



2023 HAITI FRAGILITY BRIEF

Jérémy Cotton, Mark Hammel, and Luna
Noofoory¹

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The African slaves who manumitted¹ themselves from the French in 1804 changed their nation to its Taino name: “Ayiti”, or Haiti, means “high mountains”. The uneven terrain which covers much of the country’s 27,065km² is home to the larger half of a mountainous watershed Haiti shares with the Dominican Republic. This area is home to roughly 5 million people and declining, while the capital Port-au-Prince and its satellites is home to roughly 6 million and increasing. A large majority of Haitians are of African origin, follow Christian and Vodou beliefs, and speak Haitian Creole or French (Haiti’s official languages). Haiti is particularly vulnerable to climate change and natural disasters as a result of ecocidal policies, a lack of sufficient disaster preparedness, and geographic location. Haiti’s political system has been equally susceptible to shocks, suffering from corruption, foreign exploitation, and political interference constantly throughout its long history. Haiti has seen several de-facto one-man Presidential regimes since January 2015, when President Michel Martelly dissolved Haiti’s National Assembly.² His successor, President Jovenel Moïse did the same in January 2020.³ Haiti’s turbulence and the apparent incapacity of the state to account for the needs of the population have resulted in several periods of urgent international attention in the wake of the 2010 and 2021 earthquakes.

The Haitian state has tended to have as much incentive to fight against the population as to serve it, and a culture of political violence has thrived for those at the top. Up until now, Haitian poverty has been profitable for an elite few. Today, Haiti is the poorest country in the Latin America region, and one of the poorest countries in the world. Haiti is prone to environmental shocks, such as the 7.0 magnitude earthquake that struck the country in 2010. Decades of unrelenting social and political shocks had left a hollow state unable to direct what few resources it had, nor the respective spike in aid flow, effectively. Codependence between the Haitian ownership class and the foreign interests in Haiti has resulted in an increasingly violent struggle for power by elites, arming and unleashing mercenaries or police against rival elite and neighborhood alike. The scourge of violence has now multiplied out of control, with gang leaders claiming open fiefdoms practically unchecked, primarily using sexual violence to terrorize the population.⁴ Even before the current unchecked crisis, democratic demonstrations from an alienated majority have been met with lethal force by an insecure government. Thus the picture of state fragility in Haiti is multidimensional: the government is pinned in a legitimacy trap by a pattern of gangsterization and weak state capacity.

The feedback loops which reproduce the crises in Haiti cannot be simply problematized. Indeed, many issues identified in this analysis are not unique to Haiti: the lack of distributive justice and the damage it causes to public trust in the state and between communities; rising urbanization, scarcity, and disease due to climate change and land despoliation; worsening elite capture and political interruption by domestic and foreign elites. Much of the world currently experiences each of these trends to some degree while, much like in Haiti, decaying patriarchal-colonialist institutions pose an existential threat to democratic efforts. In Haiti, these institutions have been upheld by violence, and where they fail it is often more violence that emerges in the vacuum. Whether this cultural trauma will continue to reproduce is the one trend for which this report does not directly offer a policy option. While it will be necessary to somehow disarm the increasing gang violence and address the roots of gangsterism in Haitian culture, this in itself will not resolve the Haitian crisis. This report offers a conjunction of policy options tailored to Canadian foreign policy based on a political economy which locates Haiti within the wider systems of coloniality that constitute so much of global North-South relations. Through cooperation with Haiti, we believe Canada is well-positioned to play a role in the burgeoning of new, decolonial principles of engagement between and within peoples of all nations.

METHODOLOGY

This report followed closely the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy’s (CIFP) framework developed at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, based in Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. For this analysis, we collected qualitative and quantitative data from mixed sources on six structural indicators: Security & Crime, Governance, Economic Development, Human Development, Demography & Population, and Environment.⁵ This data was then reframed into an ALC (Authority, Legitimacy, Capacity) framework and analyzed for critical outcomes, key stakeholders, current status, and trends. Best case, worst case, most likely, and wildcard scenarios are derived from this ALC analysis. We derive the policy options presented in this report from this analytical process.

BACKGROUND

Haiti was once an island of peoples on the island of Quisqueya (“mother of all lands”). Colonized by the Spanish, it became France’s wealthiest colony. The Haitian Revolution created the world’s first black republic in 1804, a name given to it by the island’s indigenous people, and for generations they were branded and embargoed by white nations.⁶ In 1947, Haiti finally repaid the \$30 billion (conservative estimate)⁷ debt imposed on them by France for their freedom. Haiti suffered no better in modernity being a colony of former slaves a short boat ride away from the United States, when US marines invaded in 1912 and shipped the wealth of the Haitian Treasury to New York for the American corporation, Citibank. The occupation ended in 1934, after much of the Haitian constitution and economy had been shaped for US interests. Haitians now grew sugar and coffee for US business on American-owned property after constitutional changes enabled foreigners to own land. They sewed baseballs and gloves in factories owned by a white-dominated elite and saw no return for their labor thanks to colonial/international economic engineering.⁸ In this new ‘independence’, a long list of Haitian leaders were assassinated, interrupted, and corrupted by the vicious competition that the unequal advantage of Haiti’s controlling interests could afford.

To date, there have been two United Nations missions in Haiti. The first one, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)⁹, which ended in October 2017, was not successful in stabilizing Haiti politically, although the presence of MINUSTAH saw an increase in Haiti’s GDP. After the expiry of MINUSTAH, the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) was launched in June 2019¹⁰. Political violence and gang violence are trends throughout the modern history of Haiti since the Duvalier administration’s infamous *Tonton Macoute* political death squads. This political violence is well captured by the July 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse¹¹, but there are many other cases of assassination of government officials and activists, such as the murder of Eric Jean Baptiste, popular leader of Rally of Progressive National Democrats Party (RNDP) in October 2022¹². Criminality and gang violence are an embedded reality in Haiti, and the pattern of political suppression and terror has been to some extent reproduced by every government. Gang actions have ranged from kidnapping key figures to the dismantling of institutions. In June 2022, the 5 Seconds gang took control of Port-Au-Prince’s Palace of Justice, “forced judicial officials out, injured a prosecutor, and stole computers, desks, and other assets”, according to Human Rights Watch.¹³ Between September and November 2022, the G9 gang alliance took control of the Varreux terminal—a key fuel depot in Haiti—and imposed a two-month fuel blockade¹⁴ in response to a decree which cut fuel subsidies. Since November 2022, the U.S. and Canada have imposed sanctions on Haitian politicians and Haitian elites over drug trafficking and gangsterism.¹⁵

STAKEHOLDERS

- **Key Internal Stakeholders**

Executive Branch

The current state of Haiti’s executive branch is marked by the assassination of Jovenel Moïse, leaving Haiti without a President since July of 2021 after Moïse’s highly divisive tenure saw increasingly authoritarian reforms unilaterally imposed by the presidency. Haiti is a presidential republic with national elections that have been consistently contested as illegitimate since 2004. Ariel Henry is the country’s acting Prime Minister, and has been recognized as legitimate and backed by the international community despite the expiration of his mandate on February 7 of 2022.¹⁶ Haiti has had no sitting parliament since 2020 and the Prime Minister’s office rules by decree.¹⁷ Henry has stated that he will remain in office until Presidential elections can be held, signing the September 11 Accord with the PHTK party and their political allies affirming full Executive powers to Henry and a Ministerial commission appointed by him.¹⁸ The PHTK party along with the church and core commercial elites are the main entities in support of Henry.¹⁹ Henry is thought to have close ties with the country’s entrenched powers and is known to have participated in the 2004 coup against Aristide, with some circumstantial but not-insignificant evidence linking him directly to the assassination of Moïse.²⁰ The administration’s visible political support resides almost entirely within the PHTK majority party and the ‘Core Group’ of US, France & Canada; what little popular legitimacy he may have claimed has suffered from his relationship with these parties.²¹ Overall, he is regarded by many Haitian people as illegitimate and/or as an extension of the decade-long foreign-backed PHTK regime reviled by Haitian popular sentiment.²²

National Assembly

The Haitian National Assembly is a bicameral institution composed of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. According to the amended 1987 Haitian constitution, the Prime Minister is appointed by the President while the Assembly has the duty of ratifying the policies of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The Chamber of Deputies is currently defunct, having been dissolved by decree in 2015 under President Martelly. Senate seats are one-third filled with not enough for a quorum. The current Senate President is Gary Bodeau of the PHTK, leading a fractured Senate. Senate terms last for 6 years, with one-third of the membership renewed every 2 years. Given that the last runoff elections were held in 2017, the few remaining Senators will see their mandates expire in 2023.²³ Several senior independent and PHTK Senators, including Gary Bodeau himself, have been the target of sanctions by Canada for corruption and supporting gang activity.²⁴ Although the NA is currently defunct, it nonetheless is the only defined institution with the power to pass laws democratically and can be considered as a potential key stakeholder in the context of the Haitian crisis.

Gangs

The “G9 Family” gang alliance is led by Jimmy “BBQ” Cherizier, a former anti-gang police officer. Established in 2020, the ‘alliance’ is a territorial network of local, insular gang factions that have risen in number and intensity in the wake of the devastation of the 2021 earthquake.²⁵ The G9 capitalized on the death of President Moïse and the ensuing chaos in order to expand their territory throughout Port-au-Prince, where gangs in general control more than 60% of the city. The G9 is estimated to be only one of 95 distinct gang elements in Haiti and currently controls large areas of Port-au-Prince. Cherizier is unique in that he often expresses political rhetoric and justifications for actions such as the takeover of the Varreux port terminal, namely to act in the benefit of the poorest majority of Haitians against the Core-Group-backed entrenched powers popularly perceived to be responsible for Haiti’s plight.²⁶ That said, no gang enjoys a legitimate reputation, and horrific violence is common.²⁷ Gangs are responsible for widespread acts of sexual violence, theft, ransom, looting, and murder, usually in the context of territorial warfare between fiefdoms²⁸. Many if not all gangs regularly cooperate with domestic and foreign elites to serve oligarchic interests through kidnapping, murder, and the intimidation of neighborhoods.²⁹ Gangs inevitably benefit to some extent (usually through provision of arms, immunity, and rent privileges) through cooperation with ruling powers, who seem to have accepted the gangsterization of the state as the de-facto form of governance. Gangs impose tariffs on their territory with impunity, including the extortion of police stations, and have been reported freely using police-owned equipment such as armored vehicles. Several prominent gangs, such as 400 Mawozo, have set up ‘courts’ in their territories by which they punish civilians in their fiefs.³⁰

CSOs & Montana Accord Coalition

August 2021 saw a coalition formed from a wide swathe of civil society organizations in support of what has become known as the Montana Accord.³¹ This coalition has produced a series of documents outlining an alternative proposition to Ariel Henry’s call for Presidential elections and international intervention. The documents call for a Haitian solution to the ongoing crisis and have been signed by many of the Haitian civil society groups and political parties involved.³² Aside from specific professional organizations, Haitian civil society organizations may emerge from Haitian communities that have no other effective political or economic representation. Other CSOs may materialize *despite* significant popular support, claiming diversity baselessly. Distinguishing these groups by their relative legitimacy is important and difficult, yet the democratic process proposed by these groups would ensure a degree of valid representation. Opponents of the Montana Accord include the PHTK and the entrenched commercial elites aligned with Henry, along with many disenfranchised and cynical citizens who support neither coalition. By September 2021, a National Transition Committee (CNT) had been formed as mandated by the Accord but without acknowledgement from Henry’s government. Infighting and self-serving politics are frequent, and distrust is high both within and without the coalition. Fanmi Lavalas (FL), the political party of former president Aristide, had joined the CNT at the outset, but in Feb 2022 retracted their support after persistent complaints of partiality in the proposed process. The political alliance with FL had hurt the Accord’s legitimacy in the first place, however FL’s withdrawal was widely reported and hurt the movement even more³³. FL criticism was aimed at the members of the political parties involved being appointed to organize elections in which their own candidates were running, which FL saw as a conflict of interest and an act of exclusion contrary to the spirit of the Montana Accord.³⁴ Political infighting and the

obstacles inherent to official rejection from Henry and the US have dimmed the movement, however the CNT and the coalition remain active participants, and can claim relative popular support as an alternative with more legitimacy and wider representation than the current government.³⁵

Commercial Elites

The Haitian elite class is colloquially known as BAM BAM. This is an acronym of 6 core elite family names which means “Gimme Gimme” in Creole. While the acronym is now outdated, the expression remains true of the sentiment surrounding Haitian elites. The Haitian commercial elite hold disproportionate influence over politicians, and typically vie for gains in a ruthless game of shifting alliances. Embedded gangsterism and corruption means that while some elites employ gangs as mercenaries, the entire ownership class owners pay bribes to gangs, police, and other established elites who act as gatekeepers, in order to do business. US ‘aid’ programs such as HOPE II allow these elites to benefit from duty-free status on imports and exports, and the same elites benefit from a lack of effective regulation along the Haiti-DR border. The wealth drain caused by the behaviour of the Haitian commercial elite is significant, as a collection of estimates from various commercial spheres add up to US\$ billions stolen.³⁶ The community of elites in Haiti is relatively small; there are several families established since the Duvalier era who own a majority of the wealth in Haiti. To her credit, Canada has recently sanctioned some of the wealthiest elites for empowering gangs. That said, elite capture must be regarded as a systemic phenomenon which intersects with other forms of injustice and inequality.³⁷

- **Key External Stakeholders**

Primary Stakeholders

Haitian Diaspora

Haiti has a large diaspora that exists in several countries but mainly in the United States, Canada, Dominican Republic, Cuba, and France³⁸. The largest Haitian diaspora exists in the United States with an estimated 2 million people, followed by the Haitian diaspora in the Dominican Republic. The World Bank estimates that in 2021 about a quarter of Haitian GDP came from diaspora remittances³⁹, making the Haitian diaspora a key player in the Haitian economy. However, the Haitian diaspora could also be taken into consideration when talking about peace building. Stewart et al. (2009) argue that the Haitian diaspora is “intimately related to the ‘drivers’ of conflict, tension, or low intensity violence that dominated the political and economic landscapes of [its] home countr[y]”⁴⁰. The Haitian diaspora’s impact on the social, political, and economic sphere in Haiti indicates that it needs to be involved in any assessment of the situation in Haiti, as well as in any discourse on problem solving.

Canada

Canada is the second-largest donor to Haiti after the US, where Haiti is the largest recipient of Canadian aid in the Americas. A sizable Haitian diaspora also exists in Canada. Haitians in Canada are mainly concentrated in Montreal and the Ottawa-Gatineau metropolitan area. Canada has led several peacekeeping missions in Haiti such as MINUSTAH with the aim of strengthening the rule of law and supporting government institutions. Canadian policies also emphasize strengthening the Police national d’Haiti (PNH). Moreover, through the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOP), Canada has been working on programming and deploying resources focusing on strengthening the rule of law, reducing violence, and including women in policy making. Canada thus plays an important role within the context of aid and support in Haiti.

- **End User - PSOP: Peace and Stabilization Operations Program**

As Haiti’s second-largest donor and one of its most important trading partners, Canada has the capacity to play an important role in supporting resilience building in Haiti. Canada is also home to the third largest Haitian diaspora population after the United States and the Dominican Republic. Canada has also imposed sanctions on 11 political and economic elites in Haiti in November and December of 2022 in response to these elites’ support and perpetuation of gang activities. It has also provided \$12.5 million in humanitarian assistance to Haiti in 2022

and contributed to the UNDP Security Basket fund that aims to strengthen the Haitian National Police as well as the country's security apparatus and judicial capacity.

This policy brief is thus directed towards Global Affairs Canada's (GAC) Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOP). Launched on August 26th, 2016, PSOP is a Global Affairs Canada program that deals with conflict prevention, stabilization, and peacebuilding in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS) through projects and deployments. It uses a peace-positive and holistic approach guided by perspectives of affected populations to conflict management. It is also a policy leader and a strategic coordinator of Canadian responses to global crises. PSOPS plays an important role in advancing the UN Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and security agenda, and implementing Canada's National Action Plan. It also directs its programming towards achieving the 16 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The three policy options mentioned in this brief would benefit from a whole-of-government style support in assessment and implementation, which PSOP has the ability to do. This makes PSOP an important policy leader within the Canadian government, and a key player in implementing the policy options mentioned in this brief.

HAITI FRAGILITY RISK ASSESSMENT

Primary Drivers of Fragility	
Governance	
Risk Level - High	Trend - Worsening
Indicator	Data
- Proportion of women seats⁴¹ - Corruption perception index⁴² - Control of corruption estimate⁴³ - CPIA quality of public administration⁴⁴ - V-Dem Access to Justice⁴⁵	- The proportion of women ministers has remained around 5% in the post-Duvalier era. This has dropped to ~2% in recent years, likely due to lack of filled seats in general. - Haiti's CPI has consistently been in the lowest 10% of countries, hovering at a score of 18/100. - Control of corruption has been difficult to track: in aggregate, a downward trend since 1990 was mitigated slightly by the presence of MINUSTAH. - While this indicator has remained stable at a low 2.5/10 throughout several decades, a rising world average has left Haiti among the countries with no growth in this area. - Access to justice remains low at a score of 0.26/1; there is reason to believe it should be even lower when familial patriarchal violence is taken into account.
Following the assassination of President Moïse, no elections have been held in Haiti. President Henry has governed the country by decree, perceived as both illegitimate and ineffective. However, government ineffectiveness and volatility in Haiti is nothing new; it runs throughout the country's history of colonialism, foreign occupation, and interference. In parallel, gangs have taken swathes of territory and committed atrocities. As such, there are overwhelming perceptions of corruption and political pessimism among Haitians. Today, Haiti is stuck in a legitimacy trap due to hollow and captured democratic institutions, violence against	

citizens, and lack of provision of services. The Haitian parliament, judiciary and executive is perceived as slow, corrupt, and ineffective by the majority of Haitians. Initiatives towards fulfilling SDGs have been almost entirely led by NGOs and CSOs, and mostly target individuals or small communities with no effect on larger governance trends. For example, programs aimed at empowering women over the past two decades have done nothing to increase the very low proportion of women seats in government - in fact, this proportion has dropped in recent years. At the current time, Haiti has no elected leaders whatsoever.⁴⁶ The lack of functioning democratic institutions and persistent delegitimizing governance practices are primary drivers of Haitian fragility.

Security and Crime

Risk Level - High

Trend - Worsening

Indicator

Data

- | | |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Intentional homicides per 100,000 people | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The 2016 estimates of 9 are likely far higher in some areas. One-dimensional indicators cannot capture differences in regions. In a 2012 study, residents of “popular zones” were 40 times more likely to be murdered than other urban dwellers.⁵⁰ |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of police officers per capita⁴⁷ | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Hovers around 1 officer per 1000 people. Slow training times, fear of retribution, and dangerous conditions are factors of low retention. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Organized crime index (OCI) criminality | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 5.73 (2nd highest in region) |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> OCI mafia-style groups | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 8.00 (highest of criminality indicators) |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> OCI resilience⁴⁸ | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2.67 (lowest in region) |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> OCI resilience for non-state actors | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 4.00 (highest of resilience indicators) |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> % of prison inmates as pre-trial detainees⁴⁹ | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 81.9% |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Average cost of a physical or sexual assault on a household member | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 20% of household annual income |

Gang violence and ill-planned international security-focused responses has created pervasive mistrust in Haiti. The Haitian state does not have a monopoly over violence, nor currently the capacity or authority to reclaim it. Haitian gangs have multiplied due to needs insecurity, poverty & unemployment, the gainseeking of gangs’ political weaponization, and international criminal interests well-established in Haiti. Until recently, local gangs had remained relatively small and insular despite some collaboration. They have been weaponized and supplied by many different actors including core elites, elected officials, and external cartels/criminal syndicates. Despite this, public trust in state & international authority is low. Many Haitians are nearly as cynical of police and intervention forces as they are gang motives. The risk and trend are both severe, as gang violence has spiraled out of control and security forces are not making enough gains to stop a worsening trend. Although gang violence and a major authority deficit have become arguably the most acute aspect of the Haitian crisis due to the spectacular and horrific violence perpetrated by gangs, gangsterization remains rooted in weak institutions and a culture of corrupt gain-making. In its current state, security concerns are a primary driver of fragility. While an arms embargo and extensive support for Haitian police and security forces should undoubtedly be a part of Haiti’s future, this report aims to address the roots of the crisis in continuity. Thus, while we recognize that disarmament of gangs is crucial, even a complete disarmament would not in itself encourage a change in the fundamental patterns of fragility in which Haiti is stuck.

Secondary Drivers of Fragility

Economic Development

Risk Level - High

Trend - Volatile

Indicator

Data

- | | |
|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GDP (current US\$) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2010: \$11.85 billion
2016: \$13.98 billion
2021: \$20.94 billion |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GDP growth (annual %) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2010: -5.65%
2013: 4.32%
2021: -1.80% |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows (% of GDP) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FDI has plunged from 1.5% of GDP in 2010 to 0.17% in 2020. This reflects a lack of investor confidence on the international scale. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Net official development assistance and official aid received (current US\$) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the wake of the 2010 earthquake, Haiti's NDO & aid was over \$2.3 billion. Despite some spikes corresponding to international attention, a downward trend has persisted, leading to ~\$800 million in NDO & aid in 2021. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Personal remittances, received (% of GDP)⁵¹ | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • From 16% in 2003, remittances increased to 23% by 2021. In this case, higher remittance rates indicate greater dependence on diaspora for income and insufficient state support for services and jobs. |

Haiti is often cited as “the Western Hemisphere’s poorest country”. In aggregate, the country was recording some economic growth from early 2010 up until 2019 where the economy contracted by 1.68 percent.⁵² Haiti had a score of 50.00 and ranked 145 out of 177 countries in the 2022 Index for Economic Freedom, ranking it the last country in the “mostly unfree” category.⁵³ According to the same source, “[T]he protection of property rights and enforcement of contracts in Haiti are very poor. There is no comprehensive civil registry for real property, and legitimate property titles are often either nonexistent or in dispute. The judiciary is poorly resourced and susceptible to political pressure and corruption, which remains pervasive”.⁵⁴ This inequality is evident when looking at the distribution of wealth amongst Haitians where the richest 20 percent of the Haitian population holds more than 64 percent of its total wealth, while the poorest 20 percent has less than one percent.⁵⁵ While some indicators have technically risen, Haiti has significantly underperformed the global average.⁵⁶ Additionally, economic growth has benefited a very small minority. If economic performance were to improve, there is no guarantee that other conditions would improve. Our analysis suggests that the government’s low economic capacity is a symptom of critically low government performance in the security and governance dimensions, which are the structural and primary drivers of fragility. Economic development is hence a secondary driver of fragility in the case of Haiti despite its high level of risk.

Human Development	
Risk Level - High	Trend - Stable/Slight Improvement
Indicator	Data
- Percentage of Population Using at Least Basic Drinking Water Services⁵⁷ - Percentage of Population Using at Least Basic Sanitation Services⁵⁸ - Prevalence of Undernourishment in Population⁵⁹ - Gender Inequality Index (high value = high level of gender inequality)⁶⁰ - Health Infrastructure Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP⁶¹ - HIV/AIDS as Percentage of Adult Females Infected⁶² - Human Development Index (low value = low level of human development)⁶³	2010: 62.20% 2015: 64.57% 2020: 66.70% 2010: 27.16% 2015: 32.50% 2020: 37.12% 2009-2011: 44.4% 2014-2016: 42.4% 2019-2021: 47.2% 2010: 0.504 2015: 0.628 2021: 0.635 2010: 4.63% 2015: 5.07% 2019: 4.73% 2010: 56.2% 2015: 57.8% 2021: 59.6% 2010: 0.433 2015: 0.529 2021: 0.535
The state of Haiti's human development is precarious. Looking at the country's HDI and GII values – the worst in Latin America and the Caribbean – is not enough to show the extent of the problem. HDI can be inflated by a ‘gamification’ of the criteria or by contraindicating factors.⁶⁴ Since 2000, Haitians have faced lack of access to education, sanitation, health and water services due to destruction and lack of investments in these sectors. They have faced increasing food insecurity, and HIV/AIDS infections. Even though humanitarian assistance is provided to Haitians, there are many obstacles to delivering such assistance. For example, UN agencies have reported multiple cases of violence and looting over humanitarian supplies in the country. Additionally, service delivery is intermittent at best in most rural areas, with many communities essentially passed over. Cultural adaptations to scarcity and cyclical shocks resist changes imposed by development programs; most rural communities prefer low-risk, no-investment forms of subsistence. This service delivery issue explains why Haiti's human development has worsened in most areas despite government efforts and receiving generous aid from various international channels, and why Haitians feel as if their government does not have the capacity to help them.	

Demography and Population	
Risk Level - Moderate	Trend - Worsening
Indicator	Data
- Life Expectancy at Birth – Total - Migration – Estimated Net - Population Density as People per sq. km - Population Growth as Annual Percentage - Slum Population as Percentage of Urban Population - Urban Growth Rate as Annual Percentage - Youth Bulge as Percentage of Population⁶⁵	2010: 60.51 years 2015: 62.49 years 2020: 64.32 years 2007: -138,004 2012: -150,000 2017: -175,000 2010: 361.01 2015: 388.08 2020: 413.73 2010: 1.53% 2015: 1.38% 2021: 1.21% 2010: 70.10% 2014: 74.40% 2018: 65.90% 2010: 3.62% 2015: 3.27% 2021: 2.74% 2010: 36.27% 2015: 34.37% 2021: 32.11%
Haiti's population is growing fast, so much that it now has the highest population density in the Americas and one of the highest population densities among lower middle income countries. These population changes and demographic shifts in themselves are not problematic. However, the past thirty years has seen rapid urbanization and a rise in internally displaced persons (IDPs), leading to large slums and the destruction of local communities via displacement and violence. This demographic shift – alongside economic hardship, insecurity, natural disasters – explains Haiti's negative net migration since 2000: many poor Haitians have fled in search of better living conditions, while Haitian elites emigrate en-masse for better security and business opportunities. Here again, the Haitian government has limited capacity, authority and legitimacy in developing policies and protecting institutions that counteract pressures related to demography and population. Despite improvement in some areas and a slight slowdown of crisis trends, we have identified this trend as “worsening” due to the unmitigated risks of continued urbanization and its correlational negative effects on governance and state authority.	
Environment	
Risk Level - High	Trend - Stable
Indicator	Data
Arable land (% of land area)	2006: 32.65% 2010: 39.91% 2020: 38.82%

• Agricultural land (% of land area) • Forest area (% of land area)⁶⁶ • Environmental performance⁶⁷ • Disaster risk⁶⁸	• 2008: 64.22% 2012: 64.40% 2020: 66.76% • 2010: 13.72% 2015: 13.16% 2022: 12.60% • Score: 26.10 Rank: 173rd out of 180 countries • Rank: 21st WDI Score: 14.54 Exposure score: 21.41 Vulnerability score: 67.91 Lack of coping capabilities score: 90.36
Haiti remains one the most vulnerable countries worldwide to natural hazards, mainly hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes. More than 96 percent of the population are exposed to these types of shocks. This vulnerability appears to be symptomatic, especially if Haiti is compared to other states that experience environmental shocks such as Chile or Japan. The latter have experienced several earthquakes but were able to absorb the shocks much better than Haiti. The government's incapability to deliver basic services to the population, such as electricity, has adapted many Haitians to scarcity within a cycle of regular shocks. The high scale at which trees have been cut down to meet the Haitian population's demand for a source of fuel has caused a large-scale deforestation, with forest area now constituting only 12.6 percent as of 2020⁶⁹. This low environmental performance is symptomatic of poor economic performance, which as we mentioned before is due to issues of security and governance.	

Legend			
Level of Risk	Low	Moderate	High
Trend	Improving	Stable	Worsening

ALC ANALYSIS

Authority: Haiti's security situation is deteriorating under pressure from establishment elite empowerment of gangs and gangs run amok, alongside an understaffed, under trained police force and effectively no judicial capacity. Those with power have relied on cooperation with gangs and have thus armed and empowered them. International focus on police funding and support has seen some improvement in task forces, but serious concerns surrounding police accountability, corruption, and oversight remain. Gangs are often seen using police equipment and police forces have been reported taking sides between warring gang factions⁷⁰. Notably, there is no official election committee, making organizing reliable elections impractical.

Legitimacy: The state's continuous association with gangsterization, corruption, and international interference have severely delegitimized the government. While NGOs and CSOs have tried to fill service gaps, the main driver of illegitimacy has been the ruling elite's use of violence to suppress political opposition, protest, and activism, arming and funding gangs as mercenaries to accomplish these ends. Mutual allegations of corruption are commonplace among political rivals, and the Haitian people have little faith in the current government. Voter turnout in the 2016 presidential election was 18%, consistent with a downward trend since 2000⁷¹. That the

central government consistently prefers the policy options suggested by international agencies over the voice of the popular movements in Haiti has further contributed to rumors of official collusion with ‘foreign masters’ and the severe political alienation of the majority of Haitians. The current situation illustrates the government’s illegitimacy: a national transition council has been formed by the civil-society led Montana Accord coalition. This transitional government is unrecognized by the Henry government, and the two maintain competing claims of legitimacy, each commanding the support of different sectors of society.

Capacity: Haiti is stuck in a capacity trap driven primarily by aid dependence, institutional weakness, official corruption, and security and infrastructure-related obstacles to development and service delivery. The government has not effectively maintained any of its functions for the whole of society since at least the 2010 earthquake. The state is sustained by international aid, while the population is sustained by remittances. General taxation is intermittent and without reach, while the major commercial players avoid most taxation altogether through a combination of legal and illegal means. Repeated shocks to the country have left the government without effective means to provide public services as most infrastructure is unusable, leaving the majority of the work in the hands of private companies and NGOs, for example in the education and healthcare sectors. Notwithstanding capacity constraints, the political will to strengthen government capacity in a meaningful, transformative way is currently limited to the interests of a ruling party with little accountability to the population and little incentive or authority to change the dynamics of elite influence, aid flows, and gangsterization which keeps them in power. The cycle of aid flow peaks in the aftermath of high-visibility natural disasters, but consistently drops after about a year. The high rate of urbanization and lack of infrastructural development compounds the challenges of natural disaster preparedness and recovery.

SCENARIOS: JANUARY 2023 - JULY 2023

Most Likely	Gangs will continue to control large amounts of territory in Port-au-Prince while the international community supports the central government. Police receive more funding, but are unable to make sustainable headway in combating gangs due to elite support for gangs and a defunct judicial system. More powerful gangs such as G9 and 400 Mawozo will begin claiming territory in more rural areas, establishing more robust networks as they control more roads in and out of Port-Au-Prince. Ariel Henry gov’t will push for elections which, when held, will have a record low voter turnout, benefit elite-aligned candidates and further perpetuate political violence across the spectrum. International aid flows and political support will allow Henry to dismiss the CNT with no significant consequences. At least one more natural disaster strikes, leading to further loss of life and further exacerbation of the cholera outbreak; international disaster assistance is hampered by violence. International attention intensifies, and political corruption becomes harder for elites due to sanctions, however more or less the same practices continue due to a lack of fundamental change in aid flows. Military intervention in some form will follow unsustainable gang violence, but will be met with significant resistance by the population.
Best Case	The Henry government succumbs to domestic pressure and agrees to a transition of power with the CNT, accepting transparency measures and the resignation of Henry following the implementation of a transitional crisis plan. This increases population engagement, facilitates local elections, and shows an increase in legitimacy and government trust indicators. Legitimacy begins to snowball as police forces attract more recruits due to police reforms and continued international support. Elite capture is mitigated by sanctions and a CSO-led transitional government with less establishment ties and greater accountability. An arms embargo makes provisional service and aid delivery significantly easier through gang disarmament.
Worst Case	In the wake of further collapse, gang alliances reign unchecked and begin to claim central government institutional buildings, pretending to claim authority by controlling essential distribution in Port-Au-Prince. Immediate military intervention is required but struggles beyond liberating key port infrastructure due to the opacity of the urban environment and decentralized gang structures which make targeting leadership ineffective.

	Prolonged conflict between intervention forces and gang insurgency leads to further loss of life and unmanageable humanitarian crises as violence inhibits disaster relief. Intervention forces fail to meet their objectives despite good intentions, as studies of similar cases have shown a systemic risk of humanitarian abuses.
Wild Card	Key Haitian leadership such as Ariel Henry himself may be assassinated, leading to an unpredictable power vacuum in the short term. Should gang violence decrease and elections be held, demagogues such as Duvalier Jr. or Aristide may influence the population towards unpredictable political outcomes. If elections are not held, strongman-type authoritarianism may prove acceptable to the majority in the context of unbearable gang violence. ⁷² Additionally, military intervention is itself a wild card: if intervention occurs, there is no way of guaranteeing that it will improve the overall situation considering the likelihood of widespread public pushback and its accompanying complications.

POLICY OPTIONS - Disruption of Embedded Dysfunctionality by Supporting Democratic Institutions

Given Haiti's embedded gangsterism and political violence, GAC and other aid donors' approaches towards Haiti have focused on security assistance and capacity building. Some countries are currently pushing for an international military intervention in Haiti. However, our analysis has shown that security issues are not the main drivers of fragility. Indeed proposed solutions such as military intervention will not address the main drivers of fragility in Haiti and could prove counterproductive. Haiti's fragility stems from a legitimacy trap and the lack of political authority in the country. Hence, our policy options aim to address Haiti's fragility drivers at their core.

- **Policy Option 1**

Canadian backing of the CSO-led transitional government & Montana Accord through political and through aid-flows, with Canadian expertise dedicated to provisionally supporting the transitional government.

Leveraging Canada's diplomatic and financial influence in Haiti to create a broader and more coherent transitional government process aims at the most immediate issue of cabinet illegitimacy. Canada would provide technical expertise and leverage international support for CSO-led transitional governance initiatives, while encouraging cooperation between the Henry government and the Montana Accord. Improvement in legitimacy outputs and popular perception would be tracked by a Canadian oversight team trained in anthropological survey methods designed in the Haitian context.⁷³ In conjunction with sanctions and regular publication of developments for transparency the transfer of power from entrenched elites to the CNT may weaken entrenched cycles of interruption and mitigate the environment of political fear, as well as empowering police forces by taking away some political incentives for corruption through broader accountability structures. While there is evidence suggesting that bypassing the state in aid delivery is counterproductive, in this case there are two competing claims for legitimate government. Rather than bypassing the state, Canada would push the Henry administration to recognize the CNT as Haiti's transitional government by leveraging aid flows.

Relevance: The Haitian government suffers from a legitimacy output deficit. In addition to encouraging popular engagement and stifling suppression tactics based on entrenched elites, substantial Canadian backing of the Montana Accord would facilitate the instantiation of a new pattern of governance in Haiti along with the support of necessary institutions such as an independent electoral committee and a dedicated disaster recovery committee, as per the Accord's mandate. Members of the CNT are diverse and represent a much larger proportion of the Haitian people than the Sept 11. coalition, including the most impoverished communities. Haitian politics have been paralyzed by a legitimacy trap and a downward authority spiral, where successive leaders and governments cannot muster the political will to change the status-quo reliance on embedded gangsterization, political gatekeeping, and elite patronage. Indicators for group grievance and inequality are both rising accordingly.

Impact Assessment: Tracking the success of the CNT in improving legitimacy would be measured in part through a decrease in group grievance and corruption perception indicators. Voter turnout should increase in the next elections, and aid delivery should be noticeably more effective when managed by local committees in conjunction with Canadian technical support.

- **Policy Option 2**

Independent institution for analysis and transparency

Through PSOP, Canada would lead the establishment of an independent analysis institution dedicated to producing regular reports on the Haitian political process designed with and for Haitians. This institution would be cooperatively staffed by Haitians and Canadians, and act as a seed institution focused on creating mutual, achievable democratic expectations, primarily in Port-Au-Prince. This institution would offer resources for civil democratic organizations, publish regular transparency reports, and produce expected timelines of ongoing political processes and outcomes for the Haitian public. These reports would be published online, in print, and most importantly via radio in Haitian Creole.

Relevance: Clear, mutual public expectations are critical to building stable institutions. Evidence shows that most aid-related policy options have not worked long-term in Haiti and similar fragile states, where legitimacy traps are common and institutions are prone to failure for lack of state support and public engagement. Should Canada wish to offer effective support to the Haitian people, they could bring together experts with diverse views and backgrounds (NGOs, think tanks, governments, universities, etc) through an independent institution dedicated to actively supporting burgeoning and pre-existing democratic organizations. Equally as critical is the ability for donors to assess the impact of aid flows: this institution would bridge the gap between the existing groups working towards democratization, addressing the assessment deficit between these disparate organizations.

Impact Assessment: Much of the data on Haiti are inaccurate or depreciated. The establishment of more stable assessment infrastructure could serve as a foothold for stronger democratic coalition-building. Notably, the use of novel survey methods and the collective engagement of Haitian academics and civil activists through a singular independent organization would contribute to public data transparency and accessibility.

- **Policy Option 3**

On the creation of maximalist-democratic global coalition targeting wealth drain & elite capture - the new principles of engagement for democracies (focusing on economic *rights* over *freedoms*).

Canada can address Haitian issues from a future-forward mindset by supporting the transition of exploitation-economy countries from economic *freedoms* to economic *rights*. This option leverages Canada's international reputation for pro-democratic multilateralism, building on recent successes such as the MLI Tax Treaty⁷⁴ towards fulfilling Canada's commitment to multilateral cooperation towards SDGs as outlined in the 2030 National Strategy Agenda.⁷⁵ Canada, through PSOP, can lead in the creation of an international institution designed to combat elite capture of fragile states by collectively targeting tax havens and providing financial and legal support proportional to need. Haiti and Canada would be the first two members. This multilateral institution would produce country reports, engage donors, and develop regional cooperation to implement policies of maximalist democratic reform for specific country cases. With international attention, these reforms would demonstrate marked improvements via workable redistributive policies for the Haitian people, bolstering state capacity and legitimacy by mitigating tax evasion, wealth drain, and by reducing wealth inequality through policy shifts away from the profit-oriented distribution of necessary resources and services. The nature of Haiti's crisis calls for new, cooperative principles of engagement with the systemic phenomenon of elite capture and its detrimental effect on democratic governance. This option could offer a genuinely new way forward for the many fragile states facing the worst

consequences of globalization and coloniality. If successful, Haiti and Canada may be able to start a new trend of decolonial international cooperation among willing states.

Relevance: Unlike Haitian politicians, the wealthiest interests in Haiti will not be affected significantly by Canadian sanctions. The inherently monopolistic, exploitative characteristics of the Haitian economy are emergent from unconstrained forces of racial capital and coloniality. Canada can support a transition “from misery, to poverty with dignity” for the Haitian people instead of committing to US-led policies that inevitably benefit the wealthiest elites and reproduce the unequal exchange relationship between Haitian ownership and Haitian labor. The unprecedented voter turnout popular and support for the Lavalas (“The Wave”) maximal democracy movement led by Aristide in the 90’s; the movement’s relative popularity in Haiti’s many aggrieved and impoverished communities; the continuous demonstrations which draw thousands of people despite danger of death: these examples illustrate the Haitian people’s collective desire for sovereignty, dignity, and self-determination. More specifically, there is an irrepressible desire for economic *rights* over economic *freedoms*. The demand for maximalist democracy over minimalist democracy is incommensurable with most domestic and foreign policies of Core Group states and the structure of the global capitalist-colonialist system inherent to those policies. Unequal exchange theory is informative in explaining the apparent invisibility of this wealth drain.⁷⁶ However, this reality is evidenced by the near-ubiquitous monopolies and monopsonies within the Haitian economy.

Impact Assessment: Tracking this option’s success would entail financial surveys and observation of Haiti’s capital flows, inequality indices, and per-capita investments. A shift in the general dialogue surrounding state and international fragility would likely be the most desirable immediate result. If inequality is reduced by these measures, changes must be comparatively analyzed with the observable income of known elites. Developing and monitoring capital flows for elite capture indicators would be one mandate of the new institution and critical to assessing its impact. Legitimacy indicators would likely improve among Haitians familiar with the mandate of the institution, as government cooperation in combating elite capture would greatly improve legitimacy. State capacity would take some time to increase, but mitigating the effects of wealth drain should lead to more small businesses and increasing public trust.

ANNEX I - Graphs and Tables

Time	GDP growth (annual %)	GDP (current US\$)	FDI, net inflows (% of GDP)	Net official development assistance and official aid received (current US\$)	Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	Personal remittances, received (% of GDP)
1997	2.70	3338938830.02	0.12	280799987.79	20.56	..
1998	2.18	3723909226.87	0.29	350929992.68	5.27	8.79
1999	2.71	4153736347.44	0.72	213770004.27	3.00	10.16
2000	0.87	6813577558.18	0.19	181639999.39	9.33	8.48
2001	-0.34	6331961555.41	0.07	170029998.78	13.32	9.85
2002	1.05	6058134466.75	0.09	151949996.95	7.03	11.15
2003	3.48	4826827577.09	0.29	186740005.49	28.70	16.80
2004	-1.32	6036959914.72	0.10	280059997.56	21.03	15.43
2005	3.07	7184064657.30	0.36	366630004.88	13.97	13.73
2006	1.77	7518107786.51	2.14	531539978.03	11.35	14.14
2007	4.71	9522763153.81	0.78	622630004.88	6.56	12.83
2008	2.66	10485225353.18	0.28	824619995.12	15.28	13.06
2009	5.89	11597014807.35	0.48	990760009.77	0.39	11.86
2010	-5.65	11859315078.79	1.50	2889840087.89	4.83	12.43
2011	5.10	13008754110.81	0.91	1506459960.94	6.33	11.93
2012	0.50	13708926466.27	1.14	1273300048.83	5.02	11.76
2013	4.32	14902474090.62	1.09	1152130004.88	4.77	11.95
2014	1.72	15139264670.42	0.65	1082359985.35	3.44	13.06
2015	2.56	14833154471.75	0.71	1045859985.35	6.73	14.80
2016	1.81	13987693738.92	0.75	1071680053.71	11.50	16.86
2017	2.51	15035560372.64	2.49	981250000.00	10.68	17.39
2018	1.67	16455034352.77	0.64	1017109985.35	12.48	18.03
2019	-1.68	14785839382.90	0.51	695869995.12	18.70	20.47
2020	-3.34	14508218017.40	0.17	886849975.59	22.80	23.82
2021	-1.80	20944392615.08	..	..	16.84	..

Time	GDP growth (annual %)	GDP (current US\$)	GDP per capita (current US\$)	Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)	Net official development assistance and official aid received (current US\$)	Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	Personal remittances, received (% of GDP)	Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate)
1997	2.70	3338938830.02	415.77	0.12	280799987.79	20.56	..	7.28
1998	2.18	3723909226.87	455.54	0.29	350929992.68	5.27	8.79	7.25
1999	2.71	4153736347.44	499.30	0.72	213770004.27	3.00	10.16	7.20
2000	0.87	6813577558.18	805.03	0.19	181639999.39	9.33	8.48	8.40
2001	-0.34	6331961555.41	735.52	0.07	170029998.78	13.32	9.85	9.63
2002	1.05	6058134466.75	692.03	0.09	151949996.95	7.03	11.15	10.83
2003	3.48	4826827577.09	542.33	0.29	186740005.49	28.70	16.80	12.00
2004	-1.32	6036959914.72	667.28	0.10	280059997.56	21.03	15.43	13.32
2005	3.07	7184064657.30	781.28	0.36	366630004.88	13.97	13.73	14.42
2006	1.77	7518107786.51	804.52	2.14	531539978.03	11.35	14.14	15.69
2007	4.71	9522763153.81	1002.89	0.78	622630004.88	6.56	12.83	16.80
2008	2.66	10485225353.18	1086.94	0.28	824619995.12	15.28	13.06	16.34
2009	5.89	11597014807.35	1183.60	0.48	990760009.77	0.39	11.86	15.66
2010	-5.65	11859315078.79	1191.97	1.50	2889840087.89	4.83	12.43	15.38
2011	5.10	13008754110.81	1287.95	0.91	1506459960.94	6.33	11.93	14.53
2012	0.50	13708926466.27	1337.34	1.14	1273300048.83	5.02	11.76	14.10
2013	4.32	14902474090.62	1432.84	1.09	1152130004.88	4.77	11.95	14.00
2014	1.72	15139264670.42	1435.14	0.65	1082359985.35	3.44	13.06	13.95
2015	2.56	14833154471.75	1386.85	0.71	1045859985.35	6.73	14.80	13.96
2016	1.81	13987693738.92	1290.38	0.75	1071680053.71	11.50	16.86	13.93
2017	2.51	15035560372.64	1369.06	2.49	981250000.00	10.68	17.39	13.88
2018	1.67	16455034352.77	1479.35	0.64	1017109985.35	12.48	18.03	13.86
2019	-1.68	14785839382.90	1312.77	0.51	695869995.12	18.70	20.47	13.91
2020	-3.34	14508218017.40	1272.37	0.17	886849975.59	22.80	23.82	15.45
2021	-1.80	20944392615.08	1814.67	..	..	16.84	..	15.73

Table 1: Source: World Development Indicators.

Time	Arable land (% of land area)	Agricultural land (% of land area)	Forest area (% of land area)
1997	32.65602322	61.32075472	13.83639332
1998	32.65602322	61.32075472	13.82815675
1999	32.65602322	61.32075472	13.81992017
2000	32.65602322	61.32075472	13.8116836
2001	32.65602322	60.59506531	13.80344702
2002	32.65602322	60.59506531	13.79521045
2003	32.65602322	60.59506531	13.78697388
2004	32.65602322	60.59506531	13.7787373
2005	32.65602322	60.59506531	13.77050073
2006	32.65602322	60.59506531	13.76226415
2007	38.09869376	66.03773585	13.75402758
2008	36.28447025	64.22351234	13.745791
2009	37.23984035	65.17888244	13.73755443
2010	39.91291727	67.85195936	13.72931785
2011	38.46153846	66.40058055	13.61661829
2012	36.28447025	64.22351234	13.50391872
2013	38.82438316	66.76342525	13.39121916
2014	38.82438316	66.76342525	13.27851959
2015	38.82438316	66.76342525	13.16582003
2016	38.82438316	66.76342525	13.05297533
2017	38.82438316	66.76342525	12.94013062
2018	38.82438316	66.76342525	12.82728592
2019	38.82438316	66.76342525	12.71444122
2020	38.82438316	66.76342525	12.60159652
2021	..	..	..

Table 2: Source: World Development Indicators

Time	GDP (current US\$)		GDP per capita (current US\$)	
	Haiti	Dominican Republic	Haiti	Dominican Republic
1997	3,338,938,830.02	20,017,480,054.83	415.77	2,476.06
1998	3,723,909,226.87	21,672,231,760.65	455.54	2,638.31
1999	4,153,736,347.44	22,136,621,337.09	499.30	2,653.23
2000	6,813,577,558.18	24,305,717,541.64	805.03	2,869.18
2001	6,331,961,555.41	25,601,765,400.52	735.52	2,977.43
2002	6,058,134,466.75	27,137,508,656.85	692.03	3,110.33
2003	4,826,827,577.09	21,403,167,848.14	542.33	2,418.35
2004	6,036,959,914.72	22,322,395,368.03	667.28	2,487.33
2005	7,184,064,657.30	35,777,570,135.52	781.28	3,932.78
2006	7,518,107,786.51	37,879,869,897.90	804.52	4,109.03
2007	9,522,763,153.81	43,965,420,072.41	1,002.89	4,707.80
2008	10,485,225,353.18	48,122,547,177.19	1,086.94	5,087.98
2009	11,597,014,807.35	48,261,033,298.21	1,183.60	5,039.40
2010	11,859,315,078.79	53,860,175,556.00	1,191.97	5,555.39
2011	13,008,754,110.81	58,029,750,745.65	1,287.95	5,913.43
2012	13,708,926,466.27	60,681,537,195.80	1,337.34	6,110.37
2013	14,902,474,090.62	62,682,163,837.35	1,432.84	6,238.13
2014	15,139,264,670.42	67,179,914,026.96	1,435.14	6,608.83
2015	14,833,154,471.75	71,164,825,256.68	1,386.85	6,921.52
2016	13,987,693,738.92	75,704,720,189.56	1,290.38	7,280.88
2017	15,035,560,372.64	79,997,975,621.87	1,369.06	7,609.35
2018	16,455,034,352.77	85,555,378,042.82	1,479.35	8,050.64
2019	14,785,839,382.90	88,941,299,733.50	1,312.77	8,282.12
2020	14,508,218,017.40	78,844,702,329.08	1,272.37	7,268.20
2021	20,944,392,615.08	94,243,453,937.45	1,814.67	8,603.79

Table 3: 1Source: World Development Indicators

ANNEX II - Data Concerns, Cultural Consensus Theory, and Anthropologically-Led Survey Methods

In the research and scope of this report legitimate questions were raised concerning the validity, accuracy, and consistency of the data used in policy analysis. While data involving Canadian policies are abundant, there are many questions which must remain unanswered, or only partially answered, when it comes to Haiti. The extent to which information published by the Haitian state can be relied upon is a constant concern, as numbers are misreported for a number of reasons such as self-interest, disorganization, or international pressure to release data despite insufficient survey methods. The best data on Haiti often comes from independent organizations within Haiti, and also from international institutions such as the World Bank. The scope of these data are often limited to the interests of these organizations. Given that much data is reported as an indexed, single-digit ranking, there are many facts and nuances of which Haitians are aware that go uncaptured and sometimes contraindicated by official reports. Additionally, aspects of the policy options which are presented in this report go beyond the scope of traditional economic assessment. Thus, determining the impact of this report's policy options through commonly used official statistics will require anthropologically informed supplemental approaches in order to capture an accurate sense of pedagogical, socio-cultural, and broadly economic shifts.

The work of anthropologist Timothy Shwartz offers a promising approach to impact assessment and information collection in the context of Haiti's dense and complex social networks, often inaccessible to accurate data collection by traditional means. Further information regarding the technical aspects of cultural consensus theory (CCT) for statistical analysis is available below.⁷⁷ As an example of how this theory can be used in impact assessment, as well as tracking corruption and legitimacy, it would be possible to generate a relative trustworthiness index of given leadership or CSOs by surveying respondents who do not necessarily know the answers to the questions they are being asked in the survey. Rather than relying solely on expert analysis or direct survey / administration data, CCT can be applied to produce the knowledge inherent to a population as a whole, leading to surprisingly specific and accurate information. Leveraging strains of popular consensus to navigate intransparency and lack of access would fit the Haitian context, where intransparency reigns. CCT goes beyond the notion of a perception survey such as LAPOP, as the function of consensus can be applied more directly to discover facts which any given respondent may not know for certain. Applying CCT in conjunction with traditional analysis would provide a solid footing on which aid delivery could be optimized and policy impact

assessments could outpace the dysfunctional official government reports without the slow and costly implementation of large, comprehensive surveys or staff-intensive operations. While both the survey design and the data would require thorough anthropological and statistical analysis, a NATCOM-based kickback SMS/whatsapp-accessible app allowing people to submit survey responses anonymously while incrementally gaining free cell-phone minutes in compensation (at least 80% of the population uses a minutes-based cell network) could automate real-time access at low cost. Absolutely no commerce would be made of the data collected if such an approach were to be remotely ethical.

ANNEX III - Secondary Stakeholders

The stakeholders below are entities with either a reactive presence in Haiti, or stakeholders which fall outside the scope of this policy report.

United States

The United States houses the largest Haitian diaspora and is one of Haiti's most important trading partners. The US is also Haiti's largest donor, sending \$US hundreds of millions in aid to Haiti each year. The complicated US-Haiti relationship is outside the scope of this report, but it must be recognized that any long-term policy options in Haiti will likely require US support to some degree. While US *support* for these policy options is not necessary, Canadian-US relations, also outside the scope of this report, are probably crucial to the success of policy option #3.

Dominican Republic

Haiti shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic with a 391 km border separating these two nations. The Dominican Republic is one of Haiti's most important trading partners by virtue of location and proximity. However, there are disparities between the two countries despite significant border mobility. The Dominican Republic's economy is much larger than that of Haiti. The Dominican Republic's GDP in 2021 was \$94 billion (current US\$), compared to that of Haiti's which was \$20 billion (current US\$). Likewise, GDP per capita was \$8,603.79 (current US\$) for the DR in 2021, compared to \$1,814.67 (current US\$) for Haiti.⁷⁸ This large difference between the two countries' economic capacities has contributed to Haiti's long-standing tension with DR, where many working Haitians are mistreated. Due to the shared border, the DR has a complex relationship with Haitian immigrants and refugees, with nearly 2 million Haitians currently residing in the DR.⁷⁹ Cross-border commerce, both legal and illegal, is used for tax evasion by elites and for the livelihood of many rural Haitians. While DR is an important stakeholder within the context of Haiti's fragility, the DR government has proven overall uncooperative and hostile to Haitians. Meaningful assistance from DR is unlikely given the state's hostile stance.

Haitian Public Media

Haitian radio media is by far the country's most popular and accessible source of news and information, with at least 90% of the population listening daily to the radio. Given the full saturation of radio programming, there are many stations producing pulpy and unprofessional reports with limited information. Despite this, community initiatives have seen success in training journalists and improving the reliability of radio content. Haitian radio is very significant to the population, and can be considered a key stakeholder group for the independent and community-based status of many stations disseminating information, and for the connectivity it provides to isolated Haitian communities. There are estimated to be over 300 radio stations operating in Haiti, despite interruptions to service through unreliable power grids. One news publication consistently producing reliable reportage on-line, in print, by radio is *Haiti Libré*. This outlet has maintained relative independence and safety through strategic self-censorship and low operating costs, and enjoys a fair reputation among most Haitians.

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¹ “manumit”: to release from slavery

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