



Security Council

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United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution [2692 \(2023\)](#), by which the Council decided to extend until 15 July 2024 the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), in accordance with resolution [2476 \(2019\)](#) establishing BINUH. The report includes developments since the previous report ([S/2024/310](#)), dated 16 April 2024.

II. Political issues and good governance

Political

2. Criminal gangs continue to target State institutions, with the violence severely impacting governance, all aspects of the daily life of Haitians, and United Nations operations. Amid the serious security challenges, national stakeholders have nevertheless made significant progress in the implementation of the outcome declaration of the meeting held on 11 March 2024 by the Caribbean Community, international partners and Haitian stakeholders, while preparing transitional governance arrangements, including the appointment of a Prime Minister, the formation and official installation of a Cabinet of Ministers, and the approval of the operating methods of the Transitional Presidential Council. The Council has identified as priorities addressing insecurity, supporting the anti-gang operations of the Haitian National Police and strengthening the national security forces. A first meeting of the Council and the new Government was held on 19 June.

3. On 16 April, the members of the Transitional Presidential Council, which had been formally established four days earlier, were officially appointed by order of the Council of Ministers. The voting members are a former Governor of the Central Bank of Haiti, Fritz Alphonse Jean (representing the Montana Group); a former diplomat, Smith Augustin (representing Engagés pour le développement/Résistance démocratique/Compromis historique); a barrister, Emmanuel Vertilaire (representing Pitit Desalin); a former President of the Senate, Edgard Leblanc fils (representing the Collectif des partis politiques du 30 janvier 2023); a former senator, Louis Gérald Gilles (representing the signatories of the agreement of 21 December 2022), a businessperson, Laurent Saint-Cyr, and a former minister, Leslie Voltaire (representing Fanmi Lavalas). The non-voting members are a pastor, Frinel Joseph (representing civil society organizations), and a public administration manager,



Régine Abraham (representing the interfaith community), the only woman on the Transitional Presidential Council. The Council of Ministers also indicated in the order that the Transitional Presidential Council, which would be presided over by one of its members, chosen by consensus or alternatively by a majority of the members, is to hand over power to a democratically elected president by 7 February 2026.

4. In line with the 11 March outcome declaration, the Prime Minister, Ariel Henry, formally resigned in a letter to the Council of Ministers on 24 April. In an order issued on the same day, the Council appointed the Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance, Michel Patrick Boisvert, interim Prime Minister until the process of selecting a new Prime Minister was completed.

5. On 25 April, the Transitional Presidential Council was inaugurated in Port-au-Prince. On 30 April, four stakeholder groups (Engagés pour le développement/Résistance démocratique/Compromis historique, the signatories of the agreement of 21 December 2022, Pitit Desalin and the Collectif des partis politiques du 30 janvier 2023) announced the formation of the Bloc majoritaire indissoluble, a majority group within the Transitional Presidential Council. The group selected Mr. Leblanc as coordinator and designated a former Minister of Youth and Sport (2006–2011), Fritz Bélizaire, as their candidate for the position of Prime Minister.

6. In diverging reactions, on 3 May, the stakeholder group representing civil society in the Transitional Presidential Council acknowledged the decision to appoint Mr. Leblanc as coordinator and designate Mr. Bélizaire as nominee for the position of Prime Minister, while also advocating unity among Council members. The Montana Group and Fanmi Lavalas portrayed the official formation of a majority bloc within the Council as a divisive act aimed at eroding the consensus-building approach enshrined in the Accord politique pour une transition pacifique et ordonnée (Political agreement for a peaceful and orderly transition), signed on 3 April, and called for transparency in selecting the Prime Minister. A number of civil society groups and political platforms not represented on the Council reiterated their alternative proposal for the designation of a judge from the Court of Cassation to lead the transition until elections are held.

7. On 7 May, the Transitional Presidential Council adopted a resolution requiring a qualified majority of five of the seven voting members for significant Council decisions, in lieu of consensus. That rule governed the subsequent selection of the Prime Minister and Cabinet of Ministers, and will be used to appoint members of the provisional electoral council, directors general and senior officials. The Transitional Presidential Council agreed that the presidency would rotate every five months among four of its members, from 7 May 2024 until 7 February 2026, when an elected President is expected to be sworn in.

8. The Transitional Presidential Council initiated a search for candidates for the position of Prime Minister and received over 100 applications between 13 and 17 May. All candidates had to provide a certificate of good conduct, a tax declaration and a wealth declaration certificate within 30 days, as well as a statement of support by political parties or civil society organizations adhering to the Political agreement of 3 April. On 28 May, following hearings of the five shortlisted candidates, all men, the Council selected Garry Conille as Prime Minister. The six voting members present all voted in favour. While some political groups expressed concern over what they termed a lack of transparency in the selection process, other stakeholders from across the spectrum welcomed the appointment of Mr. Conille as an impartial and competent figure qualified to lead the country to elections. A number of women's organizations, including the Alliance des Organisations de la Société Civile pour la Paix et l'Autonomisation des Femmes Haïtiennes (Alliance of Civil Society Organizations for Peace and the Empowerment of Haitian Women) (AOSCPAFH), the Fédération

des Organisations de Femmes pour l'Égalité des Droits Humains (Federation of Women's Organizations for Equal Human Rights) (FEDOFEDH) and the Comité de Suivi du Dialogue Inter-Femme (Committee for the Monitoring of Women's Dialogue) denounced the continuing exclusion of women from the political process and called for the implementation of the constitutional minimum of a 30 per cent quota for women in public service, including within the new Cabinet, the directorates general of the public administration, and the diplomatic service.

9. In a video message issued on 30 May, Mr. Conille stated his commitment to working with the Transitional Presidential Council to swiftly form a new Government and complete the establishment of the transitional arrangements set out in the Political agreement of 3 April, including the appointment of a new provisional electoral council. While calling for national cohesion and unity, he encouraged women and experienced young professionals to participate in the political process and support the work of the transitional authorities. On 11 June, the Cabinet of 14 ministers, including 4 women, was appointed through an order published in the Official Gazette.

10. On 16 May, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti and Head of BINUH discussed Security Council resolution [2699 \(2023\)](#) with the Transitional Presidential Council. In that resolution, the Security Council had authorized the deployment of the Multinational Security Support mission and advocated increased participation of women and youth in the political process. BINUH, in cooperation with the Volontariat pour le Développement d'Haiti (Volunteering Service for the Development of Haiti), facilitated a series of consultations between Haitian civil society organizations on ways to strengthen the work of the non-voting members of the Transitional Presidential Council on issues related to political inclusion, national dialogue and elections.

11. On 14 June, Mr. Conille and the Special Representative discussed the country's situation and the continued provision of United Nations support to the transitional authorities. Mr. Conille highlighted the importance of aligning United Nations support with the priorities defined by the Government to ensure national ownership.

III. Violence reduction

Community violence reduction programme

12. The interinstitutional and interministerial task force dedicated to the implementation of the national strategy for disarmament, disengagement, reintegration and community violence reduction consulted its technical secretariat and thematic working groups to finalize a policy paper for the newly established Transitional Presidential Council. In the document, the task force highlighted the need to strengthen its capacity to develop a national policy on public security, including weapons and ammunition management, and a nationally owned action plan.

13. The task force contributed to the drafting of a Peacebuilding Fund project on community violence reduction. The project was implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Children's Fund, with technical assistance from BINUH. The project supported the participation of a representative of the Ministry of the Interior in the 2024 Symposium on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, held in Geneva from 3 to 7 June. The Symposium provided opportunities for networking, knowledge sharing with other country settings, improving best practices and fostering collaboration for enhanced peacebuilding support.

14. On 26 April, Haiti submitted its national report on the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. Furthermore, Haiti participated in the fourth Review Conference of the Programme of Action and the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (the International Tracing Instrument), hosted by the Office of Disarmament Affairs from 18 to 28 June. BINUH continues to support national authorities in the implementation of regional priorities outlined in the Road Map for Implementing the Caribbean Priority Actions on the Illicit Proliferation of Firearms and Ammunition across the Caribbean in a Sustainable Manner by 2030 (the Caribbean Firearms Road Map).

IV. Security and the rule of law

Security

15. Gang violence continues to plague Haiti. Seemingly coordinated gang attacks have primarily targeted communes in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and key government infrastructure, forcing tens of thousands of residents to abandon their homes. Gang violence hampers the functioning of vital sectors, including security, education, health, culture and transport. Against that backdrop, government authorities extended the state of emergency across the West Department, including a night-time curfew, in effect since 3 March.

16. The number of intentional homicides has risen significantly. From January to May 2024, BINUH recorded 3,252 intentional homicides, including 361 women, 10 girls and 42 boys, compared with 2,453 victims in the previous five-month period (August–December 2023). The number of abductions was 971 from January to May 2024; the victims included 342 women, 13 girls and 13 boys. The main perpetrators are gang members operating in metropolitan Port-au-Prince and the Artibonite Department. Killings by vigilante or so-called “self-defence” groups and individuals have continued, with 140 alleged gang members slain so far this year.

17. Gangs have begun to attack cargo ships off the coast of Port-au-Prince. On 4 April, an armed robbery and hijacking of a rice cargo ship forced international shipping companies to reduce operations drastically. Gangs have used speedboats of higher capacity than the Haitian coastguard’s fleet of vessels, only four of which remain operational. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and a bilateral partner are providing boats, tactical and operational equipment, and a training package to enhance the capabilities of the Haitian coastguard. On 22 April, gangs blocked access to the Varreux oil terminal for two weeks until the police regained control, allowing fuel supply activities to resume on 5 May. Those incidents, along with the suspension of air traffic in Port-au-Prince from 4 March to 20 May, and the further consolidation of gang control over the main access roads to the capital, have worsened shortages of essential goods, affecting the daily lives of millions of Haitians.

18. National authorities and security forces have strengthened security around Toussaint Louverture International Airport, including the demolition of over 350 unlicensed dwellings for safety reasons. The enhanced security posture at the airport allowed for the resumption of domestic and international air traffic on 20 May following a 10-week hiatus.

19. Gangs have stepped up their use of social media to spread fear in communities. Although some gang leaders have openly claimed to be interested in dialogue and negotiation, they have also threatened to escalate violent attacks once the

Multinational Security Support mission is deployed. In a 28 May interview, the President of the Transitional Presidential Council strongly rejected any notion of negotiating with gangs or granting them amnesty, and urged their members to lay down weapons or face justice. Gangs have reportedly paid communities to keep residents from fleeing and potentially serve as a protective buffer during police operations.

20. On 5 April, during a joint operation at the Cap-Haïtien port terminal, the Haitian National Police and the customs authority seized 12 assault rifles, 14 pistols and 1,000 rounds of ammunition originating from the United States of America. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime is supporting the establishment, training, and equipping of control-unit teams composed of national customs and police personnel to be deployed in Port-au-Prince (West Department), Cap-Haïtien (North Department), Ouanaminthe (Northeast Department), Anse-à-Pitre (South Department), and Belladère (Central Department) as part of its border control support project. These units aim to target, screen and inspect high-risk containers, cargo and travellers.

21. During an assessment visit to Haiti between 20 to 25 May, a delegation from Kenya met with the Transitional Presidential Council and the leadership of the Haitian National Police on the operationalization of the Multinational Security Support mission. In its discussion with the delegation, BINUH noted the need for the mission to establish a communications strategy together with Haitian authorities, as well as a coordination mechanism that includes the United Nations and other partners.

Police

22. The Haitian National Police, with the support of the Armed Forces of Haiti, has continued to secure critical infrastructure, conducted anti-gang operations and maintained deterrent policing measures. The National Police faces operational limitations and a lack of adequately specialized personnel, which hinders its capability to effectively address all gang attacks and regain authority over gang-controlled neighbourhoods, including the communes of Carrefour, Croix-des-Bouquets and Gressier, and the communities of Solino and Fort-National, all in the West Department.

23. In April and May, 8 police officers, including 1 woman, were killed by gangs, with 20 officers killed since the beginning of the year. At least eight attacks on operational police infrastructure have been reported. On 10 and 11 May, in the commune of Gressier (West Department), gangs set the police station on fire. In April and May, gangs demolished three police stations and the Cabaret prison in the West Department using heavy machinery, and attempted to demolish two other police stations and the Croix-des-Bouquets prison, rendering them inoperable. As at 30 May, 47 of the 156 police installations in the West Department were non-operational due to gang attacks and violence. Of the overall fleet of 47 armoured vehicles, only 20 were operational, with 10 permanently out of use as result of gang violence. International partners and the Government are currently working to purchase and deliver additional vehicles and spare parts. In May, a major shipment of 4,000 items, including personal protective equipment, was delivered as part of the joint programme to support the professionalization of the Haitian National Police, also known as the basket fund.

24. As at 30 May, the Haitian National Police had 12,164 officers, including 1,464 women, representing a loss of 1,032 officers, including 133 women, since 1 January. That loss was mainly due to post abandonment, death or dismissal. However, the size of the force will be boosted by the 786 officers, including 109 women, of the thirty-third class of the National Police School in Port-au-Prince, who graduated on 11 March

and are pending final deployment. Multiple gang attacks on the School have impacted the recruitment process for the thirty-fourth class, with several postponements of the medical test for candidates, which was launched at the end of May.

Corrections

25. With 3 prisons demolished by gangs, the ongoing surge in seemingly coordinated gang violence has led to disruptions in activities and supply processes for the remaining 16 functional prisons. In response, the Prison Administration Directorate has introduced a new procedure to decentralize food supplies. That measure has resulted in increased costs, delaying responses to the critical food situation. The scarcity of cleaning supplies in the country has further worsened health conditions in prisons.

26. As at 19 June, Haitian prisons housed 7,506 inmates, including 400 women, 232 boys and 16 girls, for an occupancy rate of 295 per cent. Since the escape of an estimated 4,600 detainees on 2 March, after gangs attacked the National Penitentiary and the Croix-des-Bouquets prison, detainees in other prisons have also attempted to escape. On 28 April, detainees attempted to escape from the Hinche civil prison in the Central Department, but were apprehended by police, who came to the aid of prison security officers. On 3 May, approximately 30 detainees escaped from the Port-de-Paix civil prison in the North-West Department. At least 9 detainees were killed, and 15 detainees and 6 security officers were injured, during those events.

27. The General Inspectorate of the Haitian National Police opened an investigation into the escape of detainees from the National Penitentiary and the Croix-des-Bouquets prison, both of which are in Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, and sent a preliminary report to the Port-au-Prince Public Prosecutor's Office. The escape was facilitated by gang attacks on 2 March. While an investigation report has yet to be finalized by the Public Prosecutor, the police, on 6 May, released an initial list of approximately 100 prison escapees deemed highly dangerous and announced that it would make a concerted effort to arrest them.

28. The problem of overcrowding has worsened sharply in several prisons. A detention centre meant to accommodate only minors now houses 221 adults, in addition to 90 minors. Among those adults are 84 women detainees from the Cabaret civil prison, which was closed due to persistent gang attacks in June 2023; 64 new female women detainees; and 74 men who were relocated from the National Penitentiary after the gang-led prison break in March. The centre is struggling to provide enough food and medicine. On 30 April, the Public Prosecutor's Office released nine prisoners from the Les Cayes prison on humanitarian grounds, to help relieve overcrowding. On 28 May, 18 detainees at the Fort Liberté prison were also released after serving more than six months in prison for minor offences.

Justice

29. The strike by court clerks for better working conditions, which began in December, ended on 27 May. That decision was taken by the Association Nationale des Greffiers Haïtiens (National Association of Haitian Court Clerks) following the offer, by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, of a partial solution to the clerks' grievances. The heightened insecurity since early March has exacerbated the dysfunction of the courts in the capital, as law officers are unable to reach judicial premises. Despite difficult conditions, the Port-au-Prince Public Prosecutor has established an emergency team to visit accessible police stations to release individuals who are in irregular detention or have been detained for minor offences. The Ministry of Justice and Public Security has assigned 10 prosecutors to the anti-gang unit of the Port-au-Prince Prosecutor's Office. The United Nations is developing a series of

online and on-site training sessions for these prosecutors and related specialized units of the Haitian National Police.

30. On 23 April, a judge of the district court in Pilate, North Department, was assassinated on his way to work. The crime was condemned by the High Council of the Judiciary, the Office of the Ombudsperson, and professional associations of law officers. On 13 May, a judge in L'Estère (Artibonite Department) was also assassinated. The perpetrators of those crimes are yet to be identified and detained.

31. Investigations continue into the misappropriation of equipment at the Government's National Equipment Centre. On 22 April, a former provisional President, Jocelerme Privert, was questioned by an investigative judge for his alleged involvement in the misappropriation of materials. On 2 May, the judge questioned, and ordered the detention of, the Secretary-General of the Senate for her alleged involvement in corruption. She was released on 9 May after being detained in a police facility.

32. As part of the implementation of the project for a model jurisdiction in the area of sexual and gender-based violence, UNDP established a monitoring committee comprising representatives of public institutions and civil society, with the collaboration of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) and BINUH. An initial meeting was organized on 2 May with authorities in Cap-Haïtien, the designated location for the model jurisdiction. A process is under way to strengthen the jurisdiction, including by increasing the number of legal assistants assigned to gender-based violence cases.

V. Human rights

33. Amid deteriorating security, human rights abuses have persisted at alarmingly high levels. Documented abuses include targeted killings, mass rapes, kidnappings, the forced recruitment, exploitation and trafficking of children by gangs, and the intentional destruction of facilities operated by social service providers. The escalation of violence has hindered the functioning of institutions dedicated to the rule of law, as well as the efforts of civil society organizations working in human rights, dramatically reducing the judiciary's ability to offer recourse to victims. Collectively, these dynamics have created a dire humanitarian crisis, leaving countless individuals dead, orphaned, injured, displaced, food insecure, unemployed or in severe psychological distress.

34. Local populations have been the victims of gang-related human rights abuses, primarily in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince and along the coastal areas to the north and south of the capital, as well as in the small villages located along Departmental Road 11 and National Road 1 in the Artibonite Department. While there has been a lull in inter-gang confrontations, a steep rise in the frequency of clashes between gangs and the police since March has led to more people being killed or injured by stray bullets while carrying out their daily activities. During these clashes, people have been killed while walking to school or work. The victims have included very young girls. Other people have been hit and killed by stray bullets while at home. In addition, several killings of unarmed people by specialized police units on patrol in armoured vehicles have been reported. In some instances, police officers have stopped passers-by, interrogated them and then killed them on the spot or in nearby landfill sites.

35. In the Artibonite Department, small villages have repeatedly been attacked by groups of gang members shooting sporadically, looting buildings and kidnapping people in their homes. Targeted killings by gangs have also been recorded. Threats and attacks against human rights defenders, journalists and State officials have

continued. In April and May, at least four law officers and lawyers were killed and another kidnapped in the Artibonite and North Departments.

36. Public fear of the spread of gang activity has continued to drive the establishment of so-called “self-defence groups”, as well as increases in the number of vigilante killings, in the West and Artibonite Departments. While “self-defence groups” tend to present themselves as protectors of the population in the absence of the police, some have a similar *modus operandi* to gangs. In several instances, people have been publicly executed by “self-defence groups” without due process, because they were allegedly affiliated with gangs.

37. Kidnappings have remained prevalent, particularly in the Artibonite Department, where mass kidnappings of people travelling along main roads on public transport are common. Victims are subjected to further abuse, including rape and other forms of sexual violence, while in captivity. Some are tortured and subjected to horrific burn injuries. Videos of the abuses are shared by gang members on social media, reportedly to force the victims’ family members to pay a ransom. In instances where families are unable to pay the ransom, hostages have been killed. Kidnapping victims who resist are also systematically killed.

38. Young women and girls continue to be victims of sexual violence, including collective rape, perpetrated by gang members, often as a tactic to spread fear, extort money, gain power and punish the population. The proliferation of small arms is fuelling the high rates of sexual and gender-based violence. Women and girls are at risk of being ambushed and raped in broad daylight on their way to work or school. There are reports of victims who have been mutilated or killed after being raped. Gang members have forced women and girls into exploitative sexual relationships and threatened to kill them if they refuse. Internally displaced women and girls are at particular risk of being subjected to sexual violence. Overall, sexual violence remains greatly underreported due to stigma, fear of retaliation, lack of access to services and lack of trust in the justice system. Impunity is the norm. To prevent and mitigate the impact of sexual violence, BINUH is supporting three community-based organizations with awareness-raising initiatives for at-risk women and girls in sites for internally displaced people. One of these organizations is also helping survivors through the provision of individual counselling, support to service providers, and cash assistance. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and BINUH, with bilateral support, launched a two-year programme with the Haitian National Police on 8 May, in order to strengthen the National Police’s office for the coordination of women’s affairs and its judicial units to combat sexual violence committed by gangs.

39. BINUH has received reports that gangs are trafficking and recruiting more children, and increasing the number of children carrying weapons, likely in anticipation of the deployment of the Multinational Security Support mission. Gangs are also allegedly motivated to leverage potential incidents against children involving mission personnel in order to undermine the presence of those personnel in Haiti. In April and May, eight schools were looted and/or burned in the Port-au-Prince, Gressier and Croix-des-Bouquets communes. In mid-May, at least one school was forced to halt classes and send children home due to intense gunfire by gangs nearby. BINUH remains concerned about the lack of State-run or international programmes to receive and support children seeking to leave gangs, as well as about the severely limited capacity of the judiciary to provide access to justice for children.

40. People’s socioeconomic rights are also threatened as result of the insecurity caused by gang violence. On 21 April, three street merchants, including one woman, were killed by gang members. Community marketplaces, churches and more than one hundred homes have been looted or destroyed by gangs. Key informal economic

centres, such as the capital's Croix-des-Bossales market, once the largest market in the country, remain non-functional as a result of gang violence, severely reducing economic opportunities for the vast majority of people. At illegal gang-run checkpoints along main roads, victims are required to hand over large sums of cash to continue on their journey. These factors, combined with frequent attacks on main roads, severely limit free movement and economic activity.

Impunity

41. Accountability for past human rights violations and abuses, and other serious crimes, remains limited. No progress has been made in the cases of the massacres committed in Grand Ravine in 2017, La Saline in 2018 and Bel Air in 2019, or in the case of any mass killing committed since 2021. Marginal progress has been made in investigating infractions by public officials. On 2 May, the Secretary-General of the Senate was detained for the alleged mismanagement of parliamentary funds and, on 9 May, a former senator of the Artibonite Department was questioned in connection with the same case. Additionally, on 3 May, a former senator of the Central Department was referred to a criminal court, along with seven other individuals, to be tried for the murder of a journalist in October 2019.

Police oversight

42. Between 17 April and 21 May 2024, the General Inspectorate opened 49 investigations concerning 55 police officers, including 6 cases of alleged human rights violations. During the same period, nine investigations were concluded and two administrative measures were taken. No cases were referred for criminal prosecution. The offices of the General Inspectorate have been closed since 3 March due to continued gang activity in the area. The closure adversely affects the performance of the General Inspectorate.

VI. Women and peace and security

43. The limited participation and representation of women in political life has continued during the current political process. National stakeholders, including civil society groups and women's organizations, criticized the exclusion of women from the new transitional arrangements, with only one woman in the Transitional Presidential Council, and the exclusion of all women candidates from the shortlist for the position of Prime Minister. However, the new Cabinet of Ministers appointed on 11 June included four women, two of whom were in key ministerial positions; those appointments were a positive step towards the application of the constitutional minimum of a 30 per cent quota for women in public office.

44. In a note issued on 2 May, the Comité de Suivi du Dialogue Inter-Femme, a multi-stakeholder forum that advocates for women's empowerment, underscored the importance of including women in the political process, advocating for a democratic, renewed society. The Committee recommended a female former senator and former Minister of Women's Affairs and Rights as a highly qualified candidate for the position of Prime Minister. They emphasized the need for a woman with an extensive background in Haitian public administration and a strong commitment to gender equality to lead the country through the transition.

45. BINUH, UNDP and Quisqueya University launched a project to support women-led dialogue and local conflict-resolution initiatives in neighbourhoods affected by gang violence in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, empowering women as key agents of change and peacebuilders within their communities. Initial activities include stakeholder mapping, community and institutional consultations, and psychosocial

support, with a particular focus on addressing the needs and voices of women and girls as a peacebuilding measure and an incentive for disarmament.

VII. Unemployment and young people and other vulnerable groups

Socioeconomic situation

46. The decline in economic activity over the past five consecutive years has been exacerbated by the current crisis. An economic downturn, with a projected decline of 3 per cent in gross domestic product, is expected during the fiscal year 2024, which ends in September. Cumulative fiscal revenue could be lower than in the fiscal year 2023. Inflation is on an upward trend, reaching 26.7 per cent in March. The supply-side shock caused in recent months by the protracted deterioration of the security situation could continue to fuel inflationary pressures in fiscal year 2024 and worsen the hunger crisis. Haitian economists further anticipate that, in addition to existing macroeconomic imbalances, disruptions in supply chains for essential goods and the widespread destruction of infrastructure may lead to an even greater growth contraction of 5 per cent in 2024 and push inflation rates to over 30 per cent in the second quarter of the year compared with the same period in 2023, potentially resulting in stagflation.

47. The closure of the international airport to commercial aviation and the cessation of port calls by major shipping companies from early March onwards caused major supply chain disruptions. Both the port and the airport resumed operations in the second half of May. The Government of Haiti met the cost of relocating families residing in properties in the vicinity of the airport, to expand the security buffer area and prevent further gang attacks.

48. The multidimensional crisis is a setback to the textile and apparel industry, Haiti's main export sector. Trade data on United States imports indicate a drop of more than 25 per cent between March 2023 and March 2024, due to the insecurity and uncertainty that crippled day-to-day operations. The extent of job losses is worrying. According to data from the Better Work programme, a collaborative partnership between the International Finance Corporation and the International Labour Organization, there was a 61 per cent reduction in the number of formal jobs in the country's garment industry between September 2023 and mid-March 2024. Factories in Port-au-Prince are operating at only 75 per cent capacity, among them 30 textile production sites, 65 per cent of whose workforce is women.

49. Remittances reached the level of \$318.9 million in March 2024, an increase of 10.8 per cent compared with the same month in 2023, an indication of the acuteness of the crisis. In its assessment of the budget for fiscal year 2023, for example, the International Monetary Fund stated that the budget's implementation had so far been consistent with the staff-monitored programme's objective of reducing monetary financing of the budget deficit. As a result, in March 2024, the duration of the staff-monitored programme was extended until September 2024. Similarly, the Central Bank of Haiti has continued to perform to high standards despite enormous challenges.

50. To limit the spread of the effects of the near collapse of the health sector in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, the World Health Organization and other members of the Health Cluster prioritized mitigating measures such as mobile clinics and emergency multi-purpose health kits, primarily aimed at saving lives. At the departmental level, emergency supplies were used to ensure that service continuity was maintained in functioning facilities.

Social protection and food security

51. The latest Integrated Food Security Phase Classification results show that the country's food security has deteriorated, with the worst results recorded since 2010. About half of those analysed (4.97 million people) face acute insecurity, with 1.65 million at emergency levels (phase 4 of the Classification). The results of the latest Integrated Food Security Phase Classification acute malnutrition analysis, conducted by the United Nations Children's Fund and its partners, reveal that 276,136 children aged from 6 to 59 months are likely to suffer from acute malnutrition by the end of 2024, an increase of 10 per cent compared with initial projections.

52. Since the resurgence of violence at the end of February, as part of its support for the implementation of the National Policy for Social Protection and Social Promotion, the World Food Programme has provided support to the most vulnerable groups by distributing hot meals and making cash-based transfers in the Grand'Anse, Artibonite and South-East Departments, as well as for over 95,000 internally displaced persons at 80 sites in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. A total of 63 per cent of social cash transfer recipients are women. Over the past two months, the use of Cap-Haïtien as an alternative logistical hub has enabled the arrival of 108 tons of urgently needed medical products and non-food items for life-saving humanitarian assistance in the country. The Madan Sara vendors, who are pillars of domestic trade in Haiti, have been particularly affected by the security crisis.

VIII. Basic social service delivery and resilience

Humanitarian needs and access to basic services

53. The 2024 Humanitarian Response Plan is only 23.3 per cent funded. The security situation in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince has triggered massive movements of internally displaced persons; as a result, there were 578,074 such persons across the country in June. Data from the Displacement Tracking Matrix of the International Organization for Migration show that between 8 March and mid-April, 94,821 people left the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. The majority, 58 per cent, headed towards the southern departments (Grand'Anse, Sud, Nippes and Sud-Est), adding to the 116,000 people who had fled there in recent months. Nearly 40 per cent of the internally displaced persons were individuals who had never previously fled their residences. Some 35 of the 85 active sites for such persons are schools. As a result, the facilities are at risk of further degradation and tensions have been created between host communities and internally displaced persons. Decent, sustainable employment opportunities and equal access to basic services are needed to prevent further tensions.

54. Forced returns are continuing from the United States, the Dominican Republic and several neighbouring Caribbean islands, with a significant negative impact on Haitians in need of international protection. In addition, according to the Global Trends Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, by the end of 2023, there were 122,150 recognized refugees and 228,450 asylum-seekers from Haiti worldwide, 97 per cent of them in the Americas.

55. Attacks on and looting of health centres in the capital have increased fears that the overall health system will collapse. Four main health centres were attacked in March and April 2024, leaving just two of the country's five public hospitals operational. Power outages, and shortages of medical supplies and health-care workers, 40,000 of whom have left the country, according to estimates by members of the Health Cluster, are also impacting overall hospital capacity. As a result, the availability of, and access to, health care has been severely compromised. In the Port-

au-Prince metropolitan area, as of June, only 18 per cent of health institutions were functional, while 37 per cent were working at reduced capacity and 45 per cent were no longer functional.

56. While the number of cholera cases continues to decrease in most departments, the Artibonite and Centre Departments still face numerous outbreaks. In anticipation of the rainy season, the Pan American Health Organization and the World Health Organization are leading efforts for the early detection of cholera and other potentially epidemic diseases across the country, especially in the sites for internally displaced persons in the West Department.

57. Vulnerable women and children need greater face-to-face assistance and protection services than other groups. Rising poverty levels have increased the risks of sexual exploitation and abuse, and of negative coping mechanisms such as transactional sex. A total of 1,500 cases of gender-based violence were reported in March, six times higher than the 250 cases reported in January and February, with 94 per cent of cases concerning girls and women; 78 per cent of cases were among internally displaced persons, the majority of whom lived in host communities. Despite those trends, access by survivors of rape to medical assistance within 72 hours increased from 3 per cent in January to 25 per cent in March.

58. Access to education is also compromised by persistent attacks on schools and preventive school closures. Some 141 schools risk temporary closure. Extended school closures remain a concern and can exacerbate existing educational disparities, further marginalizing already vulnerable populations, such as girls and children with disabilities.

IX. Operating environment

59. The significant deterioration in the security situation following the coordinated gang attacks on communities and critical infrastructure has reshaped the operating environment for BINUH and the United Nations Country Team. BINUH has faced considerable logistical and security challenges in meeting its mandate implementation requirements. The international airport in Port-au-Prince was non-operational for 10 weeks, disrupting the supply chain as well as the main form of transportation into and out of the country.

60. For security reasons, and because of the suspension of flights to and from Toussaint Louverture airport, international United Nations personnel performing non-life-saving activities continued to be relocated outside Port-au-Prince. The United Nations footprint in the capital was reduced to a skeleton team of 72 personnel from 13 April and subsequently raised to 85 personnel on 1 June, following the partial resumption of flights by domestic and international airlines. Some United Nations personnel have been able to relocate, and continue to perform their functions from Cap-Haïtien and other cities where United Nations offices and operations are available, although such availability is limited. With no presence outside Port-au-Prince, relocated BINUH personnel have been working remotely.

X. Paragraph 19 of Security Council resolution 2699 (2023)

61. In its resolution [2699 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council authorized Member States that have notified the Secretary-General of their participation to form and deploy a Multinational Security Support mission for an initial period of 12 months, ending on 2 October 2024. In paragraph 19 of the resolution, the Secretary-General is requested, as part of his regular reporting to the Council, to provide recommendations on the

possible adaptation of the mandate of the mission or its transformation as needed, no later than nine months following the resolution's adoption; 2 July 2024 will mark nine months since the resolution was adopted.

62. The objectives of the mandate of the Multinational Security Support mission, outlined in resolution 2699 (2023), are to support the efforts of the Haitian National Police to re-establish security and build security conditions conducive to holding free and fair elections; to provide operational support to the National Police, including by building its capacity through the planning and conduct of joint security support operations, with a view to countering gangs and improving security conditions; and to provide support to the National Police for the provision of security for critical infrastructure sites and transit locations, such as the airport, ports, schools, hospitals and key intersections. Furthermore, any United Nations support to the mission, including but not limited to the provision of the logistical support packages referred to in resolution 2699 (2023), requires the application of the United Nations human rights due diligence policy to ensure that the security support that the mission provides to the National Police is consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, and the Organization's responsibility to respect, promote and encourage respect for international human rights and refugee law.

63. Since the Security Council authorized Member States to form and deploy the Multinational Security Support mission, there has been a significant increase in insecurity, armed gang violence and criminal activities, resulting in human rights abuses. That escalation has further undermined the peace, stability and security of Haiti and the region. Coordinated gang attacks on critical infrastructure since February, coupled with the ongoing reduction in the strength and capabilities of the Haitian National Police, have increasingly undermined the Government's ability to respond adequately to the security challenges posed by gangs. The increased violence has resulted in a surge in the number of people affected and in need of humanitarian assistance. The number of victims of violence, especially sexual and gender-based violence, is rising at an alarming rate. Since 29 February, more than 90,000 people have been forced to move within Port-au-Prince, while nearly 95,000 others have left the metropolitan area for other parts of the country. The provision of basic human services, including health and sanitation, is greatly impeded.

64. Despite being a primary target of gang attacks, the Haitian National Police has continued to conduct anti-gang operations, but is facing major difficulties in retaining territorial control and containing gang expansion. At least 80 per cent of Port-au-Prince is no longer under the control of the Haitian authorities. Moreover, high rates of attrition in the National Police continue, due to resignations, disciplinary actions against officers and fatalities in the line of duty.

65. The ensuing deterioration of security has reaffirmed the urgent need for the international community to provide the National Police with more support. That support should include operational assistance, particularly in the planning and conduct of joint security operations. However, it should be emphasized that the primary responsibility for providing security, ensuring stability and upholding the rule of law rests with the Government of Haiti. Improved security is also required urgently for the continuation of the inter-Haitian dialogue and the creation of conditions conducive to the holding of elections.

66. On 3 May, the President of the Transitional Presidential Council wrote to the President of Kenya, William Ruto, expressing gratitude for that country's solidarity and endorsing the Memorandum of Understanding on police and security, signed on 1 March by Haiti and Kenya. Kenya, the lead nation of the Multinational Security Support mission, is preparing for the deployment of police contingents. On 21 June, Kenya informed the Security Council of its intention to deploy contingents

imminently and provided highlights of the concept of operations for the mission. On 25 June, the first contingent of Kenyan police officers arrived in Port-au-Prince.

67. During the consultations between BINUH and the Transitional Presidential Council on 16 May, and between BINUH and the caretaker Government on 14 May, national authorities shared the view that BINUH should be part of a coordination support entity in the context of the deployment of the Multinational Security Support mission. They also raised the different types of security needs and the expectation for the mission to play a supporting role with regard to the National Police. They emphasized the importance of wastewater management and other environmental controls. National authorities highlighted the importance of a pre-deployment screening system to prevent the introduction of communicable diseases to Haiti. During its engagement with a delegation of Kenyan officials conducting a scoping mission to Port-au-Prince on 24 May, BINUH stated that, together with the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Government of Haiti, it was preparing a proposal for the establishment of a mechanism for coordination among Haitian authorities, the mission and the United Nations.

68. The conclusion drawn from the current context and from consultation with national authorities is that the mandate of the Multinational Security Support mission authorized in resolution [2699 \(2023\)](#) remains valid and will remain necessary beyond October 2024. The mandated tasks of re-establishing security in Haiti and creating security conditions conducive to the holding of free and fair elections will require continuous deployment, at least until the restoration of democratically elected authorities, expected no later than 7 February 2026, in accordance with the Decree of the Council of Ministers of 12 April 2024 on the establishment of the Transitional Presidential Council.

69. A small number of Member States have contributed to the trust fund on the Multinational Security Support mission, a key source of funding for the mission's operations. Member States have deposited \$21 million, including \$1.24 million already disbursed to reimburse the pre-deployment training of Kenyan police officers. An additional \$118 million has been pledged. Direct bilateral contributions to countries contributing uniformed personnel serve as another source of funding for the mission. One Member State has pledged \$300 million, primarily intended for logistical and operational support. Those contributions and pledges are welcome, but they remain insufficient by a considerable margin. Significant additional efforts by international partners are required to fulfil the budgetary and operational needs of the mission and ensure its continuous deployment for the duration of the political transition in Haiti. Such efforts are crucial to preventing the departure or transformation of the mission while conditions on the ground remain unconducive to peacekeeping. The robust use of force by a specialized multinational police presence, supported by military assets and supplemented by a range of non-kinetic measures, will remain necessary until the Haitian National Police is able to restore a measurable level of security. Without substantial additional funding, the mission will be unable to complete a 12-month deployment.

70. Concerning the Security Council's request, in paragraph 10 of its resolution [2699 \(2023\)](#), for the Multinational Security Support mission to establish a robust compliance mechanism, parts of the United Nations have provided advice and expertise to the mission on the best practices and processes that the mission can establish to comply with international human rights and with international standards of conduct and discipline, including in relation to the prevention of, and response to, sexual exploitation and abuse. The advice has been predominantly technical and has taken the form of outlining practical steps that the mission should take in order to integrate human rights into the training for, and planning and conduct of, its operations, and to create mechanisms to address disciplinary and accountability

issues. If requested by Member States in accordance with resolution [2699 \(2023\)](#), the United Nations could provide the mission with dedicated and substantive technical support in relation to the multiple aspects of compliance, following deployment, and in relation to the consistent and continuous implementation of the compliance mechanism of the mission, to minimize the risks of human rights violations in the planning and conduct of operations.

XI. Sexual exploitation and abuse

71. During the reporting period, BINUH registered no allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, with or without associated paternity and child support claims, involving its personnel or those from previous United Nations missions. However, an investigation completed during the reporting period revealed that acts of sexual exploitation and abuse had been committed in relation to other allegations involving a former civilian staff member of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, initially reported in 2022.

XII. Observations

72. I welcome the designation by the Transitional Presidential Council of a new Prime Minister. I am encouraged by the steady progress in the establishment of the transitional governance arrangements, and I call on all Haitian stakeholders to work together to restore democratic institutions through the holding of elections. I underscore the importance of ensuring an inclusive political transition in Haiti, including the appointment of women to decision-making positions. I urge Haitian stakeholders and authorities to take concrete steps to increase women's participation and leadership in political and public life, in order to ensure that women's voices and concerns are adequately represented during the current crisis and beyond. I urge all national stakeholders to set aside their differences through dialogue, and to act in the exclusive interest of the people of Haiti to build a stable and prosperous future.

73. We continue to witness the sharp erosion of State authority and the rule of law in Haiti, driven by gang attacks on communities and critical infrastructure. Brutal gang violence affects every aspect of public and private life. I remain deeply concerned about the extreme vulnerability of the population, including the shocking impact of gang violence on women and girls. I strongly condemn the extreme violence perpetrated by gangs, and express my deep condolences to and continued solidarity with the people of Haiti, who deserve to live in security and stability, and free from the threat of violence. Those committing human rights abuses must be held accountable for their crimes, including those associated with sexual and gender-based violence.

74. Continued progress in building strong democratic institutions, protecting human rights and achieving sustainable development and economic growth depends on a drastic improvement in the security situation. Solutions to the current crisis must be Haitian-owned and -led, but international support to bolster the capacity of the Haitian National Police to tackle the gang threat effectively is urgently required. In line with resolution [2699 \(2023\)](#), I reiterate my appeals to all Member States to ensure that the Multinational Security Support mission receives the financial and logistical support it needs to implement its mandate.

75. Insecurity continues to affect access to health care, notably in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and in the Artibonite Department. Insecurity is having a devastating impact on the lives of children in the country, as they continue to be denied access to education. Children continue to be victims of sexual violence and recruitment by

gangs. I am particularly concerned at the current lack of capacity among national and international actors to handle children involved in gang violence in Haiti. Additionally, there is a significant challenge in determining the age of individuals who are killed or injured during clashes. The stark increase in the number of gender-based violence cases since March is also alarming. In this context, the United Nations and humanitarian partners have stayed and delivered critical assistance in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and other departments.

76. BINUH was established in 2019 with minimal security and logistical resources, on the assumption that political stability would continue and the capacity of the National Police would increase; that assumption has not been borne out. The dramatic deterioration in security in Port-au-Prince has demonstrated the need for the United Nations to be able to adjust its footprint quickly in response to heightened security threats, but also to ensure that adequate numbers of personnel remain on the ground, with the commensurate security measures, to fulfil the mandate of BINUH. An office for BINUH outside the West Department would allow personnel to swiftly relocate to other parts of the country, where they would be able to continue to perform mandate-related tasks. A relocation outside the country, within the subregion, could represent an alternative course of action. As the political process advances, and as security conditions permit, BINUH will need to enhance the performance of its mandated activities in support of the holding of credible, participatory and inclusive elections. In that vein, a strengthened electoral unit would be essential to ensuring that adequate support is provided to national authorities, including the provisional electoral council. A presence outside Port-au-Prince will be necessary in the run-up to, and after, national elections, which are expected in the fourth quarter of 2025. The Secretariat will assess and explore additional arrangements, as necessary, to increase the predictability and availability of air assets for the movement of United Nations personnel, including United Nations police, for casualty evacuation and medical evacuation purposes, and, when needed, for the emergency relocation of United Nations personnel performing non-life-saving activities to mitigate risk during the current period of heightened insecurity.

77. I reiterate my full support for the Caribbean Community, the Organization of American States, regional actors and Member States in their endeavours to support Haiti. I thank the Special Representative and United Nations personnel for their dedicated efforts to support the people of Haiti.

Annex

Available information on cases of gang violence, criminal activities and human rights abuses in Haiti, provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of Security Council resolution [2692 \(2023\)](#)



BINUH Mandate - 2024 Implementation Dashboard

[Figures are inclusive of period covering 1 January to 30 May 2024]

