of a programme and then ensuring that, as far as possible, the benefits actually reach those people and not others.”

Sharp, K. 1997. *Targeting Food Aid in Ethiopia*. London, Save the Children Fund. (Cited in WFP 2006b: 5).

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1. Executive Summary

This study was commissioned by CNSA with the financial and logistic support of WFP and FAO. The objective was to examine the processes that NGO and governmental agencies employ to select beneficiaries of social assistance programs in rural Haiti. The task responds to needs associated with current humanitarian aid and development programs such as: *Ede Pep*, with the *Ti Manman Cheri* assistance program to mothers with children in primary school and managed under the Economic and Social Assistance Fund (FAES); *Kore Fanmi*., also managed under FAES, a World Bank-supported Family Development Plan that connects vulnerable families to the services and information provided by government, NGO, and international agencies and tracks progress of participant households; and *Kore Lavi*, a five-year US\$79,996,200 USAID financed plan that includes a pilot safety net program targeting 18,150 of the poorest households in 23 of Haiti's 140 communes (total population is 315,400 households), carried out under the auspices of CARE International, WFP, and ACF.

The research involved an extensive review of the literature on humanitarian targeting, including nine of the major household surveys carried out in Haiti over the past two decades as well as the ethnographic literature on rural Haiti. It also involved two weeks of field work and focus group interviews with beneficiaries and participants in community-based targeting committees as well as implementing partners in the Department of the SE and NW; interviews with 32 Port-au-Prince NGO directors, government Ministry officials, and M&E specialists; and four surveys, the most important of which was a WFP funded and CNSA supervised sampling of the Commune of Maissade in the Department of the Centre where the new Targeting technique of Frequency Listing was tested (N = 1,951 described at length in Section "Frequency Listing").

In the broadest sense, Targeting can be conceptualized as a dimension inherent in almost every decision an organization makes; from defining what the organization will specialize in (e.g. medicine vs. agriculture), to the area of the world it will work in (e.g. Africa vs. Latin America), to what kind of aid it will give (e.g. medicines, treatment, education, material goods), to how it will distribute the aid (e.g. work vs. food vs. vouchers).

In order to address current program needs in Haiti, the bulk of the analysis focuses on what is defined here as Beneficiary Detection Strategy. This includes: Selection of Geographic Criteria, Selection of Beneficiary Unit, Selection of Beneficiary Criteria, and Selection of Beneficiary Selection mechanism.

Although this report is concerned with how decisions define who is a beneficiary (selection)--and *not* with how decisions impact the transfer or delivery of aid (logistics) or how the integrity of the process is guaranteed (feedback)—logistics and feedback may have more to do with who ultimately gets the aid than the choice of intended beneficiaries. The final two sections assess the inter-relations between the entire aid chain, including the strengths and weaknesses of specific Selection strategies.

Geographic Criteria refers to how an organization decides where it will select beneficiaries. The category is principally divided according to political districting (country, state, township), or some configuration of population density (urban/rural), economic-occupational zone (agricultural, pastoral, fishing), or ecological area (forest, mountain, plain, desert). In Haiti the standard geographical criteria that humanitarian and state agencies use are Departments and Communes and six ecological-occupational zones, 1) agricultural mountain humid, 2) agro-pastoral semi-humid,

3) agro-pastoral plateau. 4) agro-pastoral dry, 5) mono-cultural plain, and 6) dry agricultural and fishing. Differences between Departments and ecological-occupational zones are so slight that it can be said that the most fantastic aspect of geographical profiles in Haiti is the overall homogeneity. Most differences can be attributed to sampling error inherent in the surveys and year-to-year climatic variation.

Beneficiary Unit can be separated here into intermediary units (e.g. school, church, association, business) and primary units, (principally households vs. individuals). Putting aside school feeding programs and the associations that help vector cash and food-for-work programs, the most common targeting unit in Haiti is the household. Because organizations focus on aid, they tend to define and conceptualize the household as a unit of consumption. But the household can also be understood as a unit of production and, as such, the primary mechanism of social security for all people living in rural Haiti. Understanding the household in this way helps explain why use of specific criteria to distinguish vulnerable households is complex, and potentially a misguided waste of effort and resources.

Beneficiary Criteria refers to parameters that define who qualifies as a beneficiary, such as people who are handicapped, pregnant women, lactating mothers, or orphans. With regard to discriminating between degrees of household vulnerability, the task becomes exceedingly complex. The current *Kore Fanmi* and *Kore Lavi* programs depend heavily on infrastructural criteria that make intuitive sense, but almost all of which have little to do with household-specific differences in vulnerability in the sense of being more impoverished. For example, they include electricity, but less than 15% of households in rural Haiti have electricity and, rather ironically, the poor are twice as likely to have it than are the non-poor. The programs include latrines as a criterion, but only 20% of households in rural Haiti have what qualifies as an “improved latrine”, and we can infer that most of those were built by aid organizations. Other typical criteria used to target vulnerable households are “female headship”, “crowding”, “high dependency ratio”, and “presence of handicapped”. Virtually all of these criteria can be called into question.

An analysis of the yet to be published 3,501 household national CNSA survey (2013) underscores that criteria and the most complex application of multiple criteria (Proxy Means Testing) are poorly adapted at discriminating degrees of vulnerability: according to the analysis of the CNSA survey data, *if we depended on knowing the vulnerability of a household based on those variables in the survey that have the strongest correlations with malnourished child in the house, we would be wrong 68% of the time.*

Indeed, the situation is such that if we look at the logic behind the common criteria used in targeting rural Haitian households, many can be re-conceptualized as indicators not of high, but of low vulnerability. For example, high numbers of elderly and young children may suggest remittances; high numbers of children over 7 years of age may suggest greater household work capacity; crowding may indicate a temporary high level of resources; presence of handicapped may indicate long-term capacity to care for a non-contributing household member. There is even strong and consistent statistical data to suggest that the most common criterion for vulnerability, female headed households, is actually more indicative of lower vulnerability than that indicated by the status male headed household.

The poor statistical applicability of criteria can be understood in part by the fact that people in rural Haiti tend to invest heavily in social capital and the fact that we are dealing with a mass of poverty such that 80% of the population is living on less than US\$2 per day. In short, households already

living on the margins of subsistence are interlocked in a network of reciprocal relations that support one another, thus reducing the vulnerability of the lone household and leveling poverty out across the population—i.e. the extent of integration among the population means that most people benefit and suffer in unison.

Also important to understand is that detecting differential rural vulnerability using material variables is obscured by the orientation toward urban migration, i.e. it is difficult to detect material differences in the rural areas when most people living there are investing in trying to leave or getting their children out. People prefer to invest in urban rather than rural residences and they make heavy investments in getting their children into urban schools. For reasons discussed shortly, this movement out of the rural areas is highly relevant to current Community Based Targeting because it has sapped the social system of its traditional leadership—i.e. they have emigrated.

A final and highly significant point is that, as touched on earlier, targeting strategies tends to define the household as a unit of consumption. But a great deal of insight can be garnered from looking at rural households in Haiti, not as an object of a safety net, but as part of one. In other words, they can be viewed as a productive unit or enterprise; one adapted to surviving in a harsh natural and economic environment characterized by unpredictable political upheavals that have made economic isolation the norm.

Beneficiary Selection: The model adopted in this study aims to clarify ambiguities and differences in other models conceptualizing the core targeting process under the single category of “Beneficiary Selection Strategies” and compartmentalizing them into a two stage process: 1) ‘Selection of who will choose the beneficiaries’ and 2) ‘Selection of how the beneficiaries will be chosen.’ Each phase has a limited number of options discussed below.

Community Based Targeting (CBT) is the managed use of community committees to select beneficiaries. **Extension Targeting** (ET) is the use of existing systems of health agents, social workers, or other auxiliaries working for NGO, government, or international organizations, and community based organizations (e.g. existing associations, schools, hospitals, churches or local governmental agencies whose staff are already working with the community in some capacity) to select beneficiaries who meet criteria. **Survey Targeting** refers to a trained quantitative or qualitative survey team that gathers data on individuals, households, or some other group to determine who qualifies as a beneficiary. Qualitative survey targeting includes focus groups or Fonkoze, Concern International, and FAES community-participatory qualitative poverty ranking systems. An example of quantitative Survey Targeting is the traditional household survey or census. A significant conditioning factor in all these selection strategies is how those who choose beneficiaries are themselves chosen: specifically whether they are chosen by donor agencies or implementing partners or by members of the community. The process can be conceptualized as top down vs. bottom up selection. Top down strategies tend to invite greater corruption and less community acceptance or “buy-in”; bottom up strategies are plagued by nepotism and competition for limited aid but they tend to get greater reception among the community and more effectively reach those closer to the category of most vulnerable.

The second phase of beneficiary selection is what mechanism is used to choose beneficiaries (how they are chosen). The process can be conceptualized as **Self-Selection**- individuals come to the program based on their own volition and need, such that cash-for-work programs where pay is set at such a low level that it draws only those individuals willing to work for low pay; **Admin-List Selection** (ALS), meaning selection is made from surveys, tax rolls, lists of land ownership, fish catches, hunting quotas or any other compendium or data base available from a formal institution

that provides information on consumption, assets, or receivables; **Network Selection**, similar to what in statistical sampling is called snow-ball surveys, refers to situations where beneficiaries are detected through individual or professional networks.

In this study we offer a fourth strategy for beneficiary detection, a modification of a technique from Cognitive Anthropology and Cultural Consensus Analysis that can be called Frequency Listing. Specifically it involves sampling a population of respondents who are asked for a list of “most vulnerable households” or “notab” (notable individuals in the community that people consider to be honest and effective leaders) who are then used to elicit lists of most vulnerable households. The advantages of **Frequency Listing** is that it taps local knowledge regarding extent of “social capital”, something that can arguably only be garnered from family, friends/enemies, and neighbors who know the status of their peers. It also increases community buy-in because criteria and selection are based on a type of community consensus, thus people in the community tend to more readily accept the results.

In evaluating the merits of different targeting strategies, it should be understood that although there is a tendency to think of CBT (Community Based Targeting) as new, it has a long history in Haiti. CBT was considered highly effective and became the prevailing strategy during the 1950s thru to the 1970s. But by the 1980s observers were describing both CBT and Extension Targeting (ET) as plagued with fraud, corruption, and what some call elite capture—redirection of aid by the elite and to the elite.

The apparent degeneration in effectiveness of CBT and ET strategies can be understood in the context of changing politics and congruently changing donor strategies and, not least of all, increasing migration out of rural areas. Before the tumultuous rural political upheavals of the 1970s and 1980s, community leaders invested in property and social capital; this made Community Based Targeting not only viable but organic and arguably unavoidable. Only with support from community leaders, could projects win community buy-in and acceptance. And even if elites were ‘capturing’ humanitarian aid, the fact that they were heavily invested in the community meant that the aid was in turned invested in the economic wellbeing of the community. But political instability and the concurrent migration out of the rural areas sapped rural society of its hierarchical integrity and cohesiveness. International aid came to take the place of traditional land, livestock, and exports as the greatest sources of rural revenue; exports and post-harvest processing industries all but completely disappeared from the rural areas. By the 1990s most traditional leaders and the children were gone as well. New leaders and a culture of aid capture had taken their place. Some—if not most--moved their families to Port-au-Prince and Miami while remaining in the area specifically to capture aid and send it to the city and overseas in support of those families.

What we call Survey Targeting and Community Wealth Ranking used by organizations such as Concern International, Fonkoze, and FAES are highly effective alternatives but impractical due to high costs. Both systems could be improved upon through the use of the Frequency Listing mentioned above, an alternative technique for detecting the most vulnerable individuals and households. With this possibility in mind, we present a summary of findings from a test of Frequency Listing conducted in the Commune of Maissade, Haiti.

Twenty surveyors traveling on 10 motorcycles spent 13 days surveying the Commune of Maissade (area 288 km², pop ~ 60,000). The surveys divided the Commune into 38 *abitasyon* (as defined by the people living there), and interviewed a target 50 respondents per *abitasyon*. Two methods of selecting respondents were used: a) a sampling strategy that involved reaching 10 random points scattered throughout the *abitasyon* and then interviewing the nearest five household heads, and b)

the kiosk method where surveyors selected two points and then invited inhabitants to come to those points to be interviewed. The respondents were asked their name, section, habitation and locality of residence and then asked for list of 10 *notab*. Those *notab* mentioned 3 or more times were then contacted and asked for a list of five “most vulnerable” beneficiary household heads, their name, section, habitation and locality of residence. The survey identified 508 *notab* and successfully contacted 451 of them; 88 beneficiaries were mentioned by 3 or more *notab*. The Kiosk method turned out to be as or more effective than the more costly method of randomly selected households. We calculate that by eliminating *notab* who give lists that do not correspond with those from other *notab* (i.e. those we can infer are non-experts or self-interested), and then asking for lists of 30 beneficiaries from the remaining *notab* “experts” we may reach a 10% mark of beneficiaries and at very little additional cost. In summary, we calculate that we could repeat the process conducted in Maissade for half the cost and 5 times the effectiveness, fully achieving a list of 10% of vulnerable potential beneficiary households.

The final sections of the report explore the importance of those segments of the humanitarian aid targeting chain not yet discussed in depth: specifically, Type of organization, Type of aid, Distribution Mechanism, Validation of Beneficiary lists and the Feedback mechanisms for determining if the results of Targeting are in fact being applied, if they have been effective, who was included and should not have been, who was excluded and should not have been, estimates of losses from corruption, identification of patterns of waste and corruption, and suggestions for improvements. Arguably the most important element is monitoring, a task that is often not rigorously conducted in Haiti and that can and often does undermine the entire Targeting and Aid Delivery process by creating the opportunity for corruption. All these Targeting components of the targeting chain are combined with those discussed elsewhere in the report to present a Targeting Decision model that depicts the alternatives at each stage of the chain. Two matrices also summarize the strengths and weakness of the core Beneficiary Selection processes, those a) regarding what group or individuals govern the process of developing beneficiary lists and b) those regarding the potential selection strategies. Specifically, the matrices evaluate Beneficiary Selection strategies according to the following criteria,


- Bottom up: degree to which it is rooted in the community
- Resistant to corruption: degree to which it resists being corrupted
- Reinforces state structure: degree to which it reinforces existing state entities
- Community buy-in/acceptance: degree to which members of the community accept the beneficiary selection as appropriate
- Validity: degree to which the selection of beneficiaries corresponds with beneficiary criteria
- Sensitivity to changes: degree to which the selection strategy can detect or be adapted to detect changes in beneficiary status
- Capacity to Detect social capital: degree to which the selection strategy measure an individual or households social capital
- Resistance to corruption: degree to which the strategy cannot be corrupted
- Effective after disaster: degree to which the governing organization and strategy are useful in detecting beneficiaries after a disaster
- Effective during non-disaster: degree to which the governing organization and specific strategy chosen are useful in detecting beneficiaries during normal times
- Cost Effective: the expenses in both time and money needed to employ the strategy

Having said all that, the simple fact is that there is no magic formula or diagram that can make a targeting system work from the safety of the board room. All the analysis and all the good will in the world will not make aid effective in the absence of institutional mechanism that can hold accountable those individuals and institutions that pilfer or waste aid. But currently there exists no evaluative mechanism or institution that can or does provide the information necessary to guarantee sincere performance of those tasked with targeting and delivery of aid.

Indeed, the greatest impediment to effective targeting is arguably the weak role of State entities. Targeting in Haiti is embedded in the context of a State that is still reeling from 29 years of dictatorship followed by another 28 years of almost uninterrupted political turmoil and instability. The international community is currently participating with State entities to fortify national institutions, but the reality if not irony of Targeting is that it is often an exercise in circumventing the State authorities. This aversion to using state officials arguably makes aid more effective because it reduces corruption. But targeting that does not involve State entities runs the risk of rendering them inert or, worse, pushing the State into a role of opponent or antagonist of aid and services intended for the good of the population.

2. Introduction

This study was commissioned to examine the processes that NGO and governmental agencies employ to select beneficiaries of humanitarian aid in rural Haiti. Despite three decades of political unrest and economic recession at the national level, malnutrition in Haiti has declined. Chronic malnutrition has gone from the 1978 level of 40% of all children under 5 years of age to the 2012 level of 22 percent (EMMUS 2012). Food insecurity remains high. CNSA (2011) estimates that 38% of households in Haiti--4 million individuals--are food insecure. The situation in rural areas are worse than those in the Port-au-Prince Metropolitan area: 42 percent of rural households are estimated to be food-insecure; 30% of rural children under five are chronically malnourished, 50% of women are anemic (ENSA, 2011). Moreover, the situation in Haiti lags far behind that found in other countries in the region (see Figure 1). According to WHO 2011, at 53 per 100,000 people, Haiti has the highest death rate from malnutrition—in proportion to those malnourished—in the world.ⁱ



(Source: WHO, World Health Statistics 2013)

To address food insecurity, the Haitian government developed the National Plan for Food Security, a whole-of-government approach built on three strategic pillars (IDB 2011),

- a) investment in agriculture
- b) provision of basic social services for improving health, education, and nutrition, and
- c) creation of social safety nets for the most vulnerable and during crisis

The plan involves multiple ministries (MAST, MCPE, MARNDR, MCI, MSPP, MEF, MCFDF), para-State agencies (CNSA, FAES, IHSI), international donors (USAID, IFAD, WFP, EU, WB, IDB, IMF), international governance and facilitating agencies (WFP, FAO, UNDP, UNICEF, PAHO, OEA), and NGO implementing partners (CARE, ACF, WV, Concern, PADF, CRS, Oxfam, and ACTED, to name only a few). The principal programs focusing on the most vulnerable, include


- The First Lady Sophia Martelly’s *Aba Grangou* launched in January 2012 (now inactive)
- *Ede Pep*, with the *Ti Maman Cheri* assistance program to mothers with children in primary school and managed under the Economic and Social Assistance Fund (FAES)
- *Kore Fanmi*, also managed under FAES, a World Bank supported Family Development Plan that connects vulnerable families to the services for immunization and education, delivers a bundle of basic goods (mosquito nets and supplements), as well as information about hygiene, and tracks progress of participant households and
- *Kore Lavi*, a five year US\$79,996,200 USAID financed plan intended to be the basis for building a nutritional safety net that targets pregnant women, malnourished children and 18,150 of the poorest households in 23 of Haiti’s 140 communes (total population is 315,400 households), and carried out under the auspices of CARE International, WFP, and ACF.

A crucial ingredient to all these--from agricultural assistance to farmers to nutritional relief to the most vulnerable households--is correctly identifying the recipients: Targeting.

Structure of the Report

The research for this report began with a central objective: to evaluate Community Based Targeting vs. Proxy Means Testing. In reviewing the concept of targeting it was found expedient to re-define Proxy Means Testing as a method of refining criteria and to categorize Community Based Targeting with forms for organizational types used in applying targeting strategies: specifically, Administrative and Survey targeting, a phase of what we define as “beneficiary detection.” The “Beneficiary Detection” targeting phase is conceptualized as part of a larger category of the targeting process—“Beneficiary Selection”-- that includes selection of Geographical Criteria, selection of Beneficiary Unit, and selection of Criteria (see Figure 2, below), all of which comprise the focus of the report and all of which are explained in greater detail in the next section.


Figure 2: Focus of the Study



What is important to understand here is that the report is designed in such a way that at the same time it assesses the different methods that organizations employ in targeting—for example, the logic underlying the household as beneficiary unit or why some criteria are, or are not, applicable--it aims to build a holistic understanding of the dynamics behind vulnerability in rural Haiti and the safety net mechanisms that farmers have relied on in the past and, to a large extent continue to rely on today. The crux of the argument is that the household as a productive enterprise is the

principal mechanism for individual social security in rural Haiti; extra-household social capital is a secondary safety net; and inter-household interdependency disseminates out primarily along the axes of biological and fictive kinship. The role of the household and inter-household relationships are conditioned by opportunities made possible through Haiti's highly integrated rotating market system and they rest on autonomous productive technologies necessary in the near total absence of effective information systems (extension services and market information), transport systems (roads, trains, and powered shipping), and administrative technologies (regulatory legal systems), the sum of which make the conditions confronting people in rural Haiti resemble, not contemporary conditions for small farmers found elsewhere in the region today, but conditions found in centuries past. All the preceding can be understood as a response to rural Haiti's rather unique configuration of current constraints that include an unusually harsh and unpredictable natural environment characterized by severe storms and frequent drought, and not least of all Haiti's historic role as rebel black republic among, until recently, officially racist counter nations, something complemented by frequent embargoes, internecine domestic politics subsidized by international special interests, economic and social isolation (see Figure 3). All that is being described should be considered critical in understanding Targeting in Haiti because they are the reasons that discriminating levels of vulnerability between the mass of rural Haitians households - 90% of which classify by *any* international standard as vulnerable—is an exceedingly difficult if not illogical pursuit.

Figure 3: Cake of Vulnerability for Rural Haiti



With respect to this objective of a holistic understanding of vulnerability in Haiti, the report deals with each phase of “Beneficiary Detection Strategy,” as defined in Figure 2, previous page, in the following manner: Geographical Targeting is examined with respect to the difference between departments and ecological zone; Beneficiary Unit is examined with special emphasis on the most common targeting unit in Haiti, the household, and the significance of the household in rural Haiti as not simply a unit of consumption but also production and, as such, the primary mechanism of social security for all people living in rural Haiti. The report examines infrastructural criteria used in the current *Kore Fanmi* and *Kore Lavi* programs and then presents the results of our analysis of the validity of the most common criteria used in Haiti based on the yet to be published 3,501 household national CNSA survey (2013). The poor statistical applicability of criteria is discussed in the context of rural Haitians’ tendency to invest in social capital and stages of urban migration, i.e. people prefer to invest in urban rather than rural residences because many if not most of them are trying to leave the rural areas. This movement out of the rural areas is highly relevant to current Community Based Targeting because the base is weak, very weak. The long history of Community Based Targeting in Haiti is discussed in the context of changing politics and vicissitudes of international aid, and increasing migration out of rural areas. The conclusion confirms something that most readers already know -- that gate-keeping and political opportunism sabotage both Community Based Targeting and what we call in this report Administrative Extension Targeting (use of NGO, religious, State, or volunteer networks of extension agents). High costs make the very effective quantitative Survey Targeting and Community Wealth Ranking impractical. Our conclusion is that both systems could be improved upon through the use of Frequency Listing, an alternative technique for detecting the most vulnerable individuals and households. We conclude the report with a summary of findings from a test of Frequency Listing conducted in the Commune of Maissade, Haiti.

Research and Methodology

Literature Review

The research for this study involved a review of the literature on humanitarian aid targeting. Lavalee et al. (2010), World Food Program (2006a; 2006b), and Lamaute-Brisson (2009) provide the most useful models for targeting. Himmelstine (2012) provides the most comprehensive review of Community Based Targeting worldwide. For the purposes of this study the most useful resources for surveys, Proxy Means Testing (PMT) and evaluation of criteria in Haiti were found to be:

- The 2001 Haiti Living Conditions Survey (HLCS or ECVH) a 7,186 representative sample of households in both rural and urban areas
- CNSA and WFP’s 2007 Analyse Compréhensive de la Sécurité Alimentaire et de la Vulnérabilité (CFSVA), a survey of 3,050 households in rural Haiti
- CNSA’s 2011 Enquête Nationale de la Sécurité Alimentaire (ENSA), a 3,557 household nationally representative survey
- The Demographic Health Surveys (DHS or EMMUS) from the year 1995 (N=4,944 households), year 2000 (N=9,595 households), year 2005 (N=9,998 households), and year 2012 (N=13,181 households)

Useful presentations and interpretations of the data from these surveys were found in FAO's 2001 and 2003 summations of the results of these surveys; Sletten and Egset's (2004) review of the 2001 HLCS; Lamaute et al.'s presentation of the data from CNSA 2007; Verner's (2008) analysis of the 2007 HCLS data; Echevin's (2011) analysis of asset data from the EMMUS 1995 to 2005; and CNSAs 2009 *Haiti: Cartographie de Vulnérabilité Multirisque*. Although not always cited, the research also draws on the author's own work (Schwartz 1998, 2009), as well as that of Murray (1977), Smucker (1983), and a long history of both foreign and Haitian anthropologists, sociologists, and economists who have documented the behaviors and customs of people living in rural Haiti (Herskovits 1937; Simpson 1942; Metraux 1951; Bastien 1961 Nichols 1974; Lundahl 1983; Lowenthal 1984, 1987; Smith 1998; Richman 2003).

Field Research

The consultants interviewed 32 Port-au-Prince NGO directors and government Ministry officials regarding their use of various Targeting strategies. Projects in three rural areas were visited during which time more than a dozen focus groups were conducted with NGO workers, political functionaries, missionaries and beneficiaries, and community council members (see Annex). Of special interest was targeting strategies that WFP, FAO, and implementing partners have used in the communes of Bel Anse, Gran Gossier and Thiotte, all three in the Department of the South East; and in North West and Upper Artibonite communes of Ennery, Mole St. Nicolas, Baie de Henne, and Terre Neuf where CARE International, ACF, and Edepep have been active targeting beneficiaries (see Annex for a complete list).

Surveys

Four surveys were conducted during the course of the field work: A random survey among the beneficiary population in the South East focused on criteria and the actual targeting strategies used in the region as beneficiaries saw them (N = 64); a similar random survey in the Department of the NW and Upper Artibonite (N=134); an online survey that requested information on targeting from 1,500 valid email addresses of NGO directors and employees (24 responded); and a WFP funded survey of the Commune of Maissade in the Department of the Centre where the new Targeting technique of Frequency Listing was tested (N = 1,951 described at length in Section "Frequency Listing").

Figure 4
North West Survey Sites




Figure 5
South East Survey Sites





Figure 6
Maissade



The Targeting Problem

Definition of Targeting

Targeting strategies are as old as humanitarian aid, but the formal study of Targeting is recent, arguably only beginning in the past decade. Maxwell et al (2009:3) define Targeting as,

... the act of ensuring that aid reaches people who need it at the right time and place, in the right form and quantity—and at the same time does not go to people who don't need it.

The World Bank,

Targeting seeks to deliver benefits to a selected group of participants, in particular poor and vulnerable people. Targeting mechanisms attempt to link a project's specific purposes with its intended group of beneficiaries. There are many ways to target programs, and most CDD projects use more than one targeting mechanism. They include geographic mapping, household surveys, censuses, qualitative surveys, and "self-targeting."ⁱⁱⁱ

WFP (2006b:1) defines targeting as,

At its broadest, targeting encompasses everything from initial assessment of the context, extent and magnitude of need through strategic planning and modality selection to eligibility selection and screening, which in turn leads to re-assessment of need through monitoring and evaluation

All the studies reviewed, no matter how broad, discuss Targeting in the context of emergency aid or assistance to the most vulnerable. Basic tenets and goals include

- to reach those most in need of food (WFP 2006b)ⁱⁱⁱ
- to maximize the use and impact of limited resources (WFP 2006b)
- to not over-supply food aid, which may result in negative impacts on communities, for example dependency and displacement of traditional social reciprocity networks, and on markets, for example lower prices and disincentives to production (WFP 2006b; Maxwell et. al 2009:4)^{iv v}

The analysis presented here also focuses primarily on humanitarian aid to the disaster stricken and the most vulnerable. But in understanding targeting, the concept should not be limited to the most vulnerable. There means to aid the most vulnerable other than direct relief, specifically helping increase agricultural yields or other productive economic activities. For example, Haiti's National Plan for Food Security includes aid to farmers with the goal of increasing production through improved seeds, application of pesticides and fertilizers and use of advanced cultivation strategies. With the importance of maintaining or increasing production in mind, WFP has also posited that underlying objectives of targeting should,

- in addition to those whose lives are at risk, target those at risk of losing their livelihoods (WFP 2006a:7)
- empower populations to feed and care for themselves (WFP Emergency ibid)

And very importantly, reviews of targeting suggest that without community acceptance aid may generate conflict and resentment, doing more to disrupt a community than contribute to recovery and reinforcement of livelihood strategies (see Himmelstine 2011). Thus, we can add another maxim that should apply to *most* Targeting, particularly targeting associated with non-emergency aid,

- Buy-in: targeting should achieve community acceptance and support

Examples of times that buy-in would *not* be applicable are cases of conflict and strife between different ethnic groups, class, or political factions. In these cases buy-in should be applied to the respective target sub-communities, but without doing harm to the other communities, ethnic groups, or classes.

Categorizing and Targeting Models

Some reviews and guides present targeting as a series of steps (e.g. WFP 2006a). Most explore targeting as a strategy to intelligently negotiate what is often a bewildering array of conflicts, politics and cultural idiosyncrasies (Maxwell et al 2009; WFP 2006b; Himmelstine 2011). Lamaute-Brisson (2009) emphasizes understanding Targeting from an institutional perspective. Several useful attempts to targeting categorize the different processes involved in targeting; most notable is Lavelle et. al. (2010). While it is useful to conceptualize Targeting as a delimited domain or set of steps, and we draw heavily on the works cited above, targeting can and arguably should be understood as more than an activity or phase of the aid process: Targeting should be understood as a dimension of aid that, whether by design or simply consequence, is embedded in every operational decision an organization makes:

- beginning with the moment an organization defines itself as dedicated to a particular type of assistance (disaster relief vs. development, medical care, agricultural, financial or educational sectors)
- to the selection of the region, country, zone or ethnic group the organization will work in (Asia or the Americas, Guatemala or Haiti, Urban or Rural, eco-economic zone)
- to deciding on the specific type of aid it will give (for example, medical care that is preventative vs. curative, seeds vs. food, money vs. vouchers)
- to deciding how the aid will be distributed or transferred (subsidies, cantine, voucher, cash transfer)
- to selecting the beneficiary units that will receive the aid (school, health clinic, association, household, individual)
- to determining the criteria that will define a beneficiary (low income, landless, HIV positive, disabled, pregnant, farmer)
- to deciding how the individuals who fit the criteria will be detected (committees, networks of extension agents, surveyors)
- to deciding who will do the selecting (members of the community, Community Based Organization)
- to the actual selection of the recipients


At each stage the field of *who* will receive aid is narrowed. After selection is made, most organizations should,

- validate whether or not the correct beneficiaries were chosen (narrowing or broadening the field of who is about to receive aid)
- monitor who is really receiving aid (narrowing or broadening the field of who is currently receiving aid)
- seek feedback from beneficiaries or members of the community through one or several complaint mechanisms (broadening the field of who receives aid)
- evaluate the effectiveness of the targeting, meaning did it accurately identify who needed aid (narrowing or broadening the field of who will subsequently receive aid)

In this way the aid process can be conceptualized as a decision making chain in which the choice of beneficiary is increasingly refined (see Figure 7).^{vi}

Figure 7: The Humanitarian Aid Targeting Chain

Logistics Strategy	Detection Strategy
1. type of organization	5. geographic criteria
2. type of aid	6. beneficiary unit
3. type of distribution mechanism	7. beneficiary criteria
4. Type of institutional partners	8. beneficiary selection
Feedback Strategy	
7. validation	9. complaint mechanism
8. monitoring	10. evaluation



In effect, Targeting should be understood as not just a process, but a dimension of aid, present at every stage of the aid chain. It can be separated into distinct groupings (as illustrated in figure 7), specifically choice of Logistic Strategy, choice of Beneficiary Detection Strategy, and choice of

Feedback Strategy. The core processes of Targeting, and what all the studies cited above share in their focus is the middle category, what we define here as Beneficiary Detection Strategy. This includes Geographic Criteria, Beneficiary Unit, Beneficiary Criteria and Beneficiary Selection. However, it is important to keep in mind that although this report is concerned with how decisions define who is a beneficiary (Beneficiary Detection Strategy)--and *not* with how decisions impact the transfer or delivery of aid (Logistics Strategy) or how the integrity of the process is guaranteed (Feedback Strategy)—logistics and feedback may have more to do with who ultimately gets the aid than the choice of intended beneficiaries (see Annex 1).

Beneficiary Detection Strategy

Geographic Area/criteria Overview

The definition of geographic criteria could begin with continental zone, cultural areas, and political borders. For the purposes of application in Haiti, these categories are omitted and geographical criteria is limited to economic, ecological, and demographic dimensions; for example, **farmers** (economic), in areas that are **littoral-dry** (ecological), **and rural** (demographic). The definition of a geographical criteria can be conditioned by disaster prone dimension of vulnerability, as in people living in flood prone areas, or hurricane strike zones, or people in areas of military or ethnic conflict. Geographical criteria can also be extended to include infrastructure and state control; for example, areas with low levels of infrastructure or state services. While remoteness and weak infrastructure are often selection criteria, in practice geo-infrastructure criteria often work against the poor. Regional food distributions can be contingent on road access, meaning that food assistance is directed away from underdeveloped regions to those with infrastructure and, by corollary, toward those that already receive greater services from the State or other service providers, as was often the case in Haiti during the 1990s (see USAID 1994). It can also and often is contingent on security concerns, such that high crime urban areas, military zones, or access to hard hit disaster areas—precisely those that most need aid--are restricted or even made off-limits to aid workers--as was seen in the wake of the 2010 Haiti Earthquake, particularly regarding Cite Soley. As with all aspects of the selection process, although the ultimate objective may be alleviation of poverty, hunger, or associated afflictions, the aid may be intended for those who are not vulnerable. An organization may target farmers in high agricultural production regions and relatively wealthy farmers with the goal of increasing locally available foods and employment, as with the Haitian government program RESPEG, which has the goal of increasing production and employment in the coffee sector and hence directs aid to relatively well-off coffee farmers in the area of Thiotte in the South East. In summary we can divide Geographical Criteria into the following six categories:

1. Population density (Urban, peri-urban, and rural)
2. Economic zone (low income areas or farming, pastoral, hunting, mining, logging)
3. Ecological zone (littoral dry, humid plateau, humid mountain, dry mountain)
4. Ethnic or Socio-cultural/linguistic groupings (not applicable in Haiti)
5. Infrastructural and service conditions (availability of services such as schools or infrastructure such as water, roads and electricity)
6. Security situation/restrictions (conflict or high crime areas, zones of guerilla activity)

Beneficiary Unit Overview

The ultimate target of most humanitarian aid is impoverished or needy individuals or households. These are primary Beneficiary Units and are examined in depth later in this report. However, what should also be included in this category are those entities or organizations used to pass aid on to recipients, what can be defined as “Intermediary Beneficiary Units.” These may be an enterprise, such as a bank, small business, school, or cooperative serving the poor; it may be a CBO, such as a church, orphanage, farming cooperative, or women’s association. Even NGOs, whether international or local, may themselves be conceptualized as Intermediary Beneficiary Units. The selection of a beneficiary unit at a level above the individual or household typically makes aid disbursement administratively easier for the organization because they can use the intermediaries system of beneficiary identification and distribution. But it often makes it more difficult to reach intended recipients because of the necessity of conforming to administrative and infrastructural exigencies. For example, financial assistance to CBOs (Community Based Organizations) is often contingent on their having a bank account, eliminating organizations with the most impoverished members or making them vulnerable to unscrupulous individuals who offer to facilitate access to banking services but intend to embezzle the aid; voucher programs may be conditional on the individual’s physical presence, eliminating the disabled or those individuals, often the poorest, who live in remote areas; assistance to school feeding programs may be conditional on secure dry storage facilities and proper accounting procedures, eliminating the most impoverished schools; assistance to children can be conditional on their being in school, eliminating the poorest children.

Figure 8: Choices of Geo-Targeting





Figure 9: Choices for Beneficiary Unit Targeting



Beneficiary Criteria Overview

Beneficiary Criteria refers specifically to who is meant to benefit from an aid. With regard to aid to the vulnerable, we can identify four types of beneficiaries (Lavalee et al 2010):

- 1) those who have little hope of overcoming their status because of disability or age,
- 2) those who are discriminated against because of some culturally defined status such as gender, ethnicity, age, religion, caste or occupation
- 3) the transient poor who have fallen on hard times because of a crisis in their own lives or the lives of a member of their family, such as in the case of illness or debt
- 4) disaster victims who have been hit by a widespread shock such as hurricane, earthquake, war, or economic recession

The status of category 4, above, that of disaster victims, tends to be aggravated by inclusion in the former categories. Specifically, in the event of a regional calamity those who tend to suffer first and most are individuals physically weak because of disability or age, those who suffer a culturally defined status that makes them vulnerable (such as an ethnic group or stigmatized class), and those who are already suffering a temporary personal or household economic crisis. On the other hand, a catastrophic shock may temporarily expose relatively well-off individuals and families to extreme hardship, inducing the need for immediate relief in the form of medical, nutritional or financial assistance.

It is important to emphasize again that target beneficiaries may be other than the poor or those in need of emergency relief. Projects that focus on production may deliberately exclude those who the most vulnerable—such as the landless or the physically or mentally incapacitated, i.e. people incapable or unlikely to assist in augmenting production. Projects with the goal of increasing regional production may focus on the relatively wealthy landowners. Other relatively wealthy beneficiary targets might be businesses and banks, or scholarships to individuals living in impoverished regions but who may not be impoverished themselves. Thus, we can add a fifth category to beneficiary criteria:

- 5) Individuals, households, or institutions with capacity to increase production, thereby elevating local living standards through increased employment, availability of goods and services, or preservation of natural resources


Community Buy-in and Validity

An important dimension of criteria is *whose criteria is it?* Is the donor or implementing organization selecting the criteria? Or is the community somehow determining the criteria? Whose criteria is being used, how well it fits with community reality and values and whether or not the community members accept the criteria as justifiable have a great deal to do with winning community *buy-in* and avoiding conflict and resentment regarding the intervention. But *buy-in* must be balanced with validity of the criteria. There are many instances where community members do not share the objectives of the donors; where community consensus is that those who most deserve aid are not the neediest but the hardest workers, the entrepreneurially inclined, or even traditional elites. In cases such as these the values and goals of aid entities must somehow be reconciled with those of the community or, at the very least, community members must be convinced of the value of the intervention (see Himmelstine 2012).

Proxy Means Testing (searching for and validating criteria)

In all the guides and studies of Targeting reviewed, Proxy Means Testing (PMT) is considered a Beneficiary Selection technique. Specifically, PMT is the use of survey research and statistical methods to identify a multidimensional set of parameters by which qualifying households or individuals can be selected as aid recipients. For this reason it is better classified not with ‘beneficiary detection techniques’—as typically done-- but rather as a tool for searching and/or validating criteria.

Figure 10: Choices for Criteria



Beneficiary Selection Overview

Beneficiary Selection refers to how a program identifies individuals or organizations that meet their beneficiary criteria. In the literature, most studies present Beneficiary Selection as a single phase with the possible categories of Self-Selection (individuals come for aid on their own volition), Means Targeting (use of official lists of income such as tax or payrolls), Proxy-Means Testing (use of multivariate formulas the validity of which is substantiated—‘tested’—through representative survey sampling), and Community Based Targeting (the formation of community committees that make up lists of qualifying individuals). WFP (2006a) adds Administrative Targeting to the list by which they mean the use of formal organizations apparatus for targeting. This model aims to clarify ambiguities and differences in the models by lumping these all under the category of Beneficiary Selection and compartmentalizing them into a two stage process: ‘*Selection of who will choose the beneficiaries*’ and ‘*selection of how the beneficiaries will be chosen.*’ Each phase has a limited number of options.

Phase 1: selecting who will choose the beneficiaries

- a) **Community Based Targeting** is the managed use of community organization or individuals to determine if an individual meets beneficiary criteria. The process usually involves formation of a community committee assembled by the organization seeking to distribute aid. Typically, a balanced members are selected from governmental sectors, religious sectors, business sector, and credible community based organizations, usually including at least one organization comprised predominately of women, such as a mothers club. A list of common complications include elite capture, politics, community rivalries, and application of criteria (see Himmelstine 2012 for a review).

- b) **Extension Targeting (ET)**: The use of health agents, social workers, or other auxiliaries working for NGO, government, or international organizations, and **community based organization**-- existing association, schools, hospitals, churches or local governmental agencies whose staff are already working with the community in some capacity-- to select beneficiaries who meet criteria. When the option is available, extension Targeting should be used for cost savings and effectiveness (can and should be combined with Admin-Targeting if possible; and preferred if organizations with selection capacity are present). A distinction can be made within Extension Targeting between formal institutions created for a purpose other than channeling aid—such as the schools, hospitals, churches and government agencies seen above—and organized local action groups (CBO) such as the Haiti’s *gwoupman* (groupman) of the 1970s and 1980s Haiti or the contemporary *asosyasyon* (associations). The *asosyasyon* merits special mention. They are currently found throughout rural Haiti and created specifically to handle aid, indeed made up themselves of beneficiaries or members of the beneficiary population; they work with donors or implementing partner to identify other beneficiaries, typically by the networking (see “conditioning factors,” below).
- c) **Survey Targeting**: refers to a trained team that gathers quantitative or qualitative data on individuals, households, or some other group to determine who qualifies as a beneficiary. Qualitative survey targeting includes focus groups or Fonkoze, Concern International and FAES community-participatory qualitative poverty ranking systems. An example of quantitative Survey Targeting is the traditional household survey or census. One expected advantage of quantitative over qualitative surveys is objective information. An advantage to the qualitative wealth-ranking or other strategies that draw on community participation is that they tap local knowledge and provide data that can discriminate inter-household vulnerability to degrees that we can never hope to achieve with quantitative surveys. These type of qualitative surveys also achieve high levels of community buy-in because criteria and ranking is determined in consultation with the community. Drawbacks of both Survey Targeting approaches are high costs.

Bottom-up vs. Top-Down Selection

A significant conditioning factor in the process being described is how those who choose beneficiaries are themselves chosen. In the case of CBT, even if we can be assured that the organizations and their representatives are credible, the approach can still be conceptualized as top down, and hence imposed on beneficiaries rather than participatory. To clarify, community leadership—as opposed to the beneficiaries themselves—is a point of departure; an unavoidable byproduct of the process is that Targeting is ultimately accomplished from their perspective or, when attempting to identify the most vulnerable, from outside the social peer strata of beneficiaries. Interesting in this regard is that during the course of the research for this report a common recommendation from beneficiaries was that someone poor be included in the selection committees.

The same is true of networks of professional extension workers—Extension Targeting--or trained volunteers and even surveyors. The selection of those who select beneficiaries is made outside the beneficiary social group and ultimately not subject to their scrutiny or control. Generalizing from the concept of World Bank consultants Mansuri and Rao (2013), it can be called an “induced” Targeting process.

On the other hand, when local CBOs are tasked with beneficiary selection we can speak of “organic” targeting. Even in the event an organization is created for the express purpose of capturing aid, the members often include intended beneficiaries. When tasked with identifying other beneficiaries they tend to select within their own social networks, which once again means that we are at least closer to the intended vulnerable populations than is the case when local elites control the process.

Both top-down and bottom-up approaches have their strengths and weaknesses. When selection of the selectors is made by people outside the community it allows for objectivity and the avoidance of three enemies of effective targeting: influence, bias, and favoritism. On the other hand, the decision is often made with little to no background knowledge, and little knowledge of the credibility of the people being entrusted. In the case of ‘organic’ selectors, members are definitively from the community—versus the leadership—but there is the tendency for some to be actively engaged in participating with the objective, not of including others, but helping themselves and their families and friends. There is a tendency to use of the task of beneficiary selection as means of reinforcing the institutional integrity of the local organization tasked with targeting and to build their own institution’s social capital. Indeed, when the selectors are embedded at lower levels of the community, even if they want to choose legitimately vulnerable beneficiaries, censure from family friends and neighbors means that they do it at their own peril, i.e. if one does not identify his or her spouse, brother, uncle, cousin or friend as a beneficiary the person will be shunned, or worse, for the oversight.

A mixture of bottom-up and top-down selection can be seen in community poverty mapping and wealth ranking schemes employed by Fonkoze, Concern International and FAES. These community mapping and wealth ranking schemes offer the advantage of tapping local knowledge but under the guidance, control, and with the objectivity of outsider participation. The problem here is, once again, high costs.

Phase 2: selecting what mechanism is used to choose beneficiaries,


The second stage of Beneficiary Selection is ‘*selection of how the beneficiaries will be chosen.*’ As with *who will do the selecting*, discussed above, each phase has a limited number of options. Specifically, Self-Selection, Admin-List Selection, Network Selection, and a new technique developed during the course of the research for this report, *Freq-Listing*, Selection by way of Frequency Listing.

- a) **Self-Selection**- individuals come to the program based on their own need, such that cash-for-work programs where pay is set at a low level draws only those individuals willing to work for low pay; subsidies to low-status staples draws only those individuals or families sufficiently in need that they will purchase and consume the staples; subsidies to public education draws only those families willing to put their children in the public education system.
- b) **Admin-List Selection (ALS)**- usually called ‘Means Targeting,’ is here redefined because of the ambiguity in the term “means.” The term “mean” is intended to designate ‘average income,’ and has the double significance of the “means” by which people live, something that could and often does include non-monetary strategies—such as consumption from hunting, gathering, scavenging, fishing, agriculture, or barter. Admin-List Selection refers to data from surveys, tax rolls, lists of land ownership, fish catches, hunting quotas or any other compendium or data base available from a formal institution that provides information on consumption, assets, or receivables. The list is used to determine if an individual, household,

or institution meets beneficiary criteria. In other studies in the literature, Means Targeting is classified as distinct from Proxy Means Targeting. In this study both Proxy Means and Wealth Ranking has been reclassified from a selective tool to a method of refining Criteria. Thus, the results of Proxy Means Testing and Wealth Ranking are included here in the resources for Admin-Lists, i.e. multivariate discriminatory criteria, based on multiple dimensions of livelihood security, such as income, house type, number of children in the house, and assets; and which are collected and consolidated in 'list' (data base) by a formal institution, in this case a survey team.^{vii}

- c) **Network Selection**--similar to what in statistical sampling is called snow-ball surveys, beneficiaries are detected through individual or professional networks. For example, if CBT is used as the means of selecting those who select beneficiaries, then the CBT committee may—and in most cases examined during the field work for this study does—use their own professional, political or personal networks to determine if an organization, household or individual qualifies for aid according to the determined beneficiary criteria.

- d) **Freq-Listing Selection**: In this study we offer a fourth strategy for beneficiary detection, a modification of a technique from Cultural Consensus Analysis (Borgatti 1992); specifically, the elicitation of lists from a sample of respondents, thus combining sampling with local knowledge (see Frequency Listing p. 80).



Beneficiary Selection Conditioning Factors

In choosing which of the preceding detection strategies will or should be used, the first decisions are made easy or complex based on,

- if self-selection is deemed an option
- whether the targeting criteria is categorical vs. multivariate discriminatory
- the capacity of State, grassroots, private and international institutions already working in the area

Practical **self-selection** should be considered an option in some cases, particularly when associated with building infrastructure with cash or food for work. However, in cases where the goal is to directly reach the most vulnerable, it often is not practical because of the incapacity of many vulnerable people to perform work.

Regarding **categorical vs. multivariate discriminatory criteria**: the group targeted often defines the complexity of the task. Programs that focus on pregnant women, malnourished children, HIV or even peanut growers are **categorical** and require little effort in determining whether one qualifies as a beneficiary. Based on a pregnancy or HIV test a woman either is or is not pregnant and is or is not HIV positive; based on health status a child either is or is not malnourished; a farmer has or has not planted peanuts or a specific area of land. In these cases the challenge is not beneficiary selection but who will make up the lists (Phase 1: “Selecting who chooses the beneficiaries”): CBT or Administrative networking.

In areas where strong **State institutions, strong traditional grassroots institutions** and leadership, or effective networks of auxiliary social workers are present the challenge of beneficiary detection is made even easier, or even made for the targeting entity, as when State, military or local tribal leaders enforce their authority over the process. On the other hand, in the case of countries where there are few strong organizations or corruption and fractured politics make reaching the vulnerable exceptionally difficult, where official tax records do not exist or formal employment scarce, there are the options seen in the preceding section, specifically, Network Selection carried out via Community Based Targeting or Admin-List selection via extension services associated with churches, health out-reach programs, NGOs, volunteer disaster relief agencies, or some type of survey; and finally the Frequency Listing Strategy presented at the end of this report.

3. Beneficiary Detection Strategies in Haiti

This section examines in the context of Haiti each phase of Beneficiary Detection Strategy introduced above. Specifically, geographic criteria, beneficiary unit, beneficiary criteria, and beneficiary selection. It evaluates the utility of each as we found them being applied Haiti, both through reading reports and interviewing aid workers and beneficiaries in the field.

Geographic Criteria in Haiti

It is always very difficult to quantify malnutrition in Haiti. ...the data available from actors appears to show that, strictly speaking, there are no pockets of malnutrition.

ECHO 2011:24

Although partners in the World Bank and USAID sponsors programs Kore Lavi and Kore Fanmi have targeted specific departments and communes based on CNSA vulnerability assessments (see CARE 2013a), a longitudinal look at survey data suggest that, with the exception of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and the Department of the West in which it is located, there is little evidence to justify more than moderate application of geographical criteria in Haiti. Not if the objective is to aid the most vulnerable.


Based on the 2001 HLCS, most departments have essentially equal populations of “extremely poor” people (individuals living on less than US\$1 per day), varying between 62 and 72 percent (Figure 12). The only exception was the North East, with 84 percent of its population extremely poor; arguably no exception at all because 67% of the country’s rural population at the time was extremely poor and the North East was, at that time, the least urbanized Department in Haiti. In other words, the proportion of the population that is extremely poor is essentially the same in all of Haiti’s 10 Departments.

Using the Genie coefficient based on durable goods (assets) as an estimation of wealth distribution (a value of 01 indicates egalitarian distribution and 100 total inequality), all the departments rate in the narrow range between 37 to 43 points (see Figure 13; based on the 2012 EMMUS sample of 13,388 households) In other words, the level of equality in distribution of wealth is essentially the same throughout the country’s 10 Departments.^{viii}

The same is true for variation among Departments regarding months of nutritional stress (Figure 14). Even variation among ecological zones yield small differences (Figure 15). CNSA found that from October 2006 to September 2007 the population of households reporting insufficient alimentation in six ecological-occupational zones fluctuated between highs of 52% and 64% for each zone to lows of 15 to 36 percent; all tended to have the same lean months and the same months of plenty with the one notable exception that agricultural mountain humid, agro-pastoral semi-humid, and agro-pastoral plateau tended to have lower stress during the Autumn months than agro-pastoral dry, mono-cultural plain, and dry agricultural and fishing. WFP’s Coping Strategy Index (CSI), a 0 to 64 point measure of food deprivation and rationing varies between 20.8 for coastal dry and 24 for Agro-Pastoral Dry, a fluctuation small enough to be attributed to natural sampling error (Figure 16: Wiesmann et al. 2009 for an explanation of CSI). The same equality

between departments and ecological zones is true for both shocks from natural disasters as well as internal household crisis (see Figure 17 proportion of adult population that have never been to school (Figure 18) children in school (Figure 19), and adult malnutrition (Figure 20).

**Figure 12: Percentage of Population
"Extremely Poor" by Department
(Sletten and Eget 2004)**



**Figure 13: Geni Coefficient
(source: EMMUS 2012)**






Figure 14: Prevalence de insuffisance d'aliments par mois by Agro-Ecologica zone



Source: CNSA/CFSVA 2007

Figure 15: Prevalence de insuffisance d'aliments par mois by Department



Sources : CNSA/CFSVA 2007

Figure 16: Coping Strategy Index by Ecological Zone (CNSA/CFSVA 2007)




Figure 17: Percentage of Households Experienceing Shocks by Type of Shock and Department (Source CNSA/CFSVA 2007)




Figure 18: Proportion of the Adult Population with No Education by Department
(Source: EMMUS 2012)




Figure 19: Children Ages 6 to 12 Years In School
(ENSA 2011)





Figure 20: Répartition de la population adulte selon l'Indice de Masse Corporelle par département et par milieu de résidence



Source ECVH 2001 or HLCS 2001 p.95

In the ENSA (2011) and CFSVA (2007) surveys the same general pattern of homogeneity between departments and ecological zones seen above can be found with respect to,

- proportion of income spent on food
- consumption scores
- dependence on markets vs. auto-consumption
- indices of durable goods
- education
- types of livelihood strategies
- remittances from within Haiti
- constraints on livestock rearing
- number of different type of livestock per household
- agriculture
- number of parcels owned
- land tenure
- access to services
- intercropping
- use of fertilizers and
- proportion of population engaged in fishing.

To be sure, there are some differences, for example in regional migration patterns, remittances, and slight differences in dependency on agricultural strategies. CNSA/FEWSNET (2009) documented differences in vulnerability and infrastructure at the sub-department level. But the same figures vary by survey, a probable consequence of sampling error;^{ix} and they vary by year, a probable consequence of climate variation and differential temporally idiosyncratic shocks. The variation over time can be seen in nutritional status of children per department (see Figure 21, below); and it can be seen in CNSA/FEWSNET Vulnerability maps (see Figure 22 below). The variation over time, with extremes of vulnerability moving from department or commune to another raise the question: to what degree are differences observed between households a consequence of temporary impacts? Moreover, differences in one variable are offset by others. For example, while in the 2007 CFSVA the department of the Artibonite had the lowest educational level and the highest number of food insecure months, it has the greatest availability of household water sources, irrigated land, and one of the highest rural income levels (at 6.4 in the CNSA/CFVSA p55 and Verner 2008:18). In short, the bulk of the population is uniformly destitute; and advantages in one respect in a particular region are consistently offset by comparatively greater disadvantages in other respects. Even rural urban distinctions can be called into question: the proportion of the population poor in provincial cities and towns vs. those in rural areas are insignificant until one reaches the highest 20% of the population (Figure 23). In summary, if we consider how small the differences in most indicators are between municipal districts and ecological zones, and then we consider change from a longitudinal perspective, the most fantastic thing about geographical profiles in Haiti is the overall homogeneity.





Figure 22: The Evolving Character of Vulnerability: Cartes De Vulnerabilite from CNSA/FEWSNET


ARTE DE VULNERABILITE
VULNERABILITE A L'INSECURITE ALIMENTAIRE
Mesure de la Vulnérabilité à l'Insécurité Alimentaire
de ménages vulnérables, par Département




2007



2008




2009



2011




2013



2014

Figure 23: Income per Decile: Metropolitan vs. Provincial Urban vs. Rural
(Verner 2008: 201, using HLCS 2001)



Beneficiary Unit in Haiti

As seen earlier, Beneficiary Units can be conceptualized as 1) “intermediary”—those institutions selected as distribution channels for reaching the intended beneficiaries—and 2) “primary”—the intended beneficiaries or groups of beneficiaries. With respect to intermediary beneficiary units, the most obvious best candidates are health organizations and schools. In the course of their work, health extension agents come into contact with the ill and malnourished making them the best situated to identify individuals and families in greatest need. However, what we found during the course of the research is that health administrators view the task of targeting as an interference with health extension work. Record keeping and tasks associated with monitoring and evaluation take up an inordinate amount of the agents’ time. Handling food draws the attention of the population and results in demands and pestering. It also incites corruption among the staff. Most health extension functionaries felt their role should be limited to making referrals to food distribution agencies.

Although the most frequent means of targeting vulnerable children, the use of schools as intermediary beneficiary units has significant drawbacks as well. Not least of all, they miss the poorest children. Many low income schools lack the infrastructure needed to store the aid; and they lack the capacity to meet the accounting requirements that the NGO, WFP and USAID distributors demand of them. The consequence is that precisely those schools most likely to harbor the poorest children—i.e. the poorest schools—are not entrusted to handle food relief. Moreover, the poorest families cannot afford to send their children to school at all. The ENSA (2011) found that 10% of children 6 to 14 years of age had never been to school; another 7% did not go regularly.

Associations are another frequently used intermediary Beneficiary Unit and also a type of beneficiary selector option as discussed in section on Community Based Targeting. The principal problem is that the most vulnerable individuals typically do not obtain representation in associations. The associations tend to be politicized and prioritize their own members as

beneficiaries. During the course of the field research, beneficiaries commonly complained about association partisanship. The extent of this partisanship cannot be gainsaid. One director confided about a recent case where he had overridden local extension agents in the selection of beneficiaries belonging to an association but then had to back down when association members threatened to burn the houses of any new beneficiaries. Most people who have worked in rural Haiti can recount their own stories of threats and violence that came from challenging grassroots associations, particularly when the members have become accustomed to proposing their own beneficiary lists. It is an alarming but emphatically *not* a recent phenomenon. The Jean Rabel massacre of 1987 (in which at least 127 people were butchered) can be understood, in part, as a struggle between associations fighting for development funds. At least 5 violent struggles between associations and NGOs occurred in Jean Rabel since. The post earthquake aid distributions were replete with acts of partisan aggression over aid; including, in Cite Soley where attacks from a neighborhood organizations of ‘competing’ beneficiaries sent the consultant’s assistant to the hospital.

But whether or not schools, associations, enterprises or CBOs are used as intermediaries, the ultimate decision regarding beneficiary units comes down to a choice between individuals and households. In some cases the objective of beneficiary criteria is to promote production. For example, in Thiotte, RESPEG is working with the BAC to promote coffee production. In this case beneficiaries are individuals, not households. Specifically those with at least $\frac{1}{4}$ *kawo* of land planted in coffee. In the case of RESPEG there is no limited number of beneficiaries per household. In most cases however, such as food relief, cash transfers and vouchers, the target beneficiaries are the most vulnerable people and the criteria is defined by or per household. Even benefits for malnourished children and HIV positive individuals are household targeted. There are logistic complications with the decision. For example, WFP gives emergency monthly food rations based on average household size; this means that a household of ten people gets the same rations that a household of three people receives. Moreover, when contemplating a permanent safety net and the enthusiasm with which a large segment of the rural population tries to qualify as beneficiaries for any aid, there is the prospect that focusing on household as a beneficiary unit introduces pressure for smaller sized, non-productive households. Despite the complication, the overwhelming majority of agencies examined during the research choose the household as beneficiary unit.

Problems with Household as a Beneficiary Unit

Household definition based on consumption

In defining what a household is, all organizations visited tend to emphasize lodging, a certain amount of time in the lodging, sharing of food, and the household head. CNSA/WFP definition is illustrative,

A household is defined as a group of people, with or without blood relation, who have been living together in the same lodging (under the same roof) for at least six months—or who have the intention of remaining in the household—and who share food and recognize the authority of the same household head (man or woman).^x

The definition is logical from the perspective of emergency food aid. It views the household as an exclusive group of consumers, residing at a specific location; perfect for distributing aid. But the usefulness of the definition does not extend to the treatment of long-term household vulnerability. The reasons are as follows:

1) *Basing the definition on consumption vs production*

A great deal of insight can be garnered from looking at rural households in Haiti, not so much as potential object of a safety net, but as micro-safety nets themselves. Few if any households in rural Haiti depend on a single production strategy. They depend instead on an array of endeavors, typically including agriculture, livestock rearing, fishing, charcoal production, harvesting of fruit from trees, and artisanship. The household head or heads organize the labor activities of its members—mostly children—to accomplish these activities. Those who do not conform are severely punished, commonly with violence, something not surprising when one considers that failure means scorn from neighbors, shame, hunger, illness, and ultimately the dissolution of the household itself and the scattering of its members.

In this endeavor to make these activities successful, meet seasonally increased labor demands associated with accomplishing them and survive hard times, rural Haitian households are linked through real and fictive kinship ties (the latter primarily being godparentage). They are linked through reciprocal agricultural work groups, religious communities, and through inter-household reciprocal exchange of meals. But more importantly than anything else, rural Haitian households are linked through participation in a vibrant and intensely integrated marketing system that has roots in pre-Columbian and colonial economies. All that is being described here is a system adapted to enabling people in rural Haiti to survive in a harsh natural and economic environment characterized by unpredictable political upheavals that in Haiti have made economic isolation the norm. And because the peculiarities of this system is so critically important to survival in rural areas and that so many aid workers who come to Haiti are unaware of just how important they are and why rural Haitians cling to them with what to many seems illogically desperate tenacity, we briefly summarize here the forces, both historical and contemporary, that undergird them.

Since 1851, Haiti has been hit with at least 19 hurricanes and 26 tropical storms—one severe storm every 3.7 years. The storms periodically ravage crops and kill livestock. Droughts, some of which last a year or more, can cause even greater damage. In areas such as the North West severe droughts strike as often as 1 in every 8 years. Arguably more devastating than natural calamities are the manmade disasters that have plagued the country for more than two centuries. Haiti's colonial history was marked by 100 years of slavery, when slaves planted their own subsistence crops. This period ended with a 13-year struggle for independence that was arguably per capita the deadliest conflict in human history (about half of both the civilian and combatants populations died from violence, starvation, and, more than anything else, disease). Social upheaval and internecine warfare continued through the 19th century, with more than 25 wars and uprisings, and 60 years of international trade embargoes. The 20th century brought an equal number of violent conflagrations and embargoes, which have continued through the first 15 years of the current century. The upshot is that Haitians are stuck on an island surrounded on three sides by water on the remaining side by a neighbor who once, under the influence of a despotic dictator (Raphaël Leonidas Trujillo), dispatched convicts, prisoners and military attaches to massacre with blades and in the space of three days 25,000 of Haitians living on wrong side of the border. The cause of these human calamities is, for the purposes of this report, a moot point. The relevant point is that the population of rural Haiti has had little choice but to adapt. They have done so by cultivating dependency on those forces they can control: technologically simple and integrated production, processing, and marketing strategies. ^{1 1 1}

Agriculture, livestock rearing, and charcoal production are the mainstays of productive survival strategies throughout Haiti. Agriculture is the pillar of the Haitian economy: 70% of rural households depend on the intercropping of sweet potatoes, yams, manioc, and plantains. These crops are known as *viv* (live), and with the exception of sweet potatoes, they are available year round and during the most severe crises. The farmers also plant corn and beans, plantains, melons, squash, and peanuts. Emphasizing the persistence and adaptability of the subsistence orientation of this livelihood strategy, five of the major crops were the very same five crops most important to the Taino Indians who inhabited the area in pre-Columbian times (manioc, sweet potatoes, corn, peanuts, and pumpkin). The people in the region also benefit from at least 18 fruit and nut bearing trees that provide an almost constant yield – of at least several – throughout the year and that include staples such as breadfruit and avocados. Sources of cash are coffee, cocoa and coconuts. The second pillar of the regional economy is livestock. Where private agricultural plots are widespread, livestock must be tethered and strict penalties are to be paid for those whose animals ravage their neighbor's gardens. In more remote communities most land is State owned land and people free range their livestock. The third pillar is manufacturing charcoal for the urban market, a major productive activity for virtually every low-income household in the region and the most important economic backstop in times of crisis.

The tools used in performing these livelihood strategies are, for the vast bulk of the population, no more complex than picks, hoes, and machetes. Animals are free ranged, tethered to bushes with rope. Few farmers use barbed wire; rather, gardens, homesteads, and the rare corral are enclosed with wooden stick barricades or living fences made of fast growing and malicious vegetation such as dagger-like sisal, cacti, and poison oak (*katoch*, *kandelab*, *pit*, *pigwen* and *bawonet*). With regard to fishing: the prevailing technologies are rowboats, bamboo fishing traps, and string nets. In most of Haiti, farmers do not use cows or horse traction to plow fields. There are few pumps; farmers with gardens plots near to springs and rivers sometimes manually haul buckets of water to irrigate crops, particularly vegetables in cool highland areas. Irrigated land is scarce (less than 2% of all agricultural land). The use of chemical or processed fertilizers and pesticides is almost entirely confined to highland vegetable gardens and, to a lesser degree, beans (also considered a cash crop), that dependably yield profits. Many houses are made of local stone or wattle and daub and roofed with plaits of *zeb guine* (Guinea Grass) or thatch from native palms.

Understanding the household—that unit of production that the overwhelming majority of organizations have decided to target as a beneficiary unit—hinges on understanding that the Agricultural-Livestock-Fishing-Charcoal livelihood system described here comes together in the Internal Rotating Market system briefly mentioned above. Throughout Haiti, open air markets occur on alternating days of the week such that people living in any given region have walking distance access to at least two markets per week (see Figure 26 below). Montane micro-climates, their differing rain patterns, and the consequently differently timed harvest season make it logical for farmers to sell their crops rather than risk losing them to insect and mold and then store surplus in the form of money. The opportunity has facilitated the evolution of the intense interregional trade dominated almost entirely by women, the *machann* and *madan sara*.

The system is such that women may sell daily small quantities of items produced by the household—such as eggs, manioc or pigeon peas. But the prevailing strategy is for one woman to seasonally specialize in a particular item, such as limes, buy small quantities from multiple farms, accumulate a profitable quantity, and then take them to market or sell them to another intermediary higher up

the chain, one more heavily capitalized, who accumulates greater quantities and who is likely destined for a larger town market, city or, the holy grail, Port-au-Prince.

The trade activity of women is a critical part of the household survival strategy. Rare today is the household that does not have at least one female member who purchases goods in the markets for the household consumption, sells products of the household in the markets, and buys and resells the products of other households in these markets. The best way to conceptualize the money from sale of household produce and female marketing activity as a medium of storage, one in which consumption of the stored household surplus can first be sold and, secondly, the surplus prolonged by rolling the cash it yielded over in the market, producing petty profits.

A critically important point for the analysis and understanding how to target interventions is that while this is a market system, it is emphatically not oriented towards “wants,” but rather subsistence and local production. The overwhelming bulk of products sold are inexpensive, locally produced and somehow related to production and subsistence; with respect to the profits that the *machann* earns, the bulk of the money is destined for reinvestment in commerce, other income generating enterprises – such as fish traps – or spent on subsistence foods and necessities for the household and, ultimately, the growing '*mama lajan*' (literally "mother money," or more technically, the principal or capital) preserved for economic recuperation during times of crisis.

The explanation of the rural economy would not be complete without some mention of the fact that the market system bleeds over into a burgeoning economy of micro-producers, service specialists and petty vendors including porter, butcher, baker, tailor, basket maker, rope weaver, carpenter, mason, iron smith, mechanic, mariner, boat maker and host of marine specialties that keep the boats afloat. Micro vendors from the most remote homestead to the towns and cities sell everything from a single cigarette and shot of rum to telephone recharge cards to hair ties to small bags of water to cures for cancer and unrequited love and bad luck or dozens of different lottery tickets.

**Figure 24:
Integrated
Household
Subsistence
Strategies and the
Market**







Figure 25
Hurricanes Since Year 1980



Map by DR-Dave from NOAA, <http://blogs.agu.org/landslideblog/2010/01/15/why-the-haiti...>

Figure 26: Internal Rotating Market System





2) Conflating the household with the physical house

The second problem with a definition of household as beneficiary unit is that the physical structure of the house is often conflated with the people live or sometimes live in it. People in rural Haiti sleep in a house, they orchestrate their labor activities and share food around the organizational axis of the household, and there is an informal but very real contract between a man and a woman in setting up a household and sharing responsibilities- a contract that serves as the foundation for household organization. The man must provide a house for a woman, then he must continue to provide money or work gardens and care for livestock; the woman must provide children, she manages the household, directs the labor activities of the children, processes and sells the products of the household in the market and engages in other marketing activities that will extend the buying power of the money. In this way the actual house can be thought of as the material focal point a productive enterprise staffed by people, i.e. the family and other members of the household. But the “household”—in terms of a group of people engaged in cooperative consumption and/or production—must not be confused with the physical structure of a house.

To begin with, the people who make up a “household” may “live” in more than a single house. In the 1998 NHADS Study in the commune of Jean Rabel, 53% of all houses are located in a compound with at least one other house, yet they may function as single household, sharing food and recognizing the authority of a single person or persons (Schwartz 2009).^{xi} Household interdependency also may and often does extend beyond the compound fence. Households are linked when their members belong to reciprocal labor groups that work in one another’s fields. They are linked when their members belong to reciprocal savings groups. They are also linked through informal reciprocal exchange among neighbors, a practice particularly prominent among the most impoverished households. Those with the least resources seem to invest in ‘social security’ most intensely in sharing cooked food or garden produce with neighbors. The pattern is

such that during the course of the field research NGO workers and beneficiaries alike emphasized that voucher recipients commonly divide the food they receive with neighbors.

3) *Ignoring multihousehold membership*

Household membership is also fluid. Most people living in rural Haiti have some form of stake—if not outright ownership—in multiple houses: for example, a garden house, a house in town and one in a nearby city. These houses may have separate owners or ‘household heads,’ but share members and are inhabited mutually by an overlapping flow of the same adults and children: children going to school, some of whom spend the week in town but weekends and vacations at the rural homestead. Similarly, itinerant market women transporting goods to town or the city for sale, and men who work part time in the city may be members of multiple households.


With itinerant household member usually go food stuffs, particularly in the direction of rural-to-urban. Also going with many of them is an unknown but substantial flow of cash. While the flow of goods and cash certainly differs based on the individual household capacity, for the bulk of households most cash is moving, not from urban to rural, but from rural household to urban kinship-linked households, particularly in the highly frequent case where children who originated in the rural household are now in a town or urban school in urban areas. In terms of household membership, children may be as transient as adults; even for those remaining in rural areas, they may contribute work efforts to multiple households and have access to food in all, including households of godparents, grandparents, older siblings, uncles, aunts, and fathers—or mothers—who do not reside in the child’s natal household.

Household linkages often reach across borders and the sea. A household member overseas or in the Dominican Republic or in urban area for months and even years may not fit the official definition of a household member seen earlier, but they too may and frequently do participate in the household as a productive enterprise. They do so through the provision of remittances and investment in household economic endeavors, such as land purchases, retail stores, and investments in motorcycle taxis or trucks for transport. In this case the money does flow in the expected direction, from outside-into Haiti; typically not so much to rural areas as but, as seen, to towns and cities where rural children and adults may go to better exploit the opportunities that remittances present, such as education, training, and remunerative enterprise or trade.^{xii xiii xiv}

The flow of goods and people between country, village, town and city, and the inter-linkages based on kinship, fictive kinship, exchanges and interdependency are the probable reasons why, as seen in the previous section on Geographical Targeting Criteria, the impoverished sector tends to be a geographically unbound mass comprising greater than 80% of the population and hovering just above the threshold of bare subsistence. Unless one can break away from the mass, there is little reason or even possibility to buck the system and accumulate. The path of least resistance, greatest security and highest popularity is to invest in social capital. It is the fluidity, the interdependence and the trend to invest in social capital that make the rigid definition of household and a unit of consumption fixed in time, space and membership cumbersome, if not misleading, in applying it to long term vulnerability. It is inside of the mass of *individuals* and the seldom measured degrees of social capital they invest in that one has to dig to uncover inter-household differences in vulnerability—not an easy task.^{xv}

Beneficiary Criteria in Haiti

Most often in the past and present, humanitarian organizations in Haiti use criteria based on expectations from elsewhere in the world, criteria that are often not based on data, and that more often than not fail to fit in Haiti. The best and most controversial example is female headed households. In the months after the 2010 earthquake, when general distributions stopped and agencies began to refine their targeting strategies, most of the major humanitarian agencies—if not all of them—began to use the beneficiary criteria of female headed households. The assumption was that the female headed households are poorer and in greater need. But the evidence suggests the opposite. Echevin’s use of the 2005 EMMUS data to measure assets-based poverty is a case in point. What Echevin found that differences between poverty in male vs. female poverty favors female headed households (see Figure 24).



The observation that male headed households are either as or more vulnerable than their female headed counterparts is neither rare nor new. As far back as 1998, World Bank consultants analyzing data for three USAID funded surveys carried out between 1994 and 1996, covering 4,026 households and more than half the country (The High Artibonite and Northwest, the South and the Grand Anse and the West and the Central Plateau), concluded that

There is no significant difference in these proportions by quintile, nor is there any difference by gender of household head in the poverty proportions. Nor do household food security levels (consumption per capita or per adult equivalent) differ significantly by gender of household head, within groups of common poverty status (indigent, poor, or non-poor).

Wiens and Sobrado (1998:7)

Proxy Means Testing (PMT)

To avoid the arbitrary use of criteria seen with the female vs. male headed households, Proxy Means Testing (PMT) has been increasingly used as a way of validating existing criteria and searching for new criteria. The goal of PMT, as discussed in section “Beneficiary Criteria in Haiti” (p.33), is to derive a multidimensional set of parameters by which vulnerable or qualifying households or individuals can be identified. It involves the analysis of data from representative

sample surveys to derive statistically valid indicators (criteria). Since the year 2000 there has been a growing body of proxy-means studies focused on discriminating degrees of vulnerability among the Haitian poor. All have yielded disappointing results (FAFO 2001, 2003; Fuller 2006; Schreiner 2006; Echevin 2011).

One of the most thorough searches for a Proxy Means Test was Schreiner (2006), who drew on 250 potential indicators that FAFO (2001, 2003) identified in the 7,168 Household and Living Conditions Survey (2001). He then refined this number to 100 indicators and tested them against income to determine the best predictors for an individual who lives on less than US \$1 per day (considering the World Bank criteria for ‘extremely poor’--US \$1.25). Echevin (2011) has done something similar to calculate poverty based on assets. His variables include many of the same included in the Kore Lavi PMT seen above. Partners in the Kore Fanmi and Kore Lavi programs are currently using such variables to develop indicators to select the most vulnerable (Figure 24) with the hope of developing, “a single targeting tool that can be used by all programs working in Haiti to distinguish household vulnerability (see Figure 25). Kore Lavi proposes to use the same variables minus hand washing as an indicator of hygiene. ^{xvi}

Figure 29




Figure 26: Kore Fanmi and Kore Lavi PMT Beneficiary Criteria

Demographic	Health	Economy
1. Maximum risk	1.Chronic illness	1. Capacity to Work
2. Presence of pregnant woman	2. Disabled member	2. Assets
3. Ratio of economic dependence	3. Use of health services	3. Floor type
Environment	Food Security	Education
1. Source of potable water	1. Consumption Score	1. School age children
2. Hand washing	2. Coping Strategies	2. School attendance
3. Latrines		

The most recent PMT models and those most instrumental in developing the Kore Lavi/Fanmi model were analyses such as 2012 ECVMAS Household Living Conditions Survey used to develop the HDVI (see Figure 27), and an unpublished analysis from World Bank consultants using the 3,501 households 2013 CNSA survey (described below) to test similar variables against a synthesis of Food Consumption Scores and Food Coping Strategies. As with PMT explorations before them (such as Scheiner 2006 and Echevin 2011), the statistical analysis of these programs—conducted independently of CNSA--suggests that in trying to discriminate between individual households the formulas may be only slightly better than random. To understand why, we begin with a review of the HDVI (the model using variables similar to those used in Kore Fanmi and many of those in the earlier Schriener 2006 and Echvin 2011 models). Specifically, the HDVI used the following model (Figure 27):

Review of HDVI Infrastructural Indicators of Vulnerability

The most striking thing about the indicators is that they are not simply useless, they may be indicating the opposite of what Targeting entities intend: they may be discriminating against those most in need of aid and selecting for those households and individuals who are less vulnerable. And just as alarming, there is abundant data available to scholars and aid workers who came up with the model to demonstrate the error. Below are list the more obvious examples.

Electricity: 85% of rural Haitian households have no electricity at all (EMMUS 2012). The 15% that do have electricity--mostly households located in villages and those on town peripheries--connect illegally to the nearest electric pole (the same is true for the majority of the 72% of urban population with electricity) giving way to the paradox that the rural “poor” more often have access to electricity than the rural “non-poor” (4% vs. 2%) (Sletten and Egset 2004: 17). Thus, more than useless as an indicator of rural household vulnerability, it is a counter-predictor: the poorer someone in the rural areas is, the more likely they are to have electricity.^{xvii}

Lighting: Anecdotally, the distinction in lighting used in rural households is most often between battery operated lamps, glass kerosene lamps, and tin milk can lamps, distinctions not captured in the 2012 ECVMAS Living Conditions Survey.

Cooking Fuel: The distinction between a household that uses wood to cook is almost entirely a rural vs. urban phenomenon: 80% of those in the city use charcoal, 73% of those in the rural areas use wood, once again rendering the category meaningless in detecting vulnerability (EMMUS 2012).

Water source: In all of Haiti, only 9.2% of households have an on-premises water source; 34% must travel more than 30 minutes to retrieve water. For those in rural areas the figures are more extreme: only 4.8% of rural homesteads have water on the premises (heavily skewed by specific regions, such as the irrigated Artibonite); 42.6% must travel more than 30 minutes to retrieve water. (EMMUS 2012). Moreover, the type of water source and location of the water is almost entirely a function of,

Table 1: Rural and Urban Access to Improved Water Sources by Department (CNSA/CFSVA)


Artibonite	29%
Centre	33%
Nord	37%
Nord Est	40%
Nord Ouest	36%
Ouest	52%
Sud Est	49%
Grand Anse	19%
Nippes	38%
Sud	49%

first, the natural environment and, second, NGOs and State, a point made clear from the 2008 survey finding that 49% of rural households get their water from a creek or river, 21% from a spring and 5% collect rain water (DINEPA 2012). Even if urban areas are included, no more than 52% of households in any of Haiti's ten departments have access to an improved source of water (see Table 1). With the majority of households in a similar state of deprivation and water access being a function, not of individual household resources, but of region and service providers, the indicator 'source of water' is, once again, an essentially meaningless criteria for discriminating household-specific vulnerability.^{xviii}

Latrine: According to DINEPA (2012) 67% of rural households have either a simple hole in the ground or they have no latrine at all. According to the 2012 EMMUS, only 20% of households in Haiti have a private latrine classified in as 'improved.' Moreover, while there is no available data to prove it, we know anecdotally that many of the 'improved latrines' in rural areas have nothing to do with the wealth of the household but rather whether or not an NGO built the latrine as part of a relief project. If the NGOs that built the latrines targeted vulnerable households—and most do exactly that --the presence of latrine can, similar to electricity, be considered a counter-indicator, meaning that those who have the improved latrines may be poorer than those with nothing at all.

Waste disposal: In their landmark 2004 study Sletten and Egset noted that garbage collection, even for the rural non-poor, does not exist—at all. There are no official dumps, landfills, or garbage collection sites. The primary and only method of waste disposal-- regardless of social class--is burning or throwing garbage in the nearest ravine (or paying someone else to do it), making the category, once again, meaningless in a rural analysis.

Hygiene: Kore Fanmi uses hand washing—or not hand washing—as an indicator of vulnerability. EMMUS surveyors estimated hand washing habits based on availability of soap and water or other hand sanitizing products (accomplished for 52% and 66% of all 13,181 households visited). But the sheer number of household that do not have these products available makes the measure questionable as an indicator of vulnerability (see Figure 28, below).



In short, most variables used in HDVI analysis do not discriminate between individual household vulnerability and some discriminate in a way that is misleading. Below we offer our own analysis of the CNSA data in an effort to search for a Proxy Means Model. But once again, the results do nothing to encourage the use of criteria to discriminate among inter-household vulnerability. As will be seen, using child malnutrition as a measure of vulnerability, the models yielded a 12% improvement over randomly guessing which households have a malnourished child: meaning that we would be wrong 67% of the time (see Annex).

CNSA Survey

In 2013, CNSA conducted a 3,501 household national survey (19,516 individuals). We used the data in an attempt to develop a statistical model to assess the predictability, based on Proxy Means Tests, of household vulnerability. Questions targeted the wide range of information listed below.

Indicators of Vulnerability

There were two categories from which we could draw dependent variables to test whether independent variables were useful in a proxy means model for vulnerability:

- 1) Reported consumption and diversity of food – it is based on reports from respondents regarding household consumption, variety of foods consumed, missed and reduced meals due to scarcity, and
- 2) Nutritional variables HAZ, WAZ, and MUAC, the only concrete and measureable indicator of vulnerability

The problem with category 1 is that while considered by some as the “gold standard” for vulnerability, the utility of these indicators have not been demonstrated in Haiti. Moreover, we found no significant statistical relationship between them and child or adult female malnutrition, the only concrete and measurable indicator of vulnerability available. Thus, we selected nutritional status as our dependent variable. Specifically we chose HAZ (Height for Age for children 6 to 59 months of age) as the dependent variable indicating vulnerability. Known as “stunting,” HAZ is recognized as the most useful indicator of chronic malnutrition—i.e. generally a consequence of long term nutritional deprivation-- and hence, long term vulnerability (WHO 2013). The proportion of children in the sample who were chronically malnourished is 19.8%.^{xix}

In the search for those variables that best determine whether a household is vulnerable--based on the presence of a malnourished child--the variables that yielded *no statistically significant* relationships and that affirm discussion in the criteria section were as follows:

- WFP Diversity score (variety of foods consumed)
- WFP Consumption index (meals missed on reduced)
- All CNSA composite indexes, including assets, house type, and construction
- Head of household is unmarried
- Head of household is unmarried woman
- Head of household is unmarried man

- Head of household is married couple
- Number of infants in household
- Number of individuals less than 7yrs old
- Number of individuals ages 7 to 25yrs old
- Number of individuals older than 65yrs old
- Number of people less than 18yrs old living outside the home
- Child has chronic health condition
- Child is handicapped
- Child has been ill
- Household has alternative revenue sources
- Household receives transfer payments
- Household receives "other" financial support from organizations
- Head of Household is female (married or unmarried)
- Age of head of household
- Head of household was in school in year '12 and '13
- Head of household has chronic health condition
- Head of household is handicapped
- Head of household has been ill


Variables that did yield *statistically significant* relationships were as follows:

- Sex of child
- Age in Months
- School (not in school)
- BMI
- Child Ratio (children < 7 years)
- Expenses on Food per person
- Peek “earners” (proportion of adults 26 to 65 years of age)

Model

An ordered logit model was chosen to perform the empirical regression analysis. This model was chosen because the desired outcome was not a predicted HAZ z-score but rather the identification of a person belonging to a “Severely Malnourished”, “Malnourished”, or “Good Health” category. In the analysis, the malnutrition category was used as the dependent variable.

Figure 31: Model for CNSA 2013 Data Analysis (authors)



Results


For each observation the independent variables used were child's personal information, health statistics of women in the household, household data, CNSA calculated synthetic food security indexes, and characteristics of the head of household. Eight variables were found to be statistically significant and are explained below: (see Annex for individual charts plotting the following relationships):^{xx}


- Age: As children get older their health status is more likely to decrease (2% less likely to be of good health at six months; 20% less likely to be of good health at fifty-eight months; p-value 0.000)
- Gender: Female children are more likely to have better health status (5% more likely to be of good health if female; p-value 0.005)
- School enrollment: Children enrolled in school are more likely to have better health status (10% more likely to be of good health in enrolled in school; p-value 0.000)
- Female nutritional status: Children are more likely to have better health status when women in the household have higher BMIs (6% more likely to be of good health if women in house have BMI of 16; 16% more likely to be of good health if women in house have BMI of 38; p-value 0.039)
- Proportion of working children in household: As the percentage of non-working/contributing children in the household decreases, children are more likely to have better health status (2% less likely to be of good health if 9% of household members are <7yrs; 12% less likely to be of good health if 67% of household members are <7yrs; p-value 0.003)

- Dependency ratio: As the number of people who live in the household ages 26-65 increases children are more likely to have better health status (2% more likely to be of good health if one person in the house is age 26-65; 12% more likely to be of good health if five people in the house are age 26-65; p-value 0.018)
- Expenditure: As the amount of money spent per month increases, children are more likely to have better health status (1% more likely to be of good health if family spends \$7 per person per month; 21% more likely to be of good health if family spend \$172 per person per month; p-value 0.000)
- Education level of households head: If the head of household has at least some post-primary education children are more likely to have better health status (7% more likely to be of good health if head of household has at least some post-primary education; p-value 0.002)

The value the model provides is (i) it mathematically proves each of the above characteristics to be significant, and (ii) quantifies each variable in a meaningful and useful way. While these variables are all statistically significant they fail to accurately predict child nutritional status at the individual level. The actual and predicted observations are shown in the graph below. Blue dots represent *real* boys and pink dots *real* girls. Black dots are the predicted outcomes of observations and each black dot is paired to exactly one *real* observation. A black dot is calculated thusly: take a *real* observation and use its characteristics as inputs into the model, which outputs a predicted value seen here as a black dot. In a perfect model each *predicted* value would have exactly the same *real* value; in other words, it would have fallen exactly on the black line. In the best of models this is an unlikely occurrence. But the model would be a good fit if the observations cluster evenly on either side of the line. Instead, what is seen here is a model with a clear upward bias on health status with *predicted* values more favorable than most *real* observations. The reason for the upward bias is that the model and most of the single predictors of malnutrition included do a better job of predicting low vulnerability. For example, among households with the lowest expenditures, knowing level of expenditures offers only a 1% improvement over guessing which household has a malnourished child; but for those households with high expenditures it offers a 21% improvement of random guessing (see Figure 30.1: see Annex for other graphs of models in variable).

Figure 32:





Overall, the best way to sum up the model is that, if we had no more information than that 19.8% of children in the sample are malnourished (the proportion of malnourished children in the sample), than we could have randomly guessed with a probability of being correct at 19.8 % that a child in any given household was malnourished. With the model and knowing all these variables, we can now ‘guess’ with an approximately 12% greater probability of being correct: 32 percent. In short, if we depended on knowing the vulnerability of a household based on these variables, and with the criteria of vulnerability being a chronically malnourished child in the house, we would be wrong 68% of the time.

Behind the Criteria


To begin exploring why the PMT models yield such poor results in Haiti, a review of indicators not discussed earlier is provided below. The focus is on indicators explored in the preceding model and the most common criteria that organizations interviewed in the course of the field work use to identify vulnerable households (see Table 2). The utility of the variables are explained in the context of discussions in Geographical Criteria and Beneficiary Unit.

Table 2: Most Common Beneficiary Criteria

Female-headed with children	Low or no labor capacity
Child-headed	With land but no labor capacity
Head illiterate or low educational level	Engaged in agriculture
Headed by disabled or chronically ill	Little or no land
Disabled or chronically ill present	At least some land
Orphan(s) present	Engaged in animal husbandry
Restavek(s) present	Little or no livestock
Former restavek(s) present	Dependent on petty trade/commerce
Internally displaced person(s) present	Dependent on fishing
Malnourished children present	Impacted by disaster
Children not in school present	Type of house material
Meals per day	Member of a women group
Reported food deprivation	Member of VSLA
High dependency ratio	Member of other association
Crowding (residents per room)	

Female Headed Households: There is no evidence that male-headed households are better off than female headed households; indeed, as discussed earlier on, the contrary may be the case. But the problem is also confounded by cultural expectations regarding gender and household headship. For example, in a 2013 FAES data collection in the North West commune of Baie De Henne, surveyors set up kiosks in 4 habitations (townships) and asked respondents, among other questions, who was head of household and their sex. In the course of the present research we re-visited 29 respondents from the same households and asked the same question. In nine cases (31%) the sex of the household was different than originally reported. And in all nine of those cases the response was different than that of the original respondent. In other words, different household members cited different household heads (Figure 31). Part of the problems derives from the fact that for many people in Haiti, particularly rural areas, households tend to be *de facto* female headed. Whether a man is present or not and whether the man reports he is running it or not, women tend to make decision regarding the households. The trend is such that a common refrain in rural Haiti is that *gason pa gen kay* (“men don’t have house,” i.e. because women own them). The trend is related to a tradition where women are the expected heads. In rural Haiti women typically control the household budget, they are the primary disciplinarians of children,

Figure 34: FAES Data from Baie d’Henne
Sex of Originally Report Hshld Hd vs. Follow-check



and they make 50% or more of the household decisions without the participation of their spouse (EMMUS (2012; 2005; CARE 2013, Schwartz 2009, Murray 1977)


Single Female Headed households: Given the preceding, when households are determined to be vulnerable because of female headship, then it makes more sense to deal with the criteria of “single female headed households,” i.e. households where the female head has no spouse. This was a criteria for virtually all the organizations visited during the course of the investigation. Yet, there are complications here as well. The 2013 CARE International survey in Leogane (N=809), found no significant differences in asset based poverty between households that had a single female head versus those that had both male and female head or a single male head. Moreover, in the same survey—including data from Carrefour (for a total N = 1,629)—for 70% of all households at least one of the two principal breadwinners was female vs. 79% of households in which at least one male was a 1st or 2nd ranked financial contributor. In only 19% of households were both primary breadwinners male and in only 13% are both female. ^{xxi}

Table 3: Household Head by Material Variables in Leogane (CARE Gender Survey 2013)			
Measure of well-being	Single Female Head	Male and Female Head	Single Male Headed
Concrete Roof	6%	6%	7%
Water source in house or yard	9%	11%	8%
Purchase bottled water	46%	44%	42%
Propane used as cooking fuel	2%	2%	0%
Owns home and land	77%	72%	65%
Cost/month for oldest Child's tuition	\$27.62	\$25.03	\$17.81

House construction: Type of floor, roof, and walls are one of the most commonly cited indicators of vulnerability. The problem with using physical household features is that, while they tell us about the house, they may not reveal much about the people who live in it. This is particularly true in rural areas. As touched on earlier, most rural people in Haiti—adults and children alike—aspire to live in a town, the provincial city and, more than anywhere else, Port-au-Prince. No matter how poorly constructed, undesirable the neighborhood, or vulnerable the plot on which the house is built, second, third, and even fourth houses in towns and cities are principal ingredients in getting children a secondary education—unavailable in the rural areas. Houses in town and urban areas also add significantly to the ease with which members are able to do business in the more lucrative

informal urban economy, not least of all the female household head or co-heads' capacity to trade; they add to male family members capacity to seek temporary work in the city; and they significantly increase the potential for building social capital by extending hospitality to rural family, friends or neighbors who do not have a house in the town or city. Adults who cannot afford to construct second and third houses may invest in family members who construct one; they may rent homes in town or the city; and if nothing else they will seek some kind of stake in the town and urban based homes of relatives, or friends. Indeed, in contemporary Haiti it is unthinkable that one does not have somewhere to stay in the town or city. What all this means is that people in rural Haiti are significantly more likely to invest, not in the quality of construction of rural homes, but those in the town and city. It is tantamount to a rule that people with homes in towns and cities, by virtue of the investment, have shabbier rural homes. None of this is captured in the typical survey or PMT model measuring vulnerability. Seldom if ever are residents asked if their family owns second or third homes.

Figure 35:



The transient size of households was captured in the follow-up check on FAES data in Baie de Henne: 8 months after the original survey, only 9 of 29 households had the same number of people. An approximately equal number of household had decreased in size as those that increased vs. Follow-check

Table 4: Income per Department (Verne 2001: 201; using HLCS 2001)			
	Urban	Rural	Total
Artibonite	1.723.0	2.134.8	2.000.0
Center	2.316.7	2.430.0	2.389.7
Grand-Anse	1.654.2	1.900.0	1.829.2
North	3.304.2	1.585.0	1.900.0
Northeast	804.2	616.7	671.7
Northwest	2.470.7	1.500.0	1.734.2
West	4.014.6	3.100.0	4.366.7
South	2.761.0	1.696.2	1.921.6
Southeast	3.240.0	2.371.7	2.507.5
Haiti	2.264.7	2.035.0	2.403.1
Metro	7.292.5		

Crowding (people per room): Limited space versus the number of people in the house suggests poverty. The intuitive explanation is that the household is too poor to build additional living space in response to increased number of people. There are problems assuming that less space and more

people is an indicator of poverty. Certainly larger homes suggest higher income. But the housing standard for the lower income mass of households of rural people in Haiti is a two room structure 12 x 20 feet long. The family tends to sleep in the same room. There is usually a single large bed. Children sleep on banana stalk mats on the floor (see Schwartz 2009). The households contract and expand in terms of members over the long and short term in direct proportion, not to the availability of space, but resources. Literally overnight household size can shrink or grow in response to short term changes in resources. Appearance of the migrant fish swells household ranks in fishing villages. The bean harvest swells them on the plains. The March increase in salt harvesting swells them on the littoral flats. Cousins, in-laws, godchildren, nephews, nieces all move to and away from households based on the resources available. Indeed, the irony of using crowding as an indicator of vulnerability is that--similar to so many other supposed indicators of vulnerability-- it is quite likely the opposite: fewer rather than more people in a household is a better indicator of vulnerability (Figure 32).

Child Dependency ratios: High numbers of children in proportion to working age adults is another intuitive indicator of vulnerability that may be contrary to expectations. Rural areas are considered safer for the children and a better caretaking environment inducing some parents working in urban areas to send young children back to rural areas to live with their own parents or family until school age. Another complication with using high children dependency ratios as an indicator of vulnerability is that children may in fact reduce household vulnerability. Beginning at about the age 7 children become valuable sources of labor in rural areas, such that the in a 1,586 household survey in Jean Rabel, the author found correlations of over 30% between the number of children resident in a household and the number of livestock and gardens belonging to household heads (Figures 33 and 34; Schwartz 2009:). In the same research the likelihood of a woman being engaged in commerce was strongly associated with the number of children resident in her household; a woman with more than 3 children is 5 to 10 times more likely to be engaged in commerce, regardless of her age, suggesting that the labor of children frees many women to engage in economic activities away from the homestead (Table 6. See Schwartz 2009: for a full discussion). More rather than less children can also be a critical factor in withstanding environment shocks. During droughts for example, water sources dry up and farmers must travel farther into remote areas to graze their animals or to cut grass for them. They must then lead the animals farther in the other direction, into more peopled areas where adequate water sources are more common and tend not to dry up as quickly. All of this additional effort translates to the need or more labor and the need for more workers, because rain or no rain, people must eat and they must drink. Food still must be cooked, water found, clothes washed, and at least some animals must be kept alive so that when the drought finally ends there will be something with which to start producing again. Farmers themselves recognize the economic advantage of children vis a vis the demanding labor regimes. In Far-West Haiti, one of the harshest natural environments in Haiti, teams of surveyors asked a random sample of 68 male and 68 female household heads the question, ‘which family is better off, the, one with 3 children or one with 6 children?’: 59% of respondents chose the family with 6 children (see Schwartz

Table 5: Child Labor Activities (n = 1,482)*

Task	% of Households
Housework	75.7%
Cooking	72.8%
Childcare	62.5%
Carry water	73.6%
Sell produce	31.6%
Sell livestock	32.9%
Tend Livestock	56.5%
Garden work	52.7%
Wage labor	8.3%

*Includes households with no children and those with only toddlers

2009:chapt 13). When presented with the hypothetical scenarios, ‘if an NGO offered to pay you 500 dollars per month, every month for the rest of your life to not bear children would you agree?’ Rather than responding with a joyous “yes!” that outsiders who think children are a burden on the poor might expect, 90% said “No.” The responses were captured on recording devices and transcribed. Most respondents were perplexed why anyone would contemplate accepting such an offer. Common were remarks such as,

No. I would not agree. That couldn't help you at all. If I am getting \$500 a month and I do not have a child to say, go there, take this gallon, go get some water for me. Look at me, I'd be making \$500 dollars a month and all the time things would be getting worse. Not better. No. Not better. Worse. Things would be getting worse.^{xxii}

(fifty-one-year-old father of two)

The most common explanation for refusing the hypothetical \$500 included the importance of children when the respondent is sick or injured (see also Table 8, below). More than 50% of respondents mentioned illness with comments such as,

No. Because let's say you have money. You go find someone to do something for you. He doesn't do it. But children. As soon as I am sick, look at my child making food for me, washing clothes for me, doing things for me. And if it was money, it wouldn't be doing anything for me.^{xxiii}

(thirty-year-old father of four)

I don't understand what you are saying. Children are there to help you. Your children do your work. I don't know who takes care of things at your house.^{xxiv}

(sixty-year-old father of thirteen)

Figure 36: Children by Gardens




Figure 37: Children by Animals




Table 6: Number of Children Resident in House by Whether or Not Woman is Engaged in Marketing (n = 132; children 7 to 25 years of age)

		Number of children	Does Woman Market		Total women Total
			No	Yes	
Age Categories of women	20 – 34 years	0 – 3	8	8	16
		4 – 6	4	12	16
		7+	0	2	2
		Total	12	22	34
	35 – 49 years	0 – 3	5	6	11
		4 – 6	4	18	22
		7+	0	13	13
		Total	9	38	47
	50+ years	0 – 3	8	11	19
		4 – 6	3	17	20
		7+	4	7	11
		Total	15	36	51

Elderly: Similar to the problems with using high numbers of small children as an indicator of poverty and vulnerability, adults seeking care for elderly parents often choose to send them to the ‘family farm’ or town in the province where care is less expensive or cost free; cost of living in other respects low; crime low; and where the elderly can conduct petty commerce or work in gardens. Moreover, organizations tend to create criteria for “aged”--such as over 70 years of age--that do not always fit. We found in the course of the research at least two cases where elder beneficiaries spontaneously complained about being defined as vulnerable, explaining that they are the most productive members of the household. Not least of all, during the past century and up to the present, rural Haitians bore an average of 7.1 children per person. What this means is that as the typical rural farmer in Haiti ages, the quantity of direct living descendants grows underneath them like a pyramid of social capital rising from the sand. They also tend to have a lifetime of accumulated investment in land. And what both accumulated wealth and large numbers of living descendants mean for measures of vulnerability is that the presence of a feeble old man or woman with a cane confined to the household may be an indication, not of poverty, but wealth and land ownership or remittances from adult children, grandchildren or great grandchildren living overseas, the migration of which the elder as likely as not financed in years past.

Handicapped: Little argument can be made against the probability that a disabled person is more likely to be vulnerable than his or her healthy counterpart. The problem comes in applying the logic at the household level. Data on how many handicapped people are in rural Haiti could not be found. But we know anecdotally the numbers are few. We can assume that the low numbers have to do with food insecurity and high labor demands associated with survival. We can also reasonably assume that the survival of those who are alive is, for the most part, not owed to State or NGO interventions (only a few programs in rural Haiti have traditionally targeted the disabled, most of those are religious missions). Thus we can deduce that the few handicapped who survive

in rural areas are more than likely alive because they are being cared for and supported by members of the household in which they live. Hence, presence of disabled may be a better indication that a household is not vulnerable but rather capable of supporting and caring for non-productive member. In support of the point, in one of the earliest reports on Targeting in rural Haiti the researchers noted that,

In normal Haitian household feeding patterns, it should be noted, infants, young children, pregnant and lactating mothers, the ill, and the elderly are not disadvantaged. Quite the contrary. The team found that, in times of scarcity, these particular groups receive priority in feeding, even when the more productive household members go without.

(USAID 1994:23)

Meals per day: A principal indicator of food security explored in many surveys is meals per day (CNSA/CFSVA 2007; CNSA 2013). But meals and what comprises a meal are cultural constructs. Popular class Haitians eat one principal meal per day, at noon. They also eat one semi-meal (breakfast) and something in the evening. The morning or midmorning snack is typically reported as a meal. That of the evening is not. Or so it might be supposed. The fact is that reporting may also be idiosyncratic. Rural Haitians have an array of cultural constructs regarding consumption of a meal versus a snack. For example, while someone from the US might consider a large bowl of cereal a meal a rural Haitian probably would not. On the other hand, people in rural Haiti define a meal as eating food with salt, *manje sel* (rice, beans, yams, plantains, meat or fish sauce). Turning the issue around, the criteria of *manje sel* means that while a US citizen would qualify salted crackers as non-nutritious snack, popular class Haitians may consider salted crackers a type of meal. Thus, for reported ‘meals per day’ to be accepted as a valid criteria, it would first have to be shown that respondents were consistently reporting in such a way that it reflected nutritional deprivation, a moot point as meals per day yields no statistical significance in PMT explorations such as that presented with the CNSA data earlier on. Another point about meals is that cooking them often has more to do with availability of dry fuel –wood in rural areas and charcoal in towns—making missed meals a variable also dependent on weather patterns.

Coping Strategies Index (CSI): Sometimes used as the dependent variable for proxy means tests, WFPs Coping Strategy Index is the sum of points assigned to five weighted questions about household food rationing strategies in the week prior to the interview (see CNSA/CFVSA 2007: 82). For example, questions include, “did anyone in the house miss any meals in the past week because of lack of income.” Or, “did people in the house reduce the size of meals or eat less preferable foods because of a lack of income.” In the case of CNSA/CFSVA 2007 the score could range from 0 to 63. Problems with the CSI begin with it being dependent on self-reporting, not observation. In the course of the research no study demonstrating the accuracy of the measure in Haiti was found. Thus, it is not known whether the CSI in Haiti measures food rationing strategies or respondent tendency to prevaricate in the hope of attaining aid. Unless we are to assume that respondents are uniformly incapable of making the connection between reported food rationing and the probability of getting aid—a great underestimation of ‘peasant’ power of reasoning-- it is difficult to see how asking about food rationing differs from asking people outright if they are vulnerable or hungry. Just as problematic is the fact that, even if reporting is candid, the Coping Strategies Index (CSI) is a snapshot, useful in times of crisis but only as an indicator of temporary status, i.e. the seven days preceding the interview. As if all the preceding were not problematic


enough, the utility of the CSI measure for identifying a small number of beneficiary households is reduced by the high number of respondents who report rationing. In the CNSA/CFSVA 2007, the following percentage of respondents reported rationing for each of the questions asked:

1. Reduce number meals in the past week: 38.8%
2. Reduce quantity of food : 45.7%
3. Borrow food or depend on the aid of family or friends outside of the household :10.3%
4. Eat foods that are less costly or less preferred : 40.7%
5. Reduce food eaten by adults in favor of the children :26.2%




Months of Food Rationing: Months of food rationing per year is another indicator of vulnerability that varies little between those practicing different livelihood strategies, once again suggesting that shocks and coping are somehow leveled between groups through social redistributive mechanisms, discussed on page 35.

Figure 39: Months when Food Provisions Insufficient (CNSA/CFSVA 2007:55)



Food Consumption Score: Consumption score has the potential to discriminate to fine degree between households. Food diversity is calculated based on reported household consumption for 23 foods that can be lumped into 8 categories (the exact number of categories varies in different surveys). But once again there is the issue of reporting error. The measure is based on self-reporting. It is not known what portion of respondents, rather than having low diversity scores, are simply not forthcoming with answers. Consumption scores do not correlate well with other indicators of vulnerability. For example, households principally dependent on agricultural labor and charcoal are relatively secure in terms of Coping Strategies; yet they rate the poorest on consumption (diversity). And as with the CSI above, with the exception of emergency situations all the preceding are moot points because the Food Consumption Score is a snapshot that, if it reveals anything at all about true food insecurity, is limited to the seven days preceding the survey—those days about which the surveyors inquire--making it more useful in times of crisis than as a long term indicator of chronic food insecurity.



Income, Expenditures and Assets: Rural Haitians, similar to small farmers everywhere, would prefer that their neighbors do not know what they have and, we can infer, are not enthusiastic about sharing the information with strangers—i.e. the surveyors. This is not a novel observation. Most organizations, including WFP (undated_b) and USAID (2013) recommend not trying to gather data on income (see also CNSA/CFVSA 2007:36). Thus, expenditures are a better indicator than income. But during crisis, expenses may not decline as expected. They may stay the same or they may increase as families sell off goods and investments to buy food. Charcoal production or harvest trees hitherto preserved for hard times. Detecting this change, indeed, measuring income at all is a difficult and unverifiable task. Another complication with expenses in rural Haiti is that they are seasonal, as with planting and school tuition, something reflected in data on livestock slaughters (see Figures 35-36 and Table 7). Even if we assume accurate measures of income, expenditures and assets there are problems, particularly with regard to income and expenses as

indicators of chronic vulnerability. The sheer number of very poor people makes the measure almost useless. In 2001, the last time estimates of income were made for a national sample, 56% of Haitians were considered “extremely poor” (living on less than US\$1.25 per day); 76% were “poor” (living on less than US\$2 per day). The situation is worse in rural areas where 67% of people were extremely poor; 88% were poor.^{xxv} If essentially everyone has daily income differentials measured in pennies, it does little good to use the category as an indicator of differential vulnerability. Moreover, use of the data for targeting assumes that household economic status is static. The models do nothing to capture the fact that households and individuals are daily, weekly, monthly, and annually crossing back and forth across arbitrary poverty lines. Nor does the technique capture social capital, arguably the most important variable in rural livelihood security.

Table 7: Reasons that Farmers in Jean Rabel Slaughter or Sell Livestock			
Reasons	Count	Percent	Cumulative
Hunger (necessity)	1,158	30.1	30.1
School (pay costs)	1,045	27.1	57.2
Food (no necessity)	400	10.4	67.6
Death (pay for funeral)	372	9.7	77.3
Birth (pay costs)	342	8.9	86.2
Make Room for New Stock	68	1.8	88.0
Marriage, Baptism...	47	1.2	89.2
Over Population	9	.2	89.4
Other	412	10.6	100.0
Total	3,853	100.0	100.0

Dependence on Agriculture/commerce/charcoal: A common criteria used to indicate vulnerability is dependence on a particular livelihood strategy, most commonly agriculture commerce or fishing. And it may sometimes be the case that, for example, a single female headed household depends only on commerce. Or a male headed household is dependent on agriculture. But overwhelming this is not the case. The vast majority of Haitian households are engaged in multidimensional livelihoods strategies. Thus, while the Haitian government in the form of MARNDP (2009) estimates that about 80% of Haiti’s 52,000 fisherman are engaged in full time fishing, all fishing households in communities visited during the course of fieldwork for the Haitian Red Cross (Schwartz 2013) also depended on agriculture, livestock rearing, and making charcoal-- mainstays of livelihood and survival, not just in the region studied, but throughout Haiti (see page 31). All these activities integrated through female trade, providing another common household source of income; and all have complementary specialties for which people are paid such that even a woman who is predominately engaged in itinerate trade may work a *jounen* planting crops in a neighbors field one day, gather salt per *jakout* in a coastal salt pan another day, and work as a porter carrying fish traps from a rural market to a fishing village by the sea on the next day. When all else fails, the production, packaging, shipping, and sale of charcoal is the primary fallback on which people in rural Haiti survive crisis, something regrettable in terms of

deforestation, but that, far more often than any NGO or state intervention, has acted to stave off famine and it has done so for more than two centuries.

Returning to the main point, identifying people as dependent on any one economic activity ignores the reality of integrated rural livelihood strategies and it ignores the vast array of petty income earning opportunities. Most researchers know this, but still pursue discrepancies between primary dependence. The weakness of using primary dependence as an indicator of vulnerability comes through with the observation that vulnerability in one category might not be the same in another. For example, the 2007 CFSVA study found that charcoal vendors/producers were among the poorest groups, but they had one of the lowest food insecurity scores. Thus, this arguably makes the poor charcoal vendors less vulnerable than comparable groups. Another example of the complexities that come with basing vulnerability on what are for most multi-dimensional livelihood strategies is that in the same survey those households primarily dependent on agriculture were found to be experiencing high food insecurity, but those primarily dependent on both agriculture and livestock were found to be experiencing the lowest food insecurity. The problem here is that not owning livestock is a temporary status for most households. All households in the rural areas own livestock at least some of the time and most own livestock most the time. None never own livestock. It is simply part of the household productive strategy and the very reason for the existence of households---i.e. to produce so as to sustain its members. As seen earlier, households sell livestock off to meet seasonal needs—such as costs of planting or, most importantly, to pay school tuition for children. They also sell livestock off to deal with emergency costs, such as medical care or to survive environmental calamities such as when crops and animals are lost to drought, floods or blight (see Table 7). Thus, how many of those reported as dependent primarily dependent on agriculture only had lost their animals to thieves or sold them to meet expense associated with some type of shock? In effect, dependency on a single source of income begs the question, once again, about transient poverty.

Children not in school: Haitians everywhere put a high value on their children's education. The trend is such that for many observers it is a defining characteristic of being culturally Haitian. Parents or guardians who do not put their children in school are criticized. Nevertheless, 10% of all Haitian children 6 to 12 years of age are not in school (EMMUS 2012). These children are arguably the most vulnerable children. But are they representative of the most vulnerable households? At least some of these children are living as domestic servants with non-biological kin. Thus, the presence of children not in school is in some cases an indicator of the capacity to take on servants. Moreover, many children are, at any given time, only *temporarily* out of school. Most impoverished children and adults can recount a period when they were not in school, almost always explaining that their family was suffering hard times, often as a result of an illness of a parent or themselves. So once again there is the issue of transient poverty or the fluidity of the mass of rural poor. Those children 6 to 12 years of age who have never gone to school may belong to the most vulnerable or poorest households in terms of the six years span in question; but other families may be dipping below them for shorter periods, rising over the poverty line and falling again.

Land Owners: Eighty percent of people in rural areas own at least some land; 70% cultivate land (Stetten and Egset 2004). The average total land ownership in Haiti is 1 hectare (IHSI 2003). Sletter and Egset (2004) use the HLCS (2001) to show that that an increase in 1 hectare of land results in

only a 2% increase in income. Thus, statistically speaking, a person with 6 hectares--the upper 5% of the rural household land ownership in rural Haiti--only has an income level 12% greater than those with no land at all (the difference between \$1.50 and \$1.75 per household member), making land ownership a variable useful, perhaps, in excluding the wealthiest landowners, but dubious as an indicator of vulnerability (see also Verne 2008). Moreover, quantity of land owned is more contingent than quality of the land, especially regarding irrigated land. Other points that detract from the importance of landless as an indicator of rural household is that the highest income households derive most of their wealth, not from land, but from skilled craftsmanship, fishing, and healing or shamanic practices (see Schwartz 2009: Wiens and Sobrado 1998:5)

Malnutrition: The most effective criterion for defining vulnerability is arguably malnutrition. Regarding the individual it is nearly perfect because, by definition, whether from disease or actual nutrition deprivation, the individual is in a measurable state of personal crisis. One possible problem arises when we elevate the criteria to the level of household, such that a household with a malnourished adult or individual is defined as vulnerable. During the course of the fieldwork for this study, three separate clinic staff and four NGO workers claimed that because of household targeting linked to malnourished children some families deliberately deprive children of food so that the entire household may qualify for aid disbursements. Even if not true or rare, if we wait for disease or malnutrition before intervening we have essentially missed the opportunity to intervene and the individual is more than vulnerable: he or she is a victim.

Summary of Beneficiary Criteria

The most common criteria organizations use to define a rural Haitian household as vulnerable are problematic. In some cases where there is abundant data, such as with female headed households, the statistics suggest that organizations may have the equation backwards: female headed households may, for whatever reason, be indicative of better food security. The search for statistically valid indicators and PMT models does not solve the riddle. In cases of infrastructure variables, there is little practical reason—and little statistical support-- to expect they are useful in discriminating household nuance of vulnerability among rural households in Haiti, the bulk of which, by standards anywhere else in the world, are vulnerable. As seen, source of potable and general purpose water, electricity, waste disposal, and even latrines are consequences of proximity to urban areas, NGO and State services. In this way they may be useful as geographical criteria, but they do not help in discriminating vulnerability levels among individual households.

Moreover, some commonly used indicators may be indicative not of high, but low vulnerability. High numbers of elderly and young children may suggest remittances; high numbers of children over 7 years of age may suggest greater work capacity; crowding may indicate a temporary high level of resources; presence of handicapped may indicate long-term capacity to care for a non-contributing household member. Nor do PMT models offer support for most variables that international and State use in targeting. Setting aside malnutrition (which was used as the dependent variable, i.e. evidence of vulnerability), in the analysis of the most recent CNSA survey data, no variable offered more than a slight improvement over random guessing. The best that can be said of Proxy Means Test algorithms or single indicators is that they are useful in excluding non-vulnerable households from targeting: households that are well constructed, that have cars and motorcycles, high expenses, and where all the children are in school, can be readily eliminated from lists of vulnerable. But for the bulk of the population, already extremely poor, they do little

to differentiate between households in which its occupants are living on \$0.98 per day vs \$1.20 per day or even 1.50 per day. There is not even good reason to believe that they would flush out differences between “poor” and “extremely poor;” and to date no study has demonstrated they could do so with anything approaching a reasonable degree of confidence.

Transient household poverty: When we use fixed criteria we assume that the household is somehow static. But we know intuitively, anecdotally and from the available evidence that they are not static. We saw that rural Haitian households grow and shrink in size according to available resources. A household can also fall into poverty rapidly. A sick mother who is a principal contributor of income through commerce, or a sick father who is principal caretaker of animals and agricultural plots, means lost income and medical bills that can plummet the household into extreme vulnerability. The severity of household shocks is such that in the 2007 CNSA/CFSVA survey three of the five most common shocks respondents reported suffering in the previous year can be classified as internal to the household: specifically, accident/illness, death, and animal disease (Table 8).. The highest percentage of people that reported having been impacted by shock was 70.7%; that was for “Increases in Food Prices.” But three times as many people reported that the *most severe shock* the household had suffered in the preceding year was from disease or accident suffered by a family member, precisely the reasons many respondents in Jean Rabel were seen giving as advantages of having many children

Table 8: Frequency and Severity of Shocks to Household Livelihood Security

Shocks	Most Common Shock	Worst shock
Increase in food prices	70.7	10.1
Cyclone Flood	63.9	11.4
Drought	54.6	4.8
Irregular rainfall	49.6	1.7
Disease/Accident of household member	47.6	30.8
Animal diseases	47.1	9.5
Crop diseases	37.6	4.5
Rarity of basic food stuffs on the market	29.1	2.1
Increase in seed prices	27.7	1.0
Drop in relative agricultural prices	25.3	1.1
Drop in wages	22.6	1.6
Human epidemic	22.1	2.2
Death of a household member	21.9	11.7
Increase in fertilizer prices	12.9	0.9
Drop in demand	12.7	0.3
Insecurity(theft kidnapping)	11.1	2.1
New household member	10.0	0.5
Cessation of transfers from relatives/friends	4.7	0.3
Loss of job or bankruptcy	3.9	0.9
Equipment tool breakdown	2.7	0.0
Others	2.7	1.0

Source: World Bank 2011 Vulnerability before and after the Earthquake. Policy Research Working Paper 5850. By Damien Echevin. P 20. Data is drawn from CNSA/CFSVA 2007.

Social Capital: As seen with the multiple integrated livelihood strategies on page 31, few if any rural households in Haiti would risk dependence on a single source of subsistence. Those subsistence and survival strategies they do depend on are not limited to production. Not discussed is second tier security net of social capital. Households tend to be kinship based, each contributing household member has his or her own network of family, friends, associates and in many cases lovers who facilitate access to resources such as loans, jobs, favors or, as in the case of remittances and foreign aid (access to children sponsorship, Food and Cash for Work), provide direct transfers of goods or cash, all of which make up low income Haitians most significant source of social security. These linkages are difficult to quantify and just as difficult to capture, as evidenced by their absence in the criteria seen earlier. But we can gauge their importance by the one national measure that does exist, overseas remittances; in the aggregate the single greatest source of revenue for the entire country, estimated at a minimum of 2 billion in 2012 (per capita US\$200). If informal transfers are included, remittances may account for as much as half of the country's revenue (IRIN 2010). Figure 38 illustrates the variety of social relationships that may yield material support to a household member and the corresponding material underpinnings of the relationship. Figure 39 is an illustration of inter-household linkages.




Figure 42:





Figure 43: Number of gardens per household
 ($y = 2.8$, $sd = 1.6$, $N = 1,491$)







Table 9: Variation in the number of animals per household

		Number of animals					
		0	1	2	3	4	5+
Goats		8.6%	12.4%	27.6%	20.0%	11.4%	20.2%
Sheep		14.3%	19.0%	23.8%	17.1%	19.0%	6.9%
Cattle		39.3%	36.3%	18.0%	4.7%	1.0%	.6%
Hogs		31.0%	18.0%	28.3%	20.0%	1.7%	.6%
Revenue	Gdes	0	3,700	7,400	14,800	29,600	59,200+
per year	US\$	0	220	440	880	1,760	3,520+

Beneficiary Selection in Haiti

In this section we discuss how beneficiaries are actually selected. In the review of models of Beneficiary Selection on page 3, the category was divided into,

- Phase 1: The types of organization selected or created for choosing beneficiaries and
- Phase 2: How those organizations select beneficiaries

Phase One included three categories: Community Based Targeting (CBT), Extension Targeting (ET), and Survey Targeting. Community Based Targeting in Haiti follows World Bank, Oxfam and WFP model seen in the review of the literature. Phase Two defined how those who were selected to select beneficiaries went about doing so, specifically whether they depended on Self-Selection, Admin-List Selection, Network Selection, or, to be discussed in the last section, Freq-list Selection.


Table 10: Community Administrative Targeting Model

CBT Community Based Targeting	Extension Targeting				Survey
	International	State	Para- Statal	Community Based	
ACDI VOCA Solidarite PADF-CADEC CRS CONCERN CARE ACF FAO Oxfam World Vision FAES	RED CROSS HHF CARITAS HAS Hosp. A. Schweitzer Haiti Baptist Mission Fonkoze Concern CDS CRS COSMOS MSF SAVE TdH Rhasade World Vision UNICEF Zanmi Lasante	RESPEG BAC/ MARNDR MSPP KORE FANMI TI MANMAN CHERI	DPC DNSO	CODAB MPP Tet Kole UCHADER Local Authorities: Mairies, KAZEK, AZEK...	Fonkoze Concern International Brac


Extension Targeting in Haiti

Top-Down: NGOs and the State

Extension Targeting is the most widely used Targeting strategy. Those networks formed by international organizations or the State Ministries can be thought of as top-down extension targeting. All implementing organizations, even those listed in Table 10 under Community Based Targeting also employ some degree of Extension Targeting in the form of NGO workers, monitors or animators. In 2012 Aba Grangou conducted a census of top-down community extension networks in Haiti and counted a total of 28 programs employing 35,149 professional and volunteer agents located throughout the country. Thirty (30) of the 38 programs were health related. Some have been operant in Haiti for decades, as with Hospital Albert Schweitzer (1956) on the Artibonite and Haiti Health Foundation (1989) in the Grand Anse. But the extent of these resources should not be overestimated. Of the 17,149 health agents, 6,000 are members of the USAID funded Haitian Health Foundation in the Grand Anse. Others are also concentrated in specific areas. Moreover, the greatest absolute number of Top-Down Extension agents are associated with emergency response. Just two of them--the Haitian Red Cross (12,000 volunteers) and Haitian Civilian Protection DPC (7,000)--account for more than 53% of all extension agents in the country.



Regarding the effectiveness of top-down extension agents, health workers appear to be the most effective. They already target people in the communities and their criteria is unimpeachable: injury, illness and malnutrition. Success at the national level can be inferred from declining malnutrition in face of stagnant and even intensifying income levels (see Figure 44). However, they have been used extensively in past targeting and deliveries of aid to vulnerable households and there is widespread agreement that their involvement distracts from their health targeting mission.



Non-health targeting agents are problematic in other ways. While it may be politically inexpedient to acknowledge the extent to which the aid process has been corrupted, the majority or people who read this report know very well that the most significant challenge to effective targeting is corruption and the lack of accountability that nurtures it, i.e. weak monitoring and weak systems of sanctions. The modern epoch of foreign emergency aid to Haiti began with the devastation of Hurricane Hazel in 1954 when the international community and NGOs poured assistance into the country. The associated corruption was such that US diplomats and Marine historians Heintz and Heintz (1978), recall that wealthy women in Port-au-Prince who had benefitted from the “aid” subsequently dubbed their new mink stoles “Hazels.” For 50 years now, most evaluation reports end recommending that Monitoring and Evaluation be reinforced. This is true whether discussing NGO extension services or larger volunteer networks. But Haitian monitors who make ambitious inquiries and question the validity of target lists often encounter non-cooperation and cover-up. For foreigners the density of Haitian social networks and the inscrutability of the culture makes investigation nearly impossible. It is not expedient to here recount the details or name individual NGO programs and International agencies, but those past investigations that have extended beyond the office and inventory lists have frequently resulted in programs being shut down and staff transferred or dismissed. To assume that extensive fraud at the level of targeting is not occurring today is to bury our heads in the sand. Not only do beneficiaries vociferously complain about

corruption in top-down programs, during the course of field work several program directors and staff spoke candidly about school feeding programs that do not feed, beneficiary lists stuffed with false names, and beneficiaries who must pay to participate in programs. Again, while it is beyond the scope of this study to identify organizations by name, we can speak generally of single programs in which only in the past 4 years tens of millions of dollars have disappeared into rural areas with no for material results, indeed, barely a trace. Most of this corruption occurs at the high levels of administration but in defense of the those at lower levels, many volunteers and most midlevel employees might otherwise qualify as beneficiaries themselves, or at least have extensive family and friends who should qualify, putting a great deal of pressure on them to select family and friends as beneficiaries.

Bottom-up: Associations, Churches, and Local Government

Associations

Lists contained in Development Plans for Haitian communes suggest that there are at least 1,500 CBOs in rural Haiti. These include associations for women, youth, social assistance organizations, and handicap cooperatives. With their formal structure, charters, mandate and tiered positions, they resemble the formal extension organizations seen above, but their membership is comprised of potential beneficiaries, and what can be defined as “organic,” “self-selected,” or as defined here, “bottom-up” participants. In principle they are member-governed and leaders reside in their areas of operation and are thus subject to community censure and can be thought of as bottom up organizations.

In practice, however, many associations differ little from the extension targeting organizations just described. They have reputations for graft and corruption. Many are created specifically to capture development funds. Despite the expectation that they are bottom-up, in many cases those who control the associations do not live in the areas fulltime or move after they get control of the finances, maintaining enough of a presence support comfortable lifestyles for themselves or their families in the provincial city, Port-au-Prince or overseas (see p. 74 below). Notwithstanding, associations together with churches are those extension targeting organizational strategies most favored by beneficiaries, suggesting that they may indeed be more reliable in reaching beneficiaries than their professionalized counterparts (see Figure 45-47).

Churches

Small Catholic churches and multitudes of evangelical churches are left out of the Aba Grangou calculations of volunteer networks seen above and typically only tangentially involved in State and international targeting strategies. Yet, from the perspective of beneficiaries they are the most important extra-

Table 11: Evangelical Haitian Churches in the USA & Canada		
Denomination	# of Members	# of Churches
Haitian Southern Baptists	45,000	381
American Baptist Convention	10,000	100
National Baptist Convention	5,000	15
All other Baptists	1,000	15
Pentecostals	30,000	800
All other denominations	15,000	200
Total	106,000	1,511

Source: Baptist Press & North American Mission Board; numbers not confirmed:
<http://www.haitichristianity.org/about-haiti/history>

household organization in Haiti. Based on studies elsewhere, less than 20% of the adult population is a member of an association or NGO extension service of any kind; but more than 50% report being members of a Christian church (CARE 2013; LTL 2011). As much as 70% of primary schools are associated with Christian churches (Sali 2000). Even if we only consider overseas sponsored Evangelical churches, with three times as many members as the formal Top Down networks seen earlier they dwarf secular extension networks in Haiti (see Table 11). Some churches have elements of being top-down by virtue of overseas funding for schools, clinics and the founding of churches as well as the presences of resident missionaries from other countries and frequent and intense involvement of visiting “teams” of volunteers from overseas congregations. But all the churches have community membership based on self-selection and in many cases with no material inducements. At least part of the leadership is entrenched in the community to an extent rivaled only by the associations. Many are also linked to the community through schools, clinics, and Health Extension organizations seen earlier.

Local Government

Local government should be the purest form of bottom-up representativeness. Mayors represent the towns, *kazek* represent the rural areas at the level of “Section”—an official sub-Communal district—and *azek* represent the rural population at its lowest recognized territorial unit, the *abitasyon*. Most organizations—whether top down extension or CBT seen below—make use of the *kazek* and *azek*. In many cases, particularly cash for work, they are the principal selectors of beneficiaries.

Mayors are typically seen as belonging to the village elite, a situation aggravated by the fact that due to recurrent election shortcomings—i.e. they did not have them--those currently in place were not voted into office but appointed by the executive branch of government. Similar to some association leaders and almost all leaders of professional extension networks, many also maintain their families outside the region. In the one case where we visited a mayor during the field work he was in the US; the assistant mayor had moved back to the area from Port-au-Prince specifically because of the ‘job opportunity.’

In contrast, *kazek* are local and resident representatives. But regarding targeting vulnerable households they too are seen as remote from the interests of all but their immediate *abitasyon* and most are regarded with mistrust and seen as serving their own interests or those of “*moun pa l*”, his or her people.

The *azek*, is the political representative who, with regard to targeting the vulnerable, is most respected by all parties. We found nearly universal agreement that they should be involved in selection of beneficiaries. We also found nearly universal agreement that they should *not* be in control of the selection process. Vociferous complaints against *azek* are tempered by the fact that, “*moun pa l*” are more likely to be poor and rural and well distributed throughout the rural areas and hence, those in a position to complain are more likely to be beneficiaries when the *azek* is involved. *Azeks* themselves defend against those who do complain with the logical point that they cannot help everyone—logical given the uniform poverty seen in prior sections and the limited amount of aid for the most vulnerable-- and that those who do not get aid express themselves with accusations of favoritism.

Figure 48: Beneficiary Preferred Mechanism of Targeting (NW survey: N = 134)






Figure 49: Beneficiary Preferred Mechanism of Targeting (SE survey: N = 64)





Survey Targeting in Haiti

Representatives for most organizations visited reported depending on focus groups and quantitative surveys when defining criteria, preparing for, and evaluating targeting strategies. The impression from examining programs, criteria and speaking with beneficiaries is that the information from these studies have little impact on the programs or targeting.


The very best example of participatory survey targeting—the most effective type of targeting in Haiti-- is Fonkoze and Concern who follow the BRACa community mapping and wealth ranking strategy. It includes the following steps:

- Creating a poverty map using ranking to identify the poorest households in the community
- Conducting traditional surveys using proxy means to verify vulnerability
- Cross-verifying. Experienced staff visit all selection households

The strategy has received much praise, and is the conceptual basis for Kore Lavi and Kore Fanmi polyvalent extension agents. Problems are that as with extension structure described above, it depends on community outsiders who control the process and leans on what Hashemi, and de Montesquiou (2011) call “easily verifiable indicators, such as family size, and type of housing,” the same ones that were reviewed in the Section on Criteria (p 33) and seen to yield little statistical support under the scrutiny of Proxy Means Tests in Haiti. This is not to say the system is ineffective. With community mapping it becomes highly accurate way of identifying those people who other community members agree are the most vulnerable. In this way it taps local knowledge, accurately assess household social capital and true vulnerability, and achieves a high level of community buy-in. The drawback is high cost, making it impractical for coverage of large populations. The fact that, as seen, poverty may be better understood as a fluid rather than a fixed state that can change from week, to month, to year means that the status of beneficiaries still must be monitored and frequently updated, thereby adding to the costs.

Community Based Targeting In Haiti

In practice, Community Based Targeting is closely related and sometimes conflated with Community Driven Development (CDD), what can be considered the contemporary gold standard approach to assisting communities in developing areas. Most of the largest NGOs use it. Oxfam, PADF, and CARE International all follow a similar procedure of choosing representative Committees (see Figure 48). Most of the organizations have their own monitors in the field that act more like Extension Targeting agents. They work with the community committees by participating in meetings and often making final executive decisions. The most intensive application of CBT has been the World Bank funded PRODEP executed through PADF and with implementing partners such as CARE international and CRS.^{xxvi}



Prevailing Community Based Strategy among Organizations in Haiti

1. Geo Criteria (carte de poverté; CNSA food security)
2. Focus groups
3. Authorities
4. Selection of committee (autho., notabs, CBS, Fem group)
5. Criteria selection (for some)
6. Lists (from participants and CBOs)
7. Community wide meeting (rare and problematic)
8. Spot checks (10%, reject if)
9. Types of dist. (vouchers, vendors)
10. Hotline
11. Follow-up
12. Feedback

In evaluating CBO here is what we found in the field. Some, if not many, implementing partners say they use CBO, but the actual beneficiary selection for vulnerable people is almost always conducted along the line of networks. Community committees use associations and what they identify as *notab* (people in the community whom they see as honest and good leaders) to make the selection. Thus, in practice the CBO targeting process that we found tends to be two and even three tiered:

- 1) implementing partners request representatives from organizations that represent the community (the Mayor, the *kazek*, representatives from the largest community based organizations),
- 2) those committee members choose beneficiaries based on their own networks and/or
- 3) they pass the task on to associations and even more frequently the *azek* who choose people based on their own networks

The principal criticism of the process is that the committee members often choose their family and friends or clients as beneficiaries. Another problem is the misapplication of criteria. In 10 interviews with focus group beneficiaries, two of the respondents explained their qualification for vouchers as based on need, not so much to maintain needy household members, but rather to maintain older children attending high school in Gonaives. In another case Committee members cited a local handicapped man who was on the voucher system as an example of honest targeting. The man is indeed handicapped, insane and maintained by the household, his immediate family members. But the consultant happened to know the family for 20 years, resided in their house in the past. The man owns 1 *kawo* of irrigated land that his adult son works, he has a middle class daughter living and working in Miami, another in Port-au-Prince, and a son-in-law who owns and drives a 10 wheel transport truck used to haul charcoal out of the region.


In conclusion, the one point about Community Based Targeting and the common use of CBOs and *azek* to select vulnerable beneficiaries is that whether the truly most vulnerable household is selected or not, the community has a greater stake in the decision making process and there is greater transparency and greater pressure for the poorest to be targeted. The same cannot be said for the Extension Targeting seen earlier where people from outside the community are in control of targeting and most evidence suggests high levels of mismanagement, if not outright fraud and corruption.

While there was no means nor resources for us to rigorously evaluate the anecdotal observations mentioned above, we did capture opinions in the surveys described on page 10. What we found is that Community Based Targeting is effective in terms of people being informed of the process: more than 60% of respondents in both samples knew who the selected beneficiaries were; and about 50% were aware of the organizations doing projects and having public meetings as well as if and where the community was informed of those who qualified as beneficiaries (Table 12). The same cannot be said of whether people knew of Community hotlines of means to make complaints: only 11% had heard of one (Figure 49).

Table 12: Awareness of Beneficiary Selection Process

	NW Survey (N = 134)	SE (N = 64)
Respondent knew who selected beneficiaries	63%	61%
Organization had meeting announcing who could benefit	44%	55%

Figure 52: If the respondent is aware of any NGO that has a hotline to complain about problems in Targeting or distribution (NW Survey, N =134)



History of Beneficiary Selection

Community Councils

Reportedly inspired by the French “animation rurale” (USAID 1983), NGOs working in Haiti began using *Conseils Communitaires* (Community Councils) in earnest during the 1950s. “A guided self-help process” that responded to the USAID grant objective, “to develop self-sustaining community action programs” (Ibid), they were, in practice, identical to Community Based Targeting Strategies of today. They had selected representatives of sectors of the community and elected officials. They dealt with all areas of development: disaster relief, soil conservation, health, road rehabilitation, irrigation as well as agriculture and livestock extension services. They used Food-for-Work as a principle tool. Going farther than current CBT, the Community Councils of the 1960s, and 1970s, operated at the sub-Section level and made community support and participation a criteria for receiving aid: communities were required to contribute 50% of Cash-for-Work projects. By the mid to late 1970s, there were 212 councils in the North West alone.^{xxvii} USAID 1983 evaluation found that the Community Councils “were effective in distributing aid and reaching people.” But for reasons to be explained shortly, they did not last (See CONADEP, 1983, cited in Smucker, 1986, p. 99, USAID 1983).

Gwoupman,

Gwoupman emerged during the 1970s. Falling into the Selection classification used in this report of organic (bottom-up) Extension Targeting, they were smaller than Community Councils, composed of from a few to a dozen local farmers, they typically excluded government officials, town elite, and the large landowners found on the councils (USAID 1983).^{xxviii} They were first formed as part of the Catholic Liberation Theology movement, but secular NGOs also promoted the *gwoupman* strategy (Zaag 1999). By the late 1980s *gwoupman* had, for political reasons discussed below, completely supplanted Community Councils as the dominant Beneficiary Selection Strategy.

Associations

The Association—or in Kreyol *asosyasyon*, *oganizayon* or *mouvman*—is another type of Extension Targeting. It prevailed in rural Haiti during the mid 1990s to the present. An institutional descendent of the “cooperatives” that had been promoted in Haiti since the US Marine Corps occupation (1915-1934), they became the intermediary beneficiary units that Community Councils targeted during the 1960s and 70s. Some of the major associations found today are also federations of *gwoupman* from the 1980s.

“Associations” are larger than the *gwoupman* and, as seen earlier, hierarchical like the Community Councils. The most significant difference between an Association and the earlier *gwoupman* is that they must register with the State to be recognized and they must swear off political agendas, something that, as seen below, is surely linked to a backlash to the political activism of the *gwoupman*. Any given Communal development plan in Haiti is complemented with a long list of associations.

Selection and Politics of Changing Targeting Strategies

A look at the history of Targeting Strategies in rural Haiti goes a long way towards clarifying what is going on today and the context of this report. In 1963, as then dictator Francois Duvalier was consolidating his power of the country, he made “integrating rural communities into the rhythm of national progress” national policy. To accomplish this, he chose the Conseils d'action communautaire (*konsey kominote*; community action councils) as the official mechanisms for rural development. While Duvalier has been demonized in most of the literature as a tyrant and sociopath, at the time he was working hand in hand with the objectives of international donors and NGOs. In the case of HACHO in the NW, we have the case of a USAID funded parastatal venture managed jointly by the Government of Haiti and CARE International. A strength of the strategy was that it plugged into the existing rural hierarchy of *gran don* and *gran danm*—large and powerful landowners-- and while there were complaints about large landowners re-directing Food-for-Work to their own properties, even the criticisms suggest that the intended work was being accomplished and aid reached the poor (USAID 1983; Lavelle 2010).

It is difficult to discern the difference between contemporary “Community Demand Driven” development of today (CDD) and “Community Based Development” (CBD) by which scholars of Targeting studies define the Community Councils of the 1960s and 1970s. The modern CDD and its accompanying Community Based Targeting purports to use a formal process that includes community involvement at every stage of the development process including, at its fullest extent,

control over funds. But with regard to targeting the most vulnerable the issue of control over food or funds is usually moot. Community Councils today are indistinguishable from those of the 1960s and 70s. Just as today councils members were selected from representatives of different sectors of the community (government, religious, NGO, business...). The process also included democratic election of officers. Descriptions of the objectives and claims from contemporary proponents of CBT could just as well come from their counterparts in 1960s and 1970s such as, "CADEPs have become the representative organizations of civil society in local municipalities" (Annex 25).

Although heralded as greatly successful during the 1960s and early 1970s, by the 1980s most consultants, academics, evaluators, and even NGO workers viewed the Community Councils as detrimentally linked to rural and urban elites; as extractive, exploitative, and out of synchrony with the rural population. Maguire (1979: 28) wrote that, "The gravest problem with the community councils is that their leadership... tends to come from the local *gros neg*." Honorat wrote that they "became 'citified'" and "too often developed enduring and sympathetic ties to individual locales," and that they tended to become, "clusters of people waiting to receive and control some development project benefit" (cited in McClure 1984: 5; see also Smucker 1982, 1984).^{xxix}

The change in attitude toward rural community councils coincided with political changes, specifically with the passing of the populist Francois Duvalier regime, a shift that occurred between 1971-- the date of the dictator's death--and 1981, the date when Jean Claude Duvalier administration fully assumed control of the government (and the interim government officials and the widow of the Francois Duvalier went into exile). In 1981, USAID redirected aid from the government and began delivering foreign aid directly to NGOs (Lawless 1986). The Jean Claude Duvalier Government followed with a decree that gave the National government more control over Community Councils—the primary aid Targeting Mechanism that the NGOs were still using to deliver aid (Smucker, 1986, p. 104). NGOs turned to *gwoupman*. The *gwoupman* strategy seemed specifically designed to bypass the Community Councils: it was not hierarchical, did not include elites of government officials, and was highly participatory and effective at mobilizing the poorest people in rural areas. Its strengths were that it mimicked the informal friend and neighbor based supra-households structures that Haitian farmers are familiar with, specifically, reciprocal labor groups (*eskwad*), rotating savings groups (*sol* or *sang*), and religious musical groups (*voudouesque societé*).


A nationwide struggle emerged between the Community Councils and *Gwoupman*. The *gwoupman* became a veritable revolutionary movement. They were instrumental in the fall of the urban oriented Jean Claude Duvalier regime, after which most Community Councils ceased to exist (Lundahl 2013:122). It was at that point that *Gwoupman* experienced what Smucker and White (1998) call an 'exuberant explosion' in numbers. The political dimensions and the continued focus on international aid and development are impossible to ignore. On at least one occasion, that of Jean Rabel, 1987, open warfare broke out between *gwoupman* and those who were leaders of the *Counseil Communitaires*. The *Gwoupman* were a major force in subsequently bringing the Aristide administration to power (Lundhal 2013: 122). With the 1991-1994 military junta came a backlash, when, as White and Smucker (1998) recount, "their leaders went into hiding or to their graves." The *gwoupman* movement then, like the Community Councils, disappeared

When the international community helped return Aristide in 1994, aid donors and implementing partners once again changed strategies. *Gwoupman* became a term confined to rural political parties. Donor money earmarked for development now went to International NGOs. The NGOs in turn depended more on organizing, training, and supporting their own networks of “barefoot” community health, veterinary, and agricultural extension agents who interfaced either directly with farmers or the corporate-like Associations we still see today, those that descended from the cooperatives, that had been the aid recipients of Community Councils, and that had evolved and still function primarily as a mechanism for organizing local teams of Cash-for-Work and Food-for-Work beneficiaries.

In 2004, following 2 years of an aid embargo and the subsequent fall of the second Aristide Administration there came yet another change in Targeting strategies, a shift to increased inclusion of para-statal institutions that function almost exactly as NGOs and a return to the Community Councils. The new terms that came with the change was “Community Based Targeting.” The World Bank launched the \$61million dollar PRODEP (Project for Participatory Community Development) and implemented in Haiti its new version of Community development, Community Driven Development, at the center of which were the Community Based Targeting and the new Community Councils. NGOs such as Oxfam, and International Organizations such as WFP, and new parastatal organizations (and para-NGOs), such as FAES, also made Community Based Targeting-- with the formation of hierarchical committee, elected officers--the standard.

What exists today is a mixture of strategies. The *avant garde* NGOs and International organizations use CBT; health organizations and some NGOs still using the traditional networking (barefoot animators); networks of Red Cross Volunteers, Scouts, and the para-statal Civil Protection use network targeting and surveys (so they claim)--all are, in theory, volunteers, however, many make more in per diems when they ‘volunteer’ (400 to 500 *goud* or USD \$8 to \$10) than the average vulnerable beneficiary earns in a week of agricultural labor.

Figure 53: Evolution of Community Based Targeting 1960s to Present



Effectiveness of Past Targeting Strategies in Haiti

In looking back at the effectiveness of the varying targeting strategies since the 1980s the one consistency is the content of the critiques. Smucker concluded about the Community Councils and the associations that worked with them (also at the time called ‘*konsey*’) that,

They became project oriented and widespread perception was that they became dependent on the Food and tried to capture it... Also much complaining, even then, about the implications of foreign surplus. (White and Smucker, 1986, p. 109).

What Smucker found in the 1980s was applicable in the 1990s, when Kaufman conclude that, *gwoupman*, community associations, women's clubs and other community groups “frequently are formed in response to community development programs and remain, to a significant extent, ‘groups of symbolic participation’” (Kaufman, 1996, p. 10).

Jennie Smith summed up what most aid workers feel today when she wrote in 2001 that what she called “community action groups” –i.e. associations-- can mobilize people, but are “...plagued with corruption, mismanagement and other problems.”

In explaining the effectiveness of the bottom-up community based organizations, we need only draw on what White and Smucker said 16 years ago, something that could have just as well been written today:

Nepotism and unmitigated loyalty to extended family and individual factions have a long history in Haiti -most notably in their effect of undermining the effectiveness of formal institutions and democratic initiatives.

page 4

In White and Smucker’s comprehensive review of the topic, explanations for the failure of CBOs as effective Targeting mechanisms can be seen the same factors that make the household itself the primary social security net,

...the traditional peasant practice [is one] of maintaining a low profile, avoiding the apparatus of state, and establishing furtive agricultural units on the margins of society. In the absence of community structures, the basic building blocks of rural social life are the peasant household unit, extended family ties, and the *lakou* - the house-and-yard complex...

page 2 ^{xxx}

In summary, White and Smucker described 16 years ago precisely the situation we see today. Haitian rural subsistence strategies and associated value systems are anathema to those upon which Community Targeting and Community Based/Driven Development depends, but with one caveat: Community Councils seem to fit the description of what should be the most effective and natural form of Community Development and Targeting in rural Haiti. They reflect the traditional vertically stratified patron-client social structure that prevails in throughout the country and has since before independence, and they tap the few extra-households organizations that exist and are capable of being tapped for targeting and distribution of humanitarian—i.e. Church, *asosyasyon*, and political party. But the Community Councils working in the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s were written off in the late 1970s and early 1980s for having evolved into schemes to siphon off aid money. A concurrent trend, and possibly part of the reason for the change, was the massive exodus of the higher echelons of the rural classes. Understanding this exodus and the impact on the rural social structure should be considered a critical part of deciding how to target the most vulnerable in rural areas today.


The Difference Today: Migration

These kinds of organizations, although often run in a very top-down manner, are still more likely to represent their beneficiaries, and to empower at least some of them, than are exogenous organizations at a higher administrative level. Morton 1997

In the 1960s and 1970s the typical *gran neg* or *gran danm* was an individual belonging to a large family that, a) had more and better land than most people in the region, b) a better education, c) urban connections, but, d) was heavily invested in land, agricultural production, livestock rearing and, perhaps more than anything else, the aggregation and processing of local produce destined for export, typically coffee, cacao, rum, sisal, aloe, goat skins, and castor oil. As seen in White and Smucker's comments in the previous section, they also made, like most of their constituents in rural Haiti, e) heavy investments in social capital. All had extensive networks of *kliyan*, people who were dependent on them for credit, as purchasers of their produce, and for sharecropping arrangements that brokered access to land and animals. All had many godchildren, and while some were pious Catholics, it was not uncommon for the wealthier men among them to have 20 or more recognized offspring. These economic *patwon/kliyan* relations, and fictive kinship relations, were expanded exponentially through the similar relations of their own siblings. It would have been rare during the 1960s to find an individual in rural Haiti who could not trace some kinship relationship to a local leader. Today these leaders are typically remembered as honest notables who would judge local disputes, whose decisions were respected, who were above reproach and who not only dominated the Community Councils, but whose presence and consent was indispensable in the acceptance of any community decision.


The extent of the romanticism of the *notab* of yesteryear recorded during the course of fieldwork is in stark contrast with those of today. Today the wealthiest people in any given rural area are typically described as *volé* (thief), showy (*gen byen/pran poz*), not invested in the local economy and not interested in community wellbeing or development. Although some of this discrepancy in *notab* of the past vs those of the present may indeed be written off to romanticism, the shift fits with the changing criticisms of the effectiveness of the Community Councils described earlier, i.e. that they are not invested in the local economy but rather siphoning off aid and money meant for community services and investment in infrastructure. The criticisms also coincide with changing national political and demographic trends. Indeed, if we look at these changes in the political, economic and demographic factors we should expect a disconnection between the wealthiest members of the community and the vulnerable masses: if for no other reason than, beginning in the 1970s, almost all of the members of the traditional rural elite have left.

Figure 54



With the political turmoil seen earlier, the collapse of the formal economy and exports, the economic and social rural leaders increasingly invested, not in the local economy, but in getting themselves and their children out of the region (see Figures 51-52). The extent of the exodus and the shift in the economic leadership base from local economy to charity cannot be gainsaid. The Far-West, where the consultant did research during the 1990s, is an example. Taking eight community leaders living in the region in 1990, they had 44 children over the age of 18 years: not a single one had remained in the area. 19 were living in Port-au-Prince; 25 were in the US and Canada (see Schwartz 1991).


Figure 55



The shift also had an economic dimension. Investment in out-migration created an economic vacuum. As elsewhere in Haiti, enterprises that thrived in the Far-West up through the 1980s collapsed in the 1990s. By 1996 rum, sisal, coffee, goat skins, aloe, and castor oil were no longer aggregated in significant quantities to justify exportation. Into the void came missionaries, orphanages, schools, churches and NGOs, all of which had--and still have--their economic base in donations from overseas. During the 1990s--and largely true today--all clinics, hospitals, road construction, irrigation, soil conservation, and schools—even the public Liceys (high schools)—were heavily dependent on missionaries, UN agencies, and overseas based NGOs. This is true whether or not they were in name owned, constructed or maintained by the Haitian State. Consequently, for the majority of the rural population far and away the single most lucrative entrepreneurial opportunity became gaining access to those entities responsible for vectoring overseas aid. Whether for selfish or altruistic motivations, be it preacher, priest, orphanage owner, clinic owner, association director or those few non-charity endeavors such as merchant, ship owner, land owner, or politician, the major stakeholders earning money in rural Haiti and who were determined to keep a stake there moved his or her family to Port-au-Prince, Florida, New York, Boston, or Montreal while keeping an economic base in rural Haitian industry of charity. What they did with the money they earned—and many embezzled—is just as important. Although they may have derived *profits* from their participation in regional overseas-funded charity and development enterprise, they overwhelmingly made their own personal investments in the safer, more stable, insurable and profitable external economies. They opened bank accounts in Miami and Canada, bought homes and businesses there, and sent their children to school there. Moreover, while most observers prefer to ignore the topic, the situation was aggravated by the concurrent and very real emergence of illicit drug trafficking as the industry of choice for what has become provincial Haiti's most powerful elite, even more powerful than the new custodians of charity. What all this has meant for prospects of Community Based Targeting is that a sense of community responsibility and community censure has been sapped, leaving little reason to expect anything different than the fraud, corruption, and nepotism that evaluators, scholars and NGO workers seen in the previous section began describing in the 1980s—the same time period for which out-migration became the major demographic trend. But perhaps more importantly than anything else, among the poor who are left behind, what remained of particular survival strategies they depend

on for the past 200 years allegiance to household and family and values, loyalties that are anathema to the impartial participation in targeting and aid distribution that the State, NGOs and International organizations purport as idealize.

Figure 56



Summary of Beneficiary Detection Strategy in Haiti: Eight Questions

It was seen in the section in the discussion of Geographical Targeting in Haiti, while much has been made of regional differences, more spectacular are the similarities. Rural areas throughout the country share highly similar rates of malnutrition, as well as highly similar rates of consumption and most other indicators of food security. Most differences in indicators are small enough that they may result from sampling error or seasonal or temporary regional climactic differences. The rural population in Haiti is generally poor as a group. The extremely poor make up 67% of the rural population (people living on less than \$1.25 per day); those living on less than US\$2 per day make up 88% percent of the rural population. What these World Bank poverty thresholds mean is often the difference between a person living on USD \$1.24 per day versus on living \$1.26 per day. Moreover, the rural Gini coefficients that hover around 36 are almost certainly attributable to differences between provincial rural areas versus village. The extremity of the poverty and the fact that such a massive bulk of the rural population is included brings up the first of a series of questions that, in view of the previous discussions and analyses, may help to clarify what form of Targeting should be pursued in rural Haiti.

Question 1: *If so many people are so close to margin, how is it that with all the crises most are able to survive recurrent disasters and shocks?* As seen in the Section on Beneficiary Units (p. 29), for 200 years it has been the household—and not international aid agencies—that has functioned as the first social security net for men, women and children in rural Haiti. Families were able to maintain themselves so close to the margin of survival for so long because of dependency on productive strategies organized around the household. These strategies involve the multiplicity of risk averting-endeavors described, specifically agriculture, livestock rearing, fishing, charcoal and craft production, all interlinked through dependency on the regional rotating market system. In this way it was argued in Section on Beneficiary Units that when we speak of social security and safety nets it might behoove us to redefine the household not so much as a unit of consumption, but as a unit of production. When the household ceases to produce, or begins to go into deficit, its members draw on a second tier of social security, the social capital discussed earlier, such as kinship, reciprocal exchange with other households, and *patwon-kliyan* relationships. This brings up the next question. ^{xxxi}

u

Question 2: *What happens, in the absence of aid agencies, when social capital is exhausted and the household can no longer continue as a productive enterprise?* As seen in Section on Beneficiary Units, households are not discrete entities. They are made of individuals. These individuals have their own specific linkages that assure survival. In addition to uncles aunts, grandparents, and older siblings and half siblings, each rural Haitian child has two godparents. Adults too have their linkages. They have extensive biological family; both adults have their own godparents as well as co-parent relations linked through their own children and godchildren; a woman may have links with more than one father of her children; a minority of men have more than one wife. All these linkages provide potential options in the event that a household must break up. Social safety net for individuals, rather than households, come into play. When a household faces an internal crisis that it cannot overcome, it breaks up. Members rely on their personal safety nets. They go to live in other households, with other family; they migrate, or reconstitute themselves elsewhere. Children, the greatest concern for most socially conscience aid workers, are readily incorporated into other productive households as highly prized contributors to the labor pool, so much so that true orphans are almost impossible to find in Haiti such that “orphans”--

that thrive on donations for “orphans” --are typically stocked with children who have parents, and in many cases middle class urban parents (see Schwartz 2012). Thus, the next question that should be asked is,

Question 3: *If as a natural course of events, households cease to exist when they are no longer productive, should aid agencies intercede, detect those closest to the point of dissolution and provide subsidies to help maintain them, in effect, maintaining entities that are no longer viable and whose members would otherwise seek membership in productive households elsewhere?*

Only donor agencies and the government of Haiti can answer that question. But the question brings up the prospect that by trying to create a safety net for poor and vulnerable households we may be eliminating the incentive for the safety nets that already exist—productive households and strong kinship linkages--and thereby laying the foundation for catastrophe, i.e. by encouraging the proliferation of non-viable households that will face severe crisis in the event that donors cannot sustain an external safety net. The point suggests yet another question critical to understanding the impact of targeting the most vulnerable,

Question 4: *How stable is the group of households that comprise the most vulnerable? Is it the same people who we see at the bottom in 2007 that we see in 2008? To what extent has the composition of the poorest change from year to year?* If any study has addressed the Question 4 we did not find it in the course of the research. But it begs another question:

Question 5: *What proportion of the most vulnerable households are vulnerable because the head is promiscuous, alcoholic, or simply a bad parent, or someone who others in the community otherwise see as a burden and undeserving of aid?* It might be politically incorrect to acknowledge it, but we can assume that a portion of rural Haitian society has, like societies everywhere, at least some individuals who are lazy, wanton, violent, prone to steal from their neighbors, or otherwise burdensome to those around them and that at least some, if not many of those people can consistently be found among the lowest rungs of the society--if not as a consequence of ostracism, then as consequence of their own dysfunctional behavior. This brings up yet another—perhaps politically incorrect but important-- question,

Question 6: *Does the community see those people as deserving of aid?* We have some insight from the North West Survey: 63% of respondents said that there was a distinction between those who need aid and those who deserve it (Chart 54); and 40% said that there were people in need who do not deserve aid (Chart 54.1). Among the reasons given by those who thought some people do not deserve aid, 57% cited laziness, 39% cited not caring for family, 37% cited having multiple spouses, 34% drinking alcohol, 24% dishonesty, 15% sexual promiscuity and 37% included other reasons (Chart 55). In addressing the political correctness of even asking the question it might behoove us to ask ourselves if we would want subsidies given to the undesirables in our own neighborhoods; regardless of the response the issue touches on community buy-in and the appropriateness of who gets to target and how the selections get made.

Figure 57:
Respondents who think that
people who need aid and people
who deserve it are not same thing
(NW Survey: N =134)




Figure 58:
Respondents who think that there
are some people who are in need
but who do not deserve aid
(NW Survey: N =134)





Figure 59: For those who responded yes, reason people do
not deserve aid (NW Survey: N =134)



Question 7: In view of weak criteria seen in Section on Beneficiary Criteria (p. 33) and the fact that a large minority of people in rural Haiti may think that some people do not deserve aid, ***what is the impact of mis-targeting? Put another way, if 50% of the rural population is among the rural extremely poor, but we can only reach 8%, what is the impact on relations among people in the community when the aid only goes to a minority of them?*** When an aid agency arrives and gives \$50 per month to a household with three members who are among the 67% of all rural households who live on less than \$1 per person per day, the agency has just launched them into the higher strata of income earning households. Anecdotally we know that jealousy, conflict and resentment are common reactions from the neighbors. Households often diffuse the neighbors' envy by sharing, i.e. investing their windfall in social capital. Those who do not are treading on perilous territory. But we can also assume that when beneficiaries fall in the category that many people see of as undeserving of aid it engenders resentment and robs the program of respect and community 'buy-in.' All of which brings us to a final question,

Question 8: ***Why can't we just ask people in the communities to identify the most vulnerable households among them?*** The irony of the search for the ideal targeting mechanism is that we are trying to determine something that, if people in communities were forthcoming, they could tell us. And that is precisely the problem. What most aid workers know but it is politically incorrect to say is that the entire endeavor to find an effective targeting strategy is and long has been about keeping people from gaming the system. And in Haiti, whoever's fault it may ultimately be—donors, implementing partners or the State for ineffective monitoring, or the population for not self-regulating-- there has been a great deal of gaming going on, and for a very long time. This is precisely what renders strategies such as consumption scores invalid, because they are basically asking directly, 'are you one of the most vulnerable?' Rare is the rural Haitian farmer who would say "no." With this in mind, we propose a fourth means of targeting: Frequency Listing.^{xxxii}

4. Frequency Listing

The idea of Frequency Lists comes from the use of the Freelisting technique used in Cultural Consensus Analysis (Romney et. al. 1986; Borgatti 1992). The technique is designed to document categorical knowledge, usually among non-literate people whose folkways are little known outside their living group. For example, a researcher may wish to learn about the types of local foliage rural Haitian leaf doctors use to concoct herbal remedies. The researcher would ask a sample of leaf doctors to give the names of plants they use. The questions are typically asked of 20 to 30 respondents. Responses from the sample of respondents are then correlated. Those plants mentioned often, for example, by more than 5 respondents, are accepted as part of the semantic category of ‘plants Haitian leaf doctors use to make herbal remedies.’ Although the technique is simple in its conception and application, statistical analysis yields a depth of information. The more frequently a herb is mentioned the more commonly we can assume Leaf Doctors use it. A correlation in order of responses—mention first, second, fifth-- suggests the importance of that particular item, in this case a plant or leaf. Further analysis can be done with the results to uncover relationships between different herbs.

The Freelisting technique was modified to identify vulnerable households in what we here call Frequency Listing. The advantage of the strategy is that it taps local knowledge. As seen in the Section on Beneficiary Criteria (p. 16), Proxy Means Tests of different criteria yield low predictive value when measured against variables such as child malnutrition. Part of the reason for this is that a) differences in the wealth of the most impoverished rural Haitian households tend to be miniscule, b) inter-household dependency and sharing largely smooth over the differences, c) rural households invest heavily in urban homes, and more than anything else d) rural Haitians invest heavily in social capital. Neither outsiders nor survey questions easily measure social capital. But we can make the assumption that, not unlike the leaf doctor with his or her herbal remedies, the typically competent person can be thought of as a type of expert in judging the resources and social

capital of his or her family, friends, and neighbors. We expect from studies in Cultural Consensus Analysis that when a minimum of respondents identify the same individuals as vulnerable, those individuals are indeed the most vulnerable among their neighbors. Another advantage of what we are calling Frequency Listing is that it increases the credibility of the choice of the vulnerable. The community rather than outsiders have identified the most vulnerable household; to people in the community the technique resembles a lottery—something that during the course of the research beneficiaries recommended. The technique allows community members to censure the lists for people they see as undeserving. In summary, the Frequency Listing Technique offers the potential to

- bypass the problems of Top-Down selection by outsiders by tapping into community consensus for choice leaders
- avoid problems seen with inapplicable and weak criteria by tapping local perceptive and knowledge
- achieve community buy-in through use of community opinion on what most-vulnerable criteria should be or intuitively are, but with guidance from interviewers
- bypass the problem seen with *kazek* and *azek* choosing *moun pa yo* by seeking consensus below the *abitasyon* level among leaders regarding who is the most vulnerable
- avoids the problems of election because it is conducted rapidly by neutral outsiders and, in theory, it cannot be rigged.

Very importantly, there is currently inconsistent and sometimes antagonistic view of the State's role in humanitarian aid. If Frequency Listing is to achieve credibility and not undermine the role of State representatives (AZEK), they should be contacted, informed about the process, and their endorsement and physical assistance requested. For the process to reinforce the State it must be a State sanctioned undertaking clearly explained as a strategy to achieve a high degree of impartiality in the choice of beneficiaries and to detect those who may be recently vulnerable and to exclude past beneficiaries who are no longer among the most vulnerable. Some AZEK appreciate the strategy as a mechanism for removing suspicion that they are manipulating the Targeting process to the advantage of their own partisans. But ultimately, the extent to which Frequency Listing or any other Targeting Strategy reinforces (or does not undermine) State entities depends on the acceptance among the humanitarian aid sector of the State's role Targeting and the consistency in terms of rights and duties with which that acceptance is applied i.e. a definitive policy decreed at the level of parliament, the executive, or in the absence of the former at least a policy agreed upon among the most important donors, aid agencies and State ministries (see Conclusion).

Units of Analysis and Geographic Bounds

Units of Analysis were Households and the delimited geographical area was the Habitation. Habitations are the smallest constitutionally recognized territorial unit. They have less than 500 households per Habitation and averaging less than 5 km² in area. They are based on French Plantations that were split up after Independence was declared in 1804, but their borders have

never been officially delimited. It was not until 1994 that political representation at the Habitation level was effectively put into practice and even then, not all Communes applied the traditional concept and identification of *abityasyon* equally. Thus, in some areas of Haiti people readily recognize and agree on the limits of Habitations. In other areas the limits are less clear. ^{xxxiii}

Developing Frequency Testing Strategy

- The first tests of Frequency List Beneficiary Selection were conducted with respondents in Habitations outside of the communes of Kenskoff in the Department of the West and Lavalée in the Department of the South East. Five surveyors asked random samples of 60 respondents to name 10 household heads who lived in their *abityasyon* who they believed were the poorest and most vulnerable. The question was qualified with, “people who often go to bed without eating.”
- The responses yield few correlations. Knowing that the questions were related to potential food distributions, respondents named family members and even themselves.
- The strategy was then modified. Instead of asking for a list of 10 names of heads of the most vulnerable households, we asked for five *notab* who lived in the same “area” as the respondent, and who the respondent thought were the most honest and active in assisting neighbors, specifically,

Could you tell us a *notab*, woman or man, who lives in your township or neighborhood, who is honest, who most people respect, and who has done good deeds for the community. ^{xxxiv}

- All the lists of five *notab* gathered from each respondent were then analyzed for frequency. Those mentioned at least three times were considered as bona fide *notab*, contacted, and asked for a list of five beneficiaries who were “people who are hungriest in the township or neighborhood where you live.” ^{xxxv}
- The final lists of beneficiaries were correlated. Those mentioned as vulnerable by at least three were put on list of bona fide vulnerable.
- The technique was applied in the Commune of Maissade (area 288 km², pop ~ 60,000).
- A list of 38 *abityasyon* (Habitation) and 375 *localite* (Locality) was obtained from FAES.
- Thus, the most significant challenges anticipated in applying the strategy was getting a sample of *notab* representative at the *abityasyon* level. The challenge was made more difficult by the lack of a map for the location of *abityasyon*.
- Two strategies were tested:

- Kiosk Strategy. Surveyors coordinated with local authorities to identify two rendezvous points in the *abitasyon*.
- Geographical Strategy: To get a sample of first respondents that was as geographically representative as possible, points were marked on a map of Maissade. The points were marked at intervals of 250 meters. We then superimposed the points on a Google Satellite map, reviewed the map for clusters of houses, and then nudged the points over to those inhabited areas. The result was a guide that surveyors could use as they worked out with local guides the locations of the *abitasyon*.
- One advantage of the Frequency Listing technique is that whether using Kiosk or Geographic sampling, the strategy hinged on tapping into who people know—their social networks-- we anticipated that it would not be necessary to get perfect geographic representativeness or even a perfectly representative sample of people coming into Kiosks; so long as we got close to a well distributed sample the original respondents would smooth out the geographical gaps through their common referral to *notab*. Even if pockets of the commune were missed, so long as we had sufficient numbers of respondents in each *abitasyon*, it was expected that at least some respondents would identify the same significant *notab* in that *abitasyon*. This would allow for a rapid survey of the region, leaving out especially remote and difficult areas but capturing all significant *notab*.
- We expected the same logic to be applicable to that of the beneficiary lists. Because *notab* were expected to identify most vulnerable households based on their networks and not precise geographic proximity, they would smooth out imperfections in the sampling strategy.
- One other complication that should be mentioned is imperfect respondent knowledge of *abitasyon* and *localite*. Not all respondents understood the concept of *abitasyon* versus Locality. As seen, the Habitation is constitutionally decreed category, but its official use as a territorial designation is recent and there are not agreed upon limits of Habitation.

The questionnaire

In the first questionnaire for Respondents: Random respondents were asked their name, section, habitation and locality of residence and then asked for list of 5 *notab*

Hello. I work with CNSA. We are conducting a survey of *notab* who live in the area. The objective is to help people in need. You can help us by telling us 5 *notab* you know. It can be a man or a woman who is honest, who most people around here respect, and who respects others and who helps people or does community services.^{xxxvi}

The second questionnaire was for the *notab* mentioned most frequently (3 or more times). *Notab* were asked for a list of five potential beneficiaries, their name, section, habitation and locality of residence (the number of potential beneficiaries was increased during the survey to 10 *notab* because of the low absolute numbers of *notab*, see Annex 4)

Hello. I work with CNSA. We recently conducted a survey in the area. We asked people for the names of trustworthy *notab* and you were one of those who was mentioned by more than three respondents. Now we would like to ask you if you could give us 10 people you know in the *abistayon* where you live who are most in need. We would like the name of the household head. It can be a man or a woman. We are going to put all the lists we gather together to see who are most commonly mentioned as in the greatest need. If the list that you give us matches well with lists from other *notab* we will ask you to participate in other similar excercises as a recognized *notab*.^{xxxvii}

In both questionnaires we did not specify whether we were inquiring about people living in a specific *abitasyon* or *lokalite*. The logic of this was,

- a) They may not have anyone in their locality they depend on
- b) We were trying to capture what they see as the natural structure of leadership, and that may well follow some kind of geographical criteria-- such as high population density areas—but was not expected to be bound by the limits of *habitasyon* or *lokalite*
- c) Lack of a perfectly representative sampling strategy was expected to be compensated for by the mutual recognition of the best local leader, thus if the surveyors simply approximated a representative sample, respondents knowledge of competent leaders would compensate for difference.

The Field Survey

- On April 28, 20 surveyors riding on 10 motorcycles, carrying a 2 kw Yamaha generator, and equipped with questionnaires programmed into 22 Samsung Tablets went to Maissade.
- The survey took 13 days, three more days than originally planned.
- Fifteen surveyors (15) finished on the 9th.
- The five (5) supervisors remained in the field assisting with *Notab* contacts until the 13th of May.
- The surveyors were divided into teams of five: one supervisor and four surveyors. Each team was to survey one habitation per day, 12-13 interviews per surveyor, for a total 50 interviews per habitation. The four teams were to do 4 habitations (200 interviews) per day. The actual number of surveys accomplished varied from 150 to 250 per day.
- Surveyors slept in rented homes.
- Each evening all the surveys from that day were aggregated and the data upload to Formhub for review and analysis.

Figure 61: Map Maissade 1




Figure 62: Map Maissade 2





Figure 63: Map Maissade 3



The Office Survey

Three office workers downloaded the *notab* data, created Frequency Lists, selecting for contact all *notab* mentioned by more than three respondents.

The following day the lists were sent back to the supervisors so that they could find phone numbers for the selected *notab*.

Once the phone numbers were obtained, the telephone surveyors contacted the *notab* and interviewed them for Frequency Lists of most vulnerable household heads

Complications

As expected, Habitation were not perfectly understood. Approximately 20% of respondents did not identify their residence as within the confines of the expected Habitation. Based on the FAES list, 38 Habitations were expected: respondents identified 60 Habitations. After the surveys were completed, the interviews Google Earth to lump locality in the expected 38.

Respondents mutually identified fewer *notab* than targeted. We hoped to identify 1,800 *notab* mentioned by at least 3 respondents: we identified 508 *notab*. For 451 of those we were able to obtain telephone numbers and succeeded in contacting all of them. Note, the original 1,800 was excessive: had we found that many it would have meant that 1 in every 17 adults in Maissade qualified as a *notab*. At 451 the figure is a more reasonable 1 for every 55 adults. *Notab* were difficult to locate by telephone. To resolve the problem surveyors used local residents to locate *notab*. They were remunerated with 25 *goud* phone credit for each *notab* that called in. All 451 *notab* were located and interviewed.

Results

Table 13 gives the number of *notab* and beneficiaries in each category ‘frequency of mentions’

Table 6: Frequency of Frequencies of Mentions

Number of respondents mentioning <i>notab</i>	<i>Notab</i>		Beneficiaries	
	Frequency	Cumulative	Frequency	Cumulative
53 mentions	1	1	0	0
27 mentions	1	2	0	0
25 mentions	1	3	0	0
22 mentions	2	5	0	0
21 mentions	1	6	0	0
20 mentions	18	24	0	0
19 mentions	1	8	0	0
18 mentions	3	11	0	0
17 mentions	1	12	0	0
16 mentions	4	16	0	0
15 mentions	3	19	0	0
14 mentions	7	26	1	1
13 mentions	4	30	0	1
12 mentions	11	41	0	1
11 mentions	12	53	1	2
10 mentions	19	72	0	2
9 mentions	24	96	1	3
8 mentions	25	121	1	4
7 mentions	26	147	2	6
6 mentions	38	185	5	11
5 mentions	52	237	6	17
4 mentions	94	331	23	40
3 mentions	177	508	46	88

Comparison: Kiosk versus Random Sampling

A Random Sampling strategy was used in most of the 38 *abitasyon* from which responses were collected. This strategy involves enumerators approaching random citizens in an intelligent manner so as to build a representative sample of the local population. However, in eighteen of the forty-nine *abitasyon* (37%) a Kiosk strategy was used instead. This was done with intent so as to determine whether kiosks may be a more efficient strategy to gather respondents' information. The results of these eighteen Kiosk *abitasyon* are presented below in Table 14 where each turnout is compared to the average turnout of *abitasyon* in the same Section that used the Random Sample strategy.

At first, there seems to be positive effect when using the Kiosk strategy. The average turnout for the eighteen *abitasyon* using the Kiosk strategy is 54.1 respondents, which is 19.9 respondents greater than the thirty-one *abitasyon* using the Random Sample strategy. On average, across all *abitasyon*, it appears the Kiosk strategy increases the total number of responses by more than 58%. At the individual *abitasyon* level, seventeen of the eighteen *abitasyon* (94%) that used the Kiosk strategy outperformed the average turnout of the other *abitasyon* in the Section that used the Random Sample strategy.

Table 7: Respondent Turnout Using Kiosk

<i>Abitasyon</i>	Respondents		Kiosk Performance vs. Non-Kiosk Avg.	
	Kiosk <i>Abitasyon</i>	Section's Non-Kiosk Avg.	Absolute	Relative
Bas Hatty	86	35	51	146%
Batey	62	35	27	77%
Berbenal	52	35	17	49%
Biliguy	94	35	59	169%
Bwa Pini	3	35	-32	-91%
Cola Figi	36	35	1	3%
Hatty	68	35	33	94%
Kanyan	55	32	23	72%
Lagoun	69	35	34	97%
Lagwabit	51	333	18	55%
Letan	39	33	6	18%
Lospine	51	35	16	46%
Nan Citron	49	33	16	48%
Nan Fig	51	32	19	59%
Porte au Ciel	56	35	21	60%
Savane Grande	53	35	18	51%
Ti Kenep	48	35	13	37%
Tou le Jou	51	32	19	59%
Average	54.1	33.3	19.9	58.3%


An important learning point will be to understand the scalability of each strategy. The Random Sampling strategy is conducted with individual enumerators, so early on any additional enumerator placed in the field should have a linear effect on responses collected—e.g. twice as many enumerators begets twice as many responses. At some point however—e.g. 100 times as many enumerators—diminishing returns will take effect and each additional enumerator will be less effective. The same is true with Kiosks but it is likely their diminishing returns may be seen more quickly at the third or fourth kiosk versus the 99th or 100th enumerator. Whatever the case, further trial and research is required before a final analysis can be made. What is likely to be determined is neither strategy will be *the best strategy for all situations*. By identifying and understanding each strategy's strengths and weakness, decision makers will be able to choose a path that most efficiently meets their desired objective.

Correlation between variables/likelihood of reporting within same area

Analysis of the data shows an interesting relationship between the geographic similarities of respondents who recommended *notab*, and *notab* who recommended beneficiaries. These similarities are explained in depth below.


Figure 60 is a Venn diagram that shows the proportion of *notab* recommendations that match each respondent's geographic home at the Section-, *abitasyon*-, and/or Locality-level. In the data of respondents recommending *notab*, 36% of *notab* recommended do not share the same *localite*, *abitasyon*, or even Section as the respondent recommending them. This shows respondents were not limited to their geography when Frequency Listing names of those whom they would like to represent them. To the other end of the spectrum, fewer than one-in-ten *notab* (8%) recommended are from the same Section, *abitasyon*, and Locality as the respondent, which is represented in the center of the diagram where all three circles intersect. Interestingly, 1% of *notab* recommended share the same Section and Locality as the respondent but do not share the same *abitasyon*. This is not an error in the data; instead, it is because Sections are known to have multiple Localities with identical names but those localities are located within different *abitasyon*.

Figure 64: Respondent/Notab-Geographic Similarities



Similarly, Figure 61 is a Venn diagram that shows the proportion of beneficiary recommendations that match each *notab*'s geographic home at the Section--*abitasyon*-, and/or *localite*-level. In the data of *notab* recommending beneficiaries, 58% of beneficiaries recommended do not share the same Locality, *abitasyon*, or even Section as the *notab* recommending them. This suggests *notab* have a wide awareness of those in need and this tacit knowledge is not bounded by their home geography. To the other end of the spectrum, 13% of beneficiaries recommended are from the same Section, *abitasyon*, and Locality as the *notab* recommending them.

Figure 65: Notab/Beneficiary -Geographic Similarities



Frequency Listing Conclusions and Recommendation


The Frequency Listing technique appears to be effective. Sufficient *notab* were located, they were evenly distributed across the commune, we were able to contact the majority of them, and they were responsive. Moreover, random surveys do not appear necessary; the much simpler and less costly Kiosk method is not only effective, it appears more effective than surveyors fanning out across the Habitation and interviewing people by household.

The weak link was in the consensus among *notab* regarding beneficiaries. Using the strategy employed in this survey, we identified only 88 beneficiary household holds. That translates to approximately 2% of households. The technique could be significantly improved by choosing those *notab* who are more “expert” in choosing impoverished beneficiaries and asking them for longer list of beneficiaries. We calculate that by eliminating *notab* who give lists that do not correspond with those from other *notab* (who we can infer are non-experts or self-interested), and then asking for lists of 30 beneficiaries from the “experts”, we may reach the 10% mark of beneficiaries and at very little additional cost. In summary, we calculate that we could repeat the process conducted in Maisade for half the cost and 5 times the effectiveness, fully achieving a list of 10% of vulnerable potential beneficiary households.

5. The Rest of the Targeting Chain

In the preceding pages analysis focused on Beneficiary Detection Strategy, one of three sectors of the targeting aid chain. In this final section we develop a recommended Targeting Decision model. To effectively do so we consider the full chain discussed at the beginning of the report. Logistics and Feedback Strategies were excluded from the discussion to facilitate fuller understanding of the more controversial and, regarding the tasks in the this report, pertinent issues. Here they are re-inserted into the model.


Figure 66: HUMANITARIAN AID TARGETING CHAIN



Type of organization

Type of organization refers to what the organization specializes in, such as medical care, agricultural production, soil conservation, sanitation, health, or disaster relief. Some organizations might focus on several of these areas. And in defining humanitarian aid organizational type, the tendency among those who study them is to type by strategy: such as Charitable, Service, Participatory, or Empowering. But most organizations specialize in delivering specific services or goods. For example, finance, medical care, agriculture, sanitation, or conservation. Even if we consider the broadest categorization of aid organizations, Disaster Relief vs. Development--a dichotomization fast disappearing as many NGOs increasingly specialize in both--there is a clear tendency for the organizations to bundle the goods they deliver to those in need. For obvious reasons, when an organization defines itself as dedicated to a particular type of services or 'bundle of goods and services,' the field of beneficiaries it targets has been narrowed.

Figure 67:
Type of Organization



Type of Aid


Selection of specific type of aid refers to precisely to what is being distributed. For example, as seen in the Figure 59, above, an organization that works in education decides whether to give books to schools or supplemental tuition vouchers; a medical organization decides whether to distribute pharmaceuticals, combat disease through information campaigns, or reduce infant mortality through the widespread distribution of rehydration salts; a disaster relief organization decides between food versus cash transfers or to distribute aid through cash for work programs or matching grants. All these decisions narrow the range of who or what organization will be a candidate to receive aid. Taking the categorization of ‘type of aid’ a step farther, Lavallee et al (2010) define two broad categories of benefits:

- 1) those responding to the needs of the poor such as medical assistance, food, and school books
- 2) those promoting the use and availability of resources, such as investment in productive infrastructure--irrigation, roads, transport, agricultural and business extension services, information services, credit—or provision of back stopping mechanisms (e.g. regulatory laws and insurance)

To the preceding we can add a third category:

- 3) empowerment through organization and/or knowledge (Lavallee et. al., including the following in promotion of efficient use of resources, above), examples of organizations include (neighborhood watch groups, promotion of association; empowerment through knowledge include dissemination of information in preparation to dangers (earthquakes, hurricanes, epidemics, gender violence, drug use) or gender education and anti-violence programs, or even business skills, how to obtain passports and visas, or scholarships. Coady, Grosh et Hoddinott (2003)

Figure 68:
Type of Organization = Educational



It is important to note that although type of aid has to this point been presented as part of the Logistic Strategy and sequentially prior to decisions pertaining to Beneficiary Detection Strategy, this has been done primarily for purposes of discussing and presenting the targeting process. The type of aid given should respond to the specific beneficiary needs and the practical conditions of getting the aid to beneficiaries. It is not always possible to get beneficiaries what they most need. For example, a population may need food but logistically the food cannot be delivered because of poor roads or armed banditry, in which case cash transfer may be an alternative option.

Therefore in a processual analysis the decision on type of aid should be embedded in the selection process, i.e. according to the needs of beneficiaries and the practicality of successfully delivering a particular type of aid; and it should be determined through a formal and professional process. In this the case of s disaster it may simply be a rapid on the ground assessment or reports from stakeholders or victims. Unfortunately, what organizations give often has more to do with what they have, what was given to them, or a policy decision made in the country of origin or destination. For example, a common complaint heard from beneficiaries during the course of research was that food organizations—which often have stock piled emergency food rations-- too often intervene with food aid when it may be more effective to help with seeds and planting. More lamentable interventions come when after every crisis many good-hearted donors respond with used closed, toys, and canned food when what is more often needed is cash to purchase shelters, medical supplies and remove debris. Despite the realities of what often determines ‘type of aid’, the Targeting decision model discussed shortly is based on the assumption that the organizations can choose what aid they will deliver based on beneficiary needs.

Distribution Mechanism

Distribution mechanism refers to *how* the aid gets delivered to the beneficiary. As with Type of Organization and Type of Aid, above, it is not “selection” in the strictest sense. In practice, however, who really does benefit from the aid is probably more often determined by the selection of distribution mechanism than any other category. The major categories include two dimensions:

- 1.) Mode of Transfer: how the aid transferred to the beneficiary,
 - Direct transfers:
 - giveaway of food, money, vouchers, education and training
 - Indirect transfers
 - through schools of other institutions
 - subsidies to products, such as basic staples
 - investment in infrastructure, education, health care...
- 2) Conditioning: whether or not the aid is conditioned on some action on the part of the beneficiary. Organizations may increase the effectiveness of aid by making types of aid in the above category 1-- direct material benefits that recipients are eager to obtain—conditional on the acceptance of less demanded and even eschewed types of aid in Category 2 and Category 3 above. For example, receipt of nutritional aid—a direct transfer-- can be made conditional on participation in a maternal health program (another type of direct benefit but in this case targeting the child) or in a gender empowerment seminar (an indirect transfer or information); participation in microcredit (a direct transfer conditional on accepting to pay interest) can be made conditional on attending business seminars (an indirect empowerment benefit); participation in agricultural production assistance program that makes direct transfers in the form of cash and tools, can be made conditional on erection of erosion retention walls, the cultivation of specific seed crops and varieties of seed, as well as purchase of insurance.

A poor choice of distribution mechanism may mean intended beneficiaries get little to nothing at all. Individuals who may or may not be intended to be part of the process, sometimes end up with most the aid. This occurs in three ways:

- 1) Mechanisms such as cash transfers: If used on phone, some have no phone. Digicel, the largest mobile operator in Haiti had 65% of the market share in 2011, including 2.5 million of the poorest of the poor (Sivakumaran 2011 p 26). Similar when it comes through schools, the poorest children in Haiti are not in school.
- 2) The de facto greatest beneficiaries of most aid programs are often consultants and aid workers. Other beneficiaries include nationals hired as staff, accounts, drivers, and mechanics. In the case of food distributions they include those who rent warehouse space for storage, those who provide freight services, as well as dock workers and porters; in the case of voucher programs de facto beneficiaries include businesses that produce the coupons and vendors who exchange the coupons for food, tools, seeds or other goods. De facto humanitarian aid workers also include elites who rent apartments and houses to aid staff, the banks that transfer money, and phone companies that provide communication services. All are de facto beneficiaries of aid projects and often at figures far greater than the monetary value of what reaches the targeted beneficiaries. For example, in 1994 CARE found that from the time US food aid left US farmers it changed hands 10 times (p 26). Sivakimaran (2011 p 24) notes that in the case of one typical post-earthquake cash transfer program, total cost was US\$12 million; of which US\$7.2 million went to vendors.

- 3) A third way has to do with getting it to the wrong beneficiaries through corruption or faulty criteria and selection processes.

As seen in geographical selection, the need for infrastructure to store or cook food for canteens means that some areas--often those with the least capacity and by corollary in need--get nothing. Comments from a 1994 USAID Research Team working in Haiti neatly illustrate the point,

As stated above, children under five, pregnant and lactating women, the elderly, and the chronically ill, are the target groups for the Cantine program. These groups' special nutritional needs, it is conventionally thought, make them the most vulnerable population segments. In fact, the Cantine as a distribution mechanism tends to compromise the feeding of some of these target beneficiaries.

The timing of feeding was, the assessment team learned, a constraint in the many cases where mothers had other economic demands on her time. Food preparation, no less than the food itself, was found to be problematic for the digestion of infants and children at weaning ages and diarrhea was sometimes reported. Less serious was distaste on the part of beneficiaries with a given Cantine's particular mode of food preparation.

However, the most serious, and most commonly cited, constraints on #####'s ability to reach targeted groups stem from a single source: the largely unregulated numbers of people fed at virtually every Cantine. While the official numbers of beneficiaries for each Cantine vary between 250 and 300 individuals, most Cantines fed at least twice that number. This resulted in seriously decreased rations per individual and much disorder, with beneficiaries pushing and even fighting to receive an adequate ration. In this atmosphere of general melee, mothers were reluctant to send very young children to Cantines, even in the company of their older siblings, or mothers refused to send children at all. Likewise, the chronically ill and elderly had similar reservations about attending Cantine feedings.

Given the fact that Cantines are both public and free, it is at best difficult to enforce strictly the identity of the recipients. In light of this situation, many Cantines allowed individuals to take rations home for the entire family. Although that solves the problem of disorder, it does nothing to ensure proper targeting. (USAID 1994: 22)


Similar to the Type of Aid, discussed above, Aid Distribution Mechanism has been categorized in the chain as part of Logistics Strategy and localized as prior to the Beneficiary Detection Process. In the model presented shortly it should be and is embedded in the selection process, i.e. according to the needs of beneficiaries and the practicality of successfully delivering a particular type of aid.

Validation

After beneficiary lists have been made --whether based on survey, proxy means, or community committee--organizations should require the verification or validation of the lists. This can be accomplished through sample survey, review by other subcommittees, open community meetings, or publication. In the case of survey verification, we found that samples of 10% are standard; if 10% of those in the sample do not meet the intended criteria the list is rejected and the selection process redone. However, in many cases field workers admitted that verification does not or seldom occurs in practice. When it does occur it is often semi-formal and when a list is corrupted it is, according to most informants, quickly evident and the total 10% of sampling is not necessary to reject the list.

The use of second committees does not resolve the problem of accuracy. There remains the issue of applicability of criteria and the sincerity of those on the committee. Where corruption is widespread the second committee may serve only to further divide the spoils among the additional partisans of verification committee members. Validation may also be made by publishing the names of beneficiaries or announcing them over the radio or in open community meetings. During the research we gave this special consideration because of the potential for conflict and a violation of the privacy of beneficiaries. To clarify the issue we included an opportunistic but random survey from three communities outside of Port-au-Prince (Lafiteau n = 158, Simonette n = 50 and St. Gerard n = 50): 70% of respondents said that they would not object to having their names announced on the radio if they were chosen as vulnerable beneficiaries for a food distribution.

Figure 69: Respondents who agree with names being announced on radio if they are chosen as beneficiaries for humanitarian food aid
(n = 258)



Feedback Strategy

Monitoring

Monitoring is arguably not a part of the selection process but rather part of assuring that the process goes as planned. When there is effective monitoring, aid tends to reach recipients, even if not always those who *should* benefit (i.e. even if the targeting criteria is amiss). Poor, weak, or faulty monitoring or the absence of monitoring altogether may well be the most significant cause of failure in getting aid to the targeted beneficiaries. They lead to failure to detect and correct the operational problems identified above and the open the way to corruption. Specifically lack of monitoring,

- creates an environment of competitive corruption, infighting, and resentment among those whose who are supposed to oversee the targeting process
- when there is no accountability (i.e. as is the case in Haiti: no punitive actions, no follow up, and no adjudication or need to explain where the missing aid went) the environment is such that the individual who successfully steals or embezzles the most may become more powerful, more prestigious and richer than those who are honest
- honest workers are discouraged and distracted from performing their jobs and in many cases their honesty and integrity may be seen as a threat to those benefitting from corruption thereby creating the ironic situation where high moral standards may make the individual a pariah and put him or her in physical danger
- it destroys credibility of the program and community buy-in because at least a minority of beneficiaries are depended on to verify the credibility of the program, and in this way the general population may learn about, come to know and to understand the extent of the corruption far better than donors
- a flood of imported and low cost foods and goods embezzled from aid projects may crash local and national markets reducing the money that farmers and local craftspeople are able to obtain for their own products and in extreme cases driving them out of business.

The extent of the shortcomings regarding monitoring in Haiti should not be gainsaid. Most staff for humanitarian and government organizations are aware of this; most confidently attest to the effectiveness of their own monitoring systems; and those who have been in the country for more than a few years are also aware the extent to which most monitoring systems are not effective. In the course of the present and other research, the consultant has found that monitoring often does not occur at all.

Lack of or weak monitoring undermines the humanitarian aid sector at the institutional level as well. Some, if not many organizations may be better portrayed, not as knights in shining armor poised to save the needy, but crocodiles waiting in the river for herds of donors that, if they want to help the desperate people on the other side, have no other choice but to plunge into the water. This is not to point the figure at any particular sector of the aid community. The crocodiles can be found among all the sectors—State, NGO, International, and grassroots. Some do not even recognize themselves as predators but simply part of the natural order, bringing up the most distressing aspect of this entire Targeting topic: the industry of humanitarian has become such that we must carefully plan and target aid to avoid it being consumed by those it was not intended for, i.e. the crocodiles.

For Targeting to be effective, the institutions that distribute aid must also be effective. They must be, at least moderately, uncorrupted. Moreover, organizations and capacities are capable of changing rapidly. This is true for better and for worse. In some cases institutional capacity develops; in others credible institutions become corrupt. In this way it can be said that effective targeting depends on current knowledge, transparency, and ongoing evaluation of the organizations on the ground. Change for the better (i.e. less corruption) will only occur if there are mechanisms in place that make the implementers of targeting and the custodians of aid accountable and their performance known. What is needed where there is no strong central government coordinating the aid process, is an independent monitoring unit that can evaluate institutional performance and make recommendations regarding which institutions are credible and expose those that are not. The organization itself must be secure, well-funded, have robust evaluative unit adapted to working in rural areas, and it must be credible. In Haiti, no such institution currently exists.

The point cannot be gainsaid. All the analysis and all the good will in the world will not make aid effective in the absence of institutional mechanism that can hold those who pilfer or waste aid accountable. But currently there exists no evaluative mechanism or institution that can or does provide the information necessary to guarantee sincere performance of those tasked with targeting and delivery of aid. In the absence of such an institution, the State can still advocate for a central decision-making/recommending entity composed of representatives of significant organizations—State and International; specifically individuals with long experience dealing with humanitarian aid in Haiti; individuals who can draw their own collective experiences and knowledge to make informed decisions quickly. In this way the single greatest and most effective contribution that can be made may not a model for choosing a method of targeting beneficiaries, but one that evaluates the performance of the institutions doing the targeting. Such an institution would ensure that whatever targeting system is selected minimizes corruption, maximizes involvement of local institutions, and has built in learning.

Feedback & Complaints

Feedback comes in two general categories,

- 1) Complaint mechanisms such as suggestion box or ‘hotline,’ and
- 2) Evaluations

All major NGOs visited during the course of the research reported having a suggestion box or hotline. Their effectiveness is questionable. In the opinion surveys completed during the course of the research, only 11% were aware that there was such a mechanism (p 68). Evaluations are routine and usually required by donors. While this is not the place for a lengthy critique of project evaluations, there are consistent problems that all consultants and most NGO staff are aware, that CNSA and the Haitian Government should scrutinize, as they are in position to address these issues,

- evaluators are usually hired by the NGO overseeing the aid delivery
- the organization in question usually censors the results and sometimes deliberately demands that the consultant reformulate critiques to reflect favorably on the organization
- critical reports are sometimes repressed and seldom circulated
- few if any mechanisms are in place to ensure feedback gets incorporated into future projects

6. The Model

The model that follows is a decision-making diagram based on the analysis in the preceding pages. The sequential order of Targeting Stages is not the same as that presented in the preceding pages. The reason is two-fold. First, the theoretical and practical reality of delivering assistance are not the same. As seen, the Type of Organization often determines the Type of Aid delivered. In an institutionally ideal situation the State would, with respect to humanitarian aid, call on specific organizations according to what the organizations specialize in and an evaluation of beneficiary needs. In Haiti, however, the prevailing reality is too often different. In the case of the 2010 earthquake, for example, aid organizations arrived in the wake of disaster; many, if not most, had little knowledge of the situation or the local culture but they came with their own repertoire of material aid and services that may, as seen earlier, have had more to do with what was donated to them than beneficiary needs. Once again, it would be more expedient to decide what type of aid is needed only after having determined exactly where the aid is needed, who needs it, and why. Similarly, the choice of distribution mechanism is most expediently discussed in context of Logistic Strategies. However, how to distribute aid should be determined after the Type of Aid, Target Area, Beneficiary and Beneficiary Units have been determined.

In the model there are also obvious choices of what decisions condition subsequent decisions, not all are dependent on beneficiary needs. There are decisions that organizations make that are political or based on capacity. For example, donors may condition medical care on recipient compliance with learning or even, to use a common example, using reproductive health services. Participation in agricultural programs may be made conditional on learning administrative skills or participation in an adult literacy program. The model allots for such opportunities or decisions but we cannot recommend whether the decision to condition aid be made or not. For example, the promotion of contraceptives depends on the political, religious and moral criteria and requirement of the institution and/or the donor.


Another point that must be understood is that assistance during times of disaster and assistance during non-disaster are not equivalent. In the case of disaster there generally is not enough time to carefully build committees or plan distributions, recruit employees, and put logistic structures in place. Indeed, there may not even be time to decide who should get aid (criteria). In the case of disaster, Selection Strategies such as Community Based Targeting are only an option if the Committees have already been developed. Nevertheless, the decision making process in disaster versus non disaster situations are similar. The tasks that must be accomplished, whether disaster or non-disaster assistance, listed below.

- 1) Geographic Criteria: What are limits of the area in need or stricken?
- 2) Criteria: Specifically who is in need or was stricken? For example, all of the population, part of the population and, if the latter, what part of the population?
- 3) Type of Aid: What type of aid is needed? For example, medical assistance, food aid, shelters, water, or sanitation.

- 4) Beneficiary Units: What organizational structures are best suited to receive the aid? For example, at the intermediate level are their emergency aid networks in place, such as Civil Defense, Red Cross, or local grass root networks, NGOs, State organizations. Which are suited to distribute aid.
- 5) Distribution Mechanism: How Aid will be delivered.
- 6) Selection of beneficiaries: who does the selection and how they beneficiaries are selected.
- 7) Verification: a mechanism for checking to determine if the selection of beneficiaries is appropriate (i.e. those selected qualify as aid recipients according to the determined criteria)
- 8) Monitoring: the heart of the entire process, assuring that Targeting made effective and providing a mechanism for learning and perfecting the process
- 9) Feedback: mechanisms for determining if the targeting process been effective, who was included and should not have been, who was excluded and should not have been, estimates of losses from corruption, identification of patterns of waste and corruption, and suggestions for improvements.

Figure 70

HUMANITARIAN AID TARGETING FLOW



The Decision Model

As seen at the beginning of this report the core of Beneficiary Detection Strategy is Beneficiary Selection. It was divided into,

Phase 1: selecting who will choose the beneficiaries

- Community Based Targeting: managed use of community organization or individuals to determine if an individual meets beneficiary criteria.
- Extension Targeting (ET): The use of health agents, social workers, or other auxiliaries working for NGO, government, or international organizations, and community based organization
- Survey Targeting: trained quantitative or qualitative survey team that gathers data on individuals, households, or some other group to determine who qualifies as a beneficiary.

Phase 2: selecting what mechanism is used to choose beneficiaries,

- Self-Selection- individuals come to the program based on their own need
- Admin-List Selection (ALS)- data from surveys, tax rolls, lists of land ownership, fish catches, hunting quotas or any other compendium or data base available from a formal institution that provides information on consumption, assets, or receivables.
- Network Selection-- beneficiaries are detected through individual or professional networks.
- Frequency-Listing Selection: elicitation of lists from a sample of respondents combines sampling with local knowledge

It should be taken as a given that Targeting must balance the capacity to identify and reach the most vulnerable with the role that the chosen strategy plays in reinforcing (or undermining) State institutions (see conclusion, below). With this in mind, and drawing on discussions elsewhere in the report, choice of an effect mechanism for deciding how beneficiaries will be chosen should be evaluated on the criteria of,

- Bottom up: degree to which it is rooted in the community
- Resistant to corruption: degree to which it resists being corrupted
- Reinforces state structure: degree to which it reinforces existing state entities
- Effective after disaster: degree to which it is useful after a disaster
- Effective during non-disaster: degree to which it is useful during normal times

Choice of an effective strategy for how beneficiaries are selected should be evaluated on the criteria of,

- Community buy-in/acceptance: degree to which members of the community accept the beneficiary selection as appropriate
- Validity: degree to which the selection of beneficiaries corresponds with beneficiary criteria
- Sensitivity to changes: degree to which the selection strategy can detect or be adapted to detect changes in beneficiary status

- Capacity to Detect social capital: degree to which the selection strategy measure an individual or households social capital
- Resistance to corruption: degree to which the strategy cannot be corrupted
- Effective after disaster: degree to the strategy is useful in detecting beneficiaries after a disaster
- Effective during non-disaster: degree to the strategy is useful in detecting beneficiaries during normal times
- Cost Effective: the expenses in both time and money needed to employ the strategy

In Table 15 and 16 below provide an evaluation of the strengths of two phases of Beneficiary Selection based on the preceding criteria.

Table 15: Strengths Beneficiary Selection Phase 1: Who Selects Beneficiaries					
Potentialities	Community Based Targeting	Extension Targeting		Survey Targeting	
		No State	State	No State	State
Bottom up	*****	*****	*****	*****	***
Resistant to corruption	*****	**	**	*****	***
Reinforces state structure	*****	*	*****	*	*****
Effective after disaster	**	*****	*****	***	**
Effective during non-disaster	*****	*****	*****	*****	*****

Table 16: Strengths Beneficiary Selection Phase 2: How Beneficiaries Are Selected					
Potentials	Self-selection	Admin-List Selection		Network Selection	Frequency list selection
		Surveys	Org. lists		
Community buy-in/acceptance	*****	***	*****	*****	*****
Validity	*****	***	*****	***	*****
Sensitivity to changes	*****	***	*****	*****	*****
Capacity to Detect social capital	*****	**	***	*****	*****
Resistant to corruption	*****	*****	***	**	*****
Effective after disaster	****	*	*	*****	****
Effective during non-disaster	*****	*****	*****	*****	*****
Cost Effective	*****	**	*****	*****	*****

7. Conclusion

The analysis seen earlier in this report and a detailed description of the decision making processes seen above may be useful in helping us understand Targeting, but there is no magic formula or diagram that can make a targeting system work from the safety of the board room. At several points in the preceding pages there is a recognition, if not an apology, for the political sensitivity of issues broached. But the fact is that targeting in Haiti is embedded in the context of a State that is still reeling from 29 years of dictatorship followed by another 28 years of almost uninterrupted political turmoil and instability. If the Haitian State had strong institutions this report would not have been commissioned. There would be no need for a discussion of targeting; most of the issues explored in this document would be, for better or worse, resolved by government decrees and regulations or handled by State agencies that specialized in humanitarian services and were firmly rooted in the communities they serve. Instead the Haitian State manages the humanitarian sector in collaboration with groups of international agencies, NGOs and representatives of foreign governments. Indeed, an honest assessment would recognize that it is arguably the State that is managed by the international agencies.

To clarify: In 1981 foreign funded humanitarian aid from the US was re-routed from the Haitian government to NGOs. In the ensuing five years most other donor governments did the same. In 1986 the State collapsed. The period 1986 to 1991 was marked by six interim governments couched in coups, popular uprisings, political turmoil, and major constitutional restructuring of the State. In 1991 the State was deliberately crippled by an international embargo. In 1994, the country was occupied by UN forces and the Haitian Army—for better or worse a major structural support of the State since its founding in 1804--was disbanded. In 2002 the international community imposed a two-year aid embargo targeted at bringing the State into conformity with international demands. From 2004-2006 the UN once again occupied the country—an occupation that facilitated the formation of an unelected interim government. In 2010 the State was once again crippled, this time by an earthquake, the destruction that followed, and an incursion of international humanitarian organizations unprecedented in the history of Haiti. In the reconstruction effort that ensued, orchestration of the aid was entrusted, not to the State, but to a committee that consisted largely of representative from international organizations and in which the Haitian prime minister was not chair, but co-chair.

What is occurring at the moment is an attempt to assist the Haitian State in building capacity. It is something that arguably began in 1994, but that has emphatically not yet occurred. There remains strong suspicions among foreigner stakeholders regarding the capacity of State institutions to manage aid and the extent to which corruption undermines the strengthening State agencies. The State can rightfully point its finger back at the international community regarding waste and mismanagement. But the bottom line is that most humanitarian funds come from foreign sources and when the directors and staff of those organizations have been not satisfied with the way the programs are managed they have withdrawn or redirected those funds, something that continues to the present. The reality of control over the humanitarian aid purse strings makes it difficult to provide recommendations on the role that the State should play in targeting. Moreover, the exercise of Targeting focuses on the provision of services, programs that encourage economic development, and guarantees of social security. It is precisely these undertakings—assistance and services to the citizenry--that reinforces the State and gives it credibility and support among the people. The inverse of the State being shored up through its role as protector and nurturer of the population and

economy is that Targeting, governance, and provision of services and social security that does not involve the State works against the integrity of State institutions. Targeting in which local AZEK, KAZEK, Mayors, Departmental and National government entities are excluded undermines their credibility and creates competing power brokers. Indeed, with little to no other services and aid, Targeting that does not involve State entities runs the risk of rendering them inert or, worse, pushing the State into a role of opponent or antagonist of aid and services intended for the good of the population.^{xxxviii}

9. ANNEXES

Annex 1: Online NGO Survey

1.0 Data Description

To solicit responses for the NGO Survey an online survey was launched and made available to respondents for three weeks (Friday, April 25th thru Monday, May 19th). Emails were sent to a distribution list of approximately 2,000 individuals. Approximately one-quarter of the emails were invalid. In a final attempt to increase participation, a follow-up email was sent to all respondents one week before the close of the survey. In three weeks, only twenty-four responses were collected from the approximately 1,500 valid email addresses. The Appendix contains a table of organizations that participated.

1.1 Country of Origin

The twenty-four respondents to the NGO Online Survey were representative of twenty-four unique organizations from ten different countries. As shown in Table 1, the most represented country was the USA with nine of the twenty-four organizations headquartered there.

Table 1: Responses by Country		
Country	Freq	Percent
Canada	1	4%
Chile	1	4%
France	4	17%
Haiti	4	17%
Italy	1	4%
Luxembourg	1	4%
Netherlands	1	4%
Switzerland	1	4%
UK	1	4%
USA	9	38%
Total	24	100%

1.2 Organizational Type

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) accounted for twenty-one of the twenty-four responses (88%). In the sample collected, the most represented organization type is Secular NGOs (63%) followed by Faith-Based NGOs (25%). Haitian governmental agencies and United Nations affiliates each had one organization participate.

Table 2: Responses by Organization Type		
Type	Freq	Percent
Secular NGO	15	63%
Faith-Based NGO	6	25%
Haitian Government	1	4%
UN Affiliate	1	4%
Other	1	4%
Total	24	100%

1.3 Organizational Descriptive Statistics

Table 3 shows various statistics describing the organizations that participated in the survey. The table shows minimums, medians, averages, and maximums for the number of full-time employees that are Haitian and the number of full-time employees that are international, estimates of 2013 operating budget, and the number of years the organizations have been operating in Haiti. As shown in the table below, there is much variability in the characteristics of the respondents.

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Organization				
	Haitian Employees	Int'l Employees	2013 Operating Budget	Years Operating in Haiti
Min	0	0	\$30,000	0.4
Median	17	2	\$925,000	12.4
Average	70	5	\$3,639,786	20.0
Max	500	20	\$35,000,000	58.4

1.4 Operational Characteristics

The following series of tables, Table 4 thru Table 8, shows the operational characteristics of the twenty-four organizations that participated in the survey.

- Of those organizations who participated, 75% made an internal organizational decision to participate in Haiti;
- Popular motivators guiding this organizational decision to work in Haiti were poverty (63%) and a recent disaster (38%);
- Most widespread operational activity among organizations is education, with 50% of them engaging with that activity in some manner.
- Popular programs of the respondents is Cash-for-Work (33%), Good Distribution (29%), and Cash Transfers (25%).
- Finally, sixteen of the twenty-four organizations (67%) who participated in the survey reported involvement in disaster relief.

Table 4: Who decided the area your organization would work in Haiti?		
Decision Maker	Freq.	Percent
Decided Internally	18	75%
Haitian Government	6	25%
Donor	3	13%
Other	3	13%
*multiple selections permitted, n=24		

Table 5: What are the two most important criteria that guide(d) your choice of where to work		
Basis	Freq.	Percent
Poverty	15	63%
Recent disaster	9	38%
Agricultural area	5	21%
Low infrastructure	5	21%
High risk for disaster	4	17%
Urban area	1	4%
High infrastructure	0	0%
Other	9	38%
*multiple selections permitted, n=24		

Table 6: In what type of activities does your organization operate?		
Activity	Freq.	Percent
Education	12	50%
Food security	10	42%
Agriculture	9	38%
Health	7	29%
Reforestation	7	29%
Sanitation	6	25%
Child Protection	5	21%
Erosion control	5	21%
Livestock	5	21%
Micro credit, finance, business	4	17%
Other	12	50%
*multiple selections permitted, n=24		

Table 7: Does your organization do any of the following?		
Program	Freq.	Percent
Cash-for-Work	8	33%
Gratuitous food distribution	7	29%
Cash transfers	6	25%
Food-for-Work	1	4%
Vouchers	1	4%
Do not Know	10	42%
*multiple selections permitted, n=24		

Table 8: Is your organization involved in disaster relief?		
Yes	16	67%
No	8	33%

2.0 Disaster Operations

2.1 Type of Disaster Relief

Sixteen organizations reported involvement in disaster relief. The type of aid provided most frequently by these organizations is food assistance (44%), housing and shelter (31%), money transfers (31%), and tools (31%).

Table 9: What type of aid did your organization give?		
Aid Type	Freq.	Percent
Food distribution	7	44%
Houses	5	31%
Monetary transfers	5	31%
Tools	5	31%
Nutritional aid to malnourished	4	25%
Seeds	4	25%
Vouchers	1	6%
Other	9	56%
*multiple selections permitted, n=16		

2.2 Disaster Relief Criteria

Table 10 shows the criteria used by the disaster relief organizations to identify which beneficiaries are in need of disaster relief. Community focus groups (50%) and consulting with community leaders (50%) are the two most common methods used to determine disaster relief criteria. Review of existing literature was the least common with only one of the sixteen organizations using that method.

Table 10: How did your organization determine the criteria for beneficiaries?		
Aid Criteria	Freq.	Percent
Community Focus groups	8	50%
Consulting with a Community Committee	8	50%
Surveys	6	38%
Expert decision	2	13%
Review of literature	1	6%
Do not Know	0	0%
Other	6	38%
*multiple selections permitted, n=16		

2.3 Disaster Relief Targets

Ten of the sixteen disaster relief organizations (63%) reported targeting the household-level as the organizational unit receiving disaster relief. The next most common organizational units were community based organizations (50%) and individuals (38%). Schools and churches were the

least common organizational unit and were targeted by only two and one disaster relief organizations, respectively. Table 11 presents this data for easy reference.

Of the ten organizations that targeted disaster relief at the household-level, nine of them (90%) reported it as an *effective* strategy. The other organization reported it as having a *neutral* effect. Of the six organizations who targeted disaster relief at the individual-level, only four of them (63%) reported it as an *effective* strategy. The other two organizations reported it as having a *neutral* effect.

Table 11: What unit of organization did you target to receive aid?		
Aid Target	Freq.	Percent
Household	10	63%
Community based organization	8	50%
Individual	6	38%
Clinics and hospitals	4	25%
NGO	4	25%
Government entity	3	19%
School	2	13%
Church	1	6%
Do not Know	0	0%
Other	3	19%
*multiple selections permitted, n=16		

2.4 Disaster Relief Decision Makers & Methods

Table 12 shows the decision makers that selected the disaster relief recipients. Some of these decision makers were committee-based and others were not. The most popular form of decision maker, used by ten of the sixteen disaster relief organizations (63%), is the Community Committee. The next most common was Local CBOs (50%), and the least common decision maker was non-committee local authorities (31%).

Table 12: Who did the selection of beneficiaries?		
Selector	Freq.	Percent
Community Committees	10	63%
Local CBOs (no committee)	8	50%
Network of health agents	6	38%
Local authorities (no committee)	5	31%
Do not Know	0	0%
Other	5	31%
*multiple selections permitted, n=16		

The methods used by the decision makers, as shown in Table 13, support the nature of the decision maker. For example, the most common method for selecting disaster relief recipients was community meetings (63%), which correlates with the most common decision maker (i.e. Community Committee).

Table 13: How did they choose the beneficiaries?		
Method	Freq.	Percent
Community meetings	10	63%
CBOs active in communities	6	38%
Health centers and nutritional clinics	4	25%
NGOs	4	25%
Other Leaders	2	13%
AZEKS	1	6%
Religious leaders	1	6%
Business leaders	0	0%
Do not Know	2	13%
Other	3	19%
*multiple selections permitted, n=16		

2.5 Disaster Relief Process Improvement

The disaster relief organizations self-reported taking actions to improve the aid delivery process. Fifteen of the sixteen organizations (94%) reported verifying the list of beneficiaries given to them by the decision makers. During the process fourteen of the organizations (88%) attempted to get feedback from the recipients and all of those fourteen organizations incorporated the feedback into their operations. These figures are shown below in Table 14. The methods for verifying lists (Table 15) and obtaining feedback (Table 16) are shown below as well.

Table 14: Process Improvement		
Action	Yes	No
Did you verify lists?	15	1
Did you attempt to obtain feedback from beneficiaries?	14	2
Was the feedback incorporated in future operations?	14	0

Table 15: How did you verify lists?		
Method	Freq.	Percent
Focus groups	7	47%
Random sample	6	40%
Open Community meetings	5	33%
Community committee	4	27%
Key informants	2	13%
Complaint box or hotline	1	7%
Did not verify	0	0%
Do not know	0	0%
Opportunistic sample	0	0%
Other	4	27%
*multiple selections permitted, n=15		

Table 16: How did you attempt to obtain feedback?		
Method	Freq.	Percent
Focus groups	8	57%
Key informants	6	43%
Community committee	5	36%
Open Community meetings	5	36%
Complaint box or hotline	3	21%
Opportunistic sample	2	14%
Random sample	1	7%
Did not verify	0	0%
Do not know	0	0%
Other	5	36%
*multiple selections permitted, n=14		

3.0 Non-Disaster Operations

Of the sixteen disaster relief organizations that participated in the survey, fourteen of them (88%) reported having identical operations, recipient identification, and recipient selection processes for Disaster Operations as they do for Non-Disaster Operations. All twenty-four organizations participate in Non-Disaster Operations and that analysis follows.

3.1 Type of Assistance

The type of assistance provided most frequently by organizations is food assistance (42%), which is also the most common aid type for disaster relief. Other popular types of assistance are vouchers (33%), seeds (29%), and health & nutrition for the malnourished (21%). This information is presented in Table 17.

Table 17: What type of aid did your organization give?		
Aid Type	Freq.	Percent
Food distribution	10	42%
Vouchers	8	33%
Seeds	7	29%
Nutritional aid to malnourished	5	21%
Houses	4	17%
Tools	4	17%
Monetary transfers	1	4%
Other	13	54%
*multiple selections permitted, n=24		

3.2 Assistance Criteria

Table 18 shows the criteria used by the organizations to identify which beneficiaries are in need of assistance. Consulting with community leaders (46%) and community focus groups (38%) are the two most common methods used to determine need, which are the two most common criteria

for disaster relief, too. Review of existing literature was the least common with only one of the twenty-four organizations using that method.

Table 18: How did your organization determine the criteria for beneficiaries?

Aid Criteria	Freq.	Percent
Consulting with a Community Committee	11	46%
Community Focus groups	9	38%
Surveys	9	38%
Expert decision	4	17%
Review of literature	1	4%
Do not Know	0	0%
Other	9	38%
*multiple selections permitted, n=24		

3.3 Assistance Targets

Thirteen of the twenty-four organizations (54%) reported targeting the household-level as the organizational unit receiving disaster relief. The next most common organizational units were community based organizations (50%) and individuals (29%). Schools and churches were the least common organizational unit and were targeted by only three and two organizations, respectively. Table 19 presents this data for easy reference. It should be mentioned that the top-three and bottom-two organizational units used to target aid are the same as those used to target disaster relief, which is explained in Section 2.3 above.

Of the thirteen organizations that targeted assistance at the household-level, one of them (8%) reported it as a *very-effective* strategy, ten of them (77%) reported it as an *effective* strategy. Of the remaining two organizations, one each reported it having a *neutral* effect and the other as being an *ineffective* strategy. Of the seven organizations that targeted assistance at the individual-level, one of them reported it as *very-effective*, five reported it as *effective*, and the remaining organization reported it as having a *neutral* effect.

Table 19: What unit of organization did you target to receive aid?

Aid Target	Freq.	Percent
Household	13	54%
Community based organization	12	50%
Individual	7	29%
Clinics and hospitals	6	25%
NGO	6	25%
Government entity	4	17%
School	3	13%
Church	2	8%
Do not Know	0	0%
Other	4	17%
*multiple selections permitted, n=24		

3.4 Assistance Decision Makers & Methods

Table 20 shows the decision makers that selected the assistance recipients. Some of these decision makers were committee-based and others were not. The most popular form of decision maker used by eleven of the twenty-four organizations (46%), is the committee-based Community Committee. The next most common was Local CBOs (38%), and the least common decision maker was non-committee local authorities (21%). These three ordinal positions are the same for disaster relief as they are for assistance.

Table 20: Who did the selection of beneficiaries?		
Selector	Freq.	Percent
Community committees	11	46%
Local CBOs (no committee)	9	38%
Network of health agents	6	25%
Local authorities (no committee)	5	21%
Do not Know	2	8%
Other	10	42%
*multiple selections permitted, n=24		

The methods used by the decision makers for selecting recipients of assistance was, as shown in Table 21, community meetings (50%), which correlates with the most common decision maker (i.e. Community Committee).

Table 21: How did they choose the beneficiaries?		
Method	Freq.	Percent
Community meetings	12	50%
CBOs active in communities	7	29%
Do not Know	5	21%
NGOs	5	21%
Other Leaders	5	21%
Health centers and nutritional clinics	4	17%
AZEKS	2	8%
Religious leaders	2	8%
Business leaders	0	0%
Other	4	17%
*multiple selections permitted, n=16		

3.5 Assistance Process Improvement

The organizations self-reported taking actions to improve the assistance delivery process. Nineteen of the twenty-four organizations (79%) reported verifying the list of beneficiaries given to them by the decision makers. During the process twenty-one of the organizations (88%) attempted to get feedback from the recipients and 95% of those organizations incorporated the

feedback into their operations. These figures are shown below in Table 22. The methods for verifying lists (Table 23) and obtaining feedback (Table 24) are shown below as well.

Table 22: Process Improvement		
Action	Yes	No
Did you verify lists?	19	5
Did you attempt to obtain feedback from beneficiaries?	21	3
Was the feedback incorporated in future operations?	20	1

Table 23: How did you verify lists?		
Method	Freq.	Percent
Focus groups	7	37%
Open Community meetings	7	37%
Random sample	6	32%
Community committee	4	21%
Key informants	3	16%
Complaint box or hotline	1	5%
Did not verify	0	0%
Do not know	0	0%
Opportunistic sample	0	0%
Other	4	21%
*multiple selections permitted, n=19		

Table 24: How did you attempt to obtain feedback?		
Method	Freq.	Percent
Focus groups	10	48%
Key informants	9	43%
Open Community meetings	9	43%
Community committee	6	29%
Complaint box or hotline	3	14%
Opportunistic sample	3	14%
Random sample	2	10%
Did not verify	0	0%
Do not know	0	0%
Other	6	29%

Responses by Organization

Responses by Organization		
Organization	Frequency	Percentage
A Connected Planet	1	4%
ACF	1	4%
acted	1	4%
Action Secours Ambulance (ASA)	1	4%
AmeriCares	1	4%
Coeur pour Haiti	1	4%
FHED-INC	1	4%
Food for the Poor	1	4%
Haiti Outreach / Collaboration avec Haiti	1	4%
Handicap International	1	4%
Helpage International	1	4%
Helping Haitian Angels	1	4%
HIM International	1	4%
International Lifeline Fund	1	4%
Kids Connection Haiti	1	4%
LWF	1	4%
Medair	1	4%
Mennonite Central Committee	1	4%
Ministere de l ' Agriculture des Ressources Naturelles et du Developpement Rural(MARNDR)/ Unite de Coordination MARNDR-FIDA	1	4%
OTM Haïti	1	4%
PAIP	1	4%
PAM	1	4%
TECHO	1	4%
World Neighbors	1	4%
Total	24	100%

Annex 2

Community Extension Agents in Haiti (Source Aba Grangou 2012)

Organization responsable	Agents	ColVol	Departement	Secteur	Familles touchées par agent	Heures travaillées/semaine
MSH/USAID	1500		Tous	Santé, nutrition	300-400	20-30h
USAID	703		Ouest, Centre	Agriculture	50-100	40h
FHI/CHAMP	517		Ouest, Nord, Nord-Ouest	Santé, livelihoods	Rural: 300-400	40h
Zanmi La Santé	420		Centre, Artibonite	Santé		40h
WORLD VISION	299		Centre, Artibonite, Ouest	Santé, nutrition	200	40h
MHDH	180		Sud	Santé, nutrition	50	40h
ACDI/VOCA	147	330	Sud-Est	Santé, nutrition, agriculture	Agri.: 500. Santé: 100	40h (colvol: 20h)
FONDEFH (SDSH)*	133		Nord, Nord-Ouest, Ouest	Santé, Nutrition	Rural: 300-500. Urbain: 300	40h
CDS (SDSH)*	97		Nord, Nord-Est	Santé	500-700	40h
DNSO (SDSH)*	79		Nord-Ouest	Santé	670	65 volont., 14 agents
FONKOZE	76		SE, Centre, NE, Art., Ouest	Microcredit, Moyens économiques	50	40h
MdM France	75		Grande-Anse	Santé, nutrition	677	30h
Medishare	71		Centre	Santé, nutrition	80	40h
AVSI	65		Ouest, Sud	Agri., WASH, nutrition, protection, éd.	50-60	40h
Hôpital Alma Mater	65		Artibonite	Santé	250	25h
Save the Children	62		Centre, Ouest	Santé, nutrition	800	40h
Caritas Fort-Liberté	60	100	Nord-Est	Santé cholera	N/a	35-40h
Hôpital Albert	50		Artibonite	Santé	300 (colvol: 15)	45h
Schweitzer Haiti	400					
Medecins du Monde			Ouest			
Suisse	46		Ouest	Santé, nutrition	110	32h
HAITI PARTICIPATIVE	44	550	Ouest	Education, Santé, nutrition, Agri.	100	40h (colvol: 8h)
Haitian Health						
Foundation (HHF)	41	6000	Grande-Anse	Santé	600	40h (colvol: 2h)
MOFAM	33		Nippes	Santé, nutrition	2 agents par Centre Santé	40h
Terre des hommes	32	32	Sud	Santé, nutrition		
Cosmos	26		Centre	Santé		40h
UNASCAD	20	80	Ouest	Santé, nutrition, environnement	25-40	35-40h (colvol: 16h)
Macaya Lib	15	100	Ouest	Santé, nutrition		8h
CARE	12		Grande-Anse, Ouest		400 membres / groupe de credit)	40h
Pesadev	11		Ouest, Nord-Est	Agriculture, livelihoods	20-50	8-16h
DASH	10		OUEST	Santé, nutrition	NA	40h
Crudem	7		Nord	Santé		
AFFDPC	6		Centre	agriculture, nutrition	2000 en tout	40h
CBP	6		Nord	Santé	50-60	40h
Caritas Cap-Haitien	5	100	Nord	Agri., env., WASH, microfinance, Santé	300	40h
Croix Rouge Haitienne		12000	Tous	Urgence	20-30	n/a
DPC		7000	Tous	Gestion des Risques et Désastres		N/A
CRS		605	Sud, Nippes	Securité Alimentaire, Santé	207	
ACF		459	Artibonite, Ouest	Santé, nutrition	N/A	2-3 jours/mois
CONCERN		400	Ouest	Santé, nutrition	30 familles	8h
Caritas acmel		240	Sud	agri., env., Santé, prot., éd.	N/a	n/a
Caritas Hinche		200	Centre	agri., env., Santé, prot., microfin., éd.	N/a	n/a
GVC		24	Nippes	Hygiène	25	16-24h
CESAL		12	Ouest	Nutrition	166	2h

Artibonite	Centre	Grande-Anse	Nippes	Nord	Nord-Est	Nord-Ouest	Ouest	Sud	Sud-Est
MSH(SDSH/USAID)	MSH(SDSH/USAID)	MSH(SDSH/USAID)	MSH(SDSH/USAID)	MSH(SDSH/USAID)	MSH(SDSH/USAID)	MSH(SDSH/USAID)	MSH(SDSH/USAID)	MSH(SDSH/USAID)	MSH(SDSH/USAID)
Zanmi Lasante	Zanmi Lasante	FHI CHAMP	FHI CHAMP	FHI CHAMP	FHI CHAMP	FHI CHAMP	FHI CHAMP	FHI CHAMP	FHI CHAMP
USAID(WINNER)	World Vision	Foundation(HHF)	MOFAM	FONDEFH(SDSH)*	Fonkoze	FONDEFH(SDSH)*	USAID(WINNER)	AVSI	ACDI/VOCA
Croix Rouge Haitienne	Croix Rouge Haitienne	Croix Rouge Haitienne	Croix Rouge Haitienne	Croix Rouge Haitienne	Croix Rouge Haitienne	Croix Rouge Haitienne	Croix Rouge Haitienne	Croix Rouge Haitienne	Croix Rouge Haitienne
World Vision	Fonkoze	CARE	DPC	CDS(SDSH)*	CDS(SDSH)*	DPC	Zanmi Lasante	MHDH	Fonkoze
Save The Children	Hôpital Alma Mater	DPC	Caritas des Nippes	Crudem	Pesadev	Caritas Port-de-Paix	CONCERN	CRS	DPC
Fonkoze	HAS Haiti(SDSH)*	Caritas Jérémie		CBP	DPC		WORLD VISION HAITI	DPC	Caritas Jacmel
Medishare	ACF			CBP	Caritas Fort-Liberté		Save The Children	Caritas Cayes	
Cosmos	DPC			DPC			FONDEFH(SDSH)*		
AFFDPC	Caritas Hinche			Caritas Cap-Haïtien			Fonkoze		
DPC							AVSI		
Caritas des Gonaïves							MdM Suisse		
							HAITI PARTICIPATIVE		
							UNASCAD		
							Macaya Lib		
							CARE		
							Pesadev		
							DASH		
							DPC		
							CRS		
							ACF		
							CONCERN		
							CESAL		
							Caritas Port-au-Prince		

ANNEX 3: Maissade Frequency Listing Survey

Where those respondents who first reported on *Notab* live

To accomplish the FreeList Objective, exactly 2,005 respondents in a three-section area of the Maissade region were interviewed. The composition of these respondents is described below in Table 3.1 and shows the female-to-male ratio in each Section. At the highest level, the composition of the dataset by sex is 48% female and 52% male. Its geographic composition by the Section in which the respondent lives is varied: 39% from Hatty and Savane Grande Sections, and 22% from Naran. The subgroup of respondents from the Naran Section is the least balanced by sex (only 41% female) while the other sections are much more balanced.

Table 3.1: Respondents' Section of Residence						
Section	Female		Male		Total	
Hattv	394	41%	390	37%	784	39%
Naran	182	19%	267	25%	449	22%
Savane Grande	380	40%	392	37%	772	39%
Total	956	100%	1049	100%	2005	100%

Within each of the three Sections exists residential sections known as a *Abitasyon*. These geographic areas are unique to each Section, with as many as twenty per Section in this dataset. A series of three tables, Tables XX.1 thru XX.3 shows the female-to-male ratio in each *Abitasyon* within each Section. No single *Abitasyon* in any of the Sections was over-sampled: in Hatty Section, there are fifteen *Abitasyon* and the average representation is 7% with no single *Abitasyon* greater than 12%; in Naran Section there are twelve *Abitasyon* and the average representation is 8% with no single *Abitasyon* greater than 13%; and in Savane Grande there are twenty-two *Abitasyon* and the average representation is 5% with no single *Abitasyon* greater than 8%.

Table XX.1: Respondents' <i>Abitasyon</i> of Residence (Hatty Section Only)						
<i>Abitasyon</i>	Female		Male		Total	
Bas Hattv	42	11%	44	11%	86	11%
Batev	26	7%	36	9%	62	8%
Berbenal	18	5%	34	9%	52	7%
Biliguv	67	17%	27	7%	94	12%
Bwa Pini	1	0%	2	1%	3	0%
Cola Figi	17	4%	19	5%	36	5%
Do Bwa Pen	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Hattv	39	10%	29	7%	68	9%
Lagoun	39	10%	30	8%	69	9%
Lospine	33	8%	18	5%	51	7%
Osenande	16	4%	38	10%	54	7%
Porte au Ciel	24	6%	32	8%	56	7%
Savane Grande	25	6%	28	7%	53	7%
Savane Longue	25	6%	26	7%	51	7%
Ti Kenep	22	6%	26	7%	48	6%
Total	394	100%	390	100%	784	100%

Table XX.2: Respondents' *Abitasyon* of Residence (Naran Section Only)

<i>Abitasyon</i>	Female		Male		Total	
Cinquieme	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Do Bwa Pen	22	12%	26	10%	48	11%
Fonbrun	22	12%	36	13%	58	13%
Kann Towo	18	10%	32	12%	50	11%
Kanvan	26	14%	29	11%	55	12%
La Solable	16	9%	26	10%	42	9%
Lagoun	2	1%	0	0%	2	0%
Larique	21	12%	28	10%	49	11%
Nan Fig	12	7%	39	15%	51	11%
Savane a Palme	20	11%	21	8%	41	9%
Severine	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Tou le Jou	23	13%	28	10%	51	11%
Total	182	100%	267	100%	449	100%

Table XX.3: Respondents' *Abitasyon* of Residence (Savane Grande Section Only)

<i>Abitasyon</i>	Female		Male		Total	
Basia	28	7%	22	6%	50	6%
Bassin Cave	36	9%	15	4%	51	7%
Biliguv	1	0%	2	1%	3	0%
Bwa Pini	18	5%	8	2%	26	3%
Cinquieme	20	5%	39	10%	59	8%
Do Latanier	26	7%	32	8%	58	8%
Fonbrun		0%	1	0%	1	0%
Kafou Brile	19	5%	26	7%	45	6%
Kafou Lonbrai	1	0%		0%	1	0%
Lagwabit	24	6%	27	7%	51	7%
Letan	22	6%	17	4%	39	5%
Madame Joie	18	5%	28	7%	46	6%
Nan Citron	27	7%	22	6%	49	6%
Nan Kanpeche	1	0%		0%	1	0%
Nan Sanbe	25	7%	31	8%	56	7%
Palwat	25	7%	21	5%	46	6%
Perikit	9	2%	13	3%	22	3%
Savane a Pve	25	7%	27	7%	52	7%
Savane Grande	8	2%	7	2%	15	2%
Savane Longue	1	0%	1	0%	2	0%
Selpet	21	6%	28	7%	49	6%
Severine	25	7%	25	6%	50	6%
Total	380	100%	392	100%	772	100%

Within each Section exists an even narrower residential section known as a Locality. These geographic areas exist within a single *Abitasyon*, but it is not uncommon for two Localities in

different *Abitasyon* to have identical names. These Localities can be quite numerous within a Section, with as many as 100 per Section. Found in the Appendix is a series of three tables, Tables XX.1 thru XX.3 that shows the female-to-male ratio in each Locality within each section.

Where the *Notab* live

Recording the responses of the aforementioned 2,005 people created a broad list of 5,265 notabs. That list was narrowed to 445 *Notab* by eliminating those who were not frequently mentioned by respondents. These remaining *Notab* can be considered *those seen as most influential* among the 2,005 respondents surveyed. At the highest level, the composition of these *Notab* loosely resembles the distribution of respondents described above. The Section in which these *Notab* live is varied and is shown below in Table XX: 44% from Hatty, 19% from Naran, and 37% from Savane Grande. Data on the gender of *Notab* was not recorded.

Table XX: Notabs' Section of Residence		
Section	Freq.	Percentage
Hatty	196	44%
Naran	84	19%
Savane Grande	165	37%
Total	445	100%

A series of three tables, Tables XX.1 thru XX.3 shows the proportion of *Notab* in the *Abitasyon* within each Section. In Hatty Section, many respondents (23%) reported knowing a *notab* in the Section's Hatty *Abitasyon*. This was the most represented in the Section. In the Naran Section, there is more balance in the representation of *Abitasyon* by the *Notab* with no *Abitasyon* representing more than 13% of the total. The final Section, Savane Grande, has wide representation among twenty-four *Abitasyon*, the largest is Nan Sanbe with nineteen responses, or 12% of all *Notab* who live in this Section.

Table XX.1: Notabs' <i>Abitasyon</i> of Residence (Hatty Section Only)		
<i>Abitasyon</i>	Freq.	Percentage
Batey	13	7%
Berbenal	10	5%
Biliguy	13	7%
Cola Figi	10	5%
Grande Savane	12	6%
Hatty	46	23%
Lagoun	31	16%
Lospine	10	5%
Osenande	16	8%
Porte au Ciel	19	10%
Savane Longue	10	5%
Savane Mitan	1	1%

Table XX.1: Notabs' *Abitasyon* of Residence (Hatty Section Only)

Ti Kenep	5	3%
Total	196	100%

Table XX.2: Notabs' *Abitasyon* of Residence (Naran Section Only)

<i>Abitasyon</i>	Freq.	Percentage
Bwa Rouj	1	1%
Dos Bois Pin	7	8%
Fonbrun	7	8%
Gaga	1	1%
Kann Towo	7	8%
Kanyan	11	13%
La Solable	8	10%
Larique	11	13%
Locapa	1	1%
Mousanbe	1	1%
Nan Fig	6	7%
Rantchionobi	1	1%
Savane a Palme	10	12%
Severine	1	1%
Tou le Jou	11	13%
Total	84	100%

Table XX.3: Notabs' *Abitasyon* of Residence (Savane Grande Section Only)

<i>Abitasyon</i>	Freq.	Percentage
Base savane	1	1%
Basia	14	8%
Bassin Cave	6	4%
Bwa Pini	11	7%
Cinquieme	11	7%
Do Latanier	13	8%
Dodiyo	2	1%
Garanje	1	1%
Has Selpet	1	1%
Kafou Lonbraj	2	1%
Kajou Brile	8	5%
Lagwabit	9	5%
Letan	11	7%
Madame Joie	12	7%

Table XX.3: Notabs' <i>Abitasyon</i> of Residence (Savane Grande Section Only)		
Nan Citron	10	6%
Nan Nwel	1	1%
Nan Sanbe	19	12%
Palwat	7	4%
Perikit	1	1%
Sabien	1	1%
Savane a Pve	8	5%
Savane Grande	1	1%
Selpet	7	4%
Severine	2	1%
Sous Inyam	4	2%
Sous Yanm	1	1%
Woche 2	1	1%
Total	165	100%

Found in the Appendix is a series of three tables, Tables XX.1 thru XX.3 that shows *notab* representation in each Locality within each Section.

Where the beneficiaries reported by the the *Notab* live

The 445 *Notab* individually offered 4,509 names (slightly more than ten names per notab) of individuals in need of food assistance. There was overlap in the *Notab* responses and many names were mentioned more than once. Deeper analysis of the notabs' Frequency Listing responses generates a list of 3,903 unique beneficiaries. Of these unique beneficiaries, approximately 11% (424 beneficiaries) were mentioned by two or more notabs. This list of beneficiaries is organized by giving the highest priority to the individual mentioned by the most notabs, which identifies *the most needy individuals according to Notab most respected by respondents*. At the highest level, the composition of these beneficiaries almost exactly matches the distribution of *Notab* described above. The Section in which these beneficiaries live is varied and is shown below in Table XX: 43% from Hatty, 20% from Naran, and 37% from Savane Grande. *Notab* reported one name of beneficiaries outside the three-Section area. Data on the gender of beneficiaries was not recorded.

Table XX: Beneficiaries' Section of Residence		
Section	Freq.	Percentage
Hatty	1692	43%
Naran	770	20%
Savane Grande	1440	37%
Unknown/Other	1	0%
Total	3903	100%

A series of three tables, Tables XX.1 thru XX.3 shows the proportion of beneficiaries in the *Abitasyon* within each Section. In Hatty Section, many *Notab* (25%) reported beneficiaries in the Section's Hatty *Abitasyon*. This was the most represented in the Section. In Naran Section, five *Abitasyon* represent two-thirds of the 770 beneficiaries in the Section. These five *Abitasyon* are

Kanyan, La Solable, Larique, Savane Palme, and Tou le Jou. The final Section, Savane Grande, has wide representation among thirty-one *Abitasyon*, the largest of which is Nan Sanbe with 172 beneficiaries, or 12% of all beneficiaries in Section.

Table XX.1: Beneficiaries' <i>Abitasyon</i> of Residence (Hatty Section Only)		
<i>Abitasyon</i>	Freq.	Percentage
Batey	107	6%
Berbenal	79	5%
Biliguy	105	6%
Billiguy	5	0%
Cola Figi	82	5%
Grande Savane	117	7%
Hatty	416	25%
Lagoun	208	12%
Lospine	93	5%
Osenande	137	8%
Porte au Ciel	187	11%
Savane Longue	98	6%
Savane Mitan	10	1%
Ti Kenep	48	3%
Total	1692	100%

Table XX.2: Beneficiaries' <i>Abitasyon</i> of Residence (Naran Section Only)		
<i>Abitasyon</i>	Freq.	Percentage
Do Bwa Pen	49	6%
Fonbrun	67	9%
Gaga	2	0%
Gaja	2	0%
Kann Towo	63	8%
Kanyan	104	14%
La Solable	74	10%
Larique	104	14%
Lokapa	7	1%
Mousanbe	10	1%
Nan Fig	60	8%
Ranchionobi	14	2%
Savane a Palme	95	12%
Severine	10	1%

Table XX.2: Beneficiaries' Abitasyon of Residence (Naran Section Only)		
Tou le Jou	109	14%
Total	770	100%

Table XX.3: Beneficiaries' Abitasyon of Residence (Savane Grande Section Only)		
Abitasyon	Freq.	Percentage
Basia	113	8%
Bassin Cave	47	3%
Bwa Pini	93	6%
Caranie	9	1%
Cinquieme	105	7%
Deve Sabien	1	0%
Do Latanier	92	6%
Dodivo	19	1%
Fabien	1	0%
Garanie	1	0%
Kafou Lombrai	15	1%
Kaiou Brile	76	5%
Lagwabit	75	5%
Larique	1	0%
Letan	98	7%
Madame Joie	105	7%
Nan Citron	98	7%
Nan Nwel	10	1%
Nan Sanbe	172	12%
Nan Tidvo	1	0%
Palwat	64	4%
Perikit	10	1%
Sabien	2	0%
Savane a Pye	79	5%
Savane Grande	13	1%
Selpet	66	5%
Severine	20	1%
Sous Invam	39	3%
Sous Yanm	10	1%
Woche 1	3	0%
Woche2	2	0%
Total	1440	100%

Found in the Appendix is a series of three tables, Tables XX.1 thru XX.3 that shows beneficiaries representation in each Locality within each Section.

Respondent Localite

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Table XX.1: Respondents' Locality of Residence (Hatty Section Only)						
Locality	Female		Male		Grand Total	
Ba Berbenal	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Ba Hatty	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%
Batey 1	11	3%	23	6%	34	4%
Batey 2	14	4%	13	3%	27	3%
Berbenal	18	5%	33	8%	51	7%
Biliguy	3	1%	0	0%	3	0%
Biliguy 1	37	9%	20	5%	57	7%
Biliguy 2	29	7%	7	2%	36	5%
Bois Dom Bas	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%
Bois Seche	1	0%	7	2%	8	1%
Cola Figi	12	3%	11	3%	23	3%
Do Moron	1	0%	2	1%	3	0%
Gabo	1	0%	2	1%	3	0%
Gouf Kano	7	2%	9	2%	16	2%
Grande Savanne	17	4%	16	4%	33	4%
Hatty 1	26	7%	25	6%	51	7%
Hatty 2	16	4%	20	5%	36	5%
Jan Mannwel	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Kapat	14	4%	17	4%	31	4%
Lagoun 1	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%
Lagoun 10	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%
Lagoun 11	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Lagoun 12	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%
Lagoun 13	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Lagoun 14	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Lagoun 15	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%
Lagoun 16	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%
Lagoun 17	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Lagoun 18	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Lagoun 19	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Lagoun 2	32	8%	19	5%	51	7%
Lokapa	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%
Losabit	3	1%	1	0%	4	1%
Lospine	31	8%	18	5%	49	6%
lot	3	1%	7	2%	10	1%
Nan Joumou	6	2%	1	0%	7	1%

Table XX.1: Respondents' Locality of Residence (Hatty Section Only)

Nan Ponm	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Osenande	16	4%	40	10%	56	7%
Pennen	18	5%	8	2%	26	3%
Port au Ciel 1	24	6%	30	8%	54	7%
Rak Nwa	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Ravine Goyave	1	0%	4	1%	5	1%
Savane Mitan	1	0%	1	0%	2	0%
Savenne Longue	15	4%	10	3%	25	3%
Ti Jounen	0	0%	2	1%	2	0%
Ti Kenep	23	6%	26	7%	49	6%
Ti Sous	3	1%	1	0%	4	1%
Zan Nanna	3	1%	7	2%	10	1%
Total	394	100%	390	100%	784	100%

Table XX.2: Respondents' Locality of Residence (Naran Section Only)

Locality	Female		Male		Total	
Ba Savanne	1	1%	0	0%	1	0%
Ba Savanne a Palme	0	0%	2	1%	2	0%
Ba Savenne a Palme	5	3%	10	4%	15	3%
Boukan Joumou	1	1%	0	0%	1	0%
Bwa Nago	1	1%	4	1%	5	1%
Chene Kanel	1	1%	0	0%	1	0%
Dewonba	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Dlo Kontre	3	2%	8	3%	11	2%
Do Bwa Pen 1	3	2%	6	2%	9	2%
Do Bwa Pen 2	2	1%	2	1%	4	1%
Do Lichal	2	1%	4	1%	6	1%
Dorsaint	1	1%	1	0%	2	0%
Fon Chaplet	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Gazard	2	1%	4	1%	6	1%
Jan Fracois	3	2%	5	2%	8	2%
Kann Towo	2	1%	5	2%	7	2%
Kantyonobi	2	1%	10	4%	12	3%
Kanyen	7	4%	10	4%	17	4%
Kodjo	0	0%	2	1%	2	0%
Korido	1	1%	1	0%	2	0%
La Solable	12	7%	18	7%	30	7%
Lagwajoul	1	1%	2	1%	3	1%
Lakoma	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Larique	12	7%	14	5%	26	6%

Table XX.2: Respondents' Locality of Residence (Naran Section Only)

Larique 2	5	3%	11	4%	16	4%
Lokapa	12	7%	9	3%	21	5%
Madresit	2	1%	3	1%	5	1%
Matravesa	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Mawouj	17	9%	18	7%	35	8%
Mon Doflon	1	1%	0	0%	1	0%
Mondoflo	3	2%	3	1%	6	1%
nan bare	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Nan Fig	7	4%	24	9%	31	7%
Nan Gistan	1	1%	0	0%	1	0%
Nan Gistin	1	1%	0	0%	1	0%
Nan Gwayav	3	2%	1	0%	4	1%
Nan Jof	1	1%	0	0%	1	0%
Nan Kakon	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Nan Kokoye	2	1%	0	0%	2	0%
Nan Panache	5	3%	6	2%	11	2%
Nan Pwa Gate	3	2%	1	0%	4	1%
Nan Sicren	1	1%	0	0%	1	0%
Nan Siklen	1	1%	2	1%	3	1%
Nanan Laline	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Naran	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Panache	2	1%	3	1%	5	1%
Rak Nwa	2	1%	5	2%	7	2%
Ramier	3	2%	6	2%	9	2%
Rankepon	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Ransonobi	0	0%	3	1%	3	1%
Roch File	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Savane a Palme	26	14%	28	10%	54	12%
Savane Michel	4	2%	2	1%	6	1%
Te Panche	1	1%	0	0%	1	0%
Ti Woche	1	1%	3	1%	4	1%
Tika	4	2%	4	1%	8	2%
Tou le Jou	5	3%	10	4%	15	3%
Twaravin	0	0%	2	1%	2	0%
Woch File	3	2%	1	0%	4	1%
Zoranj Dous	4	2%	4	1%	8	2%
Total	182	100%	267	100%	449	100%

Table XX.3: Respondents' Locality of Residence (Savane Grande Section Only)						
Locality	Female		Male		Grand Total	
Adimole	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Anette	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%
Ba Cinquieme	6	2%	7	2%	13	2%
Ba Katye	0	0%	2	1%	2	0%
Ba Letan	6	2%	5	1%	11	1%
Basia	27	7%	21	5%	48	6%
Bassin Cave	21	6%	11	3%	32	4%
Bayawonn	1	0%	6	2%	7	1%
Bigay	0	0%	2	1%	2	0%
Biligui 1	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%
Boule 1	4	1%	3	1%	7	1%
Boule 2	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%
Bwa Jofri	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%
Bwa Pini	18	5%	8	2%	26	3%
Cinquieme	10	3%	22	6%	32	4%
Delava	1	0%	1	0%	2	0%
Denava	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Depase	4	1%	2	1%	6	1%
Dewonba	1	0%	1	0%	2	0%
Dlo Gaye	12	3%	2	1%	14	2%
Dlo Kontre	2	1%	1	0%	3	0%
Do Diyo	2	1%	2	1%	4	1%
Do Kajou	1	0%	1	0%	2	0%
Do Koukou	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Do Latanier	20	5%	22	6%	42	5%
Do Savanne	1	0%	3	1%	4	1%
Do Tiyo	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Dodiyo	3	1%	1	0%	4	1%
Fabyen	6	2%	5	1%	11	1%
Fon Pikan	13	3%	7	2%	20	3%
Fonbayawonn	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%
Garange	0	0%	2	1%	2	0%
Gazard	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Grande Savane 1	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%
Grande Savanne	6	2%	4	1%	10	1%
Gwabit	15	4%	12	3%	27	3%
Haut Cinquieme	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Haut Letan	10	3%	8	2%	18	2%
Jean Charles Louis	0	0%	2	1%	2	0%

Table XX.3: Respondents' Locality of Residence (Savane Grande Section Only)						
julo	2	1%	0	0%	2	0%
Kafou	1	0%	1	0%	2	0%
Kafou Lonbraj	2	1%	3	1%	5	1%
Kajou Brile	12	3%	11	3%	23	3%
Kalbasye	4	1%	8	2%	12	2%
Kodjo	1	0%	2	1%	3	0%
Krepén	3	1%	2	1%	5	1%
La Sous Inyam	2	1%	3	1%	5	1%
Lagoncite	1	0%	1	0%	2	0%
Lagrabwit	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%
Laguann	1	0%	2	1%	3	0%
Lagwabit	6	2%	12	3%	18	2%
Lagwagit	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%
Letan	4	1%	4	1%	8	1%
lot	3	1%	0	0%	3	0%
Madame Joie	2	1%	1	0%	3	0%
Moge	0	0%	3	1%	3	0%
Mosanbe	24	6%	28	7%	52	7%
Nan Ral	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Nan Cintron	12	3%	14	4%	26	3%
Nan Kanpech	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Nan Kanpeche	1	0%	2	1%	3	0%
Nan Koup	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%
Nan Lagon	0	0%	2	1%	2	0%
Nan Monben	1	0%	1	0%	2	0%
Nan Mwen	1	0%	3	1%	4	1%
Nan Nwel	14	4%	5	1%	19	2%
Nan Poban	1	0%	1	0%	2	0%
Nan Ral	1	0%	1	0%	2	0%
Nan Siline	0	0%	2	1%	2	0%
Nan Vrina	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Osal	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Osal	1	0%	2	1%	3	0%
Palma	3	1%	0	0%	3	0%
Palwat 1	1	0%	1	0%	2	0%
Palwat 2	4	1%	3	1%	7	1%
Panyak	1	0%	1	0%	2	0%
Ro Katye	1	0%	1	0%	2	0%
Rokatye	1	0%	2	1%	3	0%
Savane a Pye	3	1%	3	1%	6	1%

Table XX.3: Respondents' Locality of Residence (Savane Grande Section Only)						
Savane Arant	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Savane Bef	2	1%	2	1%	4	1%
Savane Bet	9	2%	14	4%	23	3%
Savane Grande 1	11	3%	8	2%	19	2%
Savane Petwone	0	0%	3	1%	3	0%
Savanne a Pye	22	6%	26	7%	48	6%
Selpet	9	2%	16	4%	25	3%
Severine	7	2%	13	3%	20	3%
Siline	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Sous Inyam	2	1%	2	1%	4	1%
Te Kase	1	0%	5	1%	6	1%
Tikoye	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%
Vye Fou	1	0%	2	1%	3	0%
Vye Hate	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%
Wogblan	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Zeb Guinen	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%
Total	380	100%	392	100%	772	100%

Table XX.1: Notabs' Locality of Residence (Hatty Section Only)		
Locality	Freq.	Percentage
Batey	4	2%
Batey 1	2	1%
Batey 2	8	4%
Berbenal	8	4%
Billiguy 1	1	1%
Billiguy 2	12	6%
Cola Figi	2	1%
Do Moron	2	1%
Glasi Bourik	1	1%
Gouf Kano	2	1%
Grande Savane	8	4%
Hatty 1	24	12%
Hatty 2	4	2%
Kapat	12	6%
Lagoun 1	6	3%
Lagoun 2	4	2%
Losabit	2	1%
Lospine	11	6%
Nan Fou	1	1%

Table XX.1: Notabs' Locality of Residence (Hatty Section Only)

Nan Nanna	5	3%
Osenande	13	7%
Pennen	11	6%
Port au Ciel 1	19	10%
Ravine Goyave	3	2%
Savane Long	3	2%
Savane Mitan	1	1%
Savann Bet	1	1%
Ti Jounen	2	1%
Ti Kenep	24	12%
Total	196	100%

Table XX.2: Notabs' Locality of Residence (Naran Section Only)

<i>Abitasyon</i>	Freq.	Percentage
Ba Savanne a Palme	1	1%
Bwa Woui	2	2%
Do Bois Pin 1	5	6%
Do Bwa Pen 1	2	2%
Fon Chaplet	1	1%
Kann Towo	2	2%
Kantvonobi	6	7%
Kanven	3	4%
Lagwaioul	1	1%
Larique	4	5%
Larique 2	7	8%
Lasolable	8	10%
Lokapa	1	1%
Mawoui	3	4%
Mon Doflon	1	1%
Mousanbe	1	1%
Nan Fig	6	7%
Nan Palmis	2	2%
Panache	3	4%
Ramier	1	1%
Rantchionobi	1	1%
Savane a Palme	12	14%
Severine	1	1%
Tou le Jou	8	10%
Zoranj Dous	2	2%
Total	84	100%

Table XX.3: Notabs' Locality of Residence (Savane Grande Section Only)		
<i>Abitasyon</i>	Freq.	Percentage
Bas Cinquieme	6	4%
Basia	14	8%
Bassin Cave	9	5%
Bwa Pini	10	6%
Bwa Piti	1	1%
Bwa Sak Mapou	1	1%
Cinquieme	7	4%
Dlo Gaye	7	4%
Do Latanier	8	5%
Dodiyo	2	1%
Fon pikan	3	2%
Kafou Lonbraj	1	1%
Kajou	5	3%
Kalbasye	2	1%
Kola	1	1%
Lagwabit	1	1%
Letan	2	1%
Madame Joie	6	4%
Mosanbe	19	12%
Nan Citron	4	2%
Nan Nwel	6	4%
Nan Vrina	1	1%
Palwat 1	2	1%
Palwat 2	2	1%
Rosal	1	1%
Sabien	1	1%
Savanarant	1	1%
Savane a Pye	8	5%
Savane Ggrande 2	1	1%
Savane Grande 1	12	7%
Savann Bet	8	5%
Savien	1	1%
Selpet	5	3%
Severine	1	1%
Sous Inyam	3	2%
Viric	1	1%
Vye Fou	1	1%
Zakastra	1	1%
Total	165	100%

Table XX.1: Beneficiaries' Locality of Residence (Hatty Section Only)		
Locality	Freq.	Percentage
Batey	35	2%
Batey 1	17	1%
Batey 2	63	4%
Berbenal	51	3%
Billiguy 1	10	1%
Billiguy 2	102	6%
Cola Figi	17	1%
Do Moron	20	1%
Glasi Bourik	8	0%
Gouf Kano	18	1%
Grande Savane	77	5%
Hatty 1	218	13%
Hatty 2	38	2%
Kapat	106	6%
Lagoun 1	55	3%
Lagoun 2	37	2%
Losabit	17	1%
Lospine	101	6%
Nan fou	10	1%
Osenande	119	7%
Pennen	99	6%
Port au Ciel 1	187	11%
Ravine Goyave	29	2%
Savane Long	4	0%
Savane Longue	34	2%
Savane Mitan	10	1%
Savann Bet	5	0%
Ti Jounen	20	1%
Ti Kenep	143	8%
Zan Nanna	42	2%
Total	1692	100%

Table XX.2: Beneficiaries' Locality of Residence Naran Section Only)		
<i>Abitasyon</i>	Freq.	Percentage
Ba Savanne a Palme	7	1%
Bouchi	2	0%
Bwa Wouj	18	2%
Do Bwa pen 1	42	5%
Dodilenma	1	0%
Kann Towo	13	2%
Kantyonobi	63	8%
Kanyan	28	4%
Lagwajoul	10	1%
Larique	32	4%
Larique 2	62	8%
Lasolable	72	9%
Lokapa	15	2%
Mawouj	30	4%
Mon Doflon	8	1%
Mousanbe	10	1%
Na	1	0%
Nan Fig	60	8%
Nan Palmis	19	2%
Palwat 2	1	0%
Panache	29	4%
Pouchi	1	0%
Ramier	9	1%
Rantchionobi	10	1%
Savane a Palme	120	16%
Severine	10	1%
Tou le Jou	79	10%
Zoranj Dous	18	2%
Total	770	100%

Table XX.3: Beneficiaries' Locality of Residence (Savane Grande Section Only)

<i>Abitasyon</i>	Freq.	Percentage
Bas Cinquieme	53	4%
Basia	113	8%
Bassin Cave	81	6%
Bwa Jofri	1	0%
Bwa Pini	93	6%
Bwa Piti	1	0%
Bwa sak Mapou	10	1%
Cinquieme	68	5%
Dlo Gaye	57	4%
Do Latanier	55	4%
Dodiyo	19	1%
Fon Pikan	27	2%
Jilo	3	0%
Kafou Lonbraj	10	1%
Kajou	50	3%
Kalbasye	12	1%
Kola	10	1%
Lagwabit	9	1%
Larique	10	1%
Larique 2	1	0%
Letan	18	1%
Madame Joie	58	4%
Mosanbe	171	12%
Nan Citron	48	3%
Nan Meri	3	0%
Nan Nwel	50	3%
Nan Pone	1	0%
Nan vrina	5	0%
Palma	3	0%
Palwat 1	18	1%
Palwat 2	19	1%
Rodon	1	0%
Rosal	10	1%
Sabien	7	0%
Savane a Pye	78	5%
Savane Grande	2	0%
Savane Grande 1	94	7%

Table XX.3: Beneficiaries' Locality of Residence (Savane Grande Section Only)		
Savane Grande 2	4	0%
Savann Bet	67	5%
Savann Longue	1	0%
Savien	2	0%
Selpet	42	3%
Severine	11	1%
Sous Inyam	21	1%
Vye Fou	9	1%
Vye Hate	3	0%
Yo Pyed	1	0%
Zakastra	10	1%
Total	1440	100%

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12. Notes

ⁱ <http://www.worldlifeexpectancy.com/cause-of-death/malnutrition/by-country/>

ⁱⁱ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/communitydrivendevelopment/brief/cdd-targeting-selection>

ⁱⁱⁱ Implied in this is just distribution of aid as, “[a]ssistance will be guided solely by need and will not discriminate in terms of ethnic origin, nationality, political opinion, gender, race or religion. In a country, assistance will be targeted to those most at risk from the consequences of food shortages, following a sound assessment that considers the different needs and” Humanitarian Principles (WFP/EB.A/2004/5-C):

^{iv} “... ensuring that food goes to people who need it and only those who need is critical to minimizing the collateral harm done by aid” (WFP: Targeting in Complex Emergencies, Programme Guidance Notes p 2)

^v Whether aid programs have achieved, the objectives of relieving suffering and promoting sovereignty are topics of contention. Whether or not harm has been done is vague and even in those cases where harm clearly has been one, it is seldom clear whether the good outweighs the bad: does saving 1,000 starving children while crashing the local agricultural market for 50,000 farmers justify the intervention?

^{vi} We do not include vulnerability analyses, needs assessments or mapping as we consider it a separate exercise, embedded in Beneficiary Detection Strategy.

^{vii} Lavalée et al (2010) confine the definition to income but the same method can be used to profile families for criteria other than income, for example, land ownership, family size, refugee status, and victims of disaster: if they are on a list they qualify.

^{viii} In effect, allotting for sampling error, distribution of wealth within Haiti’s 10 Departments is essentially equal for all except the West, where the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince is located (and is substantially lower at 20.1).

^{ix} This situation only slightly improved in 1999, as 48.0% were then categorized as poor. In 2001, the HLCS stated that 55.6% of households lived with less than US\$1 per day (Echevin 2011: 2)

^x Un **ménage** se définit comme un **groupe de personnes**, avec ou non un lien de sang, qui vivent ensemble dans le **même logement** (parois et toit) depuis **au moins six (6) mois** et qui **partagent la nourriture** et reconnaissent l’autorité du **même chef de ménage** (homme ou femme). On considère que les personnes qui résident dans le logement depuis moins de 6 mois mais comptent y rester sont aussi des membres du ménage.

^{xi} Based on data from Far-West region of Haiti, approximately 25% of rural children spend their early years in the homes of their grandparents, often with the mother and father absent (Schwartz 2009).

^{xii} Another example of multi-household interlinkages can be seen with polygyny, if not legal, a socially recognized practice in rural Haiti wherein all the women in union with the man are acknowledged as his *madan* (“wives”); or to put it from the perspective of the women, all of them recognize him as their husband and many are willing to defend--by violence if necessary and with the support of their own extended families (see Schwartz 2009: Chapter 16)—the rights that they and their children have to material support from him. Haitian women are often rather blunt about their rights, a common refrain being, “married women and women with children have the same strength to fight.” Nor is polygyny rare. Estimates for men age 50 or over have been engaged, at some time in their lives, in more than one recognized conjugal union range in the areas of 50% (Murray 1977; Schwartz 2009)

^{xiii} Specifically, all over rural Haiti the prevailing and socially recognized pattern is that the land is supplied and house built by the man: the single most important ingredient in cementing a conjugal union, more important in the eyes of the couple and the community than the act of legal marriage. In this way, the man owns the house but the woman has inviolable usufruct rights in the name of the children, meaning those rights are dependent on her having children with the man who built the house for her. If there is a conflict between the man and woman it is—except in all cases female infidelity on the property-- the man, according to customary law, must leave

^{xiv} Turning the argument on its head, the critique from people who insist that we focus on the households is that we cannot isolate the individual from the household. A malnourished child may be construed as an indicator that the household is suffering/”vulnerable.” The assumption is that adults make sacrifices for the children; hence if a child is malnourished most people in the household must be suffering as well. But we are unaware of statistical evidence that children tend to become malnourished along with the rest of the household. Moreover, a child might be suffering neglect in the household for any number of reasons: illness and worms are two common causes. Buried in this association of the malnourished child being an indicator of a vulnerability for the entire household is common generalization of individual characteristics to the entire households. Such that USAID Best (2013) talks of “handicapped families” we can talk of “Malnourished households.” The potential to encourage the creation of a society of victims should not be overlooked. And in this respect we seem to have learned little. After the earthquake in tent cities we saw the creation of households precisely to capture aid, something that respondents in camps consistently linked to high pregnancy rates (LTL Strategies 2011; CARE International 2013). But the fact is that households come together, dissolve, reconstitute. They are in fact the first safety net for individuals. And while it might seem logical to step in and shore up the safety net, the way to do that would be to bolster their economic base, not subsidize it thereby create ‘victim’ rather than ‘productive’ *raison d’être*. The last thing that we, as representatives of agencies trying to create sustainable livelihoods should be trying to do is sustain unsustainable households. If we focus on the individual, rather than the household, we may be able to avoid that. Moreover, if we give the goods/aid to the individual rather than the household than it increases the value of the vulnerable individual and it preserves his or her flexibility in moving from the household if condition are unfavorable.

^{xv} In understanding the dynamics of these inter-household linkages note that it's not really about the household at all. It is about the individual. Based on the linkages of individuals and social investment, the individual is a more useful unit of analysis in understanding differential degrees of vulnerability. Similarly, members of households do not collectively own nor think of themselves as the collective owners of anything. The "household", for example, does not own a bicycle; someone in the household owns a bicycle. Nor does the household own a hoe, someone in the house owns the hoe. Nor does the household own land; land is owned individually such that a male household head owns land that is farmed to the benefit of a different household; woman may have land farmed in conjunction with family that also goes to benefit a different household, such as that of their brother's household. Nor does the absence of anyone in the household owning land mean that no land being worked on behalf of members of the household. Land can be rented, sharecropped, borrowed or simply be state land). A man or men who are not members of the household can be working land the produce of which will belong to a woman or women who are members of the household. Even the trees in the yard may have a variety of specific owners some of whom are not even members of the household; a tree may be sold, as in the case of fruit trees, it may be rented or hocked to outsiders. Not even the house belongs to the household: it is rather a complexly owned entity embodied in specific rights and duties that, in cases of extended families with generations on the same property, involve spiritual rights and duties. Indeed, for the people living in the household, ownership and household membership might include people who have long been dead.

^{xvi} The exact phrasing is, "d'un outil de ciblage unique qui peut distinguer les ménages selon son niveau de vulnérabilité et que tous les programmes peuvent utiliser"

^{xvii} Thus, the presence or absence of electricity is a function of distance to the electric pole. For example, areas of the Plateau Central that are electrified are so simply because of the good fortune of being located near the path the electric lines were laid in getting electricity to the cities. Moreover, no studies were found demonstrating that electricity brings economic benefits to those households that do have access to it. Anecdotally we know of no benefits other than lighting to see and read by and perhaps a television. For example, while 11% of rural households report owning a television, only 2.7% own a refrigerator (EMMUS 2012).

^{xviii} It is interesting to note regarding infrastructure that even roads yield counter-intuitive data: Sletten and Egset (2004:17) report that the rural poor and extremely poor are, respectively, 4 and 3 times more likely to have a road leading to their house than the non-poor.

^{xix} HAZ strongly corresponded with the Child MUAC (upper arm circumference), WHZ (Weight for Height; referred to as wasting and an indicator of acute malnutrition and hence short term vulnerability), and WAZ (Weight for Height; an intermediate variable that can be conceptualized as a combination of impact of chronic and acute malnutrition). HAZ for children also correlated strongly with reproductive age female body mass index (BMI) (see Annex). A limiting factor in the use of nutritional variables was that they were available only for children 6 to 59 months of age: 816 of the 3,501 households had no children in this age range, leaving 2,685 households in the sample with children ages (ages 6-60 months) containing for each personal information and health statistics. For only 2,025 of the 2,686 children was it possible to pair health statistics with

household data. For these 2,025 observations HAZ z-score were analyzed because they provided the greatest variability in the data: 18.2% suffered from moderate malnutrition; 1.3% suffered from severe malnutrition. All things being equal, the likelihood of a child in the dataset is malnourished is 19.5%.

To determine the Z scores—number of standard deviations from the mean for normal children--the database of 2,685 children was analyzed using the Emergency Nutrition Assessment (ENA) tool and the World Health Organization 2005 Malnutrition Standards. ENA automatically removed outliers (greater than 4 standards deviations above or below the mean for normal children) and unlikely observations (based on correlations with other nutritional observations), a total of 124 children, leaving WHZ z-scores of 2,561 children. According to the tool and the WHO malnutrition standards, 10% (256 children) suffered from moderate malnutrition and 0.6% (16 children) suffered from severe malnutrition),

The Emergency Nutrition Assessment tool uses WHZ (weight-for-height z-scores) as an indicator of malnutrition. While this is a logical indicator of "sudden" or "immediate" malnutrition we do not believe it is a reliable measure for "long-term" malnutrition. To measure "long-term" or "perpetual" malnutrition we believe HAZ (height-for-age z-scores) is a better tool and is more suitable for Haiti's nutritional situation.

The ENA tool omits observations in its automated Plausibility Check for the following reasons: "probably height is incorrect"; "probably weight is incorrect". These reasons were identified as the cause for 200+ observations to be flagged as "improbable" because WHZ, WAZ, and HAZ scores were too varied. These metrics, if all measuring malnutrition, should be correlated, but certainly not perfectly correlated. But as shown below this not what we see in the data:

WAZ: (WAZ, HAZ $r=0.61$); (WAZ, WHZ $r=0.64$)
 HAZ: (HAZ, WAZ $r=0.61$); (HAZ, WHZ $r=-0.20$)
 WHZ: (WHZ, WAZ $r=0.64$); (WHZ, HAZ $r=-0.20$)

Using the 2,631 children observations that fall within four standard deviations of the global mean, the following distribution of health status was seen in the population. As shown below, using HAZ provides the greatest variability among the three categories "severely malnourished"; "malnourished", and "good health".

WAZ: Severely Malnourished 1%; Malnourished 11%; Good Health 88%
 HAZ: Severely Malnourished 4%; Malnourished 18%; Good Health 78%
 WHZ: Severely Malnourished 1%; Malnourished 5%; Good Health 94%

^{xx} As mentioned above, 816 of the 3,501 households had no children in this age range, leaving 2,685 households in the sample with children ages (ages 6-60 months) containing for each personal information and "health statistics" the term health statistics is limited to (i) chronic disease, (ii) recent illness, and (iii) disability/handicap. This information was collected for all people in the household survey regardless of age. Fewer households than children were used because in many

situations two or more children in the malnutrition data were coded as belonging to the same household.

Observations/records: 2,689
 Unique households: 1,978
 Households w/ 6 children: 2
 Households w/ 5 children: 5
 Households w/ 4 children: 13
 Households w/ 3 children: 80
 Households w/ 2 children: 482
 Households w/ 1 child: 1,396

247 were removed b/c the Emergency Nutritional Assessment application identified their records as suspicious--i.e. outliers. These results are found in the attached file **ENA Plausibility Check 140203.rtf**.

^{xxi} Nor is there any suggestion that even being female disposes individuals to being disadvantaged. On the contrary, throughout Haiti mothers and father prefer daughters over sons (EMMUS 2012, Schwartz 2000, 2013). The Understanding Children's Work Project (2006), concluded that Haitian boys more often than girls work outside the home, they work harder than girls, and they work for longer hours than girls. In her 2006 Gender Assessment for USAID, Gardella emphasized that Haitians show no gender preference in educating their children. In both urban and rural areas more Haitian females have finished primary school than males (86.6% to 85.2% for urban areas and 73.2% to 72.4% in rural areas) and more urban based females have completed secondary school (41.9 %to 39.1%). Only with regard to completion of secondary school in rural areas do boys prevail (20.0% to 11.7%: see EMMUS 2012). Indeed, for those concerned about gender differential treatment of children a good case can be made that it is Haitian boys, not girls, who are in need of special attention: in addition to the educational differences favoring girls, the 2005-06 EMMUS found that chronic malnutrition was significantly greater among boys (25% vs 20%: p.162); the same was true for child mortality (143/1,000 boys to 132/1,000 for girls 0 to 62 months of age: p. 86).

^{xxii} *Non. M pa ka dako, sa pa ka itil ou anyen. Wi, eskè m-ap touche 500 dola le mwa, epi m pa gen yon moun pou m di ale la, al pran ti gallon, al pran empè dlo pou mwen. Ala m-ap touche 500 dola le mwa, ala se pa desann m-ap desann, se pa grandi m-ap grandi. Tout tann,, m pap desann? . . . Première byen yon moun se pitit-o. Chyen ap manje o.*

^{xxiii} *Non. Paskè ou gen lajan la, si ou al jwenn yon moun pou fe yon bagay pou ou, li rete la. Min ti moun an, depi m malad la, gade pitit um ap bouye pou mwen, ap lave pou mwen, ap bagay pou mwen. E te lajan li te ye li pa tap fe anyen pou mwen.*

^{xxiv} *Pou ki sa m fe ti moun? Mwen pa konprann. Ti moun la pou sevi ... Tout kondi sevis pa-ou. Pa-ou, kondi sevis pa ou. M pa ka konprann sa-k mennen lakay ou....*

^{xxv} Echevin (2011) used data for durable assets from the 1995, 2000 and 2005 EMMUS' to come up with a similar indicator of rural poverty assets. He tested the measure against malnutrition and came up with a similar rates of the extremely poor and poor.

^{xxvi} Beginning in 2005 and running until 2010 the Office of Monetization of the Development Assistance Program (BMPAD) implemented the World Bank funded PRODEP in 59 rural and peri-urban municipalities (PRODEP) and in 18 urban municipalities (PRODEPUR). CBOs were organized in Participatory Development Support Council (CADEP) that handled grants selected through competitive proposals and bidding process. CADEP members were instructed in modern management scheme with multiple entities responsible for signatures and oversights, bank accounts specific to projects, and fund disbursement that require multiple signatures. The CADEPs contracted workers, performed, oversaw, communicated with beneficiaries and donors, analysed and managed voting of projects, approval and transfer of funds to CBOs, monitored and supervised. According to the World Bank 70% of the projects were successful. An 8 month independent investigation by Haiti Grass Roots Watch claims 40% of the projects were not monitored, that many were “captured” by village elites and channelled toward special interests and that the entire program worked against representative political process, all of which sounds suspiciously similar to critiques of CBT from the 1980s (<http://www.globalresearch.ca/world-bank-success-undermines-haitian-democracy/5321808>)

^{xxvii} However, this proved to be an unwieldy number, and it was gradually reduced to the present 108 through the consolidation of smaller councils.

^{xxix} “konsey mangey”(councils formed to obtain food) and “konsey serye” (“serious councils” that engaged in substantive development projects).

^{xxx} Some more from White and Smucker (1986) on the topic of why Community Councils fail so badly, all highly pertinent to points made earlier on in this report.

Peasant farmers also seek out and nurture other ties and obligations including patron-client relations, fictive kinship (e.g. god parent-hood), and special interpersonal relationships. In so doing, peasants actively manage their networks of special ties as personal assets - a domain of social capital based on the norms of transaction and reciprocity page 2

In order to survive, the majority of Haitians exploit their most important asset and their primary form of social security - their stock of informal social capital. Exploiting this capital means investing in and drawing down on their networks of social relations and obligations.... The poor have an excess supply of labor - their only tradable asset. Therefore, investment in traditional forms of social capital is an important survival strategy. This strategy requires complex maneuvers to maintain good social relations, generate new stocks of social assets by incurring new ties and obligations, bank favors with wealthier individuals, and avoid conflict with family and neighbors. This survival strategy imposes intense pressures on those with assets to redistribute. In effect, it also creates a leveling mechanism that constrains the accumulation of capital. In a context of growing poverty and declining sector performance, this social pressure poses additional constraints on entrepreneurs and economic growth in the small-scale private sector. page 12

The informal system evolved to ensure social security and manage conflict. Traditional social networks continue to define behavior and social organization in rural and urban

areas. Social assets serve as Haiti's primary social safety net for the poor and the not-so-poor - a hedge against the vagaries of political and economic shocks. page 12

Policies and programs promoting reform in the formal sector - especially government agencies - will be frustrated unless they take into account the intense social pressures on personnel to maintain a diversity of income sources, and privilege their network obligations over official duties. page 13

Despite recent innovations in governance, and massive popular support for fundamental changes in the system, the underlying traditional character of the state still persists. Overall, its solid base in vertical power relations has tended to be remarkably stable for the past two centuries. page 6

^{xxxi} It should be borne in mind that it is not the challenges people face on the average day, week or year that determine whether they survive: it is the extremes. It is the periods of drought, crop devastation, and hunger. When crisis hits, it is then that people are carried to the brink that they die, or the household breaks up and its members search for alternatives. It is the extremes and not the mean that determine long term adaptive patterns.

^{xxxii} But it is not just hopeful beneficiaries who game the system it would be grossly unfair to beneficiaries to leave out the fact that NGOs, whether international or grassroots also game the system, scholars game the system and consultants game the system. They game the system in pursuit of funding, in pursuit of prestige associated with exaggerating the system. Indeed, while it is politically inexpedient to say so, most NGO and public service workers know the extent of the problem. From claiming 350,000 *restavek*, calling them “slave children” to claiming that 6% of women in Port-au-Prince were raped in the 6 weeks after the earthquake (Kolbe et. al 2010). Most readers will agree with that aid agencies, whether for the poor or to meet their own salaries, also game the system. For those readers who do not agree or who take objection, the point is arguably even more poignant: there is very little factually based and agreed means to discriminate between what are real and what are contrived problems. It might—just might—be excusable when controversial or factually questionable claims are intended to raise donations for the handicapped, impoverished women and children. But it should not be excusable when the issue is hungry individuals and mis-targeting could mean depriving those most in need.

^{xxxiii} GOH 2006 DÉCRET PORTANT SUR L'ORGANISATION ET LE FONCTIONNEMENT DES SECTIONS COMMUNALES BONIFACE ALEXANDRE PRÉSIDENT PROVISOIRE DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE

Donné au Palais national, à Port-au-Prince, le 1^e février 2006, An 203^e de l'Indépendance
Article 4.- Le territoire de la Section communale est organisé en quartiers, en habitations et en villages. Les quartiers sont des zones d'habitats rapprochés que ce soit en milieu urbain ou rural. Les habitations sont des zones d'habitats dispersés identifiés comme tels par la tradition. On distingue l'habitation de 500 habitants ou moins, de la grande habitation qui en compte plus. Le village est le chef-lieu de la Section communale. Il regroupe les services administratifs et sociaux de base de la Section communale.

Article 9.- Les membres de l'Assemblée Municipale (AM) sont élus au suffrage universel indirect par les Assemblées de Sections communales (Asec) sur des listes de candidats (es) proposés (es) par les associations des habitations ou des quartiers de la Section communale, régulièrement enregistrées à la mairie de la commune. Chaque association habilitée présente à l'Asec deux candidats : un homme et une femme. Les membres de l'Assemblée municipale sont indéfiniment rééligibles.

1987 Sous-section 2.1.-De la Section communale

Article 15.- La Section communale est la collectivité territoriale de base. Son territoire est organisé en quartiers, en habitations et en villages. Le village est le chef lieu de la section communale.

Article 29.- Les membres de l'Assemblée de Section communale sont élus au suffrage universel direct au niveau de chaque habitation ou quartier, sur des listes de candidats proposées par les associations de ces habitations ou de ces quartiers régulièrement enregistrées à la mairie de la commune. La loi détermine le nombre de membres à l'assemblée au prorata du nombre d'habitants dans la Section communale. Article 30.- Les membres de l'Assemblée municipale sont élus au suffrage universel indirect par les assemblées de Sections communales, sur des listes de candidats (es) proposés (es) par les associations des habitations ou des quartiers de la Section communale régulièrement enregistrées à la mairie de la commune.

^{xxxiv} *Eske w ka di nou ki notab, fi kou gason, ki nan bitasyon o lokalite kote ou rete ki onèt, serye ke pi fò moun respekté, epi ki toujou sèvi byen ak moun nan lokalite a, oswa ki konn bay popilasyon bon jan bourad, bon jan sèvis san moun pa.*

^{xxxv} *“moun ki plis kon domi san manje nan lokalite/bitasyon an kote ou rete. Se non chef kay la nou bezwenn. Li met fi kou gason”*

^{xxxvi} *Bonjou. Mwen travay avek CNSA. Nap fe yon anket sou notab nan zon nan pou ede moun ki nan bezwenn. Ou menm ou ka ede nou nan travay sa a. Eske w ka di nou ki notab, fi kou gason, ki nan bitasyon o lokalite kote ou rete ki onèt, serye ke pi fò moun respekté, epi ki toujou sèvi byen ak moun nan lokalite a, oswa ki konn bay popilasyon bon jan bourad, bon jan sèvis san moun pa.*

^{xxxvii} *Bonjou. Mwen travay avek CNSA. Nou sot fe yon anket nan zon pa w. Nou te mande moun kiyès ki se yon bon Moun fityab epi non pa w se yon ki moun plis nonmen. Kounyea nou pral mande plizyè lòt Moun tankou w pou ede nou fè lis moun ki plis kon domi san manje nan lokalite/bitasyon an kote ou rete. Se non chef kay la nou bezwenn. Li met fi kou gason. Nou pral fè tout lis nap jwenn yo fè yon sèl pou n ka kontwole si gen non ki parèt plizyè fwa osnon ki parèt yon sèl fwa. Epitou nou pral kontwole, ak yon echantyon nan lis la, si moun ki konsène yo reyèlman nan gangou. PI DEVAN, lè lis definitiv la fin fèt, pral gen koze pou detèmine kilès nan "kay" yo ki pou resevwa oswa jere ed la. Si se youn ou lòt (nan koze distribyon), si se youn ak lòt (nan koze pwojè devlopman). Si lis ou bay nou mache byen avek lot lis nou jwenn nan min lot notab, nou pral mande ou patisipe plis epi nap rekonet ou kom yon vreman notab.*

^{xxxviii} *Again, this is a politically sensitive and for some may be an inappropriately included in the present report. But it is the political reality and if the CNSA, WFP and other partners are going to effectively operate within the system that exists—and not the one that *should* exist—it is expedient that they keep in mind the prevailing characteristics of that system. The most conspicuous*

characteristic is that has emerged in the 28 years of political and economic turmoil described above, is run-amuck system of aid. Prior to the earthquake there were only 170 foreign NGOS registered with the Ministry of Planning. Estimates of how many were really in the country ran as high as 10,000 foreign aid organizations and missionaries. Evidence of just how out of control the system had become is that this was a figure officially cited by the highest ranking representatives of the aid community; and it was based on a typo in a World Bank Report. The real figure was probably closer to 1,000 organizations. The chaotic aid free-free-all within Haiti is not a phenomenon confined to foreign NGOs. Some of the most important Haitian NGOs received foreign funds are not registered with the State. Their source, the World Bank (1998), gives a significantly different summation of the numbers: specifically, "FAO reports that the most reliable estimates concerning the number of NGOs in Haiti put them at 800. Some advance the figure of 2000. The number of NGOs registered with the Ministry of Planning is 170 (FAO, Vol. 1, 1995)."